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Correspondence

Alameda City Council
December 6, 2022

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December 6, 2022
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Alameda City Council
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From: Trish Spencer
To: Lara Weisiger
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Surveillance Technology Ordinance - Item 7-3 Date: Monday, December 5, 2022 5:21:38 PM
Attachments: We sent you safe versions of your files.msg Surveillance Ord 12-5-22.pdf
12-17-19 Minutes.pdf
Coalition SUPPORT - Surveillance Ordinance + FR Ban 12-13-19.pdf ---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Brian Hofer <[email protected]>
Date: Dec 5, 2022 10:29 AM
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Surveillance Technology Ordinance - Item 7-3 To: Trish Spencer <[email protected]>
Cc:

Mimecast Attachment Protection has deemed this file to be safe, but always exercise caution when opening files.

Apologies, I had a typo in your email below.

Brian Hofer
Executive Director
----------------------------------------------
Cell: (510) 303-2871
Twitter personal: @b_haddy
Twitter org: @SecureJustice
Oakland, CA
secure-justice.org

Hofer bio
Donate to Secure Justice
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Brian Hofer <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 10:24 AM
Subject: Surveillance Technology Ordinance - Item 7-3
To: Marilyn Ezzy Ashcraft <[email protected]
>, Malia Vella
<[email protected]>, John Knox White <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>, Nishant Joshi <[email protected]>
Mayor and City Council Members,
Please see our attached letter opposing Item 7-3 on tomorrow's agenda, a proposed surveillance technology ordinance.

Brian Hofer
Executive Director
----------------------------------------------
Cell: (510) 303-2871
Twitter personal: @b_haddy
Twitter org: @SecureJustice
Oakland, CA
secure-justice.org

Hofer bio
Donate to Secure Justice
*Disclaimer: This email may contain confidential and privileged material, including attachments, for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) named above. Please do not review, use, copy, forward, or in any way distribute or disclose the contents of this e-mail including any attachments unless you are the intended recipient(s) named above. If you are not the intended recipient, or authorized to receive this message for the recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message.

December 5, 2022

VIA EMAIL ONLY
Mayor Marilyn Ezzy Ashcraft ([email protected]) Vice Mayor Malia Vella ([email protected])
John Knox White ([email protected])
Tony Daysog ([email protected])
Trisha Herra Spencer ([email protected])
Alameda City Council
Alameda City Hall
2263 Santa Clara Avenue
Alameda, CA 94501

Re: Surveillance Technology Ordinance (Item 7-E) – oppose unless amended

Dear Mayor Ashcraft and City Councilmembers:

We write to comment on Item 7-E, the introduction of an ordinance requiring that city staff seek City Council approval before using and/or acquiring surveillance technology (“STO”). We ask that you vote No, as the harm from enacting such a weak ordinance would negatively impact other jurisdictions working towards meaningful reform around the acquisition and use of surveillance technology at the municipal level, and the ordinance will not lead to greater protections for the civil liberties of Alameda’s residents and visitors

1. Background

First, we want to thank Council Member Knox White (and previously, Vice Mayor Vella) for their now years-long pursuit at bringing Alameda forward as most of its neighbors have done when considering the difficult decisions regarding privacy impacting and potentially civil liberties violating surveillance technologies.

Alameda’s City Council has twice unanimously introduced a surveillance technology vetting framework by referral. Following the path taken by many of your surrounding neighbors like San

1 Believing that the published version was a mistake, we asked the Interim City Manager last week if the correct draft was uploaded. No reply has been received. The uploaded draft references a Use Policy (in the Annual Report definition) but does not actually require a use policy, nor is one defined anywhere. There is no provision regarding a use policy requirement anywhere in the uploaded Ordinance.

Alameda City Council
Surveillance Technology Ordinance
December 5, 2022

Francisco, Berkeley, Oakland, and even BART, the framework is modeled off an ACLU vetting framework that calls for an impact analysis to be performed prior to acquisition or use, so that better informed decisions are made. A proposed use policy is brought forward at the same time, as the two documents work together. Ideally, any red flags raised by the impact analysis will be mitigated by the guardrails in your proposed policy. If the City Council finds that the benefit from using such technology outweighs the costs (as to civil liberties and the taxpayer), then use and/or acquisition may occur.

