Anaheim City Council
January 9, 2024

SusanaBarrios
From: Theresa Bass
Sent: Tuesday, June27, 20232:11PM
To: Blake Carri; Susana Barrios
Subject: Fwd: \[EXTERNAL\] CalOptima Health LetterofSupport, Agenda Items16 & 17Re: The Salvation Army
Attachments: image001.png; CalOptima Health CityofAnaheim_Salvation ArmyLetterofSupport

6.27.pdf
Beginforwarded message:

From: "Abushawish, Jordan" <[email protected]> Date: June27, 2023at2:04:14PMPDT
To: AshleighAitken <[email protected]>, NatalieRubalcava <[email protected]>, JoseDiaz [email protected]>, "CarlosA. Leon" <[email protected]>, "NormaC. Kurtz" [email protected]>, StephenFaessel <[email protected]>, NatalieMeeks [email protected]>, CityManager <[email protected]>, TheresaBass [email protected]>
Cc: BereniceBallinas <[email protected]>, ValeriaSandoval <[email protected]>, Sarah Bartczak <[email protected]>, [email protected], NamBartash <[email protected]>, CameronWessel <[email protected]>, [email protected], GregoryGarcia [email protected]>, GraceStepter <[email protected]> Subject: \[EXTERNAL\] CalOptima HealthLetterofSupport, AgendaItems16 & 17Re: TheSalvation Army
Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Goodafternoon, MayorAitkenandMembersoftheAnaheim CityCouncil – OnbehalfofMichaelHunn, ChiefExecutiveOfficerofCalOptima Health, pleasefindtheattachedletterofsupportforagendaitems 16and17relatedtoTheSalvationArmyEmergencyShelterServices. Thankyouandhaveagreatday! JordanA. Abushawish, MPP
SeniorDirector, FederalandLocalGovernmentAffairs
CalOptimaHealth, APublicAgency
505CityParkwayWest, Orange, CA92868
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OurMission OurVisionby2027
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2 CalOptima Health
A Public Agency
505 City Parkway West
Orange, CA 92868
714-246-8400
TTY: 711
caloptima. org
June 27, 2023
Anaheim City Council
200 S. Anaheim Blvd.

Anaheim, CA 92805
RE: AGENDA ITEM 16: THIRD AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT WITH THE SALVATION ARMY FOR EMERGENCY SHELTER SERVICES ( 224 BED SHELTER), and AGENDA ITEM 17: FIRST AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT WITH THE SALVATION ARMY FOR EMERGENCY SHELTER SERVICES ( 101 BED EXPANSION)
Dear Mayor Aitken and Members of the Anaheim City Council:

On behalf of CalOptima Health and the 985,000 members we serve, I would like to express our support for agenda consent items 16 and 17 to approve the emergency shelter agreement between the City of Anaheim and The Salvation Army, California, South Division. The Salvation Army is highly regarded in our community for providing compassionate care and support for individuals experiencing homelessness, and CalOptima Health is proud to endorse this agreement.

At CalOptima Health, we believe housing is health — and we are dedicated to improving the health and well-being of all our members. Orange County is home to 3.2 million residents, of whom one-third are served by CalOptima Health. The impact on the lives of the members we serve is only as good as the partnerships we have with local organizations like The Salvation Army, and for that, we are very grateful for their tireless efforts to lift and empower our most vulnerable community members with the dignity and respect they deserve.

In March of this year, CalOptima Health was honored to award The Salvation Army with $4.1 million in grants toward the Center of Hope Permanent Supportive Housing Units which will house 70 individuals experiencing chronic homelessness. We believe that our members’ needs are better served when investments are made locally, and I commend the City of Anaheim for this recognition and supporting The Salvation Army to address the homelessness crisis in Orange County.

Thank you very much for your time and consideration of this request. CalOptima Health looks forward to our continued partnership with the City of Anaheim and The Salvation Army.

Sincerely,
Michael Hunn
Chief Executive Officer
DocuSign Envelope ID: 6196FCAA- EC48- 45D6-A4B8-669ACCFC5D24 SusanaBarrios
From: C. DeonB. <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday,
To: Natalie Meeks; Stephen Faessel; Norma C. Kurtz; CarlosA. Leon; JoseDiaz; Ashleigh Aitken; Natalie Rubalcava
Cc: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Anaheim Team2Proposal Consideration Request Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Goodevening, MayorAitken, MayorProTemRubalcava, andallDistrictCouncilMembers, IamwritingtoyoutoaskforyoursupportontheAnaheimTeam2proposal.

MynameisClarenceBatesandIhavebeenanAnaheimresidentformorethan22years. MywifeandIraisedour childreninAnaheimbecausewefellinlovewiththecultureanddiversitythroughout thecommunity. Whenthecity wasimpactedbytheCOVID-19pandemic, Ibegantoseemoreneighbors outsidegettingtoknoweachother; albeit fromasafedistance. Ialsosawthegrowthofhomelessness anddrugaddictionandtheproblems thatcontinuetorise inourcity.

Werecentlyheldameetinginmycommunity whereCouncilman Leon, DeputyDirectorSandyLozeauandOfficersLee andWilliamsoftheHALOteammetwithresidents toaddresssafetyconcernsduetothehomeless encampments. I applaudthecityforbeingoneofthefirsttotakestepstotacklehomelessness anddrugaddictionaroundthecityby implementing theCCRT, HOT, PERTandtheHALOteamstohelpthoseinneed. However, thereisonlysomuchyoucan doforsomeone whodoesn’twanthelp. Thosewhochoosenottoacceptthehelparecausingproblems withinthe community. Theproblems thatwearehavingalongtherailroadtrackcrossingbetween #748008Y (Euclid) and 748009F (Nutwood). Thesehomeless encampments supportdruguse, violence, andthefttoeveryone withinthe community. Weareconstantly dealingwithfires, fights, trashandmoreimportantly, safetyconcerns foreveryone in thecommunity.

TheinitiativesintheAnaheimTeam2proposalwillhelpeliminatetheabilityforfuturehomeless transients from establishing anencampment alongtherailroadtracks, thusprovidingtheresidents indistrict2anopportunity tolive withoutlistening toconstantfightsovernaloxone injectionneedlesandfiresencroaching alongtheshrubbery alongthe wallbehindhomes. Inaddition, passingtheAnaheimTeam2proposalwillprovidetheHALOteamwithadditional supporttoaddress homelessness crimesaroundthecity.

Isupportthehardworkeachmember workingfortheCityofAnaheim, includingthehardworkthefirefightersdoto attendtofirescreatedbythehomeless. Manytimes, theworkyoudoisn’tseenandcanbeviewedasathankless job. I wanttosayThankyou! Iamaskingyoutohelpussay “ThankYou” toeveryone supporting thehomeless concerns aroundthecitybysupporting theAnaheimTeam2proposal.

Thankyouforyourconsideration,
ClarenceBates
1 SusanaBarrios
From: ErikaR <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday,
To: Public Comment
Cc: Ashleigh Aitken; Natalie Rubalcava; JoseDiaz; CarlosA. Leon; Norma C. Kurtz; Stephen Faessel; Natalie Meeks
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Agenda item16
Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Thank youforyourtimeCouncil Members
Iwassupposed tobehereinperson saying thistoyou, however, itwasadifferent type ofcitycouncil meeting today andIhadtoleave inordertopickupmychildintime. Ihadbeenwaiting outside since 3:30p.m. toget intospeak andwatched hours takeawaywithnocluewhen I'dbeabletospeak.

ThisiswhatIhadprepared tosaytoyoutoday:

I'mspeaking today onagenda item number 16whichproposes the22.85% increase requested byOCAnimal Care...

Ihighly recommend thatthecitynotgrantthatincrease inhereiswhy:

Iamuniquely qualified totalkabout these issues asIamformally thereturn tofeelcoordinator ofanon-profit catrescue contracted byOCAnimal Caretoreturn catsbrought inbyourcitizens during thattimeIalso implemented thesame program inthecityofGarden Grove withtheiranimal control which isstillcurrently running.

When thecityofAnaheim wasapproached about buying intothenewshelter being builtitwaspromised that oneoftheservices rendered would beaTNR program That wasamajor buy-inforsome ofthecities including oursasweandSantaAnamake up50% ofallintake atOCAnimal Care.

Theprogram washighly successful tothecitizens andanimals thatrecite anAnaheim andother communities.

Community andferalcatsweresterilized, given fleatreatment, microchipped, andvaccinated before being returned totheirhomes.

SinceOCAnimal Care halted thatprogram back in2019however, ourcityhasseen ariseincatnoise complaints, overpopulation issues, lackofaffordable spayneuter options, deadanimal pickup, aswellasan uptick andcoyote activity.

Ocean Animal Careisnotaccepting healthy catsatall. They onlyaccept kittens upto8weeks ofage, sick, or injured cats.

Anaheim residents who'vewitnessed people incarsabandoning catsintheirneighborhoods havetriedtotake those catstoOCAnimal Careonlytobetoldtorelease themback towhere theywerefound, orthey'reasked to paya $300owner surrender feeforcatsthatdon'tbelong tothem. Thisiscaused abigissue andcat abandonment, andmore kittens being born inourcity! 1
OCAnimal Caredoesn'thouse animals forlong. Instead, theyputthem onOCrescue track following intake for theirnon-profitrescue partners tobeburdened withthecostandcaring fortheanimals! Evenwhen private entities werewilling tofindaspay neuter clinicatOCAnimal Care, theyrefused towork withAnaheim citizens andit'snon-profitrescues.

Could thecityofAnaheim possibly exert pressure onOCAnimal Care andtheOCBoard ofSupervisors to implement thisprogram, orpossibly spay/neuter services atnocostatitsfacility again? AtSantaAna'sbudget meeting recently, SantaAnaCityCouncil Members agreed tosetaside $75,000forTNR/spay/neuter. Could the cityofAnaheim notdothesame should OCAnimal Care stillrefuse aTNRprogram? Either ofthese options would bebeneficial toourAnaheim residents andanimals fornotonlyhealth reasons, butalsomoney reasons. Catintake atOCAnimal Carewould dramatically dropifthiswereinplace, andless money wouldbespentbythecitydown theline.

ItcostMOREtoeuthanize ananimal than itdoes tofixone!
Sandra, theformal head ofCodeEnforcement, hadspoke with myselfAndOCCommunity CatsRescue about doing apilotprogram thatwearestillresearching for.

Ifthecouncil members haveanyquestions about thattalkwithcodeenforcement, Iwould behappy toanswer anyquestions theymayhave.

Again, thank youforyourtimetoday Council Members.

Sincerely,
ErikaL. Rasmussen
2 SusanaBarrios
From: ocanimalleague8 < ocanimalleague8@gmail. com>
Sent: Tuesday, June13,
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Regarding item #16
Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

NO
SentfrommyGalaxy
1 SusanaBarrios
From: Michael Mavrovouniotis < [email protected]>
Sent: Friday, June16, 202312:

To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OCAnimal Care - Grand Juryreport
Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutsidetheCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropenattachments unlessyou recognize thesenderandareexpecting themessage.

Thisisgeneralpubliccomment forthenextcitycouncilmeeting.

TheGrandJuryReportissuedaHIGHLYCRITICAL reportonOCAnimalCare. YoucanfinditontheGrandJurywebsite, here:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocgrandjury.org%2Fpdfs%2F2022_2023_GJ report%2FGimme_Shelter_and_a_Pound_of_Advice.pdf&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C87093 dd03a0546b14ad908db6ea015a6% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7C0%7C0%7C638225406228505841%7CU nknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C 7C%7C&sdata=puQ%2F7VJ6kktxoC4cEI%2BFwLk41aDLZn8jR6hb1ra%2F6V0%3D&reserved=0 WritetoyourCountySupervisor, yourMayor, andyourCityCouncil. AskthemtoreadtheGrandJuryreport, putan endtothisscandal, andgetOCAnimalCarebackontherighttrack.

Ifyou'dlikeanyreportsemailedtoyou, [email protected] OtherreportsonOCAnimalCare:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Focshelter.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccom ment%40anaheim.net%7C87093dd03a0546b14ad908db6ea015a6% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7C0%7C0 7C638225406228505841%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwi LCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=PAkOwGo0jkFePRhuNU9KZRJQpw4mexvUtGQHBFA9R1U% 3D&reserve d=0
Anotherusefulinformation site:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopentheocshelter.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cp ubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C87093dd03a0546b14ad908db6ea015a6% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7C0%7C0%7C638225406228505841%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6 Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=77q4Mnm7%2F0mBXIinwnw%2BtJq3R%2F8SiVHCIBhloSNog0 s%3D&reserved=0
ThisistheSUMMARY takenword-for-wordfromthereport:

OrangeCountyAnimalCarehasbeenasourceofpublicconcernsincethe1990s, withnolessthanfivepreviousOrange CountyGrandJuryreportsdetailing troublingconditions. Theprevious reports citedexcessive euthanasia rates, poor leadership, inadequate numbersofanimalcareattendants, alackofcooperation betweenstaffdepartments, the exclusion ofkennelstafffromeuthanasia decisions, thelackofproperassessment ofanimalschosenforeuthanasia, and lowmoralenegatively impacting operation oftheshelter.

Recentpublicoutcrycitingconditions attheshelter, recentlitigation, andpubliclycirculated petitions callingforchanges atthesheltersuggestthepreviously expressed concerns remain. Inadditiontothesepubliclyvoicedconcerns, the currentOrangeCountyGrandJuryreceiveddirectcomplaints requesting aninquiry. TheGrandJurydetermined a 1 renewedinvestigation waswarranted. Theinvestigation focusedonthreemajorareasofconcern: themanagement of theshelter, thewelfareofanimalsundersheltercare, andthecommunication andengagement withthepublicandthe animalrescuecommunity.

Aparticular concernoftheGrandJurywastheshelter’stermination ofitsTrap, Neuter, andReturn (TNR) programfor community cats. Inearly2020, theshelterdecidedtostopitsTNRprogram. TheGrandJury’sinvestigation determined thattermination oftheTNRprogramhaddetrimental consequences forthewelfareoftheanimalsundertheshelter’s care.

Theelimination oftheTNRprogram alsohascontributed tosubstantial publicdissatisfaction andalienation that undermines thepublic’sandtherescuecommunity’srelationswithshelterleadership.

DuringtheGrandJury’sinvestigation, itwasreportedbytheshelter’sseniormanagement thatthetermination ofthe TNRprogramresultedfromanopinionrenderedbytheCounty’slegalcounsel. Understanding thereasonleadingtothe decision toterminate theTNRprogram wouldbeimportant forconsidering whethertheprogramcanand/orshouldbe reinstated. Towardthatend, theGrandJuryendeavored toobtainacopyoftheopinionoftheCounty’slegalcounselby directingawrittenrequesttotheChairoftheOrangeCountyBoardofSupervisors. WhiletheGrandJuryrecognizes that theopinionmayenjoyconfidentiality pursuant totheattorney-clientprivilege, theBoardofSupervisors hasthe discretion towaivethatprivilege. TheGrandJury’srequestincludeditscommitment tomaintaintheconfidentiality of theopinionitselfanditscontents. Nevertheless, therequestwasdeclined, aswastheGrandJury’salternative request thattheCountysimplyidentifythelegalauthority reviewedinstudyingtheissue.

Membersofsheltermanagement indicated theirunderstanding theTNRprogram wasterminated duetotheopinion thattheprogram violatesastatelaw. Thelawmakesitacrimetowillfullyabandon ananimalnotwithstanding thatthe programwasdesignedtoreturncatstotheiroriginallocationratherthanreleasing themtorandomly selected sites.

TNRprogramsarewidespread throughout California, nottomentionthenationassetforthinareportfromthe AmericanBarAssociation. TheGrandJuryisunawareofanypublished courtcasedetermining thatabonafideTNR programisprohibited undertheanti-abandonment statute. Giventheimportant benefitstoanimalsandthepublic providedbysuchprograms, theGrandJurybelievesitwouldbeprudentfortheCountytorevisittheproprietyofthe formerprogramandconsiderobtainingasecondlegalopinion.

Thisreporthighlights analysisofdataprovided totheGrandJurybytheshelterindicating thateuthanasia ratesrelated todogbehavior andtocatshaveincreased significantly withinthelasttwoyears. Theincreaseindogbehavioral euthanasia ratessuggests thatthereisinconsistency overtimeastohowdogsarebeingassessed andevaluated for behavior-relatedeuthanasia. Theincreaseinfelineeuthanasia ratesappearstobecorrelatedwithelimination ofthe TNRprogram.

Thisreportalsoaddresses thechallenges inmaintaining qualitystaffattheshelter, especially intheAnimalCare Attendant positions. Hiringpracticesfortheshelteraretoocumbersome, lengthyandlackconsideration ofhowthose practices impactanimalwelfare. AnimalCareAttendant staffingattheshelterisinadequate andAnimalCareAttendant staffingvacanciesneedtobefilledmorequickly.

Thisreportdiscussesmajordeficiencies witheachoftheissuesidentifiedaboveandmakesspecific recommendations to helpsupportamoreengagedcommunity. Statusquoattheshelterisunacceptable. Appropriate remedial stepsmustbe takenasanimalwelfareisparamount!
Finally, thisreportcomments onthedifficulties theGrandJuryencountered duringitsinvestigation. Without explanation, theentiretyoftheOrangeCountyCountyCounsel’sofficedetermined itselftobeconflicted withtheGrand Jury’sinquiryintoOrangeCountyAnimalCare. Theinvestigation washampered andslowedduringthesixweeksthe GrandJurywasrequiredtoarrangeforoutsidelegalcounsel.
2 SusanaBarrios
From: GMoses <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, June
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OCAnimal Care - Where'stheStrategic Plan? Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutsidetheCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropenattachments unlessyou recognize thesenderandareexpecting themessage.

Thisisgeneralpubliccomment forthenextcitycouncilmeeting.

WhydidOCAnimalCarechuckitsStrategicPlanwilly-nilly? AndwasOCCommunity Resources asleepatthewheel, or aiding-and-abetting?
In2018, theOCBoardofSupervisors approved anexcellentStrategicPlan. Whenthepandemic rolledin, OCACfound covertoquietlyditchtheStrategicPlanandmakeuppoliciesonawhim. TheresultisHIGHERCOSTSandWORSE RESULTS.

Ashortreportonthisscandal, "OCACBOS-Approved 2018StrategicPlan.pdf" canbefoundinthisfile-sharingBoxfolder:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapp.box.com%2Fs%2F2gtbtfl17ai8xsd6int5g37dlp 4huub3&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C237332838fc8466643dd08db6ea3be3e% 7C74c3739c5 02a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638225422535348357%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C2000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=9LjilE0u11DFYN7EinkvRr%2Bzg uAtG%2BoQ3XZYF%2Fw9a%2F4%3D&reserved=0
Inthesamefolder, you'llfindthe57-pageStrategicPlanthatcountymanagement hasbeenhidingfromyou, "OCAC StrategicPlan052218 (004).pdf". Itwasapproved onMay18, 2018bytheBoardofSupervisors. Foryourconvenience, inthesamefolder, thereisashortexcerpt:

OCACStrategicPlanPriority1.pdf" isjustthefirsttwopagesStrategicPlan, showingsomeofthebigthingsthatcounty bureaucrats threwoverboard ontheirsay-so. ThePlanspecified:

Allqualifieddogssocialized daily.
100% Trackingtomakesureanimalsgetpropercare (i.e., makesurethebureaucrats deliverwhatthecitizenisasked topaying)
Reduction inaveragelengthofstay (i.e., REDUCTION inCOSTS) Allthiswasderailedandsuppressed byOCAnimalCare andOCCommunity Resources BEHINDCLOSEDDOORS.

WithNOPLAN, thecountyisgettingHIGHERCOSTSandWORSECARE.

WritetoyourCountySupervisor, yourMayor, andyourCityCouncil. Askthemtoputanendtothisscandal, andget OCAnimalCarebackontherighttrack.

Ifyou'dlikeanyreportsemailedtoyou, [email protected] OtherreportsonOCAnimalCare:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Focshelter.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccom ment%40anaheim.net%7C237332838fc8466643dd08db6ea3be3e% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7C0%7C0 1 7C638225422535348357%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwi LCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=ZkoP9LBRghigoiPXLUWJv9U8NzxRCURuW18wuLoFHjU% 3D&reserved=0 Anotherusefulinformation site:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopentheocshelter.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cp ubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C237332838fc8466643dd08db6ea3be3e% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7 C0%7C0%7C638225422535348357%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik 1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=0OgBlBprNERxf4oohF3GJkbMmL3wfbsMC3d0X2NOiS8% 3D&re served=0
2 SusanaBarrios
From: AnDoner <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday,
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] NewsStories onthetroublewithOCAnimal Care Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutsidetheCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropenattachments unlessyou recognize thesenderandareexpecting themessage.

Thisisgeneralpubliccomment forthenextcitycouncilmeeting.

TherehasbeenaslewofHIGHLYCRITICALNewsStoriesonOCAnimalCare. Herearethedates, titles, andweblinks, for thefive-weekperiodMay7 - June92023:

OCRegister, May7, 2023:

MoreadultdogsdyingatOCAnimalCare, kennelslargelyoff-limits https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocregister.com%2F2023%2F05%2F07%2Fm ore-adult-dogs-dying-at-oc-animal-care-kennels-largely-offlimits%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c5 02a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=1g%2BaShiZtdpykMD375rUXtU UoAebmRuTz8X8joKuVE8%3D&reserved=0
KNXNews, May8, 2023
OrangeCountyanimalshelterkillratesdoubleforadultdogsin3years https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.audacy.com%2Fknxnews%2Fnews%2Flocal 2Forange-county-animal-shelter-kill-rates-double-in-3-
years&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c502a 49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDA iLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=dHOy0braf6sm2nj7CtK1ay45ZaG6% 2F6kwiBAd73scuDQ%3D&reserved=0
OCRegister, May11, 2023:

OC’sanimalshelterstillakillingzone
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocregister.com%2F2023%2F05%2F11%2Foc s-animal-shelter-still-a-killingzone%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c5 02a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=nePoOhgGkX874w4y1FT9UUea g2BSGoG8P3Hz1ysLrF4%3D&reserved=0
VoiceofOC, May31, 2023
HeadofOCAnimalCareStepsDownasActivistsFightforOpenShelterPolicies https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvoiceofoc.org%2F2023%2F05%2Fhead-of-ocanimal-care-steps-down-as-activists-fight-for-open-shelterpolicies%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739 c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjA 1 wMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=aergL2hxNyis85upC68QeUkm NkGyK%2FieexFudfSUFW0%3D&reserved=0
OCRegister, May31, 2023
OCAnimalCaredirectortemporarily movesjobsamid ‘escalating negativity’ towardher https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocregister.com%2F2023%2F05%2F31%2Foc animal-care-director-temporarily-moves-jobs-amid-escalating-negativity-towardher%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c502 a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMD AiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=VT6O8fcZZcAqxwtVXAwSrBe3oAku dVuPTX38OFV5yxc%3D&reserved=0
VoiceofOC, June7, 2023
Rhoades: OCAnimalCare, OpentheFacility
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvoiceofoc.org%2F2023%2F06%2Frhoades-ocanimal-care-open-thefacility%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c 502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=CNh35VlmhViQ21%2BKxPx2t8 HrfqWLDISf3VogXZcDLow%3D&reserved=0
VoiceofOC, June8, 2023
GrandJury: OCAnimalShelterNeedsUpdatedPoliciestoStopKillingMoreAnimals https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvoiceofoc.org%2F2023%2F06%2Fgrand-jury-ocanimal-shelter-needs-updated-policies-to-stop-killing-moreanimals%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739 c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjA wMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=p65vUhQUt4WdkIAQfld%2Be T8Iy8BShhdU3YEGDBZi67c%3D&reserved=0
OCRegister, June9, 2023
OCGrandJuryraisesconcernswithmanagement, animalwelfareatOCAnimalCare https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocregister.com%2F2023%2F06%2F09%2Foc grand-jury-raises-concerns-with-management-animal-welfare-at-oc-animalcare%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c50 2a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwM DAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=C86clPba%2FD60sMv%2FJ4J0uL7 yKugJa6D4ixvbHvfX3FA%3D&reserved=0
LosAngelesTimes, June9, 2023
StatusquoatO.C. animalshelter ‘unacceptable’ aseuthanasia ratesrise, reportsays https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.latimes.com%2Fcalifornia%2Fstory%2F202 3-06-08%2Forange-county-animal-care-shelter-grand-jury-report-dogs-catseuthanized&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c 502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=0jHeUWSvbn5c2qBD%2FfFC3w 40MNjZqSM9dY2cncfOfVs%3D&reserved=0
KTLA5News, June9, 2023
GrandjuryraisesconcernsaboutOCAnimalCare’spolicies
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fktla.com%2Fnews%2Flocal-news%2Fgrand-juryraises-concerns-about-oc-animal-cares2 policies%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739 c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22%7C0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjA wMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0% 3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=GVAKJIvUBQIXRBlN0azW%2Bj ibrpF28iFDI19zjGwj2CU%3D&reserved=0
Anupdatedversionofthislistwillbepostedregularly, alongwithotherreportsonOCAnimalCare, here:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Focshelter.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cpubliccom ment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7C0%7C0% 7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiL CJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=QvS%2BEIwhsxbNCRfBDZhd%2BRgwhirdN6SyU815LBBDJ6k% 3D&reserve d=0
Anotherusefulinformation site:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopentheocshelter.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cp ubliccomment%40anaheim.net%7C8cd7fbc8db644efbd2c208db6f7fe4b2% 7C74c3739c502a49c68d212bbc30f56f22% 7C 0%7C0%7C638226367315700837%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1 haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=9EEPOcYmrFJiqlD56Fp0AwyqkSLR9v7qD3b% 2FGAkqIn8%3D&res erved=0
Ifyou'dlikeanyreportsemailedtoyou, [email protected] 3 SusanaBarrios
From: Michael Mavrovouniotis < michaelmavrovouniotis@gmail. com> Sent: Monday, June19, 20239:

To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OCAnimal Care - Grand Jury
Attachments: Grand JurywithComments.pdf; OCAC Summary.pdf Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Iamsubmitting twoshort documents onOCAnimal Carefordistribution totheCityCouncil andinclusion in therecord (alongwiththetextofthismessage):

A6-pagefile “Grand JurywithComments.pdf” contains comments ontheFindings andRecommendations of theGrand Juryreport onOCAnimal Care.

A2-pagefile “OCAC Summary.pdf” contains abriefassessment ofthedecline intheperformance ofOC Animal Care. Thisassessment predates thepublication oftheGrand Juryreport, yetreached thesame conclusions.

Compared to2019, thelength ofstayforadultdogshasincreased by60%, andthekillratehasincreased by 104%, eventhough adultdogintakes havedecreased by28%. Thisdrop inperformance isconcurrent with changes inanimal careandtheadoption process:

Adopters cannolonger viewavailable dogs inthekennels.

Adopters select uptotwodogs tovisitperappointment byperusing anonline photo lineup.

Playgroups forlargedogs thatwereinexistence in2019havebeensuspended.

Amore detailed report canbefoundhere:
https://app.box.com/s/2nrpxbl7kac7wjikyc88519ssjwi5pmt
Newer reports anddatacanbefound onthewebsite OCShelter.com 1 The Grand Jury Report can be found here:
https:// www.ocgrandjury. org/ pdfs/ 2022_ 2023_ GJreport/ Gimme_ Shelter_ and_a_Pound_ of_Advice. pdf It can also be downloaded from the ocshelter.com website, along with other reports on OC Animal Care.

The text of each Grand Jury Finding is the intact text from the Grand Jury Report. Most but not all) Findings are followed by a Comment in italics, which is the opinion of the author. The same format is used to show, and comment on, the Grand Jury Recommendations.

GRAND JURY FINDINGS
Management:

F1 Management has limited flexibility utilizing personnel within Orange County Animal Care across departments due to structured work rules, volunteer work restrictions, and employees working in departmental silos.

Comment: The consequence is that kennels are understaffed while the office is overstaffed.

F2 Low staff morale exists within Orange County Animal Care.

Comment: Management is not providing appropriate policies and resources to take care of the animals. The shelter is not providing proper cleaning, socialization, and enrichment programs.

They advertise a luxurious adoption process which the insufficient numbers of kennel staff cannot possible provide. Stressed animals and overworked kennel staff, isn’t that a recipe for low staff morale?
F3 Orange County Animal Care staffing is negatively impacted by vacant positions remaining unfilled for greater than six months due to burdensome hiring processes. This delay in recruitment and completion of hiring has resulted in qualified candidates declining job offers.

Comment: OCAC fails to recognize that good kennel staff have valuable skills and experience.

Qualied candidates for these positions are the most likely to nd other opportunities while OCAC keeps them waiting.

F4 Based upon industry standards and best practices, Orange County Animal Care kennel attendants are understaffed to meet the needs of animals under care.

Comment: The consequences of the understaffing are dire and cumulative: Dogs are not getting socialized and spend multi- day stretches shut in the kennels. Kennels cannot be cleaned frequently or thoroughly, and the dogs are typically still in the kennel during cleaning.

Perhaps the management bars the public from the kennel areas so that they cannot witness these poor conditions.

As to adoptions, there is no way that overworked kennel staff can provide time- consuming concierge” counseling service; this has been false advertising on the part of shelter management all along.

F5 Orange County Animal Care’s operating policies and procedures manual is out of date.

Comment: Of course they are. The management’ s energy has been directed at producing outward- looking deceptive advertising. The PR documents are not truthful but they are polished. The substantive documents, including behavior evaluation, enrichment tracking, and adoption range from non- existent to outdated.

F6 The Orange County Animal Care Volunteer program was stopped during COVID-19 and restarting the program has been slow, resulting in decreased animal socialization and enrichment.

Comment: Instead of recruiting volunteers to provide better care for the animals, the management opted to lower care standards, keep the public from witnessing the deterioration, and present a false glossy image.

Animal Welfare
F7 Orange County Animal Care’s Behavior Evaluation Committee evaluates dogs for euthanasia without written guidelines, policies, or procedures, resulting in inconsistent outcomes over time. Behavior evaluated euthanasia outcomes are dependent on the experience and personal considerations of the individual committee members and management rather than written objective standards.

Comment: Indeed. Perhaps the shelter nds this convenient. It’s easier to euthanize for space and label it as behavior.

F8 The rate of behavioral euthanasia of dogs has increased significantly over the last 2 years.

Comment: And this happened in the face of lower intakes in 2020- 2022 than in the prepandemic period ( 2019). The shelter’ s policies, from inadequate socialization to sloppy assessment are at fault. Reliable studies have shown that no other explanation can be found for the rising kill rate. Analysis in https:// app.box.com/ s/nn5dlq95f37nhiip2l5jo720gazffs3z F9 Orange County Animal Care does not employ a professional or trained and certified animal behaviorist to oversee the shelter’s dog enrichment program, resulting in dogs with declining behavior being placed at greater risk of being euthanized.

Comment: This is part of the overall disregard of behavior issues ( except as excuses for euthanasia).

F10 While many county and city animal shelters throughout the state have active Trap, Neuter, and Return programs, Orange County Animal Care stopped its Trap, Neuter, and Return program, reportedly on the basis of the County Counsel’s legal opinion that the program violates a California statute related to willful animal abandonment.

F11 The termination of the Trap, Neuter, and Return program is correlated with an increase in adult cat euthanasia rate at the shelter.

Comment: No surprise. TNR is an investment that pays off in reduced intakes and euthanasia, especially for kittens. Here is a simple comparison: In 2019 the intake ratio of kittens : adult cats was 1.8:1; in 2022 that ratio rose to 4:1. The shelter is disproportionately taking in, and euthanizing, kittens. TNR can stem that.

F12 There have been public concerns and requests expressed over the years for public programs to include a spay/neuter program by Orange County Animal Care.

Comment: Whatever the method, it is in the best interest ( monetary as well as humane) of the shelter and the participating cities to reduce the overpopulation of animals. Spay/ neuter programs are a good way to do that.

Communication / Outreach
F13 The current adoption appointment system restricts public access to the dog kennels, thereby limiting potential adopters’ access to all available animals.

Comment: This diminished access has slowed down adoptions, and that means animals are staying longer at the shelter. Longer stays mean higher costs, more stress, behavior problems abetted by inadequate enrichment), and more euthanasia. The rapid increase in length of stay is analyzed by the OCShelter. com website, specically in Appendix A of this report:
https:// app.box.com/ s/2nrpxbl7kac7wjikyc88519ssjwi5pmt.

F14 Orange County Animal Care’s engagement with some animal rescue partners is negatively impacted due to differences of opinion in appropriate animal care policy.

Comment: Rescue partners are being asked to shoulder the burden of bad policies. For adult dogs, in 2019 there were 6 adoptions for every transfer to rescue. In 2022, there were only 3.2 adoptions for each rescue. Adult dog intakes were 28% lower in 2022 than 2019. With fewer intakes, the shelter was unable to get animals adopted and resorted to turning up the pressure on rescues. It’s only natural that the rescues do not want to shoulder the consequences of the shelter’ s self- inflicted problems.

F15 Internal and community engagement does not adequately communicate the shelter’s mission and operating strategy.

Comment: The only discernible an operating “ strategy” is putting out abundant untruthful PR.

F16 The information currently on the Orange County Animal Care website for low- cost spay/neuter is not up to date with regard to referrals and prices for spay/neuter procedures.

Comment: The information on the website has a strained relationship to truth. A prime example is the “ Fact Check” document, lled with misleading and at-out false statements.

Impediments to the Investigation
F17 The OC County Counsel’s office misstated to the Grand Jury the scope of its commitment to serving and assisting the Grand Jury in its investigations into County governance respecting managing conflicts between the Board of Supervisors, OC departments and agency clients, and the Grand Jury.

GRAND JURY RECOMMENDATIONS
Management:

R1 By October 1, 2023, OC Human Resource Services should review and update recruitment strategies to significantly increase the timeliness of recruitment of vacant positions and to anticipate vacancies due to retirement, resignations, transfers. (F3)
Comment: This must be done faster, in regard to kennel staff. The shelter is full and kennel staffing is even more decient now (mid- 2023) than at the time of the Grand Jury analysis.

R2 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care, OC Community Resources, and OC Human Resource Services should review hiring practices to facilitate process improvements to expedite filling OCAC vacancies. (F3)
Comment: Needed faster. See above.

R3 By October 1, 2023, OC Community Resources and Orange County Animal Care should review their current staffing allocations of Animal Care Attendants to reflect NACA guidelines and to provide appropriate staffing allocations for animal care, feeding and enrichment. (F3, F4) Comment: Needed immediately. The shelter is full. As a result, quality of care has declined since the Grand Jury’ s report. Stress has increased, and so has euthanasia.

R4 By October 1, 2023, OC Community Resources and Orange County Animal Care should review their current staffing allocations of all positions within the OCAC and reallocate resources to increase Animal Care Attendants to reflect NACA guidelines to provide appropriate staffing for animal care, feeding, and enrichment. (F3, F4)
Comment: Needed immediately. See above.

R5 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should review and update policies, procedures, guidelines, and practices to assure they are accurate and reflect current operating practices. (F5) Comment: There are steps that can be taken immediately, such as: Remove the deceptive Fact Check” document and certain similar portions of the website. Remove the false claims of concierge service and oversold counseling that the shelter is in no position to provide.

R6 By June 30, 2024, the Board of Supervisors should evaluate the strategic option of creating a Joint Powers Authority for the County and fourteen contract Cities to take ownership and shared responsibility for the financial and operating policies and practices of OCAC. (F1 thru F16) Welfare
R7 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should establish written guidelines, policies, and procedures as standards for evaluating animal behavior for use by the Behavior Evaluation Committee.

F5, F7)
Comment: Sorely needed.

R8 By December 31, 2023, in the interests of transparency, Orange County Animal Care management should add a representative from a rescue organization to serve as a non-voting, at-large member on the Behavior Evaluation Committee. (F7, F14)
Comment: Needed both to improve the decisions and to re- establish trust with rescue organizations.

R9 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care, OC Community Resources, and OC Human Resource Services should hire an animal behaviorist or certified dog trainers to work with aggressive animals to reduce the high rate of dogs being euthanized and enhance their adoptability. (F8, F9)
Comment: Needed, both to work directly with dogs and to systematically train volunteers and kennel staff, so that all can work as a team to preempt and address behavior issues.

R10 By December 31, 2023, the Orange County Board of Supervisors and Orange County Animal Care management should request that County Counsel reconsider its opinion about the shelter's former Trap, Neuter, and Return program, or seek an independent second opinion to County Counsel’s opinion, to ascertain whether the program can be re-established, or a modified version of the program can be implemented. (F10, F11) Comment: An outside counsel opinion could be obtained on a faster timeline.

