Berkeley City Council
April 15, 2025

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FIGURE 4. E MPLOYMENT ACTIONS AND QUOTA STATUTES
Silent
(No language on Type
of Employment
Action; e.g., Arkansas)
Adverse Employment
Action Only
(e.g., New York)
Employment Benefits
+ Adverse Action
(e.g., Texas)
Additional Features : Two statutes have unique features that are worth noting. First, Illinois has a provision that attempts to address potential funding complications that may arise from prohibitions. 110 Its statute states that the prohibition on quotas “shall not affect the conditions of any federal or State grants or funds awarded to the municipality and used to fund traffic enforcement programs.” 111
Second, Tennessee amended its prohibition in July 2020 and made vio- lation of the statute a Class B misdemeanor subject to a fine. 112 Since
it is a new amendment, time will tell if this will successfully deter police brass attempting to implement quotas. The shortcomings of each of these different types of state quota prohibitions often inter- face with other legal obstacles and shape litigation outcomes. That will be the topic of the next Part.

II
P

OLICE QUOTA LITIGATION
The national patchwork of quota-based statutes has produced a variegated body of caselaw. Police officers are the typical plaintiffs that bring these cases to court. They usually argue that their resistance to or inability to meet a quota led to some adverse employment action. Alternatively, officers claim that they endured retaliation for speaking out about quotas—a claim that usually involves First Amendment issues.

People subject to criminal law enforcement are also common par- ties in police quota litigation.
113 These individuals fall into two catego-
110 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1-12 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651). 111 Id.
112 Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub Acts, https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/ acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf.
113 There are a handful of cases where governments have brought charges against public officials who implemented or conformed to quotas, but these are rare. See Becker-Ross v.

State, 595 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App. 2020); Gerwer v. Kelly, 980 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 2013). 76 | Page

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ries. They can be criminal defendants who argue that their contact with law enforcement was predicated on an officer’s compliance with an illegal quota system. In essence, these parties raise the practice of quota-based policing as an affirmative defense. In instances where alleged quota-based contact resulted in dropped charges or the termi- nation of the criminal action, parties have also brought federal civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
114 In these cases, which some-
times emerge from jurisdictions without anti-quota laws, plaintiffs argue that law enforcement’s adherence to police quotas led to a vio- lation of their civil rights.

Whether the party challenging the quota is an officer or a civilian, there are a range of socio-legal, doctrinal, and evidentiary hurdles that litigants must overcome before courts will meaningfully engage with their claims. This subsection briefly describes these hurdles for both groups, then describes the varying outcomes of these cases.

A. Police Speech and the Blue Code
Police officers are the group most likely and best positioned to litigate challenges to quotas, but the “code of silence,” which prohibits officers from reporting misconduct, serves as a barrier. 115 This
code116—which commentators also refer to as “the blue wall of 114 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
115 See, e.g., Isidoro Rodriguez, The Plight of the Police Whistleblower , CRIME REPORT (June 18, 2020), https://thecrimereport.org/2020/06/18/the-plight-of-the-police- whistleblower (quoting Seth Stoughton, law professor and former police officer, saying “[t]here is tremendous pressure in policing, a cultural pressure, to not expose fellow officers to either professional or physical threats”).
116 See SANJA K UTNJAK I VKOVIC, F ALLEN B LUE K NIGHTS: C ONTROLLING P OLICE CORRUPTION 20 (2005) (describing the code as “the informal prohibition within police culture of reporting misconduct by fellow officers—binds police together”); see also Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty , 89 O R. L. R EV. 1257, 1285–92 (2011) (describing the code as an anti-snitching norm rooted in ideas about group loyalty and family); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained? , 27 H ARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 487 (1992) (“The code of silence does more than prevent testimony.

It mandates that no officer report another for misconduct, that supervisors not discipline officers for abuse, that wrongdoing be covered up, and that any investigation or legal action into police misconduct be deflected and discouraged.”). Courts have also recognized the code in § 1983 actions. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury , 59 U. P ITT. L.

REV. 233, 239, n.16 (1998) (listing cases). See generally Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability , 80 B.U. L.