The framework also calls for ongoing annual reporting, so that the elected leaders and the public can gauge for themselves whether taxpayer funds are being expended wisely, and that no civil liberties harm is occurring. This exercise in up-front vetting occurred somewhat informally recently with the Police Department’s introduction of a use policy for automated license plate readers (“ALPR”) and annual reporting requirement, which Secure Justice collaborated on.

By way of background, Vice Mayor Vella introduced almost the same referral in 2018, which directed staff to return to the City Council with a draft ordinance for consideration. Staff refused.

At that time, there were approximately seven jurisdictions across the country that had enacted similar legislation, including a few in the Bay Area. According to ACLU National, there are now 25+ jurisdictions with such ordinances in operation, with at least two dozen more actively considering similar proposals. California presently has eight such jurisdictions operating under this framework, including the first transit district in the nation (BART), smaller and more comparable jurisdictions like Davis and Berkeley, and larger cities like San Francisco and San Diego.

On December 17, 2019, Council Member Knox White again introduced a referral for among other things, a surveillance technology vetting and facial recognition ban ordinance, following the groundbreaking lead of neighboring San Francisco which just months earlier had become the first entity to ban facial recognition. His referral was supported by the greater Bay Area civil liberties/privacy community (letter enclosed for reference). Dozens of municipalities have since joined San Francisco in banning this harmful and error-prone technology, including Oakland and Berkeley. As the minutes reflect, staff was directed to “strongly consider San Francisco’s” then state-of-the-art ordinance, and further directed to return with a “facial recognition ban ordinance.” (Minutes enclosed for reference). Again, staff refused to follow the Council’s referral by not incorporating the facial recognition ban provision.

If enacted as written, Alameda’s STO will be the worst of the two-dozen similar ordinances in effect. We have not identified a single individual or entity in support of this proposal, which raises the question – why enact a law no one supports? Staff’s opposition (as evidenced by the draft itself), like the civil liberties community, is clear and the harm of enacting such a weak precedent far exceeds any nominal benefit from enacting the STO. We fail to see any upside to adopting the proposal.

Major Identified Deficiencies

First, it is impossible in the short period of time available to identify all the deficiencies in the STO. Secure Justice frequently works with municipalities to help them understand the nuances and real-world impact of this framework, as we have helped craft such legislation, advocated for Alameda City Council
Surveillance Technology Ordinance
December 5, 2022

it, and I have administered it as Chair of the City of Oakland’s Privacy Advisory Commission.

These conversations typically take anywhere from 1-2.5 years to refine the language before introducing it to the Council for consideration. Most of those conversations have not occurred in Alameda, at least not with the public. It was only a week ago that the draft STO was published online so that we could see it for the first time.

1. Omission of Use Policy Requirement

The largest oversight is fatal to this entire STO having any success in protecting civil liberties – the complete omission of any rules for use of the technology. This takes the term “performative art” to a new level. No other ordinance like this in the country has omitted the use policy requirement, for obvious reasons.

2. Facial Recognition Ban

Alameda’s Police Department ignored your unenforceable policy statement not to use facial recognition, as we warned you back in 2019 when the Council failed to enact the ban by ordinance2. Staff is again refusing to do as you directed and did not draft the facial recognition ban provision. The City Council must re-assert itself as the policy setting body for Alameda.

3. Omission of Critical Findings

Staff may not understand the finer points in the STO due to the turnover that has occurred since the referral was introduced, but many of the provisions are remarkably uniform across the country in the two dozen jurisdictions that have enacted similar measures, and staff was specifically directed to look at San Francisco’s version. We have always made ourselves available if needed to discuss this proposal.

We also know from our limited conversations that staff has looked at the ordinances enacted in San Francisco, Oakland, BART, and Davis. Each of those ordinances contains a finding that must be made by the City Council both during the up-front vetting process, and during the annual reporting review, namely, that the benefits of using the technology outweigh the costs (both to civil liberties, and the taxpayer). As written, the STO is merely a rubber-stamp approval mechanism that gives the public the illusion of meaningful reform, but surely is not.

