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Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle.
Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MD T or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.) (f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).
(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license
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plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout ) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle. (3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).
(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.
(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator. (6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate super visor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.
All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call (g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.
Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).
2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
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3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. 422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and secur ity of
data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
Commented [WL1]: I don’t know what this is
referencing but asking the department to do something
if feasible is not appropriately in a policy document.
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Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.
422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means.
The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Rel ease Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transp ortation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions). (e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.
(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy. 422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS
It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department Commented [WL2]: An independent auditor would be
more appropriate; sample size should be determined
based on the number of inquiries. 10 may be too low
dependent on the total number.
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will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above- authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding 24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.6(e).
The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting.
422.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.
(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.
(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.
ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials. 422.10 TRAINING
The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53
Public
AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE
READERS (ALPR)
IN THE CITY OF BERKELEY
A Preliminary Review of proposed BPD Policies by the
Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA)
submitted to the Police Accountability Board (PAB)
Special Meeting: June 16, 2023
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Table of Contents
Background ......................................................................................................................................................... 2 Key Questions .................................................................................................................................................... 4 Literature Review Findings: ALPR Technology and its Implications .......................................................... 4 ALPR systems and crime .............................................................................................................................. 5 ALPR systems and its effects on racial disparities in law enforcement stops ...................................... 7 ALPR systems and privacy ........................................................................................................................... 7 Preliminary Analysis of the Proposed Policies ............................................................................................ 10 BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS ......................................................................................................................................................... 10 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................... 18 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 19 Appendices ....................................................................................................................................................... 20
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Figure 1 Historical crime rates overview ............................................................................................................ 14
Background
On November 1, 2021 the Public Safety Policy Committee of the City Council, made a budget referral proposing the acquisition of fixed automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) to the Council. They emphasized the need to evaluate the costs and benefits of the proposed expenditure in comparison to other public s afety investments in the two - year FY 2022- 23 & 2023-24 budget. Furthermore, they called for the development of a policy that addresses data retention and other pertinent issues in accordance with the City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance and Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance.
On November 30, 2021, Councilmember Taplin presented the budget referral proposing the acquisition of fixed automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) and received co-sponsorship from Councilmember Droste and Councilmember Wengraf. The item was a part of the City Council’s Action Calendar (Item 28)
1 and presented the following
recommendations:
Authorize the City Manager to install ALPRs at strategic locations, including public facilities, city entrances, and areas affected by violent crime, traffic violations, illegal dumping, Schedule II drug offenses, and other criminal activities. Allocate funds for ALPRs in the FY 23-24 budget.
Refer the development of a policy enabling the use of ALPRs by the Berkeley Police Department to the City Manager, ensuring compliance with the City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance and Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance. Consider a data retention period of no longer than one year, with a minimum of sixty days to account for reporting delays.
Study the feasibility of shorter data retention periods for non-hit scans, granting the City Manager the final decision-making authority.
1 https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/city-council-meetings/2021-11-30%20An notated%20Agenda%20- %20Council%20%281%29.pdf
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Consider ALPR policies from neighboring local governments, including the City of Alameda, the City of Emeryville, the City of Hayward, the City of Oakland, the City of Piedmont, the City of Richmond, the City of San Leandro, and the City of Vallejo. Include provisions in the policy to safeguard against plate counterfeiting, plate switching, and other methods of detection evasions.
The Public Safety Policy Committee's recommendation received approval from the City Council, garnering a majority in favor
2. Councilmembers Kesarwani, Taplin, Bartlett,
Wengraf, Robinson, Droste, and Mayor Arreguin all voted in support of the recommendation. However, Councilmember Harrison voted against it, while Councilmember Hahn chose to abstain from voting. This Council approval signif ies the majority's endorsement of the proposed actions outlined in the recommendation. These actions include the installation of ALPRs at strategic locations, allocation of funds in the FY 23-24 budget for ALPRs, and the development of a policy governing the use of ALPRs by the Berkeley Police Department in compliance with relevant city ordinances, specifically Berkeley Municipal Code (BMC) 2.99
3. On May 11, 2023, Police Chief Jen Louis presented the Board4 with draft policies outlining the usage of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) in accordance with the Berkeley City Council’s budget referral item focused on Community Safety. In response to this directive, the department diligently prepared the necessary Surveillance Ordinance policies and presented the following documents to the Police Accountability Board (PAB) and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA):
Policy 422: This policy establishes guidelines for the department's use of F ixed Automated License Plate Readers.
Policy 1305: The Surveillance Use Policy specifically addresses the implementation of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers.
2 https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/city-council-meetings/2021-11-30%20An notated%20Agenda%20- %20Council%20%281%29.pdf
3 https://berkeley.municipal.codes/BMC/2.99
4 Through a secretarial oversight by the Director of Police Accountability (DPA) Hansel Alejandro Aguilar, the report was not provided to the Board until June 8, 2023. A request for additional time to review the policy (beyond the 30 days provided by the ordinance) was made to City Manager Williams -Ridley by DPA Aguilar. Per Council Member Taplin’s (current Chair of the Public Safety Policy Committee) instructions, the request to postpone was denied.
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Surveillance Acquisition Report: This report provides details regarding the acquisition of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers.
Council Budget Referral Item: This document serves as background information.
According to the provisions of the Surveillance Ordinance (BMC Section 2.99.030.2), the Police Accountability Board (PAB) must review a Surveillance Use Policy within 30 days of receiving it. During this timeframe, the PAB is required to vote on recommending approval of the policy, objecting to the proposal, suggesting modifications, or taking no action. It is important to note that if there is opposition to the policy's approval or if the PAB does not take any action, the City Manager retains the authority to conduct an independent review and potentially proceed with adopting the policy.
Key Questions
The following questions will be addressed through the preliminary review on the use of ALPR technology by law enforcement agencies:
1. What evidence exists regarding the effectiveness of ALPR systems in reducing crime rates?
2. To what extent does the implementation of ALPR technology contribute to reducing disparities in law enforcement stops?
3. What are the specific privacy concerns associated with the use of ALPR technology, and what potential safeguards can be implemented to protect individual privacy rights? How do existing legal and regulatory frameworks address the privacy concerns related to this technology?
Literature Review Findings: ALPR Technology and its
Implications
The literature review involved a thorough analysis of relevant sources, encompassing scholarly articles, research papers, reports, news articles and other pertinent publications from credible sources. The gathered information sheds light on the key questions posed in this review.
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ALPR systems and crime
In 2022, a survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) gathered responses from 1,237 law enforcement agencies regarding the use of Automated License Plate Re aders (ALPR) systems 5 . The survey revealed that approximately 40% of the participating agencies utilized ALPR systems, while 52% reported never having used such a system
6. The remaining 8% had used ALPR systems
in the past but had discontinued their use7.
Among the agencies employing ALPR systems, the majority (86%) had fewer than 10 units available for deployment8. According to the survey, the IACP found that vehicle- mounted and stationary/fixed units were the most 9 commonly utilized, whereas portable units mounted on non-vehicular objects were less prevalent. A significant portion (74%) of the agencies using ALPR had implemented the technology for a duration ranging from one to 10 years10.
For the agencies that were not currently employing ALPR systems, the primary reason cited for their non- use was the cost of acquisition. This concern was particularly pronounced among smaller agencies. The survey did not specifically request examples of how ALPR systems were used. However, a focus group identified three main purposes:
investigations, crime prevention, and traffic/parking enforcement
11. The United States
Department of Transportation's report titled "State of Knowledge and Practice for Using Automatic License Plate Readers for Traffic Safety Purposes" highlights the predominant use of ALPR systems in reactive scenarios. These include responding to incidents involving stolen vehicles, hit-and-run accidents, specific criminal activities, Amber Alerts, Megan's Law, Silver Alerts, be-on-the-look-out (BOLO) notifications, and wanted felons
12. 5 "IACP LPR Survey Results." International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP_LPR_Survey_Results_5.16.22.pdf 6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Zmud, Jennifer, et al. "State of Knowledge and Practice for Using Automated License Plate Readers for Traffic Safety Purposes." April 2021, Report No. DOT HS 813 051, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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The Vallejo Police Department conducted a case study to assess the effectiveness of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) technology. Patrol cars were randomly selected and equipped with ALPR systems, with some cars having the ALPR alerts activated and others having them deactivated. The study found that the cars with ALPR technology had a 140 percent higher ability to detect stolen vehicles 13. However, the analysis also revealed that the technology identified a significantly larger number of lost or stolen license plates, including duplicates, which may have caused officers to overlook legitimate hits
14. Fixed ALPR systems, which were stationary units, were found to be more efficient than mobile ALPR systems in making arrests. Officers using fixed systems tended to wait downstream of fixed locations for hits, resulting in more arrests. The control data indicated that 35 percent of hits from mobile readers and 37 percent of hits from fixed readers were misreads15. After accounting for the number of cars in each condition, the department found significantly more hits in the ALPR intervention condition.
The study also found that stolen vehicles identified by officers with more seniority were more likely to result in arrests, although this finding was only marginally significant.
The use of fixed ALPR systems significantly increased the odds of identifying a stolen vehicle and increased the likelihood of arrests
16. This is consistent with the IACP (2022)
findings as they note 17 , “ Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime,”. While acknowledging the potential benefits of ALPR technology, it is crucial to recognize the limited research conducted on its effectiveness in these specific scenarios. The available information predominantly originates from police technology vendors, underscoring the need for a cautious and critical approach when evaluating and interpreting it.
13 "March 2018 RIB (Research in Brief)." International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/M arch%202018%20RIB.pdf
14 "March 2018 RIB (Research in Brief)." International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/March%202018%20RIB.pdf 15 Id.
16 Id.
17 pg. 1: IACP LPR Survey Results." International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP_LPR_Survey_Results_5.16.22.pdf
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ALPR systems and its effects on racial disparities in law enforcement stops Extensive research has shown clear disparities in police traffic stops based on race. A report published in October 2022 by the Public Policy Institute of California revealed that Latino drivers constitute approximately 40 percent of traffic stops, while white drivers make up around 33 percent, and Black drivers account for approximately 14 percent18. This data highlights a notable overrepresentation of Black Californians in traffic stops, considering they comprise only 6 percent of the state's population 19. Conversely, the proportion of traffic stops involving Latino drivers closely mirrors their population representation, with 40 percent of stops compared to 39 percent of the population 20.
However, white drivers are somewhat underrepresented in traffic stops, comprising 33 percent of stops compared to 35 percent of the population. It is worth noting that despite the Asian population in Cali fornia growing to 15 percent, they are notably underrepresented in traffic stops, accounting for only 6 percent of them
21. A supporting point for the use of ALPR technology is its potential to mitigate racial and ethnic disparities in traffic stops. The rationale behind this argument is that by relying on the license plate and vehicle description, law enforcement officers can avoid making subjective judgments based on the driver’s appearance matching potentially matching a subject description22. However, through this preliminary review of the literature, the ODPA is unable to identify readily available research findings to substantiate this claim.
ALPR systems and privacy
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) has examined constitutional concerns regarding the use of Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) by law enforcement. Currently, SCOTUS has not required a warrant for photographing license plates for comparison with law enforcement databases, nor have they established a specific standard of evidence to justify the use of ALPR technology. This lack of
18 Public Policy Institute of California. "Racial Disparities in Traffic Stops." PPIC, www.ppic.org/publication/racial- disparities-in-traffic-stops/. Accessed 15 June 2023.
19 Public Policy Institute of California. "Racial Disparities in Traffic Stops." PPIC. PPIC, n.d. Web. Accessed 15 June 2023. https://www.ppic.org/publication/racial-disparities-in-traffic-stops/. 20 Id.
21 Id.
22 "Axon Ethics Report 2." Axon. Accessed 15 June 2023. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/5dadec937f5c1a2b9d698ba9/1571679380452/ Axon_Ethics_Report_2_v2.pdf
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requirement is based on two factors. First, the regulations governing vehicles on public roads have created a situation where there is no expectation of privacy regarding license plates. Second, longstanding legal precedent establishes that individuals driving on public roads have limited expectation of privacy in their movements with regard to law enforcement.
As new surveillance tools have emerged, they have raised concerns about potential infringements on individuals' Fourth Amendment rights to privacy. In the case of United States v. Jones 23 , which involved GPS tracking, the Court determined that installing and monitoring a GPS device without a warrant constituted a search that violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court did not address whether achieving the same tracking result through electronic means, without a physical trespass, would be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
In her concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s public movements. She emphasized the need to consider the aggregation of data from novel modes of surveillance and its potential impact on constitutional rights
24 . Justice Sotomayor expressed criticism t owards the trespass standard and proposed adopting the Katz test established in Katz v. United States. The Katz test centers around determining whether there is a violation of a societal expectation of privacy, rather than solely relying on physical trespass 25 . In Katz, the SCOTUS underscored that the Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals, not just physical locations. Of course, applying the Katz test presents its own sets of challenges.
The Katz test necessitates judges and lawmakers to evaluate the hypot hetical expectation of privacy held by a reasonable person. This methodology has resulted in inconsistent judgments due to varying comprehension of advanced technology among judges and the inability of law and policy to keep up with the rapid pace of technological progress. However, despite these difficulties, the Court's agreement in Jones indicated that limited monitoring of an individual's movements on public roads might be acceptable in certain circumstances, while prolonged tracking could potentially exceed permissible
23 United States v. Jones – 565 U.S. 400, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 24 Justice Sotomayor. concurring opinion, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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boundaries26. The parameters of that boundary were established in the case of Carpenter v. United States.
In the landmark case of Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court undertook an examination of the utilization of historical cell phone data by law enforcement agencies. The Court reached a significant conclusion, asserting that the collection of such data, particularly when viewed in its entirety or aggregate form, raised legitimate constitutional concerns27. The primary factors that contributed to these concerns were the depth, breadth, and automatic nature of the data collection process.
The concerns raised by citizen organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 28 and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 29, reg arding the utilization of Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) technology were echoed in this case. Like the collection of historical cell phone data, ALPR technology involves the automatic gathering of information, often on a massive scale. The automatic nature of data collection, whether it pertains to cell phone records or license plate information, raises questions about the scope of privacy intrusion and the potential for misuse or abuse of such data.
Furthermore, the Carpenter case also highlighted the significance of driving as an integral part of active participation in civil society. The Court recognized that individuals rely on their cell phones and vehicles for various daily activities, and the collection and analysis of location data can reveal detailed information about a person's movements, associations, and private activities
30. Similarly, ALPR technology captures and stores
information about an individual's whereabouts, raising concerns about the extent to which one's movements should be subject to constant surveillance by law enforcement.
