COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS
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GUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION (BERKELEY CEASEFIRE)
Department Lead: City Manager’s Office
Status Update: In Progress (FY 23 carryover request to AAO#1) Overview:
As part of the Mayor’s phased approach to Reimagining Public Safety, Phase 1 work primarily focused on community-centric processes and comprehensive engagement with key stakeholders and field experts. In this engagement, analysis, and design process, the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform15 (NICJR), was commissioned to conduct an assessment of programs and models that increase safety, properly respond to emergencies, reduce crime and violence, and improve policing. Included in their final report was a dedicated assessment of Community Driven Violence Reduction Strategies16, also known as Gun Violence Prevention or “Ceasefire,” This report was presented to the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force, and thereafter to the City Council in Spring 2022 (See Companion Appendix A, pp. 1107-1111, for NICJR Report).
Councilmember Terry Taplin recommended a series of budget referrals (November 2021, May 2022) for a Gun Violence Intervention (Operation Ceasefire) program to be designed and implemented within the city of Berkeley (See Abbreviated Appendix N, pp. 3088-3095). To support this initiative, the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) has established a comprehensive Transparency Hub17 with data and analysis designed to support the Ceasefire process and inform the community of BPD’s efforts in this space.
As the Reimagining Public Safety work transitioned to Phase 2 of analysis and implementation, on June 28, 2022, the City of Berkeley ratified a budget for FY 2023 & FY 2024 with an allocation of $1,000,000 dedicated to addressing the increase in gun violence that the city of Berkeley has experienced in recent years. The budget item, titled “Ceasefire,” is predicated on said prior discussions on potential community-based violence prevention strategies. The City Manager has since issued an Off Agenda Memo in
October 2022 providing updates on progress thus far, highlighting BPD’s preliminary steps, including engagement with Ceasefire programs in surrounding cities and other violence prevention programs when there are Berkeley connections to crime in other jurisdictions as well as their expanded partnership with UC Berkeley to include a collaboration with the Goldman School of Public Policy to design a Gun Violence Prevention program evaluation plan including the definition of success metrics and independent analysis thereof. (See Abbreviated Appendix N, pp. 3014-3087, for Report). In addition to the Police Department’s efforts, Councilmember Taplin has coordinated several advisory group meetings inviting a number of community stakeholders and experts in violence reduction programs.
These meetings included faith leaders and community-based organizations in Berkeley. The meetings involved identifying current systems and other stakeholders who should be engaged in the process as
15 https://nicjr.org/
16 https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BerkeleyReport_030722.pdf#page=100 17 https://bpd-transparency-initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS
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well as discussions as to what strategies would work best in Berkeley. A memo was published April 2023 (See Abbreviated Appendix N, page p. 3088, for April 2023 memo).
The Gun Violence Prevention (GVP) report was completed in summer 2023 and preliminary analyses and findings have been presented to the Chief of Police and City Manager’s Office, and are expected to be presented to the City Council December 5, 2023 (See Appendix N, pp. 3014-3087, for Gun Violence Prevention Report). Unspent funds ($1,000,000) from Fiscal Year 2023 have been requested for carryover to FY 2024 as part of AA0#1. The Assistant to the City Manager, now onboarded in their role as the Reimagining Public Safety Project Coordinator, will collaborate with essential stakeholders to design the forthcoming steps and processes tailored to meet the specific requirements of Berkeley’s GVP program. The team will also explore the potential need for a Request for Proposal (RFP) during this phase.
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Considerations:
• CBO/Staffing Recruitment: The current recruitment landscape presents its own set of challenges. Staffing up qualified organizations/individuals for this program may face prolonged lead times in recruitment. Beyond initial recruitment, the essential training required to ensure the efficacy of the GVP launch may further extend lead times.
Ongoing Timeline:
• December 2023 – ongoing: Unspent funds from FY 2023 have been requested for carryover as part of AA0#1. GVP findings are scheduled to be presented to the City Council December 5, 2023. The Assistant to the City Manager will collaborate with essential stakeholders. This collaboration aims to design the forthcoming steps and processes tailored to meet the specific requirements of the GVP program.
RPS Phase Timeline Status
Phase 1
(2020-2022)
Spring 2022
Preliminary Steps. NICJR Presents report to Task Force and Council. Councilmember Terry Taplin presents budget
recommendations. BPD launches transparency hub.
June 2022 $1M allocation adopted for Gun Violence Prevention Program.
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
November 2022 Gun Violence Prevention (GVP) Preliminary Analysis Initiated May 2023 GVP Report complete.
August 2023 Assistant to the City Manager – Reimagining Public Safety Project Coordinator hired.
Anticipated
December 2023 Comprehensive update on Reimagining and Project update for GVP.
Anticipated
Winter 2024 –
ongoing
Preliminary research and stakeholder engagement for next steps and possible process.
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ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS/FINES
HEARING OFFICER-ALTER NATIVES TO SANCTIO
NS/FINES
Department Lead: Public Works Department
Status Update: In Progress (funding deferred to AAO#1)
Overview:
As a Phase 2 item in the Reimagining Public Safety initiative, $150,000 was allocated for Fiscal Year 2024 to enhance hearing officer resources. The remit of this allocation includes referring individuals to community service and social services for various infractions, such as low-level violations related to parking.
As previously mentioned, several Reimagining Public Safety deliverables, have yet to be initiated.
Additionally, at the City Council’s Budget & Finance Committee meeting on June 22, 2023 and June 27, 2023 City Council session, several Reimagining Tier 1 requests were deferred to the December 2023 Annual Appropriations Ordinance #1 process (See Companion Appendix K, pp. 2902-2997 for Budget & Finance Committee Annotated Agenda and June 2023 Item 53 Council Supplemental Item). The City Manager’s Office anticipates exploring next steps towards fulfilling this deliverable once a decision around funding has been finalized at the AAO #1 meeting. In light of the need to address the backlog of the administrative review queue, the Public Works Department has expanded resources to bring on an assistant to support with this process.
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Ongoing Timeline:
• Fall 2023 – ongoing: As of this report’s submission, this deliverable has yet to be initiated. The Public Works Department anticipates exploring next steps towards fulfilling this deliverable, once a decision around funding has been finalized at the AAO #1 meeting.
RPS Phase Timeline Milestone
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
June 2023 City Council referred several Reimagining Tier 1 requests to the November 2023 Annual Appropriations Ordinance #1 process.
Anticipated
October 2023 –
ongoing
The Public Works Department anticipates exploring next steps towards fulfilling this deliverable, once a decision around funding has been made at the AAO#1 meeting.
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS
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EXPAND DOWNTOWN STREETS TEAMS
Department Lead: Public Works Dep artment
Status Update: In Progress (funding deferred to AAO#1)
Overview:
In Phase 2, a budgetary provision of $50,000 was allocated for Fiscal Years 2023 and 2024 to expand the scope of the City’s contract with Downtown Streets Team18. On May 31, 2022, City Council approved Resolution No. 70, 394-N.S to allow for City staff to enter into sole source negotiations with DST for new pricing, contract terms, and scope of services in support of the Clean Cities Program for the continuation of hand sweeping, leaf and litter removal, graffiti abatement, and poster removal services for various commercial districts (See Companion Appendix O, pp. 3097-3100 for 2022 Contract with Downtown Streets Team).
As mentioned, several Reimagining Public Safety deliverables have yet to be initiated. Additionally, at the Berkeley Budget & Finance Committee meeting on June 22, 2023 and June 27, 2023 City Council session, several Reimagining Tier 1 requests have been referred to the December 2023 Annual Appropriations Ordinance #1 process (See Companion Appendix K, pp. 2902-2997 for Budget & Finance Committee Annotated Agenda and June 2023 Item 53 Council Supplemental Item).
Public Works has since then entered into a new contract with Downtown Streets Team, June 27, 2023 wherein which DST supports the city with services related to hand sweeping, graffiti and litter abatement, poster removal, and low barrier volunteer work experience programming (See Companion Appendix O, pp. 3101-3103 for 2023 Contract with Downtown Streets Team). The Public Works department anticipates exploring next steps towards fulfilling this deliverable, once a decision around funding has been finalized at the AAO #1 meeting.
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Ongoing Timeline:
• Fall 2023 – ongoing: As of this report’s submission, this deliverable has yet to be initiated. The Public Works Department anticipates exploring next steps towards fulfilling this deliverable, once a decision around funding has been finalized at the AAO #1 meeting.
18 https://www.streetsteam.org/berkeley
RPS Phase Timeline Milestone
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
June 2023
City Council referred several Reimagining Tier 1 requests to the December 2023 Annual Appropriations Ordinance #1 process. Public Works enters contract with Downtown Streets Team.
Anticipated
October 2023 –
ongoing
The Public Works Department anticipates exploring next steps towards fulfilling this deliverable, once a decision around funding has been made at the AAO#1 meeting.
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS
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COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH, BEHAVIORAL, AND
CRISIS RESPONSE
COMMUNITY CRISIS RESPONSE SERVICES (BRIDGE SERVICES)
Department Lead: Health, Housing and Community Services Department Status Update: In Progress
Overview:
Within the framework of Phase 1 of the Reimagining Public Safety initiative, the city was actively engaged in the planning stages of the Specialized Care Unit (SCU). The SCU, envisioned as a 24/7 mobile unit, will provide support to individuals experiencing a mental health or substance abuse crisis, without necessitating direct police involvement. During the design period, with HHCS actively engaged in the development process, the city recognized the pressing need to enhance non-police relationships and support for individuals at risk of entering a crisis state. In response to this need, the City Council, on June 29, 2021, allocated up to $1,200,000 from the FY 2022 budget, sourced from the American Rescue Plan, to fund the Community Crisis Response (CCR) services. These services, intended to bridge the gap until the SCU became operational, were also referred to as “Bridge Services.”
In pursuit of these goals, the City issues a Request for Proposals, seeking community-based organizations (CBOs) and groups with expertise to provide these supportive services. The City of Berkeley received proposals from three local organizations, Alameda County Network of Mental Health
Clients19 (Berkeley Drop-in Center), Options Recovery20, and Women’s Daytime Drop-in Center21, each with intent to expand their current service offerings. The review committee, consisting of representatives from the Health, Housing and Community Services Department, the Fire Department, the Mental Health Commission, and the Berkeley Community Safety Coalition, recommended funding all three contracts (See Companion Appendix P, pp. 3105-3110 for City Manager’s consent item).
These contracts will provide financial support to:
1. Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients (Berkeley Drop-in Center) to expand their peer support programming for crisis prevention, crisis intervention and post-crisis support (See Companion Appendix P, pp. 3111-3150 for Peer Wellness Berkeley Drop-In Center Contract)
2. Options Recovery for hiring Substance Use Disorder (SUD) Navigators for culturally competent stage-matched interventions (See Companion Appendix P, pp. 3151-3244 for Options Recovery Contract)
3. Women’s Daytime Drop-in Center for enhanced mental health care services to the community including assessment, linkages, workshops, and goal-setting (See Companion Appendix P, pp. 3180-3215 for Women’s Daytime Drop-in Center Contract)
19 https://alameda.networkofcare.org/mh/services/agency.aspx?pid=BerkeleyDropInCenter_344_2 _0 20 https://optionsrecoveryservices.com/
21 https://www.womensdropin.org/
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As Reimagining efforts have transitioned into Phase 2 of the implementation process, these contracts were initiated in Spring 2022, and amended to be extended the following year, while the Specialized Care Unit, having launched September 2023, continues to build and ramp up.
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Ongoing Timeline:
• Fall 2023 – ongoing:
HHCS will continue
partnership Alameda County
Network of Mental Health
Clients (Berkeley Drop-in
Center), Options Recovery,
and Women’s Daytime
Drop-in Center for
Community Crisis Response
Services, while the SCU will
continue to hire and train
staff to build toward 24/7
operations.
RPS Phase Timeline Milestone
Phase 1
(2020-2022)
June 2021
City Council approves to allocate $1,200,000 from the FY 2022 budget, sourced from the American Rescue Plan, to fund the Community Crisis Response (CCR) services.
Summer 2021 RFP Process initiated.
November 2021
Consent item issued to adopt three Resolutions authorizing the City Manager to execute contracts and any amendments or extensions with Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients (Berkeley Drop-in Center), Options Recovery, and Women’s Daytime Drop-in Center for Community Crisis Response Services, in an amount not to exceed $1,200,000.
Spring 2022 –
Winter 2022
Contracts with Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients (Berkeley Drop-in Center), Options Recovery, and Women’s Daytime Drop-in Center initiated.
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
Spring 2023 –
ongoing
Contracts with Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients (Berkeley Drop-in Center), Options Recovery, and Women’s Daytime Drop-in Center renewed/amended, while the SCU will continue to hire and train staff to build toward 24/7 operations.
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YOUTH PEERS MENTAL HEALTH, BEHAVIORAL, AND CRISIS RESPONSE Department Lead: Health, Housing and Community Services Department Status Update: In Progress
Overview:
The City’s Health, Housing, and Community Services (HHCS) Department has initiated a collaborative effort with the Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD). Central to this partnership is the establishment of a Wellness Center at Berkeley High School22. This center is envisioned as a new space for students, providing an environment conducive to rejuvenation, connectivity, and well-being. This initiative falls under of Phase 2 of the Reimagining Public Safety’s Community Investments, with “Community Mental Health, Behavioral and Crisis Response” identified as a focal sub-category. In alignment with this vision, the City of Berkeley has allocated $175,000 for Fiscal Year 2023 and 2024 (totaling $350,000) to contract and cover the salary and benefits for a BHS Mental Health and Wellbeing Coordinator to oversee the Wellness Center. In addition, the City partially funds the MEET and Wellness Counselor at the Center (See Companion Appendix Q, pp. 3215-3239 for BUSD Contract and Scope of Services).
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Considerations:
• Coordination with the Berkeley High School Health Center: The BHS Health Center, operated by the mental health and public health divisions of HHCS, continues to provide first aid, mental health, youth development, and reproductive and sexual health services to students on campus. As Wellness Center services are largely preventive in nature, and Wellness Center and Health Center staff will coordinate as needed to support the unique needs of students.
Ongoing Timeline:
• Fall 2023 – ongoing: BUSD will submit a project evaluation plan to HHCS. Evaluation #1 will be delivered to HHCS July 2024.
22 https://sites.google.com/berkeley.net/bhswellness/bhs-mental-health-resources RPS Phase Timeline Milestone
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
July 2023 Mental Health Wellness Coordinator Hired.
August 2023 Wellness Center Refurbishing and Soft Opening.
August 2023 –
ongoing
BUSD - HHCS Collaboration Meeting.
Outreach activities to introduce MHW Coordinator to BUSD staff, students, and parents (as appropriate).
Preliminary Wellness Center activity and services offered Anticipated
November 2023 BUSD submits project evaluation plan to HHCS.
Anticipated
July 2024
Evaluation #1 due to HHCS (for the period of June 26, July 15, 2024 2023 - June 30, 2024).
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS
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RESPITE FROM GENDER VIOLENCE
RESPITE FROM GENDER VIOLENCE
Department Lead: Health, Housing and Community Services Department Status Update: In Progress
Overview:
The Health, Housing, and Community Services (HHCS) Department has initiated a strategic effort to conduct a systems analysis concerning respite from gender violence and its intersections with other pertinent crisis response systems. The purpose is to increase the community’s knowledge about respite resources, understand their strengths and challenges, and to identify gaps that can be addressed. To facilitate this, a temporary Community Services Specialist II was hired in August 2023 to lead the process. Additional resources will be identified to fill service gaps.
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Considerations:
• Community Collaboration: Prioritizing insights from community partners ensure that the policy evolution remains responsive to the lived experience, policy needs, and priorities of survivor communities.
Ongoing Timeline:
• Fall 2023 – ongoing: The Health, Housing, and Community Services Department anticipates continuing research and evaluation to identify resources available based on the needs of the community.
RPS Phase Timeline Milestone
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
August 2023 Temporary Community Services Specialist II hired.
October –
November 2023
Preliminary steps of research to identify resources available at the local, state, and federal level.
Anticipated
Fall 2023 –
ongoing
Continued research and evaluation to identify resources available based on the needs of the community.
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LANGUAGE EQUITY
LANGUAGE EQUITY
Department Lead: City Manager’s Office
Status Update: To Be Initiated (FY 23 carryover request to AAO#1) Overview:
In Phase 2 of the Reimagining Public Safety initiative, the City Council allocated a budget of $15,000 for Fiscal Year 2023 to support the publication of victim resources in plain language and multiple languages.
This strategic investment is aimed at expanding accessibility and ensuring that vital information and support services are readily available to all members of the community, including those with limited English proficiency, non-English speakers, and individuals with low-literacy levels. This initiative directly aligns with the recommendations outlined in the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force Report (See Companion Appendix A, pp. 938-941 for Reimagining Public Safety Task Force Report).
Unspent funds ($15,000) from Fiscal Year 2023 have been requested for carryover to FY 2024 as part of AA0#1. The Assistant to the City Manager, serving as the Reimagining Public Safety project manager will coordinate with the Health Housing and Community Services Department, specifically, their newly appointed Community Services Specialist II who is focusing on respite from gender violence work.
Key Accomplishments and Next Steps:
Ongoing Timeline:
• Fall 2023 – ongoing: The team anticipates continuing research and evaluation to identify resources available based on the needs of the community. As the City progresses in this phase, the team will coordinate to identify usage for language equity funds.
RPS Phase Timeline Milestone
Phase 2
(2022-2024)
August 2023 Assistant to the City Manager and temporary Community Services Specialist II hired.
October –
November 2023
Preliminary steps of research to identify resources available at the local, state, and federal level.
Anticipated
Fall 2023 –
ongoing
Continued research and evaluation to identify resources available based on the needs of the community; coordination to identify usage for language equity funds.
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APPENDICES
Please refer to the Companion Appendix online for a comprehensive archive.
To access the full Companion Appendix referenced in the Status Report, please visit the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force landing page to find the full Companion Appendix under Additional Information: https://berkeleyca.gov/your- government/boards-commissions/reimagining-public-safety-task-force
For quick reference of new materials introduced, please refer to the Abbreviated Appendix.
ABBREVIATED APPENDIX
REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY
Status Update and Report Out
City Manager’s Office
Fall 2023
Introduction
The abbreviated appendix for the Reimagining Public Safety Status Report highlights the new materials related to the City of Berkeley's Phase 2 efforts, that are not already accessible via Records Online.
Extracted from the full "Companion Appendix," these key items include a Reimagining Public Safety Coordination Plan (Appendix D) and a Gun Violence Prevention Report (Appendix N).
To access the full Companion Appendix referenced in the Status Report, please visit the Reimagining Public Safety Task Force landing page to find the full Companion Appendix under Additional Information https://berkeleyca.gov/your-government/boards-commissions/reimagining-public-safety-task-force
APPENDIX D
Reimagining Public Safety Coordination Plan
PAGE 2476
APPENDIX D
City Manager’s Office
Reimagining Public Safety Coordination Plan
PAGE 2477
APPENDIX D
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 3 2 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Objective of the Reimagining Public Safety Initiative Coordination Plan ................................ .... 4
2.2 Drivers, Problems to be Solved, and Communities Impacted ................................ ..................... 4
2.3 Purpose and Value to Organization ................................ ................................ .......................... 5 3 Reimagining Public Safety Team .......................................................................................... 6 4 Deliverables and Tasks ........................................................................................................ 7 5 Assumptions and Constraints .............................................................................................. 8 6 Project Budget .................................................................................................................... 9
6.1 Reporting Process, Frequency, and Deadlines ................................ ................................ ........... 9
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APPENDIX D
1 Executive Summary
Introduction: The Reimagining Public Safety (RPS) initiative is a groundbreaking effort by the City of Berkeley to transform its approach to public safety. The initiative aims to build a safe, equitable, and thriving community through a redefined, multidisciplinary approach to public safety.
Justification: The RPS initiative aims to achieve a transformative approach to public safety, improving community well-being and potentially reducing long-term costs. The expected outcome includes not just policy adjustments but also broad, systemic change.
Objectives: To fulfill1 the task activities and deliverables outlined within the Mayor and Councils recommendations and phased approach regarding Reimagining Public Safety:
1. Refer up to $5.3 Million to the FY 2023-2024 Budget Process for staff and/or consulting services and community investments to complete the Priority Reimagining Public Safety Initiatives listed in Attachment 1, Section A to the report
2. Direct the City Manager to prioritize over the next two years the programmatic recommendations for Phase 1 of Reimagining Implementation listed in Attachment 1, Section B to the report.
3. Direct the City Manager to initiate a design process for an innovative and comprehensive public safety agency or Department of Community Safety within the City of Berkeley administration, as outlined in Attachment 1, Section C to the report, and return with recommendations to the City Council by May 2024 to align with the FY 25-26 Biennial Budget process.
4. Except where resources may allow for expedited implementation, refer additional reforms to the FY 2025- 2026 Biennial Budget as outlined in Attachment 1, Section D to the report.
Scope: The initiative encompasses a breadth of fields including, but not limited to, law enforcement, health, housing and community services, dispatch analysis and coordination with our fire teams, and public works.
It will focus on collaborative, proactive, and problem-solving approaches that align with the mission and values of our City and Reimagining Public Safety efforts.
Purpose of the Coordination Plan: This coordination plan is aims to integrate the Assistant to the City Manager, serving as the Reimagining Public Safety Project Coordinator, into the RPS Team and establish a framework for collaborating. Designated City Departments (CMO, HHCS, Police, Fire, Public Works), who have been spearheading this initiative forward, will continue to serve as leads for respective Reimagining Public Safety deliverables. The Assistant to the City Manager will serve as the RPS project coordinator and work collaboratively alongside Departments to catalog and report-out RPS project progress.
Timeline: This timeline will follow the 2020-2026 phased approach outlined here.
Budget and Resources: A budget of up to $5.3 million has been referred for the FY 2023-2024 Budget Process. Staff and/or consulting services will be engaged for implementing deliverables.
Next Steps: This coordination plan is a dynamic document and may be updated as needed. Upon formal approval of this plan, we will make every effort to execute the plans and activities outlined herein. 1 Unless otherwise amended.
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APPENDIX D
2 Introduction
2.1 Objective of the Reimagining Public Safety Initiative Coordination Plan The primary objective of this Coordination Plan is to articulate the integration of project coordinator responsibilities within the broader context of leaders and teams committed to propelling the Reimagining Public Safety (RPS) initiative forward. Given the dynamic nature of the RPS initiative, the coordination plan is inherently a living document, adaptable to the evolving needs of the team. It establishes a framework for reporting on the progress of various deliverables and sub-deliverables associated with the Reimagining Public Safety initiative (RPS) being implemented across the City of Berkeley. The Assistant to the City Manager – RPS Project Coordinator’s role will primarily involve cataloging ongoing work, managing information flow, and ensuring that the key stakeholders are informed of RPS developments and progress.