REV. 17, 18 (2000) (exploring the police “code of silence” as an unconstitutional police practice under § 1983). In the context of quotas, the blue code could be understood in two ways. First, it could be understood as a prohibition against one officer revealing another officer’s compliance with an illegal quota (a form of misconduct) to a perceived outsider (i.e. the public, the media). Alternatively, it could apply to an officer who reveals that law enforcement leadership is enforcing quotas. At its core, the code is about a brotherhood in which some police officers might not include management. Put another way, there is an 77 | Page

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silence,” “blue cocoon,” “blue shield,” or “blue curtain” 117—has been a problem in American policing for almost a century. 118 One police misconduct attorney explains how a breach of this code can be conse- quential: “while police officers may feel that a fellow officer has acted wrongfully, they fear that they will lose their job, or be subject to ridi- cule, ostracization, and physical reprisals from their comrades if the truth is told.”
119 The same applies to speaking out about quotas. The
case of Adrian Schoolcraft is telling. Schoolcraft worked for the NYPD and secretly recorded superiors discussing illegal quotas or, as some officials described it, “paying the rent.”
120 Three weeks after he
made misconduct allegations, a dozen officers, led by a deputy chief, went to his apartment.
121 A tape recording of the event revealed that
the deputy chief Mike Marino, who has been described as a devotee of NYPD’s numbers-driven policing,
122 warned Schoolcraft, “they are
going to treat you like an EDP [emotionally disturbed person] . . . .

Now, you have a choice. You get up like a man and put your shoes on and walk into that bus, or they’re going to treat you as an EDP and argument that the blue code is about protecting not police leadership, but rank and file.

But actual instances involving police officers revealing the existence of quotas suggest that leadership is considered part of the code. See generally Radley Balko, Opinion, The Blue Wall: Stronger than Ever , W ASH. P OST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/the-watch/wp/2015/09/04/the-blue-wall-stronger-than-ever (describing instances of police officers who have revealed the existence of quotas and allege retaliation from their peers and leadership).
117 See Chin & Wells, supra note 116, at 237 n.15 (describing the different terms for the code).
118 See Craig B. Futterman, Chaclyn Hunt & Jamie Kalven, Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the Realities , 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 182 (noting that “over the last eighty-five years, at least nine different commissions around the nation have identified the police code of silence as a serious problem that prevents accountability” and listing all of the reports).
119 G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases , 48 D EPAUL L. R EV. 747, 758 (1999); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation , 2016 U. C HI. L EGAL F. 213, 247–48 (“Scholarship on policing amply shows that police officers enforce the code of silence with social ostracism, refusals to answer calls for backup, denials of promotion, reassignments to less desirable postings, and threats of violence.”).
120 Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct , V ILLAGE VOICE (May 4, 2010), https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/05/04/the-nypd-tapes-inside-bed- stuys-81st-precinct.
121 See Graham Rayman, NYPD Tapes Update: Queens DA Richard Brown’s Report on Whistleblower Cop Raises More Questions than It Answers , V ILLAGE V OICE (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.villagevoice.com/2012/12/13/nypd-tapes-update-queens-da-richard- browns-report-on-whistleblower-cop-raises-more-questions-than-it-answers. 122 See Graham Rayman, Deputy Chief Michael Marino in Stop-and-Frisk Trial: ‘Do Your Job or Suffer the Consequences ,’ VILLAGE V OICE (Mar. 25, 2013), https:// www.villagevoice.com/2013/03/25/deputy-chief-michael-marino-in-stop-and-frisk-trial-do- your-job-or-suffer-the-consequences.
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that means handcuffs.” 123 Schoolcraft was subjected to the latter and forcibly committed to a psychiatric ward.124 After six days in the ward, he was discharged and suspended and continued to receive visits from police officers.125 Ultimately, he made the tapes public and sued the NYPD for retaliation.126 The NYPD settled.127 Since the incident, the City has not “released one report, document or even scrap of paper which explains the NYPD’s handling of the episode or details the department’s conclusions about Schoolcraft’s allegations.” 128 While
this is one of the more spectacular examples of what happens when the code of silence is breached, it highlights its retaliatory nature. 129
As some of the cases discussed in this Article show, the threat of retal- iation can determine whether quota cases make it to courts and, if they do, the posture in which they enter the legal system.