Therefore, Carpenter v. United States underscored the need for judicial scrutiny and safeguards when it comes to the collection and use of personal data, whether it
26 United States v. Jones – 565 U.S. 400, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 27 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 741 (2018)
28 "Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR)." Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d. Web. Accessed 15 June 2023. https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr. 29"How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers." American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). American Civil Liberties Union, n.d. Web. Accessed Day Month Year. https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-to-pum p-the-brakes-on-your-police-departments-use-of-flocks- mass-surveillance-license-plate-readers.
30 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 741 (2018)
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involves cell phone records or ALPR technology. According to Yash Dattani's research titled "Big Brother is Scanning: The widespread implementation of ALPR Technology in America's Police Forces," a potential safeguard against privacy intrusions caused by ALPR technology would involve implementing stringent regulations on the retention periods of data not identified by the ALPR system
31. Preliminary Analysis of the Proposed Policies
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED
AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS
Per BMC 2.99.020, the City Manager is required to present a "Surveillance Acquisition Report" to the Police Accountability Board prior to adoption by the City Council (2.99.030(2)). Under the ordinance, "Surveillance Acquisition Report" means a publicly- released written report produced prior to acquisition or to proposed permanent use after use in Exigent Circumstances pursuant to Section 2.99.040 (2), of a type of Surveillance Technology that includes the following:
a. Description: Information describing the Surveillance Technology and how it works, including product descriptions from manufacturers; b. Purpose: Information on the proposed purpose(s) for the Surveillance Technology;
c. Location: T
he general location(s) it may be deployed and reasons for deployment;
d. Impact: An assessment identifying potential impacts on civil liberties and civil rights including but not limited to potential disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups;
e. Mitigation: Information regarding technical and procedural measures that can be implemented to appropriately safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (d);
f. Data Types and Sources: A list of the sources of data proposed to be collected, analyzed, or processed by the Surveillance Technology, including "open source" data;
31 Dattani. (2022). Big Brother is Scanning: The Widespread Implementation of ALPR Technology in America’s Police Forces. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 24(4), 749–785.
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g. Data Security: Information about the steps that can be taken to ensure adequate security measures to safeguard the data collected or generated from unauthorized access or disclosure;
h. Fiscal Cost: The fiscal costs for the Surveillance Technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, including to the extent practicable costs associated with compliance with this and other reporting and oversight requirements, as well as any current or potential sources of funding; i. Third Party Dependence and Access: W
hether use or maintenance of the
technology will require data gathered by the technology to be handled or stored by a third-party vendor on an ongoing basis, and whether a third party may have access to such data or may have the right to sell or otherwise share the data in aggregated, disaggregated, raw or any other formats;
j. Alternatives: A summary and general assessment of potentially viable alternative methods (whether involving the use of a new technology or not), if any, considered before deciding to propose acquiring the Surveillance Technology; and
k. Experience of Other Entities: To the extent such information is available, a summary of the experience of comparable government entities with the proposed technology, including any unanticipated financial or community costs and benefits, experienced by such other entities.
The general purpose of the acquisition report is to provide the Council with sufficient information to make a reasoned determination about the need and impact of the proposed surveillance technology acquisition or use. The following provides ODPA’s observations regarding the Acquisition Report for ALPR drafted by the BPD as the designee of the City Manager:
Description:
Considering the proposed expanded uses of the ALPR program already in place in the City, this section should provide further clarification about the technology. In our review and comparison to other descriptions and or definitions of the system, the BPD’s description section in the proposed Acquisition Report provides overall sufficient information about the technology by defining it in plain language; specifying where it can be mounted; identifying the data points it collects (i.e. license plates, location, date and time) Table _ provides information about the descriptive language used by other entities
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Table 1 ALPR Technology Description Comparison
BPD IACP32 EFF33 ACLU34
Fixed Automated License
Plate Readers (ALPRs)
are cameras systems
with software designed
for license plate
recognition. The camera
systems are typically
mounted on street poles,
street lights, and highway
overpasses.
ALPRs are designed to
capture license plate
numbers which come into
view, along with the
location, date and time.
The data, which includes
an image of the front or
the back of the car
displaying the license
plate, is then uploaded to
a central server operated
by the vendor. The
license plate data is
cross-referenced with
systems such as Stolen
Vehicle Systems (SVS),
and other lists like Amber
alerts to notice police of
vehicles with hits.
This technology does not
have facial recognition,
and is not tied to any
personal identifying
information or used for
traffic enforcement.
ALPR systems
function to
automatically
capture an image
of the vehicle’s
license plate,
transform that
image into
alphanumeric
characters using
optical character
recognition or
similar software,
compare the plate
number acquired
to one or more
databases of
vehicles of interest
to law enforcement
and other
agencies, and to
alert the officer
when a vehicle of
interest has been
observed.
ALPR are high-
speed camera
systems that
photograph
license plates,
convert the
numbers and
letters into
machine-
readable text,
tag them with
the time and
location, and
upload that data
into a database
for retrieval.
Automatic license
plate readers—
mounted on
police cars or on
objects like road
signs and
bridges—use
small high-speed
cameras to
photograph
thousands of
plates per minute.
The information
captured by the
readers—
including the
license plate
number and the
date, time, and
location of every
scan—is being
collected and
sometimes
pooled into
regional sharing
systems.
32 https://www.theiacp.org/projects/automated-license-plate-recognition 33 https://www.eff.org/pages/california-automated-license-plate-reader-policies 34 https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/automatic-license-plate-readers
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Purpose:
This section of the Acquisition Report describes the purpose for the installation and use of a network of fixed automated license plate readers by the Berkeley Police Department (BPD). Specifically, the Department clarifies that the automated license plate readers will “be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right -of-way ag reement has been established.” This is an important clarification considering that ALPRs can be mounted on police vehicles and it appears that the BPD does not have the intention in this acquisition to deploy the technology on patrol vehicles. If this is a misinterpretation on the ODPA’s behalf or an omission by the BPD in this section, this should be further clarified.
This section also presents several cases where the technology could have been beneficial in preventing crimes or apprehending suspects. From the perspective of the ODPA, it is important to evaluate whether the BPD has provided a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs and to identify areas where the section could be improved.
Data-Based Justification:
As was reported earlier this year by the Berkeleyside 35 (through their review of BPD data), we know that violent crime and property crimes are on the rise, “ The overall total number of violent and property crimes in 2022 was “the highest in the past 10 years,” Interim Police Chief Jen Louis told the City Council in a special meeting this week. “Berkeley continues to have one of the highest property crime rates in our region .” (Gecan, 2023). Specifically, the Berkleyside reports that according to the recent annual report presented by the Berkeley Police Department, crime rates in Berkeley witnessed an increase in almost all categories from 2021 to 2022. However, it is worth noting that in several areas, these rates still remain below
36 the levels observed before the pandemic.
35 https://www.berkeleyside.org/2023/03/17/crime-reports-berkeley-police 36 Id.
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Figure 1 Historical crime rates overview
Noteworthy are the following observations regarding Berkeley specific crime trends:
• Violent crimes (i.e. homicides, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults ) increased by 25.2%.
• Total property crimes (i.e. burglaries, larcenies, auto thefts and arson collectively) increased by 14.5% (although the specific categories of auto theft and ar son saw a decrease from 2021 to 2022).
At face value, these trends, compounded with the current staffing crises being experienced in the City and in the Department, provide empirical support for the implementation of innovative crime prevention and reduction strategies. The use of technological tools like ALPR, when used transparently and judiciously, can be an effective force multiplier that improves public safety while balancing the respect and protection of civil liberties. As noted in the literature review, “Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime,” (pg. 1, IACP, 2022) As currently written, however, the BPD’s Purpose section does not explicitly mention a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs (beyond the highlighted cases of interest). To strengthen the justification, the BPD could provide statistical analyses and employ predictive policing methods (or other empirical data analyses) demonstrating the effectiveness of ALPRs in reducing crime rates, apprehending suspects, or improving overall public safety. This could include information on the number of cases where ALPRs
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have aided investigations, the success rate of identifying wanted vehicles, or any studies or reports that support the use of ALPR technology.
Location:
As written, it is unclear what specific locations the proposed 52 units will be placed in around the City. Without that information, it is difficult to assess any disparate impact that may result from the use of this technology. It would be helpful to specify if the proposed 52 units translate to 13 separate locations at key intersections around the City (i.e. capturing the North, South, East, and West vantage points) or if the BPD intends to fix an ALPR unit at 52 separate locations. As referenced earlier, a ccording to the 2022 survey 37 conducted by IACP of jurisdictions utilizing the technology, “ Most (86%) agencies using LPR systems reported fewer than 10 deployable units” (pg. 4). Without a clear articulable need or justification for 52 units, the BPD should consider deploying the proposed 52 units on a segmented deployment schedule that allows for data analysis and feedback on the effectiveness of the technology in Berkeley. For example, the BPD could consider a deployment schedule as outlined in Table 2.
Table 2 Suggested Segmented Deployment Schedule
Deployment
Year
Deployed
Units
Predictive policing forecasting, benchmarking and
assessments38
2023 13 • Prior to the deployment year, through predictive policing program, utilize a forecasting methodology that addresses the specific crime problem BPD is attempting to solve (i.e. property, violent crime, etc.).
• Assign (monthly/quarterly/yearly) benchmarks or goals for assessing the efficacy of ALPR in the crime reduction and prevention forecasted.
• Continue deployment plan if data supports the effectiveness of the program
2024 13
2025 13
2026 13
This strategy will also allow the BPD to determine ongoing community receptiveness, social impact, fiscal implications beyond the initial assessment, and data to assess the soundness of the data security protocols of this proposed policy.
37 https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP_LPR_Survey_Results_5.16.22.pdf 38 For more information on predictive analytics in policing consider:
Fitzpatrick, D. J., Gorr, W. L., & Neill, D. B. (2019). Keeping score: Predictive analytics in policing. Annual Review of Criminology, 2, 473-491.
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-criminol-011518-024534
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Impact:
Similar to the comments on the previous sections, this section could benefit from further articulation of the impact. In the October 2022 Staff Report 39 to the City Council, the Palo Alto Police Department , provides a helpful framework in its Benefits of Usage section which includes a discussion on:
• Real-Time Alerts
• Deterrence
• Crime solving
• Regional coordination
• Police-Community Co-production through an expanded searchable data set
Mitigation and Data Security:
While the Department indicates that it will safeguard and protect data through procedural and technological means, Policy 1305 should be strengthened to reflect this commitment. Specifically, the BPD should consider revising 1305.4 Data Collection in the following manner:
Table 3 Data security suggestions
Current Language Suggested Language
The Department should if feasible find a
solution to transfer evidentiary hit data
into it’s digital evidence repository
through secure integration.
Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred
into the Department’s digital evidence
repository through secure integration.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR
server should be stored for no longer than
30 days, and in accordance with the
established records retention schedule.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR
server shall be stored for no longer than
30 days, and in accordance with the
established records retention schedule.
Data Types and Sources:
No comments at this time.
Fiscal Cost:
The BPD should consider revisiting its justifications to ensure the fiscal cost is accurate and a defendable use of City resources.
39 https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/files/assets/public/police-department/public-information-portal/alpr-staff- report-10-24-2022-cmr-14870.pdf
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Third Party Dependence and Access:
In this section, BPD outlines allowable uses which also appear in the corresponding policies (422 and 1305). The ODPA notes the potential for disparate impact and or civil liberties issues if safeguards are not put in place regarding the ability to use ALPR. Specifically, one of the authorized uses should be further analyzed:
(b) An A
LPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
While (as noted earlier) there are no specific legal protections for a license plate in a public roadway, the BPD should further articulate the permission to utilize ALPR technology without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Currently, the BPD’s language is consistent with every Lexipol drafted ALPR policy that the ODPA has reviewed, however, there does not appear to be clear justification or explanation on why ALPR would be used without meeting a reasonable suspicion or probable cause threshold. The BPD should assess and or explain if it has considered whether t his provision has the potential for a racially disparate impact. Potential misuse or improper training can result in additional racial disparities that the Department is currently still grappling with. While the Department explicitly prohibits this technology from being used in a discriminatory matter, absent of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, if this technology is affixed in a neighborhood or location where racial minorities are overrepresented, its mere use may yield racial disparities.
Alternatives:
While the ODPA acknowledged the City and BPD are experiencing a hiring and retention shortage, a more defensible alternative is not deploying “additional police officers”, but rather assessing if reaching the authorized number of officers will enable the Department to address the current crime issues before assessing if this technology should be deployed.
Experience of Other Entities:
As the literature review section indicated, there are considerable case studies that indicate how this technology has been utilized in other locations. The Department can
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benefit from further expanding this section to demonstrate successes and challenges with the implementation of this technology.
Recommendations
Without taking specific positions regarding the predicted or expected effectiveness of the expansion of this technological adoption in the City of Berkeley, the ODPA believes there are several opportunities to further improve this Acquisition Report and the corresponding policies.
Suggestions for Improvement include:
• Transparency and Oversight : The report is silent on the Police Accountability Board’s or the Office of the Director of Police Accountability’s access to this system’s data for the performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth by t he Charter or by Ordinance. The report and policies could benefit from including information about the policies and guidelines contemplated to ensure the responsible use of ALPRs by the BPD and the ability of the PAB and ODPA to complete their duties.
• Privacy Safeguards: Given the potential privacy concerns associated with ALPR technology, it would be valuable to highlight the steps taken by the BPD to protect the privacy of individuals whose license plate data is captured and stored. This could involve explaining measures such as data encryption, access restrictions, and training to members and users on compliance with relevant privacy laws or regulations.
• Community Engagement : The report and or policies should emphasize the importance of engaging wi th the community and seeking public input on the use of ALPRs. The BPD could consider soliciting feedback, conducting public forums or surveys, and addressing concerns raised by community members to foster trust and transparency.
• Regular Training and Accountability: The BPD should outline the minimum training provided to officers on the proper use of ALPRs and adherence to privacy and civil rights standards. Additionally, the section could mention the existence of
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mechanisms for reporting and investigating any alleged misuse or misconduct related to ALPR technology.
By incorporating these suggestions, the report and policies would provide a more comprehensive and transparent overview of the BPD's use of ALPRs, addressing potential concerns and enhancing accountability and public trust in the process.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the implementation of an Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) system holds potential benefits, it is crucial to acknowledge that the current body of research, the lack of clarity on the BPD’s deployment strategy and lack of articulation of the crime problems the BPD is attempting to solve is insufficient to make definitive conclusions about its effectiveness in the City of Berkeley. The limited scope of existing studies and varying contexts make it challenging to determine the true impact of ALPR systems on public safety and law enforcement outcomes. Therefore, further research and articulation of the proposed policies is necessary to comprehensively evaluate the efficacy of ALPR technology and its potential benefits in the City.