2.2 Drivers, Problems to be Solved, and Communities Impacted In striving to reimagine public safety, Berkeley’s efforts encompass a balanced distribution of resources, reassessment of policing responsibilities, strategic community investments, and the design of a holistic approach to safety. This approach seeks to offer a balanced model for addressing public safety while also attending to various community needs.
Drivers & Motivators Problems to be Solved Communities Impacted • Community Well-
being
• Public Trust
• Equity and Inclusion
• Legislative
Momentum
• Resource
Optimization
• Fiscal Responsibility
• Compliance and
Accountability
• Resilience and
Preparedness
• Technological
Advances
• Addressing Historical
Inequities
• Scope and Range of Police
Responsibilities
• Community Investment Gap
• Resource Allocation
• Public Perception and Trust
• Data and Reporting
• Diverse Population
Dynamics
• Community Call Responses
• Holistic Safety and Well-
being Approach
• Sustainability
• City of Berkeley Residents
o Communities of Color
o Low Income Communities
o LGBTQIA+ Communities
o Justice-Impacted Communities
o Mental Health & Substance Use Communities
o Youth & Students
o Immigrant Communities
o Justice-Impacted Communities
• Community Based Organizations
• Government Officials
o City Departments: CMO, Fire, Police, HHCS,
Public Works, HR, IT, Finance
o Council Committees: Public Safety Policy
Committee, FITES Committee, Health, Life
Enrichment, Equity & Community Committee,
Budget & Finance Policy Committee
o Boards & Commissions: Mental Health
Commission, Public Safety Policy Committee,
Police Accountability Board, RPS Taskforce
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APPENDIX D
2.3 Purpose and Value to Organization
The purpose of the Reimagining Public Safety Initiative in the City of Berkeley is to develop a more equitable, holistic, and community-centered approach to public safety. By reassessing and restructuring traditional models, we aim to address systemic inequities, increase community trust, and efficiently allocate resources for the well-being of all residents. This initiative not only seeks to enhance the city’s public safety and community engagement, but also positions Berkeley as a potential model for innovative, comprehensive, and inclusive public safety strategies nationwide. Reimagining Public Safety Principles, Commitments, and Objectives
Guiding Principle Commitment
REIMAGINE
Redesign public safety
from a traditional Police
Department to one that
is focused on the diverse
needs of the community
it serves.
A transformative approach to community-centered safety and reducing the scope of policing, by re-defining our understanding of safety to be holistic and focus not just on crime prevention but health, wellness, and economic security for all of our residents. While the focus has been on reducing the footprint of policing, we recognize that police play a critical role in our society, and we must determine the right size, focus and function of our Police Department to prevent and respond to crime, while exploring alternative response models and upstream investments in social services to create a healthy, safe and equitable community.
Reimagining health and safety, considering allocating resources towards a more holistic approach - one that shifts resources away from policing towards health, education and social services, and is able to meet crises with a variety of appropriate responses.
Identifying alternatives to policing and enforcement to re duce conflict, harm, and institutionalization , introduce alternative and restorative justice models, and reduce or eliminate use of fines and incarceration.
IMPROVE
Improve the City of
Berkeley’s public safety
system for residents and
communities that have
experienced the greatest
harm from the existing
public safety model.
A broad, inclusive community process that will result in deep and lasting change to support safety and wellbeing for all Berkeley residents.
Determining the appropriate response to community calls for help including size, scope of operation and powers and duties of a well-trained police department.
Supporting police by freeing them to focus on what they do best: respond to and investigate crimes.
REINVEST
Increase equitable
investment in vulnerable
communities and for
those who have been
historically marginalized.
Equitable investment in the essential conditions of a safe and healthy community , especially for those who have been historically marginalized and have experienced disinvestment.
Providing meaningful safety, continuing critical health and social services, and committing to, and investing in, a new, positive, equitable and community-centered approach to health and safety that is affordable and sustainable.
Ensuring an appropriately staffed and deployed Police Department while reducing the impact of Police expenditures to the General Fund; Investing in a suite of alternative response services and a sophisticated dispatch system to deploy the most appropriate emergency response in a cost-effective manner.
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APPENDIX D
3 Reimagining Public Safety Team
The Reimagining Public Safety Team has undertaken the substantial task of reshaping the city’s approach to public safety, following the City Council’s adoption of the July 2020 omnibus motion. This initiative, as noted in the City Manager’s report, represents a collective effort, drawing together city departments, community stakeholders, field experts, and the dedicated Reimagining Public Safety Task Force to collaboratively design a new public safety paradigm.
In Phase 1 (2020-2022), the City Manager, leadership team, and city staff actively engaged in comprehensive consultations and strategic planning sessions; their efforts, focused on ensuring that the initiatives underway are well-aligned with both the community’s needs and the city council’s directives, set the stage leading into Phase 2 (2022-2024).
The table below offers an overview of the Reimagining Public Safety Team’s structure for Phase 2, acknowledging the individuals and their collaborative work2. It is crucial to emphasize that this initiative is a city-wide effort, reliant on the active involvement of a variety of city staff and community-based subject matter experts throughout its phased implementation. This team is uniquely situated to continue accomplishing this work. Their dedication, passion and leadership around this work is truly exceptional.
Department RPS Team
City Manager’s Office (CMO)
Dee Williams Ridley City Manager
LaTanya Bellow Deputy City Manager
Anne Cardwell Deputy City Manager
Carianna Arredondo Assistant to the City Manager
Reimagining Public Safety Project Coordinator
Health Housing and
Community Services (HHCS)
Dr. Lisa Warhuus Director, Health Housing and Community Services Katherine Hawn Senior Management Analyst, HHCS
RPS Team Lead Representative (HHCS)
Police
Chief Jennifer Louis Chief of Police
Lt. Matthew McGee Lieutenant, Police
RPS Team Lead Representative (Police)
Fire
Chief David Sprague Chief of Fire
Shanalee Gallagher Program Manager, Fire
RPS Team Lead Representative ( Fire)
Public Works Liam Garland Director, Public Works
RPS Team Lead Representative (Public Works)
City Attorney’s Office (CAO) Brendan Darrow Assistant City Attorney City Attorney’s Office (CAO) Emile Durette Assistant to the City Attorney RPS Team Lead Representative (City Attorney ’s Office)
2 As noted in the Executive Summary, this coordination plan is aims to integrate the Assistant to the City Manager, serving as the Reimagining Public Safety Project Coordinator, into the RPS Team and establish a framework for collaborating. Designated City Departments (CMO, HHCS, Police, Fire, Public Works), who have been spearheading this initiative forward, will continue to serve as leads for respective Reimagining Public Safety deliverables. The Assistant to the City Manager will serve as the RPS project coordinator and work collaboratively alongside Departments to catalog and report-out RPS project progress.
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4 Deliverables and Tasks
At the time of this coordination plan’s creation, the Reimagining Public Safety initiative has already been set into motion. City departments, each taking steps in line with their specific mandates and responsibility, are continuing to move forward in their efforts to support this initiative. Department Heads and the designated RPS Team leads will collaborate with the Assistant to the City Manager serving as the RPS project coordinator in identifying and cataloging work that has already been completed, work that is in progress, and future tasks that still require action. This consolidated view will enable effective resource allocation, risk management, and strategic planning, thus ensuring the deliverables are executed in a timely and effective manner.
Department Deliverable
City Manager’s Office (CMO)
Phase 1 • Community Engagement Process
Phase 2
• Asst. To City Manager – RPS Project Coordinator
• DEI Officer & Asst to DEI Officer
• Grant Assistance
• Department of Community/Public Safety Design
• Fines/Fees Analysis
• Ceasefire Analysis, Design & (early) Implementation
Phase 3 • Ceasefire Implementation
• Launch Universal Basic Income Pilot
Health Housing and
Community Services (HHCS)
Phase 1 • Specialized Care Unit Design
• Bridge Services
Phase 2
• Specialized Care Unit Implementation
• Respite from Gender Violence
• Needs and Capacity Assessment
• Violence Prevention and Youth Services
• Youth Peers Mental Health Response
Phase 3 • Specialized Care Unit Expansion
Police
Phase 1 • Fair and Impartial Policing
Phase 2
• Fair & Impartial Policing
• Beat Study & Staffing Assessment
• Wellness Funding -- CIS Contract & PST
• Staffing – Community Service Officers & Dispatchers
Phase 3 • BPD Budget & Staffing Update
Fire
Phase 1 • Dispatch Analysis Study Design
Phase 2 • Dispatch Analysis Study Implementation
Phase 3 • Dispatch Redesign Application
Public Works
Phase 1 • BerkDOT Design
Phase 2
• BerkDOT Analysis & Implementation
• Associate Planner for Vision Zero Collision Analysis
• Expand Downtown Streets Teams
• Hearing Officers Alternatives to Sanctions/Fines
Phase 3 • BerkDOT Implementation
• Implementation of Public Safety Department
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5 Assumptions and Constraints
In planning and executing the Reimagining Public Safety initiative, it’s crucial to identify the underlying assumptions that guide our strategies, as well as the constraints that may limit our options. This section outlines these assumptions and constraints to provide a structured framework for decision-making, risk management, and effective project implementation on an inter-departmental level.
Assumption/Constraint Description Example Detail
Funding
Adequate financial resources will be available for
implementing various aspects of the project. Budget allocation, grants, etc.
Limited funds may restrict the extent of changes or
pace implementation.
Budget caps, competing
priorities.
Community Support
There is strong community support and engagement in
the reimagining process.
Community meetings,
surveys, etc.
Resistance or opposition from certain community
groups may slow down the project’s pace.
Public protests, negative
media attention.
Legislative Framework
Necessary changes in local and state laws will be made
to facilitate project goals.
Policy adjustments for
unarmed enforcement.
Existing laws may limit the types of changes that can
be implemented immediately.
State laws on unarmed
enforcement.
Staff Recruitment/Retention
Required staff positions will be filled timely and will remain stable throughout the project.
Assistant City Managers,
Vision Zero Coordinator, etc.
Constraints on hiring or retaining the specialized staff required for the project.
Recruitment challenges,
staffing shortages, causing
delay.
High attrition rates.
Hiring and training can take
up to a year due to added
measures in this specialty.
Technology
Technology platforms will effectively support new
dispatch and response models.
Software for prioritized
dispatch.
Technological limitations may constrain the speed or
effectiveness of new systems or models. Outdated systems, interoperability issues,
extended timelines.
Request for Proposals is often a 6-month process.
Actual implementation of new systems could take up to
two years.
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6 Project Budget
A budget allocation of up to $5.3 million3 has been designated for Fiscal Year 2023-2024. Together with additional grants, the total funding for the Reimagining Public Safety Initiative exceeds approximately $9 million. Developed based on recommendations from the City Manager, Mayor, and City Council the budget serves as a financial blueprint for responsibly allocating resources and achieving the initiative’s objectives. For optimized tracking and reporting, we’ve established a simple process that involves multiple stakeholders.
6.1 Reporting Process, Frequency, and Deadlines
The given the dynamic nature of the Reimagining Public Safety work, the team will continue to collaborate on identifying and improving best practices for budget process. RPS Project Leads will be responsible for sharing the following information for respective RPS-related deliverables:
Type of Expense Tracking Information
For Contracted Items • Vendor Name
• Contract # (if applicable)
• Budget COA
For Staffing Positions • Position Filled (Y/N)
• Job Description/Posting Link
Considering the RPS work is funded by the city across FY 2023 and FY 2024, a quarterly reporting cadence is most effective.
By adhering to these guidelines and protocols, we aim to maintain rigorous control and agility while effectively making meaningful progress on the Reimagining Public Safety Initiative.
3 Subject to change based on bi-annual budget review process and recommendations.
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Gun Violence Prevention (Ceasefire) Related Supporting Documentation PAGE 3013
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The author conducted this study as part of the program of professional education at the Goldman School of Public Policy, Univ ersity of California at Berkeley. This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree. The judgments and conclus ions are solely those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Goldman School of Public Polic y, by the University of California or by any other agency.
GUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION
Berkeley, California
Michelle A. Verger MPP ‘23
[email protected]
Abstract
This research extensively reviews the relevant literature on gun crime, crime concentration, gun violence prevention approaches, and small city gun violence prevention taken from other programs. Various interventions are evaluated using specific criteria in the context of Berkeley’s “brand” of gun violence. The recommended program is a combination of police and non-police interventions that hopefully brings a holistic sense to the program. This research also makes recommendations as to implementation and program evaluation.
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2 Table of Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 5 Statement of Positionality ................................................................................................................................ 7 Introduction and Problem Analysis ................................................................................................................... 7 Gun Crimes and Regulations Legal Landscape in Berkeley ............................................................................. 11 Data Analysis Results ...................................................................................................................................... 12 Hot Spot Analysis ....................................................................................................................................................... 12 Social Network Analysis ............................................................................................................................................. 13 Key Criteria ..................................................................................................................................................... 15 Program components ..................................................................................................................................... 16 Component #1: Hot Spots Policing/Place-based Policing ........................................................................................... 16 Component #2: Hot Spots Policing Version of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) ....................................................... 17 Social Network Analysis, Focused Deterrence, and Social Services............................................................................ 18 Component #3: SNA and Focused Deterrence/Custom Notifications ........................................................................................ 18 Component #4: SNA and Social Services .................................................................................................................................. 19 Component #5 Warrants to Remove Firearms from Domestic Abusers (DVROs) and Individuals Posing a Danger to Themselves or Others (GVROs), Court-Issued Protective Orders, and Criminal Protective Orders (CPOs) ................. 20 Component #6 Street Outreach Workers/Violence Interrupters ............................................................................... 20 Component #7 Hospital-Based Violence Intervention ............................................................................................... 21 Component #8 Gun Buyback Programs ..................................................................................................................... 21 Longer Term Solutions Addressing the Root Causes of Gun Violence ........................................................................ 21 Evaluating Components Using Criteria ........................................................................................................... 21 Hot Spots Policing ...................................................................................................................................................... 21 Hot Spots Version of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) ............................................................................................. 25 SNA and Focused Deterrence .................................................................................................................................... 26 SNA and Social Services ............................................................................................................................................. 27 Warrants to Remove Firearms from Domestic Abusers (DVROs), Individuals Posing a Danger to Themselves or Others (GVROs), Court-Issued Protective Orders, and Criminal Protective Orders (CPOs) ......................................... 28 Street Outreach Workers/Violence Interrupters ....................................................................................................... 29 Hospital Based Violence Intervention ........................................................................................................................ 30 Gun Buyback Programs .............................................................................................................................................. 31 PAGE 3015
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3 Packaged components into programs ............................................................................................................ 31 Alternative #1: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers ....................................... 31 Alternative #2: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers + SNA Focused Deterrence .................................................................................................................................................................................. 31 Alternative #3: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers + SNA Focused Deterrence + Social Services ......................................................................................................................................................... 32 Program recommendation .............................................................................................................................. 32 Implementation .............................................................................................................................................. 32 POP at Hot Spots ....................................................................................................................................................... 33 Focused Deterrence/Custom Notifications ................................................................................................................ 34 Street Outreach Workers ........................................................................................................................................... 35 Social Services ........................................................................................................................................................... 35 Program Evaluation ........................................................................................................................................ 36 Program Evaluation Recommendation ...................................................................................................................... 36 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 37 Appendices ...................................................................................................................................................... 39 Appendix A: Research Approach and Methodology .................................................................................................. 39 Overview of Research Sources ................................................................................................................................................. 39 Interview Protocol ................................................................................................................................................................... 39 Interview Practices Employed .................................................................................................................................................. 39 Interview Subjects ................................................................................................................................................................... 39 Appendix B Literature Review ................................................................................................................................... 41 Crime Concentration/Place-Based Policing .............................................................................................................................. 41 Gun Buyback Programs ........................................................................................................................................................... 44 Hot Spots Policing ................................................................................................................................................................... 46 Problem Oriented Policing ....................................................................................................................................................... 50 Social Network Analysis as it Relates to Gun Violence .............................................................................................................. 52 Gangs and Gang Membership .................................................................................................................................................. 54 Domestic Violence and Firearm Accessibility............................................................................................................................ 55 Hospital Based Violence Intervention Programs (HVIPs) ........................................................................................................... 56 Focused Deterrence (Custom Notifications) ............................................................................................................................. 57 Street Outreach Teams/Violence Interrupters ......................................................................................................................... 58 Root Causes of Gun Violence ................................................................................................................................................... 61 Appendix C Visualizations .......................................................................................................................................... 62 Hot Spot Visualizations ............................................................................................................................................................ 62 Social Network Analysis Visualizations ..................................................................................................................................... 64 PAGE 3016
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4 Appendix D Criteria Matrix ........................................................................................................................................ 66 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 68
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5 Executive Summary
Gun violence in Berkeley is rising rapidly and becoming a city-wide concern. As such, the City Council has affirmed a $1 million budget for “Berkeley Ceasefire” that will fund non-police interventions. Within the police department, the Gun Violence Intervention Working Group of the Berkeley Police Department is partnering with a UC Berkeley researcher to develop a program that incorporates both police and non-police interventions.
Causes of this steep rise in gun violence – from seven to over 50 annually in the last five years – are several. 4% have been fatal, 21% have resulted in injury, and 75% were simply “shots fired”. First, Berkeley’s problem is in the context of skyrocketing gun violence nationwide and regionally. Second, the proliferation of ghost guns makes it even more difficult to suppress supply-side dynamics. Third, street-crew shootings and domestic violence make up some portion of shootings. However, much of the gun violence is not categorized and cannot be attributed to any one cause.
This research employs mixed methods. Qualitatively, an extensive literature review was done on major topics around gun violence and prevention, and interviews with experts and practitioners were conducted. Quantitatively, I calculated geospatial point density using ArcGIS to locate “hot spots” and I performed social network analysis (SNA) to identify networks relevant to gun violence. Geospatially, I identified seven key locations for the department and community to focus interventions on. SNA revealed key ideal recipients of both social service outreach and focused deterrence measures.
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6 Hot Spots Identified
Berkeley Shootings Social Network of Offenders and Victims
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7 I considered a basic version of hot spots policing, a problem-solving version of hot spots policing, SNA-based focused deterrence, SNA-based social services, warrants to remove firearms from domestic abusers, street outreach workers, and hospital-based violence intervention programs as components to form a comprehensive gun violence prevention program. Ultimately, I concluded that four of these components will form the basis of the recommendation – problem solving at hot spots, focused deterrence, social services, and street outreach workers. This program option is advantageous because it is holistic and erodes gun violence from multiple angles. Additionally, if one approach is clearly not working or is running up too high of a cost, it can be cut and other portions of the program can remain ongoing instead of rebuilding a new program from scratch. This program should be monitored as closely as possible during its first year followed by an annual pre-test post-test evaluation to determine how close the program is to meeting the benchmark of 10% fewer shootings per year.
Intervention Description
POP at Shooting Hot Spots Random patrol idles at and checks on hot spots for 15-20 minutes. Officer notes events, people, or problems that facilitate crime at hot spot.
SNA Focused Deterrence Social Network Analysis is used to identify who is most likely to be involved in future gun violence and a CBO and police deliver a “hard” deterrence message and the community delivers a “soft” extension of help or social services.
SNA Social Services Outreach Connected to above but can be done without deterrence. SNA is used to identify people who are at risk and to extend wraparound social services to them, tailored to their specific needs. Case management ideal.
Street Outreach Workers These individuals have connections to the community and carry legitimacy in their work to diffuse conflict, stop retaliation, and urge non-violence. They also help people exit a violent lifestyle.
Statement of Positionality
I am a white skinned, queer, Latinx woman. I am Venezuelan American. I have never been shot or involved in any violent crime. This research and its findings are part of my Master’s thesis, for the Advanced Policy Analysis course at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley.
Introduction and Problem Analysis
I recommend that Berkeley implement a multi-pronged, holistic gun violence prevention program that incorporates problem-solving at hot spots, street outreach, targeted focused deterrence and social services.
The number of incidents involving firearms is sharply rising in Berkeley, California, a small city in the San Francisco East Bay. Berkeley is not alone. The nation has seen a dramatic rise in gun violence in all cities, spurring policymakers and public safety practitioners to find solutions. The Berkeley Police Department’s Gun Violence Intervention Working Group, city councilmembers, and community leaders are searching for near-term strategies to reduce gun violence.
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8 Many gun violence intervention programs have been developed throughout the country, focusing on everything from place-based or “hot spots” policing to public health epidemiological modeling to a combination of several approaches.
There have also been many programs that integrate other city services and departments, as well as Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). All of these programs have all had varying effects and results, not to mention costs and personnel.
The challenge Berkeley has is to design a multi-pronged program that is uniquely suited to its mode of gun violence and to also develop a monitoring and evaluation process that the department will implement after some time has passed.
Existing models typically have a multi-pronged approach, and often include both police activities and activities taken on by other city departments or CBOs.
Let it be noted that for the purposes of this research problem and design, “gun violence” will be defined as firearm violence between two or more people, and classified as either “shots fired”, shooting-related injury, or shooting-related death. This provides clarity that suicides, although a majority (roughly two-thirds) of firearm violence incidents in the United States
1, are not within the scope or aim of this particular project.
In 2020, Berkeley’s $1 million Ceasefire Program2 was proposed by the City Council3 in response to an alarming rise in shootings – 39 that year. In 2021 there were 50 incidents of gun violence and in 2022 even more, resulting in three dead and 15 injured.4 Over the past five years, shootings have risen from 15 in 2017 to 53 in 2022 – an increase of over 353%.5 The population of Alameda County has fallen since the 2020 census, primarily attributed to the pandemic.6, 7 Berkeley’s population likewise has dropped to 117,145 in 2021.8 So, there are approximately 45 shootings per 100,000. But, calculating only for injuries and deaths due to firearm violence, that figure drops to approximately 13 per 100,000. For injuries alone the rate is 10 per 100,000. The rate of gun deaths, however, is just 2.6 – far smaller than the state rate of 9 per 100,000. I was unable to find shots fired or firearm injury data for the state as a whole.
This is a policy problem because the police department is in charge of public safety for the City of Berkeley. This charge is represented through city budgeting, city regulations, and internal police policies. Gun violence is a clear threat to public safety and public health, one that represents injuries and loss of life. “Effective violence prevention is
1 Wintemute, Garen J. “The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States.” Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 36, no. 1, Mar. 2015, pp. 5–19. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535. 2 The goal of the Ceasefire Program, formally the “Violence Intervention Initiative”, is to identify community members most likely to engage in violence and surround them in “circles of care” like drug rehabilitation, job training, and available social workers. This is what the fiscal year 2023- 2024 budgets for the Ceasefire Program: one full time director, one program manager, five life coaches, three outreach workers, a fringe estimate, and gun violence problem analysis.