A primary goal of this oversight and transparency framework is to create a culture of “mindfulness” in the staff, public, and elected leaders, so that greater informed decisions are made via the impact analysis and annual report review, and sufficient guardrails are put into place to protect our civil liberties via the use policy. If the only requirement for approval is the submission of a document requesting approval, that intent of the ordinance will be frustrated and the impact analysis itself will be without any utility, because no privacy-protecting use policy will be crafted.

2 Alameda has previously experienced what might occur when operating via unenforceable policy – although the City Council unanimously rejected the use of facial recognition by way of policy statement, the Police Department ignored that decision by using Clearview AI.

Alameda City Council
Surveillance Technology Ordinance
December 5, 2022

4. Exempts Existing Technology

Unlike the 25+ other jurisdictions, Alameda again would be the sole outlier in exempting all existing technology. This flies in the face of common sense. If you accept the premise that surveillance technology needs to be regulated, then the technology Alameda is presently using must be covered. While we understand that a city of your size will not have the staff capacity of some other jurisdictions, Alameda also has far less technology that would be covered by the STO. The relatively minor “savings” in staff time pale in comparison to the lack of transparency, accountability and public engagement, and the lack of sufficient guardrails in community-crafted use policies could lead to significant legal liability should misconduct occur.

5. Enforcement

While any elected official will be wary of lawsuits, a) the track record from other jurisdictions across the country shows legal action under this model is a statistical rarity, b) the legal fees paid due to lawsuits based upon this ordinance is extremely low, c) and Alameda would again be an outlier (with just a couple others out of the 25+) that omitted the private right of action and attorney fees provision enacted by your Bay Area neighbors and most of the municipalities operating under this model3.

There are no criminal penalties attached to the STO, nor monetary damages (nor in the version we proposed). There will be no rush to the courthouse from plaintiffs’ attorneys looking for quick money, because no such payout is possible here. Because we favor compliance more than lawsuits, we have in the past supported a ‘right-to-cure’ provision in other jurisdictions like BART and San Francisco. Prior to filing a lawsuit, a potential claimant would be required to provide notice to the city of the alleged violation. The city would be given a period of time (e.g., 30 days) to “cure” the violation if substantiated, and notice would be provided from the city (to the extent legally allowable) of the corrective action taken. In this scenario, the private right of action would not arise. If the City ignored the chance to cure, only then upon the expiration of the notice period could a lawsuit commence. Thankfully, this has been quite rare.

Conclusion

We all know the missing component to fixing America’s criminal justice and policing systems – lack of accountability. When our elected leaders fail to assert themselves as the policy setting body that they were elected to be, and when they fail to give important matters the weight of law (and make such laws practically enforceable by all), a signal is sent to the community that the City Council isn’t interested in meaningful reform, nor accountability. If there isn’t a third vote on the City Council to move the needle in the right direction, it’s not worth taxpayer money or staff time to proceed on this item, and your actions will negatively impact the hard work of other jurisdictions on this topic.

3 $3,300 is the largest attorney fees award to date – paid to Secure Justice in ’21 by the City of Berkeley. We have identified only three lawsuits in the entire country against the 25+ municipalities operating under this model since the first ordinance was enacted in 2016.

Alameda City Council
Surveillance Technology Ordinance
December 5, 2022

Acknowledging your staff’s lack of expertise with this model and possible lack of capacity, we would be happy to hold the pen and craft an ordinance following the San Francisco model, streamlined to better fit Alameda’s resources, and honoring the intent (and specific language) of the December 17, 2019 referral4.

We believe that solutions to the above missing provisions can be found with greater engagement.

However, past failures to act by this City Council indicate a lack of political will to enact a meaningful vetting framework.

Sincerely,

Brian Hofer
Executive Director
(510) 303-2871
[email protected]
********secure-justice.org/

cc Chief Joshi ([email protected])

Encls.

4 In the short window of time we’ve had to digest staff’s draft, Secure Justice has identified and relayed to a key administrative stakeholder a few areas where the administrative burden could be relieved without defeating the intent of the ordinance.