Moreover, it is essential to recognize and address the legitimate privacy concerns raised by all relevant stakeholders. ALPR systems have the potential to collect and store vast amounts of personal data, raising concerns about surveillance and potential misuse.
To mitigate these risks, robust safeguards must be put in place to ensure the privacy and protection of non- hit license plates. Transparent policies, legal frameworks, and data governance protocols should be developed and implemented, guaranteeing that the information collected is used solely for its intended purpose and subject to strict access controls and retention limits.
Additionally, the proposed police department policies, as currently formulated, do not fully address all the concerns raised by this report. The lack of clarity and specific guidelines regarding data handling and access restrictions can contribute to mistrust and apprehension. To foster community trust, it is imperative that the policies be revisited and
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improved to incorporate meaningful community input and address the identified shortcomings. A well -defined policy should outline the purpose, limitations, and safeguards of the ALPR system, assuring the public that their priv acy rights will be respected.
In the event that the need for ALPR systems is deemed to outweigh the privacy concerns of the community in the interest of public safety, a clear and transparent plan for implementation must be established. The process should encompass thorough public consultation, open dialogue, and active involvement of stakeholders at all stages. This inclusive approach ensures that community concerns are adequately addressed, and the benefits, risks, and trade-off
s associated with ALPR deployment are fully understood by all parties involved.
In summary, while the potential benefits of ALPR systems warrant consideration, more research is required to determine their true effectiveness in our City . Privacy concerns must be taken seriously, and appropriate safeguards put in place to protect the privacy of non- hit license plates. The proposed police department policies should be refined to address community concerns and clearly articulate the plan for implementation.
If the decision is made to proceed with ALPR deployment, transparency and accountability should guide the development of policies and the implementation process, ensuring that public safety goals are achieved while respecting the rights and privacy of individuals and respecting the Charter authority of the Police Accountability Board and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability.
Appendices
A. Letter from The Director of Police Accountability to City Manager Williams-Ridley Requesting Additional Time for Review of Policies and The Respective Response.
B. Draft of BPD Policy 422 “Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)”
C. Draft of BPD Policy 1305 “Surveillance Use Policy – Fixed ALPRs”
D. Draft of BPD Policy 1305 Appendix A “Berkeley Police Department Surveillance Acquisition Report – Fixed Automated License Plate Readers”
1947 Center Street, 5th Floor, Berkeley, CA 94704 TEL: 510-981-4950 TDD: 510-981-6903 FAX: 510-981-4955 Website: www.cityofberkeley.info/dpa/ Email: [email protected]
Hansel Alejandro Aguilar
Director of Police Accountability
[email protected]
June 08, 2023
Via Electronic Mail [[email protected]]
Dee Williams-Ridley
2180 Milvia Street, 5th Floor
Berkeley, CA 94704
Re: Request to Postpone Presentation of Automated License Plate Reader Policy
Dear City Manager Williams-Ridley,
I hope this letter finds you well. I am writing to you today in my capacity as the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) and Secretary of the Police Accountability Board (PAB) to request a postponement of the presentation of the Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) policy to the Public Safety Policy Committee until July and to the full Council until after the summer recess .
This request is being made due to a secretarial oversight on my behalf, which unfortunately resulted in a delay in disseminating the proposed policy to the PAB.
While Chief Louis promptly provided the ALPR policy to me as required by the ordinance, I regretfully failed to distribute it to the rest of the Board in a timely manner. I was alerted to this oversight in the Chief’s presentation to the PAB at their regularly scheduled Board meeting on June 8, 2023. They have now received the policy, but as a result of this delay, the Board has been unable to thoroughly review the policy in the contemplated time frame and provide meaningful input to the Berkeley Police Department, Public Safety Committee, and the full Council. I take full responsibility for this oversight and deep ly apologize for any inconvenience caused especially considering the ongoing public safety discussions in the City and the need for solutions to address the various issues being experienced.
Given the importance of the ALPR policy and the need for the Boa rd's comprehensive review, I firmly believe that providing additional time in this instance will benefit both the Department and the community at large. The PAB's meticulous review process and commitment to evidence-based policing will ensure that the policy takes into account a wide range of public safety considerations.
By postponing the presentation, we can ensure that the ALPR policy is the strongest it can be, reflecting the values and concerns of the community we serve. This will ultimately contribut e to the adoption of an effective and transparent policy that upholds civil liberties while promoting public safety.
I kindly request your understanding and support in granting this postponement. We will use the additional time to support the Police Accountability Board in their thorough review and thoughtful feedback.
With this postponement, the Board will have sufficient time to review the ALPR policy and we will be better equipped to present a comprehensive and well -informed recommendatio n to the Police Department, Public Safety Policy Committee, and full Council. This will further facilitate a productive dialogue and enable us to address any concerns or suggestions raised by the Board.
Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I s incerely appreciate your consideration of our request. I can also confirm that because of this incident, I have revised my secretarial processes to ensure that this does not occur in the future. Should you require any additional information or have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to me or our team. We are fully committed to ensuring that the ALPR policy reflects the highest standards of accountability and transparency.
I look forward to your favorable response and the opportunity to work collaboratively on this important policy issue.
Sincerely,
Hansel Alejandro Aguilar
Director of Police Accountability
Cc: Public Safety Committee
Farimah Brown, City Attorney
Anne Cardwell, Deputy City Manager
Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police
Police Accountability Board
Attachments:
Email from Chief Louis dated May 11, 2023 (and resent on June 7, 2023)_Per Surveillance Ordinance _Automated License Plate Reader (APLR) Policies for PAB review
1 Aguilar, Hansel
From: Louis, Jennifer A.
Sent: Wednesday, June 7, 2023 7:18 PM
To: Aguilar, Hansel
Subject: FW: Per Surveillance Ordinance _Automated License Plate Reader (APLR) Policies for PAB review
Attachments: 1305-Surveillance_Use_Policy-Fixed_ALPRs (5-11-23).docx; 422 Automated License Plate Readers Patrol Operations (ALPRs) (5-11-23).docx; Fixed Automated LIcense Plate Reader Acquisition Report(3 rev 5-11-23).docx; 2021-11-30 Item 28 Automated license plate readers for community safety improvement.pdf
Restricted
From: Louis, Jennifer A.
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2023 5:54 PM
To: Aguilar, Hansel <[email protected]>
Cc: Cardwell, Anne <[email protected]>; Durbin, Michael R. <[email protected]>; LeDoux, Joseph <[email protected]>
Subject: Per Surveillance Ordinance _Automated License Plate Reader (APLR) Policies for PAB review
Restricted
Good afternoon Director Aguilar,
Under the direction of a Berkeley City Council Budget referral item regarding Automated License Plate Readers for Community Safety, the department drafted the required Surveillance Ordinance policies. Attached please find the following documents for PAB review:
1. Policy 422 – The policy that will establish guidelines for the Department on the use of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
2. Policy 1305 - The Surveillance Use Policy related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
3. Surveillance Acquisition Report regarding Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
4. Council Budget Referral Item (for background)
Under the Surveillance Ordinance, BMC Section 2.99.030.2, the Police Accountability Board (PAB) has a 30-day deadline “to recommend approval of the policy, object to the proposal, recommend modifications, or take no action.”
These polices are also being sent to the City Attorney’s Office for review and we plan to present on these policies to the Public Safety Policy Committee at their June meeting. Can you please forward these documents to the PAB for review.
I
wanted to get them to your office as soon as the first draft was completed so that the PAB would have ample time for review and feedback. I look forward to hearing back from you and the Board and we are available to answer questions that you or the PAB may have related to Policies 422 or 1305.
Respectfully,
Jen
2 Jen Louis
Chief of Police
Berkeley Police Department
Follow us on:
City Manager’s Office
June 13, 2023
Sent via email: [email protected]
Hansel Alejandro Aguilar
Director of Police Accountability
Office of the Director of Police Accountability
1947 Center St. – 5th floor
Berkeley, CA 94704
Dear Director Aguilar,
I am in receipt of your letter dated June 8, 2023 requesting to postpone the presentation of the Automated License Plate Reader Policy. I spoke with the Chair of the Public Safety Policy Committee, Council Member Taplin, and his desire is to move forward with this item as scheduled. This will be an opportunity for you to hear the department’s presentation in advance of your discussion with the Police Accountability Board.
It is suggested that you plan to attend the next Public Safety Policy Committee meeting on June 20 th, as well as the last City Council meeting on July 25th, when you will have the opportunity to bring forward any ideas and concerns.
If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to Anne Cardwell, Deputy City Manager.
Sincerely,
Dee Williams-Ridley
Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager
cc: Public Safety Policy Committee
Farimah Brown, City Attorney
Anne Cardwell, Deputy City Manager
Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police
Police Accountability Board
Berkeley Police Department
Policy Manual
422 Automated License Plate Readers Patrol Operations (ALPRs) (5-11-23).docx | 1
Policy
422
Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)-
422.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs policy-1305.
422.2 POLICY
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).
422.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest. (b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment.
ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts. (c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.
(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc. (e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
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(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity. 422.4 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Berkeley Police D epartment to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect apprehension and stolen property recovery.
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day -to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.
422.4.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Division Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, communication operators, records clerks, parking enforcement officers, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.
(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users. (c) ALPR system monitor ing to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.
(d) Ensuring procedures are followed for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.
(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation. (f) Working with the Custodian of Records, or vendor on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the City’s website.
422.5 OPERATIONS
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil
422 Automated License Plate Readers Patrol Operations (ALPRs) (5-11-23).docx | 3
Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle.
Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MD T or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.) (f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).
(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license
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plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle. (3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).
(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.
(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator. (6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate super visor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.
All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call (g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.
Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).
2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
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3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. 422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
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Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.
422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means.
The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. I f transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions). (e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.
(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy. 422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS
It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department
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will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above- authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding 24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.6(e).
The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting.
422.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.
(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.
(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.
ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials. 422.10 TRAINING
The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53
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Berkeley Police Department
Law Enforcement Services Manual
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs
1305.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.
Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of the Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Use Policy -422.
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).
1305.2 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest. (b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize A LPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.
(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.
(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc. (e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
Policy
1305
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(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.
1305.3 AUTHORIZED AND PROHIBITED USES
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). (a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)
(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
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(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).
(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.
(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit). (4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.
(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.
(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system.
The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.
All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call (g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.
Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible
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from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).
2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, politi cal affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.
1305.4 DATA COLLECTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.
Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report.
Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
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Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.
1305.5 DATA ACCESS
(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(b) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. (c) If practical, an operator should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.
1305.6 DATA PROTECTION
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All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password- protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52). (c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department - related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions). (e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question. (f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes. (h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.
1305.7 CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS PROTECTION
The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures described within this policy (Data Access, Data Protection, Data Retention, Public Access and Third-Party Data Sharing) protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR data. These policies ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
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1305.8 DATA RETENTION
All ALPR data belongs to the Department. All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.
Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report.
Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
1305.9 PUBLIC ACCESS
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department.
Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
The Department shall to the extent feasible aim to offer a transparency portal wherein the number of scans, hits, and queries is available to the public in real-time, or as near as real- time as feasible. All data shall be reported in the Annual Surveillance Technology Report.
1305.10 THIRD PARTY DATA-SHARING
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.
(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.
(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.
ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.
1305.11 TRAINING
Training for the operation of ALPR Technology shall be provided by BPD personnel. All BPD
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employees who utilize ALPR Technology shall be provided a copy of this Surveillance Use Policy.
1305.12 AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT
ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biannually. The data from the fixed ALPRs shall be reported annually in the Surveillance Technology Report.
1305.13 MAINTENANCE
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain or his or her designee. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. Equipment maintenance shall be provided by the vendor.
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS
1 FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR)
A. DESCRIPTION
Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras systems with software designed for license plate recognition. The camera systems are typically mounted on street poles, street lights, and highway overpasses.
ALPRs are designed to capture license plate numbers which come into view, along with the location, date and time. The data, which includes an image of the front or the back of the car displaying the license plate, is then uploaded to a central server operated by the vendor. The license plate data is cross referenced with systems such as Stolen Vehicle Systems (SVS), and other lists like Amber alerts to notice police of vehicles with hits.
This technology does not have facial recognition, and is not tied to any personal identifying information or used for traffic enforcement.
B. PURPOSE
Berkeley Police Department will utilize a network of fixed automated license plate readers. The ALPRs will be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right-of-way agreement has been established.
The use of ALPRs to alert police of a wanted or vehicle of interest entering into their respective jurisdiction has become increasingly more commonplace. This technology is being utilized on our local freeways, bridges, and in some instances in private parking lots.
Berkeley Police Department investigators have identified the following instances wherein the use of an effective deployment of ALPRs could have aided the Berkeley Police Department in it’s efforts to focus on the wanted vehicle prior to a crime occurring in the City of Berkeley, and potentially avoided an instance of victimization from happening.
RECENT CASES OF INTEREST
1.) BPD had an armed robbery in which the victim was pistol-whipped. The suspects fled in a vehicle. BPD officers located the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. The license plate on the vehicle was reported as a wanted vehicle for an armed robbery in San Ramon. Had this vehicle entered the City of Berkeley, and the vehicle passed an ALPR- BPD Officers could have been focused on finding this offender in an advance of this violent robbery.
2.) Victim was carjacked of his Toyota Rav-4. The suspect vehicle two days later was used in a murder that occurred in a nearby East Bay City. This same vehicle was used in a robbery in Oakland. The stolen property in the Oakland robbery was tracked back into Berkeley. Then this same vehicle was used to commit a robbery in Berkeley at Woolsey
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS
2 and Telegraph. The vehicle was listed as a car-jacking vehicle from the initial crime, ALPRs could have alerted BPD prior to the property being discarded in Berkeley, as well as the final robbery listed in this synopsis.
3.) Home invasion robbery in Berkeley wherein the suspect came in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS as a wanted vehicle. The suspect violently attacked the resident. The suspect was arrested shortly after in San Pablo due to an ALPR hit. Suspect was unknown but identified due to having the victims stolen property.
4.) An armed robbery occurred in Berkeley the suspects fled in a cold plated stolen vehicle, meaning the vehicle was listed as wanted in SVS. San Pablo PD stopped the suspect vehicle due to the want associated to the license plate. Suspect was arrested and was in possession of a firearm. Suspect was eventually also linked to a stranger sexual assault case.
5.) A robbery of Valero in Berkeley occurred. The suspect arrived in stolen vehicle. The suspect was subsequently arrested by San Mateo PD due to an ALPR hit.