The code of silence bleeds into First Amendment issues involving police speech. The Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos ruled that public employees who speak pursuant to their job duties have no First Amendment protection from retaliation for such speech.
130 If an
officer speaks about a quota in their official capacity, then a First Amendment retaliation claim cannot succeed. The only way such a claim could prevail is if the officer demonstrates that she spoke as a citizen and not as an employee. Post-Garcetti , federal district and appeals courts have rejected retaliation claims brought by police officers who argued that they were subject to an adverse employment action due to their complaints about police quotas.
131 Considering the
123 Graham Rayman, NYPD Tapes 4: The WhistleBlower, Adrian Schoolcraft , VILLAGE VOICE ( J u n e 1 5 , 2 0 1 0 ) , h t t p s : / / w w w . v i l l a g e v o i c e . c o m / 2 0 1 0 / 0 6 / 1 5 / n y p d - t a p e s - 4 - t h e - whistleblower-adrian-schoolcraft.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Goodman, supra note 26.
127 Id.
128 Graham Rayman, Adrian Schoolcraft: The Other NYPD Scandal in the Room , VILLAGE V OICE ( A p r . 2 0 , 2 0 1 1 ) , h t t p s : / / w w w . v i l l a g e v o i c e . c o m / 2 0 1 1 / 0 4 / 2 0 / a d r i a n - schoolcraft-the-other-nypd-scandal-in-the-room.
129 Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 74, 83 (2005) (“The threat of retaliation against whistleblowers has a chilling effect. The threat prevents officers from coming forward to expose corrupt and abusive practices and it prevents serious wrongdoing from being addressed in-house.”). 130 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
131 See, e.g., Taylor v. Pawlowski, 551 F. App’x 31, 31 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that officer’s statements to his superiors about the illegality of a quota system for traffic stops were not protected speech under the First Amendment, and that he was acting as a public employee speaking pursuant to his duties); Cid v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 18-4012, 2019 WL 161495, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2019) (rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim brought by a terminated officer because he “directed his speech to his immediate supervisors and others in his chain of command—but no one outside that chain of command” and did not make a showing that his speech “involve[d] a matter of public concern and not merely a 79 | Page

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inadequacy of whistleblower laws, which often fail to cover police officers and impose technical requirements, Garcetti presents a quag- mire.132 Officers concerned about quota-based policing in their departments can keep their objections in-house and follow typical grievance procedures. However, this process typically requires the grievant to inform a chain of command (e.g., their immediate super- visor, then chief of police, then the city manager).
133 The grievance
process can subject the officer to the hazards of retaliation for breaking the code of silence, and under Garcetti, the officer may not be protected. The officer could also go public, as some have recently done,
134 but that option can be similarly, if not more, antagonizing to colleagues and lead to resignations that are difficult to remediate. 135 These social and legal constraints provide some insight into why stat- utes prohibiting quotas are infrequently litigated.