3 “Ceasefire Off Agenda Memo- Update Violence Intervention Initiative Berkeley Ceasefire.Pdf.” Google Docs, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ESpeLFADzRbLVNRBR6Ujdi1Uu4PwyFE1/view?usp=embed_facebook. Accessed 18 Jan. 2023. 4Current Trends. Berkeley Police Department, Transparency Hub https://bpd-transparency-initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/pages/current-trends.
Accessed 25 Jan. 2023.
5Id.
6 Base population of 2020 census for entire county is 39,538,245. Census estimate for 2022 is 39,029,342. 7 Bureau, U. C. (n.d.). County population totals and components of change: 2020-2022. Census.Gov. Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-counties-total.html 8 U. S. Census bureau quickfacts: Berkeley city, California. (n.d.). Retrieved May 4, 2023, from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/berkeleycitycalifornia PAGE 3021
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9 fundamental to community and economic development, mental health, and a decent quality of life”.9 Gun violence is also a problem that can be addressed through policy formation and change. This policy formation and change has occurred in cities throughout the country, so there are many blueprints for Berkeley to follow. “Public safety is foundational to human development, economic development, and a civilized life – and communities beset by violence in all those respects…Gun violence is a multifaceted problem requiring a multifaceted response. But an essential component of any comprehensive effort is more effective policing. Most instances in which one person shoots another are crimes. The police offer a unique capacity for violence prevention that has no good substitute from other institutions, and effective policing could prevent much of the shooting.” – Braga and Cook, 2022 10 This project is best defined as “programmatic”, “prescriptive”, and “evaluative”. The goal of this project is to design a program for Berkeley to adopt – some policy prescription is needed to do that. And on the back end the program needs a way to be evaluated so that future versions integrate past successes or failures into better addressing the causes of gun violence.
It became clear to the Berkeley City Council that this rise was steep and unusual, prompting action. They are prominent stakeholders in the perseverance of said action, whatever it may be – Berkeley Ceasefire and additional measures taken.
But more importantly, so are Berkeley’s inhabitants, workers, and passersby. Over the last several years in Berkeley, families of victims and concerned citizens have held rallies for change as well as vigils in memory of those killed.
However, “shots fired” and “shooting-related injuries” affect even more people – not just those directly involved but also their greater neighborhood and even the whole city. Promoting a Berkeley that feels and is safe to all people, however lofty, is a theme of this project.
Geographic specificity here matters. Northeast Berkeley neighborhoods Northside etc.) and the Berkeley hills area (Cragmont etc.), simply put, experience less gun violence of all varieties as defined in this project. Clearly from the map on Berkeley Police Department’s “Transparency Hub”, South (of UC Berkeley) and West Berkeley are where a majority of gun violence incidents occur and where we should be focused.
9 Braga, A. A., & Cook, P. J. (2023). Policing gun violence: Strategic reforms for controlling our most pressing crime problem. Oxford University Press.
10 Id.
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10 11
Who is involved in these incidents matters too. South and West Berkeley are home to more people of color, people that are lower income, and who live in more of a “city-scape” proximate to Oakland and the water. In Berkeley, most perpetrators of gun violence in Berkeley are African American and victims are predominantly African American.12 Nationwide, “Homicide risk is concentrated to a remarkable degree among Black males through much of the life span. At ages 20-29 in 2012, the firearm homicide rate for Black males was at least five times higher than that for Hispanic males and at least 20 times that for White males.”13 This is true for Berkeley as well. Arrested subjects, suspects, and detainees were 81% male and 19% female. They were 67% Black, 19% Hispanic, 9% white, 4% Asian, and 2% other. For firearm victims, they were 58% male, 42% female, 40% white, 25% Black, 13% other, 12% Hispanic, and 10% Asian. Notably, this includes victims of property crime, who are more likely to be white, and which distorts the racial percentages of victims.
Excluding “shots fired” entirely for victims in order to exclude property damage, the race breakdown does change: 37% Black, 30% white, 15% Hispanic, and 13% other.14 These figures are for all shootings.
This report does seek to know the “why”. We are interested in who is involved in gun violence, where the incident took place, what happened, and how individuals were affected (injury, loss of life, fear). But crucially, “why” gun violence is occurring, and occurring the ways that it currently does in Berkeley, will illuminate our pursuit of the right gun violence
11 Current trends. (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2023, from https://bpd-transparency-initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/pages/current-trends 12 Berkeley Police Department, 2023
13 Wintemute, Garen J. “The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States.” Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 36, no. 1, Mar. 2015, pp. 5–19. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535. 14 Berkeley Police Department, 2023
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11 prevention program and program evaluation. Generally, gun violence is rising in Berkeley because nationwide, cities are seeing spikes in gun violence, locally ghost guns are proliferating, there is some gang- and street-crew gun violence, and there is some firearm-related domestic violence. However, the majority of gun violence cases are not specific to any category and is “random”. This is especially true of when police arrive on scene, possibly have witnesses, but only identify shell casings and do not apprehend a suspect. This happens more often than not.
The client in this case should seek to sustain a continued decrease in gun violence incidents, year after year. The Center for Criminal Justice Violent Crime Working Group states that city leaders and criminal justice advocates should aim for an annual homicide and violent crime reduction of 10% because that goal is both tangible and realistic for cities.15 At Berkeley’s volume, that’s about six shootings per year. Such a benchmark is helpful but not strict. Any reduction is a good sign and obviously exceeding it is welcome.
Long term, Berkeley should hope to get back to the 2017 rate of less than ten annual gun violence incidents. Over the course of less than ten years, we should expect to return to 2017 levels. If we are to expect the pandemic to continue subsiding, addressing gun violence with a holistic program should decrease gun violence now faster than it rose over the past five years due with that anomaly.16 This is what happened in Champaign, Illinois after they implemented their multi- pronged, holistic Blueprint program.17 The program should be monitored closely in its first year, following a very thorough annual evaluation. Then, each year there should be an analysis of shootings that occurred, what form gun violence is taking over time, and how close the city is to that 10% reduction.
Gun Crimes and Regulations Legal Landscape in Berkeley
In California, a background check is done at the point of sale for every firearm sold. It requires that everyone with a concealed carry permit complete a training that includes shooting a gun. Open carry requires a permit or is barred altogether, and the state can bar concealed carry permits to be issued to anyone they deem dangerous. The state has so far refused to enact a “Shoot First” law, also known as a “Stand Your Ground” law. Assault weapons are prohibited, except where they have been grandfathered in or modified to be “California compliant”. New handguns are required to have childproofing features and microstamping technology – which marks bullets and cartridge cases with a unique fingerprint each time the firearm is discharged. To abide by state law, firearms must be stored locked, unloaded, and separate from ammunition when a child under 18 can or will access the firearm. Ghost guns are regulated (this is not particularly enforceable), high capacity magazines are prohibited, and there is no legal immunity for the gun industry.
Officials are required to trace all guns recovered at crime scenes.
People with violent misdemeanors, felonies, hate crime convictions, a short-term emergency order in place (for domestic abusers), or a history of stalking are prohibited from possessing a firearm. Domestic abusers with misdemeanor convictions or restraining orders in place, and stalkers must relinquish their weapons. Fugitives and those who have been involuntarily committed or deemed a danger to themselves or others are barred from possessing a
15 “Saving Lives: Ten Essential Actions Can Take to Reduce Violence Now.” Council on Criminal Justice, 12 Jan. 2022, https://counciloncj.org/10- essential-actions/.
16 Gun violence prevention and response. (n.d.). City of Champaign. Retrieved May 4, 2023, from https://champaignil.gov/police/resources/gun- violence-prevention-and-response/
17 Id.
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12 weapon. Law enforcement, immediate family members, employers, coworkers, teachers, roommates, people with a child in common or who have a dating relationship in California can petition the court to temporarily take away gun access for those in crisis. There are no guns allowed in K-12 schools, on college campuses, at the state capitol, or in political demonstrations. Dealers are required to be licensed, are barred from completing sales while background checks are ongoing, must release their sales records to law enforcement and notify law enforcement when someone barred from doing so attempts to purchase a weapon. Finally, there are waiting periods to buy a gun. These are the foundational laws related to firearms in California.18
California also allows localities to enact their own gun safety laws. In Berkeley, discharging a firearm is illegal in all cases except where law enforcement is concerned or a citizen is acting in assisting an officer. Violation of this law is a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.19 Right now in Berkeley, there is “a rise in detection and seizure of firearms lacking serial numbers or other identifying markings, commonly known as “ghost guns””.20 They are prohibited by city ordinance but have been linked to many shootings over the last several years. Each possession and use of a ghost gun (or part or frame of a ghost gun) is a Class 1 misdemeanor. In 2022, BPD seized 47 ghost guns and 72 other guns. It is a rising problem, complicating tracing guns to crimes and to people.
Data Analysis Results
Hot Spot Analysis
Hot spot analysis of shootings in Berkeley shows that they are concentrated at about seven specific sites. ArcGIS was used to do geospatial analysis on five years of shooting data in Berkeley. Because there were fewer than 2,000 data points, we were unable to run Cluster, Hot Spot, or Optimized Hot Spot analysis. Instead, Point Density analysis was used as it can run for smaller datasets.21
We knew broadly already that the south (of UC Berkeley) and west parts of Berkeley are where most shootings occur.
Although at first shootings appeared to be clustered along long corridors, our Point Density analysis allowed us to further demonstrate what intersections and city blocks are statistically significant points of convergence that deserve attention. Seven locations were foremost identified by the software: 63rd Street & King Street, Acton Street & Russell Street, Channing Street & 8th Street, Channing Street & San Pablo Avenue, Durant Street & Sather Street, Harmon Street & Sacramento Street, and Oregon Street & Park Street (San Pablo Park). Identifiable to BPD from experience is the site just south of UC Berkeley, San Pablo Park, and two sites on Channing that relate to public housing where chronic
18 California. (n.d.). Everytown Research & Policy. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://research.www.everytown.org/rankings/state/california/ 19 Ch. 13.72 Discharge of Firearms. (n.d.). Berkeley Municipal Code. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://berkeley.municipal.codes/BMC/13. 20 Ch. 13.73.010 Non-Serialized Firearms. (n.d.). Berkeley Municipal Code: PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OR SALE OF NON-SERIALIZED, UNFINISHED FIREARM FRAMES OR RECEIVERS AND NON-SERIALIZED FIREARMS. Retrieved April 17, 2023, from https://berkeley.municipal.codes/BMC/13.73.010
21 The Point Density Tool calculates a magnitude-per-unit area from point features that fall within an area around each cell. The sum value of points within a search area (neighborhood) is divided by the search area size to get each cell's density value. Conceptually, a neighborhood is defined around each raster cell center, and the number of points that fall within the neighborhood is totaled and divided by the area of the neighborhood. calculates the magnitude per unit area from point features within a neighborhood.
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13 offenders are known to reside. Below we have shown the full picture of the city with the Point Density layered on top. A zoomed in portrait of each of one can be found in Appendix C.
Temporal analysis of shootings in Berkeley reveals very little. There are not clear patterns about how shooting locations have changed over the last five years. There does not seem to be an identifiable pattern when viewing the shootings by quarter year.
Social Network Analysis
“By identifying high-risk individuals and transmission pathways that might not be detected by other means, a contagion- based approach could detect strategic points of intervention that would enable measures to proactively reduce the trauma associated with gun violence rather than just react to past incidents…such a contagion-based approach is centered on the PAGE 3026
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14 subjects of gun violence and…has the potential to move the larger public dialogue on gun violence away from efforts that rest largely on geographic or group-based policing efforts that tend to disproportionately affect disadvantaged minority communities.” – Green, Horel, and Papachristos (2017)22 Social Network Analysis allowed us to see clearly that what Berkeley has is akin to other cities. We have a large network of incidents, suspects/detained parties/arrested, and victims. Within that network is a denser, more interconnected network at the center compared to the larger network. See below:
It is important that the distal effects of exposure are considered. With any SNA intervention, we should include not just immediate ties to victims and perpetrators but also their indirect 2nd degree and higher order ties.23 Likelihood of victimization is two to three times greater if one has a social tie to a victim than if they have no exposure to victims.24 This accounts for how transmissible victimization within networks.25 In Boston’s Cape Verdean network, researchers found 85% of victims in the large component.26 In Newark, 33% of all shootings occurred in network components compromising approximately less than 4% of the entire population.27 Clustering also occurs within a network – you can
22 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245 23 Papachristos, A. V., Wildeman, C., & Roberto, E. (2015). Tragic, but not random: The social contagion of nonfatal gunshot injuries. Social Science & Medicine, 125, 139–150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056 24 Id.
25 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245 26 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., & Hureau, D. M. (2012). Social networks and the risk of gunshot injury. Journal of Urban Health, 89(6), 992– 1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9
27 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., Piza, E., & Grossman, L. S. (2015). The company you keep? The spillover effects of gang membership on individual gunshot victimization in a co-offending network: gang membership, networks, & victimization. Criminology, 53(4), 624–649. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12091
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15 see dense pockets of individuals connected to each other by a small number of ties. While perhaps not as extreme, Berkeley’s network follows a similar dynamic, as is visually apparent.
Key Criteria
Do not allow non-police interventions in a program to amount to more than the allotted $1 million. Berkeley Police explained to me that that budget was for non-police interventions. The annual Ceasefire budget that was passed by the City Council is for non-police interventions of one million dollars in sum. Anything of that nature under the umbrella of the program cannot exceed this amount annually. This is the most difficult criterion to fulfill, as we will see that most non-police program elements likely surpass this budget. It is probable more funds will need to be procured, and demonstrated project success will help the city to prioritize and justify more funding.
Reduction of shootings by 10% per year.28 For Berkeley this amounts to about 5 shootings per year. This is the basic measure of effectiveness for the project, supported by literature – specifically it is the recommendation to law enforcement by the Council on Criminal Justice. This criterion is essential, although it may take time to achieve. Any reduction should be seen as a success. But, the program should be flexible enough to allow for alterations to be made continually to enable the program to get to a 10% reduction in shootings annually.
The program needs to be workable to the City Manager’s Office that will authorize the program. This report will be read and implemented by the Office of the City Manager. It is necessary that the report is understandable from their point of view and also acceptable from a political standpoint. The city is still hiring for the specific position of Assistant to the City Manager so it is impossible to know the constraints they will bring to the project.
This program needs to avoid delegitimizing the Berkeley police, instilling fear of crime in Berkeley residents, and decreasing the community’s collective efficacy.29, 30 These metrics are signs that the community-police relationship is breaking down. Police legitimacy means that the public consents to police authority and sees their part of the contract as obeying city laws. Crime spikes or hostility toward police are signs that police legitimacy is decreasing. Fear of crime can occur when a portion of the city is visually seeing more police in their immediate vicinity and interpreting this as a sign that crime has increased. When fear of crime increases in a city, fewer people interact with their neighbors or report incidents that they feel are happening all the time. Collective efficacy is the social cohesion of a group, which allows for residents to enforce mutually agreed upon norms and rules for their neighborhood. Ensuring community- police relationship success is critical to the mission of reducing gun violence. Even if short-term goals are achieved, a breakdown could offset any gains in long-term crime control. 31 A community survey or way for residents to report how they are feeling and behaving in their neighborhood after the treatment begins would be a good start to evaluating this
28 Saving lives: Ten essential actions cities can take to reduce violence now. (2022, January 12). Council on Criminal Justice. https://counciloncj.org/10-essential-actions/
29 Weisburd, D., Bushway, S., Lum, C., & Yang, S.-M. (2004). Trajectories of crime at places: A longitudinal study of street segments in the city of Seattle*. Criminology, 42(2), 283–322. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00521.x 30 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 31 Id.
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16 metric. If funds allow, having a polling agency do this work formally would go a long way to ensuring the health of the community-police relationship.
Continually monitor the program and analyze progress to ensure success. Ensure that there are personnel to monitor and evaluate the program in its infancy and on the annual. Both budget and effectiveness need to be monitored. The budget constraints are above, and it needs to be reviewed not only annually but as the program goes along to make sure that non-police interventions will not exceed the one million dollar figure at year’s end. In terms of effectiveness we know that our aim is about 5 fewer shootings per year. But, we want to stay in touch with different safety practitioners to make sure that what is being seen and heard on the ground lines up with this goal – even before the year is over.
Use of police and non-police resources. It is well known that the police are not a multitool for all public safety issues.
Many issues can be addressed or improved using city services or community-based organizations (CBOs). The gun violence intervention program needs to utilize both the capabilities of law enforcement and the different services available through the city or CBOs.
Program components
Component #1: Hot Spots Policing/Place-based Policing
Based on a long history of experimental and quasi-experimental studies and evidence, it is now known that hot spots policing – focusing on places not people – is an effective crime prevention strategy.32, 33, 34 Hot spots are identified by creating a crime map, usually with a GIS mapping system, plotting incidents, and using one of the various mathematical hot spot tools to highlight where crime convergence is unusually high compared to other micro-units of a city. Police randomly idle at hot spots every several hours and remain there for 15-20 minutes.35 An absolute minimum of 10 minutes must be spent there to have a crime control effect and some “survival time”.36 Survival time is the amount of time after police leave that an area remains disorder- and crime-free.37 Koper (1995) studied the residual deterrent effects of police patrols in hot spots and whether longer “dosages” (time spent at a hot spot) created stronger effects.
He found that each additional minute of police presence increased survival time by 23%.38 Two theories underpin this strategy. First, deterrence: police can maximize crime and disorder reduction at hot spots simply by being visible randomly and intermittently, thus maximizing deterrence and minimizing the amount of
32 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 33 Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x 34 Skogan, W. G., & Frydl, K. (2004). Fairness and effectiveness in policing: The evidence. National Academies Press. 35 Koper, C. S. (1995). Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 649–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096231 36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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17 unnecessary time spent at hot spots. Second, crime opportunity reduction: police presence modifies the opportunity structure to cause crime and disorder at hot spots.39
The concern has often been, if you are patrolling certain micro-locations more often, you might encounter negative crime spillover effects to neighboring areas as the hot spot is recognized to encounter police more often.40 However, several studies have shown that what is more likely is the diffusion of crime control benefits into the surrounding areas, not crime displacement.41, 42, 43, 44
In one small city in the Midwest, continual adjustment of hot spots, and active management and tracking of patrols helped keep officers diligent as a trend has been that effectiveness of this intervention decreases over time. This study showed that without deep problem solving efforts, a sustained visible presence approach can also serve to impact crime over the long run.45 This strategy can easily be operationalized for Berkeley gun violence. For this report, hot spot analysis was run and seven locations were identified [12].
Component #2: Hot Spots Policing Version of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)
The same theories of deterrence and opportunity reduction underlie POP at hot spots. Braga (2012) found that POP programs that incorporate hot spots policing produced effect sizes more than double those produced by hot spots studies only on police presence.46 POP is associated with statistically significant impacts on crime reduction and shows no evidence of crime displacement.47
The first step to POP at each hot spot is identifying the spots, bumping up police presence for the near future, and spending that same 15 minutes every few hours of patrol at the spot, patrolling and scanning for potential problems
39 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 40 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 41 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 42 Sherman, L. W., & Weisburd, D. (1995). General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime “hot spots”: A randomized, controlled trial. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 625–648. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096221 43 Weisburd, D., Wyckoff, L. A., Ready, J., Eck, J. E., Hinkle, J. C., & Gajewski, F. (2006). Does crime just move around the corner? A controlled study of spatial displacement and diffusion of crime control benefits. Criminology, 44(3), 549–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745- 9125.2006.00057.x
44 Bowers, K. J. (2004). Prospective hot-spotting: The future of crime mapping? British Journal of Criminology, 44(5), 641–658. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azh036
45 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city.
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110–1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096 46 Braga, A. A. (2008). Problem-oriented policing and crime prevention (2nd ed). Willow Tree Press. 47 Hinkle, J. C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C. W., & Petersen, K. (2021). Problem-oriented policing for reducing crime and disorder: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. CrimRxiv. https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69 PAGE 3030
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18 using the SARA method (see Literature Review [50]). Regarding what to do at each spot, most traditionally the S.A.R.A. method (Scanning-Analysis-Response-Assessment) is used when applying POP. 48 Police presence is theorized to deter would-be criminal acts from occurring, and this bears out in the research.49 This deterrence is key, but in practice it cannot go on forever. While there, police document problems that could facilitate crime, whether they be social or environmental. That is where other entities, and the police department staff that liaises with them, come into play. Depending on the unique environment of each hot spot, the department would come together and determine what non-police interventions would transform the location. This could involve street teams to diffuse possibly violent situations, street lighting, the addition of green space, among many other interventions. If these transformations cause the area to be perceived differently by would-be criminals (again, this bears out in the research), the program’s impact has the staying power to continue to deter gun violence longer than simply patrolling hot spots.
Social Network Analysis, Focused Deterrence, and Social Services
Some social network analysis (SNA) was done for this report. Further SNA may have to be done as time passes or as other alternatives are identified. “Gunshot violence follows an epidemic-like process of social contagion that is transmitted through networks of people by social interactions.”50 Social network analysis allows police to see clearly which people are most connected to incidents of gun violence and either victims or perpetrators of gun violence.51, 52, 53 Studies show that it is these individuals who are most at risk of becoming involved in gun violence for the first time or again. The theories of change here are deterrence and social supports.
Component #3: SNA and Focused Deterrence/Custom Notifications
From SNA the police can identify those most at-risk of gun violence perpetration or victimization. The task then is to deliver a message that violence will no longer be tolerated in the community and that any violence will be met with swift consequences. Champaign, Illinois has a program where these “custom notifications” are not done by law enforcement
48 Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). Problem-solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News. U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
49 Koper, C. S. (1995). Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 649–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096231 50 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245 51Zeoli, A. M., Pizarro, J. M., Grady, S. C., & Melde, C. (2014). Homicide as infectious disease: Using public health methods to investigate the diffusion of homicide. Justice Quarterly, 31(3), 609–632. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.732100 52 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., & Hureau, D. M. (2012). Social networks and the risk of gunshot injury. Journal of Urban Health, 89(6), 992– 1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9
53 Papachristos, A. V., Wildeman, C., & Roberto, E. (2015). Tragic, but not random: The social contagion of nonfatal gunshot injuries. Social Science & Medicine, 125, 139–150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056 PAGE 3031
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19 but by a community-based organization.54 This is because when police do notifications, receptivity of that “hard” message by individuals can be very low.55
At the least, in Berkeley, street outreach or social workers would need to accompany the police for the delivery of the custom notification and/or provide a written notice of zero tolerance signed by the police chief. The notice would detail that individual’s legal vulnerabilities for their specific criminal history. Avoidance of punishment, theoretically and empirically, is what drives gun violence down. So, for focused deterrence to work, the desire to avoid punishment needs to be there.