6.) A Victim called BPD to report his carjacked/stolen vehicle (from Union City), was tracking in South Berkeley. The victim was originally carjacked via gun by a group of suspects in Union City a few days prior. Moreover, Officers responded to South Berkeley but were unable to locate the victim’s vehicle. The victim later tracked his carjacked/stolen vehicle to 1370 University Ave. Officers responded to this location and located the victim’s vehicle. Three juveniles and one adult fled from the vehicle but were captured by the Officers. A search of the vehicle yielded a concealed/loaded firearm.
CATALYTIC CONVERTER THEFTS WITH GUNFIRE
7.) A theft of a catalytic converter took place at 5
th and Hearst. The suspect vehicle’s
license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. San Pablo PD located the vehicle using their ALPR system and arrested the driver who was in possession of a loaded handgun.
8.) A catalytic converter theft occurred at 145 Hillcrest Road. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. Pinole PD located the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, BPD located an assault rifle (ghost gun) and arrested the suspect.
9.) A pickup truck, wanted in SVS due to it being reported as a stolen vehicle, entered Berkeley. The aforementioned was caught in the act of cutting a catalytic converter
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3 from a vehicle on the 1800 block of 4th Street. Witnesses and a Security guard confronted the suspects. The suspects fled, and then immediately returned to shoot at the witness and security guard.
PROPERTY CRIME
10.) An auto burglary occurred at 1316 San Pablo Avenue and the victim obtained a license plate. A felony entry was made on the license plate. Pittsburg PD located the suspect vehicle due to an ALPR hit. The vehicle failed to yield and crashed. The driver was arrested for the failure to yield and Pittsburg PD located a loaded handgun in her purse.
11.) A suspect drove into Berkeley in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS. The suspect drove to the driveway of 1626 Berkeley Way and proceeded to steal that resident’s vehicle.
12.) Two suspects drove a reported stolen auto to Berkeley Bowl West. The suspects then burglarized a victim’s vehicle. The suspect then proceeded to Emeryville where they used the Victim’s identity to commit identity theft.
13.) A series of auto burglaries were committed in the area of San Pablo and Gilman.
The suspects were seen getting into a vehicle which was listed in SVS as a stolen vehicle.
Two days later a nearby city reported the same vehicle was used in a murder in that city.
ALPR system could have notified officers of that wanted vehicle and helped in the capture of the suspects, and potentially intervened before the subsequent murder.
HOMICIDE
14.) Another agency reported a vehicle used in a murder, with a known license plate was entered into SVS with a felony want (associated with a murder). On 08/02/22 the vehicle was located in Berkeley. The associated suspects were located after fleeing from officers.
15.) BPD officers responded to a report of a person casing a house. Upon their arrival the suspects fled in a white sedan. That sedan was determined to be a reported stolen auto. The sedan fled from officers after they activated their emergency lights and sirens.
The same vehicle was reported to be involved in a road rage incident in an adjacent city wherein the suspects shot and killed the victim on the freeway.
SEX/DV CRIMES
16.) This is a DV case in which the suspect fought with his adult girlfriend causing visible injury and then chased his girlfriend’s 12 year old daughter down the street and shot at
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BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS
4 her with a firearm. San Pablo PD had an ALPR hit from this Berkeley PD case. The suspect ran from San Pablo PD and a gun was recovered from him.
17.) This is a series of peeping and prowling incidents against female UC Berkeley students. The suspect was driving for a ride share service and was in and out of Berkeley for the several months. The suspect was homeless, and thereby conventional methods of locating the suspect weren’t fruitful.
C. LOCATION
BPD proposes to install 52 fixed ALPRs in the City of Berkeley. While the cameras are permanent installations, if found ineffective in the installed location, the Department can elect to move the camera to another location at nominal cost. It’s preferred to leave cameras installed in locations for periods of minimally a year. Locations will be determined using crime data, known locations of ingress or egress into the City of Berkeley, and commonly known direction of travel after criminal acts based on information provided from investigators. The Department will balance the need to deploy the camera systems equitably across the City of Berkeley with the need to deploy the cameras in an effective manner. BPD will solicit input from the vendor for an effective deployment.
D. IMPACT
The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures utilized with ALPR Units will help to ensure unauthorized use of its data. The procedures will ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
E. MITIGATION
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means which are implemented to safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (D). See subsection (G) for further.
F. DATA TYPES AND SOURCES
Images of license plates and location metadata may be obtained through the use of ALPR cameras.
The vendor’s system may have searching capabilities due to technology from machine learning
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5 that allow officers to search by vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, bumper sticker (the presence of a bumper sticker, not the image or content), decals (again the presence of a decal, not the image or content) and roof racks. All data stored in the vendor’s servers shall be securely protected with end-to-end encryption.
G. DATA SECURITY
BPD takes data security seriously. All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALP R data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager.
(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.
(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.
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6 H. FISCAL COST
Since the City of Berkeley has not acquired the specific cameras, the costs can only be estimated. BPD expects the individual camera costs to range from $2500-$5000 each, with the installation to vary. BPD believes that for the proposed 52 camera deployment the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $250,000. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to range from $125,000 to $175,000 a year.
I. THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCE AND ACCESS
ALPR vendor would store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The vendor will purge their data at the end of 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule (i.e. if detectives establish a hit results in evidentiary value it should be incorporated into the digital evidence of that specific case, and thereby would be kept longer than the aforementioned 30 days).
Restrictions on use of fixed ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the Vendor will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose unless allowed by policy (i.e. metadata will be permissible use for annual surveillance reporting).
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department.
Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
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BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS
7 (1) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment). (2) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
(3) Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
(4) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
(5) First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law. (a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).
(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
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8 J. ALTERNATIVES
An alternative is the deployment of additional police resources. The inherent problems with this alternative is that it is difficult to hire and train additional police officers and the cost would be significantly higher than adding technology. Furthermore, this technology furthers the Department’s goal in protecting and safeguarding our community through precision based policing strategies.
K. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER ENTITIES
Currently, in Alameda County, the following cities have ALPR programs, The Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Alameda PD, Emeryville PD, Fremont PD, Hayward PD, Livermore PD, Newark PD, Oakland PD, Piedmont PD, Pleasanton PD, San Leandro PD, Union City PD, and the California Highway Patrol. The only agency in Alameda County to not utilize ALPRs is Albany PD.
Representatives from Newark indicated success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
Representatives from indicated similar to the above, success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
Berkeley Police Department
Policy Manual
422 Automated License Plate Readers Patrol Operations (ALPRs) (7-5-23).docx | 1
Policy
422
Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)-
422.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs policy-1305. 422.2 POLICY
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).
422.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest. (b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment.
ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts. (c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.
(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc. (e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
Attachment 3
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(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity. 422.4 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Berkeley Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect apprehension and stolen property recovery.
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.
422.4.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Division Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, communication operators, records clerks, parking enforcement officers, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.
(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users. (c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.
(d) Ensuring procedures are followed for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.
(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation. (f) Working with the Custodian of Records, or vendor on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the City’s website.
422.5 OPERATIONS
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil
422 Automated License Plate Readers Patrol Operations (ALPRs) (7-5-23).docx | 3
Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR database.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(e) If practicablefeasible, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle.
Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch.
(e)(f) Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)
(f)(g) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).
(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number
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captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle. (3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).
(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.
(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator. (6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.
All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call (g)(h) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.
Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate California law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).
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2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
(i) Anyone who intentionally engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may shall be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (j) Anyone who negligently engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. 422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
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ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate California law enforcement or public safety purposes.
422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means.
The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate California law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions). (e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.
(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate California law enforcement purposes.
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(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy. 422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS
It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above- authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding 24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.6(e).
The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting. 422.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law. (a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter. (b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.
422.10 &
ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials. 422.10 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
Any ALPR data or images that are utilized for an investigation that becomes evidence in a case will be made available to the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) as it relates to a specific complaint of misconduct. Additionally, the results of any audits will be shared with the ODPA upon their completion.
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422.10422.11 TRAINING
The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/04/14, All Rights Reserved.
Published with permission by Berkeley Police Department ***DRAFT*** Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs - 1
Berkeley Police Department
Law Enforcement Services Manual
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs
1305.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.
Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of the Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Use Policy -422.
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).
1305.2 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest. (b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.
(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.
(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc. (e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
Policy
1305
Attachment 4
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(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.
1305.3 AUTHORIZED AND PROHIBITED USES
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). (a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR database.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(e) If practicablefeasible, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. (e)(f) Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)
(f)(g) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
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(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).
(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.
(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit). (4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.
(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.
(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system.
The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.
All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call (g)(h) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.
Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate California law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible
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from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).
2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
(i) Anyone who intentionally engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may shall be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. (j) Anyone who negligently engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. 1305.4 DATA COLLECTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration. Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.
All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining
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any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.
Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report.
Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate California law enforcement or public safety purposes.
1305.5 DATA ACCESS
(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(b) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. (c) If practical, an operator should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.
1305.6 DATA PROTECTION
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All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52). (c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate California law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions). (e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question. (f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate California law enforcement purposes. (h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy. 1305.7 CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS PROTECTION
The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures described within this policy (Data Access, Data Protection, Data Retention, Public Access and Third-Party Data Sharing) protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR data. These policies ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
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1305.8 DATA RETENTION
All ALPR data belongs to the Department. All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.
Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report.
Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines. 1305.9 PUBLIC ACCESS
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department.
Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
The Department shall to the extent feasible aim to offer a transparency portal wherein the number of scans, hits, and queries is available to the public in real-time, or as near as real- time as feasible. All data shall be reported in the Annual Surveillance Technology Report. 1305.10 THIRD PARTY DATA-SHARING
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law. (a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.
(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55). (c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.
ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials. 1305.11 TRAINING
Training for the operation of ALPR Technology shall be provided by BPD personnel. All BPD
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employees who utilize ALPR Technology shall be provided a copy of this Surveillance Use Policy.
1305.12 AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT
ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biannually. The data from the fixed ALPRs shall be reported annually in the Surveillance Technology Report.
Any ALPR data or images that are utilized for an investigation that becomes evidence in a case will be made available to the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) as it relates to a specific complaint of misconduct. Additionally, the results of any audits will be shared with the ODPA upon their completion.
1305.13 MAINTENANCE
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain or his or her designee. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. Equipment maintenance shall be provided by the vendor.
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 1 FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR)
A. DESCRIPTION
Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras systems with software designed for license plate recognition. The camera systems are typically mounted on street poles, street lights, and highway overpasses.
ALPRs are designed to capture license plate numbers which come into view, along with the location, date and time. The data, which includes an image of the front or the back of the car displaying the license plate, is then uploaded to a central server operated by the vendor. The license plate data is cross referenced with systems such as Stolen Vehicle Systems (SVS), and other lists like Amber alerts to notice police of vehicles with hits.
This technology does not have facial recognition, and is not tied to any personal identifying information or used for traffic enforcement.
B. PURPOSE
Berkeley Police Department will utilize a network of fixed automated license plate readers. The ALPRs will be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right-of-way agreement has been established.
The use of ALPRs to alert police of a wanted or vehicle of interest entering into their respective jurisdiction has become increasingly more commonplace. This technology is being utilized on our local freeways, bridges, and in some instances in private parking lots.
Berkeley Police Department investigators have identified the following instances wherein the use of an effective deployment of ALPRs could have aided the Berkeley Police Department in it’s efforts to focus on the wanted vehicle prior to a crime occurring in the City of Berkeley, and potentially avoided an instance of victimization from happening.
RECENT CASES OF INTEREST
1.) BPD had an armed robbery in which the victim was pistol-whipped. The suspects fled in a vehicle. BPD officers located the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. The license plate on the vehicle was reported as a wanted vehicle for an armed robbery in San Ramon. Had this vehicle entered the City of Berkeley, and the vehicle passed an ALPR- BPD Officers could have been focused on finding this offender in an advance of this violent robbery.
2.) Victim was carjacked of his Toyota Rav-4. The suspect vehicle two days later was used in a murder that occurred in a nearby East Bay City. This same vehicle was used in a robbery in Oakland. The stolen property in the Oakland robbery was tracked back into Berkeley. Then this same vehicle was used to commit a robbery in Berkeley at Woolsey Attachment 5
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 2 and Telegraph. The vehicle was listed as a car-jacking vehicle from the initial crime, ALPRs could have alerted BPD prior to the property being discarded in Berkeley, as well as the final robbery listed in this synopsis.
3.) Home invasion robbery in Berkeley wherein the suspect came in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS as a wanted vehicle. The suspect violently attacked the resident. The suspect was arrested shortly after in San Pablo due to an ALPR hit. Suspect was unknown but identified due to having the victims stolen property.
4.) An armed robbery occurred in Berkeley the suspects fled in a cold plated stolen vehicle, meaning the vehicle was listed as wanted in SVS. San Pablo PD stopped the suspect vehicle due to the want associated to the license plate. Suspect was arrested and was in possession of a firearm. Suspect was eventually also linked to a stranger sexual assault case.
5.) A robbery of Valero in Berkeley occurred. The suspect arrived in stolen vehicle. The suspect was subsequently arrested by San Mateo PD due to an ALPR hit.
6.) A Victim called BPD to report his carjacked/stolen vehicle (from Union City), was tracking in South Berkeley. The victim was originally carjacked via gun by a group of suspects in Union City a few days prior. Moreover, Officers responded to South Berkeley but were unable to locate the victim’s vehicle. The victim later tracked his carjacked/stolen vehicle to 1370 University Ave. Officers responded to this location and located the victim’s vehicle. Three juveniles and one adult fled from the vehicle but were captured by the Officers. A search of the vehicle yielded a concealed/loaded firearm.
CATALYTIC CONVERTER THEFTS WITH GUNFIRE
7.) A theft of a catalytic converter took place at 5th and Hearst. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. San Pablo PD located the vehicle using their ALPR system and arrested the driver who was in possession of a loaded handgun.
8.) A catalytic converter theft occurred at 145 Hillcrest Road. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. Pinole PD located the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, BPD located an assault rifle (ghost gun) and arrested the suspect.
9.) A pickup truck, wanted in SVS due to it being reported as a stolen vehicle, entered Berkeley. The aforementioned was caught in the act of cutting a catalytic converter
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 3 from a vehicle on the 1800 block of 4th Street. Witnesses and a Security guard confronted the suspects. The suspects fled, and then immediately returned to shoot at the witness and security guard.
PROPERTY CRIME
10.) An auto burglary occurred at 1316 San Pablo Avenue and the victim obtained a license plate. A felony entry was made on the license plate. Pittsburg PD located the suspect vehicle due to an ALPR hit. The vehicle failed to yield and crashed. The driver was arrested for the failure to yield and Pittsburg PD located a loaded handgun in her purse.