B. Evidentiary Challenges for Civilians
Challenges to quota-based policing brought by civilians raise many of the evidentiary problems discussed in “access to justice” scholarship. This body of work describes how infidelity to discovery rules, strict pleading standards, and the judicial hostility to the enforcement of civil rights make courts inaccessible to civilians. 136 As
a threshold matter, discovery disputes can preclude parties from dem- onstrating that quota-based policing exists. For example, in cases personal issue internal to the workplace”); Whitehead v. City of New York, 953 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[P]laintiff’s refusal to comply with the quota policy is not protected by the First Amendment because he confined his opposition to and criticism of the quota policy within the NYPD and never attempted to communicate his complaints to the public.”). But see Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that officer spoke as a citizen when he spoke to his commanding officers about its arrest policy).
132 Whistleblower laws sometimes lack statutory coverage for municipal and county employees (categories police officers often fall in) and have various technical requirements for coverage (e.g., mandated initial disclosure to supervisors for protection to attach). See Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle , 52 U.C. D AVIS L. R EV. ONLINE 1, 26–31 (2018). 133 See LARRY K. G AINES & J OHN L. W ORRALL, P OLICE A DMINISTRATION 344–45 (2012) (describing grievance procedures).
134 See infra note 330; supra notes 37, 44, 65, 120–29. 135 See Huq & McAdams, supra note 119, at 247–48 (suggesting that harassment that forces an officer to resign should be understood as a constructive discharge and noting “the well-known reality is that it remains difficult or impossible to prove constructive discharge in any individual case, given the code of silence”).
136 See STEPHEN B. B URBANK & S EAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION A GAINST F EDERAL L ITIGATION (2017); E RWIN C HEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE C OURTHOUSE D OOR: H OW Y OUR C ONSTITUTIONAL R IGHTS B ECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017); S ARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015).
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involving criminal defendants who were charged with driving while intoxicated and sought arrest data to prove the existence of police quotas, some courts have ruled that such information is not relevant or would not bear any material information.
137
Some civil rights plaintiffs have unsuccessfully brought legal actions arguing that quota-satisfying officers violated their rights. For example, in D.H. v. City of New York , a group of women of color were arrested and charged with loitering for the purposes of prostitu- tion.
138 They brought a § 1983 suit against the City of New York and their arresting officers. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the loitering statute and argued that they were discriminated against on the basis of their race, gender, and gender identity. 139 The
plaintiffs also argued that the arrests were products of quota-based policing.
140 To support their claim, they relied on statistical evidence and a statement from a former police officer who noted that arrest quotas led cops to go after “black, . . . Hispanic, . . . [and] LGBT communit[ies].”
141 Notwithstanding this evidence, New York’s anti-
quota statute, 142 and the NYPD’s documented struggles with quotas,143 the court found their arguments unpersuasive. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show that “one of these defendants needed to make these arrests to meet his or her performance goals and arrest quotas, assuming such goals and quotas existed.”
144 By requiring this kind of
evidence at the pleading stage, particularly in a jurisdiction that has 137 See, e.g., Mayes v. City of Oak Park, No. 05-CV-74386-DT, 2007 WL 9751967, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d, 285 F. App’x 261 (6th Cir. 2008) (ruling that the plaintiff, a former public safety officer who claimed his termination was based on race and disability discrimination, was not entitled to racial data on arrests and tickets in Oak Park because it was not relevant to his claim); Page v. State, 7 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s request for DWI task force information, which he argued was material and could be used to impeach the arresting officer since a DWI quota directive would have given the officer a motive to falsify his report); County of Nassau Police Dep’t v. Judge, 654 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (App. Div. 1997) (ruling that motorist was not entitled to production of internal police directives and orders that allegedly established DWI quota system because the respondent did not demonstrate that any information would be relevant or exculpatory).
138 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
139 Id. at 64.
140 Id. at 76.
141 Id. at 75.
142 N.Y. L AB. L AW § 215-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020, chs. 1 to 387).
143 See Bronstein, supra note 21 (arguing that the New York anti-quota statute has largely failed to rectify the negative practices of the NYPD). 144 D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (emphasis added).
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been the poster-child for police quotas, the court created a high bar for future civil rights plaintiffs seeking to challenge this practice.

Many of the same problems arise in federal cases out of jurisdic- tions that do not have quota legislation. Before Tennessee passed its legislation, a federal court in that state heard a case brought by Terry Wynn, a Black physician who was stopped by the police after speeding to a hospital to help deliver a patient’s baby.
145 Despite the interven-
tion of a hospital supervisor who came to the hospital parking lot to inform the arresting officer that Wynn was indeed a doctor, the officer prepared a criminal summons against Wynn for speeding, felony evading arrest, resisting arrest, and a host of other violations. 146 A
local prosecutor dropped the charges. 147 Meanwhile, the officer was suspended for a month for what the police chief described as a failure of judgement.
148 Wynn brought a § 1983 suit, arguing that the officer and the City had violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
149 She argued that the City of Pulaski had a quota that required law enforcement to obtain “10 ‘traffic or custodial arrests’ per month as a work performance goal,” citing the arresting officer’s own testi- mony as evidence.
150 The court ruled that this testimony was not
indicative of a “hard-and-fast policy of the department.” 151 If it was a formal policy, the court added, “municipal liability cannot attach in the absence of showing some link between the quota and the allegedly false arrest of, and use of excessive force on, Dr. Wynn.” 152 Ulti-
mately, in the federal tribunals where non-officers bring their chal- lenges to quotas, courts demand tight causal links between the alleged quota and the constitutional violation. These evidentiary demands, along with different statutory conceptions of quotas, have likely stunted the development of case law in this area.