After the individual is given the “hard” message, the CBO can deliver the helping or “soft” message. The “soft” message is that neither the CBO nor the police nor the individual’s family want to see them dead from gun violence, and essentially, they all want to help lift this person out of a violent future. They offer the individual various services to help them navigate a new way forward. The downside to this intervention is that the individual can reject both messages, stay involved in violence, and refuse social services. Focused deterrence has credibility in the literature but is by no means the only way the police can utilize SNA.
Component #4: SNA and Social Services
Through identification using SNA, the police can connect at-risk people with community-based organization case managers and thus to social services. This can include case management broadly, mental health services, housing assistance, reentry services for the formerly incarcerated, economic opportunity (employment, training), restorative justice, among other services.
The vast majority of these types of interventions would require the city to partner with CBOs or other city departments56 and, as with environmental improvements in Problem Solving Policing, require some sort of go-between for the Berkeley Police Department to monitor the course of the program. The theory of change here is that with additional social supports, the impetus to turn to delinquency and gun violence decreases.57 For example, for the young man who is occasionally dealing drugs with a gun and has many connections to gunshot victims, perhaps job training and employment may provide him financial incentive to refrain from carrying a handgun and dealing drugs. For the older gang member, perhaps stable housing opportunities for their family would remove them from the geographic area the gang operates in and provide a way out of life on the street. These are just examples, but very targeted social services can and do change people’s motivations for engaging in violence.58 There is not much of a role for law enforcement to play in this intervention, it is more a city-CBO partnership that precludes the “hard” message described above.
54Elvir, J. (2023, March 22). Champagne, Illinois Blueprint Program [Zoom]. 55 Id.
56 Pivot. (n.d.). Retrieved February 15, 2023, from https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/community-involvement/pivot/ 57 Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x 58 Id.
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20 Component #5 Warrants to Remove Firearms from Domestic Abusers (DVROs) and Individuals Posing a Danger to Themselves or Others (GVROs), Court-Issued Protective Orders, and Criminal Protective Orders (CPOs)
Combining the use of DVROs with GVROs, Court-Issued Protective Orders, and CPOs might be impactful. Each of these are aimed at preventing people deemed to be a danger to themselves or others from possessing a firearm.59 GVROs – also referred to as “red flag laws” – are court-issued orders that temporarily suspend a person’s access to firearms when they are found to pose a significant risk to themselves or others by having legal access to firearms or ammunition. Court- Issued Protective Orders are certain orders from a court prohibiting specified persons (also called the “restrained party” or “respondent”) from possessing firearms or ammunition. CPOs are like DVROs, but are issued by a court during a criminal case, or after a finding of guilt. Like GVROs and DVROs, CPOs prohibit the subject of the order from possessing firearms or ammunitions.60 Using each of these more and in addition to DVROs would augment the strategy of using DVROs more often in the community.
Component #6 Street Outreach Workers/Violence Interrupters
Out of the public health science of behavioral epidemiology emerged the idea that violence is a social contagion capable of spreading from individual to individual based on exposure.61 Street Outreach Workers or “Violence Interrupters” address this cause by being a presence on the street, stopping the spread of the contagion of violence. Street Outreach Workers help identify violence and interrupt or mediate it in real time. They are credible messengers, often formerly incarcerated or have been involved in or affected by violence in the past. They bolster any law enforcement intervention they aid due to that credibility.62 They often have connections to or knowledge of the street life, culture, and “code”, and can be a quality “go-between” for those living a life of violence and the larger gun violence intervention program.63 Operating beneath this strategy is the aim to increasing informal social controls – or fortifying a community’s collective norms and standards of conduct, and encouraging community members to uphold them. When done well it “marries the goal of strengthening a community’s moral voice against violence with the imperative to offer help to its highest risk population.64 It also lends itself to concrete violence interventions, such as controlling rumors during moments of
59 Domestic violence restraining orders and gun violence restraining orders. (2022, September 20). State of California - Department of Justice - Office of the Attorney General. https://oag.ca.gov/ogvp/gvro-dvro 60 Id.
61 Butts, J. A., Roman, C. G., Bostwick, L., & Porter, J. R. (2015). Cure violence: A public health model to reduce gun violence. Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1), 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122509 62 Considering the place of streetwork in violence interventions. (n.d.). National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC). Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://nnscommunities.org/guides/considering-the-place-of-streetwork-in-violence-interventions/ 63 Id.
64 Op-ed: What we know (And don’t know) about street outreach and gun violence prevention. (2021, October 25). Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-chicago-gun-violence-street-outreach-20211025-6pylamxs5jazhhyya3x3nb3eya- story.html
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21 conflict, calming people down to defuse potential retaliation, and mentoring people at high risk of hurting someone or being hurt”.65
Component #7 Hospital-Based Violence Intervention
Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Programs identify violently injured patients and intervene at their hospital bedside immediately following a violent victimization. Patients are assigned a case manager or social worker who evaluates patients based on the patient’s perception of their own psychosocial, emotional, or financial needs and connects them with providers in the community that are capable of addressing those needs. Various models tend to emphasize that case workers need to be culturally competent and it is beneficial if they come from similar environments as patients. In the San Francisco Bay Area, there are two such programs. The Wraparound Program is run by Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital, and they utilize hospital social worker staff to work with patients if they opt in.66 The other is run through Highland Hospital in Oakland by YouthAlive! – a CBO.67 I was unable to reach these programs to better understand their similarities and differences. That said, gunshot victims in Berkeley go to Highland Hospital as it is the local Trauma 1 hospital.
Component #8 Gun Buyback Programs
Gun buyback programs are a supply-side oriented tactic to reduce gun violence. Gun buyback programs are “no- questions-asked”, anonymous forums for community members to relinquish weapons in exchange for monetary value – usually cash or a gift card. The theory of change here is financial – money incentivizes those willing to part with their weapon to do so, thereby the community becomes safer for each gun collected in the buyback program.
Longer Term Solutions Addressing the Root Causes of Gun Violence
It is indisputable that addressing the root causes of negative social phenomena improves well-being and has a decreasing effect on violence overall. Berkeley should either start or continue to improve public schools, lessen income inequality and poverty, invest in quality public housing and public services, and build social bridges so under-resourced community members can thrive. They should continue to minimize easy access to firearms by high-risk people – legislatively or via the warrant described above. However, the urgency of this issue makes these longer term solutions drive change over the course of years not months, and are thus outside the particular scope of this project. These solutions should, however, absolutely be part of the normal operations of the city of Berkeley.
Evaluating Components Using Criteria
Hot Spots Policing
65 Considering the place of streetwork in violence interventions. (n.d.). National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC). Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://nnscommunities.org/guides/considering-the-place-of-streetwork-in-violence-interventions/ 66 Wraparound project. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://wraparound.ucsf.edu/ 67 O’Brien, J. (2019, June 20). Dinner honors clients, highland social workers. Youth ALIVE! https://www.youthalive.org/dinner-honors-clients- highland-social-workers/
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22 The majority of the U.S. public believes policing is more cost-effective than incarceration and supports focus on sentinel patrols (patrolling and prevention rather than solving crimes already committed) and crime Hot Spots Policing (HSP).68 This is relevant because it is common knowledge that Berkeley is to the political left of the U.S. average and therefore is less punitive.
There is very robust evidence not only that hot spots policing is an effective crime prevention strategy but that it has significant diffusion of crime control benefits rather than crime displacement.69 It is well established that mere presence of law enforcement at hot spots is sufficient to deter crime.70, 71, 72, 73 “Crime prevention is maximized when police focus resources on these micro-units of geography.” While this may seem controversial at the outset, understanding that the micro-units examined here are street segments or intersections. No neighborhood or city area is targeted broadly. Hot spots here are hyper-local locations where there has been a convergence of shootings surrounding that spot. 20 out of 25 experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations report crime reductions, so the vast majority, suggest that when police focus in on this micro-unit they can positively impact public safety in that area.74 The Berkeley Police Department says that HSP could be accomplished without increasing costs, with officers spending more time at hot spots along their regular beats. During the day shift there are 14 beats (down from 16 due to staffing shortages). During the night shift they collapse into seven. Each hot spot would require officer presence for 15 minutes every few hours at random.75 The main cost of this alternative is a department-wide training where all officers would be taught the efficacy and responsibilities of performing Hot Spots Policing.
68 Metcalfe, C., & Pickett, J. T. (2018). The extent and correlates of public support for deterrence reforms and hot spots policing: Deterrence reforms and hot spots policing. Law & Society Review, 52(2), 471–502. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12327 69 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 70 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 71 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 72 Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x 73 Skogan, W. G., & Frydl, K. (2004). Fairness and effectiveness in policing: The evidence. National Academies Press. 74 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 75 Koper, C. S. (1995). Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 649–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096231 PAGE 3035
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23 Berkeley Daytime Beats (collapse into eight at night) 76 Crime concentration has been studied in small cities some, and those studies have concluded that crime concentrates more not less in small cities. Generally, “reducing crime by 20% at hot spots that generate 50% of a jurisdiction’s crime should reduce the locality’s overall crime level by roughly 10%.77 “City leaders should commit to tangible reductions in these measures. Annual 10% reductions in homicides and non-fatal shootings are realistic goals.”78 It is likely that this intervention will reduce shootings by 10% annually for as long as the program can be maintained. I am confident in this
76 Berkeley Police Department, 2023
77 Nagin, D. S., & Sampson, R. J. (2019). The real gold standard: Measuring counterfactual worlds that matter most to social science and policy.
Annual Review of Criminology, 2(1), 123–145. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-011518-024838 78 Saving lives: Ten essential actions can take to reduce violence now. (2022, January 12). Council on Criminal Justice. https://counciloncj.org/10- essential-actions/
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24 with one strong caveat: the gun violence concentration in hot spots does not reach 50% of overall levels, so it is harder to project just how much gun violence will drop.
I am also confident that the issue of gun violence is poignant enough to make this intervention politically feasible. It is BPD’s experience that the city council has an appetite for law enforcement action to address gun violence. While the Assistant to the City Manager has not been hired yet, we can have moderate confidence in interpreting this appetite as consistent in city government.
“It is not entirely clear whether police can achieve and maintain such ‘system-level’ impacts through HSP.”79 There is strong evidence of eventual of deterrence decay – due to either police loss of focus or fatigue.80 Another weakness of this alternative is that it is truly short-term and difficult to maintain. Decay can also be caused by non-geographical crime displacement such as offense type, target, or temporal displacement.81 Displacement by type is when offenders switch crime; displacement by target is when they change who they are victimizing; and displacement temporally is when time or date is altered to avoid detection.82
“Prior studies of HSP, which have often focused on pilot or other temporary programs, have mostly used follow-up periods ranging from a few months or less (in most studies) to 1–2 years; very rarely have they gone beyond 2 or 3 years to assess the long-term institutionalization and impacts of these strategies. Notably, the studies of HSP’s aggregate-level effects highlighted above spanned several months at most.”83 In one exception, a study of the HSP program in Manhattan, Kansas over the course of 8 years, violent crime dropped by 39.8% over 8 years. But, strength of the effect did weaken over time.84
The perception of aggressive policing may drive a wedge between the community and police. Studies have conflicted on whether HSP produces a negative impact on police legitimacy but most study data do not support that concern. 85 Resident fear of crime at hot spots is relatively unaffected by increased police intervention. There is little empirical evidence to date on the impact of HSP approaches on citizens in targeted areas in terms of fear, collective efficacy, or
79 Nagin, D. S., & Sampson, R. J. (2019). The real gold standard: Measuring counterfactual worlds that matter most to social science and policy.
Annual Review of Criminology, 2(1), 123–145. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-011518-024838 80 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city.
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110–1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096
81 Id.
82Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 83 Eck, J. (1993). Criminal Justice Abstracts. Problem Solving Quarterly: A Police Executive Research Forum Publication Reporting on Innovative Approaches to Policing, 6(3), 1–2.
84 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city.
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110–1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096 85 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 PAGE 3037
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25 attitudes toward the police more generally.86 Based on these overall findings, I am very confident that HSP has low or no negative impact on fear, collective efficacy, or police legitimacy.
Hot Spots Version of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)
Implementing POP at hot spots would use normal staff hours and beats, not increasing costs. It would require training, redirecting patrols, or rearranging staff activities (including researcher/analyst capacity) which would likely cost less than $1 million, but this intervention is not beholden to that criterion. It would require heavy use of the Violence Prevention Working Group and the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) strategies – a multi-disciplinary approach to reduce opportunities for crime that are inherent in structure design, architectural planning and design, and the management of natural environments.87 According to John Eck, Ph.D., this approach needs to recognize who has power over places, and that is primarily property owners – landlords, homeowners, public housing authorities, and businesses that own their buildings. These people need to buy in to whatever changes Berkeley wants to make to specific environments that are relevant to them.
Few studies have done cost-benefit analysis on this intervention but in all cases where cost-benefit was measured, POP projects were associated with a substantial cost savings.88 A meta-analysis of POP programs shows statistically significant reduction in crime by 34%. But, specifically, violent crime studies did not yield a significant effect but the reduction was still positive, 9.5%. There are some violent crime studies in the meta-analysis but they don’t have the same large drops that property crime studies show. Still, studies show evidence of some impact of POP programs.89 It shows no evidence of crime displacement and possibly diffusion of crime benefits.90 It is proven that things that are aggressive do not work as well as things that are problem-solving.91 I am somewhat confident that it is likely to reduce shootings by about 10%.
Because this strategy does not direct patrols only, but focuses on problem-solving and may leverage non-police resources like city services, it is less controversial as there is less of a chance of increased enforcement on low-income neighborhoods of color. This will make it more palatable to Berkeley residents and politicians. These changes, unlike altered patrolling alone, are far more sustainable over time. POP (and CPTED) is more capable of maintaining its negative impact on crime over time. You may have multiple iterations of solving the problem (e.g. maintaining green space) but this is doable.
In the meta-analysis of P.O.P. Six, eight, and three studies collectively show limited impact on police legitimacy, fear of crime, and collective efficacy respectively. The most rigorous study designs show little to no decrease on police legitimacy but, the studies are not consistent with one another. Often, they show that people who live near target
86 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 87 Current trends. (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2023, from https://bpd-transparency-initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/pages/current-trends 88 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 89 Hinkle, Joshua C., et al. “Problem-Oriented Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” CrimRxiv, July 2021. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69. 90 Id.
91 Eck, J. (2023, March 24). Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati [Zoom].
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26 problem sites are more susceptible to fear of crime.92 Collectively, they show mixed and inconsistent effects on collective efficacy.
According to John Eck, Ph.D., the main downside to this is that it is most likely to reduce shootings over a period of months or years, not necessarily right away. There will need to be interim solutions while that success is being developed. Hot spots patrol can certainly fill that gap, or other interventions.93 Depending on urgency and how easily the “problems” can be addressed, this may or may not be preferable in Berkeley.
SNA and Focused Deterrence
SNA and focused deterrence require normal data analyst personnel hours which use existing staff time and adds $0. It requires officer training, which is exempt from the cost criterion but would likely meet it. However, this also requires contracting with a CBO and monitoring their participation, which likely costs around $1 million. Social network analysis models gun violence in a way that helps identify who could be victimized in the future and to target individuals with law enforcement messages.94 The literature shows that these individuals would have to adopt permanent lifestyle changes in order to sustain lower tendency toward gun violence. Also, new high-risk individuals would need to be prevented from entering the pool of violence, so SNA would need to be iterative for the program to be successful. Gun violence reduction strategies are best served by directing intervention and prevention toward high-risk social networks.95 A “hard” message with a “soft” message can beneficially leverage both law enforcement and social services. Focused deterrence studies conclude that they statistically significantly reduce gun violence, making me somewhat confident that reductions could meet 10% annually.
According to Cody Telep Ph.D., “focused deterrence can be effective in a smaller city if violence is concentrated among a small group of individuals. There is some good evidence from places like Lowell, MA that are similar in size to Berkeley.96 The challenging part for a small city can just be coordinating all the criminal justice organizations and resources needed to create [credible deterrence] to make the program successful in a small environment.”97 The Berkeley Ceasefire D2 Ad Hoc Advisory Group Brief reflects a sole focus on social services and a lack of political will to engage law enforcement directly with at-risk individuals. This intervention has moderate political feasibility, as the Brief does mention that BPD is already playing a role in SNA. While there is no literature evidence, logic says that because this affects a very small group of people rather than a neighborhood or hot spot, it is not voluminous enough to cause fear of crime to rise, or police legitimacy or collective efficacy to fall. I am very confident in this low risk.
92 Hinkle, Joshua C., et al. “Problem-Oriented Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” CrimRxiv, July 2021. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69. 93 Eck, J. (2023, March 24). Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati [Zoom]. 94 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245 95 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., & Hureau, D. M. (2012). Social networks and the risk of gunshot injury. Journal of Urban Health, 89(6), 992– 1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9
96 Project safe neighborhoods (Lowell, Massachusetts). (n.d.). National Gang Center. Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://nationalgangcenter.ojp.gov/spt/Programs/3588
97 Telep, C. (2023, April 11). Associate Professor & Associate Director of the School of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Arizona State University [Email].
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27 SNA and Social Services
SNA and requires normal data analyst and office personnel hours (to identify individuals and liaise with the CBO respectively) which uses existing staff time and adds $0. This does require contracting with a CBO and monitoring their participation, which adds costs likely around $1 million. Finding out just how much it will cost is based on first estimating, how many individuals you want to serve, and second, what size case load is manageable and appropriate for a case manager. Once again, modeling gun violence helps identify who could be victimized by or perpetrate gun violence in the future, and target social services to those individuals.98 Gun violence reduction strategies are best served by directing intervention and prevention toward high-risk social networks.99 However, this intervention is unlikely to reduce shootings without additional “hard message”. If it reduces shootings, I am somewhat confident that it is unlikely to reach the 10% annual goal.
The Berkeley Ceasefire D2 Ad Hoc Advisory Group Brief makes clear that a targeted social services approach is incredibly politically palatable in Berkeley. Again, individuals would have to adopt permanent lifestyle changes in order to sustain lower tendency toward gun violence. Also, new high-risk individuals would need to be prevented from entering the pool of violence, so SNA would need to be iterative for the program to be successful. While there is no literature evidence, logic confidently illustrates that because this does not involve police it cannot cause police legitimacy or collective efficacy to fall, or fear of crime to rise.
Papachristos, Ph.D., recognizes the relatively high average age of those involved in violence in his study – 29 – and says that this high age actually means the services needed by the population are many and vary widely. Health and housing, he says, are the big two, but jobs, job training, education, psychological help, and childcare are also important for many individuals. Street Outreach is there to build trust and relationships, and stop violence, but it cannot be a replacement for the dire need of clinicians – both mental and physical health clinicians – for this population.100 The literature is not as supportive of these programs and they are understudied and do not have as much empirical success. Since they are opt-in, a program’s success could also simply reflect the less vulnerable nature of those who are likely to take up the program. This component very much reflects the vision for Berkeley to “surround individuals in circles of care”. It is certainly possible to extend social services proactively but there is no guarantee they will be taken up.
98 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245 99 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., & Hureau, D. M. (2012). Social networks and the risk of gunshot injury. Journal of Urban Health, 89(6), 992– 1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9
100 Papachristos, A. (2023, March 9). Professor of Sociology and Faculty Fellow at Northwestern’s Institute for Policy Research [Zoom].
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28 Warrants to Remove Firearms from Domestic Abusers (DVROs), Individuals Posing a Danger to Themselves or Others (GVROs), Court-Issued Protective Orders, and Criminal Protective Orders (CPOs)
When there is a gun in the home, domestic violence is more likely to escalate to murder.101 Removing firearms from homes of abusers is rated one of the most effective and most frequently used interventions according to a national survey of local police departments.102 Domestic violence restraining order firearm-prohibition laws are associated with 10% reductions in Intimate Partner Homicide, but those results are only statistically significant when the law covers dating partners and ex-parte orders.103104 California law does both of these things. Upon being served with a domestic violence protective order in California, the respondent must relinquish his or her firearm by surrendering it immediately upon request of any law enforcement officer, or within 24 hours if no request is made.105 This requires staff time and liaising with the courts to get warrants for these interventions. Expert opinion within the police department states that routine staff hours are used up until liaising with the courts, which requires more.
Sometimes the Community Services Bureau will look at calls or cases and proactively seek a GVRO. In some cases it is based on the continued behavior of a subject. If BPD gets a seizure order/warrant, based on the nature of the situation, it will likely cost overtime in the form of BPD’s SRT (SWAT) serving the search warrant. This only applies if someone is not in custody when BPD is granted the seizure order. Most cases will likely be the former, in which BPD takes someone into custody responding to a call and contemporaneously seizes the guns by consent or warrant. I can confidently say that this intervention has minimal costs, with the exception of the overtime.106 The downside of this component is that domestic violence-related firearm incidents are just not that common in Berkeley, and even very successful interventions of this nature would not reduce overall gun violence much. There are only a handful of Domestic Violence cases annually that include firearms. I can confidently say that this would not amount to a 10% reduction in shootings – the cases are not frequent enough. Also, it is known that acquiring a firearm illegally is easy locally, especially with the proliferation of ghost guns.107 As California is one of the friendliest states to gun regulations and Berkeley is an epicenter of progressive gun reforms, this intervention should not be politically problematic. Restraining orders and protective orders are, by their very definition, temporary. So, logically, I am confident that this would not have long-lasting effects, although it may reduce
101 Domestic violence & firearms in California. (n.d.). Giffords. Retrieved April 9, 2023, from https://giffords.org/lawcenter/state-laws/domestic- violence-and-firearms-in-california/
102 Koper, C. S., Woods, D. J., & Kubu, B. E. (2013). Gun violence prevention practices among local police in the United States. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 36(3), 577–603. https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-06-2012-0052 103 An “ex parte order” is when one is able to get a restraining order without the other person present 104 Zeoli, A. M., McCourt, A., Buggs, S., Frattaroli, S., Lilley, D., & Webster, D. W. (2018). Retracted: Analysis of the strength of legal firearms restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence and their associations with intimate partner homicide. American Journal of Epidemiology, 187(7), 1449–1455. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwx362
105 Domestic violence & firearms in California. (n.d.). Giffords. Retrieved April 9, 2023, from https://giffords.org/lawcenter/state-laws/domestic- violence-and-firearms-in-california/
106 Berkeley Police Department (2023)
107 Smith, E. (2023, January 25). California has some of the strictest gun laws in the country. Here’s what we know about the guns used in this week’s deadly attacks. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/25/us/california-shootings-guns-wwk/index.html PAGE 3041
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29 the number of shootings by a few. This intervention occurs siloed away in individual homes. Neighbors would see the police on scene but overall there logically should be no impact on police legitimacy, fear of crime, or collective efficacy.
