Cities Index.
12-A - Supplemental Materials

Bellflower City Council
February 9, 2026

Document
12-A - Supplemental Materials
Meeting
February 9, 2026
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Bellflower City Council
Pages
28
Original file
23 KB
Text extracted from the city's file for reading and search. Open the original on portal.laserfiche.com. That file is the official record.

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3543509.2 06363-001-000 1
RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

ARIA GUILANI (Bar No. 337834)
[email protected]
ANDERSON, McPHARLIN & CONNERS LLP
707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, California 90017-3623
TELEPHONE: (213) 688-0080 FACSIMILE: (213) 622-7594

Attorneys for
EITAN SHARAF and

ARTESIA ENTERPRISES, LLC

BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE

CITY OF BELLFLOWER

In the matter of:

9103-9121 Artesia Boulevard,
Assessor’s Parcel Numbers
7162-16-044, 7162-16-045, and
7162-16-046

RESPONSE TO CITY OF
BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR

ABATEMENT COSTS

Place: City Council of the City of Bellflower
16600 Civic Center Drive
Bellflower, California 90706

12-A - SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS

SUBMITTED BY PROPERTY OWNER

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3543509.2 06363-001-000 2
RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Artesia Enterprises, LLC (“Artesia”) purchased 9103-9121 Artesia Boulevard, Bellflower, California (collectively, the “Lots”) on or around March 2013. The Lots are arranged as follows:

Over the course of several years, the City of Bellflower (“City”) and Artesia, via its manager, Mr. Eitan Sharaf, worked to abate the alleged nuisances existing on the Lots. When purchased, and throughout the relevant time period for this matter, the Lots contained numerous tenants, some of whom pre-dated Artesia’s purchase of the Lots. As is relevant to the current issue before this Council, beginning on or around July 2022, the City’s attorneys (now Burke, Williams, and Sorensen, LLP (“BWS”)) began informing the tenants residing upon the Lots of Bellflower Municipal Code (“BMC”) violations on their respective lots. Between that period of time and the present, BWS, on behalf of the City, issued further notices to Artesia regarding numerous purported BMC violations on the Lots.

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3543509.2 06363-001-000 3
RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

Artesia complied with the demanded actions to abate the alleged violations on the Lots.

Indeed, between December 2023 and April 2024, Artesia effectuated the removal of all tenants from the Lots. Between March 2024 and September 2024, Artesia: (1) removed all signs, fences, wind screens, and tenant-abandoned vehicles, boats, and hazardous waste; (2) moved three mobile offices and a camper on the Lots; (3) removed the doors on a canopy on the Lots, removed all wood shades, demolished the unpermitted bathroom, and removed the canopy existing over a mobile office; (4) painted all buildings and light poles; (5) obtained the asbestos report to demolish one of the structures existing on the Lots, as mandated by the City; (6) obtained the required engineering report for all buildings; (7) obtained engineering plans for the fences and gates that were the subject of the notices of violations and submitted said plans to the City; (8) completed the required asphalt slurry seal upon the Lots; (9) installed all required fencing, landscaping, and gates on the Lots; (10) per Council’s September 9, 2024 order, completed demolition of all buildings by October 1, 2024 and removed the final mobile office; and, (11) installed a new roof upon 9121 Artesia Boulevard, Bellflower, California at BWS’s request.

BWS, following the completion of all requested abatement, stated that all required abatement was completed by the due date – at the end of 2024. BWS did not contact Mr. Sharaf or Artesia further after December 2024 regarding abatement.

Almost a year later, Mr. Sharaf received a letter from BWS dated November 17, 2025 demanding payment of the abatement costs for the Lots between January 27, 2022 and September 30, 2025 for the sum of $82,740.82. This letter contained an “accounting” that failed to provide any description, unit, or names as to the work done by BWS, or any description as to the Code Enforcement actions taken by the City’s officers. By way of example, all of the City officials’ “entries” appear in the following format:1

1 A copy of the Demand for Costs is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 for Council’s ease of reference.

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3543509.2 06363-001-000 4
RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

All of BWS’ fees appear in the following fashion:

Seeking to contest the reasonableness of these charges, Mr. Sharaf and Artesia, through his agent and counsel of record, requested records to itemize and describe these claimed costs. The City attorneys, Solange Fortenbach and Tim Campen, refused to provide them. In so doing, both claimed that no such itemization or descriptors were needed—but that’s wrong.