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1 December 13, 2019

VIA EMAIL ONLY
Mayor Marilyn Ezzy Ashcraft ([email protected]) Jim Oddie ([email protected])
Tony Daysog ([email protected])
Malia Vella ([email protected])
Vice Mayor John Knox White ([email protected])
Alameda City Council
Alameda City Hall
2263 Santa Clara Avenue
Alameda, CA 94501
Re: SUPPORT for the Surveillance Ordinance + Face Surveillance Ban Dear Mayor and City Council Members:

We are a coalition of civil rights organizations writing to express support for Vice Mayor Knox White’s proposed surveillance equipment and face surveillance prohibition ordinance(s), part of multiple proposals in Item 6-C on your December 17, 2019 agenda. This legislation will improve public safety by creating a transparent process for considering surveillance technology proposals, safeguard against dangerous and biased surveillance practices, and provide the public and City Council with a necessary voice in important surveillance decisions affecting Alameda residents.

We urge you to support the motion by Vice Mayor Knox White, and the ordinance when it returns.

From our discussions with the Vice Mayor, it is our understanding that on December 17, he will move the City Council to direct staff to return with an ACLU model surveillance ordinance and ꢀ 2ꢀ
facial recognition ban, like those adopted in San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley. Exhibit 1 in Item 6-C contains the ACLU modeled San Francisco Ordinance adopted in May 2019 by a 10-1 vote of the Board of Supervisors. As Oakland and Berkeley had previously and unanimously enacted ACLU model surveillance ordinances in 2018, both City Councils subsequently amended their respective ordinances to include a prohibition on the city’s use of facial recognition technology, following San Francisco’s lead. The amendments were adopted by unanimous vote. Emeryville’s City Council has also directed its staff to return with a face surveillance ban ordinance, also by unanimous vote. We expect to see that ordinance in January.

This letter explains the purpose of the ordinance and how it helps protect the privacy and safety of all Alameda residents. First, the letter outlines the problems addressed by the Ordinance.

Second, the letter explains why Alameda should prevent the deployment of face surveillance technology that poses a threat to the community regardless of its accuracy.

1. The Ordinance Ensures Diverse Community Members Are Part of Important Safety Decisions

Surveillance technologies collect sensitive personal information that can record where people go, who they associate with, and even how they feel. All too often, surveillance systems operate out of public view and collect information without the knowledge or consent of residents. When used by public agencies, technologies such as automated license plate readers, camera-equipped drones, and predictive policing software can fundamentally change the relationship between governments and residents, influencing decisions about who receives a government service, who is monitored and subjected to potentially dangerous encounters with the police, and whether people feel comfortable organizing and engaging in activism. Alameda should not deploy surveillance technology on its residents without public debate about how these technologies work and their potential harms, and clear guidelines for how the technology can be used.ꢀ ꢀ
Public scrutiny of surveillance technology is essential because the impacts of surveillance technology are not equitably distributed – all too often, data collection and processing systems focus their digital gaze on immigrants, people of color, and the poor. As a result, errors resulting from flawed data or operator misuse are biased and disproportionately harm these communities as well. Without adequate public debate or safeguards to prevent misuse, surveillance technology will harm community members. We know this because it has already happened in the Bay Area.

Many Bay Area police departments secretly deploy surveillance system without policies to govern their use, provide accountability, and ensure people’s safety. This has put our immigrant and Black community members in harm’s way. In San Francisco, SFPD officersꢀheld a Black woman at gunpoint outside her car after misusing an automated license plate reader that they operated without a policy to prevent potentially grave mistakes. According to a 2015 report, Oakland police’s use of license plate readers was effectively concentrated in low-income and Black communities.1 In San Jose, police secretly purchased a drone without meaningfully consulting Muslim community members and other residents who have been targeted by the ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ 1 Dave Maass, What You Can Learn From Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data , Electronic Frontier Foundation, Jan. 21, 2015, https://www.eff.org/deep links/2015/01/what-we-learned- oakland-raw-alpr-data. ꢀ 3ꢀ
government for their religious affiliation.2 And in Fresno, the police department used social media surveillance software from a vendor that encouraged police to spy on Black Lives Matter activists.3