R11 By July 1, 2024, Orange County Animal Care should implement a low-cost public spay/neuter program. (F12)
Communication / Outreach
R12 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should hold all- hands staff meetings at least every quarter. (F1, F2) R13 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care, OC Community Resources, and OC Human Resource Services should conduct annual

surveys of staff to monitor morale and identify opportunities for operational improvement. (F1, F2)
R14 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should open the shelter to the public for walk throughs to maximize opportunities for the public to adopt animals under the care of the shelter. (F13) Comment: There is no reason to wait until December. The shelter is full now and in dire need of more adoptions. Allowing the public to walk through the kennel areas is merely a return to the 2019 practices. It’s nothing radical. If the shelter needs to ease into this, it can easily do that by designating certain days of the week as free- walk- through days.

R15 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should look for new ways to be more inclusive and engaged with volunteers and the rescue organizations that are necessary for the shelter’s success. (F14, F15)
Comment: Indeed. Both of these fall in the purview of the Community Outreach department, which has in the past run roughshod over volunteers and rescues. The entire mode of operation of this department will have to change.

R16 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care should schedule quarterly meetings with community stakeholders to facilitate transparency and engagement. (F14, F15)
Comment: These meetings need to be inclusive and substantive. In the current Community Outreach Committee meetings, shelter management treats the community as an adversary to be undercut, not as a partner to work with. Anybody raising a question or a different point of view is beaten back. A different model is needed.

R17 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should update the information currently on its website for low-cost spay/neuter of feral cats with regard to referrals and prices for spay/neuter procedures.

F16)
Impediments to the Investigation
R18 Beginning with the 2023/2024 Grand Jury training, and all training thereafter, County Counsel should provide detailed instruction about the circumstances under which the County Counsel’s office might recuse itself from assisting with Grand Jury investigations and the alternatives available to the Grand Jury under such circumstances. (F17)

Summary - 1
An Assessment of OC Animal Care – Summary
Orange County Animal Care ( OCAC) had excellent performance in 2019. The picture is different in 2022. For adult dogs:

The length of stay has increased by 60%.

The kill rate has increased by 104%.

This is not the result of a higher number of incoming animals. Comparing 2022 to 2019:

Adult dog intakes have decreased by 28%.

This drop in performance is concurrent with changes in animal care and the adoption process:

Adopters can no longer view available dogs in the kennels.

Adopters select up to two dogs to visit per appointment by perusing an online photo lineup.

Play groups for large dogs that were in existence in 2019 have been suspended.

OCAC appears to be unaware of the decline in their critical metrics.

The only way to ensure continuous improvement is to have better data analysis.

Length of Stay – Adult Dogs & Cats
The length of stay was estimated from the average inventory ( based on values from the first and last days of year) and the annual flow (based on incoming and outgoing animals). The graphs above show that the length of stay for adult dogs and cats has increased dramatically from 2019.

The change in the length of stay wasn’ t due to more animals coming into the shelter. In fact, the graphs above show that fewer adult dogs and cats were handled by the shelter than in 2019.

Summary - 2
Kill Rate – Adult Dogs
The kill rate for adult dogs was calculated from the Asilomar data. The graphs above show that the kill rate has more than doubled since 2019 even though the shelter handles significantly fewer dogs.

Are there other mitigating factors?
The intakes for large dogs are somewhat lower than in 2019. The same applies for three of the more challenging breeds. If higher intakes for large dogs or challenging breeds aren’ t the problem, what is? The problem appears to be the long length of stay that results in: (1) a higher inventory, ( 2) more behavioral challenges, and (3) higher costs.

What can be done?
The adoption system is obviously performing poorly now compared to its performance in 2019. What was working in 2019 that isn’t working today?
Picking a dog: Why can’t people walk through the kennels to view the dogs prior to picking a dog? An online photo lineup doesn’ t tell you anything about the dog’ s personality. Since a person can only choose two dogs to visit with, being able to see and connect with the dog prior to visiting is important.

How does a person choose from multiple huskies that all look similar without seeing them in person? Reducing behavior problems & determining sociability: Play groups for the large dogs are no longer happening. Not only do play groups help reduce stress for the long term residents, but they also provide information to adopters that already have another dog at home.

SusanaBarrios
From: OCCommunity Cats <anaheimfixproject@gmail. com>
Sent: Tuesday, June13, 2023
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] 6/13/23PUBLIC COMMENT forAnaheim CityCouncil meeting Attachments: Gimme_Shelter_and_a_Pound_of_Advice.pdf
Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

MynameisMeredith Kirby. Iamavolunteer andboardmember withthenon-profitOCCommunity Cats. We arebased inAnaheim anddedicated tothewelfare ofcommunity (free-roaming) catsinNorthOrange County.

Mycomment today isspecifically addressing Agenda item16andthesignificant increase inthecostofservices proposed byOCAnimal Care, theshelter Anaheim contracts with.

TheNOIspecifies anearly 23% increase. However, OCAnimal Careisnotproviding services itpromised when theshelter wasbuilt.

Beginning inearly2020, OCAnimal Caremade deliberate reductions inservices andimplemented policy changes thathave negative impacts ontheanimals & residents ofAnaheim, andtheother cities whichcontract them.

OCAnimal Carestopped theverysuccessful Trap, Neuter, Return (TNR) & Return toField (RTF) programs, resulting inthepopulation explosion ofcommunity cats.

OCAnimal Carenolonger accepts healthy stray catsorkittens 8weeks orolder. Theytellpeople toputthem backoutside where theywerefound. YettheysayRTF & TNR are "animal abandonment." OCAnimal Caredoesnotaccept owner surrenders without collecting a $300fee. Most people can'taffordthat, socatsarebeing dumped onthestreet tofendforthemselves. Iftheyarelucky, theyfindtheirwaytoa community catcolony. Wehave thishappening atthecolonies wemanage. InMay, 2adults & 12kittens of various agesweredumped atoneofourcolonies where coyotes areknown totravel.

OCAnimal Careisstillaccepting somesick/injured stray cats, buttheygive minimal careandputthesecatson rescue track." Thatmeans thecatsareavailable fornon-profit, volunteer run, donation funded groups to rescue. Otherwise, theyareeuthanized.

OCAnimal Carenowhasanappointment onlypolicy, soapotential adopter mustmake anappointment toseea single animal (cat, dog, bunny, etc) atatime. People can'tgototheshelter andwalkthrough thekennels tosee theanimals andmake aconnection.

These policy changes haveresulted inapopulation explosion ofcommunity cats, abandonment ofcats, increases indeadanimals, anuptick inCoyote activity, fewer adoptions, more killing ofanimals. 1 Theburden placed ontheshoulders ofnon-profits, local veterinarians andindependent rescuers isdevastating.

Several vets, suchasProPetFixhaveclosed. Some rescues havehadtoshutdown. Independent rescuers are going broke. They should nothave todotheshelter'sjobwithout compensation.

Thiscounty funded, multimillion dollar, stateoftheartshelter should beproviding alltheservices itpromised totheanimals andresidents ofAnaheim andOrange County, notless.

Sowhyaretheyasking fornearly 23% more? What aretheanimals andcitizens ofAnaheim getting forthis increase? Isuggest requiring adetailed explanation fromOCAnimal Care.

Finally, youmaynotbeaware thattheOCGrand Jury hasrecently investigated OCAnimal Careandissued a report withtheirfindings anddirectives. I'veheard fromaninsider thatOCAnimal Careisnottaking it seriously.

Weshould.

Linkattached.

Thank youforyourtime & consideration.

Meredith Kirby
2 Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
The State of Animal Welfare Overseen by the County of Orange COUNTY OF ORANGE Grand Jury 2022-2023
Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2022 I 2023 PAGE 2 OF 51

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. 2 TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................................................... 3 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 4 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 5 REASON FOR STUDY ................................................................................................... 8 METHOD OF STUDY ...................................................................................................... 8 Interviews .................................................................................................................... 8 Surveys ........................................................................................................................ 9 Site Visits ..................................................................................................................... 9 Key Documents ........................................................................................................... 9 Documents Requested but Not Provided ................................................................... 10 INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS................................................................................ 10 Services and Facilities ............................................................................................... 10 Volunteer and Rescue Relations ............................................................................... 12 Human Resources ..................................................................................................... 13 Animal Care Attendants ............................................................................................. 14 Communication .......................................................................................................... 16 Policies and Procedures ............................................................................................ 16 COVID- 19 .................................................................................................................. 17 Facilitating Adoption .................................................................................................. 18 Spay and Neuter Overview ........................................................................................ 19 Trap, Neuter and Return ............................................................................................ 20 Euthanasia Report ..................................................................................................... 22 Asilomar Reports ....................................................................................................... 22 Analysis of OCAC Data ............................................................................................. 23 Dog Euthanasia: ........................................................................................................ 25 Impediments to the Investigation ............................................................................... 27 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 30 FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................... 31 Management: ............................................................................................................. 31 Animal Welfare .......................................................................................................... 31 Communication / Outreach ........................................................................................ 32 Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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Impediments to the Investigation ............................................................................... 32 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 33 Management: ............................................................................................................. 33 Welfare ...................................................................................................................... 33 Communication / Outreach ........................................................................................ 34 Impediments to the Investigation ............................................................................... 35 REQUIRED RESPONSES ............................................................................................ 36 Findings – 90-day Response Required ...................................................................... 37 Recommendations – 90-day Response Required ..................................................... 38 REQUESTED RESPONSEs ......................................................................................... 39 Findings – 90-Day Response Requested .................................................................. 39 Recommendations – 90-Day Response Requested .................................................. 39 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 40 APPENDIX 1 ................................................................................................................. 42 Table 1 - Adult Cat Euthanasia and TNR Rates by Quarter ...................................... 42 APPENDIX 2 ................................................................................................................. 43 Table 3 - Dog Behavioral Euthanasia Rates by Quarter ............................................ 43 APPENDIX 3 ................................................................................................................. 44 Orange County Grand Jury Animal Shelter Contract City Survey .............................. 44 APPENDIX 4 ................................................................................................................. 45 Orange County Grand Jury Independent City Shelter Survey ................................... 45 Appendix 5 .................................................................................................................... 46 OCAC 4th Quarter 2022 Asilomar Report ................................................................... 46 ABBREVIATIONS: ........................................................................................................ 47 GLOSSARY: ................................................................................................................. 48 DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................ 51

TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1 - Map of Orange County .................................................................................... 7 Figure 2 - Adult Cat Euthanasia Rates .......................................................................... 24 Figure 3 - Dog Euthanasia Rates ( Behavioral) .............................................................. 26 Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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SUMMARY
Orange County Animal Care has been a source of public concern since the 1990s, with no less than five previous Orange County Grand Jury reports detailing troubling conditions. The previous reports cited excessive euthanasia rates, poor leadership, inadequate numbers of animal care attendants, a lack of cooperation between staff departments, the exclusion of kennel staff from euthanasia decisions, the lack of proper assessment of animals chosen for euthanasia, and low morale negatively impacting operation of the shelter.

Recent public outcry citing conditions at the shelter, recent litigation, and publicly circulated petitions calling for changes at the shelter suggest the previously expressed concerns remain. In addition to these publicly voiced concerns, the current Orange County Grand Jury received direct complaints requesting an inquiry. The Grand Jury determined a renewed investigation was warranted. The investigation focused on three major areas of concern: the management of the shelter, the welfare of animals under shelter care, and the communication and engagement with the public and the animal rescue community.

A particular concern of the Grand Jury was the shelter’ s termination of its Trap, Neuter, and Return ( TNR) program for community cats. In early 2020, the shelter decided to stop its TNR program. The Grand Jury’s investigation determined that termination of the TNR program had detrimental consequences for the welfare of the animals under the shelter’ s care.

The elimination of the TNR program also has contributed to substantial public dissatisfaction and alienation that undermines the public’ s and the rescue community’ s relations with shelter leadership.

During the Grand Jury’s investigation, it was reported by the shelter’ s senior management that the termination of the TNR program resulted from an opinion rendered by the County’ s legal counsel. Understanding the reason leading to the decision to terminate the TNR program would be important for considering whether the program can and/or should be reinstated. Toward that end, the Grand Jury endeavored to obtain a copy of the opinion of the County’ s legal counsel by directing a written request to the Chair of the Orange County Board of Supervisors. While the Grand Jury recognizes that the opinion may enjoy confidentiality pursuant to the attorney- client privilege, the Board of Supervisors has the discretion to waive that privilege. The Grand Jury’s request included its commitment to maintain the confidentiality of the opinion itself and its contents. Nevertheless, the request was declined, as was the Grand Jury’s alternative request that the County simply identify the legal authority reviewed in studying the issue.

Members of shelter management indicated their understanding the TNR program was terminated due to the opinion that the program violates a state law. The law makes it a crime to willfully abandon an animal notwithstanding that the program was designed to Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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return cats to their original location rather than releasing them to randomly selected sites. TNR programs are widespread throughout California, not to mention the nation as set forth in a report from the American Bar Association. The Grand Jury is unaware of any published court case determining that a bona fide TNR program is prohibited under the anti-abandonment statute. Given the important benefits to animals and the public provided by such programs, the Grand Jury believes it would be prudent for the County to revisit the propriety of the former program and consider obtaining a second legal opinion.

This report highlights analysis of data provided to the Grand Jury by the shelter indicating that euthanasia rates related to dog behavior and to cats have increased significantly within the last two years. The increase in dog behavioral euthanasia rates suggests that there is inconsistency over time as to how dogs are being assessed and evaluated for behavior- related euthanasia. The increase in feline euthanasia rates appears to be correlated with elimination of the TNR program.

This report also addresses the challenges in maintaining quality staff at the shelter, especially in the Animal Care Attendant positions. Hiring practices for the shelter are too cumbersome, lengthy and lack consideration of how those practices impact animal welfare. Animal Care Attendant staffing at the shelter is inadequate and Animal Care Attendant staffing vacancies need to be filled more quickly.

This report discusses major deficiencies with each of the issues identified above and makes specific recommendations to help support a more engaged community. Status quo at the shelter is unacceptable. Appropriate remedial steps must be taken as animal welfare is paramount!
Finally, this report comments on the difficulties the Grand Jury encountered during its investigation. Without explanation, the entirety of the Orange County County Counsel’ s office determined itself to be conflicted with the Grand Jury’s inquiry into Orange County Animal Care. The investigation was hampered and slowed during the six weeks the Grand Jury was required to arrange for outside legal counsel.

BACKGROUND
Orange County Animal Care (OCAC) began operations in 1941 and was responsible for rabies and tending to lost livestock. In 1950, the population of Orange County was roughly 216,000. By January 2022, the estimated population was 3.1 million people.

OCAC provides a myriad of services over a wide territory and variety of client needs and expectations. OCAC serves the unincorporated areas of Orange County and contracts its services to 14 client cities: Anaheim, Brea, Cypress, Fountain Valley, Fullerton, Huntington Beach, Lake Forest, Orange, Placentia, San Juan Capistrano, Santa Ana, Tustin, Villa Park, and Yorba Linda. The remaining cities in Orange County either have their own shelter or contract with other cities or non-profit groups to provide animal care and control services. The unincorporated areas of the county and the 14 Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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contract cities have a combined population of approximately 1.8 million residents, greater than half of the total population of Orange County.

In March 2018, a new shelter was opened on a 10-acre site at a cost of $35 million. The shelter includes a two-story, approximately 30,000 square- foot main building, six standalone kennel buildings, multiple dog play yards, a barnyard, and a rabbit housing area.

OCAC can shelter up to 600 animals and is the single largest municipal animal facility in the western United States serving residents in one location.

OCAC has 137 authorized staff positions. Approximately 21 staff are animal care attendants who are represented by the Teamsters Union. All other staff are represented by the Orange County Employees Association. Labor relations and contract terms must be taken into consideration while operating the shelter.

OCAC, like most municipal shelters, relies upon a variety of rescue support groups and citizen volunteers to enhance animal welfare and outcomes. The relationship between shelter management, rescue groups, and volunteers has deteriorated in the last three years. The historical partnership between the shelter and rescue groups has become stressed due to a variety of reasons. The breakdown in communication, engagement, and trust between parties has negatively affected shelter operations.

Most large municipal shelters are “kill” shelters, which are shelters where animals may be euthanized for any of a variety of reasons. Privately operated shelters and smaller municipal shelters tend to be non-kill shelters. Non-kill shelters may euthanize some animals in special cases, but generally do not euthanize animals. Large municipal shelters, owing to their size, capacity, public responsibility, operational mandates, and their positioning as “shelters of last resort,” euthanize animals as a matter of course.

Animals are euthanized for a variety of reasons, such as:
they suffer from irredeemable disease or injury,
they are of a species that represent a danger to the community, or they are behaviorally unfit for adoption.

Many shelters have Trap, Neuter and Return ( TNR) programs. In accordance with these programs, feral and community cats are captured from their outdoor environment, taken to a shelter or veterinarian where they are neutered, and then returned to the location from where they were trapped. TNR programs serve to reduce colonies of feral and community cats in a humane manner and serve to manage and reduce this cat population. OCAC had a TNR program beginning in 2013 until early 2020 when it was discontinued.

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Figure 1 - Map of Orange County
Cities Contracted with Orange County Animal Care
The map above shows the cities and unincorporated areas currently contracted with OCAC. All city contracts are not alike in that OCAC may provide partial services for some cities and full services for others.

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REASON FOR STUDY
In 2022, the Grand Jury received 14 complaints about the Orange County Animal Care OCAC) shelter. Many of those complaints were the same complaints addressed in five previous Grand Jury reports, including:
the shelter’ s unresponsiveness to community needs,
restricted public access to the shelter’ s kennels,
restricted opportunities to walk through the kennels and engage with adoptable animals, and
concerns related to inadequate staffing and volunteer levels.

Complainants also expressed concerns about animal surrenders, a perceived increase in homeless cats with less spay/neuter availability, and the shelter’ s increased euthanasia rates.

About the same time the Grand Jury was receiving public complaints about the shelter, a petition with thousands of signatures was delivered to the Orange County Board of Supervisors. The petition addressed the same concerns as the complaints received by the Grand Jury and demanded change in the shelter’ s appointment- only system and reinstatement of the shelter’ s TNR program.

The Grand Jury also learned about a lawsuit filed by Elizabeth Hueg, Safe Rescue Team a California 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation), and Cats In Need Of Human Care (another California 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation) seeking an injunction from the Orange County Superior Court for the assignment of a shelter monitor to oversee shelter operations.

The 2022-2023 Grand Jury revisited OCAC because public discussion pointed to new and allegedly ongoing and unresolved concerns about shelter operations. The Grand Jury focused on current practices at OCAC to determine how well the needs of the animals, staff, and public are being met.

METHOD OF STUDY
The Orange County Grand Jury’s objective is to provide an accurate portrayal of OCAC’ s current operations, culture, inner workings, and challenges. The Grand Jury investigation relied on interviews, public and shelter documents, surveys, site visits, and news accounts about the shelter. The information supporting the facts, findings, and recommendations in this report is corroborated, validated, and verified through multiple sources.

Interviews
The interviews conducted by the Grand Jury focused on an in-depth review of OCAC management, staffing, operating structure, animal care procedures, communications, animal care statistics, operating plan, organization structure, morale, the volunteer Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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program, relationship with rescue organizations, and complaints. Interviews included the following:

Management and staff from OCAC.

Current and former volunteers from OCAC.

Management from the OC Community Resources ( OCCR) office.

Management from the Orange County Centralized Human Resources and OCCR Human Resources offices.

Community complainants from Orange County Grand Jury Public Concern Letters.

Retained outside legal counsel.

Leaders of Orange County city-managed shelters.

Animal advocates.

Surveys
The Grand Jury solicited feedback from the shelter’ s clients by surveying the 14 cities contracted with OCAC to provide animal care and control services. Questions in the survey were crafted to determine city satisfaction with the services provided and cost effectiveness, and to solicit any concerns city leaders, managers, and residents may have with OCAC. ( Appendix 3)
A second survey was directed to the five independent city-managed animal shelters in Orange County, soliciting information about their shelter operations, staffing, animal population, adoption procedures, and other challenges. ( Appendix 4) Site Visits
The Grand Jury conducted tours and site visits to the OCAC shelter:

One visit was a guided tour of the facility, during which the Grand Jury was provided behind-the-scenes access to observe conditions and observe shelter staff as they went about their daily routines.

A second visit was an anonymous visit by two members of the Grand Jury. The two members visited the shelter to experience, firsthand, guest services and the appointment process for adopting an animal.

A third visit was an unscheduled visit to observe kennel cleaning and to gather additional documents and records.

The Grand Jury also toured the City of Irvine Animal Shelter and the Mission Viejo Animal Services Center.

Key Documents
Documents and information provided by OCAC:
o Policy and Procedure Manual governing the Orange County Animal Shelter
o Volunteer Program Manual
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o Total number of volunteers who have served by year since 2018 o Organization Charts
o Job Descriptions of all authorized and contracted positions o Statistics on animals under OCAC care, including adoptions o The OCAC Monthly and Quarterly National Shelter Statistics Project Data Matrix ( 2018-2022)
o OCAC euthanasia records
o OCAC Asilomar Reports
OCGJ cat and dog euthanasia statistical analysis derived from OCAC euthanasia records and OCAC Asilomar Reports
City Run Shelters and Contracted City survey responses and summaries Reports from city-managed shelters
OCGJ Public Concern Letters
Legal briefs filed in the lawsuit against OCAC (Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2022-01282419- CU-WM-CJC)
Reports from five former OC Grand Juries: 1999-2000, 2003-2004, 2007-2008, and 2014-2015 ( 2 reports in 2014-2015)
OCAC Performance Audit responses ( February 4, 2016)
American Bar Association legal opinion 102B, Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section report to House of Delegates - Resolution No. 29N, pages 1 and 2 California Penal Code Section 597s
OCAC Strategic Plan Executive Summary ( January 22, 2018) - Strategic Priority, pages 1 to 4
Association of Shelter Veterinarians Guidelines for Standards of Care in Animal Shelters
Documents Requested but Not Provided
Daily census of all animals plus breakdown of number of cats and dogs from 2018 through 2022 ( not provided by OCAC since it reportedly is not tracked).

Complaints and Grievance log.

The Grand Jury attempted, without success, to obtain a copy of OC County Counsel’ s opinion concerning the terminated TNR program. The Grand Jury’s request to the Chair of the Orange County Board of Supervisors for a copy of the opinion was denied, as was an alternative request that the County simply identify the legal authority reviewed in studying the issue.

INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS
Services and Facilities
The Orange County Animal Care (OCAC) shelter is the largest municipal shelter in the western United States serving residents in one location. The nature, size, and scope of the shelter adds complexity and unique challenges to its operation. The shelter employs 137 staff engaged in a variety of functions including animal sheltering and care, animal control, reuniting lost pets with their owners, veterinary services, licensing, adoption, marketing, public relations, and administration. Supporting the varied needs of over 1.8 Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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million residents requires a substantial investment in facilities, infrastructure, personnel, organization, customer service, and public outreach.

OCAC provides temporary shelter and medical care for “lost” owned or stray animals and opportunities for adoption of these animals. OCAC houses and provides medical care for impounded dogs, cats, and exotic animals. OCAC also provides animal control services that include removing dangerous non-domesticated animals where they pose a hazard to humans or other animals.

OCAC is not a No-Kill shelter. OCAC euthanizes animals for several different and sometimes compelling reasons, including animals injured beyond redemptive medical care, behavior, species and breed, and age.

The size and complexity of the shelter leads to numerous managerial and operational challenges. The shelter has space capacity to care for up to 600 animals; however, at times, the number of animals at the shelter exceeds shelter capacity. When capacity is exceeded, temporary capacity is created by moving cat cages into administrative areas such as the facility’ s training and conference room. On the day the Grand Jury toured the shelter, there were 450 animals. The Grand Jury was unable to obtain a full accounting of the average number of animals per day at the facility since OCAC only began keeping daily animal census records in December 2022. However, the Grand Jury was able to estimate average daily cat and dog count from the shelter’ s Asilomar reports.

Average daily cat and dog count based on quarterly Asilomar data for the years 2021 and 2022 was between 350 and 400 cats and dogs. Actual daily counts will vary from the average and counts vary with the seasons.

The Grand Jury surveyed the cities being served by OCAC. Most cities expressed satisfaction with the services provided by the shelter. During interviews with the Grand Jury, shelter management voiced the challenge of expanding and enhancing services versus the willingness of contract cities to pay for additional services. Shelter management expressed the need to balance services with the cost consciousness of their contract cities and the county budget, while also providing a level of service expected by the public. Shelter management expressed awareness that contract cities have alternative service options if the prices charged by OCAC for its service are beyond city expectations or budget.

From 1995 through 2016, the California Department of Public Health ( CDPH) collected and published data from California’ s animal shelters. Currently, CDPH does not keep or compile comprehensive data on animal shelters operating within the State. Out of concern for crowding and high euthanasia rates, animal welfare groups within the State have pressed for legislative action in Sacramento. In January of 2023, Assembly Bill 332, called the “Shelter Animal Collection Data Act,” was introduced by Assemblyman Alex Lee (D-San José) and coauthored by Assemblywoman Marie Waldron ( R-Valley Center).

Assembly Bill 332, if adopted, would require shelter data collection and reporting that piggybacks onto current rabies reporting mandates. The bill would further require CDPH to collect and publish animal shelter intake and outcome data, including adoption, redemption, euthanasia, and other categories.

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Volunteer and Rescue Relations
Most animal shelters rely on a host of shelter volunteers to help with the care and enrichment of the animals under supervision, and they also rely on private rescue organizations ( rescues) to help with the adoption process and fostering. OCAC is no exception.

Shelter volunteers help by assisting shelter staff with animal care, socialization, and enrichment; community outreach and events; conducting tours; greeting shelter visitors; and assisting with shelter adoptions. Volunteers are often the ones who walk the dogs, work with their socialization, and foster kittens without mothers. The volunteer program is vital.

Rescue organizations help by accepting animals from the shelter and facilitating adoptions or placing animals in foster care for eventual adoption. Rescues help relieve the shelter of overcrowding. These organizations benefit animals by facilitating adoptions or placing them in foster homes with enriched social environments greater than the shelter can reasonably provide.

The coordinated efforts of shelter staff, volunteers, and rescue organizations are vital to OCAC’ s success and the welfare of animals under its care. OCAC has been challenged by both inadequate staffing and strained collaboration between the shelter, volunteers, and rescues. Some challenges are the result of the recent COVID- 19 crisis, when the volunteer program was shut down in response to County health mandates. Other challenges are due to some rescue organizations’ responses to changes in shelter organization, operation, and procedures within the last 2 to 3 years. Moreover, some organizations report recent funding challenges that limit their ability to fully assist the shelter with its animal welfare mandate. Funding has been especially challenging for rescues since COVID- 19.

The shelter’ s volunteer program was not restarted until late 2022, although state COVID19 restrictions were lifted June 15, 2021. Unfortunately, restarting the program required more than calling all volunteers back from COVID- 19 isolation. Some former volunteers have not returned because they have moved on with their lives. Some volunteers have not returned because of their dissatisfaction with recent changes in organization, operation, and procedures at the shelter. However, some volunteers have returned, and more are being recruited to form the foundation for a re-energized volunteer program.

Relationships between the shelter and some rescues remain strained. Leadership changes within the past three years, changes in circumstances at the shelter, and the shelter’ s response to COVID- 19 resulted in changes to shelter priorities and practices to which some rescues object. Some changes were precipitated by differences in priorities and concerns that came with the change in shelter leadership, some changes were in response to COVID- 19 restrictions and concerns, and one change came as the result of the shelter’ s response to a threat of litigation by a lone animal activist from outside Orange County challenging the shelter ’s TNR program.

Strained relations between OCAC and rescue organizations are detrimental to the operations of the shelter and ultimately to the welfare of animals under the shelter’ s care.

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To operate at its highest potential, OCAC needs to have a good working relationship with the rescues. Rescues want to have a good working relationship with OCAC. During Grand Jury interviews, both management at OCAC and representatives of rescues indicated a desire to work to resolve their differences, and both expressed the welfare of the animals as being their highest priority.

OCAC will benefit if it has a robust outreach program to continually recruit volunteers and will benefit by engaging with the rescue community to mend the fractured relationship that has developed between them.

Human Resources
The OCAC shelter is a 24/7 facility that requires adequate staffing during all hours to meet the highest standards of animal welfare.

Continuity of leadership at the OCAC shelter has been a challenge over the past four years with turnover in management and supervisorial staff level positions. Over the past four years, two executive directors have been hired with interim leadership having to be provided on two separate occasions. The Chief Veterinary position went unfilled for months until the current Chief Veterinarian was brought onboard in May 2022. Between September 2021 and May 2022, the shelter did not have a chief or a staff veterinarian and services were provided by one contract veterinarian.

OCAC is under the direction of OC Community Resources ( OCCR). However, day-today human resource and recruitment support for the shelter is performed by OC Human Resource Services ( OCHRS). OCHRS provides separate, targeted human resource support for OCAC’ s recruitment, labor relations, and employee relations needs.

Personnel turnover in critical job categories, such as kennel attendants, can add huge pressure to the remaining staff. Vacancies in critical positions strain shelter operations and impact animal welfare. There are currently 21 allocated Animal Care Attendant positions out of the 136 shelter staff positions. The 21 animal care attendants are assigned to fill the shelter’ s attendant needs over the 7-day shelter week. There is reason for concern and urgency when even one Animal Care Attendant position goes unfilled.

County policies and practices exacerbate high turnover and make filling vacant positions difficult. Current county practice allows an employee to promote out of their shelter position, or any position, at any time, even while they are still within their probationary period. The ease and fluidity of transitioning adds to the shelter’ s understaffing and staffing volatility.

Staff vacancies, which have been as high as 23%, negatively impact shelter operations and have taken as long as six months or longer to fill. Delays in filling staff positions disrupt shelter operations. Delays have resulted in qualified candidates declining job offers because they have accepted other positions. Animal Care Attendant and Veterinarian positions are particularly critical and vital to the welfare of the shelter’ s animals. While OCCR has taken some steps to correct hiring delays, there needs to be an increased sense of urgency when posting and filling critical vacant positions.

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As a unionized organization, limitations exist which impact the assignment of human resources within the shelter’ s organization and daily operations. Staff are siloed into operational categories and job functions, which limits managerial flexibility in their ability to respond to special operational needs. An inflexibility in management’ s ability to respond to vacancies in Animal Care Attendant staffing is one such example. Staffing limitations and operational inflexibility has resulted in instances of inefficient allocation of shelter human resources. Moreover, labor rules limit shelter volunteers from performing certain duties that must be performed by shelter employees. Volunteers are drawn to the shelter out of a desire to work and care for the animals. Restricting volunteers from lending a hand when they see the need is disheartening to the volunteers.

Animal Care Attendants
Animal care attendants at OCAC provide the direct, daily care of the animals. They attend to several areas of responsibilities:

Intaking animals brought to the shelter by the public or impounded by animal control or the cities, entering information about the animal into the shelter’ s data base, and taking pictures of the animals.

Feeding and watering of all the shelter’ s animals – domestic, exotic, and wild.

Cleaning and disinfecting kennels, cages, corrals, and equipment and maintaining the general cleanliness of the shelter’ s kennel facilities.

Monitoring, documenting, and reporting on the health and well-being of sick, exotic, and quarantined animals; reporting any abnormalities or changes in condition to veterinary staff.

Assisting with animal adoptions, including providing counseling on breed characteristics, matching and introducing the appropriate animal to the potential adopter, and instructing adopters in basic animal care.

Grooming the animals for the health and comfort of the animals.

Responding to public inquiries about legal retention, adoption procedures, basic animal care, and behavior.

Animal Care Attendants may be assigned into any one of three areas of responsibility:

Intake, Cat Team, or Dog Team. Usually, Intake has two Animal Care Attendants assigned to it; they may receive 30 to 60 animals per day. The Cat Team is responsible for the kennel areas housing cats, kittens, rabbits, guinea pigs and other animals. Their duties include cleaning and feeding, enrichment, adoption and the other activities discussed above. The Dog Team is responsible for the kennel areas housing dogs. Their duties include cleaning and feeding, enrichment, adoption and the other activities noted above.

In 2016, OCAC brought in professional consultants to provide recommendations for a 2018 Strategic Plan. One of the consultant’ s recommendations was for the shelter to increase staffing allocation to 26 Animal Care Attendant positions. OCAC did not implement that recommendation. Additionally, the consultant recommended the shelter follow the Association of Shelter Veterinarians ( ASV) Guidelines for Standards of Care in Animal Shelters. Those practices include National Animal Control Association ( NACA) Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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guidelines and the Humane Society of the United States ( HSUS) guidelines ( which is the current standard).

The allocation of Animal Care Attendants at OCAC is insufficient for the shelter to meet industry standards for level of care. NACA and HSUS recommend a minimum of 15 minutes of care per day per animal for feeding and cleaning each animal housed in the shelter; 9 minutes for cleaning and 6 minutes for feeding and watering.

There are currently 21 Animal Care Attendant positions allocated at the shelter. Three positions were vacant as of May 1, 2023. A normal Animal Care Attendant daily shift at the shelter is 10 hours, of which the attendants are expected to spend half their time cleaning, feeding, and watering the animals and half their time attending to other responsibilities, including those responsibilities noted above. Half the Animal Care Attendants work from Wednesday through Saturday and the others work Sunday through Wednesday. Animal Care Attendants spend about 4½ hours cleaning and feeding the animals each day.

The Grand Jury evaluated the Animal Care Attendant’ s workload during the four-month period between December 4, 2022 and April 10, 2023. Individual Animal Care Attendants cared for 48 animals per shift on average and in some cases up to 90 animals per shift.

Conservatively, Animal Care Attendants at the shelter spend less than 6 minutes on average per animal attending to cleaning and feeding, which is much less than the 15 minutes recommended by the NACA and HSUS guidelines.

Of note, the four-month period reviewed by the Grand Jury is not the shelter’ s busy season. During kitten season, the cats and kittens alone can number up to 500 to 600 cats and kittens per day. The Grand Jury could not evaluate daily census records prior to December 4, 2022 because OCAC did not keep daily animal census records prior to that date.

There are still other needs the animals have, such as time for animal enrichment which is required daily. The other half of the Animal Attendant’ s shift is devoted to picking up animals from intake, showing animals for potential adoptions, walking dogs, stocking supplies, washing dishes or other non-direct animal care tasks.

ASV Guidelines stress enrichment should be given the same significance as feeding, watering, and veterinary care. Successful enrichment programs prevent the development and display of abnormal behavior and provide for the well-being of the animal. Regular positive daily social interaction with humans is essential for both dogs and cats. Animals need daily walking, playing, grooming, petting, etc. OCAC’ s 2018 Strategic Plan called for all sheltered dogs and cats to receive appropriate daily enrichment tailored to their needs. The Grand Jury found that other shelters in Orange County walk their dogs several times per day and provide numerous opportunities for enrichment. At the OCAC shelter, dogs are not always walked daily. Instead, animal care attendants only walk dogs every other day, as time permits.

The Grand Jury recognizes that resources are limited, but the shelter must prioritize the welfare of the animals over other shelter operation considerations. This puts pressure on management to operate the shelter efficiently. Other animal care facilities report 50% of Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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their staff provide direct care to their animals. At OCAC, only 15% of staff provide direct care. The Grand Jury recommends a review of the current allocation of positions within OCAC. OCAC has 137 budgeted staff positions of which only 21 positions provide direct care to the animals. Assigning adequate resources to the direct care of the animals must be a priority as the health and welfare of the animals is the shelter’ s primary charge. The current allocation of Animal Care Attendant positions is insufficient.

Communication
The shelter’ s organizational challenges are numerous; many challenges are systemic, but some are self-inflicted. With many constituents, such as shelter staff, volunteers, rescue organizations, and the public at large, robust communication programs are essential to addressing the concerns and needs of both internal and external audiences.

Collaboration and communication within the shelter are lacking. Departments within the shelter are siloed. Staff within departments focus solely on their duties and responsibilities and are not encouraged to think of their efforts as being part of a “Big Picture.” Morale is reported to be low. Workplace rules and position classifications tend to discourage a collaborative mindset.

In March 2015, the Orange County Office of the Performance Director issued a report on the OCAC. The OC Auditor noted that, among other things, the shelter was not holding regular “ all-hands” staff meetings. The Auditor recommended that the shelter hold meetings at least every quarter. The 2014/2015 Orange County Grand Jury report of the OCAC made the same recommendation. The response from OCAC to this Grand Jury report was that all-hands meetings were implemented. However, all-hands meetings currently do not occur at any regularly scheduled interval. Although shelter staff have a general sense of shelter operations and functions, the shelter is a siloed work environment. Without regularly scheduled all-hands meetings, staff have little opportunity to hear and be heard by shelter leadership and for management to communicate a consistent message.

Shelter volunteers are limited to a program that effectively segregates them from shelter staff and management. Volunteers have little to no voice or effective input into the shelter’ s decision hierarchy.