Now, with an impending Council meeting scheduled for February 9, 2026, and faced with a complete inability to contest the reasonableness of the costs requested, Artesia and Mr. Sharaf seek (1) a continuance of the February 9, 2026 hearing to the March or April session and (2) an order by the Council requiring the City attorney’s office to substantiate the costs incurred by their office(s) and the City in connection with the abatement of the Lots. (See Charter of the City of Bellflower, Art. III(A)-(C) [enunciating City Council’s authority]; id., Art. VIII(C) [City

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RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

Council’s grant of authority in line with the Government Code]; see also BMC, § 17.112.060 [City council’s authority to hear appeals]; Montgomery v. Superior Court (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 657, 668 [City Council may direct City attorney to undertake certain actions].)2 The entry of such orders would allow Mr. Sharaf and Artesia a meaningful opportunity to respond to the abatement costs sought. As it currently stands, they are not being given the opportunity to meaningfully respond to the demand, in violation of their procedural due process rights.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Artesia and Mr. Sharaf’s due process rights will be violated if such costs are granted without a reasonable itemization and description of abatement fees and costs.

The BMC mandates that the City must keep an accounting of its abatement costs. (BMC, § 8.36.180(A).) In keeping this accounting, the City may seek fees and costs associated with abatement. (Id., § 8.36.190.) To do so, it must serve a statement of abatement costs on the responsible persons within 20 calendar days of the City's completion of nuisance abatement actions. (Id. § 8.36.180(B).) A responsible party thereafter may contest the abatement costs sought by providing the following:
a. Name, address, telephone number, and signature of each responsible party who is contesting the statement of
abatement costs;
b. Address and description of real property upon which the City abated a public nuisance;
c. Date of the statement of abatement costs being appealed; and 2 This does not account for the fact that BWS did not serve a statement of abatement costs on the responsible persons within 20 calendar days of the City's completion of nuisance abatement actions. (BMC, § 8.36.180(B).) Based on BWS’ communications with Mr. Sharaf, abatement was to be completed and was completed at the end of 2024. It appears the election to recover fees is thus untimely – as the statement of costs was served 331 calendar days after abatement was completed. (See Schneider v. County of San Diego (9th Cir.1994) 28 F.3d 89, 93 [when a property aligns to the municipal code where it once was not in alignment, nuisance abatement is “complete.”].)

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RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

d. Description of the specific abatement cost being contested, and a statement of the grounds for contest in sufficient detail to enable the City Council to understand the nature of the controversy.
(Id., § 8.36.180(D)(1).)
Such requirements purport to provide the process afforded to a responsible person to contest the reasonableness of any fees or costs provided. Preliminarily, as alleged “responsible persons,” Artesia and Mr. Sharaf hold due process rights under the California and Federal Constitutions. (See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 778-779 [corporations have Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process protections]; accord Palm Medical Group, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 206, 217 [procedural due process protections under the California constitution].)

1. The refusal to provide substantive and itemized descriptions for the abatement costs sought violates the procedural due process clause of the California Constitution.

Procedural due process under the California Constitution is “much more inclusive” and protects a broader range of interests than under the federal Constitution. (San Jose Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Jose (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1478.) Under the California Constitution, the application
must be determined in the context of the individual's due process liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures.

Thus, when a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due process analysis must start not with a judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an ‘entitlement’ that can be defined as ‘liberty’ or ‘property,’ but with an assessment of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private interests at stake.
(See People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 264 (Ramirez).) In so doing, the court instructed reviewing bodies to “ ‘evaluate the extent to which procedural protections can be tailored to promote more accurate and reliable administrative decisions in light of the governmental and private interests at stake....’ ” (See id. at p. 267, bolded and italicized emphases added and quotations omitted.)

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RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

This approach presumes that, when an individual is subjected to deprivatory governmental action, they always have a due process liberty interest both in fair and unprejudicial decision- making and in being treated with respect and dignity. (Id. at p. 268.) In essence, a party is entitled to (1) notice, and (2) a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the validity, fairness, and amount of the costs. (Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 7(a); Thain v. City of Palo Alto (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 173, 191; see also Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R. Co. v. Risty (1928) 276 U.S. 567, 574 [landowner must be apprised of what is proposed and afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard].) The determination of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of four factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the individual action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; (3) the dignitary interest of informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and of enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official; and (4) the government interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. (Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371, 390–391, citations and quotations omitted.) The primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. (Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation-San Diego Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1072.) That isn’t happening here, as elucidated below, infra II(A)(3).

2. The refusal to itemize and describe its abatement costs violates the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 332 (Matthews); see U.S. Const. Amend. 14.) To satisfy the requirements of Federal procedural due process, the government must provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their

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RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

objections. (Jones v. Flowers (2006) 547 U.S. 220, 225-226, citation omitted.) While a procedure for challenging a city’s decision is adequate prior to deprivation, such a hearing must also include a meaningful opportunity to present objections. (Matthews, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 334-335; Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. (1987) 481 U.S. 252, 261 [Due process requires notice and an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”], internal quotation marks original and cleaned up.)
Similar to the California Supreme Court’s guidance, an administrative body must first, evaluate the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, evaluate the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, evaluate the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
(Ibid., cleaned up.) This evaluation is flexible and must take into account the procedural protections that a particular situation demands. (Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) 545 U.S. 209, 224– 225.)