C. Wins and Losses
Challenges to quotas that get beyond these hurdles have had mixed success. This subsection describes the few wins that plaintiffs have achieved when litigating police quotas, as well as the many losses.
145 Wynn v. City of Pulaski, No. 11-0025, 2013 WL 527154 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2013). 146 Id. at *3.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at *13.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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Some criminal defendants have persuaded appellate tribunals that quotas governed their arrests and were not adequately considered by trial courts. In Pennsylvania, for example, various courts have interpreted the state’s anti-quota law as creating an affirmative defense if defendants can prove a violation of the statute by a prepon- derance of the evidence.
153 In Commonwealth v. Greene , a
Pennsylvania court reversed a speeding conviction after the defendant produced a memo from a sergeant to patrol supervisors imploring them to increase their citations from 168 to 450 a month and insisting that they “get the numbers up.”
154 The court ruled that the defendant
met his burden, and interpreted the memo as creating an impermis- sible quota.
155
A Texas appeals court came to a similar conclusion, reversing the DWI conviction of a defendant who was precluded from cross- examining the arresting officer about a departmental quota for DWI arrests, even though the officer was the state’s sole witness and had testified that a quota existed.
156 The appellate court ruled that the trial
court had abused its discretion and deprived the appellant of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
157 A cross-examination that
revealed the existence of a DWI quota would also play a role in a Louisiana court’s decision to vacate a conviction.
158
Police officers who exposed the existence of quotas have also suc- cessfully brought retaliation claims against police departments. These decisions were not per se challenges to the alleged quota system, but they remain important because they contribute to the small body of litigation that addresses quotas, shed light on the existence of the practice, and demonstrate the stakes for police officers who complain about this kind of policing. Many of these challenges were First Amendment retaliation cases, decided before Garcetti ruled out employee claims of retaliation for things they said while on duty. 159
Other cases, decided before and after Garcetti, did not hinge on First Amendment claims, and involved officer complaints about quotas and 153 See, e.g., Woolston v. Cutting, 474 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. 1984) (holding that in authoring the anti-quota statute, the legislature intended it to function as an affirmative defense rather than a civil cause of action).
154 Commonwealth v. Greene, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 48, 52–53 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1984). 155 Id. at 53–54.
156 Alexander v. State, 949 S.W.2d 772, 773–74 (Tex. App. 1997). 157 Id. at 775. But see Hollier v. State, No. 14-99-01348-CR, 2001 WL 951014, at *7 (Tex.