Policies and Procedures
The Grand Jury found that the shelter’ s Policies and Procedures manual does not undergo regular internal review. There are policies and procedures in the manual that do not reflect current shelter practices. Additionally, there are important shelter practices and functions that are not addressed or are inadequately documented within the manual.

There are some policies and procedures in the manual addressing programs that are no longer relevant or where the manual describes practices that are outdated. It is evident some policies and procedures in the manual have from time to time been inserted or revised, but those cases appear to be done on an ad-hoc basis and are not methodical.

Individual policies and procedures documented in the manual are annotated with the date they became effective and, when applicable, revised. However, there is nothing to Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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indicate when or if a policy or procedure has been contemporarily reviewed and determined to be relevant, accurate, and applicable. Some policies and procedures in the manual were written as long ago as the late 1970s with revisions in the mid-2000s.

There is no indication that any particular policy or procedure has been reviewed as current and appropriate, or by whom, or when.

Operating a shelter without up-to-date, reliable policies, procedures, and guidelines make formal training difficult, if not impossible, and results in inconsistent operating protocols and practices. More importantly, when new staff are hired, training becomes on the job training” and subject to inconsistency. With the high level of turnover at the shelter, it is all the more important to ensure policies and procedures are up to date.

COVID-19
The impacts of COVID- 19 on shelter operations should not go unacknowledged. Shelter operations were severely strained as state and county COVID- 19 restrictions were put into place. The shelter was effectively closed to the public. Emergency protocols and practices were put into place to ensure the safety of the public and OCAC staff.

Leadership had to manage a 24-hour shelter, with many members of the staff required to work on site. Work shifts and resources had to be juggled to ensure staffing was sufficient and personnel were kept safe. Within the limits of the shelter’ s staffing allocation, management created a Team A/Team B system that isolated one half of the staff from the other half of the staff. Staff came into work only during those days and hours their assigned team was scheduled. Extraordinary sanitation protocols were put into place.

Nevertheless, when COVID- 19 illnesses did occur, management and staff rose to the occasion, working flexibly and cooperatively to prioritize the care of the animals. Both shelter leadership and staff are to be commended for managing shelter operations through a difficult time.

Unfortunately, the volunteer program was suspended during COVID- 19 restrictions and engagement with rescues was significantly impacted. The volunteer program was slow to be restarted. Shelter management could and should have anticipated the end of COVID19 restrictions and worked toward reinstating the shelter’ s volunteer program much earlier than late 2022.

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Facilitating Adoption
During COVID- 19, most animal shelters, including OCAC, closed or restricted their shelters to public access, including stopping all public walk-in visits.

Prior to COVID- 19, the adoption process at the shelter was relatively open. The public was at liberty to visit the shelter at their convenience without an appointment. The cat and dog kennels were mostly open to public viewing where a potential adopter could experience first-hand the size, look, and manner of a potential adoptee. Volunteers and staff were available to facilitate an intimate meeting where humans and animals could interact and bond. The experience was unconstrained, spontaneous, instinctive, and natural.

OCAC previously had an animal behaviorist who worked with stressed animals to facilitate their adoptability. OCAC eliminated the animal behaviorist position. Other animal shelters in Orange County have animal behaviorists working with their animals to facilitate adoptability.

During COVID- 19, public adoptions were carried out by appointment only and computer facilitated. The public was required to schedule an appointment to visit the shelter. Up to three animals could be selected on the shelter’ s website from photographs and biographical information about the animals. A one-on-one meet-up with the animal( s) followed. People without computer access could use the shelter’ s computer kiosk to select an animal, but by appointment only. If a suitable animal was not found among the animals selected via computer, kennel staff might make recommendations to the potential adopter.

Currently, the adoption process is less restrictive than during COVID- 19 but remains more restrictive than pre-COVID- 19. The current appointment system is restrictive and Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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does not provide prospective adopters viewing access to all available adoptable animals.

The shelter has opened to limited walk-ins on a stand-by basis when there are openings in the appointment schedule and when staff are available to assist. All potential adopters, appointments, and walk-ins are still required to use the shelter’ s website to pre-select potential adoptees prior to a one-on-one meeting. The kennels are still off-limits to all visitors.

OCAC leadership expressed concern about bites to visitors as the primary reason for restricting kennel access. The shelter experienced a marked drop in bites coincidental with the closure of the facility to the public when COVID- 19 restrictions were implemented:
2019 – 23 bites
2020 – 7 bites
2021 – 3 bites
2022 – 2 bites ( as of December 23)
However, not all dogs are bite risks and there is space throughout the kennel facilities to provide for public viewing. Public safety is important, however, dogs representing bite risks can be segregated, and supervised viewing is a viable option.

Shelter leadership said that public viewing within the kennels stresses the animals and that restricting access keeps the animals calm. However, to address that concern, dogs prone to excitability and stress can be secluded, and supervised viewing is an option.

Spay and Neuter Overview
As mentioned earlier, the population of Orange County in 1950 was about 216,000.

Today the contract cities and unincorporated county areas served by OCAC has a population of approximately 1,800,000. With the population increase comes an increase in the number of dogs, cats, and other pets.

Euthanasia of animals at the shelter is a challenging problem confronting OCAC and pet owners. In most cases, members of the public either bring lost animals to the shelter to be reunited with their owners or bring their own animals to be adopted to new homes.

Few people bring animals to the shelter to be euthanized. One reason OCAC has so many animals and a high incidence of euthanasia is that many pet owners do not spay/neuter their pets and thereby allow them to reproduce beyond the owner’ s ability to care for the offspring.

Uncontrolled reproduction is a factor in the high population of dogs and especially cats.

According to a 2011 report by the North Shore Animal League of America, each day over 70,000 puppies and kittens are born in the United States, and because of overpopulation, more than 3.7 million animals are still being euthanized each year across the country. The absence of TNR at the shelter has seriously increased the rate of euthanasia of cats, especially kittens, who are not old enough or healthy enough to adopt.

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Many communities incentivize sterilization of pet dogs by significantly lowering the cost of dog licenses for sterilized dogs in their city. Generally, community shelters and rescue organizations will only allow spayed/ neutered animals for adoption or require the new owner have the animal spayed/ neutered as part of the adoption process.

Some complaints received by the Grand Jury assert that the public has requested low/no cost spay/neuter assistance from OCAC without success. OCAC does not offer low or no cost spay/neuter clinics or events but does list on its website feral cat low cost spay/neuter resources. However, the Grand Jury found that some of the listed phone numbers are incorrect and for those that are correct, some of the listed prices are incorrect. Providing a low/no cost spay/neuter clinic would provide a great service to the community, decrease overpopulation of animals, and decrease the potential euthanasia of cats and dogs.

Trap, Neuter and Return
OCAC began a pilot Trap, Neuter, and Return ( TNR) program for cats in 2013 and over the following years saw cat intake and euthanasia decrease dramatically. TNR has been shown to be the most humane, efficient way of stabilizing feral and community cat populations. TNR is an animal control program practiced by many animal shelters throughout the United States and the State of California. Prior to April 2020, the Orange County Animal Shelter had an active Trap, Neuter, and Return program.

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OCAC’ s TNR program was a cooperative endeavor that depended and relied on the efforts of participating non-profit rescue organizations and individual members of the community. Both OCAC and community participants worked together to make the TNR program successful. Non-profits and interested members of the animal welfare community performed the field work necessary to trap feral and community cats and transport the cats to the shelter. OCAC received the animals, performed the spay and neuter procedure, vaccinated the animals, and treated them for injuries or disease.

When the animals were healthy, fit, and ready for return to their outdoor home, the same non-profit organization or community members retrieved the cats from the shelter and returned them to the same location from which they were trapped.

OCAC only provided TNR related services within its shelter facility and did not participate in locating, trapping, or returning the animals to the location from where they were trapped. However, OCAC played an integral role in the TNR process. When OCAC’ s participation in the TNR program ended, TNR within the county effectively ceased.

OCAC’ s TNR program was popular among many local animal welfare groups and individuals and is a necessary element to the continuance of a viable TNR program throughout the county.

The Grand Jury recognizes there is disagreement among animal control and welfare advocates whether TNR is effective in reducing feral and community cat populations, whether TNR serves the best interest of the individual animal, and whether TNR is an environmentally sound practice. In Orange County at least, there apparently is also disagreement whether TNR programs violate a provision of the California Penal Code dealing with malicious mischief.

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California Penal Code Section 597s states:
a) Every person who willfully abandons any animal is guilty of a misdemeanor. b) This section shall not apply to the release or rehabilitation and release of native California wildlife pursuant to statute or regulations of the California Department of Fish and Game.

As best as the Grand Jury can determine, the validity of California Penal Code Section 597s or its interpretation or application has never been adjudicated in a reported California court decision. According to a report published by the American Bar Association, it is questionable whether a bona fide TNR program, in which animals are returned to the same location where they were trapped, constitutes willful abandonment.

In or about late 2019/ early 2020, OCAC received a cease- and-desist complaint demanding that it end its participation in the TNR program. OCAC referred the complaint to OC County Counsel. County Counsel reviewed and responded to the referral in an opinion. The Grand Jury went to great lengths to obtain a copy of County Counsel’ s opinion, to no avail. The Grand Jury requested a copy of the opinion from OCAC, the County Counsel, the Orange County Board of Supervisors, and Orange County Public Resources. As of the publication of this report, the Grand Jury was not able to acquire a copy of County Counsel’ s opinion. The Grand Jury was informed that OCCR and OCAC management were advised they could be held personally liable for any legal action arising out of continuance of the TNR program. OCAC’ s TNR program was terminated in or about April 2020.

Euthanasia Report
OCAC keeps detailed records of each animal it euthanizes. The Grand Jury reviewed a comprehensive list of all euthanasia outcomes at the shelter spanning the period August 19, 2018 through December 4, 2022. The shelter euthanized 11,143 animals during that period. Of the euthanized animals, 5,123 were identified as either domestic cats or dogs.

Feral cats are classified as domestic animals.) The remaining 6,020 euthanized animals included other domestic and/or non-domesticated animals.

OCAC’ s records identify every euthanized animal’ s date of euthanasia, estimated age, sex, species, breed, and the reason for euthanasia. Estimated animal ages span one day to 50 years. Species span domestic cats and dogs to domestic and/or nondomesticated animals such as snakes, birds, opossums, bats, rabbits, raccoons, skunks, lizards, rats, squirrels, coyotes, deer, and more. Reasons for euthanasia are varied and include irredeemable suffering, Head Test (rabies), disease, behavior, age, species public safety), and owner request.

Asilomar Reports
In 2004, leaders representing national organizations and industry stakeholders gathered to find common ground in the animal welfare field. Together, they wrote the Asilomar Accords, which establishes common definitions and a standardized way of reporting shelter statistics. Asilomar reports are statistical reports that animal shelters compile documenting their animal intakes and outcomes. The reports are aggregated into a national Shelter Animals Count National Database.

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OCAC compiles records and participates according to the Asilomar Accords data collection methods. The shelter publishes its Asilomar reports on its website. OCAC’ s data includes statistics on monthly ( pre-2021) and quarterly ( post-2021) cat and dog intake and outcomes such as adoptions, transfers, returns to owner, and euthanasia.

Analysis of OCAC Data
The Grand Jury reviewed euthanasia and Asilomar outcomes to evaluate whether termination of the TNR program may have had any impact on euthanasia rates at the shelter. Possibly confounding the issue is the fact that COVID- 19 restrictions were put into place about the same time the TNR program was terminated.

Figure 2 shows quarterly OCAC Asilomar adult cat TNR outcomes and adult cat euthanasia outcomes from the 3rd quarter of 2018 through the end of 2022. TNR rates are represented as a percent of total Asilomar outcomes. Euthanasia rates are represented as a percent of total Asilomar outcomes net of TNR outcomes. Juvenile cats are not included in the review because the shelter’ s juvenile cat population varies widely with the season and, moreover, juveniles are not candidates for TNR.

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Figure 2 - Adult Cat Euthanasia Rates
Figure 2 illustrates that adult cat euthanasia rates increased at OCAC following the termination of the TNR program and the beginning of COVID- 19 restrictions.

The average adult cat euthanasia rate in the period from the 3rd quarter of 2018 through the 1st quarter of 2020 (pre-TNR termination and COVID- 19 restrictions) was 20.9%. The average adult cat euthanasia rate in the period from the 2nd quarter of 2020 through the end of 2022 ( post-TNR and COVID- 19) was 28.8%. The increase in the rate of adult cat euthanasia following TNR/COVID- 19 is 38% over the previous period. The increase is statistically significant. ( See Appendix 1)
To evaluate whether circumstances related to COVID- 19 accounted for the increase in euthanasia rates, the rates from the post-COVID- 19/post-TNR termination were compared to the rates pre-COVID- 19/pre-TNR termination. Again, the average adult cat Comparing adult cat euthanasia rates pre-TNR
and post-TNR … the termination of the TNR
program correlate to an increase in adult cat
euthanasia rate at the shelter.

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euthanasia rate before COVID- 19 and during the TNR program was 20.9%. The average adult cat euthanasia rate after COVID- 19 restrictions were lifted but still during the termination of the TNR program ( Q3 2021 – Q4 2022) was 25.4%. The increase in the rate of adult cat euthanasia following termination of the TNR program but after COVID19 restrictions were lifted is 21% over the pre-TNR termination/ pre-COVID- 19 restrictions rate. Again, the increase is statistically significant.

Comparing adult cat euthanasia rates pre-TNR and post-TNR and pre- and post-COVID19 restrictions, it appears both COVID- 19 restrictions and the termination of the TNR program correlate to an increase in adult cat euthanasia rate at the shelter.

Dog Euthanasia:

OCAC euthanizes animals for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to injuries beyond redemptive medical care, age, and behavior. When OCAC euthanizes a dog for medical reasons, the Chief Veterinarian or a staff veterinarian must approve the procedure. In the case of behavior- related euthanasia, approval is determined by a fivemember Behavior Evaluation Committee.

OCAC euthanizes dogs that are determined to have irredeemable behavioral issues, including displays of aggression toward people or other animals, bites, and severe kennel stress. The five members of the Behavior Evaluation Committee include staff members representing Field Operations, Animal Services Operations, the Community Outreach team, the Chief Veterinarian, and a representative from senior management.

While there are five staff members represented on the Behavior Evaluation Committee, only three participants are voting members. The Chief Veterinarian and the member from senior management serve only as advisory members. A majority of the three voting members of the committee must approve a behavioral euthanasia – that is, at least two of the three voting members must approve.

OCAC’ s Behavior Evaluation Committee evaluates dogs for euthanasia without written guidelines, policies, or procedures, resulting in inconsistent outcomes over time.

Behavior- evaluated euthanasia outcomes are dependent on the experience and personal considerations of the individual committee members and management rather than written objective standards. The voting members of the Behavior Evaluation Committee may evaluate behavior based on their own observations and/or on the written reports of other staff members. The voting members are not required to directly observe a dog’s behavior, and in some cases have not made direct observation, but they do have access to video documentation of a dog’s behavior. Voting members come to their own conclusions based on their own understanding of dog behavior and rehabilitative potential.

OCAC does not have a professional licensed, trained, or certified animal behaviorist on staff to oversee the dog enrichment programs, resulting in dogs with declining behavior being placed at greater risk of being euthanized. Voting members of the Behavior Evaluation Committee are not required to certify or participate in animal behavior education programs. The Behavior Evaluation Committee meets once per week and participation of the voting member from any one of the three voting departments may be Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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delegated to a lesser experienced staff member when the regular voting member is unavailable.

The Grand Jury reviewed dog behavior- related euthanasia data and Asilomar outcomes from the fourth quarter of 2018 to the third quarter of 2022 to evaluate the nature of dog behavioral euthanasia at the shelter over time. The chart below shows quarterly dog behavior euthanasia at OCAC for the third quarter of 2018 through the third quarter of 2022. Euthanasia rates are represented as a percent of total dog Asilomar outcomes by quarter. Juvenile dogs are included in the review because the shelter’ s juvenile dog population is subject to behavioral euthanasia. The Grand Jury found that for the dogs euthanized for behavior during the period under review, 7.4% of the dogs were no more than 6 months old and 14.2% were less than 1 year old. The Grand Jury was unable to determine why dogs less than one year in age would warrant behavioral euthanasia.

Figure 3 - Dog Euthanasia Rates (Behavioral)
Dog behavioral euthanasia rates increase at OC Animal Care between the second and third quarters in 2021
Figure 3 illustrates that dog behavior- related euthanasia rates increased at OCAC between the second and third quarters of 2021. The average dog behavioral euthanasia rate prior to the end of the second quarter of 2021 was 1.19% of all dog Asilomar outcomes. Beginning in the third quarter of 2021 and through the third quarter of 2022, the average dog behavioral euthanasia rate increased to 3.41% of all dog Asilomar outcomes, an increase of 187%. The increase is statistically significant. ( See Appendix 2)
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Impediments to the Investigation
The Grand Jury’s function is to investigate the operation of the various officers, departments, and agencies of the local government.

Article 1, Section 23 of the California Constitution states:

One or more grand juries shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county.”
Provisions of the California Penal Code define the scope and limitations of a grand jury’s authority:

Penal Code Section 916:

Rules of procedure shall include guidelines for that grand jury to ensure that all findings included in its final reports are supported by documented evidence, including … official records, or interviews attended by no fewer than two grand jurors and that all problems identified in a final report are accompanied by suggested means for their resolution, including financial, when applicable.

Penal Code Section 921:

The grand jury is entitled to … the examination, without charge, of all public records within the county.

Penal Code Section 925:

The grand jury shall investigate and report on the operations, accounts, and records of the officers, departments, or functions of the county … The investigations may be conducted on some selective basis each year …
Penal Code Section 925 (a):

The grand jury may, at all times, request the advice of the court, or the judge thereof, the district attorney, the county counsel, or the Attorney General … As a department of Orange County government, the County Counsel’ s office provides legal counsel and services to the Orange County Board of Supervisors and all other Orange County departments and agencies, including the Grand Jury.

At the start of a Grand Jury’s one-year term, County Counsel assigns an individual attorney within its office to serve as the Grand Jury’s primary attorney. Because the individual serving as the Grand Jury’s counsel is also assigned to other departments or agencies within Orange County government, there is the potential for the Grand Jury’s designated primary counsel to have a conflict of interest when the Grand Jury investigates a department or agency otherwise served by the primary attorney. To ensure continuity of legal service to the Grand Jury, the County Counsel’ s office also assigns a back-up attorney that provides service to the Grand Jury when the primary counsel is conflicted. The back-up attorney is selected so that at least the primary or Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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back-up would not have a disabling conflict – that is, one or the other would be available to serve the Grand Jury in any investigation not directly related to the County Counsel’ s office itself. Back-up counsel advises the Grand Jury on those matters only when the primary attorney is conflicted.

Early during its one-year term and early in its investigation, the Grand Jury learned that its primary counsel had a conflict of interest with its investigation of OCAC. The County Counsel’ s office explained, and the Grand Jury understood, that the services of the County Counsel’ s office would continue through the back-up attorney assigned for such circumstances. Initially, during the early stages of its OCAC investigation, the Grand Jury received the legal advice and assistance of the back-up attorney in the County Counsel’ s office.

Later during its investigation of OCAC, the Grand Jury inquired into the shelter’ s prior TNR program and the program’ s termination in early 2020. The Grand Jury learned the program was terminated after a cease- and-desist demand to stop the program was received from a lone individual residing outside of Orange County. The Grand Jury was informed that the County Counsel’ s office, in response to a request by OCAC to review the cease- and-desist demand, issued an opinion to the Orange County Board of Supervisors and OCAC about the shelter’ s TNR program that evidently led to a direction to terminate the program.

In the course of the Grand Jury’s investigation, including interviews with OCAC and OCCR staff and leadership, the County Counsel’ s office and its opinion were repeatedly cited as being the source of the decision to stop the TNR program.

The Grand Jury understands County Counsel’ s role is to provide advice and counsel to the Board of Supervisors, County departments, and various County agencies, but that it has no decision- making authority over any division of County governance, except regarding its own internal functions. While the Grand Jury was skeptical that the County Counsel’ s office actually made, or had the authority to make, the decision to terminate the TNR program, the Grand Jury nevertheless understood that the County Counsel’ s opinion was pivotal to the decision. Therefore, the Grand Jury requested a copy of the opinion to learn if there was a clear impediment to or prohibition on a possible renewal of the TNR program.

The Grand Jury requested a copy of the opinion from interviewees who were privy to the document or its contents. In addition, the Grand Jury asked the County Counsel’ s office for a copy of the opinion. In every instance, those requested told the Grand Jury the opinion is a privileged communication between the County Counsel’ s office and the Board of Supervisors and that only the Board of Supervisors has authority to release the document. Finally, the Grand Jury asked the Board of Supervisors, through its Chair, for Grand Jury: Who was the decision maker?
Answer: “ The County Counsel.”
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a copy of the opinion or alternatively for an identification of the legal authority reviewed in studying the issue, and stated the confidentiality of the document would be maintained, whereupon the Board of Supervisors declined to consider or include the request in its meeting agenda. Unfortunately, and not through a lack of trying, the Grand Jury has been unable to review or assess the basis of the opinion.

During the Grand Jury’s interviews, when various levels of leadership within OCAC asserted that County Counsel made the decision to terminate the TNR program, the Grand Jury always expressed its skepticism and inquired as to how County Counsel, an advisor to the County and OCAC, and only an advisor, could be making policy decisions for OCAC? The Grand Jury inquired and pressed its interviewees, asking if it was, in fact, a decision made at some level within OCAC’ s leadership, or by OCCR, or by the Board of Supervisors. When pressed, in every case, each interviewee modified their explanation and affirmed the decision had been theirs or that they had taken part in the decision, each taking personal responsibility for the decision.

The Grand Jury was determined to obtain documentation of the decision as it continued to press for a copy of the County Counsel’ s opinion, The Grand Jury then requested all internal OCAC communications documenting the decision and/or order to stop the TNR program. The Grand Jury requested departmental communications instructing staff to stand down from the TNR program, whether from the OCCR to OCAC, OCAC to animal shelter leadership, or animal shelter leadership to shelter staff.

Departmental communications about the TNR program are policy and procedure communications. The Grand Jury assumed that departmental communications would point to how and by whom the decision was made. The Grand Jury understands such communications are public records, not privileged communications. Nevertheless, the Grand Jury’s request for documentation was denied by OCAC with the reason that such communications were privileged.

Coincidental to the Grand Jury’s efforts to obtain a copy of the County Counsel’ s opinion, at the end of 2022, the County Counsel’ s office detached itself altogether from all matters related to the Grand Jury’s investigation of OCAC. The County Counsel’ s office informed the Superior Court and the Grand Jury that its entire office was “conflicted” with regard to the investigation into OCAC and would recuse itself from assisting the Grand Jury in its investigation into all matters related to OCAC. No back-up attorney was provided and all communications ceased.

Of note, the Grand Jury’s investigation was not an investigation of the County Counsel’ s office. Rather, the Grand Jury was investigating an Orange County agency, a client of the County Counsel, just as every Grand Jury investigation into County agencies represents an investigation into clients of the County Counsel. When the County Counsel’ s office recused itself from the Grand Jury’s OCAC investigation, it did not explain or cite any specific aspect of the OCAC investigation that makes it exceptional from any other of the ongoing Grand Jury investigations into County departments or agencies.

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were directed toward arranging for alternative outside counsel at the recommendation and with the support of the Superior Court. After losing approximately six weeks, the Grand Jury was able to engage alternative outside counsel in early February of 2023.

As of the publication of this report, the Grand Jury was not able to confirm the logic, reasoning, or basis of the County Counsel’ s opinion, or even whether in fact the County Counsel advised against the continuance of the TNR program. Moreover, the Grand Jury cannot confirm whether, or who, or at what level of authority, within the County government the decision to end TNR emanated. As a consequence, the Grand Jury cannot verify that any such decision was ever actually made, or communicated at any level of authority, by anyone within Orange County’ s governing hierarchy and, more importantly, why any such decision was made. The only fact the Grand Jury can confirm with any confidence is that the TNR program was terminated in or about early 2020.

CONCLUSION
OCAC has been a source of public concern since the 1990s, with five previous Orange County Grand Jury reports and an Orange County Performance Audit detailing troubling conditions at the OCAC shelter. This Grand Jury report shines a light on deficiencies at the shelter still needing resolution. The Grand Jury believes that if the recommendations included in this report are implemented:

Internal and external communications at OCAC will improve.

The reallocation of staffing positions within the organization, increasing the number of Animal Care Attendant positions and employing an animal behaviorist or trainer, will improve general animal welfare at the shelter.

Improvements in the timely filling of staff vacancies will enhance shelter operations and overall staff morale.

The adoption process will be more public-friendly, leading to more adoptions.

The behavioral euthanasia decision process will be standardized, articulated, and documented, leading to consistent behavioral euthanasia outcomes.

The shelter’ s Policies and Procedures will be correct and up to date.

OCAC and Orange County rescue organizations and animal advocates can work toward mending their relations for the welfare of the animals.

The shelter’ s TNR program will be re-evaluated, reconsidered and reinstated.

The shelter’ s volunteers will be more integrated into the shelter’ s personnel team and communications.

The Grand Jury conducted many interviews with shelter personnel. The Grand Jury is very impressed with their sense of dedication and earnest concern for the welfare of shelter animals.

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FINDINGS
In accordance with California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05, the 2022-2023 Grand Jury requires ( or, as noted, requests) Responses from each agency affected by the Findings presented in this section. The Responses are to be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Based on its investigation titled, “ Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice, The State of Animal Welfare Overseen by the County of Orange,” the 2022-2023 Grand Jury has arrived at seventeen Findings, as follows:

Management:

F1 Management has limited flexibility utilizing personnel within Orange County Animal Care across departments due to structured work rules, volunteer work restrictions, and employees working in departmental silos.

F2 Low staff morale exists within Orange County Animal Care.

F3 Orange County Animal Care staffing is negatively impacted by vacant positions remaining unfilled for greater than six months due to burdensome hiring processes. This delay in recruitment and completion of hiring has resulted in qualified candidates declining job offers.

F4 Based upon industry standards and best practices, Orange County Animal Care kennel attendants are understaffed to meet the needs of animals under care.

F5 Orange County Animal Care’s operating policies and procedures manual is out of date.

F6 The Orange County Animal Care Volunteer program was stopped during COVID- 19 and restarting the program has been slow, resulting in decreased animal socialization and enrichment.

Animal Welfare
F7 Orange County Animal Care’s Behavior Evaluation Committee evaluates dogs for euthanasia without written guidelines, policies, or procedures, resulting in inconsistent outcomes over time. Behavior evaluated euthanasia outcomes are dependent on the experience and personal considerations of the individual committee members and management rather than written objective standards.

F8 The rate of behavioral euthanasia of dogs has increased significantly over the last 2 years.

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F9 Orange County Animal Care does not employ a professional or trained and certified animal behaviorist to oversee the shelter’ s dog enrichment program, resulting in dogs with declining behavior being placed at greater risk of being euthanized.

F10 While many county and city animal shelters throughout the state have active Trap, Neuter, and Return programs, Orange County Animal Care stopped its Trap, Neuter, and Return program, reportedly on the basis of the County Counsel’ s legal opinion that the program violates a California statute related to willful animal abandonment.

F11 The termination of the Trap, Neuter, and Return program is correlated with an increase in adult cat euthanasia rate at the shelter.

F12 There have been public concerns and requests expressed over the years for public programs to include a spay/neuter program by Orange County Animal Care.

Communication / Outreach
F13 The current adoption appointment system restricts public access to the dog kennels, thereby limiting potential adopters’ access to all available animals.

F14 Orange County Animal Care’s engagement with some animal rescue partners is negatively impacted due to differences of opinion in appropriate animal care policy.

F15 Internal and community engagement does not adequately communicate the shelter’ s mission and operating strategy.

F16 The information currently on the Orange County Animal Care website for lowcost spay/neuter is not up to date with regard to referrals and prices for spay/neuter procedures.

Impediments to the Investigation
F17 The OC County Counsel’ s office misstated to the Grand Jury the scope of its commitment to serving and assisting the Grand Jury in its investigations into County governance respecting managing conflicts between the Board of Supervisors, OC departments and agency clients, and the Grand Jury.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
In accordance with California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05, the 2022-2023 Grand Jury requires ( or, as noted, requests) responses from each agency affected by the Recommendations presented in this section. The Responses are to be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Based on its investigation titled “Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice, The State of Animal Welfare Overseen by the County of Orange,” the 2022-2023 Grand Jury makes the following seventeen recommendations:

Management:

R1 By October 1, 2023, OC Human Resource Services should review and update recruitment strategies to significantly increase the timeliness of recruitment of vacant positions and to anticipate vacancies due to retirement, resignations, transfers. ( F3)
R2 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care, OC Community Resources, and OC Human Resource Services should review hiring practices to facilitate process improvements to expedite filling OCAC vacancies. ( F3) R3 By October 1, 2023, OC Community Resources and Orange County Animal Care should review their current staffing allocations of Animal Care Attendants to reflect NACA guidelines and to provide appropriate staffing allocations for animal care, feeding and enrichment. ( F3, F4)
R4 By October 1, 2023, OC Community Resources and Orange County Animal Care should review their current staffing allocations of all positions within the OCAC and reallocate resources to increase Animal Care Attendants to reflect NACA guidelines to provide appropriate staffing for animal care, feeding, and enrichment. ( F3, F4)
R5 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should review and update policies, procedures, guidelines, and practices to assure they are accurate and reflect current operating practices. ( F5) R6 By June 30, 2024, the Board of Supervisors should evaluate the strategic option of creating a Joint Powers Authority for the County and fourteen contract Cities to take ownership and shared responsibility for the financial and operating policies and practices of OCAC. ( F1 thru F16)
Welfare
R7 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should establish written guidelines, policies, and procedures as standards for evaluating animal behavior for use by the Behavior Evaluation Committee. ( F5, F7) Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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R8 By December 31, 2023, in the interests of transparency, Orange County Animal Care management should add a representative from a rescue organization to serve as a non-voting, at-large member on the Behavior Evaluation Committee.

F7, F14)
R9 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care, OC Community Resources, and OC Human Resource Services should hire an animal behaviorist or certified dog trainers to work with aggressive animals to reduce the high rate of dogs being euthanized and enhance their adoptability. ( F8, F9) R10 By December 31, 2023, the Orange County Board of Supervisors and Orange County Animal Care management should request that County Counsel reconsider its opinion about the shelter' s former Trap, Neuter, and Return program, or seek an independent second opinion to County Counsel’ s opinion, to ascertain whether the program can be re-established, or a modified version of the program can be implemented. ( F10, F11)
R11 By July 1, 2024, Orange County Animal Care should implement a low-cost public spay/neuter program. ( F12)
Communication / Outreach
R12 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should hold allhands staff meetings at least every quarter. ( F1, F2) R13 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care, OC Community Resources, and OC Human Resource Services should conduct annual surveys of staff to monitor morale and identify opportunities for operational improvement. ( F1, F2) R14 By December 31, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should open the shelter to the public for walk throughs to maximize opportunities for the public to adopt animals under the care of the shelter. ( F13) R15 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should look for new ways to be more inclusive and engaged with volunteers and the rescue organizations that are necessary for the shelter’ s success. ( F14, F15) R16 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care should schedule quarterly meetings with community stakeholders to facilitate transparency and engagement. ( F14, F15)
R17 By October 1, 2023, Orange County Animal Care management should update the information currently on its website for low-cost spay/neuter of feral cats with regard to referrals and prices for spay/neuter procedures. ( F16) Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
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Impediments to the Investigation
R18 Beginning with the 2023/2024 Grand Jury training, and all training thereafter, County Counsel should provide detailed instruction about the circumstances under which the County Counsel’ s office might recuse itself from assisting with Grand Jury investigations and the alternatives available to the Grand Jury under such circumstances. ( F17)
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REQUIRED RESPONSES
California Penal Code Section 933 requires the governing body of any public agency which the Grand Jury has reviewed, and about which it has issued a final report, to comment to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations pertaining to matters under the control of the governing body. Such comment shall be made no later than 90 days after the Grand Jury publishes its report filed with the Clerk of the Court). Additionally, in the case of a report containing findings and recommendations pertaining to a department or agency headed by an elected County official ( e.g., District Attorney, Sheriff, etc.), such elected County official shall comment on the findings and recommendations pertaining to the matters under that elected official’ s control within 60 days to the Presiding Judge with an information copy sent to the Board of Supervisors.

Furthermore, California Penal Code Section 933.05 specifies the manner in which such comment( s) are to be made as follows:
a) As to each Grand Jury finding, the responding person or entity shall indicate one of the following:
1) The respondent agrees with the finding.
2) The respondent disagrees wholly or partially with the finding, in which case the response shall specify the portion of the finding that is disputed and shall include an explanation of the reasons therefor.
b) As to each Grand Jury recommendation, the responding person or entity shall report one of the following actions:
1) The recommendation has been implemented, with a summary regarding the implemented action.
2) The recommendation has not yet been implemented, but will be implemented in the future, with a time frame for implementation.
3) The recommendation requires further analysis, with an explanation and the scope and parameters of an analysis or study, and a time frame for the matter to be prepared for discussion by the officer or head of the agency or department being investigated or reviewed, including the governing body of the public agency when applicable. This time frame shall not exceed six months from the date of publication of the Grand Jury report.
4) The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable, with an explanation therefor.
c) If a finding or recommendation of the Grand Jury addresses budgetary or personnel matters of a county agency or department headed by an elected officer, both the agency or department head and the Board of Supervisors shall respond if requested by the Grand Jury, but the response of the Board of Supervisors shall address only those Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2022 I 2023 PAGE 37 OF 51
budgetary / or personnel matters over which it has some decision making authority. The response of the elected agency or department head shall address all aspects of the findings or recommendations affecting his or her agency or department.

Comments to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in compliance with Penal Code 933.05 are required and requested from:

Findings – 90-day Response Required
Orange County Board of
Supervisors:

F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12,
F13, F14, F15, F16, F17
City of Anaheim: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Brea: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Cypress: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Fountain Valley: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Fullerton: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Huntington Beach: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Lake Forest: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Orange: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Placentia: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of San Juan Capistrano: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Santa Ana: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Tustin: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Villa Park: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 City of Yorba Linda: F4, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F15, F16 Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2022 I 2023 PAGE 38 OF 51
Recommendations – 90-day Response Required
Orange County Board of
Supervisors:

R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12,
R13, R14, R15, R16, R17, R18
City of Anaheim: R6
City of Brea: R6
City of Cypress: R6
City of Fountain Valley: R6
City of Fullerton: R6
City of Huntington Beach: R6
City of Lake Forest: R6
City of Orange: R6
City of Placentia: R6
City of San Juan Capistrano: R6
City of Santa Ana: R6
City of Tustin: R6
City of Villa Park: R6
City of Yorba Linda: R6
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REQUESTED RESPONSES
Findings – 90-Day Response Requested
Orange County Animal Care: F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15, F16
OC Human Resources
Services:

F1, F2, F3, F4, F9
Orange County County
Counsel:

F10, F11, F17
Recommendations – 90-Day Response Requested
Orange County Animal Care: R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15, R16, R17
OC Human Resources
Services:

R1, R2, R9, R13
Orange County County
Counsel:

R10, R18
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REFERENCES
American Bar Association, Tort, Trial, and Insurance Practice Section. “Report to the House of Delegates Resolution 102B.” 2017.Accessed September 30, 2022. American- BarAssociation- TNVR-report.pdf (maddiesfund. org) American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty toAnimals. “Asilomar Accords: Definitions.” 2004. Accessed January 28, .2023, Asilomar Accords: Definitions | ASPCA Association ofShelter Veterinarians “Shelter Terminology.” 2017. Accessed March 25, 2023, Microsoft Word - Shelter Terminology (sheltervet.org) City of Garden Grove. “Ordinance NO. 2911”. 2019. Accessed January 28, 2023. 11-26- 19_cc_Ordinance_ Amending_ Animal_ and_Fire_Dept_Related_ Regulations. pdf City of West Hollywood. “An Ordinance of the City ofWest Hollywood Establishing a Trap- Neuter-Return Program for Community Cats; Amending the Language of the Municipal Code to Reflect a Change in Nomenclature From "Feral Cats" toCommunity Cats"; Updating Section 9.48.080 To Reflect the Current Code Provision Regarding Animal Noise and Determination that the Project isExempt From CEQA.” November 4, 2019. “ California Population.” Accessed March 22, 2023. Orange County, California Population 2023 (worldpopulationreview.com) Human Animal Support Services. “Animal Shelter Speak: Understanding Common Animal Services Jargon. 2023. Accessed March 25, 2023. Animal Shelter Speak: Understanding Common Animal Services Jargon - HASS (humananimalsupportservices.org) Newbury, Sandra et al. “Guidelines forStandards of Care inAnimal Shelters. The Association ofShelter Veterinarians. 2010. shelter-standards-oct2011-wforward.pdf (sheltervet.org). North Shore Animal League. “Did youKnow?” 2011. Accessed February 24, 2023 cats- multiply-pyramid.pdf (animalleague.org) Orange County Animal Care “Strategic Plan – 2018” accessed January 28, 2023. ocac_2018_strategic_plan.pdf (stayinalivelongbeach.org) Orange County. Office ofPerformance Audit. “Performance Audit of Orange County Animal Care.” Final Report (#141505). Orange County California, 2015. Microsoft Word - Animal Care Report (ocgov.com) Orange County Grand Jury 2014-2015. “IfAnimals Could Talk About the Orange County Animal Shelter.” 2015. Accessed January 28, 2023. Shelter_Performance_V8R2_web.pdf ( ocgrandjury.org) Orange County Grand Jury 2014-2015. “The Orange County Animal Shelter: the Facility, the Function, the Future.” 2015. Accessed January 28, 2023. OC_animal_shelter.pdf ( ocgrandjury.org).