Street Outreach Workers/Violence Interrupters
Acquiring street outreach workers involves contracting with a CBO and monitoring their participation, which adds costs likely around $1 million. If they are already operating in Oakland or Richmond it would be worth exploring if they could expand operations to include Berkeley as well. I reached out to several CBOs for input and did not manage to connect with any of them.
Street teams can be very effective. But that assessment is based on high-risk community members opting in and having contact with a street team member. Of people that participated in Chicago’s CRED program, victimization rates were 50% lower than non-participants.108 I am unsure of what percentage reduction in shootings would occur because it is based on opting-in, and we don’t know the likelihood of any one person opting in to the program. Andrew Papachristos, Ph.D. claims that there will also be reports coming out soon that show a positive programmatic effect at an individual and a community level.109 What is unrealistic, he says, is “level setting” – claiming a specific amount of impact for any program. While sometimes it has been effective, sometimes it also hasn’t.
The National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC) highlights the imperative of strong working relationships between street outreach workers and police departments for street work to be successful as part of a larger gun violence initiative.110 This is the case in Stockton, California, Los Angeles, California, Chicago, Illinois, and New York City, New York.111 Unfortunately, there is not such affirming research on street teams in small cities. However, there could be much added value to custom notifications (focused deterrence) if street outreach workers accompanied Berkeley police to deliver messages to high-risk individuals. It would increase credibility of the police and the message, and the optics would be more genuine.112
Again, referencing the Berkeley Ceasefire D2 Ad Hoc Advisory Group Brief, there is strong evidence that social services and community interventions that do not involve law enforcement are extremely palatable to politicians. Participants chose CRED and remained enrolled in CRED to avoid pervasive community violence and attempt to improve their own situations. Those individuals were receptive to CRED recruitment efforts, citing the program’s immediate, tangible
108 Op-ed: What we know (And don’t know) about street outreach and gun violence prevention. (2021, October 25). Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-chicago-gun-violence-street-outreach-20211025-6pylamxs5jazhhyya3x3nb3eya- story.html
109 Papachristos, A. (2023, March 9). Professor of Sociology and Faculty Fellow at Northwestern’s Institute for Policy Research [Zoom]. 110 Considering the place of streetwork in violence interventions. (n.d.). National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC). Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://nnscommunities.org/guides/considering-the-place-of-streetwork-in-violence-interventions/ 111 Project safe neighborhoods (Lowell, Massachusetts). (n.d.). National Gang Center. Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://nationalgangcenter.ojp.gov/spt/Programs/3588
112 Elvir, J. (2023, March 22). Community Relations Manager Champaign, Illinois Blueprint Program [Zoom].
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30 benefits and fulfilling relationships with staff as key reasons for remaining engaged.113 There is some evidence of long- lasting effects but only for those that take up the program.
This intervention tangentially involves police but mostly uses community members as credible messengers for peace, so it maintains trust between street teams and community members. Papachristos states that, “in the 90s in Boston, you actually saw people recognize that there are different lanes, and people stayed in their lanes and shared relevant information and it actually went without much drama…outreach organizations and police for their part, they don’t want to be seen crossing the line. I do not think street outreach should be informants nor do I think that cops should be using intelligence to do so.”.114 If those boundaries can be maintained, street outreach will likely have no impact on police legitimacy. If done well, it would diffuse street tensions and likelihood of shootings/crime, leading to a decrease in fear of crime. Street workers ostensibly create more accountability by leveraging existing relationships in the community, thereby increasing collective efficacy.
Reviewing shootings that have just occurred and having information flow unidirectionally from police to streetworkers would identify high risk individuals and also likely prevent future violence. Protocols and boundaries need to be established prior to their work. Information should not flow from streetworkers to police, but rather only from police to streetworkers in terms of intelligence. This preserves the credibility of street outreach among community members. The only times they should be together are during intelligence meetings (shooting reviews, violence reviews) and custom notifications. If this working agreement can be designed, a mutually beneficial relationship can be formed, sustained, and trusted, street outreach can be effective in Berkeley.
Hospital Based Violence Intervention
YouthAlive! is a CBO currently doing bedside interventions at Highland Hospital in Oakland, which is the local Trauma 1 hospital for Berkeley.115 Shooting victims are nearly always sent to the local Trauma 1 hospital according to DHHS. While attempts to contact YouthAlive! to understand the logistics and determine the efficacy of their ongoing program have not been successful, this intervention is already being done.
Youth Alive! is doing bedside intervention when there is an act of violence to stop retaliation and connect victims with services. It stands to reason that, as it is already happening, hospital-based violence intervention is already being paid for and we do not need to consider it as a program component. More research is necessary to understand their approach and its efficacy, but since it is ongoing and shootings are still rising, it has little to no chance of reaching a 10% annual reduction in shootings. By the same token, this is already happening and not causing any political friction. In terms of how long its effects endure, this is a one-on-one interaction that hopefully has a positive effect on others in the victim’s social network. But, shootings are still increasing so it is unlikely to have long term or notable spillover effects.
113 Op-ed: What we know (And don’t know) about street outreach and gun violence prevention. (2021, October 25). Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-chicago-gun-violence-street-outreach-20211025-6pylamxs5jazhhyya3x3nb3eya- story.html
114 Papachristos, A. (2023, March 9). Professor of Sociology and Faculty Fellow at Northwestern’s Institute for Policy Research [Zoom]. 115 Berkeley Police Department, 2023
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31 Because this does not involve police and does not occur in a neighborhood, I can confidently conclude that it has little to no effect on police legitimacy, fear of crime, or collective efficacy.
Gun Buyback Programs
While the low cost is very attractive – a simple multiple of however many guns are turned in – the efficacy of gun buyback programs to curb firearm violence is seriously limited.116 Many studies have shown gun violence is a serious public emergency.117 Studies also show that buybacks do indeed have the ability to collect many weapons from the community.118 However, studies fail to show how buybacks are causal drivers in any reduction of violence or attract participants that are also involved in community violence. In this last respect programs have deeply failed, with participants lacking most characteristics of violent offenders, other than being mostly male. The typical buyback participant is over 55, white, and either inherited a gun they did not want or have no use for a gun.119 For more on these shortcomings, see Gun Buyback Programs [44] in the Literature Review. That said, buyback programs have no chance of increasing fear of crime, or decreasing police legitimacy or collective efficacy. Law enforcement plays a passive role, simply facilitating the collection of weapons.
Packaged components into programs
Alternative #1: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers A POP approach would allow for longer-term systemic impacts to be made at hot spots than hot spots policing on its own. While law enforcement would be analyzing and spending time at hot spots, street outreach workers would be building rapport with offenders and possible victims as well as diffusing tensions among individuals.
Alternative #2: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers + SNA Focused Deterrence
A POP approach would allow for longer-term systemic impacts to be made at hot spots than hot spots policing on its own. While law enforcement would be analyzing and spending time at hot spots, street outreach workers would be building rapport with offenders and possible victims as well as diffusing tensions among individuals. Street outreach workers would also help in the custom notification process, to balance the deterrent message by offering support and social services.
116 Kasper, R. E., Green, J., Damle, R. N., Aidlen, J., Nazarey, P., Manno, M., Borer, E., & Hirsh, M. P. (2017). And the survey said.... Evaluating rationale for participation in gun buybacks as a tool to encourage higher yields. Journal of Pediatric Surgery, 52(2), 354–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpedsurg.2016.08.009
117 Wintemute, G. J. (2015). The epidemiology of firearm violence in the twenty-first century united states. Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535 118 Kasper, R. E., Green, J., Damle, R. N., Aidlen, J., Nazarey, P., Manno, M., Borer, E., & Hirsh, M. P. (2017). And the survey said.... Evaluating rationale for participation in gun buybacks as a tool to encourage higher yields. Journal of Pediatric Surgery, 52(2), 354–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpedsurg.2016.08.009
119 Violano, P., Driscoll, C., Chaudhary, N. K., Schuster, K. M., Davis, K. A., Borer, E., Winters, J. K., & Hirsh, M. P. (2014). Gun buyback programs: A venue to eliminate unwanted guns in the community. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 77(3), S46–S50. https://doi.org/10.1097/TA.0000000000000319
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32 Alternative #3: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers + SNA Focused Deterrence + Social Services
A POP approach would allow for longer-term systemic impacts to be made at hot spots than hot spots policing on its own. While law enforcement would be analyzing and spending time at hot spots, street outreach workers would be building rapport with offenders and possible victims as well as diffusing tensions among individuals. Street outreach workers would also help in the custom notification process, to balance the deterrent message by offering support and social services. In this package, the city would invest additional money in case management for at-risk individuals, making both focused deterrence and social services key applications of the social network analysis.
Program recommendation
I recommend that the City of Berkeley and Berkeley Police Department implement Alternative #3: Problem Oriented Policing (POP) at Hot Spots + Street Outreach Workers + SNA Focused Deterrence + Social Services. As long as the budget can make it work, I highly recommend doing the most programmatically that can be done as gun violence takes human lives.
These programs are complementary but not interdependent. So, it is additionally advantageous, if any part of the program fails to produce results or runs up too high of a cost it can be cut while other measures are already active. The remaining measures would not be harmed. This is more convenient than having to start from scratch with new program ideas. If the same CBO is being funded for multiple programs, it is critical that it is clear how much of their funding goes to each program. In the slight way that focused deterrence is related to social services and street outreach, it is most likely helpful not harmful if community members recognize the same workers in different roles. More frequent, positive encounters promote trust and mutual respect.
In the analysis of outcomes, POP at hot spots has the potential for negative community-level effects, which could be counteracted by street workers that develop trust and cohesion in a neighborhood. The “hard” message of focused deterrence is similarly counteracted through the offering of social services. Bundling, in this sense, ensures that Berkeley achieves its goals without creating significant deleterious side effects due to one component or another. Having such a multipronged program is aspirational and as such may not be feasible – that is really up to the city.
Eroding violence from multiple angles is a goal of this recommendation. It recognizes that the roots of gun violence are complex, many, and intertwined. If we can simultaneously activate this multi-pronged program, we will be joining other small cities (Champaign, IL, Lowell, MA) in attempting to curb gun violence from a law enforcement perspective and a human perspective.
Implementation
The program as a whole would benefit from one additional administrative staff member assigned to the Community Services Bureau and one additional patrol officer. The administrative staff member will ensure that officers know to whom they should make their reports related to the program and would be available to communicate with CBOs or other municipal services regarding ongoing programmatic matters. The additional patrol officer would be able to fill any PAGE 3045
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33 gaps created by POP at hot spots in overall patrol. I realize this may be difficult, with patrol downsizing and the hiring crisis being what it is.
It is ideal if the City of Berkeley can find a CBO willing and able to manage focused deterrence, street outreach, and the extension of social services. Even if it costs more budgetarily, this makes sense from an efficiency standpoint and from an information standpoint. It is much easier if one CBO houses all the information necessary to do all three jobs and it can be reasoned that each one would be enhanced by the others.
POP at Hot Spots
Ideally, the department would select a few (2-5) crime concentrations in specific places identified (7) in this research on which to focus.120 The police would need to incorporate the mapped gun violence incident data from this report but also possibly do their own crime mapping if it would be more up-to-date by the time this report is read.
Police should use the S.A.R.A. method when operationalizing problem-solving. “Scanning” involves the identification and prioritization of potential problems that may be causing crime within a jurisdiction. “Analysis” involves and in-depth evaluation of problems using a variety of data sources so the most appropriate response can be developed. This is not just about problem outcomes like traditional policing but concerned with the underlying processes that lead to problems. “Response” is the development and implementation of an intervention tailored to the nature of the problem distilled in the analysis phase. Response searches should be broad, involving law enforcement and non-law enforcement methods, other agencies, community groups and members. “Assessment” is the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the response effect on targeted problem(s). This process is intended lead to continual improvements and refinement in further iterations of the response.121
When not answering calls for service, officers should visit the locations on their beat, on a random basis, and patrol (including foot patrol) for 15-20 minutes. A minimum of 10 minutes must be spent in each hot spot to have any deterrent effect.122 This should be repeated periodically and unpredictably. This will likely require a reorganization or reorientation of patrol, to enable them to spend 15 minutes every several hours (but randomly – for example not every three hours on the dot just several times a shift) in each hot spot. If problems are inside a store or business, walk inside of that location in addition to outside patrol.123 While patrolling hot spots, officers should record anything notable that facilitates crime, from the same individuals to substantial debris to a deserted lot used as a loitering area. These notes should be used in the future to alter these spaces in ways where crime control is long lasting.
120 How many hot spots are addressed at one time depends on the capabilities of the police force. If they can treat multiple locations with enough dosage that may make sense from a public safety perspective. But if they are experimenting to see which approach works best they might want to begin with a small number of places.
121 Chief Eliot Isaac, Lt. Matthew Hammer M.S., Blake Christenson M.A., & Dr. Tamara D. Madensen. (2017). P.I.V.O.T. Place Based Investigations of Violent Offender Territories (Herman Goldstein Award Submission). Cincinnati Police Department. 122 Koper, C. S. (1995). Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 649–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096231 123 High-Crime Areas (“Hot spots”). (n.d.). https://www.evidence-basedpolicing.org/hot-spot- patrols/#:~:text=The%20Koper%20Principle%20states%20that,in%20conjunction%20with%20other%20strategies.
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34 It is well within the capacity of the Berkeley Police Department to undertake POP, especially because they have some degree of a head start. Some police officers already use a POP approach to their beats. To do POP at hot spots, they would need evolving data analysis, personnel to devote to, at minimum, two hot spots for a limited amount of time, and administrative personnel to liaise with other departments and CBOs regarding non-police interventions. BPD says that both POP and hot spots policing could both be accomplished with “staff time,” with officers incorporating POP approaches along their regular beats. Additionally, there already are some staff that could liaise with other city departments without increasing costs. POP at hot spots will require a training for all patrol officers and office staff who would be coordinating city or community services regarding problems cited by patrol.
Focused Deterrence/Custom Notifications
Focused deterrence will require a training for all officers that will be utilized for this specialized program as well as any CBO actors partnered with for this purpose. Other criminal justice agencies (e.g. parole, probation) need to be identified early on, and if they can also participate in the trainings that is ideal. The earlier who does what can be determined all the better. The CBO needs to be amenable to delivering the “soft” message while working in tandem with the police and others as they deliver the “hard” message. The officers involved in this intervention need to be selected extremely carefully. Not only do they need to believe in deterrence but they need to be able to deliver the message with great care. The Community Services Bureau (CSB) in tandem with the Personnel and Training Department’s Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on focused deterrence should coordinate internal training for these officers. CSB is dedicated to liaising with the public and should be responsible for all communications regarding training for this highly specialized team. Not only do they have experts on doing so but they have powerful data analysis personnel and tools (coding, GIS mapping, network analysis), allowing them to zero in on key people.
A best practices process to custom notifications is encouraged by COPS – Community Oriented Policing Services at the U.S. Department of Justice124. First, impact players are identified, using SNA if possible. Next, custom legal assessments are done for each impact player that law enforcement plans on notifying. Third, positive influentials in impact players’ lives are identified and community, social services, and street outreach workers are mobilized. Lastly, written documents and support materials are created to aid with the notification.
Identifying impact players is straightforward. The first thing is to talk to frontline personnel – beat officers, special units, probation, parole, corrections staff, and/or confidential informants. They have the greatest knowledge of who is at the center of ongoing violence. If violence has just occurred, convene right away to determine the groups involved, key players, and instigating factors. Debrief all the same parties, review incident data, crosscheck lists of groups and their members, conduct criminal history reviews of active group members, perform social network analysis, and create a final list of impact players. Get input from street outreach workers and community members, and use social network analysis to focus resources strategically on those at highest risk of violence. Identify as many impact players as possible to notify.125
124 Kennedy, D. M., & Friedrich, M. A. (2014). Custom Notifications: Individualized Communication in the Group Violence Intervention. U.S.
Department of Justice COPS Community Oriented Policing Services. https://nnscommunities.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/10/GVI_Custom_Notifications_Guide.pdf 125 At this stage, it unnecessary for evidence to meet legal standards for arrest because arrests are not goal of custom notifications. Their purpose is to communicate to impact players that violence is unacceptable, let them know their custom legal exposure, and to offer them opportunities for help. As such, evidence can be based on broad range of information that officers and community members provide about impact players.
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35 An influential is a person close to an impact player who has their respect and can help them make positive choices. This may be someone within their family or a person with moral standing and credibility within the community. Asking the impact player is the best way to identify an influential, followed by examining personal connections – family, friends, partners, coaches, barbers, school resource officers, or street outreach workers. A last resort is looking at people who have posted their bail or attended hearings. An influential is only relevant in this context if they are a positive influence on the individual and not committed to the street code – the set of norms that mandates violence as a response to disrespect, indifference to prison, and antagonism to the police. If an impact player cannot be directly reached, delivering the message both orally and in writing to the influential seems to be an effective substitute. 126
It is important that custom legal assessments are made for each person to whom a notification is given. A meeting should be held with prosecutors to determine the individual’s personal legal exposure from past violent crimes, especially those with a firearm, and compile the potential state and federal sanctions for further violent crimes. “Compiling custom legal assessments of this sort requires a close working partnership between police and prosecutors at local, state, and federal levels. After police perform an incident review to identify the impact players they want to notify, they pass their names to the [prosecutor]. The state prosecutor reviews the criminal records and determines potential sanctions for a range of violent offenses [sometimes] consulting with the federal prosecutor to establish whether grounds exist for a federal case.”
127 The custom legal assessment should be finalized in writing that is plain and easily understood.
Street Outreach Workers
The first step required is identifying a CBO that is ready and willing to take on street outreach. It is smart to check with neighboring cities (Oakland, Richmond) that are already overseeing similar work. This will require approximately bimonthly meetings between the CBO and the Berkeley Police. This is so that the police can provide any intelligence that may help the CBO on the street and so that the police can monitor and get an idea of the effectiveness of the street outreach. While these meetings may not cost any money per se, it will take dedicated staff time and record keeping within the Community Services Bureau. During these meetings it is important to go over cost effectiveness and budget items of the CBO’s program to create an accountability structure for the funding they are getting from the city. It is also important that the city apply for grants to fund this program, so it makes sense for there to be dedicated personnel specializing in grant research and applications at least at the city level. Champaign, IL found such positions essential for its CBO programs within their gun violence initiative.
128
Social Services
This has the same steps as above – it first requires identifying a CBO that is ready and willing to take on social services case management and checking with neighboring cities is the logical first step. It is my understanding that many community members in Berkeley have case managers through many different CBOs. It is important that, once SNA identifies who should be targeted for social services based on risk, those people should all be managed through one CBO.
126 Ruderman, W. (2013, March 3). To Stem Juvenile Robbers, Police Trail Youth Before the Crime. New York Times. 127 Kennedy, D. M., & Friedrich, M. A. (2014). Custom Notifications: Individualized Communication in the Group Violence Intervention. U.S.
Department of Justice COPS Community Oriented Policing Services. https://nnscommunities.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/10/GVI_Custom_Notifications_Guide.pdf 128 Elvir, J. (2023, March 22). Community Relations Manager Champaign, Illinois Blueprint Program [Zoom].
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36 This will also require a bimonthly meeting between the CBO and police. This is so that the police can monitor and get an idea of the effectiveness of the case management by the CBO. It may also help police to know what services people are taking up or which seem to be most needed. While these meetings may not cost any money per se, it will take dedicated staff time and record keeping, within the Community Services Bureau. During these meetings it is important to go over cost effectiveness and budget items of the CBO’s program to create an accountability structure for the funding they are getting from the city. It is also important that the city apply for grants to fund this program, so it makes sense for there to be dedicated personnel specializing in grant research and applications at least at the city level. Champaign, IL found such positions essential for its CBO programs within their gun violence initiative.129 Program Evaluation
Program Evaluation Recommendation
According to David Weisburd, Ph.D., “It is important to begin assessment when a program begins so that you can see how the intervention affected the street over time. As a rule, if the purpose is to assess the impacts of the program it is better to select sites and then randomize them to receive the intervention. If you have control conditions that have not been treated, that will provide the best comparison for assessing whether the intervention is having an impact. Those "control" sites can then receive the treatment later if it turns out that the intervention is effective. Sometimes such rigor is not possible in the everyday realities of policing, but it is still important to try to identify comparison places that are similar to those receiving the intervention if you want a valid assessment of the program's utility. It is a good idea of police agencies to team up with researchers if they are trying to assess outcomes.”130 As previously stated, the client in this case should seek to sustain a continued decrease in gun violence incidents, year after year. The Center for Criminal Justice Violent Crime Working Group states that city leaders and criminal justice advocates should aim for an annual homicide and violent crime reduction of 10%.131 The program should be monitored closely in its first year, following a very thorough annual evaluation. No randomized control trial is possible, due to this program operating in the real world. Not just because of legal and ethical constraints, but you could not leave a part of Berkeley without police services just to test a hypothesis. But, what would be possible is applying alternatives 2 and 3 differentially – applying social services in one part of the city and not in a different part. If the department really wants to know if an intervention is effective this is a good choice. The question then becomes, which parts of the city are comparable enough to give different treatments? Only police intelligence and data analysis of violence can answer this question.
Berkeley’s trend should be regularly compared to the rest of Alameda County and the state to see where it sits contextually. In a one-group pretest-posttest design, the dependent variable is measured once before the treatment is implemented and once after it is implemented. This is a stronger evaluative measure than simply a posttest evaluation.
This would mean comparing the number of shootings prior to the intervention to the number after the intervention begins. It might also make sense to compare shots fired pre-test to shots fired post-test, and likewise with firearm
129 Elvir, J. (2023, March 22). Community Relations Manager Champaign, Illinois Blueprint Program [Zoom]. 130 Weisburd, D. (2023, April 11). Distinguished Professor at George Mason University [Email]. 131 “Saving Lives: Ten Essential Actions Can Take to Reduce Violence Now.” Council on Criminal Justice, 12 Jan. 2022, https://counciloncj.org/10- essential-actions/.
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37 injuries and firearm fatalities. This would be informative by allowing practitioners and researchers to see from which category the most change is coming from.
Conclusion
The value of law enforcement partnerships with academic researchers is a cornerstone of data-driven, smart policing.