Information about residents in local surveillance systems is also vulnerable to efforts by federal agencies such as ICE, who may seek to exploit it to fuel inhumane policies. This is not a hypothetical threat – we recently learned that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement has purchased access to a database of driver locations from a vendor that sells automated license plate readers to many Bay Area communities.4 We know that ICE can use that database to assist its efforts to locate and deport community members. The potential vulnerability of local surveillance databases to agencies such as ICE threatens Alameda’s commitment to be a sanctuary city for all residents. This Ordinance would require proposals for such databases be subject to City Council and public scrutiny, and strict safeguards to prevent abuse.

The secretive and unaccountable use of surveillance technology not only harms residents, it damages community trust in local governments.5 Other cities have experienced this first hand, such as when Oakland’s City Council faced a public backlash after the public learned about secret plans to build a DHS-funded “Domain Awareness Center” that aggregated surveillance feeds from around the city.6 Likewise, when citizens and the Seattle City Council discovered that the police department had acquired drones three years earlier, the ensuing protests led the Mayor to shelve the program, stating that Seattle needed to focus on “community building.” 7 In both cases, the absence of public debate and a process for evaluating technologies triggered an avoidable public controversy that sapped staff time and taxpayer resources.

2. The Ordinance Ensures Democratic Debate and Oversight for Surveillance Technology Decisions

This proposed Ordinance is straightforward and ensures proper democratic debate, transparency, and oversight of surveillance technologies. The Ordinance requires that a city department seeking surveillance technology explain to the public how it works, what community goals it will accomplish, and what rules will exist to protect the public. Second, the Ordinance requires that ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ 2 Thomas Mann Miller, San Jose Police Department's Secret Drone Purchase: Where's the Accountability? , ACLU- NorCal, July 30, 2014, http s://www.aclunc.org/blog/san-jose-police-departme nts-secret-drone-purchase-wheres- accountability.
3 Justin Jouvenal, The new way police are surveillance you: calculating your threat ‘score , Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 2016, http s://www.washingtonpos t.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are- surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-s core/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4- bdf37355da0c_story.html?utm_term=.3514f883ceeb.
4 Vasudha Talla, Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data from Local Police for Deportations , ACLU.org, Mar. 13, 2019, https://www. aclu.org/blog/immigrants -rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/documents- reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data.
5 A 2014 ACLU of California survey found that at least 90 California communities were in possession of various surveillance technologies, and that public debate rarely occurred when technologies were proposed. State of Surveillance in California – Findings & Recommendations, January 2015, ***********.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/201501-aclu_ca_surveillancetech_summary_and_recommendations.pdf. 6 Brian Wheeler, Police Surveillance: The US city that beat Big Brother , Sept. 29, 2016, **********.bbc.com/news/magazine-37411250.
7 Seattle Mayor ends police drone efforts , USAToday, Feb. 7, 2013, ***********.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/07/seattle-police-drone-efforts/1900785/. ꢀ 4ꢀ
the proposal be heard by the City Council at a regular public meeting. If the Board approves a new surveillance technology at that meeting, the Ordinance ensures the Board and public will be able to understand how it will be used. The Ordinance also ensures that existing surveillance technologies are subject to the same safeguards.

The Ordinance appropriately requires that the local democratic process play a role in evaluating new surveillance technologies before they are acquired or used. And by requiring straightforward safeguards and an annual report, the Ordinance ensures technology community members are not harmed and that the City council fully understands how approved technologies are used. This has produced better outcomes in other Northern California communities with similar laws. Since 2016, Santa Clara County, Oakland, Berkeley, Davis, Palo Alto, BART, and San Francisco have all passed similar ordinances to the one now contemplated by Vice Mayor Knox White. On repeated occasions, these communities have come to better decisions about surveillance technology – whether it was Santa Clara’s imposition of safeguards on body cameras or Oakland’s scrutiny of a relationship with a federal “fusion center” – because of the process put in place by their local surveillance ordinance. We urge Alameda to adopt the same common-sense process for considering new surveillance.