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ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2022 I 2023 PAGE 41 OF 51
Orange County Grand Jury 2007-2008. “Is Orange County Going to the Dogs”. 2008. Accessed January 28, 2023. 2023, IS ORANGE COUNTY GOING TO THE DOGS (ocgrandjury.org) Orange County Grand Jury 2003-2004. “The Orange County Animal Shelter, Are Improvements Needed?” 2004. Accessed January 28, 2023. Microsoft Word - AnimalShelterReport draft 12a.doc (ocgrandjury.org). Orange County Grand Jury 1999-2000. “We Can doBetter…Improving Animal Care in Orange County.” 2000. Accessed January 28, 2023. FINAL.PDF (ocgrandjury. org) Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2022 I 2023 PAGE 42 OF 51
APPENDIX 1
Table 1 - Adult Cat Euthanasia and TNR Rates by Quarter Adult Cats Euthanized
as a % of Adult Cat
Asilomar Outcomes net
of TNR Outcomes
Adult Cat TNR
Outcomes as % of adult
Cat Asilomar Outcomes
2018 Q3 23.17% 40%
Q4 17.27% 36%
2019 Q1 17.42% 41%
Q2 26.81% 49%
Q3 24.95% 47%
Q4 18.77% 31%
2020 Q1 18.08% 37%
Q2 42.65% 5%
Q3 41.67% 4%
Q4 25.50% 1%
2021 Q1 27.50% 0%
Q2 27.31% 0%
Q3 25.86% 0%
Q4 23.21% 0%
2022 Q1 21.93% 0%
Q2 30.12% 0%
Q3 24.73% 0%
Q4 26.26% 0%
Table 2 - Adult Cat Euthanasia Sample T-Test
Adult Cats Euthanized as a % of Non-TNR Asilomar Outcomes Q3 2018 thru Q1 2020 vs. Q2 2020 thru Q4 2022
TNR period vs. No TNR period)
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Q3 2018 to Q1
2020
Q2 2020 to End
of Year 2022
Mean 20.9% 28.8%
Variance 0.001571145 0.004841058
Observations 7 11
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 16
t Stat - 3.0532928
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003793173
t Critical one-tail 1.745883676
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APPENDIX 2
Table 3 - Dog Behavioral Euthanasia Rates by Quarter
All Dogs Euthanized for Behavior
as % of all Adult Dog ASILOMAR Outcomes
Dogs
Euthanized
for Behavior
All Dog
Asilomar
Outcomes
Dogs
Euthanized
2018 Q4 8 1356 0.59%
2019 Q1 21 1385 1.52%
Q2 15 1384 1.08%
Q3 15 1522 0.99%
Q4 16 1312 1.22%
2020 Q1 13 1146 1.13%
Q2 7 701 1.00%
Q3 13 817 1.59%
Q4 13 791 1.64%
2021 Q1 8 746 1.07%
Q2 10 824 1.21%
Q3 18 868 2.07%
Q4 49 882 5.56%
2022 Q1 27 956 2.82%
Q2 44 962 4.57%
Q3 23 1143 2.01%
Table 4 - Dog Behavioral Euthanasia Rates 2 Sample T-Test All Dogs Euthanized for Behavior as a % of All Dog
ASILOMAR Outcomes Q4 2018 to Q2 2021 vs Q3 2021 to Q3 2022 t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Q4 2018 to Q2
2021
Q3 2021 to Q3
2022
Mean 1.19% 3.41%
Variance 9.40995E- 06 0.000251006
Observations 11 5
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 4
t Stat - 3.109244662
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.017949066
t Critical one-tail 2.131846786
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APPENDIX 3
Orange County Grand Jury Animal Shelter Contract City Survey

1. How long has your city been serviced by the Orange County Animal Shelter? a. What factors motivated the city to contract with the Orange County Animal Shelter?

2. What Services have you contracted for the Orange County Animal Shelter? i.e., Shelter; Animal Control, Licensing, other)

3. What Animal control and care services does the city continue to reserve for itself or contract out to other agencies or vendors not with the Orange County Animal Shelter? i.e., Control, Licensing, other)

4. How often is the city contract with the Orange County Animal Shelter reviewed and renewed?

5. Describe any regularly scheduled processes the city has in place to review the quality of service provided by the Orange County Animal Shelter.
a. Describe the measure or metrics the city uses when evaluating the Animal Shelter. Please provide a copy of the last review of the Animal Shelter conducted by the city.
b. Describe any review of the Orange County Animal Shelter and the services it provides as part of Shelter contract review and renewal? c. Who conducts Animal Shelter reviews for the city.
d. Are Animal Shelter reviews presented to the city council for their consideration?

6. Does your City have an appointed member of city staff to serve as liaison between the city and OC Animal Shelter management?
a. How frequently does your city meet with the OC Animal Shelter management?

7. As it relates to the sheltering and adoption services provided by the Orange County Animal Shelter( if any) describe your level of satisfaction or any concerns with the service and support.

8. As it relates to Animal Control services being provided ( if any) describe your level of satisfaction or any concerns with the service and support.

9. As it relates to Licensing fees and processing ( if any) describe your level of satisfaction or any concerns with the service and support.

10. How reasonable are the County fees for providing this service?

11. Have members of you community voiced any concern with Orange County Animal Shelter policies or practices.
a. Please provide the Grand Jury with the any of the city’s complaint logs or records pertaining to the Orange County Animal Shelter.

12. Are there any improvements in the service OC Animal Shelter provides or in the City’s relationship with the Shelter you would like to see?
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APPENDIX 4
Orange County Grand Jury Independent City Shelter Survey

1. How is the shelter organized and management governance accomplished at your Center?

2. How many cats, dogs and other animals can you shelter?

3. What services do you provide your local community?

4. How many total staff and volunteers are working or engaged with the shelter?

5. How many volunteers do you require on a daily or weekly basis? a. Do you have adequate volunteers?

6. Do you promote spay/ neuter services to the members of your community? a. If yes, is there a cost to the individual?

7. From your perspective what are the challenges faced by your Center?

8. Does your center practice TNR (Trap Neuter Return)?
a. If no, was it ever in place and then discontinued - why? b. If yes, how effective is the program?

9. Does your center accept healthy cats and put them up for adoption? a. If yes, please describe the process.

10. What are the parameters that guide euthanasia at your shelter?

11. Do you have an animal behaviorist on staff? If no, why not?

12. Do you have any interaction with the Orange County Animal Shelter? a. If yes, please describe.
b. If no, why?

13. How is adoption handled in your center? ( Adoption by appointment system, open visits, other)?

14. Do your adoption totals include totals transferred to rescues or does it apply only to private parties?

15. Please provide statistics ( attachment) for your center ( intake, adopted, transferred to shelter, euthanized, etc. by animal type for the current and past 3 years).

16. How does your center respond to complaints from the community and animal activists?

17. If tracked, please provide statistics on complaints you received.

18. Please provide intake statistics ( by Cats and Dogs) for the current and 3 past years:
a. Strays
b. Relinquished by owner
c. Owner intended Euthanasia
d. Other Intakes

19. Please provide live outcomes statistics ( by Cats and Dogs) for the current and 3 past years:

20. Adoptions
a. Return to Owner
b. Transferred to another agency
c. Returned to Field

21. Please provide other outcomes statistics ( by Cats and Dogs) for the current and 3 past years:
a. Died in Care
b. Shelter Euthanasia
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APPENDIX 5
OCAC 4th Quarter 2022 Asilomar Report
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ABBREVIATIONS:

ABA: American Bar Association
ASPCA: The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ASV: Association of Shelter Veterinarians
CDPH: California Department of Public Health
HASS: Human Animal Support Services
HSUS: Human Society of the United States
OCAC: Orange County Animal Care
OCCR: OC Community Resources
OCGJ: Orange County Grand Jury
OCHRS: OC Human Resource Services
NACA: National Animal Control Association
NGA: Non-government Organization
TNR: Trap, Neuter, Return
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GLOSSARY:

Adoption Barriers
Policies or procedures that make adoption, fostering, or volunteering a challenge.

Asilomar
Asilomar refers to an animal welfare industry conference held at Asilomar in Pacific Grove, California. Statistical guidelines developed from this meeting became known as the Asilomar Accords. Participating shelters compile their own data into ‘Asilomar’ reports, publish their data, and forward their reports to Humane Rescue Alliance which compiles nationwide animal welfare statistics.

Behavior Dogs
Dogs identified as having challenging behaviors.

Capacity for Care
Capacity for Care is an organization’ s ability to appropriately care for the animals it serves. This is based on a range of parameters including, but not limited to, the number of appropriate housing units; staffing for programs or services; staff training; average length of stay; and the total number of reclaims, adoptions, transfers, returns, or other outcomes.

Community Cat
An unowned cat can be social with people or not. A “Community Cat” is an umbrella definition that includes any outdoor, free roaming cat. These cats may be “Feral” (unsocialized) or friendly or may have been born into the wild. Usually, a Community Cat is a friendly cat.

Feral Cats
Feral cats are not socialized to, and are extremely fearful of, contact with people.

Typically, they do not respond well in captivity. A feral cat is typically born in the wild or outdoors with little to no human interaction. If you attempt to get too close or try to pet them, feral cats view your hand as a claw that will harm them and will hiss and/or run away. Feral cats are born from other ferals or from stray cats.

Kill / No Kill
Kill / No Kill refers to a shelter’ s policy respecting euthanasia. A no kill shelter will not conduct euthanasia, with exceptions for humane reasons. Practices of no kill shelters vary along a spectrum that reject the use of euthanasia as a primary means of population control and health management. A kill shelter will conduct euthanasia for a variety of reasons that include animal control, medical and population control, and Gimme Shelter and a Pound of Advice
ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY 2022 I 2023 PAGE 49 OF 51
behavior. Many municipal shelters are “kill” shelters as their mandates often include animal control.

Kitten Season
A busy time in the animal shelter world when feral and community cats have kittens. The season occurs during warm weather months. Also referred to as cat breeding season.

Typically kitten season is March-October but varies from place to place and in some areas is year-round.

Legal Retention
The number of days a shelter is required by law to hold an animal for recovery by owner prior to placing the animal for adoption, for sale, or euthanizing.

Live Outcome Types
Adoption: an animal is adopted
Return- to-Owner: an animal is returned to the custody of their human/ s.

Transferred- Out: an animal is transferred to the custody of another organization.

Trap Neuter Return: an animal is returned to their habitat or community after being treated for medical conditions, including spay/neuter.

Return to Field: putting an animal back where it was found, often as part of a TNR program.

Live Release Rate ( Asilomar Report)
Live Release Rate is the proportion of animals leaving the shelter alive to the total number of animals leaving alive plus the number of shelter directed euthanized animals.

Live outcomes are usually achieved through adoption, reclaim by owner, transfer to another agency or other life saving actions
Other Outcome Types
Died in Care: any animal who died while in the custody of the shelter, not by euthanasia.

Euthanized/ Killed: any animal whose life was ended purposefully while in custody of the organization.

Rescue Groups
Rescue Groups are often operated by a network of foster home based volunteers that may or may not be associated with a standing facility. These organizations often accept difficult to adopt animals from other shelters and may transfer them or facilitate adoptions outside of the shelter setting.

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Return to the Field
An animal who has been returned to its home or habitat. Also referred to as relocate, return to community, or return to wild.

Save Rate ( Asilomar Report)
Save Rate is the proportion of animals leaving the shelter alive to the total number of animal outcomes.

Shelter Types
Municipal: an organization that provides the animal care services of a city, county, or cities or counties.

Municipal Contract: A private organization that provides contracted services for the animal care of a city, county, or cities or counties.

Rescue without a Municipal Contract: a private organization that has no affiliation to the city or county animal services.

Foster based Rescue without Shelter: an organization who houses all animals in its custody in foster homes.

Sanctuary: An organization that offers animals a place to live out the remainder of their life. Sometimes sanctuaries offer the option of adoption placement.

Animal welfare sanctuaries often offer this space for animals that have exhausted all other local resources, as an alternative to death.

Stray Hold
The number of days a shelter must hold a stray animal before determining the outcome, as determined by local ordinances. These vary from place to place.

TNR ( Trap Neuter Return)
TNR (Trap Neuter Return) refers to an approach for managing community cats that is an alternative to shelter impoundment. In appropriately managed TNR programs, cats are humanely trapped and surgically sterilized, vaccinated, ear tipped, and returned to the location from where they were trapped.

TNR cats are often not taken into the custody of a spaying/ neutering organization because they generally have established community colonies to which they are quickly returned. Community cat colonies are often under the care of a local human member of a community.

Treatable
Treatable means dogs and cats with medical or behavioral issues that can be rehabilitated and managed.

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Unhealthy and Untreatable
Unhealthy and untreatable means dogs and cats who, at or subsequent to the time they are taken into possession:

1. have a behavioral or temperamental characteristic that poses a health or safety risk or otherwise makes the animal unsuitable for placement as a pet, and are not likely to become healthy or treatable; or

2. are suffering from a disease, injury, or congenital or hereditary condition that adversely affects the animal’ s health or is likely to adversely affect the animal’ s health in the future, and are not likely to become healthy or treatable; or

3. are under the age of eight weeks and are not likely to become healthy or treatable, even if provided the care typically provided to pets by reasonable and caring pet guardians in the community.

DISCLAIMER
Reports issued by the Grand Jury do not identify individuals interviewed. Penal Code Section 929 requires that reports of the Grand Jury not contain the name of any person or facts leading to the identity of any person who provides information to the Grand Jury.

SusanaBarrios
From: AndiFriedman <andiattheark@gmail. com>
Sent: Tuesday, June
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OCAC (OCAnimalShelter) Request for22.8% Increase inPayment byCity ofAnaheim: Consent Calendar No. 16: UrgeaVoteofNO
Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutsidetheCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropenattachments unlessyou recognize thesenderandareexpecting themessage.

DearCityCouncilMembersandMayor:

OCAC (OrangeCountyAnimalShelter) isaskingyourcitytoincreaseitspayment totheirsheltertoover22percent! Pleasevotenoonthisrequest. Thislargetaxpayerfundedshelter (builtin2018atacostof $35million) istheonly countyshelteraroundthathasremainedclosedtowalk-inadoptions, canceledspay/neuterandTNRprograms, andthe animalsinOCandespeciallyAnaheimkeepmultiplying exponentially. Theworstoutcomeofthisshelter’spoor management isthehorriblyhigheuthanasia rateandtheshelter’srelianceonnonprofitanimalrescuestotaketoo manyanimals thattheyshouldbeadoptingoutthemselves andgettingspayedorneutered. Animalrescueshaveno taxpayer support (unlikethisshelter) andtheyareoverburdened withanextremely highnumberofanimalsfromOC Shelter.

Thisshelterhascancelled dogsocialization andotherrelateddogprograms, TNRprograms, hasnowalk-inadoptions, so animalsgetlabeledaggressive orashavingexhibitedpoorbehaviorduetokennelstressandnotenoughtimeforthe publictoviewthem.

Thisshelterhasbeenlikethissince “Covid,” andthatwastheirinitialexcusefornotdoingtheirjobthattheyarehighly paidtodo (Directorevidentlyearnscloseto $300,000annually). Sincewestoppedlockdowns, theiratrociouspractices havecontinuedwithalltypesofnonsensical excuses, i.e., allowingthepublictohavewalk-inadoptionswilloverly pressurethestaffandstressouttheanimals. So, isitbettertohavedogsincagesfor3weeksstraightandthenlabel themaggressive andkillthem? Doesthissoundhumane?
Thisshelterhasbeen, andistotallymismanaged, yetyourcityand13otherOCcitieskeeppayingtheirrequests for moreandmorefundingwithalmostnoprograms remaining tohelptheanimalsorthepublic. Theotherlargecounty shelterslikeLAarefullyopenwithprograms tohelptheanimaloverpopulation crisisbutthisshelterneedsanoverhaul, notmorefundingwhenitfailstoevendotheminimumtohelpneedyanimalsinAnaheim. Thedirectorissouncaring andineptthatoveraperiodofmonths, over50,000peoplesignedachange.orgpetitiontoreplaceherandbringthe shelteruptothestandards requiredunderthelawforethicalandhumanetreatmentoftheanimals. Evenafterthat petition, theOCBoardofSupervisors didnothing, andcontinuenottoforceanypositivechangethere.

AfewweeksagotheOCRegisterdidanarticle (frontpage) onthesehorrificandinhumane practicesattheOCShelter.

Thatarticlewasfollowedafewdayslaterbyaneditorial backedbythefullEditorialBoardoftheOCRegister, askingthe politicians taskedwithoverseeing thisshelter, TheOCBoardofSupervisors, tostepinandrevamptheshelter, reinstate walk-inadoptions, TNRandneuterspay. Therewaspredictably NoResponse totheOCRegister’sarticleandeditorial criticizing theOCShelter.

Donotbeconvinced thattheshelter’sfeeforAnaheimdeserves tobeincreased! Theyareakillingmachineandarenot doingtheirjob. Insteadofgivingthemmorefunds, forcethemtorestartTNRprograms tohelpresidents payforspay 1 andneuterandtoreducetheoverpopulation inyourCity. Demandthattheshelterfullyopenupwidetothepublicfor adoptionswithoutappointments likealltheothershelters! Theirdirectorshouldbefiredandnomoretaxpayerdollars shouldbeprovidedfrombothanethicalandfinancialstandpoint.

Whypayanincreased feewhentheshelterisnotevenrunningthesameprograms tohelpsaveanimals’ livesthatwere inplacepre-Covidin2019?
Thankyouforyouconsideration.

Respectfully,
AndreaFriedman
SentfrommyiPhone
2 SusanaBarrios
From: Michael Mavrovouniotis < michaelmavrovouniotis@gmail. com> Sent: Monday, June26, 20234:

To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OCAnimal Care
Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Somebody tellOCAnimal Carethepandemic isover
OCAnimal Careissticking topandemic-erarestrictions, preventing visitors fromseeing thedogs intheir kennels. Arecent announcement ofabsurdly limited access isdesigned tofail.

Let’slookatthedogadoption procedures ofourneighbors, LACityandLACounty. Theywere already far more accommodating toadopters. Inthesetwosystems, appointments wereonlyadevice toregulate flow, not anexcuse tokeep thekennels outofthepublic eye.

Ourneighbors, always looking forimprovements, aregradually moving towards evenmorefreedom for prospective adopters. (Quotes arefromthewebsites provided.) LAAnimalServices: Noappointmentneededtoadopt, fosterpets https://heysocal.com/2023/06/22/la-animal-services-no-appointment-needed-to-adopt-foster-pets/ TheLosAngeles Animal Services Department announced Thursday itwillnolongerrequire appointments for Angelenos toadoptorfoster ananimal fromitsshelters starting June28.” LACounty: majorityofhourswithnoappointment, asmallerportionappointment-based (withadopters visitingthekennelsinbothcases)
https://animalcare.lacounty.gov/adoption-hours/
Morning visiting hours areBYAPPOINTMENT ONLY10am -12pm Daily except Wednesdays.” Appointments areNOTREQUIRED forafternoon visits (2-5pmeveryday except onWednesdays when visiting hours are2-7pm)”
Fortheappointment hours, astaffmember oravolunteer willbeonhandtoassist youinviewing ourReady to GoHome (RTG) animals thatday. Thismeans theyarespayed orneutered, offstrayholdandhavegonetodog playgroups atleastonce (fordogsover35lbs.). AllRTGanimals canbeadopted onafirst-come, first-served basis. ForNon-Appointment visits, assistance willbeprovided according tostaffcapacity. Weareconfident thisnewprocess willprovide options forpotential adopters toviewandadoptanimals inawaythatis accessible andmaintains animal health andwellbeing.”
OnlyOCAnimalCarepreventsprospectiveadoptersfromseeingdogsinthekennels.

Rumor hasittheywilldesignate 5hours aweek inwhich some limited number ofvisitors willbeescorted through anareathathouses lessthan25% ofavailable dogs. Thisismeant todeflect criticism ratherthansolve theproblem.

OCAnimal Careneeds torealize thatthepandemic isover, andallitsfabricated excuses havebeen exposed. 1 SusanaBarrios
From: OCCommunity Cats <anaheimfixproject@gmail. com>
Sent: Tuesday, June27, 2023
To: Public Comment
Cc: Natalie Rubalcava; Ashleigh Aitken; JoseDiaz; CarlosA. Leon; Norma C. Kurtz; Stephen Faessel; Natalie Meeks; Brittney Malenofski
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] 6/27/23PUBLIC COMMENT ONAGENDA ITEM19 Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

MynameisMeredith Kirby. Iamavolunteer andboardmember withthenon-profitOCCommunity Cats. We arebased inAnaheim anddedicated tothewelfare ofcommunity (free-roaming) catsinNorthOrange County.

Mycomment today isspecifically addressing Agenda item19andthesignificant increase inthecostofservices proposed byOCAnimal Care, theshelter Anaheim contracts with.

TheNOIspecifies anearly 23% increase. However, OCAnimal Careisnotproviding services itpromised when theshelter wasbuilt.

Beginning inearly2020, OCAnimal Caremade deliberate reductions inservices andimplemented policy changes thathavenegative impacts ontheanimals & residents ofAnaheim, andtheother citieswhich contract them.

OCAnimal Carestopped theverysuccessful Trap, Neuter, Return (TNR) & Return toField (RTF) programs, resulting inthepopulation explosion ofcommunity cats.

OCAnimal Carenolonger accepts healthy stray catsorkittens 8weeks orolder. Theytellpeople toputthem backoutside where theywerefound. YettheysayRTF & TNRare "animal abandonment." OCAnimal Caredoesnotaccept owner surrenders without collecting a $300fee, IFtheyaccept thematall.

Most people can'tafford that, socatsarebeingdumped onthestreet tofendforthemselves. Iftheyarelucky, theyfindtheirwaytoacommunity catcolony. Wehavethishappening atthecolonies wemanage. InMay, 2 adults & 12kittens ofvarious agesweredumped atoneofourcolonies where coyotes areknown totravel.

Recently, OCAnimal Carewascalled toassist inahoarding caseinAnaheim at1934W. Tedmar, Thefamily flewinfromoutofstateandweretrying togethelpfrom OCAC forthecats. OCAC flatly saidNO, theycould nothelp. Wejumped in, with2otherrescues & saved thecats. Wearevolunteers fornon-profits. Weshould not bedoing theworkthatourcounty shelterispaidtodo.

OCAnimal Careisstillaccepting some sick/injured stray cats, buttheygiveminimal careandputthese catson rescue track." Thatmeans thecatsareavailable fornon-profit, volunteer run, donation funded groups to rescue. Otherwise, theyareeuthanized.

OCAnimal Carenowhasanappointment onlypolicy, soapotential adopter mustmake anappointment toseea single animal (cat, dog, bunny, etc) atatime. People can'tgototheshelter andwalkthrough thekennels tosee theanimals andmake aconnection. 1
These policy changes haveresulted inapopulation explosion ofcommunity cats, abandonment ofcats, increases indeadanimals, anuptick inCoyote activity, fewer adoptions, more killing ofanimals.

Theburden placed ontheshoulders ofnon-profits, local veterinarians andindependent rescuers isdevastating.

Several vets, suchasProPetFixhaveclosed. Some rescues havehadtoshutdown. Independent rescuers are going broke. They should nothavetodotheshelter'sjobwithout compensation.

Thiscounty funded, multimillion dollar, stateoftheartshelter should beproviding alltheservices itpromised totheanimals andresidents ofAnaheim andOrange County, notless.

Sowhyaretheyasking fornearly 23% more? What aretheanimals andcitizens ofAnaheim getting forthis increase? Isuggest requiring adetailed explanation fromOCAnimal Care.

Finally, youmaynotbeaware thattheOCGrand Juryhasrecently investigated OCAnimal Careandissued a report withtheirfindings anddirectives. I'veheard from aninsider thatOCAnimal Careisnottaking it seriously.

Weshould.

Linkattached. Gimmee Shelter
Thank youforyourtime & consideration.

Meredith Kirby
OCCommunity Cats
2 SusanaBarrios
From: LauraLawther <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] CityMeeting 06/27/23- Agenda Item19Re: OCAC 22% increase Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

TotheMayorandCityCouncilMembers:

Iwouldliketoaddressthecouncilonitem #19regardingthecitycontract withOCanimalcare. Thecountyhaspresentedthecitywitha22%
increaseandasataxpayer, IwouldliketoknowwhatIamreceivingforthat significantjumpincostrelativetothecurrentservicesthatwearebeing provided.

Currentlytheshelterisofflimitstothepublictofindanadoptableanimal.

OCAnimalCarecontinuesitsrestrictiveonlineappointmentonlyCOVID policy, whichhaslongbeenabandonedbyotheranimalshelters. Usingthis appointmentonlyprocess, limitsaccessforlow-incomeresidentsand seniorswhomaynothaveaccesstothetechnologytosearchforanimals online. Italsostopsworkingfamilieswhoonlyhavetimeduringthe weekendtovisitshelterstoseeadoptablepets.

Theshelterisalsoofflimitsifyouloseyourpet. Infact, didyouknowifyour catgetslostandsomeonefindsitandtakesittoOCanimalcaretheywill beturnedaway? Theywillnotevenscanthecatforamicrochip. Thisdoes notsoundlikeservicesthatweshouldbepayingthecountymillionsof dollarsfor.

Secondly, thecountyisresponsibletoprovideTNR- trap, neuter, return- to thecityandyettheyrefusetoandnooneisholdingthemaccountable. 1 Meanwhile neighborhoods arebeing overrun byferal catsandnonprofit rescue groups arebeing inundated withresidents asking forhelp. Every timeOCAnimalCareareaskedwhytheynolongerprovideTNR, theycite arecommendation fromCounty Counsel, however thereisnoevidence of thisthatcanbefound. EventheGrandJury, inthereportreleasedthis week, couldn’tgetastraightanswerfromthecountywhentheypressed themonthereasonwhytheystoppedtheTNRprogram. Infact, theentire CountyCounselofficehadtorecuseitselffromtheirinvestigationandthe GrandJuryhadtoseekoutsideindependentcounselwhichsignificantly delayedtheirinvestigation.

ItwouldseemtomethattheCountyisgoingtogreatlengthstohidethe reasoningbehindwhywearenotreceivingyetanotherservicethatisbeing paidfor. IamaskingthecounciltorequestaformalauditofOCAnimal CareandtostarttoreevaluatehowthecityofAnaheimwouldliketoprovide animalservicestoitsresidents. Iamconfidentthatlocalnonprofitanimal rescuegroupscoulddomuchmorewith5milliondollarsayearthanthe bureaucratsinchargeatthecountylevel.

Thankyou,
LauraLawther
2 SusanaBarrios
From: LauraCunningham <Laura@anaheimchamber. org>
Sent: Tuesday, June27, 20233:35PM
To: Ashleigh Aitken; Natalie Rubalcava; JoseDiaz; CarlosA. Leon; Norma C. Kurtz; Stephen Faessel; Natalie Meeks
Cc: CityClerk
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Agenda Item23 - SafetyOrdinance
Attachments: Agenda Item23 - SafetyOrdinance - LettertoCouncil.pdf Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearMayor Aitken andMembers oftheCityCouncil,
Attached pleasefindoursupport letterforAgenda Item23ontoday’sagenda.

LAURA CUNNINGHAM
President & CEO
O714-758-0222 |
[email protected]
1 2099 S. State College Blvd., Suite 650 Anaheim, CA 92806 T (714) 758- 0222 AnaheimChamber. org June 27, 2023
Mayor and City Council
Anaheim City Hall
200 South Anaheim Boulevard
Anaheim, California 92805
RE: SUPPORT – Agenda Item 23 – Adoption of Ordinance adding Chapter 6.101 Hotel Worker Protections) to Title 6 of the Anaheim Municipal Code to provide safety and security measures for hotel workers in Anaheim.

Dear Mayor Aitken, Mayor Pro Tem Rubalcava, and Members of the City Council:

The Anaheim Chamber of Commerce supports Agenda Item 23 to adopt the Hotel Worker Protection ordinance. Safety is the top priority of Anaheim’s hotels and Anaheim’s business community. This ordinance is a consensus item that protects the safety of hotel workers by giving them personal security devices to activate if they are threatened, at risk of violence, or in another emergency situation with response from designated hotel personnel to respond to those activations.

The ordinance also requires hotels to provide their employees with training regarding the rights, responsibilities, and protections of the ordinance and to notify hotel guests about these worker protections. Additionally, this ordinance protects workers who exercise the above rights.

The Chamber also thanks Mayor Pro Tem Rubalcava for her op-ed in today’s Orange County Register (“The way forward on hotel worker safety in Anaheim”). She shares the story of her grandmother’s work as a motel housekeeper in Anaheim and emphasizes the importance of hotel worker safety and this ordinance.

For all these reasons, the Anaheim Chamber of Commerce supports Agenda Item 23 to adopt the ordinance adding hotel worker protections as Chapter 6.101 to Title 6 of the Anaheim Municipal Code.

Sincerely,
Laura Cunningham
President and CEO
SusanaBarrios
From: JuanCarlos Mendez <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, June18, 2023
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OrderaSpecialElection - HotelWorker Initiative Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearAnaheim CityCouncil,
OnJune13youwillconsider anordinance which would drastically impact hotels throughout theCityof Anaheim. While promoted byUNITE HERE Local 11asameasure toincrease hotelworker safety, thispoorly drafted proposal contains wage andwork rules requirements thatwould devastate Anaheim hotels, withripple effects thatwould gutAnaheim’sbudget.

Amajority ofthecouncil wascorrect toreject outright adoption atitsMay16meeting andinstead direct an economic impact study. Weurge adoption toberejected again. Instead, theCityCouncil should place this matter ontheballotforthepeople todecide inaspecial election laterthisyear.

Asamatter ofpolicy, thehotelproposal written byUNITE HERELocal 11would beadisaster.

Imposing theproposed wage andwork rulesonAnaheim hotelswould beacostly newmandate. Many workers whoweresupposed tobenefit willlikely seetheirhours reduced ortheirjobseliminated. Larger hotelswill raisetheirprices forrooms, amenities, andservices, resulting infewer hotelstays andless taxrevenue forthe city. Smaller hotels, including family owned “mom andpop” hotels, willlikely justgooutofbusiness.

Theincreased costsofdoing business inAnaheim overall willmake ittougher forAnaheim toattract andretain thebigtrade shows andconventions, likeNAMM andNatural Products, andmake ittougher forfamilies and tourists tojustify thecosts ofavacation totheAnaheim Resort.

Those increased costs couldalsoresult inachilling effect oneconomic development throughout Anaheim, but especially where tourism matters most: intheAnaheim Resort. Tourism developments, including newhotels, could slowdownorbecanceled outright because nobusiness willwanttomake asignificant investment ina citywhere costs aregoing toskyrocket.

From apractical standpoint, theproposal’s10-dayimplementation window isonethatwould be impossible tomeet during theDecember 2024 holiday rush, which isexactly what hotels would befaced withifthemeasure wassuccessful intheNovember 2024General Election. Ifpassed inaspecial election, themeasure would atleastbesomewhat lessdifficult forsome hotels toimplement within 10days.

Wehope thatitwillnotcome tothis, however.

Once thevoters ofAnaheim learnhowtheUNITE HERELocal 11measure willdevastate thecity’sfinances, andthreaten theabilityofyou, theCityCouncil, toproperly fundservices suchaslibraries, parksand recreation, street maintenance, andpolice andfireprotection, theywillrejectthismeasure. TheCityCouncil should givethevoters thatopportunity byplacing itontheballot inaspecial election. 1 Whencitystaffpresent youwiththefindings ofitseconomic impactresearch, theconsequences oftheproposed ordinance willbeclear. Itisimperative thatvoters beabletohavetheir sayasquickly aspossible. Wecannot waituntilNovember 2024. Please: Orderaspecial election.

JuanCarlos Mendez
2 SusanaBarrios
From: HollyFelipe <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June13, 20234:44PM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] NoCostlySpecial Elections, NoWasting Taxpayer Money Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thatshouldprideitselfonfiscalresponsibilityandbalancingofrevenuesandgovernment spending. ItmakesNOSENSEtowasteoveramilliondollarsoftaxpayermoneyforan electioninwhichfewerthanaquarterofregisteredvoterswilllikelyevenshowup. Forthese reasons, Anaheimhasn’thadaballotinitiativeoff-cycleinaspecialelectionindecades. This isfiscalirresponsibilityatitsworst.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 that itwould cost toputthe Initiative ontheballot inthegeneral election in2024, fora differenceofoveramilliondollars. Let’sbeclear: TheCityofAnaheimshouldNOTdrainits cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

IftheCityofAnaheimisseriousaboutfiscalresponsibilitywithtaxpayermoneyand communityinputthenitwillputourHotel & EventCenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonthe ballotinNovember2024, whichwouldsavethetaxpayersoveramilliondollarsandensure maximalinputbytheresidentsofAnaheim.

HollyFelipe
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: Michael Wade <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, June15, 20233:28PM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Anaheim: Don’tDodge Democracy, LettheVotersSpeak! Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
I, MichaelE. Wade, writeasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputthe Hotel & EventCenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear.

Anaheimisacitythathasstruggledwithtransparencyingovernmentfortoolong. Thevoters ofthiscityhavetherighttoknowwhatishappeningwithourlawsandtherighttohaveour voicesheard. ThisInitiativeisanimportantstepforourcitytotake, andweneedasmany votersaspossibleinthiscitytocasttheirballotsonthisvitalissue.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 thatitwouldcosttoputtheInitiativeontheballotinthegeneralelectionin2024, fora difference ofover amillion dollars. Let’sbeclear: The City ofAnaheim should NOT drain its cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

ThereisnoreasontointentionallylimittheamountofvoicesAnaheimiswillingtohearonthis issue, andschedulingaspecialelectionwouldverylikelymeanfewervoterswouldweighin onthisimportantissue, nottomentiontheenormouscostthespecialelectionwouldhaveto hardworkingtaxpayersinAnaheim. PleaseplacethisInitiativeonthegeneralelectionballot inNovemberof2024.

MichaelWade
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: LaurenAlexander <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June13, 20232:04PM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] NOCostlySpecial Elections, NOWasting Taxpayer Money Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thatshouldprideitselfonfiscalresponsibilityandbalancingofrevenuesandgovernment spending. ItmakesNOSENSEtowasteoveramilliondollarsoftaxpayermoneyforan electioninwhichfewerthanaquarterofregisteredvoterswilllikelyevenshowup. Forthese reasons, Anaheimhasn’thadaballotinitiativeoff-cycleinaspecialelectionindecades. This isfiscalirresponsibilityatitsworst.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 that itwould cost toputthe Initiative ontheballot inthegeneral election in2024, fora differenceofoveramilliondollars. Let’sbeclear: TheCityofAnaheimshouldNOTdrainits cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

IftheCityofAnaheimisseriousaboutfiscalresponsibilitywithtaxpayermoneyand communityinputthenitwillputourHotel & EventCenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonthe ballotinNovember2024, whichwouldsavethetaxpayersoveramilliondollarsandensure maximalinputbytheresidentsofAnaheim.

LaurenAlexander
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: PollyPelonis <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, June
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OrderaSpecialElection - HotelWorker Initiative Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearAnaheim CityCouncil,
OnJune13youwillconsider anordinance which would drastically impact hotels throughout theCityof Anaheim. While promoted byUNITE HERE Local 11asameasure toincrease hotelworker safety, thispoorly drafted proposal contains wage andwork rules requirements thatwould devastate Anaheim hotels, withripple effects thatwould gutAnaheim’sbudget.

Amajority ofthecouncil wascorrect toreject outright adoption atitsMay16meeting andinstead direct an economic impact study. Weurge adoption toberejected again. Instead, theCityCouncil should place this matter ontheballotforthepeople todecide inaspecial election laterthisyear.