Especially in this turbulent time, where policing is under strict scrutiny by the public, it is imperative that the foundations of policing be navigated and calculated with scientific precision. I selected this Advanced Policy Analysis with an optimistic eye toward these foundations as we move forward in our search for stronger policies around policing. “Police chiefs benefit immensely from having a respected academic representative standing next to them affirming that the choices and decisions made by the police follow best practices developed by research, study, and assessment.”132 Gun violence takes human lives, and we should pilot as many prongs of a program as can be sustained budgetarily and practically. It is my hope that these recommendations are undertaken with as much aspiration as they are intended, and that the consistency of the science underpinning policing remains in place. “Promising partnerships are developing between American police agencies and universities as well as abroad. If carefully cultivated and nurtured, these relationships may well be the third police research tradition that is essential for enhancing police practices.” 133
The past lack of “real-world” value of academic police research mainly was reflected in the absence of implementation recommendations. “It would be naïve to suggest that the working relationship is always smooth.”134 “Academics are very good at detecting, describing, and documenting the problems in police practices. Academics are also very good at theorizing and providing innovative ways to enhance policing practices…however, academics have not traditionally been good at providing the necessary guidance regarding implementation.”135 This is why I have included a relatively detailed implementation process for each prong of the program that I am recommending. However, much of implementation changes as programs go along, incorporating real-time data and experience.
Ultimately, we cannot solve the crime problems of today, including the rise in gun violence, without smart and evidence- based solutions. It is well documented “why police administrators should strongly consider the work generated by the academic community…and why academics need to better listen to and understand police”.136, 137 This research has carefully considered the policies, procedures, and politics underlying professional policing and sought to overcome past
132 Engel, R. S., & Whalen, J. L. (2010). Police–academic partnerships: Ending the dialogue of the deaf, the Cincinnati experience. Police Practice and Research, 11(2), 105–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614261003590803 133 Id.
134 Fleming, J. (2010). Learning to work together: Police and academics. Policing, 4(2), 139–145. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paq002 135 Engel, R. S., & Whalen, J. L. (2010). Police–academic partnerships: Ending the dialogue of the deaf, the Cincinnati experience. Police Practice and Research, 11(2), 105–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614261003590803 136 Id.
137 There are four primary reasons for police administrators to strongly consider the research and viewpoints of the academic world when making important decisions about the leadership of a police department: (1) operational effectiveness and efficiency, (2) external validity, (3) cooperative transparency, and (4) the information technology revolution. (Engel & Whalen, 2010) PAGE 3050
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38 barriers of “the ivory tower versus the real world”.138 I hope that this research and any that follows can continue the new trend in police-academic partnerships that is grounded in practical, applicable methods that practitioners can use.
138 Original quotation
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39 Appendices
Appendix A: Research Approach and Methodology
I employ a mixed methods approach in this report, focusing on a review of the scholarly literature, an examination of interventions that could or could not apply to the City of Berkeley’s gun violence, qualitative interviews, and Berkeley Police Department shooting data. Quantitatively, I performed point density analysis to identify geospatial points of convergence or gun violence “hot spots”, and Social Network Analysis to identify individuals at risk of gun violence perpetration and victimization.
Overview of Research Sources
Source Category Source
Legal California Penal Code
Berkeley Municipal Code
Scholarly UC Berkeley Library
Departmental – Police 2018-2022 Shooting Data on Location, Type, Date and Time 2017-2022 Data on All Persons Involved in Shootings and Their Race, Gender, and Age
Public Berkeley Police Department Transparency Hub
Interview Protocol
I developed a step-by-step approach to guide requests for interviews, the interview process, and the follow-up. After initially developing this approach, I integrated feedback from a GSPP Faculty Advisor, and refined the final approach:
Step 1: Send email to request interview using email template Step 2: Set up time to schedule interview
Interviews completed by the end of March / early April
Step 3: Find category of interview and look at question bank Log all interviews and notes in Interview Running Notes document Step 4: Send thank you and any other follow-up message(s) to interviewee Step 5: Consolidate takeaways
Interview Practices Employed
I am experienced with policy work related to public safety more generally, but much research was done in order to target the right subjects. I contacted the subjects and scheduled the interviews. In all but one case I recorded the sessions with permission so that notes could be taken later. This made space for follow-up questions and comments.
Interview Subjects
David Weisburd Ph.D., Distinguished Professor at George Mason University PAGE 3052
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40 Andrew Papachristos Ph.D., Professor of Sociology and Faculty Fellow at Northwestern's Institute for Policy Research, and the Faculty Director of Corners: The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science.
Cody Telep Ph.D., Associate Professor & Associate Director of the School of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Arizona State University
John Eck Ph.D., Professor of Criminal Justice at University of Cincinnati Rebecca Plevin, M.D., FACS, Co-Director of the San Francisco Wraparound Project Jorge Elvir, Champagne, IL Blueprint Community Relations Manager, Equity and Engagement Department
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41 Appendix B Literature Review
Crime Concentration/Place-Based Policing
It is a well-known in criminology that crime in general is concentrated in a very small amount of micro-geographic units.
Or, more scientifically the “Law of Crime Concentration” says that “for a defined measure of crime at a specific micro- geographic unit, the concentration of crime will fall within a narrow bandwidth of percentages for a defined cumulative proportion of crime.”139 Specifically, gun violence is concentrated in small portions of the country and within even smaller geographic portions of cities, particularly in under resourced and disadvantaged neighborhoods. This results in an “uneven distribution of race and place,” further complicating how police address it and what issues fall out of those interventions.140
Weisburd’s “law of crime concentration” says that crime at a specific micro-geographic unit, the concentration of crime will fall within a narrow bandwidth of percentages (eg. 25% or 50%) for a defined proportion of crime, even when there is extreme volatility in the total number of crime incidents.141 Weisburd (2004, 2015) and Braga (2010), among others, find strong support for the law of crime concentration.142 For example, in Seattle it was found that 50% of crime incidents occurred at only 4.5% of street segments.143
For example, over the course of 30 years in Boston, 89% of street segments and intersections had zero ABDW (Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon) firearm incidents and another 6% experienced just one. The remainder was responsible for the overwhelming majority of ABDW firearm incidents.144 This trend was stable over the course of the 30-year period. Due to this crime concentration, it has been productive and impactful for police to focus on the small proportion of cities that generates the most crime. In his study of crime concentration in different sized cities, Weisburd looks at small cities: Brooklyn Park, MN, Redlands, CA, and Ventura, CA. He finds that 50% of crime is concentrated in between 2.1 and 3.5% of the cities. This is remarkable because he finds that it is even more concentrated than his sample of large cities (New York, NY, Cincinnati, OH etc.).145 Braga (2013) finds that 89% of Boston’s street segments and intersections had zero firearm assaults with a deadly weapon. 6% experienced 1. The remaining 5% was responsible for virtually all of Boston’s gun violence. The epidemic
139 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
140 Papachristos, A. V., Wildeman, C., & Roberto, E. (2015). Tragic, but not random: The social contagion of nonfatal gunshot injuries. Social Science & Medicine, 125, 139–150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056 141 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
142 Braga, A. A., & Weisburd, D. (2010). Policing problem places: Crime hot spots and effective prevention. Oxford University Press. 143 Weisburd, D., Bushway, S., Lum, C., & Yang, S.-M. (2004). Trajectories of crime at places: A longitudinal study of street segments in the city of Seattle*. Criminology, 42(2), 283–322. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00521.x 144 Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x 145 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
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42 and later downturn of gun violence is credited to trends at 3% of micro-places that experienced volatility in gun violence through that time.146
So far as it has been studied, smaller cities have higher levels of crime concentration. Scholars caution applying big city trends and solutions to less dense cities, suburbs, and rural areas. Weisburd (2015) looked at three small cities, including Ventura, CA which is comparable to Berkeley’s size. The data suggest that crime concentration can be different in smaller cities, like simply being on a few specific high-density streets. They have fewer overall crime incidents and their street segments are generally much longer. Small city phenomena are just beginning to be studied. 147
146 Braga, A. A., & Schnell, C. (2013). Evaluating place-based policing strategies: Lessons learned from the smart policing initiative in Boston.
Police Quarterly, 16(3), 339–357. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611113497046 147 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
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43 148
The street segment has been identified as a useful division of a city because it is a sort of “micro-community,” in that a block has certain culture, closeness, norms, activities, boundaries, and historical evolution. These qualities make it “an important theoretical unit in the studying of crime at place”.149 The “street segment” is two block faces on both sides of a street between two intersections.150 It is a better micro-unit choice than smaller units, such as addresses, and makes for less complicated data gathering and analysis. Intersections have, on occasion, been used in addition to street segments. “City level gun violence trends are understood best by the analyses of trends at a very small number of micro places, such as street segments and intersections, rather than analyses of trends at larger areal units such as neighborhoods, arbitrarily-defined policing districts, or Census tracts.” 151 Knowing this has positively impacted gun
violence policing and public policy. The more we learn about the concentration of gun violence, the more we are able to concentrate treatments for gun violence (policing, social services etc.) in those specific areas.152 What are now referred to generally as “Place-Based Policing” and “Hot Spots Policing” originate from these studies and conclusions.
The natural conclusion from this, with the caveat of having only few small city studies, is that if crime is indeed so concentrated, policing and prevention resources should be similarly geospatially concentrated.153 Interventions should
148 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
149 Id.
150 Weisburd, D., Bushway, S., Lum, C., & Yang, S.-M. (2004). Trajectories of crime at places: A longitudinal study of street segments in the city of Seattle*. Criminology, 42(2), 283–322. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00521.x 151 Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x 152 Weisburd, D., Groff, E. R., & Yang, S.-M. (2014). The importance of both opportunity and social disorganization theory in a future research agenda to advance criminological theory and crime prevention at places. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 51(4), 499–508. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427814530404
153 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
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44 focus on very specific location and not larger neighborhoods or “beats”.154 This conclusion extends beyond criminal justice intervention and applies as well to social interventions that may ameliorate gun violence. The concept of treating city “hot spots” in prevention efforts grows out of the now established fact of crime concentration.
Gun Buyback Programs
Gun buyback programs theoretically decrease the supply of guns in a community. Buyback programs encourage participation by offering cash or gift cards in exchange for weapons voluntarily surrendered and by using a “no questions asked” policy. Several studies have been done on who participates in a gun buyback program once it exists, but less studies have illuminated their effect on overall gun violence. “Additional research is needed to determine effective methods to target individuals who would have the greatest impact on gun violence if they relinquished their weapons.”155 Less ambiguously, these individuals are not relinquishing their guns during gun buybacks, which is why research is needed on how to get high-risk individuals to participate.
For example, some characteristics of participants in a Worcester, Massachusetts buyback program from 2009 to 2015 are that 68% had gun safety training and a majority were white males over 55 years old who did not themselves buy the gun. Most commonly, those surveyed inherited the gun they turned in, and there was a strong positive relationship between inheriting a gun and turning it in.156 This is significantly different than the population of individuals involved in gun violence. In fact, 98% of gun buyback participants were white when just 65% of Worcester’s population is white.157,158 This study illustrates that guns are a public health risk and that buybacks take in guns, but it fails to illustrate how buybacks increase public safety by removing guns accessible to individuals at risk of violence. Even they state, “Our program has so far failed to attract significant numbers of young minority community members. Improving upon this is particularly important, given the higher burden of gun violence experienced among minority communities. A recent New York Times review article explored 358 national armed encounters occurring in 2015 where four or more people were killed or wounded. They found that 73% of the victims were black, 72% were males, and the average age was 27.” 159
A study that looks at three cities’ programs (Worcester, MA included) found that more than half of participants (55%) did not purchase the firearm, but acquired it through inheritance, gift, or random find.160 “The primary goal of gun
154 Braga, A. A., & Schnell, C. (2013). Evaluating place-based policing strategies: Lessons learned from the smart policing initiative in Boston.
Police Quarterly, 16(3), 339–357. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611113497046 155 Violano, P., Driscoll, C., Chaudhary, N. K., Schuster, K. M., Davis, K. A., Borer, E., Winters, J. K., & Hirsh, M. P. (2014). Gun buyback programs: A venue to eliminate unwanted guns in the community. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 77(3), S46–S50. https://doi.org/10.1097/TA.0000000000000319
156 Kasper, R. E., Green, J., Damle, R. N., Aidlen, J., Nazarey, P., Manno, M., Borer, E., & Hirsh, M. P. (2017). And the survey said.... Evaluating rationale for participation in gun buybacks as a tool to encourage higher yields. Journal of Pediatric Surgery, 52(2), 354–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpedsurg.2016.08.009
157 Id.
158 U. S. Census bureau quickfacts: Worcester city, Massachusetts. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2023, from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/worcestercitymassachusetts 159 Kasper, R. E., Green, J., Damle, R. N., Aidlen, J., Nazarey, P., Manno, M., Borer, E., & Hirsh, M. P. (2017). And the survey said.... Evaluating rationale for participation in gun buybacks as a tool to encourage higher yields. Journal of Pediatric Surgery, 52(2), 354–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpedsurg.2016.08.009
160 Violano, P., Driscoll, C., Chaudhary, N. K., Schuster, K. M., Davis, K. A., Borer, E., Winters, J. K., & Hirsh, M. P. (2014). Gun buyback programs: A venue to eliminate unwanted guns in the community. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 77(3), S46–S50. https://doi.org/10.1097/TA.0000000000000319
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45 buyback programs is the removal of unwanted firearms from the community,” not necessarily the increase of safety and decrease of gun violence. “To improve the effectiveness of gun buyback programs, it is necessary to understand the demographic that is likely to participate. The majority of participants in our gun buyback program study were white males. Most have additional weapons at home. Participants are more likely to reside in suburban affluent communities than in urban locations, which is similar to other reports.”161 As there has not yet been innovation in how to attract likely perpetrators and likely victims of gun violence to these gun buybacks, and as we know the demography of said population, gun buybacks are not linked causally to less gun violence.
161 Violano, P., Driscoll, C., Chaudhary, N. K., Schuster, K. M., Davis, K. A., Borer, E., Winters, J. K., & Hirsh, M. P. (2014). Gun buyback programs: A venue to eliminate unwanted guns in the community. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 77(3), S46–S50. https://doi.org/10.1097/TA.0000000000000319
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46 162
163
Hot Spots Policing
It is a generally known fact that hot spots policing is effective at reducing crime. The effectiveness of hot spots policing bears out in the extensive body of research that includes numerous experimental and quasi-experimental studies.164
162 Kasper, R. E., Green, J., Damle, R. N., Aidlen, J., Nazarey, P., Manno, M., Borer, E., & Hirsh, M. P. (2017). And the survey said.... Evaluating rationale for participation in gun buybacks as a tool to encourage higher yields. Journal of Pediatric Surgery, 52(2), 354–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpedsurg.2016.08.009
163 Violano, P., Driscoll, C., Chaudhary, N. K., Schuster, K. M., Davis, K. A., Borer, E., Winters, J. K., & Hirsh, M. P. (2014). Gun buyback programs: A venue to eliminate unwanted guns in the community. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 77(3), S46–S50. https://doi.org/10.1097/TA.0000000000000319
164 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 PAGE 3059
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47 Braga (2007) stated, “extant evaluation research seems to provide fairly robust evidence that hot spots policing is an effective crime prevention strategy”.165
Hot spots policing originated out of the widespread acknowledgement that crime, including gun violence, is clustered heavily around very small geospatial units within a city. It is a strategy that focuses prevention resources on specific locations where crime is highly concentrated.166 It is widely accepted that a very small percentage of units of analysis of place is responsible for a majority of crime incidents.167 Simply stated, when focused on small units of geography with high rates of crime, police can effectively tackle crime and disorder.168 Instead of larger units, hot spots policing can adopt a range of responses focused on street segments and intersections.
This contrasts with the traditional policing strategy which focuses on individuals.169 Police records can be analyzed to identify gun violence concentration in such places and how that concentration changes – or is stable – over time.
There is the question of what activities officers should undertake while in these hot spots. Just increasing officer presence at a hot spot has a deterrent effect on crime.170 In the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment, police were not given specific instructions other than to increase patrol at hot spots. Increased police presence alone had a statistically significant effect on deterring crime.171 The theory of change here is that criminals will note the police presence and be deterred due to the increased cost of offending. Analysis by Koper (1995) concluded that the ideal time spent at each hot spot is 15 minutes. After that interval, police presence has diminished marginal returns. This phenomenon is known as the “Koper curve”.172 “Survival time” is the amount of time it takes for crime or disorder to happen after an officer has departed. When officers are just present for 15 minutes, survival time increased by 23%.173
165 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 166 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 167 Weisburd, D. (2015). The law of crime concentration and the criminology of place*: The law of crime concentration. Criminology, 53(2), 133– 157. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12070
168 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., & Hureau, D. M. (2012). Social networks and the risk of gunshot injury. Journal of Urban Health, 89(6), 992– 1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9
169 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 170 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 171 Sherman, L. W., & Weisburd, D. (1995). General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime “hot spots”: A randomized, controlled trial. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 625–648. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096221 172 Koper, C. S. (1995). Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 649–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096231 173 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 PAGE 3060
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48 Although mere presence produces crime control benefits, when police undertake tailored and specific interventions at each hot spot, the more effective the program at reducing crime after police depart and in the long-run.174 The more diverse the intervention strategy at place, the greater deterrence it is shown to have in hot spots. This strategy is known as Problem-Oriented Policing and is described later in this report. Problem-Oriented Policing programs that incorporate these tailored responses produce effect sizes that are more than double those produced by hot spots studies focused only on police presence.
The “question of displacement versus deterrence is crucial to evaluation costs and benefits of the policies but also has implications for understanding criminal incentives and behavior.”175 The larger body of literature on hot spots policing and displacement concludes that violent crime simply does not displace geospatially to neighboring areas. Displacement is the idea that interventions at a place will cause crime to shift spatially to a neighboring or new area as offenders evaluate risks related to certain areas and relocate. If anything, hot spots policing actually sees a diffusion of crime control benefits to neighboring areas.
A large, city-wide study conducted in Bogotá, Colombia is an outlier. It did find displacement of property crimes but found no evidence of displacement for violent crimes. This is significant because, there is something specific about violent crimes (“crimes of passion”) that does not spill over into neighboring areas or other parts of the city. This is consistent with the idea that offenders with sustained motives (like theft) respond strategically to targeted police presence and choose to relocate. Crimes of passion might be easier to deter, given that they target a specific person in a specific place. This suggests that policymakers should consider carefully if the crime patterns in their city can be deterred by place-based hot spots policing.
176 Gun violence is usually a “crime of passion,” not one of convenience, and therefore it is likely that the hot spots policing model would effectively address such crimes.
Displacement that is not nearby or geospatial in nature, however, is understudied and not fully understood. Perhaps there is displacement of the crime type – the specific crime of gun violence does not occur but another type of crime is committed instead.177 Or, displacement could occur but much farther away, although they did not find this for violent crime in Bogotá.178
There are three possible counter-effective outcomes of hot spots policing. First, increasing police presence in an area may lead residents to believe crime has increased, thereby producing fear. Out of fear, residents can retreat from the community and the social controls that deter crime can break down.179 Second, if hot spots policing decreases collective efficacy, it could increase crime over the long run and any short-term crime control gains would be offset. “Collective
174 Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 175 Blattman, C., Green, D. P., Ortega, D., & Tobón, S. (2021). Place-based interventions at scale: The direct and spillover effects of policing and city services on crime. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(4), 2022–2051. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab002 176 Id.
177 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 178 Blattman, C., Green, D. P., Ortega, D., & Tobón, S. (2021). Place-based interventions at scale: The direct and spillover effects of policing and city services on crime. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(4), 2022–2051. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab002 179 Wilson, G. L. K., James Q. (1982, March 1). Broken windows. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken- windows/304465/
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49 efficacy” means the ability of a community to operate with common values and regulate behavior within it through strong relationships and mutual trust.180 Weisburd et al. (2004) found that the “hotter” the spot, the lower the rates of collective efficacy.181 Lastly, a concern of hot spots policing is that it may decrease police legitimacy. To do their job, police need support and cooperation from the public, and their willingness to defer to their authority. If this breaks down, long term, a community could become lawless and even attract crime from elsewhere.182 Essentially, can simple everyday police methods produce long-term crime reductions at hot spots without deeper structural change to address inequities at the heart of crime?183 Each of the above counter-effects could in the long-term offset the short-term gains made from hot spots policing.
While the theories underpinning the potential downsides of hot spots policing are valid, none have been studied to the degree where experts feel confident expressing that they ring true. In particular, there are conflicting studies regarding the impact of hot spots policing on police legitimacy. There is not enough research to make a judgment call on these concerns.184 The police and criminal justice practitioners must monitor and evaluate their own community’s fear of crime, collective efficacy, and police legitimacy to understand the possible or likely impacts of a hot spots policing program in their city.
In addition to not knowing the full range of hot spots policing effects, we also do not fully understand the impacts of hot spots policing on rural areas or smaller cities.185 Larger cities are almost always the focus of the literature with few exceptions. One study of San Bernardino County looked at hot spots in a suburban sprawl environment. While lower- activity places may still be “crime hot spots” in smaller jurisdictions, the ability of the police to influence crime at such places may be different. The number of events at each hot spot in San Bernardino County was too small to allow for statistically powerful outcomes. This is likely to be a serious barrier to evaluation in many smaller cities or in rural areas.
One study of Manhattan, Kansas evaluated their Operation Laser Point.186 In it, the police targeted micro-hot spot locations and instituted regular, daily directed patrol visits, community engagement, and problem solving techniques.
Crime decreased after the program began and held fairly steady throughout the program and afterward. Crime also declined in areas outside the hot spots, supporting prior research showing diffusion of crime control benefits. This study
180 Weisburd, D., Hinkle, J. C., Famega, C., & Ready, J. (2011). The possible “backfire” effects of hot spots policing: An experimental assessment of impacts on legitimacy, fear and collective efficacy. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 7(4), 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-011-9130-z 181 Weisburd, D., Bushway, S., Lum, C., & Yang, S.-M. (2004). Trajectories of crime at places: A longitudinal study of street segments in the city of Seattle*. Criminology, 42(2), 283–322. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00521.x 182 Weisburd, D., Hinkle, J. C., Famega, C., & Ready, J. (2011). The possible “backfire” effects of hot spots policing: An experimental assessment of impacts on legitimacy, fear and collective efficacy. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 7(4), 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-011-9130-z 183 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110–1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096 184 Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot spots policing: What we know and what we need to know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214525083 185 Id.