3. The Ordinance Protects Alameda from Dangerous and Biased Face Surveillance

We also fully endorse the prohibition on the use of facial recognition technology by city departments. This is a technology that poses a threat to people of color and facilitates biased government surveillance of our communities. The use of this technology by government agencies poses a unique threat to public safety and the well-being of people in Alameda, regardless of the system’s accuracy. Alameda should refuse to allow government agencies to acquire or use it for at least three reasons: first, due to flaws in face surveillance systems; second, because such systems are frequently built upon biased datasets; and finally, because face surveillance would supercharge invasive and discriminatory government surveillance.

The biased algorithms and processes that power face surveillance technology pose a threat to people of color. Multiple tests of this technology indicate it is less accurate for darker-skinned people. Peer-reviewed academic research by researchers at MIT has demonstrated that prominent facial recognition technology products perform more poorly for people with darker skin and women.8 Last year, a test of Amazon’s Rekognition facial surveillance product by the ACLU of Northern California falsely matched 28 members of Congress with arrest booking photos.9 Of those false matches, 39 percent were people of color, even though people of color only constitute 19 percent of Congress. In practice, an erroneous face surveillance system could misinform and influence a decision about how to approach a person, including the decision of whether to use force. These kind of flaw systems should not be used to make decisions about Alameda residents’ lives.

ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ 8 Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru , Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification , Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 81: 1-15, 2018, *******proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf; Natasha Singer, Amazon Is Pushing Facial Technology That a Study Says Could Be Biased , New York Times, Jan 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/01/24/technology/amazon- facial-technology-study.html .
9 Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress With Mugshots , ACLU Free Future Blog, July 26, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-t echnology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely- matched-28.
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The databases the underlie facial recognition systems are frequently biased as well. Facial recognition systems are commonly connected to databases of mugshot photos. These photos are then used as a reference point when the system searches for matches of individuals in the world.

But because mugshot databases reflect historical over-policing of communities of color, facial recognition “matching” databases are disproportionately made up of people of color arrested in our communities. If such systems are connected to officer body cameras or surveillance cameras, these communities may be unfairly targeted simply because they appeared in another database.

Finally, face surveillance gives the government unprecedented reach into our lives and will fuel discriminatory government surveillance. People should be free to go about their daily lives without the government knowing whether they visit a bar or an abortion clinic, march at a political rally, or attend a religious service. Yet with the flip of a switch, Alameda could add face surveillance to public CCTV cameras, sensor-equipped smart street lights, or even officer-worn body cameras, creating a citywide surveillance network that could track and recognize residents as they move across town. Face surveillance technology makes it easy for the government to learn these and other details of private lives, all with little to no human effort. And like the surveillance systems that came before, the harms will fall hardest on people of color, religious minorities, and immigrants.

If Alameda builds a face surveillance database, it might also invite requests from other governmental entities such as ICE, in effect entangling local agencies in the federal government’s deportation machine. At a time when public protest is at an all-time high and the federal government is attacking immigrants and activists, Alameda should refuse to build face surveillance systems that could easily be misused for dangerous, authoritarian surveillance.

Face surveillance will not make the Alameda community safer and could lead to grave harm. It would subject residents and visitors to continuous monitoring and potentially violent contacts with law enforcement if it produces erroneous results. Regardless of accuracy, systems built on face surveillance will amplify and exacerbate historical and existing bias that harms immigrants, religious minorities, activists, and people of color. An identification—whether accurate or not— could cost people their freedom or even lives. Alameda should refuse to go down this road.

4. Conclusion

Thank you for your consideration of this essential Ordinance designed to protect public safety and ensure that the City Council and Alameda community have a voice in decisions about surveillance technology in Alameda. We look forward to working with the staff and City Council to pass and implement this Ordinance. Please let us know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

ACLU of Northern California
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – Asian Law Caucus
Council on American-Islamic Relations – San Francisco Bay Area Electronic Frontier Foundation
Ella Baker Center
ESG Transparency Initiative
Fight For The Future
Greenlining Institute
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San Francisco Public Defender – Racial Justice Committee Secure Justice
Support Life Foundation
Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club

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