Asamatter ofpolicy, thehotelproposal written byUNITE HERELocal 11would beadisaster.

Imposing theproposed wage andwork rulesonAnaheim hotelswould beacostly newmandate. Many workers whoweresupposed tobenefit willlikely seetheirhours reduced ortheirjobseliminated. Larger hotelswill raisetheirprices forrooms, amenities, andservices, resulting infewer hotelstays andless taxrevenue forthe city. Smaller hotels, including family owned “mom andpop” hotels, willlikely justgooutofbusiness.

Theincreased costsofdoing business inAnaheim overall willmake ittougher forAnaheim toattract andretain thebigtrade shows andconventions, likeNAMM andNatural Products, andmake ittougher forfamilies and tourists tojustify thecosts ofavacation totheAnaheim Resort.

Those increased costs couldalsoresult inachilling effect oneconomic development throughout Anaheim, but especially where tourism matters most: intheAnaheim Resort. Tourism developments, including newhotels, could slowdownorbecanceled outright because nobusiness willwanttomake asignificant investment ina citywhere costs aregoing toskyrocket.

From apractical standpoint, theproposal’s10-dayimplementation window isonethatwould be impossible tomeet during theDecember 2024 holiday rush, which isexactly what hotels would befaced withifthemeasure wassuccessful intheNovember 2024General Election. Ifpassed inaspecial election, themeasure would atleastbesomewhat lessdifficult forsome hotels toimplement within 10days.

Wehope thatitwillnotcome tothis, however.

Once thevoters ofAnaheim learnhowtheUNITE HERELocal 11measure willdevastate thecity’sfinances, andthreaten theabilityofyou, theCityCouncil, toproperly fundservices suchaslibraries, parksand 1 recreation, street maintenance, andpolice andfireprotection, theywillrejectthismeasure. TheCityCouncil should givethevoters thatopportunity byplacing itontheballot inaspecial election.

Whencitystaffpresent youwiththefindings ofitseconomic impactresearch, theconsequences oftheproposed ordinance willbeclear. Itisimperative thatvoters beabletohavetheir sayasquickly aspossible. Wecannot waituntilNovember 2024. Please: Orderaspecial election.

PollyPelonis
2 SusanaBarrios
From: DonaldBrothers <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OrderaSpecialElection - HotelWorker Initiative Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearAnaheim CityCouncil,
OnJune13youwillconsider anordinance which would drastically impact hotels throughout theCityof Anaheim. While promoted byUNITE HERE Local 11asameasure toincrease hotelworker safety, thispoorly drafted proposal contains wage andwork rules requirements thatwould devastate Anaheim hotels, withripple effects thatwould gutAnaheim’sbudget.

Amajority ofthecouncil wascorrect toreject outright adoption atitsMay16meeting andinstead direct an economic impact study. Weurge adoption toberejected again. Instead, theCityCouncil should place this matter ontheballotforthepeople todecide inaspecial election laterthisyear.

Asamatter ofpolicy, thehotelproposal written byUNITE HERELocal 11would beadisaster.

Imposing theproposed wage andwork rulesonAnaheim hotelswould beacostly newmandate. Many workers whoweresupposed tobenefit willlikely seetheirhours reduced ortheirjobseliminated. Larger hotelswill raisetheirprices forrooms, amenities, andservices, resulting infewer hotelstays andless taxrevenue forthe city. Smaller hotels, including family owned “mom andpop” hotels, willlikely justgooutofbusiness.

Theincreased costsofdoing business inAnaheim overall willmake ittougher forAnaheim toattract andretain thebigtrade shows andconventions, likeNAMM andNatural Products, andmake ittougher forfamilies and tourists tojustify thecosts ofavacation totheAnaheim Resort.

Those increased costs couldalsoresult inachilling effect oneconomic development throughout Anaheim, but especially where tourism matters most: intheAnaheim Resort. Tourism developments, including newhotels, could slowdownorbecanceled outright because nobusiness willwanttomake asignificant investment ina citywhere costs aregoing toskyrocket.

From apractical standpoint, theproposal’s10-dayimplementation window isonethatwould be impossible tomeet during theDecember 2024 holiday rush, which isexactly what hotels would befaced withifthemeasure wassuccessful intheNovember 2024General Election. Ifpassed inaspecial election, themeasure would atleastbesomewhat lessdifficult forsome hotels toimplement within 10days.

Wehope thatitwillnotcome tothis, however.

Once thevoters ofAnaheim learnhowtheUNITE HERELocal 11measure willdevastate thecity’sfinances, andthreaten theabilityofyou, theCityCouncil, toproperly fundservices suchaslibraries, parksand recreation, street maintenance, andpolice andfireprotection, theywillrejectthismeasure. TheCityCouncil should givethevoters thatopportunity byplacing itontheballot inaspecial election. 1 Whencitystaffpresent youwiththefindings ofitseconomic impactresearch, theconsequences oftheproposed ordinance willbeclear. Itisimperative thatvoters beabletohavetheir sayasquickly aspossible. Wecannot waituntilNovember 2024. Please: Orderaspecial election.

Donald Brothers
2 SusanaBarrios
From: Adriana Demendoza <demendozaadriana+ [email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, June14,
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OrderaSpecialElection - HotelWorker Initiative Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearAnaheim CityCouncil,
OnJune13youwillconsider anordinance which would drastically impact hotels throughout theCityof Anaheim. While promoted byUNITE HERE Local 11asameasure toincrease hotelworker safety, thispoorly drafted proposal contains wage andwork rules requirements thatwould devastate Anaheim hotels, withripple effects thatwould gutAnaheim’sbudget.

Amajority ofthecouncil wascorrect toreject outright adoption atitsMay16meeting andinstead direct an economic impact study. Weurge adoption toberejected again. Instead, theCityCouncil should place this matter ontheballotforthepeople todecide inaspecial election laterthisyear.

Asamatter ofpolicy, thehotelproposal written byUNITE HERELocal 11would beadisaster.

Imposing theproposed wage andwork rulesonAnaheim hotelswould beacostly newmandate. Many workers whoweresupposed tobenefit willlikely seetheirhours reduced ortheirjobseliminated. Larger hotelswill raisetheirprices forrooms, amenities, andservices, resulting infewer hotelstays andless taxrevenue forthe city. Smaller hotels, including family owned “mom andpop” hotels, willlikely justgooutofbusiness.

Theincreased costsofdoing business inAnaheim overall willmake ittougher forAnaheim toattract andretain thebigtrade shows andconventions, likeNAMM andNatural Products, andmake ittougher forfamilies and tourists tojustify thecosts ofavacation totheAnaheim Resort.

Those increased costs couldalsoresult inachilling effect oneconomic development throughout Anaheim, but especially where tourism matters most: intheAnaheim Resort. Tourism developments, including newhotels, could slowdownorbecanceled outright because nobusiness willwanttomake asignificant investment ina citywhere costs aregoing toskyrocket.

From apractical standpoint, theproposal’s10-dayimplementation window isonethatwould be impossible tomeet during theDecember 2024 holiday rush, which isexactly what hotels would befaced withifthemeasure wassuccessful intheNovember 2024General Election. Ifpassed inaspecial election, themeasure would atleastbesomewhat lessdifficult forsome hotels toimplement within 10days.

Wehope thatitwillnotcome tothis, however.

Once thevoters ofAnaheim learnhowtheUNITE HERELocal 11measure willdevastate thecity’sfinances, andthreaten theabilityofyou, theCityCouncil, toproperly fundservices suchaslibraries, parksand recreation, street maintenance, andpolice andfireprotection, theywillrejectthismeasure. TheCityCouncil should givethevoters thatopportunity byplacing itontheballot inaspecial election. 1 Whencitystaffpresent youwiththefindings ofitseconomic impactresearch, theconsequences oftheproposed ordinance willbeclear. Itisimperative thatvoters beabletohavetheir sayasquickly aspossible. Wecannot waituntilNovember 2024. Please: Orderaspecial election.

Adriana Demendoza
2 SusanaBarrios
From: Michael Watkins <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June14, 20238:04AM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Anaheim: Don’tDodge Democracy, LettheVotersSpeak! Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thathasstruggledwithtransparencyingovernmentfortoolong. Thevotersofthiscityhave therighttoknowwhatishappeningwithourlawsandtherighttohaveourvoicesheard. This Initiativeisanimportantstepforourcitytotake, andweneedasmanyvotersaspossiblein thiscitytocasttheirballotsonthisvitalissue.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 thatitwouldcosttoputtheInitiativeontheballotinthegeneralelectionin2024, fora difference ofover amillion dollars. Let’sbeclear: The City ofAnaheim should NOT drain its cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

ThereisnoreasontointentionallylimittheamountofvoicesAnaheimiswillingtohearonthis issue, andschedulingaspecialelectionwouldverylikelymeanfewervoterswouldweighin onthisimportantissue, nottomentiontheenormouscostthespecialelectionwouldhaveto hardworkingtaxpayersinAnaheim. PleaseplacethisInitiativeonthegeneralelectionballot inNovemberof2024.

MichaelWatkins
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: Theresa Bass
Sent: Thursday, June15, 202310:44PM
To: Public Comment
Subject: FW: \[EXTERNAL\] THANK YOUforordering aspecial election! From: StephenFaessel <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, June15, 202310:40AM
To: TheresaBass <[email protected]>
Subject: Fwd: \[EXTERNAL\] THANKYOUfororderingaspecialelection! SentfrommyiPhone
Beginforwarded message:

From: NaomiDiggs <[email protected]>
Date: June15, 2023at9:10:43AMPDT
To: StephenFaessel <[email protected]>
Subject: \[EXTERNAL\] THANKYOUfororderingaspecialelection! Reply-To: [email protected]
Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclick linksoropenattachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearCouncilman Stephen Faessel,
THANK YOUforsuccessfully ordering theUNITE HERELocal 11hotelworker ordinance toa September 12, 2023, special election.

Iappreciate thetimeyoutooktomeetwithandlisten toourhospitality industry members and other stakeholders andforthecareful andthoughtful consideration youtookwhile deliberating onthisissue overthepast several weeks. Asyouheard fromthedozens ofpublic comment speakers andhundreds ofemails youreceived, thisissue isoftheutmost importance. Andas illustrated bytheeconomic reports produced byBakerTillyandBeacon Economics, theimpacts oftheordinance, ifenacted, would beasubstantial detriment tothehotel industry andthecity itself.
1 Thank youforyourlevel-headedness andresponsible policymaking. Anaheim'shotel and lodging industry community isdeeply appreciative, asamI.

Naomi Diggs
616Convention Way
Anaheim, California 92802
2 SusanaBarrios
From: RICHARD SIPEK <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, June18,
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] NoCostlySpecial Elections, NoWasting Taxpayer Money Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thatshouldprideitselfonfiscalresponsibilityandbalancingofrevenuesandgovernment spending. ItmakesNOSENSEtowasteoveramilliondollarsoftaxpayermoneyforan electioninwhichfewerthanaquarterofregisteredvoterswilllikelyevenshowup. Forthese reasons, Anaheimhasn’thadaballotinitiativeoff-cycleinaspecialelectionindecades. This isfiscalirresponsibilityatitsworst.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 that itwould cost toputthe Initiative ontheballot inthegeneral election in2024, fora differenceofoveramilliondollars. Let’sbeclear: TheCityofAnaheimshouldNOTdrainits cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

IftheCityofAnaheimisseriousaboutfiscalresponsibilitywithtaxpayermoneyand communityinputthenitwillputourHotel & EventCenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonthe ballotinNovember2024, whichwouldsavethetaxpayersoveramilliondollarsandensure maximalinputbytheresidentsofAnaheim.

RICHARDSIPEK
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, 53PM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Anaheim: Don’tDodge Democracy, LettheVotersSpeak! Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thathasstruggledwithtransparencyingovernmentfortoolong. Thevotersofthiscityhave therighttoknowwhatishappeningwithourlawsandtherighttohaveourvoicesheard. This Initiativeisanimportantstepforourcitytotake, andweneedasmanyvotersaspossiblein thiscitytocasttheirballotsonthisvitalissue.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 thatitwouldcosttoputtheInitiativeontheballotinthegeneralelectionin2024, fora difference ofover amillion dollars. Let’sbeclear: The City ofAnaheim should NOT drain its cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

ThereisnoreasontointentionallylimittheamountofvoicesAnaheimiswillingtohearonthis issue, andschedulingaspecialelectionwouldverylikelymeanfewervoterswouldweighin onthisimportantissue, nottomentiontheenormouscostthespecialelectionwouldhaveto hardworkingtaxpayersinAnaheim. PleaseplacethisInitiativeonthegeneralelectionballot inNovemberof2024.
1 pamela.
2 SusanaBarrios
From: ErikAcosta <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June13, 20233:12PM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Anaheim: Don’tDodge Democracy, LettheVotersSpeak! Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thathasstruggledwithtransparencyingovernmentfortoolong. Thevotersofthiscityhave therighttoknowwhatishappeningwithourlawsandtherighttohaveourvoicesheard. This Initiativeisanimportantstepforourcitytotake, andweneedasmanyvotersaspossiblein thiscitytocasttheirballotsonthisvitalissue.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 thatitwouldcosttoputtheInitiativeontheballotinthegeneralelectionin2024, fora difference ofover amillion dollars. Let’sbeclear: The City ofAnaheim should NOT drain its cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

ThereisnoreasontointentionallylimittheamountofvoicesAnaheimiswillingtohearonthis issue, andschedulingaspecialelectionwouldverylikelymeanfewervoterswouldweighin onthisimportantissue, nottomentiontheenormouscostthespecialelectionwouldhaveto hardworkingtaxpayersinAnaheim. PleaseplacethisInitiativeonthegeneralelectionballot inNovemberof2024.

ErikAcosta
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: Theresa Bass
Sent: Thursday, June22, 20238:54PM
To: Public Comment
Subject: FW: \[EXTERNAL\] HotelandEventCenter Minimum Wage, Worker Retention, and HotelWorker SafetyandWorkload Initiative
Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclick linksoropenattachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

MayorAshleighE. AItken
MayorProTemNatalieRubalcava
Councilmember JoseDiaz
Councilmember CarlosA. Leon
Councilmember NormaCamposKurtz
Councilmember StephenFaessel
Councilmember NatalieMeeks
MayorAitken, MayorProTemRubalcava, andCouncilmembers:

OnbehalfoftheStovall’sHotelsofAnaheim andtheO’ConnellHospitality GroupIamwritingtoaskthat thependingHotelandEventCenterMinimumWage, WorkerRetention, andHotelWorkerSafetyand Workload Initiative (the “Initiative”) beplacedontheballotforthevotersofAnaheimtodecideata specialelectionlaterthisyear.

Whileweunderstand thatcitystaffhasbeendirected toundertake andreportitsfindingsonthewider consequences oftheInitiativeonthecity, thehospitality industry alreadyknowsthatthewage, workplace rules, andimplementation writtenintotheInitiativemakeitunworkable, impractical, and unrealistic toabidebyevenunderthebestofcircumstances. Simplyput, thisisanattemptbyUnite Heretounionize hotelsthroughtheballotboxandforgotheprocessofcollective bargaining negotiations.

Ifvotersweretoapprovethemeasure inaNovember 2024vote, implementation wouldbemandated in thepeakoftheDecember 2024holidayseason, whenanumberofhotelprofessionals neededto overseethisprocesswouldlikelybeunavailable. Theimplementation mandateforceshoteliers, large andsmall, toundertake massiveadministrative, personnel, andtechnical changes topoliciesand procedures atthemostinopportune time.

Timeisoftheessence. Theneedforaspecial election isnecessary duetothefactthe business community, specifically theconvention center, needs clarity inordertobookfuture conventions. Thesearetypically bookedthreetofiveyearsout. Manymeeting planners are indicating theywillbeholding offfuturebookings untilthereisresolution regarding thismeasure.

Equally important, aspecial election wouldallowthecitizens ofAnaheim tobetter understand theimpactofthismeasure asastandaloneitemnottobeconfused with othermeasures.
1 Further, iftheInitiativeissuccessfulattheballotboxinNovember 2024, theCityofAnaheimmayfindit necessary tohireadditional staff, oreventocreateanadditional newdepartment, inordertomonitor andenforcetheordinance. Again, thistimingwouldnecessarily coincidewiththe2024holidays.

Whilewestandinsteadfast supportofandagreewiththeworkersafetyand “panicbutton” provisions oftheInitiative, weopposethewagemandateandworkplace ruleswhichwoulddevastate smaller Anaheimhotelsandforcelargeronestoincreasetheircoststoconsumers – andslashTOTrevenueto thecityintheprocess.

VotersinAnaheim deservethechancetovoteupontheproposal soonerratherthanlater.

Thankyouforyourconsideration. Wehopeyouwillsupportaspecialelection.

Bestregards,
William R. O'Connell III
WilliamR. O'ConnellIII
O'ConnellHotels & Hospitality
Stovall'sHotelsofAnaheim
1110W. KatellaAve.

Anaheim, CA92802
Office: 714.778.5220ext. 164
2 SusanaBarrios
From: Theresa Bass
Sent: Sunday, June25, 20235:24PM
To: Public Comment
Subject: FW: \[EXTERNAL\] Item25: Thank youforcalling the10/3specialelection From: TonyTzeng < [email protected]>
Date: June24, 2023at2:40:36PMPDT
To: StephenFaessel <[email protected]>
Subject: \[EXTERNAL\] Item25: Thankyouforcallingthe10/3specialelection Reply-To:

Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclick linksoropenattachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearCouncil Member Stephen Faessel,
Thank youforcalling theSpecial Election thatwillallowvoters todecide onthisdisastrous measure. Iamsincerely grateful foryour cooperation withtheOrange County Registrar of Voters inensuring allAnaheim voters canparticipate. Knowing thatthismeasure willhavelonglasting negative impacts onresidents, taxpayers, smallbusinesses, andthecity, Iaskthatyou adopt theresolution tocalltheSpecial Election. Byadopting theresolution oftheelection, you willguarantee ittakes place ontheearliest possible datedetermined bytheRegistrar ofVoters, October 3, 2023.

TonyTzeng
1 SusanaBarrios
From: Theresa Bass
Sent: Sunday, June25, 20235:23PM
To: Public Comment
Subject: FW: \[EXTERNAL\] Item25: Thank youforcalling the10/3specialelection From: MarshallWeinstein <marshall@grandlegacyhotel. com> Date: June25, 2023at2:50:25AMPDT
To: StephenFaessel <[email protected]>
Subject: \[EXTERNAL\] Item25: Thankyouforcallingthe10/3specialelection Reply-To: marshall@grandlegacyhotel. com
Warning: Thisemailoriginated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropenattachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearCouncil Member Stephen Faessel,
Thank youforcalling theSpecial Election thatwillallowvoters todecide onthisdisastrous measure. Iamsincerely grateful foryour cooperation withtheOrange County Registrar of Voters inensuring allAnaheim voters canparticipate. Knowing thatthismeasure willhavelonglasting negative impacts onresidents, taxpayers, smallbusinesses, andthecity, Iaskthatyou adopt theresolution tocalltheSpecial Election. Byadopting theresolution oftheelection, you willguarantee ittakes place ontheearliest possible datedetermined bytheRegistrar ofVoters, October 3, 2023.

Marshall Weinstein
1650SJarbor Blvd
Anaheim, California 92802
1 SusanaBarrios
From: Jaqueline Dueñas <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, June26, 20235:04PM
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Anaheim: Don’tDodge Democracy, LettheVotersSpeak! Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

ForPublicComment,
DearMayorandHonorableCityCouncil,
IwriteasaconcernedcitizenofAnaheimtoaskthatyourefusetoputtheHotel & Event CenterWorkerProtectionInitiativeonacostlyspecialelectionthisyear. Anaheimisacity thathasstruggledwithtransparencyingovernmentfortoolong. Thevotersofthiscityhave therighttoknowwhatishappeningwithourlawsandtherighttohaveourvoicesheard. This Initiativeisanimportantstepforourcitytotake, andweneedasmanyvotersaspossiblein thiscitytocasttheirballotsonthisvitalissue.

AccordingtotheCouncilstaffreportfromlastmonth’sMay16meeting, aspecialelection wouldcostthecity $1,477,297 - $1,632,776. That’scomparedtothe $198,891 - $233,265 thatitwouldcosttoputtheInitiativeontheballotinthegeneralelectionin2024, fora difference ofover amillion dollars. Let’sbeclear: The City ofAnaheim should NOT drain its cofferstoholdaspecialelectionatthebehestofbigbusinessinterests.

ThereisnoreasontointentionallylimittheamountofvoicesAnaheimiswillingtohearonthis issue, andschedulingaspecialelectionwouldverylikelymeanfewervoterswouldweighin onthisimportantissue, nottomentiontheenormouscostthespecialelectionwouldhaveto hardworkingtaxpayersinAnaheim. PleaseplacethisInitiativeonthegeneralelectionballot inNovemberof2024.

JaquelineDueñas
1 2
SusanaBarrios
From: Francis Tuzzolino Jr <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, June24,
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] OrderaSpecialElection - HotelWorker Initiative Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearAnaheim CityCouncil,
OnJune13youwillconsider anordinance which would drastically impact hotels throughout theCityof Anaheim. While promoted byUNITE HERE Local 11asameasure toincrease hotelworker safety, thispoorly drafted proposal contains wage andwork rules requirements thatwould devastate Anaheim hotels, withripple effects thatwould gutAnaheim’sbudget.

Amajority ofthecouncil wascorrect toreject outright adoption atitsMay16meeting andinstead direct an economic impact study. Weurge adoption toberejected again. Instead, theCityCouncil should place this matter ontheballotforthepeople todecide inaspecial election laterthisyear.

Asamatter ofpolicy, thehotelproposal written byUNITE HERELocal 11would beadisaster.

Imposing theproposed wage andwork rulesonAnaheim hotelswould beacostly newmandate. Many workers whoweresupposed tobenefit willlikely seetheirhours reduced ortheirjobseliminated. Larger hotelswill raisetheirprices forrooms, amenities, andservices, resulting infewer hotelstays andless taxrevenue forthe city. Smaller hotels, including family owned “mom andpop” hotels, willlikely justgooutofbusiness.

Theincreased costsofdoing business inAnaheim overall willmake ittougher forAnaheim toattract andretain thebigtrade shows andconventions, likeNAMM andNatural Products, andmake ittougher forfamilies and tourists tojustify thecosts ofavacation totheAnaheim Resort.

Those increased costs couldalsoresult inachilling effect oneconomic development throughout Anaheim, but especially where tourism matters most: intheAnaheim Resort. Tourism developments, including newhotels, could slowdownorbecanceled outright because nobusiness willwanttomake asignificant investment ina citywhere costs aregoing toskyrocket.

From apractical standpoint, theproposal’s10-dayimplementation window isonethatwould be impossible tomeet during theDecember 2024 holiday rush, which isexactly what hotels would befaced withifthemeasure wassuccessful intheNovember 2024General Election. Ifpassed inaspecial election, themeasure would atleastbesomewhat lessdifficult forsome hotels toimplement within 10days.

Wehope thatitwillnotcome tothis, however.

Once thevoters ofAnaheim learnhowtheUNITE HERELocal 11measure willdevastate thecity’sfinances, andthreaten theabilityofyou, theCityCouncil, toproperly fundservices suchaslibraries, parksand recreation, street maintenance, andpolice andfireprotection, theywillrejectthismeasure. TheCityCouncil should givethevoters thatopportunity byplacing itontheballot inaspecial election. 1 Whencitystaffpresent youwiththefindings ofitseconomic impactresearch, theconsequences oftheproposed ordinance willbeclear. Itisimperative thatvoters beabletohavetheir sayasquickly aspossible. Wecannot waituntilNovember 2024. Please: Orderaspecial election.

Francis Tuzzolino Jr
2 SusanaBarrios
From: LauraCunningham <Laura@anaheimchamber. org>
Sent: Tuesday, June27, 20233:37PM
To: Ashleigh Aitken; Natalie Rubalcava; JoseDiaz; CarlosA. Leon; Norma C. Kurtz; Stephen Faessel; Natalie Meeks
Cc: CityClerk
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Agenda Item25 - SpecialElection
Attachments: Agenda Item25 - Special Election - LettertoCouncil.pdf Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearMayor Aitken andMembers oftheCityCouncil,
Attached pleasefindoursupport letterforAgenda Item25ontoday’sagenda.

LAURA CUNNINGHAM
President & CEO
O714-758-0222 |
[email protected]
1 2099 S. State College Blvd., Suite 650 Anaheim, CA 92806 T (714) 758- 0222 AnaheimChamber. org June 27, 2023
Mayor and City Council
Anaheim City Hall
200 South Anaheim Boulevard
Anaheim, California 92805
RE: SUPPORT – Agenda Item 25 – Calling October 3 Special Election.

Dear Mayor Aitken, Mayor Pro Tem Rubalcava, and Members of the City Council:

The Anaheim Chamber of Commerce supports Agenda Item 25 to call an October 3 special election to allow Anaheim voters to decide upon the ballot measure that will have a catastrophic effect on Anaheim’s economy and Anaheim’s small businesses.

We thank the Council for enabling voters to move swiftly to resolve the fate of this damaging measure, rather than waiting another year and a half.

Holding a special election on this measure will allow voters to focus on the effects of this measure upon Anaheim. The economic impact analyses conducted by independent experts commissioned by the City Council have found this measure will cost Anaheim taxpayers $13 million each year.

The Registrar of Voters will mail a ballot to every single Anaheim registered voter, including those Anaheim residents who are military deployed on active duty and those Anaheim residents temporarily living abroad, so any Anaheim voter can cast a ballot on this devastating measure.

For all these reasons, the Anaheim Chamber of Commerce supports Agenda Item 25 to call a special election for Tuesday, October 3, 2023. We thank the Council for approving this agenda item.

Sincerely,
Laura Cunningham
President and CEO
SusanaBarrios
From: Christine Schachter <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, June26, 20235:48PM
To: CityClerk; PublicComment; Ashleigh Aitken; Natalie Rubalcava; JoseDiaz; CarlosA.

Leon; Norma C. Kurtz; Stephen Faessel; Natalie Meeks; Berenice Ballinas; Valeria Sandoval; SarahBartczak; TaylorN. Griffin; NadiaVillafana; RobertMendoza; Nam Bartash; JoelSaldivar; Cameron Wessel; CityManager; JimVanderpool; AndyNogal Cc: PhilHawkins; TimShaw
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] PWRLetterreJune27, 2023CityCouncil Agenda ItemNo. 26 Attachments: PWRLettertoAnaheim CityCouncilreAgenda Item26_6.27.23.pdf; Below-Market Housing Mandates asTakings - Measuring theirImpact.pdf; DoAffordable Housing Mandates Work? Evidence fromLosAngeles County andOrange County.pdf Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Honorable MayorAitkenandMembers oftheCityCouncil:

Please findattached aletterfromthePacificWestAssociation ofREALTORS® (PWR) regarding itemno. 26ontheJune27, 2023meeting agenda.

Thank youforyourtimeandconsideration.

Sincerely,
ChristineSchachter
Government Affairs Director
Pacific WestAssociation ofREALTORS®
1601E. Orangewood Ave.

Anaheim, CA92805
714-245-5500 (main)
1 714-221-8474 (direct)
[email protected]
Serving Orange County & LosAngeles County
2 PACIFIC WEST ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®

ANAHEIM OFFICE - MAIN LONG BEACH OFFICE
1601 East Orangewood Ave., Anaheim, CA 92805 5000 East Spring St Suite # 110, Long Beach, CA 90815 714) 245-5500 | www.pwr.net
June 26, 2023
Anaheim City Council
200 S. Anaheim Blvd.

Anaheim, CA 92805
Re: June 27, 2023, Council Agenda Item No. 26, Housing Affordability Ad Hoc Committee Update Honorable Mayor Aitken and Members of the City Council:

The Pacific West Association of REALTORS® ( PWR) is the local real estate association that represents Los Angeles and Orange Counties, including the city of Anaheim, and PWR’s 13,000 members promote homeownership, private property rights, and responsible government.

We recognize the need both locally and statewide to address the housing affordability crisis, which has made housing a substantial economic burden on working families, senior citizens, and residents on fixed incomes, and we respectfully request that the City of Anaheim support housing policies that are centered around process improvements, incentives and adaptable development standards as opposed to counterproductive measures such as market controls or government mandates.

The consideration of an affordable housing development fee or inclusionary housing program by the City’s Housing Ad Hoc Committee is problematic without having obtained public input, a competitive bid process for a study of other potential alternatives, and market analysis of existing incentives.

A comparable case is that of Santa Ana where burdensome inclusionary housing requirements imposed by the city council effectively halted residential construction across the city. Unfortunately, inclusionary zoning does not address the factors that contribute to the high cost of housing such as land prices, lack of available sites, developer fees and exactions, cumbersome permittingprocesses, etc. For your reference, please find the following attachments on this topic.

Below Market Housing Mandates as Takings: Measuring Their Impact”, Independent Policy Report, by Tom Means, Edward Stringham, and Edward Lopez, November 2007.

Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work? Evidence from Los Angeles County and Orange County”, Reason Public Policy Institute , by Benjamin Powell and Edward Stringham, June 2004.

We stand ready to support efforts that are proven to work but placing the burden on current residents by driving up housing prices is not the solution. For so long, Anaheim has been a leader in finding innovative ways to build a vibrant and thriving community and we hope to see that continue.

Sincerely,
Phil Hawkins Tim Shaw Christine Schachter
Chief Executive Officer Government Affairs Director Government Affairs Director 3065*/(Housing affordability has become a
major issue inrecent years. Toaddress the
problem, many cities have adopted apolicy known
as below- market housing mandates or
inclu- sionary zoning. As commonly practiced
in California, below- market housing
mandates require developers to sell 10–20 percent
of new homes at prices affordable tolowincome
households. Many developers, however, argue that
theprogram is inviolation ofthetakings clause
of the U.S. Constitution because itforces
devel-opers touse some oftheir property to
advance apublic goal. Nevertheless, in Home
Builders Association of Northern California v. City
of Napa ( 2001), the court ruled against the
regu-latory takings argument, saying that
below-market housing mandates are legal because (
1) they offer compensating benefits to
developers and ( 2) they necessarily increase the supply of affordable
housing. This study investigates these claims in
the following way: Section 2discusses the
his-tory of regulatory takings and discusses
why below-market housing mandates may be
con-sidered ataking. Section 3investigates
how much below- market housing mandates
cost developers. Section 4investigates
econometri- cally whether below-market housing
mandates actually make housing more
affordable. Our research indicates that the
deci- sion by the California Courts of Appeal
is on shaky ground. Below- market
housing mandates require developers toforego
sub-stantial amounts of revenue and they
provide little offsetting benefit. A mandate in
Marin, California, for example, would require
devel- opers toforfeit roughly 40percent of
revenue from aproject, andbuilders are offered
almost nothing in
return. We can see how below- market
housing mandates affect housing markets by
using econometrics toanalyze data of price
andquantity for California cities in1990 and
2000. Our regressions show that cities that impose
abelow- market housing mandate actually
end up with 10percent fewer homes and 20
per-cent higher
prices. For developers, inclusionary zoning
has an effect similar to aregulatory taking.

For society in general, affordable housing
man-dates decrease the supply of new housing
and increase prices, which exacerbates the
afford-ability
problem. Below-Market Housing Mandates as
Takings:Measuring their
Impact Tom Means, Edward Edward Stringham, and
LopezNovember
2007 Executive
Independent Policy Reports are published by The Independent Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, scholarly research and educational organization that sponsors comprehensive studies on the political economy of critical social and economic issues. Nothing herein should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Independent Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Copyright © 2007 by The Independent Institute
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by electronic or mechanical means now known or to be invented, including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.

The Independent Institute
100 Swan Way, Oakland, CA 94621-1428
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1. Introduction
High housing prices in recent years are making it increasingly difficult for many to purchase a home. Prices have been rising all over the United States, especially in cities on the East
and West Coasts. In San Francisco, for example, the median home sells for $846,500 ( Said, 2007, p.c1), which requires yearly mortgage payments of roughly $63,000 ( plus yearly property taxes of $8,500).1 Not only is the median home
unaffordable to most, but there is a dearth of
affordable homes on the low end, too. In San
Francisco, a household making the median
income of $86,100 can afford ( using traditional
lending guidelines) only 6.7 percent of existing
homes ( National Association of Homebuilders/
Wells Fargo, 2007). Households making less are
all but precluded from the possibility of home
ownership ( Riches, 2004).

As a proposed solution, many cities are
adopting a policy often referred to as belowmarket housing mandates, affordable housing mandates, or inclusionary zoning ( California
Coalition for Rural Housing and Non-profit
Housing Association of Northern California,
2003). The specifics of the policy vary by city,
but inclusionary zoning as commonly practiced in California mandates that developers sell 10– 20 percent of new homes at prices affordable
to low-income households. Below-market units
typically have been interspersed among marketrate units, have a similar size and appearance as market-rate units, and retain their below-market
status for a period of fifty- five years.2 The program is touted as a way to make housing more affordable, and as a way to provide housing for
all income levels, not just the rich. In contrast to
exclusionary zoning, a practice that uses housing
laws to keep out the poor, inclusionary zoning is
advocated as a way to help the poor. Because of
its expressed good intentions, the program has
gained tremendous popularity. First introduced
in Palo Alto, California, in 1973, the program
has increased in popularity in the past decade
Below-Market Housing
Mandates as Takings
Measuring their Impact
Tom Means, Edward Stringham, and Edward Lopez
institute2 | the independent
and is now in place in one-third of the cities in
California ( Non-Profit Housing Association of
Northern California, 2007). And it is spreading nationwide, having been already adopted in parts of Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia
Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach, 1997).

But the program is not without controversy.3
In Home Builders Association of Northern
California v. City of Napa ( 2001), the Home
Builders Association maintained that by requiring developers to sell a percentage of their development for less than market price, the
ordinance violated the takings clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions.” A ruling by
the Court of Appeals in California stated that
affordable housing mandates are legal and not a
taking because ( 1) they benefit developers, and
2) they necessarily increase the supply of affordable housing. This report investigates these claims by examining the costs of the programs
and reviewing econometrically how they affect
the price and quantity of housing.

Our report is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses the history of regulatory takings decisions by the courts and relates them to affordable housing mandates. It provides a brief overview
of regulatory takings decisions and discusses the
arguments about why affordable housing mandates may or may not be considered a taking.

When government allows certain buyers to purchase at below-market prices, itis making sellers sell their property at price-controlled prices. If
sellers are not compensated for being forced to
sell their property at a below-market price, that
may be considered a taking.

Section 3 investigates how much affordable
housing mandates cost developers. By calculating the price- controlled level and comparing it to the market price, we can observe the costs to
developers each time they sell a price- controlled
home. After estimating how much the program
costs developers, we discuss to what extent they
are being compensated. We find that the alleged
benefits to developers pale in comparison to the
costs.

Section 4 investigates econometrically
whether below-market housing mandates actually make housing more affordable. Using panel data for California cities, we investigate how
below-market housing mandates affect the price
and quantity of housing. We find that cities that
adopt below- market housing mandates actually
drive housing prices up by 20 percent and end up
with 10 percent fewer homes. These statistically
significant findings thus bring into question the
idea that mandating affordable housing necessarily increases the amount of affordable housing.

Section 5 concludes by discussing why, contrary to Home Builders Association of Northern California v. City of Napa ( 2001), below-market
housing mandates should be considered a taking.

2. Below- market Housing Mandates
and Takings
What are “takings,” and should affordable housing mandates be considered a taking? The most familiar form of taking is when the government
acquires title to real property for public use, such
as common carriage rights of way (roads, rail, or
power lines). Precedent for these types of takings
is evident in early U.S. jurisprudence, which
institutionalized the principle that the government’s chief function is to protect private property.4 As such, the government’ s takings power was limited in several key respects. Most impor-
Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 3
tant, the nineteenth- century Supreme Court
prohibited takings that transferred property
from one private owner to another and upheld
the fundamental fairness doctrine that no individual property owner should bear too much of the burden in supplying public uses.

But government’ s takings power has
expanded over time. Takings restrictions were
gradually eroded beginning in the Progressive
Era and accelerating during the New Deal, as
the Supreme Court increasingly deferred to legislative bodies and an ever-expanding notion of public use. Starting in the latter half of the
twentieth century, the stage was set to approve
takings for “ public uses” such as urban renewal
Berman v. Parker, 1954), competition in real
estate ( Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff, 1984), expansion of the tax base ( Kelo v. New London, 2005), and other types of “economic development takings” ( Somin, 2004). By the final decade of the twentieth century, one prominent legal scholar
described the public use clause as being of
nearly complete insignificance” ( Rubenfeld,
1993, p.1078).

Regulatory takings differ in that they are
generally not subject to just compensation,
because they rest on the government’ s police
power, not the power of eminent domain.