11.) A suspect drove into Berkeley in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS. The suspect drove to the driveway of 1626 Berkeley Way and proceeded to steal that resident’s vehicle.
12.) Two suspects drove a reported stolen auto to Berkeley Bowl West. The suspects then burglarized a victim’s vehicle. The suspect then proceeded to Emeryville where they used the Victim’s identity to commit identity theft.
13.) A series of auto burglaries were committed in the area of San Pablo and Gilman.
The suspects were seen getting into a vehicle which was listed in SVS as a stolen vehicle.
Two days later a nearby city reported the same vehicle was used in a murder in that city.
ALPR system could have notified officers of that wanted vehicle and helped in the capture of the suspects, and potentially intervened before the subsequent murder.
HOMICIDE
14.) Another agency reported a vehicle used in a murder, with a known license plate was entered into SVS with a felony want (associated with a murder). On 08/02/22 the vehicle was located in Berkeley. The associated suspects were located after fleeing from officers.
15.) BPD officers responded to a report of a person casing a house. Upon their arrival the suspects fled in a white sedan. That sedan was determined to be a reported stolen auto. The sedan fled from officers after they activated their emergency lights and sirens.
The same vehicle was reported to be involved in a road rage incident in an adjacent city wherein the suspects shot and killed the victim on the freeway.
SEX/DV CRIMES
16.) This is a DV case in which the suspect fought with his adult girlfriend causing visible injury and then chased his girlfriend’s 12 year old daughter down the street and shot at
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 4 her with a firearm. San Pablo PD had an ALPR hit from this Berkeley PD case. The suspect ran from San Pablo PD and a gun was recovered from him.
17.) This is a series of peeping and prowling incidents against female UC Berkeley students. The suspect was driving for a ride share service and was in and out of Berkeley for the several months. The suspect was homeless, and thereby conventional methods of locating the suspect weren’t fruitful.
C. LOCATION
BPD proposes to install 52 fixed ALPRs in the City of Berkeley. While the cameras are permanent installations, if found ineffective in the installed location, the Department can elect to move the camera to another location at nominal cost. It’s preferred to leave cameras installed in locations for periods of minimally a year. Locations will be determined using crime data, known locations of ingress or egress into the City of Berkeley, and commonly known direction of travel after criminal acts based on information provided from investigators. The Department will balance the need to deploy the camera systems equitably across the City of Berkeley with the need to deploy the cameras in an effective manner. BPD will solicit input from the vendor for an effective deployment.
D. IMPACT
The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures utilized with ALPR Units will help to ensure unauthorized use of its data. The procedures will ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
E. MITIGATION
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means which are implemented to safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (D). See subsection (G) for further.
F. DATA TYPES AND SOURCES
Images of license plates and location metadata may be obtained through the use of ALPR cameras.
The vendor’s system may have searching capabilities due to technology from machine learning
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 5 that allow officers to search by vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, bumper sticker (the presence of a bumper sticker, not the image or content), decals (again the presence of a decal, not the image or content) and roof racks. All data stored in the vendor’s servers shall be securely protected with end-to-end encryption.
G. DATA SECURITY
BPD takes data security seriously. All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.
(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager.
(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.
(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial. (g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 6 H. FISCAL COST
Since the City of Berkeley has not acquired the specific cameras, the costs can only be estimated. BPD expects the individual camera costs to range from $2500-$5000 each, with the installation to vary. BPD believes that for the proposed 52 camera deployment the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $250,000. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to range from $125,000 to $175,000 a year.
I. THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCE AND ACCESS
ALPR vendor would store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The vendor will purge their data at the end of 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule (i.e. if detectives establish a hit results in evidentiary value it should be incorporated into the digital evidence of that specific case, and thereby would be kept longer than the aforementioned 30 days).
Restrictions on use of fixed ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the Vendor will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose unless allowed by policy (i.e. metadata will be permissible use for annual surveillance reporting).
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department.
Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
(1) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 7 those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment). (2) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
(3) Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.
(4) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
(5) First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law. (a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).
(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
J. ALTERNATIVES
An alternative is the deployment of additional police resources. The inherent problems with this alternative is that it is difficult to hire and train additional police officers and the cost would be
1305 APPENDIX A
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 8 significantly higher than adding technology. Furthermore, this technology furthers the Department’s goal in protecting and safeguarding our community through precision based policing strategies.
K. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER ENTITIES
Currently, in Alameda County, the following cities have ALPR programs, The Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Alameda PD, Emeryville PD, Fremont PD, Hayward PD, Livermore PD, Newark PD, Oakland PD, Piedmont PD, Pleasanton PD, San Leandro PD, Union City PD, and the California Highway Patrol. The only agency in Alameda County to not utilize ALPRs is Albany PD.
Representatives from Newark indicated success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
Representatives from indicated similar to the above, success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
Office of the City Manager
2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7000 ● TDD: (510) 981-6903 ● Fax: (510) 981-7099 E-Mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.CityofBerkeley.info/Manager July 25th, 2023
To: Honorable Mayor and City Council Members
From: Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager
Submitted by: Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police
Subject: Response to the PAB Objections and PSPC on Surveillance Ordinance item related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
The Berkeley Police Department received feedback regarding the proposed policies from the Police Accountability Board at an ad hoc PAB meeting on 6/16/23 and the Public Safety Policy Committee meeting on 6/20/23. The purpose of this memorandum is to address those concerns.
On June 16, 2023, Chief Louis received via electronic mail an Objection to the Berkeley Police Department Surveillance Acquisition Report – Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) and Proposed Policies 422 and 1305 from PAB Chair John “Chip” Moore. That document listed four primary concerns with eight subsections that are restated and addressed below.
1.) Civil Liberties Protections: The proposed acquisition report and policies need to provide stronger safeguards and assurances for protecting civil liberties and privacy rights. It is essential to ensure that the acquisition and use of ALPRs do not infringe upon the rights of individuals in our community. For example:
a. One PAB member expressed concerns that the acquisition report or the policies don’t provide safeguards for this surveillance technology or its data being used in a way that could run afoul of reproductive rights by recording movements or location patterns of individuals seeking medical attention or health services for reproductive rights.
BPD Response:
At the recommendation of a PAB Member on 6/20/23, the Department has modified the language to include “California” law enforcement purposes to address this concern. The policy was changed from “legitimate law enforcement purposes” to “legitimate California law enforcement purposes” b. The PAB stated concern that the Department indicates “Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR”, but provides no clear Attachment 6
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
examples of a scenario where the technology may be required to be used without reaching these important legal thresholds.
BPD Response:
ALPR is a tool that assists law enforcement in several manners. First, it is proactive by alerting patrol officers when a wanted vehicle passes through an intersection that is equipped with an ALPR. Additionally, as the Department shared in both the PAB subcommittee meeting on 6/16/23 and the PSPC meeting on 6/20/23, ALPR also has a second use as a potential to aid in developing probable cause. An example of this use would be if a shooting occurred at Sacramento and Ashby with a white vehicle fleeing. The use of an ALPR could further the detective’s ability to establish probable cause and further an investigation. Additionally, officers investigating missing person cases would be able to add a vehicle license plate to the missing person report, but not every missing person case would have probable cause or reasonable suspicion as it’s not necessarily a crime.
Furthermore, in a PAB meeting, it was clarified that in this language that the PAB cites(from Policy 422.5(b) and 1305.3(b)) the Department has added Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR database.
This further refines the point that this applies to the database. It was not intended to mislead that an enforcement stop could be conducted outside of the constitutionally guided authority.
c. There appears to be unclear language about retention periods. In one section the Department indicates, “The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage.” Then, the Department includes seemingly contradictory language in its policy: “However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.” (see Section 1305.4 of the proposed policy).
BPD Response:
This language indicates that any ALPR hit that becomes part of a case would be downloaded into the digital evidence repository and subject to the pre- established retention guidelines for evidence pursuant to BPD Policy 804 Records Release Management.
2) Lack of Empirical Support or Data justifying the need or its intended use: We have noted a lack of empirical evidence or data demonstrating the effectiveness of the technology in achieving its intended goals here in the City of Berkeley. While the PAB is aware the BPD has reported an increase in crime in specific categories over the years, comparable jurisdictions with or without this technology have not been analyzed to
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
determine potential effectiveness for those crime categories. Before moving forward with the acquisition, it is crucial to have solid evidence that ALPRs will significantly contribute to solving criminal investigations and enhancing public safety beyond the highlighted cases the Department cites in the Acquisition Report. a. The ODPA’s report cited the IACP (2022) survey3 which indicated, “Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime.” However, the Acquisition Report fails to adequately provide a data-based justification for why the City of Berkeley needs to adopt this technology.
BPD Response:
The Department has brought forth this item in response to a City Council Budget Referral Item. However, in 2020 Berkeley Police reported to the FBI a total of 805 vehicle thefts. As of 6/20/23, in the past 180 days, Berkeley Police had 704 reported vehicle thefts. This data indicates that for the first half of 2023, the City has reached 87% of vehicle thefts for the entire year of 2020. If that trend continues that could lead to a 74% increase in vehicle thefts. According to a record management query, BPD year to date has noted the loss in vehicle thefts for the City of Berkeley (only those reported to BPD, not including BART, or UCPD-Berkeley as of 6/26/23) is $1,949,386 in losses just from the vehicles; which does not include lost wages, or emotional losses. b. As noted in the ODPA report, as currently written, the Purpose section of the BPD’s Acquisition Report does not explicitly mention a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs (beyond the highlighted cases of interest). To strengthen the justification for the acquisition, the BPD needs to provide statistical analyses (or other data analyses) demonstrating the effectiveness of ALPRs in reducing the specific crime problems the City would like to resolve.
BPD Response:
The item was drafted in response to a City Council Budget referral. However, as it relates to effectiveness, it’s difficult to empirically capture the expected effectiveness though the Department expects there to be both a deterrent effect as well as a direct measurable impact. While some cities like Alameda have few entrances and exits to the city via roadway, Berkeley has several dozens of roadways that enter and exit our neighboring cities. BPD is not recommending tracking all of those avenues but rather focuses on the main corridors with the limited number of cameras proposed. BPD is proposing in this item a two-year trial period wherein the data can be tracked in the Annual STO report. At the end of the trial period City Council will ultimately decide on the extent of continued use.
3) Concerns about True Financial Costs: The PAB has concerns about the true costs
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
associated with the technology, including potential hidden costs, maintenance expenses, and long-term financial commitments. It is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the financial implications and ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs.
BPD Response:
BPD is confident in our ask for Council authority as outlined in section H of the Acquisition Report, where BPD indicates that the initial cost is not to exceed $250,000 and that the annual subscription cost is not to exceed $175,000 a year based on the current costs. This is an all-inclusive cost as the equipment is leased, and all maintenance is assumed by the vendor.
4) Lack of Completeness of the Acquisition Report and Proposed Policies: The proposed policies require further clarity, elaboration, and editing. Particularly, the Department should clearly outline the intended uses of the data, retention periods, access controls, and measures to protect against potential misuse or unauthorized access (to include more information about minimum training requirements for the users of the technology). For example:
a. The PAB stated that in the proposed policies, the Department uses language to emphasize the importance of data privacy, protection of civil liberties, and accountability but has a weak approach to misuse in Section 422.5 of the proposed policy, “ Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.” (emphasis added). Adherence to the policy needs to be nonnegotiable, therefore the Department needs to modify the language to indicate that impermissible uses SHALL be subject to administrative sanctions.
BPD Response:
BPD proposes the following edit as discussed at PSPC on 6/20/23:
Anyone who intentionally engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists shall be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.
Anyone who negligently engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
b. Section 422.10 of the proposed policy mentions the requirement for training but does not specify what that will look like. As noted in the ODPA report, the BPD should outline the minimum training requirements provided to officers on the proper use of ALPRs and adherence to privacy and civil rights standards.
BPD Response:
Training is offered by FLOCK upon entering into a contract. The training will cover the use of the technology, equipment, and policy. BPD will help in the creation of robust training to ensure officers are able to properly and lawfully utilize the ALPRs upon Council approval.
c. Without clear articulation of the minimum training requirements, the Board has concerns regarding Sections 422.5 and 1305.3 of the proposed policies which encapsulate conditions for use, standards to be observed for various circumstances (stop of car vs. stop of person for example) and required verification before certain activities can be taken.
BPD Response:
The Department does not anticipate the use of ALPRs to lead to stops of persons, also referred to as pedestrian stops. However, as explained at the PAB meeting on 06/27/23, nothing changes the legal parameters that guide the permissibility of detentions.
As with any new or updated policy issued by the Department, an appropriate training plan will be developed to ensure personnel are aware of how to use technology and the policy that guides its use. For this technology, training will be provided by the vendor. It’s premature to develop a training plan in advance of Council approval, and without knowing the vendor for certain. If the vendor is Flock they offer a training program which will be made available on the Department’s Website. As for concern for adherence to the policy, all policy violations are enforced pursuant to Policy 1010. Regardless of training, no officer can use the system without acknowledging the policy and understanding the consequences of policy violations.
OTHER CONCERNS ADDRESSED:
PAB reviewing ALPR data
PAB/DPA sought language added to the policy to codify their ability to review materials related to the ALPR system.
BPD Response:
The Department has included the following language in the policy (422.10 & 1305.12):
Office of the Director of Police Accountability
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
Any ALPR data or images that are utilized for an investigation that becomes evidence in a case will be made available to the ODPA as it relates to a specific complaint of misconduct. Additionally, the results of any audits will be shared with the ODPA upon their completion.
A member asked about Berkeley’s Stolen Vehicle trends
BPD Response:
According to BPD Law Enforcement Records Management System (VC 10851 – vehicle theft) According to BPD Law Enforcement Records Management System (PC 215 – Car-jacking)
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
A member asked about other nearby agencies utilizing ALPR’s and any data as to the effectiveness.
BPD Response:
# of
ALPR
Population
2021
Annual
Auto
Thefts-
2020 FBI
UCR
Cameras
per
#persons
BART 100
Piedmont 34 11,107 67 1:326
El Cerrito 40 25,845 105 1:646
Hercules 25 26,091 39 1:1043
Benicia 45 26,819 48 1:596
San Pablo 84 31,773 306 1:378
UC Berkeley 45,057 38
Alameda (City) 35 76,362 470 1:2181
Richmond 40 115,639 1,511 1:2890
BERKELEY *52 117,145 805 1:2252
Concord 65 124,074 695 1:1908
Vallejo 98 124,886 1,067 1:1274
ODPA Mitigation and Data Security
While the Department indicates that it will safeguard and protect data through procedural and technological means, Policy 1305 should be strengthened to reflect this commitment. Specifically, the BPD should consider revising 1305.4 Data Collection in the following manner:
BPD Response:
Current Language: The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into its digital evidence repository through secure integration.