186 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110–1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096 PAGE 3062
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50 shows that hot spots policing can be effective as a long-term crime control strategy in small cities – positive evidence for suburban areas and in lower crime areas of large cities.187 Problem Oriented Policing
“Problem-Oriented Policing” or POP was developed by Herman Goldstein as an alternative method to traditional reactive efforts to address chronic problems.188 It was his view that American policing had fallen ill with "means over ends" syndrome, placing more emphasis in their improvement efforts on organization and operating methods (number of arrests, average response time) than on the substantive outcome of their work”.189 Essentially, they became so focused on means of policing, like staffing and management, that they were ignoring the things they were meant to solve. POP, he suggested, would refocus police on crime and disorder. This, he believed, would be a paradigm shift that would replace incident-driven, reactive “standard” policing with a model that required police to be proactive.190 POP emphasizes the analysis of crime trends and root causes of crime in a community. It can be applied in neighborhoods, non-residential areas, or whole cities. This approach requires police to take a proactive stance by closely examining violence trends and customizing interventions for specific issues. While law enforcement plays a significant role in overseeing and participating in POP, non-law enforcement entities such as community organizations, healthcare services, other city departments and municipal actors may also have a part to play in addressing some problems. These non-law enforcement partnerships were key to ameliorating crime and disorder, in Goldstein’s vision of POP.
Additionally, POP demands that law enforcement evaluate their strategies and determine whether they have achieved their goals.191 Because of this systematic method, Goldstein emphasized the importance of having personnel trained in research and assessment.192
Most traditionally, the S.A.R.A. method (Scanning-Analysis-Response-Assessment) is used when applying POP. Eck and Spelman developed the method in 1987 as a “framework for uncovering complex mechanisms at play in crime problems and for developing tailor-made interventions to address the underlying conditions that cause crime problems”.193 “Scanning” involves the identification and prioritization of potential problems that may be causing crime within a jurisdiction. “Analysis” involves and in-depth evaluation of problems using a variety of data sources so the most appropriate response can be developed. This is not just about problem outcomes like traditional policing but concerned with the underlying processes that lead to problems. “Response” is the development and implementation of an intervention tailored to the nature of the problem distilled in the analysis phase. Response searches should be broad,
187 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110–1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096 188 Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & Delinquency, 25(2), 236–258. https://doi.org/10.1177/001112877902500207
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). Who ya gonna call? The police as problem-busters. Crime & Delinquency, 33(1), 31–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128787033001003
192 Hinkle, Joshua C., et al. “Problem-Oriented Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” CrimRxiv, July 2021. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69. 193 Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). Problem-solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News. U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
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51 involving law enforcement and non-law enforcement methods, other agencies, community groups and members. “Assessment” is the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the response effect on targeted problem(s). This process is intended lead to continual improvements and refinement in further iterations of the response.194 The three musts in conducting POP are that problems must be defined specifically, information must be collected from sources outside the department, and agencies must engage in a broad search for solutions. The best solutions tend to involve public and private entities that have a stake in solving the problem. Officers tend to get a more satisfying experience doing POP than traditional police work because they directly observe the results of their work, although it does require additional training and management.195
Recently, it has been theorized that there are four “types” of crime-involved places that problem solving would benefit – crime sites, convergent settings, comfort spaces, and corrupting spots. Crime sites are those which analysts can identify on a map, through hot spot analysis or observation alone. Convergent settings are public places where people come together. For example, there is a bus depot in Cincinnati, Ohio where buses converge, and this space is a meeting spot for delinquent teenagers. Depending on the circumstances, there may or may not be crime occurring at a convergent setting. Third, comfort spaces are those which are private locations that offenders use for a variety of reasons, from hanging out to storing supplies to surveilling for the presence of law enforcement. Offenders prefer that crimes are not committed in comfort spaces.196 Lastly, corrupting spots are those that are often businesses that allow for the facilitation of crime. An example is an auto repair shop that takes stolen car parts. Identifying these locations can, according to John Eck, Ph.D. and Lt. Matt Hammer, Ph.D., go a long way in dismantling place systems underlying crime.197
A meta-analysis of POP suggests a statistically significant average decline (-33.8%) in general crime and disorder in treatment areas as opposed to controls. The analysis did not find significant spatial displacement of crime to other areas, but it did find evidence of some diffusion of crime control benefits to neighboring areas.198 In terms of cost- effectiveness, crime “crackdowns”, or person-based programs where services have to be continually delivered, are less effective at lasting crime decline than programs where lasting change is instituted. The former sees deterrent effects erode when a program ends.199
The greatest deterrence results are found when police combine hot spots policing with POP (situational prevention strategies). Disrupting situational dynamics that are catalysts to gun violence increases the necessary risk or effort in offending, or reduces attractiveness of possible victims. These interventions can range from an officer patrolling the block or city services creating green space or installing better street lighting. Razing abandoned buildings and cleaning
194 Chief Eliot Isaac, Lt. Matthew Hammer M.S., Blake Christenson M.A., & Dr. Tamara D. Madensen. (2017). P.I.V.O.T. Place Based Investigations of Violent Offender Territories (Herman Goldstein Award Submission). Cincinnati Police Department. 195 Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). Who ya gonna call? The police as problem-busters. Crime & Delinquency, 33(1), 31–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128787033001003
196 Eck, J. (2023, March 24). Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati [Zoom]. 197 Chief Eliot Isaac, Lt. Matthew Hammer M.S., Blake Christenson M.A., & Dr. Tamara D. Madensen. (2017). P.I.V.O.T. Place Based Investigations of Violent Offender Territories (Herman Goldstein Award Submission). Cincinnati Police Department. 198 Hinkle, Joshua C., et al. “Problem-Oriented Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” CrimRxiv, July 2021. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69. 199 Id.
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52 up graffiti are also common implementations of POP in hot spots. Despite this, POP often addresses non-geographic crime concentration – repeat offenders, repeat victims, hot products etc. While POP can be a type of Hot Spots Policing, many hot spots programs do not use the systematic approach of POP, which itself does not favor any particular intervention.200
Potential pitfalls to POP implementation are similar to those for hot spot policing: increased fear of crime, and decreased collective efficacy and police legitimacy.
Social Network Analysis as it Relates to Gun Violence
The epidemiological approach to behavior promises community leaders a better way to prevent gun violence – through Social Network Analysis (SNA) and identification of individuals vulnerable to perpetration and victimization.201 A social network is a bounded number of social actors connected by various relationships (“ties”) – family, friendship, schooling, neighborhood, sexual relationships, etc.202. Theoretically, SNA refers to the statistical analysis of how actors, usually people, are connected and influence each other’s thoughts, feelings, and actions.203,204 “As with other important health problems, most cases of firearm violence arise from large but low-risk subsets of the population”.205 Like many health phenomena, gun violence has been widely studied as a social contagion, in that it has been shown repeatedly to diffuse in a population, transmitted from person to person through social interaction.206 This means that individuals that have been exposed to gun violence, or exposed to individuals that have been perpetrators or victims of gun violence, have greater risk of victimization or perpetration when compared to those that have not.207 A study of homicides in Newark, NJ found that homicides were “not random but…moved [by a] similar process to an infectious disease, with firearms and gangs operating as infectious agents”.208 Direct exposure has a larger positive relationship to involvement with gun violence, although even small amounts of exposure can increase the likelihood of future victimization.209 One study of nonfatal gunshot victim social networks determined that a 1% increase in exposure to
200 Hinkle, Joshua C., et al. “Problem-Oriented Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” CrimRxiv, July 2021. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69. 201 McGee, Zina T., et al. “A Multivariate Analysis of Gun Violence among Urban Youth: The Impact of Direct Victimization, Indirect Victimization, and Victimization among Peers.” Cogent Social Sciences, edited by Jamie Halsall, vol. 3, no. 1, Jan. 2017, p. 1328772. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1328772. 202 Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 203 Id.
204 Papachristos, Andrew V., et al. “Social Networks and the Risk of Gunshot Injury.” Journal of Urban Health, vol. 89, no. 6, Dec. 2012, pp. 992– 1003. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9. 205 Wintemute, Garen J. “The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States.” Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 36, no. 1, Mar. 2015, pp. 5–19. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535. 206 Kadushin, Charles. Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings. Oxford University Press, 2012. 207 Tracy, Melissa, et al. “The Transmission of Gun and Other Weapon-Involved Violence Within Social Networks.” Epidemiologic Reviews, Jan. 2016, p. mxv009. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1093/epirev/mxv009. 208 Zeoli, April M., et al. “Homicide as Infectious Disease: Using Public Health Methods to Investigate the Diffusion of Homicide.” Justice Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 3, May 2014, pp. 609–32. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.732100. 209 McGee, Zina T., et al. “A Multivariate Analysis of Gun Violence among Urban Youth: The Impact of Direct Victimization, Indirect Victimization, and Victimization among Peers.” Cogent Social Sciences, edited by Jamie Halsall, vol. 3, no. 1, Jan. 2017, p. 1328772. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1328772.
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53 gunshot victims in one’s immediate network increases the odds of becoming a victim by 1.1%. It also found that 10 percent exposure to victims at distances ≤ 2 ties increases the odds of gunshot victimization by 27.0 percent, and 25 percent exposure to victims increases the odds by 81.6 percent.210 While gun violence may seem random, studying the social network underlying it can shed light on just how connected exposure is to future perpetration or future victimization. For example, we know from empirical and anecdotal data that young minority males are the most likely victims of gunshot injuries. Homicide risk is concentrated to a remarkable degree among Black males over the life course. At ages 20 to 29 in 2012, the firearm homicide rate for Black males was at least five times higher than that for Hispanic males and at least 20 times that for White males.211 212
But, we cannot know why, between two young men with identical risk factors, one ends up victimized and one does not. “Defining the at-risk population as including young, minority males living in disadvantaged neighborhoods is not refined enough to capture the extreme concentration of gun violence in urban environments. Urban gun violence trends may be best understood as generated by a very small number of high-risk individuals who participate in high-risk social networks
210 Papachristos, Andrew V., et al. “Tragic, but Not Random: The Social Contagion of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries.” Social Science & Medicine, vol. 125, Jan. 2015, pp. 139–50. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056. 211 Wintemute, G. J. (2015). The epidemiology of firearm violence in the twenty-first century United States. Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535 212 Papachristos, Andrew V., et al. “Tragic, but Not Random: The Social Contagion of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries.” Social Science & Medicine, vol. 125, Jan. 2015, pp. 139–50. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056.
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54 and perpetrate their shootings at a very small number of high-risk micro places”.213 This is where social network analysis, rather than examining neighborhoods or census tracts, can be useful in identifying at-risk individuals. SNA theorists claim that violence prevention efforts accounting for social contagion, in addition to demographics, have the potential to prevent more shootings than efforts that focus only on demographics.214 Many studies on gun violence networks show that while all victims are in one very large and possibly additional smaller networks, gun violence is even more concentrated within networks. Only with SNA can we more precisely predict an individual’s risk within a certain network. One study of Boston shootings found that 85% of all gunshot injuries in a sample occurred within just one social network and that the closer one is to a gunshot victim (in number of ties), the greater the probability of one’s own victimization.215 In the Newark, NJ study mentioned above, one third of all fatal and nonfatal shootings occurred in a network of less than 4% of the city’s population. This phenomenon has tremendous implications for public policy interventions aimed at reducing gun violence. If gun violence is affecting one very small subset of a larger network, police, along with city departments and social service organizations can most efficiently target those individuals for maximum violence prevention.
Gangs and Gang Membership
It has been widely studied and concluded that membership in a gang is highly associated with violent victimization.216 Social Network Analysis (SNA) can provide mathematical understanding of gang-related networks and violent involvement in crime. Violence, specifically gun violence, can spread within co-offending networks from gang members to non-gang members.217 A co-offending network is a network of individuals who have committed crimes together in the past, regardless of gang status. Some offenders in these networks are gang members and some are not, as not all criminal associates of gang members are necessarily in gangs.218 Co-offending networks have been well documented in criminology as a base for the sociological processes underpinning crime and violence.219 Co-offending as a mechanism to study gunshot violence has been used several times to understand the effect of past history of violent crime (or gang membership) on future risk of violent crime.
213 Braga, Anthony A., et al. “The Concentration and Stability of Gun Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 1980–2008.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, vol. 26, no. 1, Mar. 2010, pp. 33–53. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x. 214 Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245 215 Papachristos, Andrew V., et al. “Social Networks and the Risk of Gunshot Injury.” Journal of Urban Health, vol. 89, no. 6, Dec. 2012, pp. 992– 1003. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9. 216 Decker, S. H., Pyrooz, D. C., & Moule, R. K. (2014). Disengagement from gangs as role transitions. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 24(2), 268–283. https://doi.org/10.1111/jora.12074
217 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., Piza, E., & Grossman, L. S. (2015). The company you keep? The spillover effects of gang membership on individual gunshot victimization in a co-offending network: gang membership, networks, & victimization. Criminology, 53(4), 624–649. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12091
218 Id.
219 Warr, M. (2002). Companions in crime: The social aspects of criminal conduct. Cambridge University Press.
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55 One co-offender network study of gang members in Newark, NJ found that gang membership increases the odds of gunshot victimization by 344%.220 That study also concluded that one or more ties to a gang member, or the closer in proximity to a gang member (even when not direct) within the co-offending network significantly increases the probability that one will experience fatal or non-fatal gunshot victimization.221 Almost one third of all fatal or non-fatal shootings occurred in a network comprised of less than 4% of the city’s population. If a subset of a city’s gun violence is gang related, it is clear that performing SNA and locating individuals most at risk for intervention would be an effective and logical step toward reducing gun violence.
Domestic Violence and Firearm Accessibility
Nicholas Kristoff with the New York Times writes that we already bar felons from owning guns, and we should go a step further and bar violent misdemeanor offenders from possessing guns.222 California has taken this step. In California, there is a domestic violence misdemeanor firearm prohibition, required firearm relinquishment for domestic violence misdemeanors, and required reporting of domestic violence misdemeanors to national databases.
Stalking, domestic violence, and alcohol abuse are particular warning signs of future violence. A study on femicide in intimate partner relationships states that “an abusive partner’s access to a firearm is a serious threat to victims of domestic violence, making it five times more likely that [they] will be killed”.223 States that bar those subject to active domestic violence restraining orders from accessing guns have seen a 13% reduction in intimate partner homicides involving firearms.224 Removal of guns from domestic violence offenders is one of the most frequently used and effective strategies as rated by local police throughout the country.225 Those who have been an abuse victim of an intimate partner need intervention to “prevent further escalation of violence. Healthcare practitioners should question individuals not only about domestic violence but also about abusers’ access to a gun and should provide appropriate referrals to services and information regarding serious risk in such
220 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., Piza, E., & Grossman, L. S. (2015). The company you keep? The spillover effects of gang membership on individual gunshot victimization in a co-offending network: gang membership, networks, & victimization. Criminology, 53(4), 624–649. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12091
221 Id.
222 Kristof, N. (2023, January 24). Opinion | a smarter way to reduce gun deaths. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/24/opinion/gun-death-health.html 223 Campbell, J. C., Webster, D., Koziol-McLain, J., Block, C., Campbell, D., Curry, M. A., Gary, F., Glass, N., McFarlane, J., Sachs, C., Sharps, P., Ulrich, Y., Wilt, S. A., Manganello, J., Xu, X., Schollenberger, J., Frye, V., & Laughon, K. (2003). Risk factors for femicide in abusive relationships:
Results from a multisite case control study. American Journal of Public Health, 93(7), 1089–1097. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.7.1089 224 Zeoli, A. M., McCourt, A., Buggs, S., Frattaroli, S., Lilley, D., & Webster, D. W. (2018). Retracted: Analysis of the strength of legal firearms restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence and their associations with intimate partner homicide. American Journal of Epidemiology, 187(7), 1449–1455. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwx362
225Koper, C. S., Woods, D. J., & Kubu, B. E. (2013). Gun violence prevention practices among local police in the United States. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 36(3), 577–603. https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-06-2012-0052 PAGE 3068
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56 situations.”226, 227 The most important thing clinicians can do is inform a victim of domestic violence that Extreme Risk Protection Orders exist.
Police can only act on active restraining orders and Extreme Risk Protection Orders, so direction should be given to victims on how to obtain one. An Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) is a civil order that temporarily prohibits individuals who pose a danger to themselves or others from purchasing and possessing firearms. In California, law enforcement or clinicians, a family or household member, employers, co-workers, and employees and teachers at secondary and post-secondary schools can petition for an individual to be under an ERPO. 228 In California, these laws can
also apply to dating partners (not true in every state).
There is both objective and anecdotal evidence that these actions work when they happen and do reduce violence.
Hospital Based Violence Intervention Programs (HVIPs)
The rationale for a Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Program is a public health one. Their goal is to improve the pre- existing social determinants of health (such as poverty, a low level of education, and substance abuse) that may have led to violent victimization and, in doing so, prevent reinjury.229 One of the strongest predictors of future injury is past injury, and victims of violent injury are more than twice as likely to die a violent death compared to matched control subjects.79,230 Gunshot victims or victims of violent assault are almost always taken to trauma I hospitals. The window after an injury is considered a valuable time for intervention, while that patient is still being treated in the hospital. It has really been just over the last 20 years that these programs have emerged to take advantage of that time to break the cycle of violence.231
Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Programs identify violently injured patients and intervene at their bedside immediately following a violent victimization injury. Typically, the hospital assigns patients a case manager or social worker who evaluates patients based on the patient’s perception of their own psychosocial, emotional, or financial needs and connects them with providers in the community that are capable of addressing those needs. Various models tend to emphasize that case workers need to be culturally competent and it is beneficial if they come from similar environments as patients.
226 Tracy, M., Braga, A. A., & Papachristos, A. V. (2016). The transmission of gun and other weapon-involved violence within social networks.
Epidemiologic Reviews, mxv009. https://doi.org/10.1093/epirev/mxv009 227 Campbell, J. C., Webster, D., Koziol-McLain, J., Block, C., Campbell, D., Curry, M. A., Gary, F., Glass, N., McFarlane, J., Sachs, C., Sharps, P., Ulrich, Y., Wilt, S. A., Manganello, J., Xu, X., Schollenberger, J., Frye, V., & Laughon, K. (2003). Risk factors for femicide in abusive relationships:
Results from a multisite case control study. American Journal of Public Health, 93(7), 1089–1097. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.7.1089 228 California code, penal code—Pen § 18100. (n.d.). Findlaw. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect- 18100/
229 Gorman, E., Coles, Z., Baker, N., Tufariello, A., Edemba, D., Ordonez, M., Walling, P., Livingston, D. H., & Bonne, S. (2022). Beyond recidivism: Hospital-based violence intervention and early health and social outcomes. Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 235(6), 927– 939. https://doi.org/10.1097/XCS.0000000000000409
230 Juillard, C., Cooperman, L., Allen, I., Pirracchio, R., Henderson, T., Marquez, R., Orellana, J., Texada, M., & Dicker, R. A. (2016). A decade of hospital-based violence intervention: Benefits and shortcomings. Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, 81(6), 1156–1161. https://doi.org/10.1097/TA.0000000000001261
231 Id.
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57 Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital is the only Trauma I facility serving the whole city and county of San Francisco. Since 2005 the Wraparound Program has been implemented as its HVIP. They offer enrollment in the program to all victims of intentional injuries that are between 10-35 years old that they determine via a screening process to be at high-risk of reinjury. The victim must also be injured or live in San Francisco. Notably, patients excluded are those whose injuries are a result of domestic violence or child abuse, or if self-inflicted. Patients must consent to participation and then an initial intake and needs assessment is done. The program provides up to one year of intensive case management including mentorship, advocacy, and services from community providers. There are challenges in evaluating this program because bias is introduced by self-selection (which would likely decrease the rate of reinjury) and the fact that only patients screened to be high-risk are selected (which would likely increase the rate of reinjury).
However, the injury recidivism rate decreased from 8.4% to 4.9% after its institution at Zuckerberg in 2006. A study of the Violence Intervention Advocacy Program at Boston Medical Center similarly finds that it effectively serves the population choosing the program.
232 The HVIP at University Hospital in Newark, New Jersey has also been studied and found achieve patient-stated short-term health and social goals in half of its enrollees during 2020.233 “Recidivism has been used as an outcome measure of HVIPs for several years. Although it adds a layer of complexity, its measurement has been linked to the cost–benefit ratio for hospitals and communities to use in obtaining grant funding and convincing administrators of the utility of HVIPs.”234 In Alameda County, a CBO program called Caught in the Crossfire does hospital bed interventions similar to the Wraparound Program but, it is not directly managed by hospitals; they rely on hospital buy-in.235 Their stated goals are to convince the victims, their friends, and their family not to retaliate, to reduce hostilities, and provide victims pathways to a safer life.236
Focused Deterrence (Custom Notifications)
The theory of change in focused deterrence is that violence can be prevented if individuals believe that the costs of violence outweigh its potential benefits.237 The strategy identifies those most at risk of becoming a perpetrator of gun violence and delivers a “hard” message – that violence will not be tolerated and any of it will be met with swift arrests and criminal justice consequences. There is also the “soft” message delivery, that the police and (usually a CBO) are here to help connect the individual with resources that they can then leverage to transition away from violence.
Historically, custom notifications were delivered as part of a larger “call-in”, where group members are all called to the same place and a message is communicated that “affected communities want the violence to stop, there is help available to group members who want it, and meaningful legal consequences will follow if the violence does not stop.”
232 Pino, E. C., Fontin, F., James, T. L., & Dugan, E. (2021). Boston violence intervention advocacy program: Challenges and opportunities for client engagement and goal achievement. Academic Emergency Medicine, 28(3), 281–291. https://doi.org/10.1111/acem.14162 233 Gorman, E., Coles, Z., Baker, N., Tufariello, A., Edemba, D., Ordonez, M., Walling, P., Livingston, D. H., & Bonne, S. (2022). Beyond recidivism: Hospital-based violence intervention and early health and social outcomes. Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 235(6), 927– 939. https://doi.org/10.1097/XCS.0000000000000409
234 Id.
235 Intervention. (n.d.). Youth ALIVE! Retrieved March 28, 2023, from https://www.youthalive.org/caught-in-the-crossfire/ 236 Id.
237 Braga, A. A. (2008). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies and the prevention of gun homicide. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(4), 332– 343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.06.009
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58 These, however, assume group violence is at a certain height and also require a large amount of pre-work to be done to gather the right people and communicate the messages tailored to the full group as well as to the individuals. Therefore, they are not tactical because it is not possible to get one together to prevent violence likely to occur within a day or two.
Instead, it has been valuable instead to focus just on individuals in their homes with appropriate personnel, such as probation, parole, and police officers, as well as community voices and positive “influentials” such as family members.