Regulatory takings differ also in that the owner
retains title to the property but suffers attenuated rights. For example, a government might rezone an area for environmental conservation
and thereby prevent a landowner from developing his property. But does an owner still own his property if he is deprived of using it according
to his original intent? These were the essential
characteristics of the regulation challenged in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council ( 1992). 5
In that case, David Lucas owned two plots of
land that he bought for nearly $ 1 million and
intended to develop. But the South Carolina
Coastal Council later rezoned his property,
stating that it would be used for conservation.

The Court sided with Lucas, saying that if he
was deprived of economically valuable use, he
must be compensated. Under Lucas, federal law
requires compensation if the regulation diminishes the entire value of the property, such that an effective taking exists despite no physical
removal.

This so- called “ total takings” test is one of
several doctrines that could be used to judge
regulatory takings. For example, the diminution
of value test could support compensation to the
extent of the harm done to the property owner.

This was the Court’ s tendency in the 1922 case
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, which found that a
regulatory act can constitute a taking depending
on the extent to which the value of a property
is lowered. 6 So the Lucas Court was not up to
something new. As a matter of fact, the concept
of regulatory takings was discussed by key figures in the American founding era and became an important topic in nineteenth- century legal
scholarship as well. 7
Following in this tradition, the Lucas Court
addressed several sticking points with regulatory
takings law. For example, the majority opinion
cited Justice Holmes as stating the maxim that
when regulation goes too far in diminishing the
owner’s property rights, it becomes a taking.

However, as the majority opinion pointed out,
the Court does not have a well-developed standard for determining when a regulation goes too far to become a taking. Finally, and most important for our purposes, the Lucas Court also stressed that the law is necessary to prevent policymakers from using the expediency of police power to avoid the just compensation required
under eminent domain. TheLucas Court exam-
institute4 | the independent
ined regulators’ incentives and voiced its discomfort with the “ heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.”
Because they rezone land, requiring owners
to provide a public service of making low-income
housing, below-market housing mandates seem
like they fit into theLucas Court’s description
of what could be considered a taking. This specific issue, however, is still being debated in the courts. In 1999, the Home Builders Association
of Northern California brought a case against
the City of Napa for mandating that 10 percent
of new units be sold at below-market rates. The
Home Builders Association argued that the
affordable housing mandate violated the Fifth
Amendment’ s takings clause stating that “ private property [ shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.” The trial court dismissed the complaint, and in 2001, the Court of Appeals decided against the Home Builders
Association, arguing that “[ a]lthough the ordinance imposed significant burdens on developers, it also provided significant benefits for those who complied.” 8In addition, the California
court argued that because making housing more
affordable is a legitimate state interest, then
below-market housing mandates are legitimate,
because they advance that goal. Judge Scott
Snowden ( who was affirmed by Judges J. Stevens
and J. Simons) wrote, “ Second, it is beyond
question that City’s inclusionary zoning ordinance will ‘substantially advance’ the important governmental interest of providing affordable
housing for low and moderate- income families.

By requiring developers in City to create a modest amount of affordable housing ( or to comply with one of the alternatives) the ordinance will
necessarily increase the supply of affordable
housing.” 9 The Home Builders Association’ s
subsequent attempts to have the case reheard or
reviewed by the Supreme Court were denied.

So the Court’s argument rests on two
propositions that it considers beyond question:
1) affordable housing mandates provide significant benefits to builders that offset the costs, and (2) affordable housing mandates necessarily
increase the supply of affordable housing. Both
of these are empirical arguments that can be
tested against real-world data. We investigate
these propositions in the following two sections.

3. Estimating the Costs of Belowmarket Housing Mandates If one wants to state that “[ A]lthough the ordinance imposed significant burdens on developers, it also provided significant benefits for those who complied,” one needs to investigate the costs
of below-market housing mandates in these programs. Yet when this statement was issued by the Court in 2001, there had been no study of the
costs. 10 The first work to estimate these costs was
done by Powell and Stringham ( 2004a). Let us
here provide some sample calculations and then
present some data for costs in various California
cities. Once we present the costs, we can consider
whether the programs have significant, offsetting
benefits for developers.

First let us consider a real example from
Marin County’ s drafted Countywide Plan. 11
According to the plan, affordable housing mandates would be designated for certain areas of the county ( with privately owned property). In
these areas, anyone wishing to develop their
property would have to sell or lease 50– 60 percent of their property at below-market rates. 12 Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 5
The plan requires the below- market- rate homes
to be affordable to households earning 60–80
percent of the median income, which means
price- controlled units must be sold for approximately $ 180,000–$240,000.13 How much does such an affordable housing mandate cost developers? New homes are typically sold for more than the median price of housing, but for simplicity let us assume that new homes would have been sold at the median price in Marin, which
is $838,750. For each unit sold at $180,002, the
revenue is $658,748 less due to the price control.

Consider the following sample calculations for a
ten-unit project in Marin that show how much
revenue a developer could get with and without
price controls.

As these calculations show, the below-market housing mandate decreases the revenue from a ten-unit project by $3,293,740, which is roughly
40 percent of the value of a project. This is just
one example, and there are many more.

Powell and Stringham ( 2004a and 2004b)
estimate the costs of below-market housing
mandates in the San Francisco Bay Area, Los
Angeles, and Orange counties. By estimating how much units must be sold for at belowmarket rates and comparing this to how much homes could be sold for without price controls,
one can estimate how much money below-market housing mandates make developers forgo.

Even using conservative estimates ( to not overestimate costs), these policies cost developers a substantial amount. Figure 1 shows that in the
median San Francisco Bay Area city with a
below-market housing mandate, each price- controlled unit must be sold for more than $300,000 below the market price. In cities with high housing prices and restrictive price controls, such as Los Altos and Portola Valley, developers must
sell below-market-rate homes for more than $1
million below the market price.

One can estimate the costs imposed by
these programs on developers by looking at the
cost per unit times the number of units built.

This measure is not what economists call deadweight costs (which attempts to measure the lost gains from trade from what is not being built),
but just a measure of the lost revenue that developers incur for the units actually built. In many cities, no units have been built as a result of the
program, but nevertheless, the costs ( in current
prices) are quite high. The results for the San
Francisco Bay Area are displayed in figure 2. In
five cities—Mill Valley, Petaluma, Palo Alto,
San Rafael, and Sunnyvale— the amount of the
giveaways” in current prices totals over $1 billion.

The next important question is whether
developers are getting anything in return. If
Mill Valley, Petaluma, Palo Alto, San Rafael,
and Sunnyvale were to issue checks to developSample calculations for a ten-unit, for sale development in Marin County
Scenario 1:

Development without price controls
Revenue from a ten-unit project without price
controls
ten market-rate units) x ($838,750 per unit)] =
8, 387,500
Scenario 2:

Development with below-market mandate
Revenue from a ten-unit project, with 50 percent
of homes under price controls set for 60 percent of
median- income households
five market- rate units) x ($ 838, 750 per unit)]
five price- controlled units) x ($ 180, 002 per
unit)]= $5,093,760
institute6 | the independent
ers totaling $1 billion, one could say that even
though there was a taking, there was also a type
of compensation. But the interesting aspect
about affordable housing mandates as practiced
in California and most other places is that government offers no monetary compensation at all. In fact, this is one of the reasons why advocates of the program and governments have been adopting it. In the words of one prominent
advocate, Andrew Dieterich ( 1996, p. 41), “ a vast
inclusionary program need not spend a public
dime.” In contrast to government- built housing
projects, which require tax revenue to construct
and manage, affordable- housing mandates
impose those costs onto private citizens, namely
housing developers. Here we have private parties
losing billions of dollars in revenue and receiving no monetary compensation in return.

Monetary compensation for developers is
not present, but are affordable housing mandates accompanied by nonmonetary benefits? The Court inHome Builders Association v. Napa
2001) stated that “[ D]evelopments that include
affordable housing are eligible for expedited
processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants, and
density bonuses.” 14 According to California
Government Code section 65915, government
must provide a density bonus of at least 25 percent to developers who make 20 percent of a project affordable to low-income households.

The value of these offsetting benefits will vary
based on the specifics, but for full compensation to take place, these benefits would have to be more than $300,000 per home in the median
Bay Area city with inclusionary zoning.

One could determine in two ways that the
offsetting benefits were worth more than the
costs. 15 The first way would be if one observed
the building industry actively lobbying for these
programs. But in California and most other
areas, the building industry is usually the most
vocal opponent of these programs. In Home
Builders Association of Northern California v.

City of Napa the court provided no explanation
of why the Home Builders Association would be
suing to stop a program if it really did provide
significant benefits for those who complied.”
If the programs really did benefit developers,
Source: Powell and Stringham ( 2004a, p.15) Source: Powell and Stringham ( 2004a, p.15) Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 7
there would be no reason why developers would
oppose them.

Why don’t builders want to sell units for
hundreds of thousands less than market price
for each unit sold? Or why don’t California
builders want to forgo billions in revenue? All
of the builders with whom we have spoken have
stated that the offsetting “ benefits” are no benefits at all. For example, a city might grant a density bonus, but the density bonus might be
completely unusable, because density restrictions are just one of a set of restrictions on how many units will fit on the property. Other constraints such as setbacks, minimum requirements for public and private open space, floor area ratios, and even tree protections make it
extremely complicated to get more units on the
property. Conventional wisdom suggests that
building at 100 percent of allowable density
will maximize profits, but in reality developers
tend to build out at less than full density. The
City of Mountain View recently passed a policy
requiring developers to provide an explanation
for projects that failed to meet 80 percent of the
allowable density.16 Prior projects had averaged
around 65 percent of allowable density. So giving
builders the opportunity to build at 125 percent of
allowable density is often worth nothing, when so
many other binding regulations exist.

The second and even simpler way to determine whether the affordable housing mandates provide significant benefits to compensate developers for their costs would be to make the inclusionary zoning programs voluntary. Developers could then weigh the benefits and costs of participating, and ifthe benefits exceeded the costs, the developers could voluntarily comply. A few
cities in California tried to adopt voluntary ordinances, and perhaps unsurprisingly, they did not attract developers. One advocate of affordable housing mandates argues that the problem with voluntary programs is “ that most of them,
because of their voluntary nature, produce very
few units” ( Tetreault, 2000, p.20).

From these simple observations, we can
infer that the significant “ benefits” of these programs are not as significant as the costs. In this sense, the program has the character of a reguSource: Powell and Stringham ( 2004a, p.15) institute8 | the independent
latory taking. In addition to observing whether
builders would support or voluntarily participate in these programs, we can also analyze data to observe how these programs affect the quantity of housing. If the Court in Home Builders Association v. Napa is correct that the benefits are
significant, then we would predict that imposing
an affordable housing mandate would not affect
or it would encourage) housing production in a
jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the program
is not compensating for what it takes, we would
predict that cities with the program will see less
development than in otherwise similar cities
without the program. Here the program is a taking that will hinder new development.

4. Testing How Below- market
Housing Mandates Affect the Price
and Quantity of Housing
The court inHome Builders Association v. Napa
puts forth an important proposition, which we
can examine statistically. The court states: “ By
requiring developers in City to create a modest amount of affordable housing ( or to comply with one of the alternatives) the ordinance will
necessarily increase the supply of affordable housing” (emphasis added). Although the court suggests that it is an a priori fact that price controls will increase the supply of affordable housing,
the issue may be a bit more complicated than
these appellate judges maintain. Before getting
to the econometrics, let us consider some simple
economic theory and simple statistics about the
California experience. First, if a price control is
so restrictive, developers cannot make any profits and so the price control can easily drive out all development from an area. Cities such as
Watsonville adopted overly restrictive price controls, and they all but prevented development until they scaled back the requirements ( Powell
and Stringham, 2005). Over the course of thirty
years in the entire San Francisco Bay Area,
below- market housing mandates have resulted in
the production of only 6,836 affordable units, an
average of 228 per year ( Powell and Stringham,
2004a, p. 5). Controlling for the length of time
each program has been in effect, the average
jurisdiction has produced only 14.7 units for
each year since adopting abelow-market housing
mandate. Since the programs have been implemented, dozens of cities have produced a total of zero units (Powell and Stringham, 2004a, pp.
4–5). So unless one defines zero as an increase,
it might be more accurate to restate “ necessarily
increase” as “ might increase.”
Economic theory predicts that price controls on housing lead to a decrease in quantity produced. Because developers must sell a percentage of units at price- controlled rates in order to get permission to build market-rate units, this
policy also will affect the supply of market- rate
units. Powell and Stringham ( 2005) discuss how
the policy may be analyzed as a tax on new housing. If below-market-rate housing mandates act as a tax on housing, they will reduce quantity
and increase housing price. This is the exact
opposite of what advocates of below- market-rate
housing mandates say they prefer. So we have
two competing hypotheses, that of economic
theory, and that of the court in Home Builders
Association v. Napa. Luckily, we can test these
two hypotheses by examining data for housing
production and housing prices in California.

Our approach is to use panel data, which
has a significant advantage over simple crosssectional or time-series data. Suppose a city adopts the policy, there is an unrelated statewide
Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 9
decline in demand, and housing output falls by
10 percent. A time- series approach would still
have to control for other economic factors that
might have changed and reduced housing output. One would still need to compare the reduction inoutput from a city that adopted the policy to a nearby similar city that did not. A crosssectional approach can control overall economic factors at a point in time but will not control for
unobserved city differences. Our approach is to
set up a two-period panel data set to control for
unobserved city differences and to control for
changes over time. The tests, which we explain
in detail below, will enable us to see how adopting a below-market-rate housing mandate will affect variables such as output and prices.

4.1. Description of the Data
The first set of data we utilize consists of the
1990 and 2000 census data for California cities.

The 2000 census data are restricted to cities with
a population greater than ten thousand, while
1990 census data are not. A decrease in population for some cities during the decade resulted in a loss of fifteen cities from the sample. We do
not include the 1980 census, because there were
few policies in effect during this decade ( Palo
Alto passed the first policy in 1972). Focusing
on this decade also highlights some economic
issues. From 1987 to 1989, housing prices grew
very rapidly. Prices for the first half of 1989 grew
around 25 percent, only to fall by this amount
for the second half of the year, and continue to
slide as the California economy declined. For
some areas, prices did not recover to their original level until halfway through the 1990 decade.

The California economy grew faster in the second half of the decade due to the dot-com boom in the technology sector. Data from the RAND
California Statistics Web site provided average
home sale prices for each city for the 1990 and
2000 period. The RAND data do not report
1990 home sale prices for some cities, resulting
in a loss of more observations. Summary statistics are provided in table 1.

Data onthe policy adoption dates came from
the California Coalition for Rural Housing and
Non-profit Housing Association of Northern
California. Table 2 describes the summary
statistics of the policy variables that we constructed. IZyr is a dummy variable defined to equal one if the city passed a below-market-rate
housing ordinance that year or in prior years.

As noted above, differences in population cutoff
points and missing 1990 housing prices reduced
the sample of cities that passed ( or did not pass)
an ordinance. Starting in 1985, our sample contains fifteen California cities that had passed an ordinance. The number increased to fifty-nine
cities by the end of 1999. The last column reports
the difference between decades. In other words,
iz95delta reports the number of cities that passed
an ordinance between 1985 and 1995. The difference variables are fairly constant and capture a large number of cities that passed ordinances
during the decade. Focusing on the 1990– 2000
decade should allow us enough observations to
capture the impact of the policy.

4.2. Empirical Tests
Jeffrey Wooldridge ( 2006) provides an excellent
discussion of how to test the impact of a policy
using two-period panel data. Our approach is to
specify a model with unobserved city effects that
are assumed constant over the decade ( 1990–
2000) and estimate a first- difference model
institute10 | the independent
to eliminate the fixed effect. We also specify a
semilog model so that the first difference yields
the log of the ratio of the dependent variables
over the decade. Estimating the models in logs
also simplifies the interpretation of the policy
variable coefficient as an approximate percentage change rather than an absolute difference in averages. For the policy variable, we define IZyr
as a dummy variable equal to one if the policy
was in effect during the current and previous
years. To see the importance of the first- difference approach, consider a model specified for each decade.

Level Model:
lnYi,t = 0 + d0YR2000i,t + d1IZyri,t +
1Xi,t + ai + vi,t
Equation 1)
i = city
t = 1990, 2000
The dependent variable is either housing
output or housing prices, YR2000 is a dummy
variable allowing the intercept to change over
the decade, IZyr is the policy dummy variable,
and the X are control variables. The error term
contains two terms: the unobserved fixed city
component ( ai) considered fixed for the decade
e.g., location, weather, political tastes); and the
usual error component ( vit). If the unobserved
fixed effect is uncorrelated with the exogenous
variables, one can estimate the model using
ordinary- least- squares for each decade. The coefficient for IZyr measures the impact of the policy for each decade. 17 Unfortunately, estimating the level model may not capture the differences
between cities that passed an ordinance and the
ones that did not. In other words, suppose cities with higher housing prices are more likely to adopt the policy. The dummy variable may capture the impact of the policy along with the fact that these cities already have higher prices.

The above issues can be addressed by differencing the level models to eliminate the fixed city effect, which yields the first-difference model.18 First- Difference Model
lnYi,2000 - lnYi,1990 = d0 + d1IZyri,2000
d1IZyri,1990 + 1Xi,2000 - 1Xi,1990 +
vi,2000 - vi,1990
Equation 2)
i = city
which can be rewritten as:
ln(Yi,2000/ Yi,1990 ) = d0 + d1IZyri,t +
1Xi,t + vi,t
Equation 3)
i = city
t = 2000
Eliminating the unobserved fixed city
effect, which we show below in the last two columns of tables 3 and 4, has an important effect on estimating the impact of the policy variable.

Differencing the panel data also yields a dummy
variable that represents the change in policy participation over the decade ( an example of this is the iz95delta appearing in tables 2 through 6).

When policy participation takes place in both
periods ( 1990 and 2000), the interpretation
of the differenced dummy is slightly different
from the usual policy treatment approach. The
differenced dummy variable predicts the average change in the dependent variable due to an increase ( or decrease) in participation.

To see the advantage of the first- difference
approach, we first estimated ( without control
variables, which we will add in tables 5 and 6)
the un-differenced equations of the log of aver-
Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 11
age housing prices and output ( lnYi,t = 0 +
d1IZyri,t) over various lagged policy dummies.

The first four columns in table 3 report the estimated coefficients (d1) for each lag year for the level models. The left two columns show the
coefficient estimates for the five regressions that
look at housing prices in 1990 and have iz1985,
iz1986, iz1987, iz1988, or iz1989 as the policy variable. The third and fourth columns in table 3 show the coefficient estimates for the five regresVariable Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Population 2000 N=446 65,466 ( 197,087) 10,007 3,694,834 Population 1990 N=431 58,468 ( 187,014) 1,520 3,485,398 Households 2000 N=446 22,251 ( 68,673) 1,927 1,276,609
Households 1990 N=431 20,512 ( 66,074) 522 1,219,770
Housing Units 2000 N=446 23,278 ( 71,843) 2,069 1,337,668 Housing Units 1990 N=431 21,745 ( 70,331) 597 1,299,963 Density 2000
persons/ acre) N=446 7.62 ( 6.06) 0.42 37.32
Density 1990
persons/ acre) N=431 6.87 ( 5.88) 0.08 37.01
Median Household
Income 2000 N=446 52,582 ( 21,873) 16,151 193,157
Median Household
Income 1990 N=431 38,518 ( 14,543) 14,215 123,625
Per Capita
Income 2000 N=446 23,903 ( 13,041) 7,078 98,643
Per Capita
Income 1990 N=431 16,696 ( 8,070) 4,784 63,302
Rents/Income
2000 N=446 27.60%( 3.1%) 14.4% 50.1%
Rents/Income
1990 N=431 28.9%( 2.7%) 14.9% 35.1%
Average Home
Price 2000 N=360 300,594 ( 235,436) 49,151 2,253,218
Average Home
Price 1990 N=352 206,754 ( 112,804) 52,858 1,018,106
Table 1 Summary Statistics
institute12 | the independent
sions that look at housing prices in 2000 and
have iz1995, iz1996, iz1997, iz1998, or iz1999 as
the policy variable. For example, the 0.389 in the
first row indicates that cities with inclusionary
zoning in 1985 had 47.6 percent ( exp(0.389) - 1)
higher than average prices in 1990, and the 0.627
in the first row indicates that cities with inclusionary zoning in 1995 had 87.2 percent higherthan-average prices in 2000. For both decades, the impact increases slightly as the lag period
is decreased, though the impact for the 2000
period is much larger than the 1990 period.

Table 2 Summary Statistics – Policy Variables
Variable
of cities with
inclusionary
zoning (in that
year) Variable
of cities with
inclusionary
zoning (in that
year) Variable
Change in # of
cities with inclusionary zoning
over 10 years)
iz1985 15 iz1995 50
iz95delta
which is iz1995-iz1985) 35
iz1986 19 iz1996 52
iz96delta
which is iz1996-iz1986) 33
iz1987 19 iz1997 54
iz97delta
which is iz1997-iz1987) 35
iz1988 22 iz1998 54
iz98delta
which is iz1998- iz1988) 32
iz1989 23 iz1999 59
iz99delta
which is iz1999-iz1989) 36
Dependent Variable: ln(Price)
Level models for 1990 data Level models for 2000 data
First-difference models
2000–1990)
Policy Variable Coefficient of
Policy Variable
Policy variable Coefficient of
Policy Variable
Policy variable Coefficient of
Policy Variable
iz1985 . 389 iz1995 . 627 iz95delta . 312
iz1986 . 431 iz1996 . 642 iz96delta . 298
iz1987 . 431 iz1997 . 637 iz97delta . 278
iz1988 . 442 iz1998 . 637 iz98delta . 270
iz1989 . 457 iz1999 . 642 iz99delta . 265
Table 3 Summary of Policy Coefficients from Fifteen Regressions on the Price of Housing by Model and by Lag Year
Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 13
The estimated coefficients ( d1) for 1990 and
2000 range from 0.389 to 0.642 and indicate
that cities with inclusionary zoning have 48–90
percent higher housing prices, but this does not
take into consideration the possibility that cities
that adopted the policy already had higher prices
when they did so. To account for this potential
problem, the first- difference model estimates how
changes in the policy variable ( adopting a belowmarket housing ordinance) alone affect housing prices. The last two columns of table 3 report the
first- difference estimates ( ln(Yi,2000/ Yi,1990) = d0 d1IZyri,t). For example, the 0.312 in the last
column of the first row indicates that cities with
below- market housing mandates have 36.6 percent
higher prices. Each of the estimated coefficients in
table 3 are significant at the 1 percent level. The
results in the last two columns indicate that belowmarket housing mandates have increased the price of the average home by 30 to 37 percent.

The results for housing output ( the number
of units) are even more interesting. These results
are presented in table 4. The estimates ofd1for
the level models for 1990 and 2000 are positive
and statistically significant at the one percent
level, which indicates that cities with inclusionary zoning have more housing production, but similar to the housing price regressions do not
take into consideration the possibility that cities that adopted the policy already were growing when they adopted the policy. Again, we need to look at the difference in output based
on cities adopting the policy. The last two columns in table 4 show how changes in the policy variable ( adopting a below-market-rate housing
ordinance) alone affect the quantity of housing. Eliminating the unobserved fixed effect by differencing the data switches the sign of
the policy variable from positive to negative
though most are statistically insignificant without control variables). This switch in sign ofd1 provides strong evidence of the importance of
eliminating the unobserved fixed city effect. The
negative impact increases in size and statistical
significance when control variables are added to
the first- difference model.

Dependent Variable: ln(Housing Units)
Level models for 1990 data Level models for 2000 data
First- difference models
2000–1990)
Policy Variable Coefficient of
Policy Variable
Policy variable Coefficient of
Policy Variable
Policy variable Coefficient of
Policy Variable
iz1985 . 777 iz1995 . 665 iz95delta -. 045
iz1986 . 751 iz1996 . 614 iz96delta -. 024
iz1987 . 751 iz1997 . 585 iz97delta -. 027
iz1988 . 679 iz1998 . 585 iz98delta -. 038
iz1989 . 653 iz1999 . 618 iz99delta -. 051
Table 4 Summary of Policy Coefficients from Fifteen Regressions on the Quantity of Housing by Model and by Lag Year
institute14 | the independent
Tables 3 and 4 indicate the importance of
differencing the data and removing the unobserved fixed city effect.19 The next set of regressions in table 5 report first- difference estimates for housing prices for the five-year and one year
lag while adding other control variables that may
change over time.20 The other models ( using
lag periods iz96delta, iz97delta, and iz98delta)
yielded similar results. Adding income, whether
median household income or per capita income,
increases the size of the estimated policy effect.

All policy estimates of d1 are larger than 0.20,
suggesting that cities that impose an affordable
housing mandate drive up prices by more than 20
percent. Dropping the insignificant variables and
adjusting for heteroscedasticity had little impact
on the policy and income variables.

The final set of results in table 6 reports
the estimated effects on housing quantity for
the same lag periods as the price estimates. The
results are nearly identical for the other lag periods (iz96delta, iz97delta, and iz98delta). Adding control variables increases the policy impact and
its statistical significance. Substituting the number of households for the number of units as the dependent variable does not alter the main
results. Adjusting for heteroscedasticity did
increase the statistical significance levels slightly
for the policy variable. The negative policy coefficients (- 0. 104 and - 0. 097) suggest that cities that impose an affordable housing mandate
reduce housing units by more than 10 percent.

Table 5 Regression Results of How Below-market Housing Mandates Affect the Price of Housing: First-difference Model with Control Variables
Dependent Variable: ln(average price 2000/ 1990)
Independent Variable Coefficients and
Standard Errors)
Coefficients and
Standard Errors)
N=431 N=431
Constant 0.001

0.025)

0.009

0.025)
iz95delta 0.228***

0.038)
iz99delta 0.217***

0.037)
median income 0.173***

0.0126)

0.178***

0.0125)
density - 0.007

0.011)

0.008

0.011)
population - 0.0017

0.00661)

0.00112

0.00662)
rent %- 0.002

0.005)

0.003

0.005)
Adj. R-Squared 0.4332 0.4300
Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 15

5. Conclusion
Our research provides answers to two important
questions: How much do below-market housing
mandates cost developers, and do below-market
housing mandates improve housing affordability? After showing that below-market housing mandates cost developers hundreds of thousands of dollars for each unit sold, we discussed how developers do not receive compensation in
this amount. Next we investigated how these
policies affected the supply of housing. Using
panel data and first difference estimates, we
found that below- market housing mandates
lead to decreased construction and increased
prices. Over a ten-year period, cities that
imposed a below-market housing mandate on
average ended up with 10 percent fewer homes
and 20 percent higher prices. These results are
highly significant. The assertion by the court
in Home Builders Association v. Napa that “ the
ordinance will necessarily increase the supply
of affordable housing” is simply untrue.

The justification for the decision that
below- market housing mandates are not a taking rests on some extremely questionable economic assumptions. We are not sure about the amount of economics knowledge of Judges
Scott Snowden, J. Stevens, and J. Simons.

Below-market housing mandates are simply a
type of price control, and nearly every economist agrees that price controls on housing lead to a decrease in quantity and quality of housing available ( Kearl et al., 1979, p.28). Because these price controls apply to a percentage of new
housing, and builders must comply with them
Table 6 Regression Results of How Below-market Housing Mandates Affect the Quality of Housing: First-difference Model with Control Variables
Dependent Variable: ln(units 2000–1990)
Independent Variable Coefficients and
Standard Errors)
Coefficients and
Standard Errors)
N=431 N=431
Constant - 0.056**

0.023)

0.054**

0.023)
iz95delta - 0.104**

0.042)
iz99delta - 0.097**

0.041)
median income 0.0683***

0.0132)

0.0660***

0.0131)
density 0.113*

0.011)

0.114

0.011)
population 0.0233*

0.00729)

0.0230*

0.00729)
Adj. R-Squared 0.2921 0.2911
Note: *, **,*** denotes significance at the . 10, . 05, . 01 levels, two-tailed test. institute16 | the independent
if they want to build market-rate housing, price
controls also will affect the supply of market- rate
housing. Because price controls act as a tax on
new housing, we would expect a supply shift
leading to less output and higher prices for all
remaining units.

New names for price controls, like “ inclusionary zoning,” make the policy sound innocuous or even beneficial ( who can be against a policy of inclusion?), but in reality the program
is a mandate that imposes significant costs on a
minority of citizens. The costs of below- market
housing mandates are borne by developers and
other new homebuyers who receive little or no
compensation. From this perspective, belowmarket housing mandates are a taking no different in substance from an outright taking under eminent domain. Below-market housing
mandates represent the sort of abuse the Lucas
Court forewarned, and they should rightly be
considered a taking. In terms of economics,
below-market housing mandates only differ
from an outright taking in degree— there is not
a “ total taking” but a partial taking and clearly a
diminution of value without any compensation.

The amount of harm imposed by below- market
housing mandates should inform their status
under the law.

References
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Calavita, Nico, Kenneth Grimes, and Alan Mallach. 1997.

Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey:
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Mayo. 2005. “ Metropolitan- Specific Estimates of
the Price Elasticity of Supply of Housing, and Their
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334–39.

Kautz, Barbara Erlich. 2002. “ In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing.”
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Larry T. Wimmer. 1979. “ A Confusion of Economists?” American Economic Review 69: pp. 28–37.

Mayer, Christopher J., and C. Tsuriel Somerville, 2000.

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Pipes, Richard. 1999. Property and Freedom. New York:

Alfred A. Knopf.

Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 17
Powell, Benjamin, and Edward Stringham. 2004a. “ Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work?” Reason Policy Study 318.

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Cases Cited
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Berman et al. v. Parker et al., 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 ( 1984).

Home Builders Association of Northern California v. City of Napa, 89 Cal. App. 4th 897 (modified and republished
90 Cal. App. 4th 188) (2001).

Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469 2005).

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
1992).

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Notes
1 Assuming a 30-year fixed-interest- rate mortgage with an interest rate of 6.3 percent.
2 For details about the program, see California Coalition for Rural Housing and Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California ( 2003) and Powell
and Stringham ( 2004a).
3 For review of the literature, see Powell and Stringham 2005).
4 “ The country that became the United States was
unique in world history in that it was founded by
individuals in quest of private property. . . . [ T]he
conviction that the protection of property was the
main function of government, and its corollary that a
government that did not fulfill this obligation forfeited its mandate, acquired the status of a self-evident truth in the minds of the American colonists.” Pipes ( 1999,
p.240).
5 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 ( 1992).
6 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 260, U.S. 393 (1922).
7 As 1egal scholar James Ely writes, “ In his famous
1792 essay James Madison perceptively warned
people against government that ‘ indirectly violates
their property, in their actual possessions.’ Although
Madison anticipated the regulatory takings doctrine,
the modern doctrine began to take shape in the last
decades of the nineteenth century. For example, in a
treatise on eminent domain published in 1888, John
institute18 | the independent
Lewis declared that when a person was deprived of
the possession, use, or disposition of property ‘ he is to that extent deprived of his property, and, hence . . . his property may be taken, in the constitutional sense, though his title and possession remain undisturbed.’
Likewise, in 1891 Justice David J. Brewer pointed out
that regulation of the use of property might destroy
its value and constitute the practical equivalent of
outright appropriation. While on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes also recognized that regulations might amount to a
taking of property. ‘ It would be open to argument at
least,’ he stated, ‘ that an owner might be stripped of his rights so far as to amount to a taking without any
physical interference with his land.’” ( Ely, 2005, p.43, footnotes in original omitted.)
8 Home Builders Association of Northern California v.

City of Napa ( 2001), p. 188.
9 Home Builders Association of Northern California v.

City of Napa ( 2001), pp. 195–6.
10 The California Coalition for Rural Housing and
Non-profit Housing Association of Northern California (2003, p.3) stated, “ These debates, though fierce, remain largely theoretical due to the lack of empirical research.”
11 Marin County is one of the highest- income and most
costly areas in the San Francisco Bay Area.
12 http:// www.co.marin.ca.us/ EFiles/ Docs/ CD/
PlanUpdate/ 07_0430_IT_070430091111. pdf
accessed August 19, 2007). To simplify the specifics, developers have the choice of selling 60 percent of homes to low-income households or 50 percent
of homes to very-low-income households, which
calculates to roughly the same loss of revenue, so for
simplicity we will focus on the latter scenario.
13 Median income for a household of four is $ 91,200,
so a household earning 80 percent of median income
earns $ 73,696, and a household earning 60 percent
of the median income earns $ 55,272. The specific
affordability price control formula will depend on certain assumptions ( for example, the level of the interest rate in the formula), but using some standard assumptions we can create an estimate ( assuming homes will be financed with 0 percent down, a 30- year, fixed- rate mortgage, and an interest rate of 7 percent, and assuming that 26 percent of income will pay mortgage payments and 4 percent of income will pay for real
estate taxes and other homeowner costs).

This formula gives us how much a household
in each income level could afford and the level of the
price controls. In Marin County, a home sold to a
four- person household earning 80 percent of median
income could be sold for no more than $ 240,003,
and a home sold to a four- person household earning
60 percent of the median income could be sold for no
more than $ 180,002.

The price controls may be set at stricter levels,
depending on the city ordinance. For example, the
City of Tiburon sets price controls for “affordability” much more strictly than the above formula. Its ordinance assumes an interest rate of 9.5 percent and
assumes that 25 percent of income can be devoted
to a mortgage. According to Tiburon’ s ordinance, a
moderate,” price- controlled home can be sold for no
more than $ 109,800.
14 Home Builders Association of Northern California v.

City of Napa ( 2001), p.194.
15 Powell and Stringham ( 2005) discuss this issue in depth. 16 Policy on Achieving Higher Residential Densities in
Multiple- Family Zones, ( September 13, 2005).
17 For those readers unfamiliar with semilog models, d1 provides an interpretation of the policy variable as a
percentage change. The estimate ofd1 is interpreted as
the approximate percentage change in Y for cities that
pass an ordinance. When the estimate of d1 is large
greater than 10 percent), the more accurate estimate
is % Y = exp( d1)– 1.
18 The first difference model is the fixed- effects model when there are two time periods.
19 Controlling for the endogeneity of the policy variable will have little or no impact. The data reveal that cities that passed an ordinance also have higher housing
prices on average. It may be that higher- priced cities are more likely to pass an ordinance. Given our results, we have some doubts about whether this will
impact our conclusion. First we lagged the policy
variable from one to five years and found very little
variation in the OLS estimates. A lag of five years
for a potential dependent variable) should reduce or
eliminate the potential bias. Second, the first- difference approach reduced the price effect and significantly changed the output effect by controlling for unobserved fixed effects. Finally, there are some limits to finding instrumental variables for a first-difference model. Clearly it would not be appropriate to use
any of the 2000 data to control for policies passed in
earlier years. One could use the 1990 census data, but
even here there are some cities that passed the policy
prior to 1990. For these reasons, we believe controlling for endogeneity will not change the basic results. 20 The income and population variables are rescaled
in units of ten thousand to simplify the coefficient
presentation.

Below- Market Housing Mandates As Takings | 19
About the Authors
Tom Means is Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and Professor of Economics at San Jose State University and serves as Director of the Center for Economic Education. He earned his Ph.D. in economics from UCLA in 1983 and has been with San Jose State for twenty-five years. Professor Means teaches the graduate microeconomics and econometrics seminars. His research focuses on applied economics in the areas of public choice, labor economics, and forensic economics.

He has published in a variety of journals, including Public Choice, The Southern Economics Journal, and The Journal Of Forensic Economics. Since 2004 he has served on the City Council of Mountain View and is currently Vice-Mayor.

Edward P. Stringham is Research Fellow at the Independent Institute, Associate Professor of Economics at San Jose State University, President of the Association of Private Enterprise Education, editor of the Journal of Private Enterprise, editor of two books, and author of twenty articles in refereed journals including the Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics, Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance, and Journal of Labor Research.

Stringham has been discussed on more than 100 broadcast stations including CBS, CNBC, CNN, Fox, Headline News, NPR, and MTV and in hundreds of newspapers worldwide.

Stringham earned his Ph.D. from George Mason University in2002, and has won the Templeton Culture of Enterprise Best Article Award, Paper of the Year Award from the Association of Private Enterprise, Best Article Award from the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, Second Place in the Independent Institute Garvey Fellowship Awards, and Distinguished Young Scholar Award from the Liberalni Institut and the Prague School of Economics.

Edward J. Lopez is Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and Professor of Law and Economics at San Jose State University. His main area of research is in public choice and law and economics, with emphases on empirical models of creative expression, technological innovation, political ideology, and political institutions. Additional areas of research include antitrust regulation, property rights, campaign finance, term limits, and federal fiscal policy. Professor Lopez has taught courses in microeconomics, macroeconomics, law and economics, public finance, public choice, and mathematical economics. He earned a Ph.D. from George Mason University in 1997. Professor Lopez joined the faculty of San Jose State in the fall of 2005.