Suggested Language: Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.
The Department accepted this suggested language as proposed.
ODPA -Third Party Dependencies.
The ODPA asserts concern that the use of ALPRs may lead to racial disparities.
BPD Response:
The Department does not anticipate the placement of ALPR may yield racial disparities.
The cameras capture objective evidence and provide objective results or notifications.
SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS
This technology further supports the Department’s goal of providing precision-based policing. The Department believes this technology furthers the goal of reducing racial disparities by leveraging objective evidence.
The Department would also like to advise the Council that California legislatures currently have AB 1463 which would restrict retention periods, require annual audits, and prohibit out-of-state sharing without a valid subpoena, court order, or warrant. This legislation is pending further approval.
On 6/20/23 at the direction of the Public Safety Policy Committee, the Department agreed to submit an off-agenda item with the placement of the ALPRs pending the Council’s approval of the item.
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS
None identified.
CONTACT PERSON
Captain Mike Durbin, Police, Professional Standards Division (510) 981-5760
1947 Center Street, 5th Floor Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-4950 ● TDD: (510) 981-6903 ● E-Mail: [email protected] Website: https://berkeleyca.gov/safety-health/police-accountability
TIME CRITICAL
AGENDA MATERIAL
Meeting Date: July 25, 2023
Item Description: Police Accountability Board (PAB) response to # 38.
Surveillance Ordinance items related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Berkeley Municipal Code 2.99 “Acquisit ion and Use of Surveillance Technology” requires that the City Manager present a Surveillance Use Policy for each Surveillance Technology to the Police Review Commission1 before City Council adoption. The Police Accountability Board (PAB) must receive the corresponding Surveillance Acquisition Report presented to the Council for that Surveillance Technology. Within 30 days of receiving a Surveillance Use Policy for review, the Police Review Commission must vote to recommend approval, object to the proposal, recommend modifications, or take no action.
To this end, on May 11, 2023, Berkeley Police Department Chief Louis presented the PAB with the proposed acquisition report and Policy 42 2 and Policy 1305 —the proposed ALPR policies . On June 15, 2023 , the ODPA provides a report to the PAB titled “Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) in the City of Ber keley: A Preliminary Review of Proposed BPD Policies by the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) Submitted to the Police Accountability Board (PAB)” . On June 16, 2023 , the PAB held a special meeting to discuss the proposed ALPR policies. The PAB voted to object to the acquisition report and proposed policies as presented. Subsequently, on that day, the PAB sent an objection letter to the BPD and City Council.
On June 20, 2023, the Public Safety Policy Committee held a special meeting to discuss the ALPR policies. The committee voted to send a qualified positive to the City Council on the condition that the PAB and BPD work to address the concerns of the PAB. On June 27, 2023, PAB Chair Moore, Board Member Wilson, Sgt. Ledoux, and ODPA Staff met to discuss the concerns of the PAB as articulated in the objection letter. On July 6, 2023, the BPD provide d the PAB with the updated policies : the ALPR documents (proposed redline versions of the policies); and a memo prepared at the request of the Public Safety Policy Committee, responding to the concerns raised by the DPA/PAB.
There was no change to the previously submitted Acquisition Report.
1 * - BMC 2.99 currently references the predecessor agency the Police Review Commissio n (PRC). The PAB has assumed all duties and responsibilities of the PRC.
Public
On July 6, 2023, the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) held a virtual community in put session to s olicit further community in put to present to the Board .
During the session, ODPA staff provided the community an informative overview of various topics, including BMC 2.99 - Acquisition and Use of Sur veillance Technology, BPD's Acquisition, Report for ALPRs, BPD's proposed Surveillance Use Policy, BPD's proposed Training and Operational Policy, Council Legislative History on ALPR, and the initial position of the Police Accountability Board (PAB) regarding these policies.
The PAB is in the pro cess of reviewing the updated policies and further discuss their stance on ALPRs at their regularly scheduled July 12, 2023, meeting. On July 25, 2023, the BPD will present its acquisition report and use policies to the full City Council.
The DPA, in capacity of Secretary to the Board, respectfully requests that the Policy Committee of the City Council allow for the July 25, 2023, to include an agenda item following the presentation of # 38. Surveillance Ordinance items related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). A proposed title for the agenda item can be Police Accountability Board (PAB) response to Surveillance Ordinance items related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). Additionally, the DPA requests that the ODPA community input session documents be entered into the agenda packet for July 25, 2023, and any subsequent PAB produced communications pursuant to their July 12, 2023, meeting.
Attachments:
• ODPA Memorandum titled Recap of Community Input Session_ Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR): A Discussion on ALPRs in the City of Berkeley • Invitational email
• Invitational flyer
• Opening remarks
• Input Session PowerPoint Presentation
• Transcript with YouTube video link
• Questions/comments made through the Q&A tool
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Time Critical Items. A Time Critical item is defined as a matter that is considered urgent by the sponsor and that has a deadline for action that is prior to the next meeting of the Council and for which a report prepared by the City Manager, Auditor, Mayor or Council Member is received by the City Clerk after established deadlines and is not included on the Agenda Committee’s published agenda.
The author of the report shall bring any reports submitted as Time Critical to the meeting of the Agenda Committee. Per BMC 2.06.060 (D), Time Critical items must be accompanied by complete reports and statements of financial implications.
If the Agenda Committee finds the matter to meet the definition of Time Critical, the Agenda Committee may place the matter on the Agenda on either the Consent or Action Calendar
Berkeley City Council's Legislative History on
ALPR
-November 1, 2021 -Public Safety Policy Committee of the City Council makes a budget referral proposing the acquisition of fixed ALPRs. -November 30, 2021 -The budget referral was presented to the City Council and approved by a majority of Council.
-The budget referral included the installation of ALPRs at strategic locations, allocation of funds in the FY 23-24 budget for ALPRs, and the development of a policy governing the use of ALPRs by the Berkeley Police Department in compliance with relevant city ordinances, specifically Berkeley Municipal Code (BMC) 2.99.
-May 11, 2023 -Police Chief Louis presented the Board with Policy 422 and Policy 1305-the proposed ALPR policies.
Berkeley City Council's Legislative History
on ALPR {Cont.)
-June 15, 2023 - The ODPA provides a report to the PAB titled "Automatic License Plate Readers /ALPR) in the Citv of Berkeley: A Preliminary Review of Proposed BPD Policies bY, the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) Submitted to the Police Accountability Board (PAB)" -June 16, 2023 - The PAB holds a special meeting to discuss the proposed ALPR policies. The PAB votes to object to the acquisition report and proposed policies as presented. The PAB sends an objection letter to the BPD and City Council.
-June 20 2023 - The Public Safety Policy Committee holds a special meeting to discuss the ALPR r:>olicies. The committee votes to send a qualified r:>_ositive to the City Council on the condition that the PAB and BPD work to address the concerns of the PAB.
-June 27h 2023 - PAB Chair Moore, Board Member Wilson, Sgt. Ledoux, and ODPA Staff meet to discuss t e concerns of the PAB as articulated in the objection letfer. -July 6, 2023 - The BPD provides the PAB with the updated policies. The ALPR documents (pror:>osed redline versions of the policies) as well as a memo prepared at the request of the Public Safety Policy Committee which provides specific responses to concerns raised by the DPNPAB. There was no change to the previously submitted Acquisition Report.
7/7/2023
5
Public
Office of the Director of Police Accountability
CITY OF BERKELEY | 1947 CENTER STREET, 5TH FLOOR, BERKELEY, CA 94704 Community Input
Session Transcript
Session Topic: “Automated License Plate Readers
(ALPR): A Discussion on ALPRs in the City of Berkeley”
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
1 DISCLAIMER
This document is an automatically generated transcript produced by Zoom's transcription feature.
The transcription process is automated and may not capture the exact wording, tone, or context of the original spoken conve rsation. Therefore, it is advised to exercise caution and refer to the original recording or seek further clarification when relying on this transcript for official or critical purposes. The accuracy and reliability of the transcript may vary based on fact ors such as audio quality and background noise.
The video recording is available for viewing through the following link: https://youtu.be/00L2wYj- DA0.
TRANSCRIPT
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:00:37
Okay. Good afternoon everyone. My name is Jose Murillo. I'm a policy analyst with the Office of the Director of Police Accountability.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:00:46
Today we're going to be providing you with a presentation on automatic license plate readers.
And with that, I'll hand it over to the director who will get us started this afternoon.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:01:00 Good evening committee members. We do see we got a quite a few folks here so we'll get started with our discussion.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:01:07 We are on the clock so to speak. Just I do see we have at least one hand.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:01:14 That's raised in the attendee section and just wanna make sure that I acknowledge you and that we will be able to get to community comments.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:01:24 We just have to provide a overview about the agenda for today and how we'll p roceed today. Do you get proceed with the next slide, please?
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:01:34 So here's our agenda for today. I am the, director of police accountability here in the city of Berkeley and I do wanna thank you and welcome you to this input, committee input session.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:01:48 We're really. Grateful that use community members are able to join us today. As we stand as we sit here today to gather and to discuss an important matter concerning public safety in our city.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
2 [Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:01 I just wanna take a moment to acknowledge and recognize that discussions on matters of public safety. They can evoke strong opinions and sentiments.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:09 However, it is crucial that we a process dialogue with open minds respect for diverse perspectives in a shared commitment to the well being of our community.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:19 First, I'd like to again extend my gratitude to each and every one of you for taking the time to join us here today.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:25 You press this here, reflects your dedication to actively participating in decision making processes that shape our city's policies.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:34 It is through this open and inclusive dialogue. That we can make sure that we make informed decisions that truly serve the needs and aspirations of our community.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:44 It's also worth noting that we're holding this committee input session during a week that holds great significance to us.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:02:52 The week in which we celebrate our independence to the Fourth of July holiday. This location reminds us of the principles upon which our nation was founded on.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:03:00 And including the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. So we is in this period. That, the spirit of freedom and community that we can be here today striving to ensure that our city's policies uphold these cherished values.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:03:15 The focus of today's discussion is to potential acquisition of automated license plate readers or ALPR.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:03:25 As are commonly referred to by the acronym. By our police department. These technological tools have the potential impact the way launch enforcement operates in our community and is crucial that we thoroughly evaluate the event their potential benefits and risk.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:03:40 As the Police Accountability Board considers the proposed policies regarding It is vital that we gather diverse input for community members like you.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
3 [Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:03:50 Your perspectives, concerns and insights will greatly inform the decision making process of the city council and help shape the policies that govern this acknowledges usage in our city if adopted.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:04:01 Let me emphasize that the purpose of the input session is to create an inclusive space for dialogue where different viewpoints can be shared and understood.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:04:09 We encourage everyone to engage respect fully and constructively. Ensuring that all voices are heard and valued. By doing so, we can foster a sense of trust, collaboration, and accountability within our community.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:04:22 Was again, thank you for your presence and commitment to shaping the future of our city. So as you can see in the slide before you, the overview, we're going to, do a thorough review of what we like to call community agreements that spell out a little bit more about the agreements that we expect out of
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:04:42 this dialogue today. We're going to have an overview via policy analysts of the Berkeley municipal code, 2.9 9 the acquisition and user surveillance technology.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:04:54 We're going to do an overview of the proposed. License plate vendors. Technology, excuse me, of the technology itself, then an overview of the legislative history, an overview of the department's proposed policies and the initial position of the police accountability boards on these policies.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:05:15 Then we'll go ahead and open discussion and do QA. I do believe though our policy analyst has a note about the QA session.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:05:23 If you can. Surprise and guidance there.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:05:27
Sorry, I was muted for a moment. But yes, some of you have already found we have enabled the QA section.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:05:35
As you have questions through the presentation, feel free to drop them in that chat box. So what we'll do at the end of the presentation is that we'll review the questions or comments are submitted there.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:05:45
Zoom does have the feature, to upload any questions. So if you see a question in that chat box and you think, wow, that's a great question.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
4 [Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:05:54
You could vote for it and I'll go up towards the top. We'll try to get to as many hands as we can during our, last portion as well.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:06:01
Again, I also see that again, recognizing the hands are already raised. We will ha ve that opportunity.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:06:06
But again, the QA chat box is open in case there's any questions that come up through that process, feel free to drop them in there.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:06:14
We'll be monitoring them as we go along.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:06:18 And I do see a note about close captioning. Can you just confirm if that's already enabled for the community members?
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:06:27 You're muted.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:06:32
Sorry, yes, it is enabled. Close captioning and then there's also a question about the QA.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:06:39
That box that I'm referring to is where the comments are being. Submitted
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:06:51 So we'll go ahead and you can advance to the next slide.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:06:59 Discuss our community agreement. Okay. One of the things that the main points here is to be both teachers and learners.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:07:08 Challenge ideas, not people. Practice active listening, show respect and empathy and take accountability.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:07:16 Again, I wanna emphasize that public safety discussions can, evoke a lot of strong emotions and sentiments.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:07:23
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
5 We understand there's a lot at stak e when we're authorizing the, our government, whether local or, at the state level or the federal level to be able to utilize technologies to monitor our community members.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:07:39 We know that these ha ve real life impacts. We also do know that community members are concerned for personal safety and also do know that community members are concerned for personal safety and also safety of property.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:07:56 Viewpoints and making sure that we're providing the space we are again going to be reporting back to the police accountability board.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:08:04 The, feedback that we're receiving here at the board con tinues to. Consider the department's proposed policies.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:08:15 They will be meeting for their next regularly scheduled meeting on July 12. So it is our are in our task to, memorialize the feedback we r eceive here and present it to the board at this next board meeting.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:08:33 And we can go ahead and, we'll revisit the community agreements, before we start the discussion.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:08:39
Oh! Okay. So again, my name's Las Mudi. I'm the policy analyst here with the office of director of police accountability.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:08:49
And we just wanna start today with, the Berkeley, 2 99 for the acquisition and use of surveillance technology.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:08:58
I know during a lot of the police accountability boards meetings during the council meetings. You often hear us referring to BMC 2 99 or the surveillance ordinance which is what we'll be covering today so we just want to give that overview before we get into technology itself.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:09:15
So the goal of BMC 2 99 is to essentially establish a process, for the procurement and use of surveillance technology, in a way that considers both public safety and privacy and civil rights.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:09:29
Transparency is the main theme behind this ordinance. It's crucial in the consideration of any surveillance technology that we are transparent.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:09:38
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ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
6 And again, it emphasizes that surveillance technology can benefit public order and safety. But it could also jeopardize privacy and civil liberties if it's a abuse.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:09:48
So the decision on surveillance technology, should always prioritize impact on civil rights and civil liberties, as guaranteed by the California and US constitutions.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:10:00
And under that general principle is that the city passed this ordinance.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:10:08
Again, part is part of the ordinance there requires an evaluation of the financial costs associated with the acquisition.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:10:15
The installment, the use and the maintenance of any surveillance technology. It states that city council should govern decisions on funding acquisition on the use of the surveillance technology so this is where you hear a lot of the mandate for a policy like recovery today.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:10:31
And it also includes, or it also requires that certain safeguards, including transparency, the idea of oversight is terms of the scope of our work.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:10:41
And I accountability measures are set in place. Of course. And then there's data reporting.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:10:49
Just to measure that there's compliance with the initial intent and that civil liberties civil rights and civil leaders are being safeguarded.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:11:00
Right. So. Our role or rather the role of the police accountability board. With BMC 2 99 is that we are in essentially the review.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:11:11
A body for some of these policies. The city manager whenever there will be a new surveillance technology on behalf of the police department.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:11:20
Must present a surveillance use policy for each technology to the police review commission which is now of course the police accountability board before city council adopts it or essentially considers it for adoption.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:11:36
The police accountability board must receive a c orresponding surveillance acquisition report as well as the surveillance policy and then the use policy which will differentiate as we go later on so it's 3 documents that accompany these reviews.