App. Aug. 23, 2001) (rejecting a similar claim because, unlike in Alexander, the appellant could not show that the arresting officer was operating under a quota at the time of arrest). 158 See State v. Sampia, 696 So. 2d 618, 620 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 159 See, e.g., Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding a violation under the First Amendment); Ruhlman v. Barger, 435 F. Supp. 447, 450 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (same).
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police misconduct. Two are noteworthy. Iglesias v. City of Hialeah, the more modest and recent of the two, took place in a small city outside of Miami. 160 Juan Iglesias, an officer in the City’s police depart- ment,161 sent letters to the City’s police chief and mayor protesting the enforcement of illegal ticket quotas. 162 Nevertheless, he received mul- tiple disciplinary notices for not meeting traffic enforcement stan- dards.
163 He used the state’s whistleblower law to argue that the City had illegally retaliated against him for complaining about the quotas.
164 The trial court awarded him lost wages but precluded him from seeking noneconomic damages—a decision that the appellate court reversed.
165
Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect is the most noteworthy court victory involving a police challenge to a quota. 166 The case involved a Latinx police trainee, Martinez, who brought a national origin employment discrimination claim against the Village of Mount Prospect, a community outside of Chicago.
167 He argued that police
leadership directed officers to target Latinx drivers to meet ticket quota requirements; to support his claim, he presented evidence high- lighting the disproportionate number of traffic tickets given to Latinx drivers.
168 A federal district court entered an approximately $1.1 mil- lion settlement for Martinez 169 and enjoined the Village from “directing, suggesting, ordering or otherwise communicating that any police officer should focus, concentrate, target, profile, or otherwise modify law enforcement efforts in any way on the sole basis of the national origin of any person.”
170 Finally, the presiding judge sent a
letter, included in the opinion, to the Department of Justice. 171 The 160 Iglesias v. City of Hialeah, No. 3D18-639, 2019 WL 3309040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 24, 2019).
161 Id. at *1.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at *2. This dispute spawned a separate ongoing case involving Iglesias’s sergeant, Paul DiPietro. In his testimony for Iglesias’s case, DiPietro was reprimanded for failing to adequately discipline Iglesias, and then in Iglesias’s civil suit, gave testimony that contradicted the City’s position that there was no traffic quota. He argued that he was retaliated against by reassignment to a far location and then terminated. DiPietro brought his own claim into federal court, which the parties settled in 2020. See Joint Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice at 1, DiPietro v. City of Hialeah, No. 19-cv-23212 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2020), ECF No. 50.
166 92 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
167 Id. at 781.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 782.
171 Id.
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letter highlighted the interface of the quota policy and racial profiling and encouraged the agency to investigate the Village for civil rights violations.
172
Martinez represents one of the more significant rulings on police quotas, but when cases are decided on the merits, it is much more common for plaintiffs to lose. Judicial rebuffs come in a variety of forms. Sometimes courts, relying on Garcetti, rule that officer objec- tions to police quotas do not constitute protected speech, which often ends the analysis.
173 Sometimes courts are unpersuaded by evidence
that points to the existence of quotas. 174 Sometimes the claims are outright unpersuasive, as in Gravitte v. N.C. Division of Motor Vehicles,175 where the Fourth Circuit rejected claims brought by a police officer and a police union who argued that North Carolina’s quota policy violated officers’ right to equal protection because the policy operated in some districts but not others.
176
Two litigation losses are particularly instructive for thinking about quota-based policing in the future. Both cases, brought by police unions, reveal how departments and jurisdictions can work around statutory prohibitions. The first concerns Camden, New Jersey, which has been at the center of police reform for its drastic reboot of its police department.
177 In Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
1 v. City of Camden , the Fraternal Order of Police challenged the City’s implementation of a “directed patrol” program that required 172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Whitehead v. City of New York, 953 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff officer’s objections to the quota were not protected by the First Amendment because refusing to comply with the quota does not constitute expressive conduct).
174 See, e.g. , Statewide Univ. Police Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., B290293, 2020 WL 2213040, at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2020) (finding no violation of the state’s quota statute where personal evaluation “comment cards” offering feedback on the lack of parking enforcement citations were not punitive in nature); Oliverio v. Butler Univ., No. 15-cv-01630, 2017 WL 1650501, at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 2, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s invocation of the respondent’s quota requirement for parking tickets as not relevant because he was arrested for battery); Matarazzo v. Safir, 689 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (App. Div. 1999) (dismissing claim because petitioners gave no indication of how many tickets petitioners had to write and the only evidence offered was from two supervising officers from two different precincts who directed the individual petitioners to perform duties, during their meal breaks, that were likely to result in the issuance of tickets); Commonwealth v. McClellan, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 627, 628 (C.P. Chester 1987) (rejecting defendant’s affirmative quota defense because he only offered budget statements that showed projected revenues, which the court argued did not establish the existence of a quota system).
175 33 F. App’x 45, 47 (4th Cir. 2002).
176 The plaintiffs also raised relatively unpersuasive claims under the Due Process clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 47, 49. 177 See Fussell, supra note 31.
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police officers to “engage” people whether or not they were suspected of wrongdoing.178 The directed patrol program consisted of “a struc- tured 15–20 minute deployment into a targeted area to accomplish a specific patrol or crime reduction function.”
179 The contacts were to
be tracked and recorded, and officers on regular patrol were expected to perform a minimum of eighteen contacts.
180 According to plaintiffs,
failure to comply with these numerical requirements was cause for dis- ciplinary action.
181 The City argued that the program was not a quota
because it required police-civilian interactions and not arrests or cita- tions.
182 The Third Circuit relied on the text of the statute and, in a short analysis, agreed.183 Fraternal Order is a paradigmatic example of how a police department can circumvent a statutory prohibition on quotas by focusing on precursory activity such as stops and contacts.