Previously he held appointments at the University of North Texas and George Mason University, and he served as staff economist on the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.

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June 2004
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK?

EVIDENCE FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND

ORANGE COUNTY
320
POLICY
STUDY
A
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Reason Public Policy Institute
Policy Study No. 320
Do Affordable Housing Mandates
Work? Evidence from Los Angeles
County and Orange County
By Benjamin Powell, Ph.D. and Edward Stringham, Ph.D
Project Director: Adrian T. Moore, Ph.D
Executive Summary
alifornia and many urban areas nationwide face a housing affordability crisis. New housing production has chronically failed to meet housing needs, causing housing prices to escalate. Faced with demands to “ do something” about the housing affordability crisis, many local governments have turned to inclusionary zoning” ordinances in which they mandate that developers sell a certain percentage of the homes they build at below-market prices to make them affordable for people with lower incomes.

The number of cities with affordable housing mandates has grown rapidly, to about 10 percent of cities over 100,000 population as of the mid-90s, and many advocacy groups predict the trend will accelerate in the next five years. California was an early leader in the adoption of inclusionary zoning, and its use there has grown rapidly. Between 1990 and 2003, the number of California communities with inclusionary zoning more than tripled—from 29 to 107 communities— meaning about 20 percent of California communities now have inclusionary zoning.

Inclusionary zoning attempts to deal with high housing costs by imposing price controls on a percentage of new homes. During the past 20 years, a number of publications have debated the merits of inclusionary zoning programs. Nevertheless, as a recent report observed, “ These debates, though fierce, remain largely theoretical due to the lack of empirical research.”
Our recent report, Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work?, filled the empirical research void. We measured the actual performance of these ordinances in the San Francisco Bay Area. This study follows up on our previous study by examining data from communities in Los Angeles County and Orange County to evaluate the effects of inclusionary zoning and examine whether it is an C
effective public policy response to high housing prices. In Los Angeles and Orange Counties, 13 cities have an affordable housing mandate. These communities vary in size and density with different income levels and demographics, so they provide a good sample to tell us how inclusionary zoning is working in Southern California.

These are our findings:

Inclusionary Zoning Produces Few Units
Since its inception, inclusionary zoning has resulted in few affordable units. The 13 Los Angeles and Orange County cities with inclusionary zoning have produced only 6,379 affordable units, with 70 percent of those units being produced in Irvine. After passing an ordinance, the median city produces less than eight affordable units per year. Inclusionary zoning cannot meet the area’ s affordable housing needs.

Inclusionary Zoning Has High Costs
Inclusionary zoning imposes large burdens on the housing market. For example, if a home could be sold for 500,000 dollars but must be sold for $200,000, the revenue from the sale is $300,000 less. In half the Los Angeles County and Orange County jurisdictions this cost associated with selling each inclusionary unit exceeds $575,000. In current prices the cost of inclusionary zoning in the average jurisdiction is $298 million, bringing the total cost for all inclusionary units in Los Angeles and Orange County to date to $3.9 billion.

Inclusionary Zoning Makes Market- priced Homes More Expensive Who bears the costs of inclusionary zoning? The effective tax of inclusionary zoning will be borne by some combination of market-rate homebuyers, landowners, and builders. How much of the burden is borne by market-rate buyers versus landowners and builders is determined by each group’ s relative responsiveness to price changes.

We estimate that inclusionary zoning causes the price of new homes in the median city to increase by 33,000 to $66,000. In high market-rate cities such as San Juan Capistrano and Laguna Beach we estimate that inclusionary zoning adds more than $100,000 to the price of each new home.

Inclusionary Zoning Restricts the Supply of New Homes
Inclusionary zoning drives away builders, makes landowners supply less land for residential use, and leads to less housing for homebuyers— the very problem it was instituted to address.

We find that new housing production drastically decreases the year after cities adopt inclusionary zoning.

For all 13 cities average production of housing fell the year following the adoption of inclusionary zoning. In the eight cities with data for seven years prior and seven years following inclusionary zoning, 17,296 fewer homes were produced during the seven years after the adoption of inclusionary zoning. In those cities 770 affordable” units were produced. One must question whether 770 units are worth the cost in terms of 17,296 fewer homes. By discouraging production of 17,296 homes in those eight cities, $11 billion worth of housing was essentially destroyed.

Inclusionary Zoning Costs Government Revenue
Price controls on new development lower assessed values, thereby costing state and local governments lost tax revenue each year. Because inclusionary zoning restricts resale values for a number of years, the loss in annual tax revenue can become substantial. The total present value of lost government revenue due to Los Angeles and Orange County inclusionary zoning ordinances is upwards of $752 million.

Price Controls Do Not Address the Cause of the Affordability Problem Price controls fail to get to the root of the affordable housing problem. Indeed, by causing fewer homes to be built they actually make things worse. The real problem is government restrictions on supply.

Supply has not kept up with demand due to these artificial restrictions. One recent study found that 90 percent of the difference between physical construction costs and the market price of new homes can be attributed to land use regulation.

The solution is to allow more construction. When the supply of homes increases, existing homeowners often upgrade to the newly constructed homes. This frees up their prior homes for other families with lower income. Inclusionary zoning restricts this upgrade process by slowing or eliminating new construction.

With fewer new homes available, middle- and upper-income families bid up the price of the existing stock of homes, thus making housing less affordable for everyone.

Conclusion
Inclusionary zoning has failed to produce a significant number of affordable homes due to the incentives created by the price controls. Even the few inclusionary zoning units produced have cost builders, homeowners, and governments greatly. By restricting the supply of new homes and driving up the price of both newly constructed market-rate homes and the existing stock of homes, inclusionary zoning makes housing less affordable.

Inclusionary zoning ordinances will continue to make housing less affordable by restricting the supply of new homes. If more affordable housing is the goal, governments should pursue policies that encourage the production of new housing. Ending the price controls of inclusionary zoning would be a good start.

Policy Study No. 320
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................ 1 The Housing Market and Inclusionary Zoning in Los Angeles and Orange Counties ..... 3 Costs Associated with Below- Market Units .................................................................. 6 A. Estimating the Effects of Price Controls by City................................................................................... 9 B. Who Bears the Burden of Inclusionary Zoning?................................................................................ 11 C. The Effect of Price Controls on Housing Construction...................................................................... 15 The Fiscal Cost of Price Controls to State and Local Government............................... 18 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 21 About the Authors..................................................................................................... 22 Related Reason Foundation Studies........................................................................... 23 Endnotes................................................................................................................... 24 DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 1
Part I
Introduction
he number of cities with affordable housing mandates has grown rapidly, to about 10 percent of cities over 100,000 population as of the mid-90s, and many advocacy groups predict the trend will accelerate in the next five years.1 California was an early leader in the adoption of inclusionary zoning, and its use there has grown rapidly. Between 1990 and 2003, the number of California communities with inclusionary zoning more than tripled—from 29 to 107 communities—meaning about 20 percent of California communities now have inclusionary zoning.2Thirteen cities in Los Angeles and Orange Counties have inclusionary zoning.

The median price of new housing is $450,000 in Los Angeles County and $660,000 in Orange County.3 Such high prices affect all but the wealthiest families’ chances of buying a new home. Of metropolitan areas with more than one million residents, the Los Angeles-Long Beach Metropolitan Area and the Orange County Metropolitan Area respectively rank five and six as the least affordable areas in the nation.

Table 1: Least Affordable Metropolitan Areas in the Nation Metro Area Least Affordable
Metropolitan Areas
Share of Homes Affordable
for Median Incomes
Family Income
San Francisco, CA PMSA* 1 9.2% $ 86,100
San José, CA PMSA 2 20.1% $ 96,000
San Diego, CA MSA 3 21.6% $ 60,100
Oakland, CA PMSA 4 23.9% $ 74,500
Los Angeles- Long Beach, CA PMSA 5 34.4% $ 55,100
Orange County, CA PMSA 6 37.7% $ 75,600
Sacramento, CA PMSA 7 43.7% $ 57,300
Portland- Vancouver, OR- WA PMSA 8 46.6% $ 57,200
Boston, MA-NH PMSA 9 48.2% $ 74,200
Riverside- San Bernardino, CA PMSA 10 49.6% $ 50,300
New York, NY PMSA 11 49.9% $ 62,800
Miami, FL PMSA 12 58.1% $ 48,200
Denver, CO PMSA 13 59.6% $ 69,900
Bergen- Passaic, NJ PMSA 14 61.5% $ 78,900
Newark, NJ PMSA 15 61.1% $ 78,700
Source: Data are from the “Housing Opportunity Index: First Quarter 2002” (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Homebuilders), * PMSA and MSA are census designations meaning, respectively, Primary Municipal Statistical Area and Municipal Statistical Area.

Faced with demands to “ do something” about the region’ s housing affordability crisis, many local governments have turned to inclusionary zoning ordinances. Inclusionary zoning is a name for artificially T
2 Reason Public Policy Institute
lowering the price, and therefore the value, on a percentage of new homes. Builders and subsequent owners are forced to sell the homes so that they are “ affordable” to specific income levels.

The price controls are set using different formulas so that the “inclusionary” units will be affordable to either Very Low,” “ Low,” or “Moderate” income households, or some combination thereof. “Very Low” income is most often classified as up to 50 percent of county median income, “ Low” as 50-80 percent of median, and Moderate” as 80-120 percent of median. The percentage of units targeted as inclusionary units varies by jurisdiction, ranging from 5 to 25 percent of the new homes constructed in a project. Typically, the inclusionary units must be constructed within the project and be of the same size and quality as the marketrate units. Some jurisdictions exempt small developments while others require builders to pay an in-lieu fee for developments of 10 homes or fewer to get out from under the price controls. Still others allow in-lieu fees for projects of all sizes. Ostensibly, some jurisdictions also offer incentives for compliance. These can take the form of “density bonuses” ( giving builders the option to increase the density of their developments instead of making more of the units affordable), fast-track permitting (speeding up the process of issuing permits for new development), fee waivers, or exemptions from growth controls. In a few voluntary inclusionary programs, incentives are offered in exchange for a builder committing to sell at the pricecontrolled rates. But most inclusionary zoning programs are mandatory, requiring all builders to participate.

The proliferation of inclusionary zoning raises important public policy questions:

Is it effective—does inclusionary zoning lead to a substantial increase in affordable housing production? Is it efficient—how do inclusionary zoning’ s costs compare to its benefits? Is it equitable—does inclusionary zoning fairly apportion the cost of providing affordable housing? Until recently these questions had not been adequately addressed. During the past 20 years a number of publications debated the merits of inclusionary zoning programs. Nevertheless, as the 2003 report Inclusionary Housing in California: 30 Years of Innovation observed, “ These debates, though fierce, remain largely theoretical due to the lack of empirical research.” 4 Without knowing the economic and other realworld consequences of inclusionary zoning, policymakers have difficulty assessing the merits or faults of inclusionary zoning.

Our recent report, Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work?, filled the empirical research void. 5 We measured the actual performance of these ordinances in the San Francisco Bay Area. We found that the San Francisco Bay Area inclusionary ordinances produced few “affordable” units, drove up the price of market-rate homes, and dramatically decreased the supply of new construction.

Paradoxically, in the Bay Area, “affordable” housing mandates actually made most housing more expensive.

The track record of affordable housing mandates in the Bay Area is consistent with the predictions of economic theory. Inclusionary zoning ordinances act like a tax on new development. Taxes decrease the supply of new housing and increase prices of the few homes that are built. This basic economic model should apply in other regions as well.6
This study follows up our prior one to see if the empirical record of inclusionary zoning is consistent with economic theory in another region of California. We use data from communities in Los Angeles County and Orange County to evaluate the effects of inclusionary zoning and examine whether it is an effective public policy in Southern California. We include in our analysis all the cities in these counties with inclusionary ordinances. Included are: Agoura Hills, Brea, Huntington Beach, Irvine, Laguna Beach, Long Beach, Monrovia, Pasadena, Rancho Palos Verdes, San Clemente, San Juan Capistrano, Santa Monica and West Hollywood. These communities have various sizes and densities with different income levels and demographics, so they provide a good sample to measure the effects of inclusionary zoning in Southern California.

DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 3
Part 2
The Housing Market and Inclusionary
Zoning in Los Angeles and Orange
Counties
number of studies document high housing prices and the affordability crisis in California.7 Offering a temperate climate, cultural and natural resources, and job growth, Los Angeles County and Orange County have become increasingly desirable places to live. The percentage of homes affordable to a family earning median income is only 34.4 percent for Los Angeles-Long Beach Metro and 37.7 percent for Orange Metro.8Families earning less than median income have even fewer homes available in their price range.

In response to the affordable housing crisis, 13 local governments in Los Angeles and Orange County have adopted inclusionary zoning requirements (Figure 1) and remaining cities now face loud calls from planners and advocacy groups to adopt inclusionary zoning as well.

Figure 1: Number of Los Angeles County and Orange County Cities with Inclusionary Zoning
0 2
4 6
8 10
12 14
19761977197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001Number of Los Angeles County and Orange County Cities with Inclusionary Zoning A
4 Reason Public Policy Institute
Table 2 shows the jurisdictional requirements and the number of price-controlled units produced by city.

Several communities could not report how many affordable units had been produced under the program, demonstrating a simple unwillingness by city officials to keep track of how effective the policy is in spite of its costs. Our calculations of averages and costs exclude these cities.

Table 2: Southern California Cities with Inclusionary Zoning City Year
imposed
Percent of
new units
under price
controls
Target levels
VL= Very Low;
L= Low;
M= Moderate
Number of pricecontrolled units
produced by
program
Average number of
price- controlled
units produced per
year since program
inception
Agoura Hills 1987 10 M 50 3.1
Brea 1993 10 VL, L, M 278 27.8
Huntington Beach 2001 10 L 313 156. 5
Irvine 1977 5 VL, L, M 4,469 171.9
Laguna Beach 1985 25 VL, L, M 139 7.7
Long Beach 1992 5 M * *
Monrovia 1990 20 M 280 21.5
Pasadena 1991 15 L, M 14 1.2
Rancho Palos
Verdes
1997 5 VL, L * *
San Clemente 1980 4 VL 627 27.3
San Juan Capistrano 1995 30 VL, L 196 24.5
Santa Monica 1985 10 VL, L * *
West Hollywood 1986 20 L, M 13 0.8
Sources: California Coalition for Rural Housing and Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California, Inclusionary Housing in California, ( Sacramento, CA: California Coalition for Rural Housing), 2003;. and Calavita and Grimes, “ Inclusionary Zoning in California: The Experience of Two Decades.” Journal of the American Planning Association v 64 no.2,1998, p. 152.

Inclusionary Housing in California does not report any units for these cities.

Advocates of inclusionary zoning herald price controls as the solution to the affordability crisis. They point to the inclusionary units produced and declare the program to be a success. While the program has been a boon to the few families who luck out on getting the artificially reduced homes, the ripple effect distortion in the market caused by inclusion zoning is overwhelming, costing far more. Obviously, a more thorough assessment of inclusionary zoning is necessary. From an overall production perspective, how effective has inclusionary zoning been? The numbers do not look good. Compared to the region’ s overall affordable housing needs for this period, inclusionary zoning clearly has not made a significant contribution to solving the region’ s affordable housing crisis.

For the 13 cities, the Southern California Association of Governments projects the current 7.5 year affordable housing need for very low, low, and moderate income households to be 12,460.9 But in the 27 years that inclusionary zoning has been implemented in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, inclusionary zoning has resulted in the production of only 6,379 affordable units. Of those, 4,469 were in Irvine, which built a number of the units to settle a lawsuit for not providing “ affordable” housing. That averages to only 236 units per year, with 165 in Irvine and 71 in all other cities. Controlling for the length of time each program has been in effect, the average jurisdiction with inclusionary zoning produces only 34 units each year since adoption of its inclusionary zoning requirement.

DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 5
The disparity between the regional housing need and inclusionary zoning production is shown in Figure 2.

In Figure 2, the front (red) columns represent the average yearly production of affordable housing reported by cities (only for years when cities had inclusionary zoning) multiplied times 7.5, and the back (green) columns represent the 7.5 year need for affordable housing in the cities with inclusionary zoning. The number of units expected from inclusionary zoning does not meet most cities’ needs for affordable housing.

Huntington Beach is the most notable exception.

Laguna
BeachRancho Palos
VerdesAgoura HillsMonroviaWest
HollywoodSan Juan
CapistranoBreaLong BeachHuntington
BeachPasadenaSanta MonicaSan
ClementeIrvine0 1,
000 2, 000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
Figure 2: Housing Needs Versus Expected Units Produced under Inclusionary Zoning Affordable" units produced through inclusionary zoning. (Calculated for7.5years by multiplying average units per year produced under inclusionary zoning times 7.5.)7.5year housing needs according
tothe Southern California Association ofGovernments "Regional Housing Needs Assessment." From anoverall production standpoint, inclusionary zoning has not been effective. Some advocates ofinclusionary zoning respond to this poorrecord by calling for more vigorous andnumerous restrictions. Instead, jurisdictions need to fundamentally reexamine ifpricecontrols arean effective wayof producing more affordable housing. Policymakers should analyze the actual consequencesofinclusionary zoning and judge whether the poor results achieved by inclusionary zoning are caused by the very nature ofthese laws. Looking atthe numberof below-market units created by programs only begins to reveal inclusionary zoning’s effect on affordability.

Our findings suggest
6 Reason Public Policy Institute
Part 4
Costs Associated with Below-Market
Units
upporters often promote inclusionary zoning as a costless way of providing affordable housing. Many highlight the number of units produced under inclusionary zoning and then claim the program to be a success. But the costs of these units and programs are often missed. For example, West Hollywood has had inclusionary zoning since 1986, and the program has led to 13 affordable units. The initial reaction might be to consider the program worthwhile simply because 13 units were built. But accurately judging the efficacy of a program requires looking at its costs. What were the costs of producing each of those units? We all agree that the goal is to help low-income households, but we must recognize that some ways are better than others. If two methods cost the same amount but one helps more, we should choose the one that yields greater benefits. Or, if two methods yield the same benefits but one costs less, we should support the one with lower costs. Even though many cities have adopted inclusionary zoning, to date no one has comprehensively estimated the program costs. Without looking at the costs of inclusionary zoning, one cannot determine if better ways to provide affordable housing exist.

By definition, whenever sellers must sell a unit at a government-set price, they cannot sell that unit at the market price. For example, for a home to be “ affordable” to a low-income household in West Hollywood, we estimate that the home must be sold for $147,000. If a new home could be sold for $588,000 but must be sold for $147,000, the revenue from the sale is $441,000 less. When someone forgoes one opportunity to take another, economists refer to this as the “ opportunity cost.” The opportunity cost of selling a “ Low” priced unit for $147,000 is not selling the unit for $588,000, i.e., $ 441,000. Keep in mind that this does not measure production costs. Rather, it represents the lost revenue per sale of price-controlled units.

First, let us consider the cost associated with each inclusionary unit by city. We calculate the cost for each unit by subtracting the regulated price from the market price.10 Most inclusionary zoning ordinances mandate that homes be affordable to some combination of very low income, low income and moderate income households. Very low income is typically defined by up to 50 percent of median, low income is defined by up to 80 percent of median, and moderate income is defined by up to 120 percent of median. The California Department of Housing and Community Development provides income levels for four-person households Figure 3).11
S
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 7
Lo s A n g e
le s C o
u
n
ty O ra n
g e C o
u
n
ty0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000 Figure 3: 2003 Income Levels forFour-Person Households Defined by California Department of Housing and
Community Development Very Low Income Low Income
Moderate Income Inclusionary zoning sets price controls such that homes can be “affordable” atthe specified income levels. Table 3indicates sample price controls for homes to be “affordable” to thefour-person households inthe respective income groups. We assume homes will be financed with 0 percent down, a30-year fixed-rate mortgage, and an interest rate of7percent. We assume 26 percent of income willpay mortgage payments and 4 percent of income will pay for real estate taxes and other homeowner costs. This formula gives us how much a household ineach income level could afford. We decided touseconservative assumptions so that we would not overestimate the costsof inclusionary zoning. Different jurisdictions use different formulas for calculating their price controls; actual price controls will differ accordingly. Tothe extent that families can afford less than our calculations assume orthat jurisdictions set price controls more stringently than we assume, the costsofinclusionary zoning willbesignificantly higher than our estimates. Table 3: Sample Price Controls for Homes tobe “Affordable” toDifferent Income Groups County Very Low Price Control Low Price Control Moderate Price Control Los Angeles County $ 91,837 $ 146,875 $
215,265 Orange County $ 123, 101 $ 184, 001 $
295,379 We canthen compare the level oftheprice controls tothe market price of homes. The more restrictive the price controls, the greater the cost for each unit. Figures 4, 5, and 6compare the median price of existing homes ineach county toour sample price controls. The heights of lower (red) bars represent the price controls: “ very low” in Figure 4, “low” in Figure 5, and “moderate” in Figure 6. The top of the 8 Reason Public Policy Institute
bars represent the 2003 average market price of new homes by county. The difference between the market price and the price-controlled price (the height of the red bar) is the cost of providing the affordable unit.

Figure 4: “ Very Low” Price Controls Compared
to Average Market Price by County
0 100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
Los Angeles County Orange County
Very Low" price control Cost Associated with selling "Very Low" unit Figure 5: “ Low” Price Controls Compared
to Average Market Price by County
0 100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
Los Angeles County Orange County
Low" price control Cost associated with selling " Low" unit DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 9
Figure 6: “ Moderate” Price Controls Compared
to Average Market Price by County
0 100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
Los Angeles County Orange County
Moderate" price control Cost associated with selling " Moderate" unit Comparing the figures, the “ moderate” price controls are not as restrictive as the “low” price controls and impose less of a cost. When price controls are at the market price we would not count them as costly. In reality price controls set near the market price also cause builders to lose revenue because the price controls come with other restrictions.

Inclusionary zoning ordinances almost always impose restrictions on the resale price of below-market units.

The reasoning seems straightforward: the subsidized units should remain affordable for future buyers, and the initial buyers should not be able to cash out on the windfall profits of acquiring a price-controlled unit.12 These affordability controls limit appreciation to some formula based on inflation, or they simply mandate that the home be “ affordable” to the equivalent income groups calculated at the time of sale. Resale price controls typically last 30 years or more and are renewed upon each sale. Because home ownership is a longterm commitment and affordability controls last a number of years, price-controlled homes are simply less valuable.

A. Estimating the Effects of Price Controls by City
By comparing the market price to the average level of the price controls in each city, we can estimate the average cost of each price-controlled unit and the total costs for each city. Each ordinance targets different income levels, so each city’s price controls will vary. For example, if a city in Orange County required that 15 percent of new units be “ affordable” and its only target income group was “ very low,” we assumed that 15 percent of units needed to be sold for $123,101 each. Or, if a city in Orange County required that 15 percent of new units be “ affordable” and its only target income group was “ low,” we assumed that 15 percent of units needed to be sold for $184,001.
10 Reason Public Policy Institute
For cities with more than one target income group, for the sake of simplicity we took the average level of the price controls. For example, if a city in Orange County required that 15 percent of new units be “ affordable” and the target income groups were “ very low,” “low,” and “ moderate,” we assumed that 5 percent of the units needed to be sold for $123,101 each, 5 percent for $184,001 each, and 5 percent for $295,379 each.

Taking the average of those figures, we arrive at our estimate that 15 percent of units need to be sold for 200,827 each. Because many towns targeting multiple income groups do not target each income group equally, our estimates will not be 100 percent accurate. If a city targeting multiple income groups requires more “ very low” units, our estimates of the costs of zoning will be on the low side. On the other hand, if a city requires more “ moderate” units, our estimates will be on the high side. In addition, when a jurisdiction required 10 to 15 percent of units to be affordable, we always chose the lower bound and ignored the upper bound in order not to overestimate the costs of inclusionary zoning.13 Once we arrived at the average price control for each city, we then subtracted it from the market price for each city.14 For example, we estimate that a new home in West Hollywood could be sold for $588,530. West Hollywood requires that 10 percent of homes be priced at “low” and 10 percent at “ moderate,” which we estimate at $146,875 and $215,265, an average of $181,070 per home. That means 20 percent of homes would need to be sold for $407,460 less than market price. In other words, the cost of providing each inclusionary unit in West Hollywood is $407,460. In high-priced jurisdictions these losses can be quite high.

Figure 7 shows the average cost associated with selling a price-controlled unit based on the standards in those cities and the market prices. In cities with more restrictive price controls and higher land values, the cost is higher. In the median city the cost of providing each inclusionary unit is $577,726.

Figure 7: Average Cost Associated with Selling Each Price-Controlled Unit 0 200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 11
The cost of each inclusionary unit is large. Next let us look at the cost per unit times the number produced in each city (Figure 8).15 This gives a measure of the aggregate cost of inclusionary units by city for those that report creating affordable homes under inclusionary zoning.

Figure 8: Average Cost Associated with Selling Each Price-Controlled Unit Times the Number of Units
West Hollywood,
5,296, 977
San Clemente,
519,491,982
Huntington Beach,
180, 828, 261
Brea, $ 124, 456, 235
Monrovia,
79,989, 814
Agoura Hills,
29,678, 632
Irvine,
1,000, 000, 000
Pasadena,
5,851, 457
Laguna Beach,
204, 114, 750
San Juan Capistrano,
110, 050, 263
According to our estimates, the costs associated with producing inclusionary units in Los Angeles County and Orange County have been $3.8 billion. Combining data from Los Angeles and Orange Counties with data from cities in the Bay Area that just adopted their programs, we can get a more accurate estimate of the costs of inclusionary zoning. We find that the median city’s cost of below-market units was more than $79 million.

B. Who Bears the Burden of Inclusionary Zoning?
The costs of inclusionary zoning are largely hidden. None of the costs imposed on the housing market shows up on any city’s annual budget, but they still exist. Who ends up paying for that $3.8 billion for belowmarket rate homes? One can debate exactly who bears the costs, but they are necessarily borne by someone.

Because they are imposed on the new housing market—and not paid for by government— the costs will be borne by some combination of developers, new homebuyers, and landowners. Exactly who shoulders more of the burden depends on market conditions and supply and demand.

All theory and evidence suggest that the costs of inclusionary zoning, effectively a tax, will not be borne by builders but by new homebuyers and landowners.16 Construction is a competitive industry with relatively free entry. Local market conditions will determine exactly how the burden is split. If buyers are more sensitive than sellers to changes in price, then landowners will bear most of the tax. This happens when more 12 Reason Public Policy Institute
buyers have many options, such as living in similar or nearby areas. If sellers are more sensitive than buyers to changes in price, then new homebuyers will bear most of the tax. This happens when landowners have more options, such as being able to devote their land to commercial, industrial, or other endeavors.

If profits are abnormally high, other builders will enter the market and undercut prices, thus bringing profits down. Conversely, if profits are abnormally low it will drive would-be builders to invest in other endeavors.

When a tax in the form of inclusionary zoning is placed on builders, it decreases the number of profitable projects that they want to undertake in that jurisdiction. Builders will vote with their feet and undertake fewer projects in jurisdictions with price controls and more in neighboring jurisdictions without price controls. The quantity of housing produced will decrease where there are price controls, but increase in other places where there are not price controls, pushing some homebuyers away from their first choice of locations, and for developers profit rates at the margin will remain the same.

Price controls may not stop all development, but new construction will decrease. In order for development in a price-controlled city to be profitable enough to attract builders, one of two things has to happen. Either market-rate home prices must increase, or land prices must decrease to compensate the builder for his losses due to price controls. Even with price controls on a portion of development, builders can still earn the normal rate of return if other home prices increase or land prices decrease. The likely result will be some combination of the two.

Both effects lead to a decrease in the quantity of new housing as market-rate buyers will be able to afford less housing and/or landowners will supply less land for residential development due to low market prices.

Raising home prices for other new homebuyers creates a paradox because the alleged goal of inclusionary zoning is to make housing more affordable, not less. Decreasing land prices also decreases the quantity of new housing because it discourages landowners from providing their land for residential projects. Instead, more land will be put to uses in which the final product is not subject to price controls. Thus, the restriction on the supply of land restricts the supply of new homes.

Advocates of inclusionary zoning tend to assume that the below-market rate units are subsidized out of builder profits, but economics predicts that builders are actually least likely to bear the burden. In the very short run, if builders own the land when the ordinance was passed, they would bear part of the burden. But in the long run, builders are most able to avoid the tax because they can simply move their construction to more profitable locations. The land cannot move, and buyers are often attached to living in a particular locale. Landowners and new homebuyers will end up paying for the subsidy on the price-controlled units.

Inclusionary zoning effectively acts as a tax on the production of market-rate units because developers must sell a percentage of units at a loss to gain permits to sell market-rate units. If market prices went up by the exact amount of losses on the price-controlled units, buyers would bear the full burden of the tax. If market prices did not change at all, builders and landowners would bear the full burden of the tax. In most situations buyers and sellers each bear part of the tax burden. Regardless of who bears the burden, because some units are price-controlled and others are not, the losses from price-controlled units must be spread over some combination of buyers and sellers of the remaining units.

We calculate the effective tax in each city by looking at the average cost associated with each inclusionary unit and the number of market-priced units over which the cost will be spread. To do this we multiply the cost of each inclusionary unit times the percentage mandated by each city and then divide by the percentage of market-rate homes. To illustrate, for San Juan Capistrano each price-controlled unit has an associated cost DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 13
of $561,480 (Figure 7) and 30 percent of units must be sold at those price controls (Table 2). The calculation would be [($ 561,480)X(0.30)]/( 0.70)= $240,634. To make it more concrete, if a project had 10 units, three must be sold at a loss of $561,480. Spreading the loss over the remaining seven units gives a tax of $240,634 per market-rate unit. Figure 9 shows the effective tax on new home purchases imposed by inclusionary zoning. Inclusionary zoning imposes sizeable taxes on each newly constructed home. The median city with inclusionary zoning is effectively imposing $65,952 of taxes on each market-rate home.

Figure 9: Effective Tax Imposed on New Market- Rate Units Caused by Inclusionary Zoning
0 100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
Long Beach Irvine San Clemente Brea Rancho Palos Verdes Huntington Beach Agoura Hills Monrovia Pasadena West Hollywood Santa Monica San Juan Capistrano Laguna Beach Cities with higher land values and more restrictive price controls impose the highest effective taxon new homes. In Laguna Beach the
equivalent taxona market-rate home if adeveloper built and sold an affordable home is approaching $ 500, 000per newly constructed home. Afterhaving calculated the amountofthe tax, we can approximate who bears the bruntof the tax. The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) takes
the position that inclusionary zoning translates into higher prices for new homebuyers. HCD has consistently held this position through both Republican and Democratic Administrations: Under most inclusionary programs, which typically include anin lieu fee [whereby the builder pays a fee toopt out of the inclusionary zone requirements] option, the cost of subsidizing low-income housing units is underwritten bythe purchasersofmarket-rate units inthe form of higher housing prices. This practice of
cost shifting is particularly detrimentaltoa home buyer who marginally qualifies fora mortgage yet earns too much to receive governmental assistance.17 We have consistently…asked local jurisdictions to analyze aninclusionary program asa potential governmental constraint. Thereasoning for this isthat most programs ofthis sort impose afee or
14 Reason Public Policy Institute
Others believe the brunt of the tax will be borne by some combination of builders and landowners. 19 Figure 10 estimates price increases on new homes under the three scenarios. If the lower bound is accurate (when buyers only pay 50 percent of the tax), the price of new homes is increased by $30,000 or more in 8 of 13 cities. If the upper bound is accurate (when buyers pay all of the tax), the price of new homes is increased by 30,000 or more in 12 of the 13 Los Angeles County and Orange County cities with inclusionary zoning.

Agoura Hills is the median city. Inclusionary zoning increases new home prices there by $32,976 in scenario one, $55,400 in scenario two, or $65,952 in scenario three. Although the goal is to produce more affordable housing, inclusionary zoning is actually producing the opposite effect. Inclusionary zoning translates into significantly higher prices for market-rate homebuyers. By creating price controls on a percentage of units, it taxes other new units and leads to higher housing prices.

Long
BeachIrvineSan ClementeBreaRancho
Palos VerdesHuntington
BeachAgoura HillsMonroviaPasadenaWest
HollywoodSanta MonicaSan
Juan CapistranoLaguna
Beach$0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000450,000 500,000
Figure 10: Increases inPrice of New Homes Caused
byInclusionary Zoning Under Three Different Assumptions About Who Bears the Costs) Assuming 50% of tax is borne by consumers Assuming 84% of tax
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 15
To the extent that sellers bear more of the burden of taxation, the housing market also faces negative consequences. Because builders can move to jurisdictions without inclusionary zoning, they will not bear the burden of the inclusionary zoning tax. Thus, landowners will bear most of the sellers’ portion of the burden. Inclusionary zoning ordinances decrease the value for which landowners can sell undeveloped land to homebuilders. Because landowners receive lower prices, they will supply less land for residential development, and fewer homes will be built.

Governments already give landowners incentives to supply land for commercial and industrial uses instead of residential ones. Since Proposition 13 limited increases in residential property taxes, governments began creating incentives for developing commercial real estate instead of residential because it generates more revenue. This has become known as the “fiscalization of land use.” One study described how local governments responded to limits on property taxes this way:

Local municipalities employ two primary methods for revenue generation: the imposition of heavier exaction fees for new development and the promotion of retail development in order to maximize sales tax revenues. This has had a direct, deleterious impact on new housing production. Rather than adopt land-use policies that advance or incentivize new housing production, developing new retail centers — such as big box developments, entertainment complexes, and shopping destinations — emerged as the primary approach for increasing local government revenue. Consequently, residential development (and other forms of development) suffered due to a lack of incentives or outright disincentives.20 Inclusionary zoning ordinances add yet another disincentive to provide land for residential development.

When part of the burden of taxation is borne by landowners, we should expect inclusionary zoning to decrease the supply of new housing.

C. The Effect of Price Controls on Housing Construction In addition to increasing prices, inclusionary zoning leads to a decrease in new housing. Economics clearly predicts that the quantity of construction will be lower after the adoption of inclusionary zoning. But advocates of inclusionary zoning advance an alternate hypothesis that the quantity of construction will be the same (or higher) after the adoption of inclusionary zoning. By looking at the data of housing construction, we can get an idea of which hypothesis is correct.

One test is to look at the amount of new construction in years prior and years following the adoption of an inclusionary zoning law. We examined Construction Industry Research Board yearly housing permit data for single and multifamily dwellings to compute average construction pre- and post-ordinance. For example, San Clemente adopted its ordinance in 1980 and Long Beach adopted its ordinance in 1992. We would thus compare San Clemente housing construction in 1979 and 1981, and Long Beach housing construction in 1991 and 1993. We also can compare housing production for the seven years prior and the seven years following the ordinance, so for San Clemente we would compare housing production in 1973-1979 to housing production in 1981-1987 and for Long Beach we would compare housing production in 1984-1990 to housing production in 1992-1998. Because ordinances have been adopted throughout the past 26 years Figure 1), economy-wide phenomena such as business cycles should not be biasing the data in either direction. For example, some cities adopted their ordinances during down times while others adopted their ordinances during up times.
16 Reason Public Policy Institute
The data indicate that inclusionary zoning does indeed lead to a decrease in new construction. For the one-, three-, five- and seven-year averages before and after the ordinances, the production of housing decreased after the adoption of inclusionary zoning.

As price controls are in place for more time, the decrease in housing production adds up. Data on housing production seven years prior and seven years following the ordinance exist for 8 of the 13 cities. In those cities in the seven years prior to the adoption of inclusionary zoning 28,296 homes were produced, whereas in the seven years following the adoption of inclusionary zoning only 11,000 homes were produced. In those eight Los Angeles County and Orange County jurisdictions, inclusionary zoning appears to decrease housing by 17,296 units. That amounts to a decrease in housing production by 61 percent.

If those 17,296 units would have been worth $650,000 per home, then the value of housing not built because of inclusionary zoning is approximately 11 billion dollars. For those jurisdictions, in only seven years the average destruction of value per city is $1.4 billion.

Figure 11: Total Production of Housing 7 Years Prior and 7 Years Following the Ordinance for Eight Jurisdictions' Available Data 0 5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
Before After
Recall that over 27 years inclusionary zoning in Los Angeles County and Orange County has only led to 6,379 affordable units, which amounts to 1,653 every seven years. In those eight jurisdictions only 1,534 units have been produced. Controlling for the length of time for each ordinance, those cities in total average 110 units per year since an ordinance has been adopted. Multiplying the yearly production rate by seven gives the expected number of “affordable” units over seven years, which amounts to 770 in all of those eight cities.