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ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
7 [Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:11:52
These policies have to be given to the police accountability board within 30 days. Or rather the review has to be completed within a 30 days of receiving the policy.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:12:03
And the board has to vote whether to accept whether to recommend approval eject to the proposal recommend modifications or take no action of course, the opposition or failure by the police accountability board to act on these policies.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:12:18
Does not prevent the city manager from, proceeding with their own review and potential adoption.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:12:24
Again, we're recommending body. In this regard.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:12:31
So what are automatic license plate readers? Lpr systems, are essentially cameras that capture images of license plates automatically.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:12:42
The images are converted into text using special software. They convert plate numbers and. They essentially capture plate numbers and compare with databases.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:12:53
Of vehicles of interest. Law enforcement and other agencies use ALPRs to identify vehicles they're looking for.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:13:00
When a vehicle of interest is detected the system notifies the officer through the procedures that various departments have.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:13:09
So again, where do they use for? They're used for rapidly identifying and locating vehicles of interest law enforcement.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:13:17
Again, they compare license plane counters with law enforcement databases, which is often referred to as sought list.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:13:23
For active investigations such as missing persons stolen vehicles are stolen license place. They assess the identification of suspects, victims and witnesses by canvassing license plates near crime scenes.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:13:36
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ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
8 And they're also used as actin g as a search tool with limited information and comparing license plate. Details.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:13:47
So just a bit of the legislative history. As we go into the final stages of this review. The ALPR discussion or at least some of the preliminary discussion started back in 2021 when the public safety policy committee made a budget made a recommendation for a budget referral proposing the acquisition of fixed
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:14:12
ALPRs on November thirtieth 2021 the budget referral was presented to the city council and it was approved by a majority of council.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:14:21
The budget referral included the installation of ALPR as a strategic locations, the allocations of funds in the 2,024 fiscal year budget for and the development of a policy governing the use of ARPR policies which is what we're reviewing today.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:14:36
So part of the condition was that a policy had to be developed and approved by the council before they could proceed.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:14:44
On May eleventh, 2023, so about 2 years later, a little under 2 years.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:14:50
Those policies were developed in their, transmitted to the police accountability board for review.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:14:59
On June fifteenth after receiving those policies, the office of the director of police accountability provided a report to the police accountability board title and automatic license plate readers in the city of Berkeley, a preliminary review of proposed.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:15:14
LPR policies by the office of director police accountability which was submitted to the police accountability board.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:15:22
This report was primarily research of the different sources that are available. As well as some of the different policies that are currently implemented in place.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:15:32
The next day the police accountability board held a special meeting to discuss the proposed LPR policies.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:15:38
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9 The board voted ultimately to object to the acquisition report and proposed and the proposed policies as presented. The police accountability board sets an objection lighter to the BPD and the city council.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:15:52
Then on June twentieth, the public safety policy committee also held a special meeting. To discuss LPR.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:15:59
The LPR policies and the considerations of, or rather the concerns of the police accountability board.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:16:07
They voted to send the qualified positive to the city council, with condition that the board and the police department, work to address the concerns that were expressed in the board's letter.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:16:19
On June 20 seventh chair more the chair of the police accountability boar d a board member willson sergeant widow and ODPA staff met to discuss and articulate some of the concerns of the objections of the letter.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:16:33
This was not necessarily official position on the board, but it was rea lly to set the framework for our upcoming meeting where, the board will make their, final decision, on the matter.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:16:45
And then again, actually just today we received the updated policies for the board to include, in its next agenda packet.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:16:59
And then of course as I stated on July 12, the board is going to convene for the regular meeting where the new ALPR policies will be discussed further and the board will further discuss further and the board will further discuss their stance on the technology.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:17:13
And then of course on July 20 fifth the BPD will present its acquisition report and use policies to the full city council.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:17:22
I do just want to make a note that tomorrow or it will be posting their agenda where we'll make these documents available.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:17:31
Okay, director.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:17:35
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ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
10 Thank you for that. So in In summary, what the acquisition report is as acknowledged or as representing the, ordinance.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:17:44 To beMCO Ordin is the police department or the city manager has to make the case for why they want to acquire a news of surveillance technology or they want to utilize from, with the support of nearby departments.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:01 In this case, the, Br ooklyn Police Department's acquisition report, provided this, a purpose for acquiring this, surveillance technology.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:12 They are just to also clarify, ALPRs can be, a fixed as, as our policy analys ts mentioned on, vehicles at this time, it is not the department's, wish to do so.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:27 They want to fix them at any location. So if it's a street pull street lights or other similar objects owned by the state of Berkeley or cover by right away agreement.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:36 The AOPRs are commonly used to alert police of wanted vehicles. Or vehicles of interest entered into jurisdiction.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:43 And the, technology is increasingly used on local freeways bridges and sometimes in private parking lot.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:50 So this is language directly from the acquisi tion report which is publicly available. It has been included in our agenda packets and also in the.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:18:58 City councils or public safety committee packet and feel free to contact us at any time if you want to have access to these documents.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:19:08 The next slide, please.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:19:12 Okay, the justification as articulated in the acquisition report, the police departments investigators, they have identified instances where the effective deployment of this technology could have helped focus on wanted vehicles and potentially prevented crimes in the city.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:19:31 They noted these different categories of crime, a depth of vehicles, incidents of armed robbery.
Property related crimes, homicide cases, sex, domestic violence crimes and in the acquisition
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11 report they do provide several cases where they cou ld have utilized this technology solve those crimes.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:19:52 If you could proceed with the next slide, please.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:19:56 Another element of this is th e location and where will these how many and where will they be placed around the city.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:20:05 The police department, proposes to install 52, ALPRs in the city of Berkeley.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:20:13 Again, there's a permanent locations. They are going to be the specific locations haven't been identified yet but they will, want to solicit input from the vendor, who has not been chosen at this time, because they're in the, in the process of getting
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:20:34 council approval to acquire them. So if the council were to approve this technology in the city, the police department would then potentially, will, identify vendo r and they want to work with that vendor to.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:20:48 Look at the locations around the city where they will put these, fixed cameras in.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:20:57 The impact as articulated by the police department in their acquisition report. They wanna utilize, their resources effectively as we know the city is, facing a hybrid crisis, hiring a retention crisis and not only in the police department or across many departments.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:21:17 If you haven't looked at the city auditors, recent report, that gives you good context of the current state of the city right now in terms of hiring and retention.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:21:27 But one of the One of the ways that police departments not just, the Brooklyn Police Department, but other departments around the country have been able to overcome some of these challenges in in personnel is through the adoption of these technologies which is what the department proposes here.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:21:47 They do recognize the department the need to protect ownership and patrol over shared information and protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public in accordance with federal state law.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:21:58
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ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
12 And also, noted, in the, acquisition report that the units will help to prevent unauthorized there will be procedures in place that help prevent unauthorized use of the data the procedures will ensure that data is not used in any way that would violate or a upon any more
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:22:19 civilized inner liberties, including but not limited to potentially desperate for adverse impacts on any community groups. And again, this is language from the acquisition report.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:22:28 You can proceed with the next slide.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:22:32 Okay, so there are 2 in addition to the proposed the acquisition report there are 2 policies that the department has drafted.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:22:43 There it's what will fall on the directions for the officers at the street level in any of the.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:22:52 Operators of this technology and then there is the other policy that provides more of the, articulation that is legally required, for this use of technology.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:23:05 But policy, BPD, POSI, 4 22, in the purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture storage and usage of the digital data obtained thro ugh use of ALPR technology department personnel shall adhere to the requirements of fix ALPRs in this policy as well as corresponding surveillance use
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:23:24 fix AOPR policy 1305 and could advance to t he next slide please. Okay, so the The other policy that is.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:23:38 Attached to the this surveillance technology policy is 1305 and the purpose of that policy is to provide guidance.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:23:47 Again, very similar language, but this one is to ensure that it is meeting. The legal requirements both.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:23:54 At the state level, federal level, but also in compliance with any, Berkeley, or Berkeley, local laws in the.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:24:07 We get it.
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13 [Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:24:10 Okay.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:24:12
Okay, so as we noted earlier, at their June sixteenth meeting, The police accountability board voted to write.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:24:23
To the public safety policy committee as well as the city council and the Berkeley Police Department to express their concerns about the policies that were proposed to the board.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:24:32
There's 4 primary areas that the board was concerned about, and that they had an opportunity to address to the public safety committee.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:24:39
The first one was of course, the concerns over civil liberty protections. The proposed acquisition report and the, or as the board stated, the proposed acquisition report and policies need to be need to p rovide stronger safeguards and assurances for protecting civil liberties and privacy rights.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:24:58
The PAB emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the acquisition and use of ALPRs do not infringe upon the rights of individuals in the community.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:25:07
The second concern was that there's lack of empirical support or data. The police accountability board as they stated has noted a lack of empirical evidence or data demonstrating the effectiveness of that technology and achieving its intended goals within the City of Berkeley while acknowledging the reported increase in crimes in specific categories, the
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:25:28
PAB highlights the need for an analysis of comparable jurisdictions with their without this technology to the terminus potential effectiveness.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:25:37
Solid evidence is crucial before moving forward with the acquisition to ensure it's significant contribution to solving crime investigations and enhancing public safety.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:25:46
So again, those were just 2 of the 4 and I'll proceed to the next 2.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:25:52
There is also concerns about the true cost. In their letter the board noted that rather the police accountability board state that it has expressed concerns about the true cost of associated with the technology included potential hidden costs, maintenance expenses, and long -term financial commitments.
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14 [Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:26:13
It is imperative to have a comprehensive understanding of the financial implications and ensure that the benefits outweigh the cost.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:26:21
And then lastly the last concern that was noted was the lack of completeness of acquisition report and the proposed policies.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:26:29
And again in their letter they stated the proposed policies require further clarity, collaboration, and editing, specifically the PAB cause for a clear outline of the intended use of the data retention periods access controls and measures to protect against potential misuse or unauthorized access.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:26:47
The inclusion of more information about minimum training requirements for the users of the technology is also requested. So again, these were the analysis that was, Initially provide these this was in response to the initial policies that were provided to the board and have been workshop with the department to an extent.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:07
The board has not taken, official position just yet in terms of the ALPR policies, but these were just their initial analysis.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:17
And that they'll continue at the next meeting on. July twelfth.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:25
Okay. Okay, so we've reached the end of our presentation. We're very conscious to allow time.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:34
For folks to provide their input. As I noted at the start of the presentation the way that we will be.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:44
With this is that we'll be looking at the QA list first to see if there are any qu estions there that haven't been answered.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:48
We have been monitoring and we see that there's a few comments there. That wants to be for the record and we assure you that they will Well, we'll then open it up to live questions.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:27:58
Again, we do have a good amount of participants here joining us today. And we do have a few hands raised so we'll make sure to, give enough time for folks to express their comments.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:28:08
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15 And then we'll end up with any closing comments, as we move forward to the next steps.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:28:14
So with that said, we'll just take a few minutes to look over the QA.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:28:17
Again if you don't necessarily wish to speak but you still wanna answer your question that's a great or ask a question.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:28:23
It's a great tool.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:28:27 And, could you please put the, community agreements? Just as a reminder to guide us as we engage in this conversation.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:28:28
Okay.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:28:37
Yes.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:28:37 And I do want to, if I may, and just make sure that we're communicating effectively the board position at this moment.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:28:48 It was to object the the acquis ition report and the policies as presented they have sought, they have provided guidance to the police department and we did receive, a response to some of the the concerns that were raised by the board, those responses were provided today by the police department.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:29:11 They will be in the agenda packet and the board will further discuss their stance based on this new information and the address and the concerns that have already, been brought forth b y the police accountability board.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:29:27
Okay. And then we just, I'll start with the QA questions. The first question that I have and it's more of a procedural aspect on our end.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:29:39
Our closing comments going to be from attendees or from the PAB. So we will go ahead director.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:29:49
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16 So I do wanna just say that we are our assistant the board in this process this is not a b oard meeting per se so the comments that we would the office will make as we facilitate this in procession will not necessarily be representations of the board.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:30:09 We do have individual board members and we have a lot of community members logged in. And they're more than welcome to make any comments, throughout this discussion, but I do want to make sure that we're communicating that effectively that this is not necessarily a event that's host being hosted by the Police Accountability
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:30:27 Board, but rather by the office in our capacity as the administrative support of the board.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:30:37
Okay, so quite a few questions.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:30:42
Oh, and there's a clarifying question as to that. Do attendees have a chance to make comments.
I only ask specific questions. Yes, you will have the opportunity to make comments.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:30:55
When we get to the live questions aspects of it. My apologies if we weren't clear with that.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:30:58
But yes, you will be allowed to either ask a question or make a comment. Okay, so the n ext question is, so what is the estimated cost of performing the case control studies that the PAB and the case is needed to inform this proposal.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:31:14
How do these costs compare to the program cost?
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:31:19 So that's great question. Another disclaimer in this conversation. There's some questions that may be beyond the scope of what we, intend to do tonight.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:31:28 We will register any questions and we'll try to follow up with any community member. That has a more targeted question that's gonna require more research.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:31:37 But feel free again to register your questions and comments. The goal here is to receive input so the board can make informed decisions in their recommendations.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:31:52
The next question is will BPD have a contractor actually operating the cameras co llecting the data, etc.?