3. The refusal to itemize and describe the abatement costs means that Artesia and Mr. Sharaf cannot meaningfully challenge the abatement costs sought, in contravention of the United States and California Constitutions.

The protections of procedural due process apply to administrative proceedings. (See Thain v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d at p. 189.) Indeed, a responsible person under the BMC is entitled to challenge the reasonableness of any costs claimed, provided there is (1) a description of the specific abatement cost being contested and (2) a statement of the grounds for the contest in sufficient detail to enable the City Council to understand the nature of the controversy. (See Houser Holdings CA, LLC v. Tokio Marine Specialty Insurance Company (N.D. Cal. 2024) 738 F.Supp.3d 1226, 1234.) In evaluating the overlapping Ramirez and Matthews factors, the City attorney’s (BWS) current position of refusing to itemize and describe the costs sought violates Artesia and Mr. Sharaf’s procedural due process rights.

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3543509.2 06363-001-000 9
RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

The payment or loss of money is a protected property interest that triggers procedural due process protections. (See Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 571-572.) Absent the ability to meaningfully evaluate and respond to each claimed cost, it is likely that Artesia and Mr. Sharaf will possibly overpay for costs that are not reasonable to the abatement action. To wit, with the current iterations of the “accounting,”
it is impossible to ascertain what costs are being claimed and for what purpose. (See cf. Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [laws that do not allow a person of common intelligence to know what is prohibited or allowed are void as a matter of law].) There would be little to no burden upon the City or BWS in providing the complete information requested and necessary here. By way of example, if this were a civil enforcement

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action, the City’s and BWS’ request for attorney’s fees must include itemized descriptions of the work done. (See Maria P v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) To provide a date and amount billed, as is the case here, would not suffice. As such, there is no added burden to BWS or the City in providing this required information. (Matthews, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 334-335.) Council is acting as a quasi-judicial body in determining whether to award abatement costs. (See, e.g., Clary v. City of Crescent City (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 273, 284; see also BMC, § 8.36.180(H).) This Council should not grant its imprimatur to a lesser standard than that which is uniformly required for any party claiming fees – i.e., a rubber stamp in violation of the California and United States Constitutions. (See, e.g., R. H. Macy & Co. v. Robinson (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 182, 191-192; see also Beames v. City of Visalia (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 741, 767- 787 [due process violation existed where a city failed to provide a property owner a meaningful opportunity to challenge nuisance abatement action and abatement cost recovery].) Requiring BWS to substantiate their claimed fees with itemized descriptions, as would be required in any judicial setting, is necessary. To allow otherwise would infringe upon Artesia and Mr. Sharaf’s procedural due process rights. (Matthews, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 334-335.) As such, Artesia and Mr. Sharaf seek (1) a continuance of the February 9, 2026 hearing to the March or April session, and (2) an order by the Council requiring the City attorney’s office to substantiate the costs incurred by their office(s) and the City in connection with the abatement of the Lots.

III. CONCLUSION
Procedural due process requires a meaningful opportunity to respond to a governmental entity’s attempt to deprive a property owner of a protected interest. Regarding abatement costs, procedural due process requires that a contesting party from whom costs are sought know the basis for a cost. That is absent here. BWS, the City’s attorney, has steadfastly refused to do that which it would be required to do in a judicial setting – i.e., itemize and describe the fees associated with abatement.

Council, in determining whether to assess such costs against all responsible persons, is acting in its quasi-judicial setting. To allow the recovery of costs with this dearth of information is a violation of Artesia’s and Mr. Sharaf’s procedural due process rights, as they cannot provide

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3543509.2 06363-001-000
11 RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS the detail required by the BMC to contest the costs. As such, Artesia and Mr. Sharaf seek (1) a continuance of the February 9, 2026 hearing to the March or April session, and (2) an order by the Council requiring the City attorney’s office to substantiate the costs incurred by their office(s) and the City in connection with the abatement of the Lots.

DATED: February 3, 2026 ANDERSON, McPHARLIN & CONNERS LLP By:

Aria Guilani
Attorneys for
EITAN SHARAF and ARTESIA ENTERPRISES,
LLC

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28 RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 4000, Los Angeles, California 90017-3623.

On February 3, 2026, I served true copies of the document described as RESPONSE TO CITY OF BELLFLOWER’S REQUEST FOR ABATEMENT COSTS on the interested parties in this action as follows:

City of Bellflower
E-Mail: [email protected]
City Clerk
Timothy E. Campen, Esq.

Burke, Williams & Sorenson LLP
501 West Broadway, Suite 1600
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 814-5800
Facsimile: (619) 814-6799
E-Mail: [email protected]
Attorneys for City of Bellflower
Solange Z. Fortenbach, Esq.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP
18300 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 650
Irvine, CA 92612-1032
Telephone: (949) 265-3416
E-Mail: [email protected]
Attorneys for City of Bellflower
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address [email protected] to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 3, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.

LISA GREENE

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