Although those cities together had an estimated increase in 770 “ affordable” units the seven years following the adoption of inclusionary zoning, the total number of homes not built was 17,296 (Figure 12). Is a policy that creates 770 “ affordable” homes at the expense of discouraging 17,296 market-rate homes worth it? This is crucial because most entry into the housing market by lower-income families is by buying older homes freed up when middle-income families move into new homes.21 Reducing the overall production of DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 17
housing both drives up prices and means that the people crowded out of the housing market are the lowerincome would-be homeowners.

Figure 12: Comparing the Increase in "Affordable" Units to the Overall Decrease in New Construction Associated with Inclusionary Zoning 770
17,296
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0 5,000
Additional statistical work on inclusionary zoning is needed. The data indicate that the number of units pushed out of the market by inclusionary zoning is much larger than the number of “affordable” units built.

Advocates of price controls must recognize that their programs lead to only a handful of below-market units coupled with a sharp decrease in market-rate homes. Because we cannot directly observe the thousands of homes never built, the costs of the program go largely unseen. Also unseen are those 17, 296 families that cannot buy homes because inclusionary zoning prevented the construction of additional homes. Is a program that destroys over $10 billion worth of housing and prevents thousands more families from getting a home than it places in an “ affordable” unit worth the high costs? Decrease in overall new construction
associated with inclusionary zoning
for eight cities over seven years)
Inclusionary units produced ( for
eight cities over seven years)
18 Reason Public Policy Institute
Part 5
The Fiscal Cost of Price Controls to
State and Local Government
ot only do price controls lead to a decrease in the quantity of housing and an increase in prices for consumers, but price controls also lead to decreased revenue for both state and local government.

Inclusionary zoning ordinances are often sold to policymakers as the proverbial free lunch, with proponents claiming “A vast inclusionary program need not spend a public dime.” 22 Even if market-rate buyers and landowners end up paying the price of the subsidy, so the argument goes, at least local governments need not spend revenue to create affordable housing. Proponents write, “From a local agency standpoint, inclusionary zoning provides affordable housing at no public cost” ( emphasis added). 23 The story, however, is not that simple. The advocates fail to take account that inclusionary zoning leads to direct losses in state and local government revenue.

Inclusionary units demand and receive the same municipal services as market-rate homes. There is no evidence that providing municipal services to price-controlled homes is less costly than providing to marketpriced homes. The cost of inclusionary zoning to governments comes from the fact that price-controlled homes cost the same to service but generate less revenue. Because the values of the homes are set at belowmarket rates, the assessed values are lower and so their property tax is lower. Thus, although governments may not spend “ a public dime” to produce price-controlled homes, they take on an obligation of providing municipal services while receiving lower annual tax revenues. The cost to government from price-controlled units is the difference in the annual tax revenue that would have been generated had the same homes been assessed at market prices.

If the real estate tax rate is 1 percent per year, a $700,000 dollar home generates $7,000 in government revenue, whereas a $200,000 home generates $2,000 in government revenue. To calculate the yearly tax revenue lost, we take the difference between current market price and the price-controlled price times 1 percent (for the property tax) for each unit. Multiplying times the number of units in each jurisdiction gives us a rough measure of the lost tax revenue per year. Biasing our numbers downward is the fact that we do not count the lost revenue from the homes never produced because of price controls. Biasing the numbers upward is the fact that not all market-rate homes are assessed at current prices due to Proposition 13. Also, many of the “ affordable” units do not remain affordable if resale restrictions are absent. But the numbers illustrate the limit as homes are frequently resold and reassessed at current prices. They also approximate how much revenue would be gained if price-controlled units were reassessed at market rates. Figure 15 shows the yearly loss in combined state and local revenue due to price controls." to "lost state and local revenue combined become significant, as depicted in Figure 13.

N
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 19
We do not believe that the goal is to maximize tax revenue at the expense of low-income households, and we are not advocating raising real estate taxes for low-income residents. But before considering inclusionary ordinances, governments must look at their budgets and examine whether better ways of helping low-income households exist.

Figure 13: Yearly Loss in Combined State and Local Government Revenue Due to Price Controls (Assuming All Units Are Assessed at Current Prices) Irvine, $ 26,162, 480
West Hollywood,
52,970
Laguna Beach,
2,041, 148
San Juan Capistrano
1,100,503
Huntington Beach,
1,808, 283
Brea, $ 1,244, 562
898Agoura Monrovia, $ 799,
Hills,
296, 786
Pasadena, $ 58,515
San Clemente,
5,194, 920
Government would be well advised to consider these yearly costs before adopting inclusionary zoning. It is important to note that the lost tax revenue occurs not just in one year but every year that the price controls are in existence. The total present value of lost government revenue is upwards of $752 million (Figure 14).24 Although inclusionary zoning is often pitched to governments as a zero-cost method of creating affordable housing, the costs from lower assessed valuations are quite large.

Both state and local governments bear some of the burden of lost tax revenue caused by inclusionary zoning.

Property tax revenue goes to the state government, and a portion is rebated back to city and county governments. The exact amount returned to each jurisdiction varies significantly, so our above estimates measure the combined total of lost tax revenue without distinguishing the particular splits between local and state governments. Importantly this implies that although inclusionary zoning policies are usually debated and implemented at the city and county levels, state legislators should be concerned with these policies too.

Each additional local inclusionary zoning ordinance adversely impacts the tax revenue not just of its own jurisdiction but also decreases the state’ s tax revenue. 20 Reason Public Policy Institute
Figure 14: Present Value of Yearly Loss in State and Local Government Revenue Due to Price Controls ( Assuming a Discount Rate of 3 Percent and that All Units Stay Assessed at Current Prices)
Irvine, $ 512, 796, 153
Pasadena,
1,566, 694
Agoura Hills,
3,543, 016
Monrovia,
21,416, 815
San Clemente,
77,287,289
West Hollywood,
1,671,031
San Juan Capistrano,
16,372,700
Huntington Beach,
44,336, 762
Laguna Beach,
48,666, 401
Brea, $24,393,971
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 21
Part 8
Conclusion
nclusionary zoning should only be enacted if the goal is to make housing more expensive and decrease the quantity of new housing. Our findings in Los Angeles County and Orange County are consistent with the experience of the San Francisco Bay Area. Inclusionary zoning hurts homebuyers and will price out most low-income families. Despite the good intentions of those who support inclusionary zoning, economics tell us that price controls on new housing will have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity of new homes built. Rather than helping, inclusionary zoning will actually make the affordability problem worse.

We have shown that inclusionary zoning imposes significant costs on the housing sector. Those costs are passed on to landowners and buyers of market-rate homes. Higher housing prices will result.

Something should be done about the affordability crisis, but price controls are not the answer and may be part of the problem. Southern California cities will never be able to rely on inclusionary zoning to meet their housing needs. In fact, inclusionary zoning has led to a decrease in housing production. Rather than continuing to impose these policies, jurisdictions would do well to eliminate them. By ending price controls on new construction, builders would have an incentive to supply more housing. The worst possible solution to the affordability crisis is to pass policies that result in restricting the supply of housing. Inclusionary zoning is one such policy.

I
22 Reason Public Policy Institute
About the Authors
enjamin Powell is an Assistant Professor of Economics at San José State University and an Adjunct Scholar with Reason Foundation. He received his Ph.D. from George Mason University in 2003. He has numerous publications in scholarly journals, policy papers, and the popular press.

Edward Stringham is an Assistant Professor of Economics at San José State University and an Adjunct Scholar with Reason Foundation. He received his Ph.D. from George Mason University in 2002. He is winner of the Paper of the Year Award from the Association of Private Enterprise, Best Article Award from the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, and Second Prize from the Independent Institute Garvey Essay Contest. Stringham serves on the Executive Committee of the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics and on the Executive Committee of the Association of Private Enterprise Education.

Powell and Stringham's other recent work on housing includes a policy study, "Estimating the Effects of Price Controls in the Redevelopment of the Fort Ord Military Base" and testimony before the Board of the Fort Ord Reuse Authority. Powell and Stringham also have the entry on "Housing" in the forthcoming Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.

Note: The authors appreciate research assistance from Ilkay Pulan, Daocheng Zhu, and a research grant from the California Building Industry Association.

B
DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 23
Related Reason Foundation Studies
Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work?, by Benjamin Powell and Edward Stringham, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 318, April 2004, http://www.rppi.org/ps318.pdf Smart Growth in Action, Part 2: Case Studies in Housing Capacity and Development from Ventura County, California, by William Fulton, Susan Weaver, Geoffrey F. Segal, and Lily Okamura, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 311, May 2003, http://www.rppi.org/ps311.pdf San José Demonstrates the Limits of Urban Growth Boundaries and Urban Rail, by Randal O'Toole, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 309, April 2003, http://www.rppi.org/ps309.pdf Smart Growth in Action: Housing Capacity and Development in Ventura County, by William Fulton, Chris Williamson, Kathleen Mallory, and Jeff Jones, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 288, December 2001, http://www.rppi.org/ps288.pdf
Smart Growth and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Statewide Planning Laws, by Sam Staley and Leonard C. Gilroy, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 287, December 2001, http://www.rppi.org/ps287.pdf
Urban-Growth Boundaries and Housing Affordability: Lessons from Portland, by Samuel Staley, Reason Foundation Policy Brief No. 11, October 1999, http://www.rppi.org/urban/pb11.pdf Repairing the Ladder: Toward a New Housing Paradigm, by Howard Husock, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 207, July 1996, http://www.rppi.org/ps207.pdf 24 Reason Public Policy Institute
Endnotes
1 See the statements of the housing advocacy coalition National Housing Conference at www.nhc.org 2 National Housing Conference, Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience, Washington, D.C.:

National Housing Conference, 2004, http://www.nhc.org/nhcimages/California%20IZ/CaIZ04.pdf. 3 Meyers Group “ Meyers Group Summary Statistics” January- March 2004. 4 California Coalition for Rural Housing and Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California 2003). Inclusionary Housing in California: 30 Years of Innovation, p.3. 5 Powell and Stringham, Housing Supply and Affordability, pp. i-v, pp. 1-45. 6 For an in depth explanation of the economics of inclusionary zoning see Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work? . This study also contains discussions about the long-term effects of affordability controls and the current debate on inclusionary zoning. Each of those sections is equally applicable to the Southern California market. 7 Southern California Association of Governments State of the Region 2003 , pp. 35-42 (Los Angeles:

Southern California Association of Governments, 2003)
8 National Association of Homebuilders, Housing Opportunity Index: First Quarter (Washington, D.C.:

National Association of Homebuilders, 2002).
9 Calculated by taking the 7.5 year Southern California Association of Governments 1998-2005 Regional Housing Need Assessment for the 13 cities and dividing by 7.5. 10 We are not measuring what economists refer to as social costs, which would include the value of the lost consumer and producer surplus associated with inclusionary zoning. We are simply estimating the monetary amount that a seller must forgo when selling at the restricted price. 11 Income categories are adjusted by household size. Compared to a four-member household, a household with five members can have an 8 percent greater income, a household with six members a 16 percent greater income, etc. Households with three members will have a 10 percent lower income, two members 20 percent lower and one member 30 percent lower according to the Department of Housing and Community Development. Because the four-member household is the baseline, we focus on fourmember households throughout the paper. 12 Barbara Kautz, “ In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing” University of San Francisco Law Review, vol. 36, 2002, p. 1014, gives an additional legal reason: “ An inclusionary ordinance that does not limit the resale prices of for-sale units (creating ‘ premium pricing’ for the first buyer) may be vulnerable to attack for ‘not advancing a legitimate state interest.’” 13 For example, inclusionary zoning in Santa Monica requires 10-20 percent of units be affordable, and its target groups are “ Very Low” and “ Low.” In this case we would assume only 10 percent needed to affordable and the share was split 5 percent for “Very Low’ and 5 percent for “Low.” Because data for specific requirements of each city are currently unavailable, we decided to make simplifying assumptions and again err on the side of lower costs of inclusionary zoning. 14 We estimate market price by city by comparing 2004 data of the average price of new homes by county compiled by Meyers Group and 2000 Census median price of existing homes by city. Because new homes in Los Angeles County and Orange County typically sell for more than the 2000 median price of DO AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 25
existing homes, and because new home price data by city is difficult to assemble, we adjust the 2000 Census city data based on each county's price differential for new homes. In Los Angeles County the ratio of the price of new homes to the price of existing homes is 2.2 and in Orange County that ratio is

2.6. For example, the 2000 Census median price of existing homes in the city of West Hollywood was 263,400, so we multiply that by 2.2 to estimate that a new home would be sold for closer to $588,530. 15 The figure looks at costs in today’ s prices. The divergence between current price controls and the price at which the units currently could sell gives us comparable numbers in today’ s dollars. It does not calculate the home price for the year the price-controlled units were built or calculate the price controls in that year.

Donna Jones, “ Homes, Good and Cheap: Low-income Buyers Get High-Quality Homes,” Santa Cruz Sentinel, January 10, 2004, p.9. reports on one project built in 1998 that helps illustrates our assumptions. When homes were first sold, government set the prices at around $160,000. Today government sets their prices at $280,000, and “ they would be worth at least $800,000 on the open market.” For the purposes of our calculations, we would subtract the restricted price of $280,000 from the market price of $800,000 to arrive at the $520,000 difference. That price control (and that difference divergence between the market price and the restricted price) is no longer imposed on the initial seller but is now imposed on the current owner. If 10 homes were in a project, the equivalent cost from the price controls would be 10 times that number.
16 The requirement of subsidized housing has the same effect as a development tax. The developer makes zero economic profit with or without inclusionary zoning, so the implicit tax is passed on to consumers housing price increases) and landowners (the price of vacant land decreases). In other words, housing consumers and landowners pay for inclusionary zoning.” Robert Burchel and Catherine Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons,” in The California Inclusionary Housing Reader, ( Sacramento:

Institute for Local Government, 2003), p.29.
17 California Department of Housing and Community Development letter to the city of Fairfield, July 16, 1996.
18 California Department of Housing and Community Development letter to the city of Fairfield, April 26, 2001.
19 Laura Padilla, “ Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its Viability” Hofstra Law Review, vol. 23, 1995, p.576.
20 Joel Kotkin and Thomas Tseng, Rewarding Ambition: Latinos, Housing, and the Future of California Malibu, California: Pepperdine University School of Public Policy, 2002). 21 Howard Hussock, Repairing The Ladder: Toward a New Housing Policy Paradigm, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 207 (Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, July 1996). 22 Andrew G. Dieterich, "An Egalitarian Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed" Fordham Urban Law Journal, vol. 24 (1996) p. 41.
23 Several studies emphasize the assertion that there is no direct cost. See Kautz, “In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning,” p.5; Robert Burchel and Catherine Galley, “Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons,” in The California Inclusionary Housing Reader (Sacramento: Institute for Local Government, 2003), p.29; and Marc Smith, et.al., “Inclusionary Housing Programs: Issues and Outcomes,” Real Estate Law Journal, Fall 1996.
24 We take into account the length that each city intends to impose price controls (30 years for the median city) and then calculate the present value, assuming a 3 percent discount rate.

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SusanaBarrios
From: AdamWood <[email protected]>
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Leon; Norma C. Kurtz; Stephen Faessel; Natalie Meeks
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Item26 - Housing Coalition Comment Letter Attachments: Item26 - Coalition Letter.pdf
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Adam
AdamS. Wood
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Orange County Chapter
BuildingIndustryAssociationofSouthern California, Inc.
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Address: 17192MurphyAve., #14445, Irvine, CA92623
1 June 27, 2023
Mayor Ashleigh Aitken
City of Anaheim
200 S. Anaheim Blvd.

Anaheim, CA 92805
Re: File Item 26: Update on the City’ s Housing Affordability Ad Hoc – Oppose Dear Mayor and Council,
Housing affordability is unquestionably a leading issue for California policy makers. Historically high home prices have dominated news cycles and placed undue burdens on communities across the State. Action is needed to address the growing housing crisis but before that can happen, we must first understand the cause.

For over 40 years, the population of California has rapidly outpaced housing production. For as complicated as housing policy can be, cost escalation is relatively straight forward. California has not produced enough units to meet the demand. As California remains a highly desirable place to live, the supply/ demand imbalance has resulted in rapidly escalating home prices.

The specific reasons why California underproduced can be debated but ultimately it results from laws and policies that have constrained production. With this in mind, we are deeply concerned to see the Staff Report for the “ Update from the Housing Affordability Ad Hoc Committee” expressing a desire to investigate development fees and inclusionary housing programs.

Additional fees and barriers will do nothing to facilitate new housing production in Anaheim.

The staff report states that the Ad Hoc Committee specifically looked at development fee programs and inclusionary housing. There is an implication that other programs might have been considered but none are addressed in the staff report. The conclusion of said report states if staff is directed to conduct a study in furtherance of the Committee’ s work…” it will cost $50,000.

We have considerable concern about the scope and procurement of such direction.

The ad hoc committee was not subject to the Brown Act and thus had no public participation.

Other than the information contained in the Staff Report, there is no indication as to what exactly a “ study in furtherance” would entail. The proposed $ 50,000 cost estimate indicates a specific scope that staff contemplated. To date, this scope is not public information.

Further, proceeding under the City Manger’ s budget authority raises multiple questions. Will this 50,000 report be competitively bid to ensure the city receives a balanced report? As far as the record reflects, the only outside voice considered at this point is that of Keyser Marston. Input from one potential vendor does not make for a balanced or equitable approach to procurement. In the interest of transparency and best practice, if this advances, we hope multiple firms are contacted and given the ability to submit a reasonable scope of work ( and cost estimate) aligning with “ a study in furtherance.”
This, however, brings the central question back into focus. Why is Anaheim even considering fee programs and inclusionary housing? The Staff Report states that on March 9, 2023, staff provided background on current practices which includes meeting with housing developers to review the merits for voluntarily including below market rate units on site. It is implied this meeting did not assuage concerns of the Ad Hoc Committee. This is where concerns about lack of public input comes in to focus.

If the goal of this Council is to produce housing, the question is how to maximize production, not squeeze concession. If the current “ meet and confer” approach did not address concerns of the Ad Hoc committee, then we need to study why the incentives the city offers are insufficient. The Ad Hoc should consider spending $ 50,000 on an incentive system that leverages market realities, as opposed to investigating programs to extract fees and impose barriers.

A perfect example of why incentives, not fees, should be pursued can be seen in Santa Ana. During a hot housing market, Santa Ana spent years with zero new projects entering the production pipeline. Then, in 2020 their Council reduced burdensome Inclusionary requirements and a flood of new units were proposed. This provides a tangible neighboring- city example where cityimposed burdens on development stopped housing. This is common across the state but remains underreported as there is no database for projects that “ didn’ t happen.” Instead, you must look at the continued rates of underproduction to see that no city with development fees and inclusionary solved” their affordability issues.

It does merit mentioning that many supporters of the Inclusionary approach like to cite the city of Irvine as an example of success. If every city had a decommissioned military base with unified development control, then citing Irvine would be valid. As no other jurisdiction sits in a land use or economic situation reflective of Irvine conditions, comparisons are not valid.

In conclusion, Inclusionary is not a solution if the goal is housing production. We hope the council will consider leveraging market realities to offer a non— punitive approach to subsidized housing production. Anything short of that will further limit production in Anaheim and will mark a clear departure from the City’ s long held values of vitality through innovation.

We appreciate your thoughtful consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,
Adam Wood, Senior Vice President
Building Industry Association Southern California – OC Chapter ( BIA/OC) Victor Cao, Senior Vice President, Local Public Affairs California Apartment Association ( CAA)
Jennifer Bullard, Senior Vice President
Orange County Business Council ( OCBC)
Phil Hawkins, Chief Executive Officer
Pacific West Association of REALTORS® ( PWR)
Sara Catalán, President and CEO
Orange County Taxpayers Association ( OCTax)
David Cordero, Executive Director
Apartment Association of Orange County ( AAOC)
Vickie Talley, Executive Director
Manufactured Housing Educational Trust ( MHET)
SusanaBarrios
From: Amanda Soto <amandas@kennedycommission. org>
Sent: Tuesday, June27, 202311:50AM
To: CityClerk
Cc: CesarC
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Kennedy Commission PublicComment onItem #26 Attachments: anahiem citycouncil public comment #26.pdf Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Goodmorning--
Hereisenclosed theKennedy Commission publiccomment onItem #26 "UPDATE FROM THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY ADHOCCOMMITTEE"
Thank you,
Amanda Soto
Amanda Soto (she/her)
Community Organizer
1 June 27, 2023
Mayor Ashleigh Aitken
Anaheim City Council Members
City of Anaheim
200 S Anaheim Blvd
Anaheim, CA 92805
RE: Item 26 City of Anaheim Council Meeting ( June 27, 2023) Dear Mayor Aitken and City Council:

The Kennedy Commission (the Commission) is a broad-based coalition of residents and community organizations that advocates for the production of homes affordable for extremely low income families earning less than $30,000 annually in Orange County. Formed in 2001, the Commission has been successful in partnering and working with Orange County jurisdictions to create effective housing and land-use policies that have led to the construction of homes affordable to lower- income working families.

We are writing today to request that the City of Anaheim move forward with evaluating policies and programs that would increase affordable housing options in Anaheim.

An inclusionary housing program, city owned sites, opportunity sites and other affordable housing programs will ensure that the City will effectively produce affordable housing at the extremely low, very low-, and low-income level.

We want to ensure that the city includes an Inclusionary Housing Ordinance as part of their housing programs and priorities to support extremely and very low income families in Anaheim.

While market rate housing production is clearly happening in Anaheim as a result of incentives and concessions to developers, it is occurring in an unbalanced way that is not producing affordable housing for lower income families.

The housing production trends are illustrated by the city’s performance in the 2014-2021 Housing Element planning period. The city had a RHNA of 1,256 very low- and 907 low-income households. During this 5th cycle, the city built 298 or 24% of the 1,256 very low income units and 71 or 8% of the 907 low-income units. However, for the above moderate-income units, the city outperformed and exceeded the RHNA by constructing 8,266 or 331% of the original 2,501 above moderate-income RHNA. The housing imbalance is due to the fact that the city does not have an effective affordable housing policy.

In the current 6th cycle planning period, the city has a RHNA of 6,164 units for lower income households. To-date, the city has approved 155 deed-restricted units for lower income units.

While the city has approved some lower income developments, the city’ s plans and programs are falling behind on facilitating the necessary affordable units to meet the needs of the housing crisis to support low and very low-income residents in Anaheim. This comes in comparison to the approved 211 moderate and above- moderate income units, and over 6,106 above market level housing units in the city’s development pipeline. As described in the draft Housing Element, the majority of the City’ s RHNA for above moderate housing needs will be met with these pipeline projects. The deficit of affordable housing in the city is unfortunate given that Anaheim residents are in urgent need for housing at the lower income levels and are looking to the city to construct more affordable housing developments.

As Anaheim considers the recommended policies and programs that could increase affordable housing, the Commission recommends that the City adopt new affordable housing priorities and policies that will help develop affordable housing for lower income levels and create balanced housing opportunities in Anaheim. To effectively produce housing at the extremely low, very low-, and low-income level, the Commission recommends that the city adopt the following strategies:

1. Inclusionary Housing Ordinance: To ensure housing is produced equitably and meets the current and future needs of Anaheim residents, the Commission strongly recommends the city adopt an Inclusionary Housing Ordinance that requires 20% of units of all citywide residential projects be set at the extremely low (7.5%), very low (7.5%), and low-income levels (5%).

This ordinance will help the city create balanced housing development along with market rate housing. This policy will help create affordable housing that is not created in the Anaheim housing market. The Inclusionary Housing Ordinance should be implemented within the next six months to ensure that affordable housing is created in the city.

2. Affordable Housing Fee: The Commission recommends that if the city elects an affordable housing fee program it considers the following:

The policy should be part of a comprehensive approach to address the production of affordable housing on sites identified to create affordable housing, such as implementing an Inclusionary Housing program as outlined above and having an in lieu fee option.

An in-lieu fee instead of affordable housing should help the city achieve the affordable housing opportunity not realized on the sites. The fee needs to be calculated based on the true cost to develop affordable housing units and other financial and market factors. Given the high cost of land, market rate housing competing for the same sites, construction cost, and the land use and zoning limitations on where affordable housing can realistically be developed, funding generated from this fee would likely have limited success if set to low.The proposed program should evaluate the lost opportunity to create affordable housing on these opportunity sites and actual cost to develop affordable housing elsewhere.

The fee should be in the range of $15,000 -$ 30,000 per unit to allow the city to leverage state, federal and other affordable housing funds and be able to develop affordable housing developments that will serve lower income families making $ 30,000-$ 80,000.

We recommend that the fee be utilized specifically for the creation of new affordable housing units for low, very-low, extremely low, and acutely low-income families. An in-lieu fee should be studied and implemented within the next six months.

The implementation of the Inclusionary Housing Ordinance and in-lieu fee will continue to offer development incentives and concessions for market rate development and implement a policy to create affordable housing along with market rate housing. Moreover, it will encourage the City to prioritize housing for residents living below the poverty line and facing housing and economic uncertainty.

The Commission looks forward to partnering with the City of Anaheim to create opportunities to increase affordable homes for lower income households in the city. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at ( 949) 250- 0909 or cesarc@kennedycommission. org.

Sincerely,
Cesar Covarrubias
Executive Director
SusanaBarrios
From: WesW <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday,
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Budget priorities - Parks, Libraries, Police Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

Please keepourkidsinmindforyourbudget. IwasatBrookhust Park twoweeks agoforalittleleague game.

Attheendofthegame, gangs started fighting andshots rangout. Police mustbeapriority. Ourparksmustbea priority. Safety mustbeaprirotiy. Weneedmorrpolice. Ourlibraries helpengage ourchildren inlearning and reading. Library hours should beexpanded. Failtogivekidsanoutlet likeatlibraries, andplantoneedmore police tocatch andjailthemwhenmanyofthembecome taggers, gangmembers, andcriminals.

Thank you.
1 SusanaBarrios
From: BrandiGarcia-Valdes <brandi.valdes@camortgagerelief. org> Sent: Tuesday, June13, 2023
To: Public Comment
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] PubicComment: California Mortgage ReliefProgram Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage.

DearAnaheim CityCouncil,
Formypubliccomment fortoday'smeeting, Iwanttosharedetailswithyouaboutthe California Mortgage ReliefProgram (https://camortgagerelief.org/), astaterunprogram thatcanhelp homeowners stayintheirhomes andgetcaught upwiththeirmortgage. The California Mortgage ReliefProgram isopentoalleligible Californians andisabsolutely free—funds neverneedtobepaidback. Grants fromtheprogram arepaiddirectly toyourbankormortgage servicer. The program'swebsite isavailable in6languages (English, Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, & Tagalog.

Thelinkforthetoolkitisprovided here (https://camortgagerelief.org/partner-resources/). Theresource page hasmoreinformation toshare withyournetwork andmaterials. Homeowners canvisittheapplication questionnaire heretofindoutiftheyqualify. Property taxhasnowbeenaddedwhichcovers1payment owed priortoMarch 2023.

When possible, I’dliketoholdacalltogoovermoredetailsontheprogram andhelpgather anyquestions thatyoumayhave. Looking forward tohowwecanworktogether.

Moredetailsoftheprogram:

Previously awarded homeowners whoarestilleligible andneedmoreassistance canreturnfor additional fundswithamaximum of $80,000intotalassistance Assistance isnowavailable forhomeowners withpartial claimsecond mortgages orloan deferrals takenduring orafterJanuary 2020
Thedelinquency dateforassistance withpast-duemortgage andproperty taxpayments wasreset - applicants musthave missed atleasttwomortgage payments ORatleastoneproperty taxpayment priortoMarch 1, 2023
Homeowners withaprimary residence thatincludes upto4unitsontheproperty maynowbeeligible Musthavefaced apandemic-related financial hardship afterJanuary 21, 2020 Musthavemissed atleast2payments byMarch 1, 2023, andarecurrently behind.

Ifyouhaveanyquestions and/orwould likefurther assistance, please feelfreetocontact meatthe information below.

Thank you!
1 Best,
Brandi Garcia-Valdes
Outreach Specialist
CalHFAHomeowner ReliefCorporation
626) 536-9639 | [email protected]
ThismessageandanyattacheddocumentscontaininformationfromtheCalHFAHomeownerReliefCorporationthatmaybe confidentialand/orprivileged. Ifyouarenottheintendedrecipient, youmaynotread, copy, distribute, orusethisinformation. Ifyou havereceivedthistransmissioninerror, pleasenotifythesenderimmediatelybyreplye-mailandthendeletethismessage. Thank you.
2 SusanaBarrios
From: durfeycraig778@gmail. com
Sent: Saturday, PM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; 'Teresa
Pomeroy'; 'PublicRecords Request'; 'MariaStipe'; 'PamHaddad'; [email protected]; [email protected]; 'NickDibs'; [email protected]; [email protected]; 'LisaKim'; 'BillMurray'; 'BillMock'; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; 'KimNguyen'; [email protected]; REPLOUCORREA@MAIL. HOUSE.GOV; [email protected]; PublicComment; [email protected]; 'stevej'; 'stephaniek'; SHELLYHOLMAN60@yahoo. com; 'Gabriela Mafi'; 'George Brietigam'; 'Garden Grove President'; [email protected]; 'communityrelations';
Walter Muneton'; 'BillMock'; 'TeresaPomeroy'; 'DinaNguyen'; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; 'LanNguyen'; 'LisaKim'; 'BobHarden'; PIODepartment'
Subject:\[ EXTERNAL\] Inspire aloveofgardening inyoungsters bymaking itfun/Greening schools andsurrounding neighborhoods alsohasthepotential toboost academic achievement byimproving students' abilitytoconcentrate.

Attachments: Who'sLivinginYourBackyard andNeighborhood.pdf; FunPlants forKids __ Melinda Myers.html; Inspire aloveofgardening inyoungsters bymaking itfun - StGeorge News.html; AB638 (Quirk-Silva) - AsAmended March 26, 2021202120220AB638 Assembly Health.pdf
Warning: Thisemail originated fromoutside theCityofAnaheim. Donotclicklinksoropen attachments unless yourecognize thesender andareexpecting themessage. 06-17-2023
P.R.D.D.C.)

PARENTSFORTHERIGHTSOFDEVELOPMENTALLYDISABLEDCHILDREN
CRAIGA. DURFEYFOUNDEROFP.R.D.D.C.

U.S. HOUSEOFCONGRESSH2404 - HONORINGCRAIGDURFEYFORHISFIGHTAGAINSTAUTISM Ms. LORETTASANCHEZofCalifornia.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2003-03-27/pdf/CREC-2003-03-27.pdf newwebsite socialemotionalpaws. org
1 Towhomitmayconcern.

Withadolescent growing impactwithsocialmedia screentime, isolation fromthe addictions, braininjuryhaving waystoaddress thiswithrealbenefits fromEcho Therapy Ecotherapy, alsoknownasnature therapyorgreentherapy socialemotionalpaws.com) natures greenNaturetherapy, alsoreferred toas ecotherapy, isanumbrella termfortherapy programs andguided nature-based activities intended toimprove mentalhealth. Typesofnaturetherapy includeforestbathing, horticultural therapy, wilderness therapy, andanimal-assisted therapy. Adults canalso withmentalhealthcanalsobenefitfromurbanforestwithdog ,horse, watertherapy sufferPTSD.

Request aletterofsupport toaddress thelackofawareness EchoTherapy withamental healthcrisesbelowstoryaboutoneofmanynewsstorieswithlinksoughttoinspireour elected leaders, schools, toharness thetruepowerofnatures provides usthatseems to mis-understood leaving communities without theopportunities toenrichtheholistic benefits enhance wellness.

FEATURE — Gardening isgoodforthemind, bodyandspirit. Itisalsogoodforthe youngsters inourlives. Research showsgardening helpsrelievestress, improve focus, positively impacts moodandpsychological well-being, buildsasenseofconfidence, and more.

Lookforcreative ways togetchildren involved ingardening. Tapintoother interests orskillslikeart, reading, writing, insects, math, andcomputers ifyou needtopersuade reluctant participants intogrowing plants.

Include lotsofcolorsanduniqueplantsthatkidswilllove. Crested celosia resembles brains, making itagoodchoiceforthezombie fansinthegroup.

Eyeball plant (Acmella oleracea), balloon plant (Gomphocarpus physocarpus) withits hairyinflated seedpods, snakeplant, andkangaroo paws (Anigozanthos favidus) area fewtoconsider. Gardeners ofallageswillappreciate thepopcorn plant (Senna didymobotrya) withitsbuttered popcorn-scented leavesorbat-facedcuphea andthe hummingbirds itwillattract.

Consider addingfeatures thatmakethegarden afunspacetovisit. Thereisareason beanteepees, sunflower houses, andtunnels inthegarden haveremained popularwith kidsofallagesfordecades. Orgrowagarden shaped likeasliceofpizzaplantedwithall 2 thekeyingredients orasalsagarden. Everyone willbenefitwhenusingfreshlyharvested ingredients tocreatethesedishes.

Including ateepee orusingitasatrellisforpole
beans isafunaddition toanykid’sgarden, location anddateunspecified | Photo courtesy ofMelindaMyers.com, St. GeorgeNews
Apotorflatofgrassmakesanicefieldforsuperheroes andalawnfordolls. Abare patchofsoilisperfect fordigging, drivingcarsandtrucks, orsculpting hillsandvalleys.

Allthesebuildskillsthatcanbeapplied tofuturegardening efforts.

Plantsomesaladradishes thatarereadytoharvest in25to30days. Thiswillhelpkeep thekidsinterested inthegardenwhenwaiting forthetomatoes, beansandother vegetables toripen. Callitharvesting whenyouarethinning theradish planting. Use thesegreens asasnackorinasalad. Harvesting andeating ismorefunforallofusthan justthinning theexcess plants.

Userainydaystocreate plantlabelsfrompaintsticksorstones. Paintindividual words onsomeofthestonesandplacetheminthegarden. Letchildren leavemessages for eachotherorwritepoetry. Orrepurpose picklejarsintogarden treasure jars. Have children decorate thejars. Thenyoufillthejarswithmessages ortreasures before hidingtheminthegarden.

Explore waystoreuseandrecycle landscape trimmings. Puttwigstousecreating smallscalewattlefences forafairy, gnome orzombie garden. Thisisgreatpractice for building alarger-scalewattlefenceforthegarden.
3 Goonabughunttoseewhoislivinginyourgarden, yardorneighborhood. Lookforgood bugslikeladybeetles thateatplant-damaging aphidsandbeesthatpollinate our flowers. Thenlogwhatyoufindinabackyard journal.

Gentleguidance, realistic expectations, andage-appropriate activitieswillhelpgetkids excited aboutgardening. Thegardens theycreateandtheplantstheygrowareoften amazing butmoreimportantly, itistheexperience ofgrowing togetherthatmakes it worthwhile.

Copyright Melinda Myers, LLC, allrightsreserved.

ABOUT THEAUTHOR
Melinda Myershaswritten morethan20gardening books, including TheMidwest Gardener’sHandbook andSmallSpaceGardening. ShehostsTheGreatCourses “Howto GrowAnything” DVDseriesandthenationally-syndicated Melinda’sGarden Moment TV & radioprogram. Myers isacolumnist andcontributing editorforBirds & Blooms magazine.

Herwebsiteiswww.melindamyers.com.
2) Inspirealoveofgardening inyoungsters bymaking itfun – StGeorge News stgeorgeutah.com)
CAEDUCATION CODEFORGARDENS § 51795WASTE MANAEGMENT
socialemotionalpaws.com)
LivingSchoolyard MonthDesignates themonth ofMay2014 (socialemotionalpaws.com) GreenSchoolyards America (socialemotionalpaws.com)
https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/green-schoolyards-america Greening foracademic achievement: Prioritizing whattoplantand socialemotionalpaws.com)
Ecotherapy, alsoknownasnaturetherapyorgreentherapy (socialemotionalpaws.com) TheImpactofSchoolyard Greening onChildren’sPhysicalActivity socialemotionalpaws.com)
https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/greening-for-academic-achievementprioritizing-what-to-plant-and https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/trust-for-public-land S.1538 - LivingSchoolyards Actof2023 (socialemotionalpaws.com) 4 TreesinSchoolyards – SanDiegoRegional UrbanForests Council (sdrufc.com) Whytreesinschoolyards? (socialemotionalpaws.com)
https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/trust-for-public-land https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/california-lawmakers-advance-bill-to-cooldown-outside-areas-at-s https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/heinrich-introduces-living-schoolyards-actto-create-unique-heal https://socialemotionalpaws.com/blog-post-1/f/learning-about-trees-in-schools Greenspace isvitaltothehealthtoallhavingafullcanopyoftreesrecommended , parksratiostomatchpopulation density, gardens, education canhavetangible benefits increasing awareness toencourage moretraininghowEchoTherapy licenses wouldall benefits
ThankYou
CraigADurfey
5 AB 638