Custom notifications have many advantages on their own. They can be delivered to anyone, regardless of whether they are on parole, probation, or in a larger group. They can be delivered to a smaller number of impact players, who often are not under court supervision and cannot be mandated to attend a call-in. They are flexible and implemented with short notice and can be delivered by law enforcement alone, community figures alone, or a combination. They can incorporate an “influential”, someone close to the individual who represents a consistent, positive influence.
Incorporating influentials as partners with community members, law enforcement, and social service providers gives a strong message about making good choices and the consequences of violence. They are powerful tools for interrupting gang “beefs”, heading off retaliation after a violent event, calming down outbreaks of violence and bolstering the core gun violence program. They can incorporate highly specific information meaningful to the person being notified, such as the help they personally may need or particular legal vulnerabilities they face if they continue offending. These messages can be delivered to parolees or probationers as they prepare to reenter society. 238 Lastly, custom notifications
can create spillover violence reduction effects on group members who are socially tied to others engaged in violence, so you reach more than just those individuals that were selected for direct contact. This is especially true if Social Network Analysis is used to identify them.
It is emphasized in the literature that partnering with a CBO, such as California Partnership for Safe Communities, is ideal. A social service provider, community group, faith-based organization, or street outreach worker can increase the credibility of law enforcement and connect more genuinely with the individual. Mobilizing such organizations is critical so that the “soft” message is extended, and the individual feels cared about, related to, and that someone wants to help them. They can deliver antiviolence messages on their own or alongside law enforcement. In Cincinnati, community representatives take the lead in the notification process, speaking to impact players on their own before police, social services, and street outreach workers visit. Street outreach workers often have history of being group-involved or incarcerated and can be able to reach impact players not easily located by law enforcement. Their personal histories better able them to relate to impact players on the falsehood of the street code and what the street code has cost them.
Street Outreach Teams/Violence Interrupters
“Street Outreach organizations do a lot more for public safety than just trying to stop gun violence: they are anchoring institutions for neighborhood safety and well-being, dealing with issues related to housing, mental health, education, and justice.”239 Street Outreach Workers are credible messengers, often formerly incarcerated or have been involved in or affected by violence in the past, that help identify violence and interrupt or mediate it in real time. They have inroads
238 A New York initiative replicates the work of Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), which achieved large violence reductions selecting districts through delivery of individualized messages to parolees about legal exposure and services available. Chicago districts participating in PSN communication saw a 37% reduction in homicide and a 30% decrease in recidivism among notified offenders. 239 Op-ed: What we know (And don’t know) about street outreach and gun violence prevention. (2021, October 25). Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-chicago-gun-violence-street-outreach-20211025-6pylamxs5jazhhyya3x3nb3eya- story.html
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59 to vulnerable groups that police do not, act as a conduit between group members and other participants in a city’s violence reduction program, and help people make the transition away from street violence.
The overall theory of change is a public health one – that violence is like a contagious disease and its spread can be interrupted.240 Operating beneath this strategy is the aim to increasing informal social controls – or fortifying a community’s collective norms and standards of conduct and encouraging community members to uphold them. When done well it “marries the goal of strengthening a community’s moral voice against violence with the imperative to offer help to its highest risk population. It also lends itself to concrete violence interventions, such as controlling rumors during moments of conflict, calming people down to defuse potential retaliation, and mentoring people at high risk of hurting someone or being hurt”.241
“Safe Streets” in Baltimore, Maryland, and “Ceasefire” in Chicago, Illinois both used the same model and showed statistically significant decreases in the overall level of violence in treatment areas. Unfortunately, this is not a consistent outcome. While many programs do reflect the essential nature of credible messengers and violence interruption, others have either null or negative results. Often, those that have negative effects are programs that stand alone, not within broader violence reduction programs. It is also not useful to work with gangs as gangs – as that gives them recognition and can even increase gang cohesion. Also, programs that prioritize job or educational outcomes but don’t focus primarily on street violence do not achieve their stated goal to reduce it. Even where street work has been successful and demonstrated positive effects, it has been too limited in scope and impact to reduce overall levels of violence in a city.
242
Many street outreach programs do not work or communicate with law enforcement or other entities with the same goals. While they may have principled reasons for this, it undermines the interagency partnership that has been the “hallmark of effective violence interventions”. Understandably, Street Outreach workers can be wary of police – it could threaten their credibility with the population they serve and need access to. Cities have ameliorated much of this by working with street workers to establish clear boundaries and clear times when they do work in tandem. Both police and street workers establish protocols in advance of their work, about how and under what conditions they will collaborate, what information they will share, and how they will address the public concern about their working together. Street workers protect the names of people they work with and do not share information with police or help them build and solve cases. Both sides need training on these protocols to maintain accountability and partnership.243 The “triangle protocol” in Los Angeles establishes the city violence reduction initiative as a partner to the LAPD and their streetwork agencies, linking victims with services, brokering peace, and communicating with police about incidents. New York City has a similar organization with the Mayor’s Office to Prevent Gun Violence, working in tandem with streetworkers and the NYPD. Recent Evaluation has shown this structure to be highly effective in preventing retaliatory shootings.244
240 Butts, J. A., Roman, C. G., Bostwick, L., & Porter, J. R. (2015). Cure violence: A public health model to reduce gun violence. Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1), 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122509 241 Considering the place of streetwork in violence interventions. (n.d.). National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC). Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://nnscommunities.org/guides/considering-the-place-of-streetwork-in-violence-interventions/ 242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
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60 Andrew Papachristos, Ph.D. describes a pilot project where twice a week he and partners sit down and do network analysis with the outreach staff. He says that data is starting to be brought to outreach. “We do know,” he says, “that when police and outreach are doing their jobs right they’re actually working with the same people.” Including street outreach in shooting reviews where mapping is done has shown to be beneficial in Boston and Oakland.
Operation Peacekeeper in Stockton, California exemplifies these best practices when it comes to streetwork. At one time, they used to walk a neighborhood with the police after a shooting to offer care and services. They observed that this compromised their capital with the community and the Peacekeepers ended that with support from the police.
Nevertheless, the two organizations still successfully navigate violence prevention in partnership and produce public safety. The Stockton Police Department does not expect or want information from Peacekeepers and believes that their clients need to be protected to preserve Peacekeepers’ legitimacy. After gun violence, Peacekeepers’ priority is stopping further violence or retaliation. They offer services and support but do not enter active crime scenes. Peacekeepers and police collaborate on “shooting reviews” to track recent violence and prevent new violence. Information is unidirectional, flowing only and carefully from police to streetworkers so they can focus on those most at risk.
Sometimes, Stockton streetworkers accompany police to deliver in-person messages known as “custom notifications” to people with the highest risk of gun violence involvement. The process has been developed to warn high-risk individuals that violence will not be tolerated and to offer community resources to support them and keep them safe. Oakland, California also does this as part of their gun violence reduction work. 245
Chicago CRED is a Street Outreach initiative that incorporates life skills training, as well as educational and employment programming.246 Early evidence suggests that street outreach reduces gun violence or at least saves the lives of participants. 18 months after beginning the program, participants in the Chicago CRED and similar programs have victimization rates 50% lower than non-participants. 63% of CRED participants that did not have a high school diploma prior to the program received one while in the program. Participants were 79% less likely to be arrested for shootings and homicides.247
Chicago CRED, despite its success and more than 250 active employees on the street, hasn’t decreased the overall level of gun violence. At its scale in Chicago, for every participant in the program there are 20 more in the same neighborhood lacking equal services. Also, violence is entrenched in societies beyond the individual and their ties to others and violent situations. Although not a panacea, Dr. Papachristos of Northwestern University says that Street Outreach is a necessary component for any city looking to adopt a multi-pronged violence prevention program, but any program that doesn’t consider the full neighborhood context will fall short.248 In Oakland, YouthALIVE!, the same CBO that does Hospital-Based Violence Prevention, does violence interruption.249
245 Considering the place of streetwork in violence interventions. (n.d.). National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC). Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://nnscommunities.org/guides/considering-the-place-of-streetwork-in-violence-interventions/ 246 A nonprofit for reducing gun violence in chicago. (n.d.). Chicago CRED. Retrieved May 7, 2023, from https://www.chicagocred.org/ 247 A nonprofit for reducing gun violence in chicago. (n.d.). Chicago CRED. Retrieved May 7, 2023, from https://www.chicagocred.org/ 248 Op-ed: What we know (And don’t know) about street outreach and gun violence prevention. (2021, October 25). Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-chicago-gun-violence-street-outreach-20211025-6pylamxs5jazhhyya3x3nb3eya- story.html
249 Intervention. (n.d.). Youth ALIVE! Retrieved March 28, 2023, from https://www.youthalive.org/caught-in-the-crossfire/ PAGE 3073
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61 Root Causes of Gun Violence
Contrary to popular thought, mental illness is not a primary contributor to interpersonal firearm violence.250,251 Access to firearms and firearm ownership remain the most potent determinants of an individual’s likelihood to engage in any type of gun violence.252 Other predictors for future gun violence involvement are prior history of violence (especially domestic violence253) and substance abuse. The leading cause of death for teenagers and young adults is firearm violence, and homicide risk is extremely concentrated among Black males regardless of age, although it does diminish in later years.254 The next most at-risk subset is Hispanic males, but the rate for Black men remains five times higher than for Hispanic men and 20 times higher than for white men.255 The most common environment for gun violence is minority and economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, SNA reveals that the vast majority of Black and Hispanic men in these neighborhoods do not become victims or perpetrators, but rather the phenomenon is highly concentrated among people within a much larger network that includes, but is not limited to, that neighborhood.256 The Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence (EFSGV) released a report in 2020 citing seven central root causes to gun violence – income inequality, poverty, underfunded public housing, under-resourced public services, underperforming schools, lack of opportunity and perception of hopelessness, and easy access to firearms by high-risk people.257 Notably, only the last of these is something that police have any direct power over, and that power has been expressly curved by the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in three states.258 However, California officials remain able to confiscate firearms from domestic abusers unless that ruling is appealed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The remainder of these root causes must be the jurisdiction of community-based organizations and a long term partnership with their municipalities or counties. A police department could, however, lead the way for these partnerships.
250 Swanson, Jeffrey W., et al. “Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: Bringing Epidemiologic Research to Policy.” Annals of Epidemiology, vol. 25, no. 5, May 2015, pp. 366–76. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annepidem.2014.03.004. 251 Wintemute, Garen J. “The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States.” Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 36, no. 1, Mar. 2015, pp. 5–19. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535. 252 Id.
253 The presence of a gun in a domestic violence situation increases the risk of homicide by 500%. A study of women in 67 California domestic violence shelters found that abusive intimate partners used handguns to harm, threaten, or scare 32.1% of study participants; long guns were used to harm, threaten, or scare 15.9% of participants. 39.1% reported that the abusive intimate partner owned a firearm during the relationship, almost twice the rate of gun ownership in California. Of participants in gun-owning households, 64.5% said a gun had been used against them. (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence)
254 Wintemute, Garen J. “The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States.” Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 36, no. 1, Mar. 2015, pp. 5–19. DOI.org (Crossref), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535. 255 Id.
256 Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x 257 “EFSGV.” Root Causes of Gun Violence, The Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence, https://efsgv.org/. Accessed 12 Feb. 2023. 258 Sneed, Tierney. “Latest Supreme Court-Related Ruling Overturning Gun Regulations Worries Domestic Violence Survivor Advocates | CNN Politics.” CNN, 12 Feb. 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/12/politics/domestic-abuse-guns-5th-circuit-supreme-court/index.html.
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62 Appendix C Visualizations
Hot Spot Visualizations
PAGE 3075
APPENDIX N
63 Acton Street & Russell Street Harmon Street & Sacramento Street Durant Street & Sather Street Channing Street & San Pablo Avenue Channing Street & 8th Street Oregon Street & Park Street (San Pablo Park) PAGE 3076
APPENDIX N
64 63rd Street & King Street
Social Network Analysis Visualizations
People of Interest/Incidents
People (Suspects, victims, involved parties)
Shooting Events (shots fired, firearm assault/injury, firearm fatality) PAGE 3077
APPENDIX N
65 Denser, More Concentrated Network within Larger Network
PAGE 3078
APPENDIX N
66 Appendix D Criteria Matrix
Criteria
Alternatives Cost
Effectiveness:
Stays under
$1M
Effectiveness:
Reduces
shootings by
10%
annually
Weight = *3
Political
Feasibility
(DCM will
accept
change)
Likelihood
of long-
lasting
effects
Preserves
police
legitimacy
Keeps fear
of crime
from
rising
Preserves
neighborhood
cohesion and
collective
efficacy
Hot Spots Policing
7.5 + 2(4) +3
18.5/24
.77
ü
Very
confident in
assessment
N/A
Some
confidence in
assessment
HIGH first
year
MEDIUM
ongoing
2.5(3)
7.5 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Very
confident
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Very
confident in
assessment
HIGH
3 Problem-oriented
Policing
6 + 2(2) + 3(3)
19/24
.79
ü
Very
confident in
assessment
N/A
Some
confidence in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 2(3)
6 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence
in this
assessment
HIGH
3 Some
confidence
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence in
assessment
HIGH
3 SNA and Focused
Deterrence/Custom
Notifications
9 + 2(5)
19/24
.79
ü
Very
confident in
assessment
N/A
Some
confidence in
assessment
HIGH
3 3(3)
9 Very
confident
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Some
confidence in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 SNA and Social
Services
1(2) +3(4)
14/27
.52
Notably low, but
goes with focused
deterrence
Not confident
in assessment
LOW
1 Some
confidence in
assessment
LOW
1 1(3)
3 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Some
confidence
in
assessment
LOW
1 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Very
confident in
assessment
HIGH
3 Removing
Firearms from
Very
confident in
assessment
Very
confident in
assessment
Very
confident
Very
confident in
assessment
Very
confident
Very
confident
Very
confident in
assessment
PAGE 3079
APPENDIX N
67 Homes of Domestic
Abusers
3(6) + 1
19/27
.70
HIGH
3 LOW
1 1(3)
3 in
assessment
HIGH
3 LOW
1 in
assessment
HIGH
3 in
assessment
HIGH
3 HIGH
3 Street Outreach
Teams
1 + 2 + 3(4) + 6
21/27
.78
ü
Some
confidence in
assessment
LOW
1 Some
confidence in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 2(3)
6 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Some
confidence
in
assessment
MEDIUM
2 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Very
confident in
assessment
HIGH
3 Hospital-based
Violence
Intervention
3(5) + 1(2)
17/27
.63
X already
happening
Very
confident in
assessment
LOW
1 Very
confident in
assessment
LOW
1 1(3)
3 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Some
confidence
in
assessment
LOW
1 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Very
confident
in
assessment
HIGH
3 Very
confident in
assessment
HIGH
3 PAGE 3080
APPENDIX N
68 References
A nonprofit for reducing gun violence in chicago. (n.d.). Chicago CRED. Retrieved May 7, 2023, from https://www.chicagocred.org/
AFRO, S. to the. (2021, September 8). Op-ed: Tackling gun violence together. AFRO American Newspapers. http://afro.com/op-ed-tackling-gun-violence-together/
Blattman, C., Green, D. P., Ortega, D., & Tobón, S. (2021). Place-based interventions at scale: The direct and spillover effects of policing and city services on crime. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(4), 2022–2051. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab002
Bowers, K. J. (2004). Prospective hot-spotting: The future of crime mapping? British Journal of Criminology, 44(5), 641–658. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azh036
Braga, A. A. (2008a). Problem-oriented policing and crime prevention (2nd ed). Willow Tree Press.
Braga, A. A. (2008b). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies and the prevention of gun homicide. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(4), 332–343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.06.009 Braga, A. A., & Cook, P. J. (2023). Policing gun violence: Strategic reforms for controlling our most pressing crime problem. Oxford University Press.
Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2010). The concentration and stability of gun violence at micro places in Boston, 1980–2008. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9082-x
Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing and crime reduction: An update of an ongoing systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 15(3), 289–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3 Braga, A. A., & Weisburd, D. (2010). Policing problem places: Crime hot spots and effective prevention.
Oxford University Press.
Bureau, U. C. (n.d.). County population totals and components of change: 2020-2022. Census.Gov. Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-counties- total.html
Butts, J. A., Roman, C. G., Bostwick, L., & Porter, J. R. (2015). Cure violence: A public health model to reduce gun violence. Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1), 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth- 031914-122509
California. (n.d.). Everytown Research & Policy. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://research.www.everytown.org/rankings/state/california/ California code, penal code—Pen § 18100. (n.d.). Findlaw. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect-18100/ PAGE 3081
APPENDIX N
69 Campbell, J. C., Webster, D., Koziol-McLain, J., Block, C., Campbell, D., Curry, M. A., Gary, F., Glass, N., McFarlane, J., Sachs, C., Sharps, P., Ulrich, Y., Wilt, S. A., Manganello, J., Xu, X., Schollenberger, J., Frye, V., & Laughon, K. (2003). Risk factors for femicide in abusive relationships: Results from a multisite case control study. American Journal of Public Health, 93(7), 1089–1097. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.7.1089
Ch. 13.72 Discharge of Firearms. (n.d.). Berkeley Municipal Code. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://berkeley.municipal.codes/BMC/13.72
Ch. 13.73.010 Non-Serialized Firearms . (n.d.). Berkeley Municipal Code: PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION
OR SALE OF NON-SERIALIZED, UNFINISHED FIREARM FRAMES OR RECEIVERS AND NON- SERIALIZED FIREARMS. Retrieved April 17, 2023, from
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Gorman, E., Coles, Z., Baker, N., Tufariello, A., Edemba, D., Ordonez, M., Walling, P., Livingston, D. H., & Bonne, S. (2022). Beyond recidivism: Hospital-based violence intervention and early health and social outcomes. Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 235(6), 927–939. https://doi.org/10.1097/XCS.0000000000000409
Green, B., Horel, T., & Papachristos, A. V. (2017). Modeling contagion through social networks to explain and predict gunshot violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014. JAMA Internal Medicine, 177(3), 326. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.8245
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Hinkle, J. C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C. W., & Petersen, K. (2021). Problem-oriented policing for reducing crime and disorder: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. CrimRxiv. https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.5277ad69
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Intervention. (n.d.). Youth ALIVE! Retrieved March 28, 2023, from https://www.youthalive.org/caught-in-the- crossfire/
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Kasper, R. E., Green, J., Damle, R. N., Aidlen, J., Nazarey, P., Manno, M., Borer, E., & Hirsh, M. P. (2017).
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Koper, C. S. (1995). Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 649–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418829500096231 Koper, C. S., Egge, S. J., & Lum, C. (2015). Institutionalizing place-based approaches: Opening ‘cases’ on gun crime hot spots. Policing, 9(3), 242–254. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pav023 Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Wu, X., & Hegarty, T. (2021). The long-term and system-level impacts of institutionalizing hot spot policing in a small city. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1110– 1128. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa096
Koper, C. S., & Mayo-Wilson, E. (2012). Police strategies to reduce illegal possession and carrying of firearms:
Effects on gun crime. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 8(1), 1–53. https://doi.org/10.4073/csr.2012.11 Koper, C. S., Woods, D. J., & Kubu, B. E. (2013). Gun violence prevention practices among local police in the United States. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 36(3), 577–603. https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-06-2012-0052
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McGee, Z. T., Logan, K., Samuel, J., & Nunn, T. (2017). A multivariate analysis of gun violence among urban youth: The impact of direct victimization, indirect victimization, and victimization among peers. Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1), 1328772. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1328772 Metcalfe, C., & Pickett, J. T. (2018). The extent and correlates of public support for deterrence reforms and hot spots policing: Deterrence reforms and hot spots policing. Law & Society Review, 52(2), 471–502. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12327
Monitoring offenders on conditional release. (2016, January 1). ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/monitoring-offenders-conditional-release Nagin, D. S., & Sampson, R. J. (2019). The real gold standard: Measuring counterfactual worlds that matter most to social science and policy. Annual Review of Criminology, 2(1), 123–145. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-011518-024838
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72 Nunn, S., Quinet, K., Rowe, K., & Christ, D. (2006). Interdiction day: Covert surveillance operations, drugs, and serious crime in an inner-city neighborhood. Police Quarterly, 9(1), 73–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611105274467
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Chicago Tribune. https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-chicago-gun-violence- street-outreach-20211025-6pylamxs5jazhhyya3x3nb3eya-story.html Papachristos, A. (2023, March 9). Professor of Sociology and Faculty Fellow at Northwestern’s Institute for Policy Research [Zoom].
Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., & Hureau, D. M. (2012). Social networks and the risk of gunshot injury.
Journal of Urban Health, 89(6), 992–1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-012-9703-9 Papachristos, A. V., Braga, A. A., Piza, E., & Grossman, L. S. (2015). The company you keep? The spillover effects of gang membership on individual gunshot victimization in a co-offending network: gang membership, networks, & victimization. Criminology, 53(4), 624–649. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745- 9125.12091
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Challenges and opportunities for client engagement and goal achievement. Academic Emergency Medicine, 28(3), 281–291. https://doi.org/10.1111/acem.14162 Project safe neighborhoods (Lowell, Massachusetts). (n.d.). National Gang Center. Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://nationalgangcenter.ojp.gov/spt/Programs/3588 Ruderman, W. (2013, March 3). To Stem Juvenile Robbers, Police Trail Youth Before the Crime. New York Times.
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73 Swanson, J. W., McGinty, E. E., Fazel, S., & Mays, V. M. (2015). Mental illness and reduction of gun violence and suicide: Bringing epidemiologic research to policy. Annals of Epidemiology, 25(5), 366–376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annepidem.2014.03.004
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74 Wilson, G. L. K., James Q. (1982, March 1). Broken windows. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ Wintemute, G. J. (2015). The epidemiology of firearm violence in the twenty-first century united states. Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122535 Wraparound project. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2023, from https://wraparound.ucsf.edu/ Zeoli, A. M., McCourt, A., Buggs, S., Frattaroli, S., Lilley, D., & Webster, D. W. (2018). Retracted: Analysis of the strength of legal firearms restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence and their associations with intimate partner homicide. American Journal of Epidemiology, 187(7), 1449–1455. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwx362
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Communications
All communications submitted to the City Council are
public record. Communications are not published directly to the City’s website. Copies of individual communications are available for viewing at the City Clerk Department and through Records Online.
City Clerk Department
2180 Milvia Street
Berkeley, CA 94704
(510) 981-6900
Records Online
https://records.cityofberkeley.info/
To search for communications associated with a particular City Council meeting using Records Online:
1. Select Search Type = “Public – Communication Query (Keywords)”
2. From Date: Enter the date of the Council meeting
3. To Date: Enter the date of the Council meeting (this may match the From Date field)
4. Click the “Search” button
5. Communication packets matching the entered criteria will be returned
6. Click the desired file in the Results column to view the document as a PDF