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17 [Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:32:03 So it is the, in the acquisition report and the policies they do describe the logistics and the mechanics by which.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:32:12 The operators will be able to utilize this. So, there are, there will be officers if the department, is approved to have this technology.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:32:25 The vendor will then provide training. There will also be some training to ensure legal compliance and the operators, that are trained to utilize the technology would be able to access the databases.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:32:38 In that. Yeah, where the license plates, are being, kept and be able to access that information.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:32:46 So there is a training component that's being provided by the vendor, but also by different, different, components like the legal requirements that will be necessary to ensure compliance with this technology.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:33:01
Then the next question you've briefly touched on, Director, will I be Pd department officials have access to the surveillance data.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:33:10 As the policy and acquisition report currently reads, it will be individuals that are trained on this.
Department.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:33:19 It is not. My understanding that all of department members will necessarily be trained on this, but anybody that Does utilize the technology will be trained on it.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:33:35
Then this is a set of 3 questions. But they all relate. So in regards to the data, will it be shared with other law enforcement agencies and our private organizations?
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:33:47
How many wrong arrests have been made using ALPR technology. Is there data to support the claim that ALPR does in fact solve crime.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:33:57 So then those are great questions in terms of sharing. Those are the sort of, nuances that I think the board was.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:34:06
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18 I'm very concerned about it making sure that the language is clear on that if there is a legal requirement for the department, to share any, information like a subpoena is provided to the department, then that would need to be considered.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:34:22 But there was also a conversation at the Public Safety Committee. What role, will the department and or our city attorney office play in potentially quashing any subpoenas that would potentially contradict our current policies and or audiences within the city.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:34:42 So there is some element where there may be sharing, with other law enforcement agencies.
There is, No, to my knowledge and, please correct me, Mr. Mario.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:34:55 Is there any intention of sharing this information with private organizations. If we don't have that information, we certainly get back to community member.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:35:03
We can certainly get back, but our other standing with the conversations that the board had at the special meeting.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:35:10
And at the policy, committee by on behalf of council. Private organizat ions are not being contemplated.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:35:18
There's a big emphasis that the policy, there's a big emphasis within the policy that the data wouldn't be shared without outside agencies.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:35:27
They specifically drop and this isn't necessarily private agency, but more of a federal agency with ICE or other federal agencies for those enforcement matters.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:35:37
Again, you noted, previously in terms of whether, they're legally obligated to, is a different question that has to be considered on a case by case basis.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:35:48
But again, the BPD at least has written through the policy in the recent conversations, expresses that the information won't be shared with other agencies again, unless there's legal obligation to do so.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:36:02
Okay, so we do have a few more questions that trickled in.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:36:09
And I will. Okay.
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July 6, 2023
19 [Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:36:17
So this question says, will ALPR be provided to the police to help identify automobiles nearby the locations at times of crimes reported to the BPD.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:36:33 I'm sorry, I'm trying to look for. We have questioning.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:36:37
It's towards the
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:36:41 What's the time stamp on it?
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:36:43
6 34.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:36:49 We provide to to the police. To help identify automobiles nearby the locations at times when crimes reported to the BPD.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:36:58 So the way the technology works, they if there is. A license plate or a vehicle of interest they could potentially answer that into the database and that would then, potentially, if that vehicles identified in one of the other fixe d cameras, a woman around the city, it can give a hit for the officer to be able to flag
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:37:20 it as a vehicle of interest. There are other legal thresholds that the department must the officers must be able to satisfy before any enforcement action is taking place.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:37:34 So they would need to have reasonable suspicion and probable cause to pursue. Any further action, even if they have a hit of a vehicle license plate.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:37:50
Okay, the other question that came in around that time is will the operators who have access to data be bonded and have to take an oath to confidentiality?
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:38:01 So the operators of the of the technology they are there's language within the policies. Regarding the privacy implications of this data and also they are there's language regarding any repercussions for the unlawful or impermissible use of this technology.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:38:22 So they do have to ensure that they're complying with current, oaths of office that they have as officers or operators.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
20 [Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:38:31
And then you briefly touched on this next question. But the question is, 10 officers asked for the trained officers to retrieve data from the ALPR database and provide it to them.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:38:44 Then those are their, great logistical questions. So if that is part of an investigative procedure, the individual that is seeking or is access in the database would have to be trained.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:38:58 The operator would need to consider whether a fellow officer or a person within the department seeking information is doing it for lawful purposes.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:39:11 So there would need to be a discussion there. Why are you access ing the data? And have that conversation.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:39:16 But that, is, I think, one of the the logistical questions of how this looks in real life when you have so the department officers or department employees are trained and others that aren't.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:39:34 So that is something that needs to be contemplated further.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:39:39
Okay.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:39:42
Next question is what example of civil liberties that will be impacted by implementing these cameras and are there reports that this happens in other cities?
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:39:53
Where this has been implemented.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:39:57 And if you can go back to. The slide we got in the boards. There is an articulation there about the board's concerns.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:40:09 With civil liberties And when we're talking about amassing the data like this, there's always implications on privacy and how will this data be used and how will it be protected.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:40:23 Where it's not just a license plate itself which is in public view and this not necessarily.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:40:28
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
21 Expectation of privacy would your license pay per se, but you had, what an important, considerations here is that the, the technology allows for the tracking of movement.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:40:40 So the, ALPR data could potentially indicate if you have 52 cameras around the city the movements of a particular license way throughout.
[Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability] 18:40:50 The city and that is the civil liberty component of this And we have to ensure that we're utilizing this technology in a judicious manner.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:41:02
And thank you. Okay, and I'll get to some of the questions now from folks that haven't.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:41:10
Have their question and, answer just yet. This question states where will the information reside on locally controlled servers or on the server of the provider.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:41:21
And I'll just tie this in with another question that was asked in. Which kind of ties in since we don't have a vendor, how can you guarantee they'll comply with the COB surveillance policy and data sharing.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:41:36
I think. Sorry, I connected those 2 questions because in a way they sort of, answer each other in one way or the other.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:41:48
At this time we don't necessarily again because there isn't a vendor. We don't know the specific way that the data will be stored.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:41:58
There's talks with them the department from what we've been informed. That they're looking more at a cloud based.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:06
Platform as many of the vendors offer that service it's supposed to be more cost effective than storing large amount of data locally.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:15
And that's in terms of answer that qu estion. And then again, to the previous question about how could we guarantee they follow Bp's policy.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:23
It is also our understanding that vendors tailor the product to the specific city and their policy.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:35
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
22 Okay. So again, we won't be able to get through all of our questions today in terms of the QA, but we will get back to them as many as we can.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:45
We're gonna move on to the l ive comment just because we do have a good amount of folks waiting to provide their comment there.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:52
So again, we see in here your questions. They are part of our record.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:42:58
Just for the interest of time, we're gonna move on to live comment. You're more than free to participate there as well.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:43:07
Okay.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:43:13
Okay, one moment.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:43:21
Okay. So John Cannon, you're being granted permission to speak. We're asking you folks to try to limit their comment for 2 to 3 min at most just because we do have.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:43:34
A good amount of folks. So we'll go ahead and give you that permission.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:43:40
Again, John.
[John Caner] 18:43:43
Yes, thank you. I'm John Kayner. In my day job, I'm CEO of the downtown Berkeley Association.
[John Caner] 18:43:50
But I'm not speaking on our but on that behalf because our board hasn't had a chance to win on this.
[John Caner] 18:43:57
I'm speaking. As a neighbor and on a on a personal level my husband and i live 3 blocks from the police department.
[John Caner] 18:44:06
And since the beginning of the year, we've had 2 carjackings within a block of our house.
[John Caner] 18:44:11
We've had a student. Badly beaten and robbed. 3 blocks where we've had a 70 year old woman who was, who was attacked and robbed and we're not feeling safe in our neighborhood.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
23 [John Caner] 18:44:28
We fully support automated license plates readers. We need to discourage criminals from committing crimes in Berkeley and we need to provide BPD the pool the tools that they need to apprehend.
[John Caner] 18:44:42
Folks who engage in criminal criminal activity. So, please, please, please, fully support this.
[John Caner] 18:44:50
And, thank you very much. Bye.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:44:53
Thank you.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:44:59
Okay. So we will now go on to Sagar Jitani and I apologize if I'm pronounced any names in advance.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:45:09
But, you should have permission to speak now.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:45:13
Thank you. You know, 3 years ago the city council voted to reimagine policing. Part of that overhaul was this idea that police shouldn't be conducting routine traffic stops because of racially disparate outcomes.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:45:25
So the preferred solution, creating a Department of Transportation was blocked on other grounds, legal grounds.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:45:30
You fast forward to today. As John was just saying, we're in the midst of a significant increase in crime in Berkeley, especially violent crime like what he described.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:45:39
We're seeing residents held up a gun point by criminals riding into town from other communities, dramatic number of carjackings and other violent crimes involving vehicles.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:45:48
You know, the goal was to reimagine policing, not abolish it. Licensed by readers are an easy, cost effective solution.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:45:57
One that's used by thousands of other communities around the country. I'm sure you guys know the stat but nearby Vacaville saw a 33% decrease in auto theft.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
24 [Sagar Jethani] 18:46:05
And a 35% increase in arrests. After installing LPRs. Meanwhile, here in the city of Berkeley.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:46:13
We've seen a 43% increase in auto thefts over just the past 6 months.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:46:18
You know, it's time to get behind this. Reasonable measure. There's perception that sometimes the PAB will block whatever it is the police department wants.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:46:26
This is a great chance to prove those critics wrong . The concerns that are raised are perfectly reasonable. But I think that those concerns have been addressed.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:46:34
By the Berkeley Police Department and I'm hoping that people can get behind this and we can start getting a lid on reducing violent crime in Berkeley.
[Sagar Jethani] 18:46:43
Thanks so much.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:46:44
Thank you.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:46:51
Ted Sagenar, you haven't. A lot permission to speak.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:46:55
Hi, my name is Kit Sagar. I'm really concerned about effectiveness. And whether or not, and it appears not that ALPRs will actually help in the prevention of crime.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:47:07
And then there's several different aspects to this. I'll try to be brief. One, issue actually is the an error rate and some of that error rate.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:47:17
I don't know what the cause of it is, but it means that people who are not committing a crime can in fact get in trouble and put put on the hot list and so forth.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:47:26
One issue I know that it just that it contributes the error, the error rate is people actually altering their license plates.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:47:32
You really need to find out what's happening in New York City at this point. In New York City, there's this huge rash of plates being altered or false plates being particularly false paper plates
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
25 being being put on cars even by people who are otherwise law-abiding in order to defeat parking tickets and highway
[Kitt Saginor] 18:47:53
tolls. So APR, ALPR technology becomes rather ineffective if all the people you're trying to catch are obscuring or changing their plates.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:04
The the strategies for defeating LPRs are already known to criminals and who already use it.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:11
It's you're foolish if you think that criminals will not adapt to a increase in ALPR technology in terms of car theft.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:21
Criminals can switch license plates with a parked car. They can use counterfeit plates.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:26
They can steal a car. It you know 10 pm complete their crimes during the night and dump the car before the owner has realized in the morning that the car is missing and reported is stolen.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:39
Particularly swapping plates is is something that it can go for without detection for some time.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:46
Most people, if they go out in the morning, will not notice that the license played on their car is not the same license plate that was on it yesterday.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:48:52
So it can be quite some time before a stolen license place gets reported. Meanwhile, the person who the legitimate owner of a car is driving around with a stolen plate on their car that was put on their car by the thief.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:49:06
And so that causes even more problems. What we really need is prevention of crime and particularly in the case of vehicle theft.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:49:14
There are ways to look at where the thieves are, what's happening with the thefts and to look into that.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:49:21
It was just mentioned that there was a 43% in auto thefts in Berkeley just recently.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:49:27
The largest part of that increase in fact I think the entire increase was caused by increased theft of Kias and Hyundai.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
26 [Kitt Saginor] 18:49:35
I'm not sure how to pronounce that, which apparently we're sold with the defective technology making them so easy to steal that you can look at a YouTube video and go steal a car in 15 min or less.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:49:46
The other type of car that's easy to steal our Honda Civics and Honda Accords that are 20 years old or older.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:49:55
Once you know which cars are the ones that, and this is not just, Berkeley throughout the state of California, the statistics from the California Highway Patrol show that 31% of the automobiles stolen in California in 2022 were the Kia's Hayonda, Hyundai's.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:50:14
or old Hondas. So for prevention, right, fix the software, pressure the companies to fix the software on the newer cars and on the older cars those the owners of those cars can be provided with information and resources about protecting their vehicles, perhaps even including a program to help them obtain low-cost trackers to hide
[Kitt Saginor] 18:50:35
in their cars and that way it will be easier to find those particular cars if they're stolen. And if you can cut down considerably on the theft of those cars you will have actually prevented prevented in advance from its happening a lot of vehicle theft.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:50:51
And I think some of the other things that involve tracking a vehicles need to be looked at the same way.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:50:57
So that you can do, we can, the city should be doing prevention rather than trying to chase after them with ALPRs at which point the criminals just adjust their their methods so as to make your ALPR readers rather not very helpful for finding particularly those cars that are involved with commission of a crime.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:51:19
Thank you very much and and please also look as I said at the error rate for ALPR readers.
[Kitt Saginor] 18:51:25
Thank you.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:51:27
Thank you.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:51:33
Okay, just one moment.
Public
ALPR Community Input Session Transcript
July 6, 2023
27 [Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:51:38
Okay.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:51:43
Mari Mendesa you should be allowed to speak now.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:51:48
Okay, hello. Hi. Okay, great. Thank you.
[Jose Murillo, ODPA Policy Analyst] 18:51:50
Yes, we could hear you.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:51:53
Good evening and I appreciate all the work. I wanna thank you both for presenting this evening and allowing an opportunity for.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:51:59
Community to chime in and thank you for all your work and trying to be thorough and how you're looking at all of the aspects.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:52:06
That the considerations will, or have the potential to affect the entire diverse community. One of the Most interesting things that I think we all have to Continue to remind ourselves.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:52:22
And I think Kit's point about criminals adopting 2 roles and even the fact that we have all kinds of laws and rules.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:52:29
And people committing crime even still that we have those laws. In rules and even cameras and whatnot.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:52:36
Crime, is typically and acted and especially in a society where there's much, much foundational and systemic injustice.
[Mari Mendonca] 18:52:47
You know, and we always look at crime as pointing the finger at people being criminal. But the initial crime in our society is in equity, right?
[Mari Mendonca] 18:52:56
It's predatory capitalism. It's the way that that we marginalize people with the least and keep them pinned down in a place of no return, right?
[Mari Mendonca] 18:53:07