Another failed litigation challenge highlights the sophisticated ways through which police departments can subvert quota statutes. In Phillipsburg Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 56 v. Township of Phillipsburg , a local police union challenged a township’s “self- directed patrol index policy,” which created a point system to evaluate police officers.
184 The index assigned different values to different
kinds of arrests and citations:
• 4 Points - Narcotics arrests (4 points per subject arrested) • 4 Points - Burglary and theft arrests
• 3 Points - Warrant arrests (1 subject, multiple warrants = 3 points)
• 2 Points - All moving motor vehicle summonses
• 2 Points - Quality of life summonses (e.g., excessive noise, alcohol related offenses, and animal offenses)
• 2 Points - Other arrests (e.g., disorderly conduct, domestic vio- lence offense; 2 points per subject)
• 2 Points - Unsecured business found (report completed) • 1 Point - All other town ordinance violations
• 1 Point - Hazardous conditions reported (report must be com- pleted for incident)
• 1 Point - All parking tickets
178 842 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2016).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 237.
183 Id. at 239.
184 Phillipsburg Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 56 v. Twp. of Phillipsburg, A- 5016-12T3, 2014 WL 8765463, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2015). 86 | Page

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• 1/2 Point - For every two individual community policing con- tacts per tour of duty (4 contacts = 2 points, 6 contacts = 3 points, etc.)185
Officers who received an index of two or more points received an exceptional performance evaluation. 186 The union argued that the policy undermined the state’s prohibition on quotas, and the trial court agreed.
187
The appellate court struggled because the statute’s language only prohibited traffic violations and arrests and, according to the Township, officers could achieve an excellent evaluation without resorting to either.
188 The court acknowledged that the policy “does
not, on its face, require quotas” but went on to find that the “defen- dants cannot avoid the statutory prohibition by crafting a carefully worded policy that does not, when read literally, violate a statutory mandate, but does so when implemented.”
189 It added, “if it looks like
a duck, quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.” 190 Notwith- standing the court’s acknowledgment of possible subterfuge, it reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the policy constituted an illegal quota.
191 As I explain in more detail in Part IV, decisions like Fraternal Order and Phillipsburg are more than simple losses for police unions. They demonstrate how quota statutes can be evaded in ways that harm the public and frustrate efforts to reign in police malfeasance.

D. Settlements
Social norms, legal hurdles, and an unfavorable jurisprudential landscape are features of quota litigation, but so are settlements. Gov- ernment settlements with officers and civilians have touched various parts of the country—from small cities to big cities—and have ranged from five-figure to eight-figure payouts.
192 Though settlements often
come with the qualification that they are not admissions of guilt, they provide a provisional glimpse behind the “blue wall” that quotas sometimes operate behind. Settlements typically come after courts reject motions by governments to dispense with litigation, leaving a body of law that may be useful for future challenges. At a bare min- 185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at *2.
188 Id. at *3.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at *4.
192 See supra note 26.
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imum, settlements reveal how much a jurisdiction wants to avoid liti- gating their public insistence that they do not use quotas.

New York City, the jurisdiction with the country’s largest police force,193 has struggled with quota allegations and doled out the most in settlements. Adrian Schoolcraft—the involuntarily committed officer discussed above—survived a motion for summary judgment after a federal judge ruled that his speech was protected because he spoke as a citizen. Shortly thereafter, the City of New York settled with Schoolcraft for $600,000.
194 That same year, the City settled with
Craig Matthews, an NYPD officer who complained that his Bronx precinct had competitions for who could make the most arrests, con- duct the most stop-and-frisks, and issue the most summonses. 195 The
Second Circuit ruled that Matthews’s speech was protected by the First Amendment and the City subsequently settled with Matthews for $280,000 to avoid further litigation.
196
A little less than a year later, after a federal judge certified a class of defendants subject to quota-based policing and subsequently imposed sanctions on the NYPD for destroying relevant evidence, the City of New York settled with the class for $75 million. 197 Under the
settlement, the City agreed to reiterate its policy that quotas were illegal and that supervisors who implemented them could be subject to discipline.
198 In Floyd v. City of New York , the famous “stop and frisk” decision, quotas were a significant theme. 199
193 SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016: PERSONNEL 3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf (noting that in 2016, New York City had the largest local police department with more than three times the number of employees than any other department). 194 Goodman, supra note 26.
195 Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Christopher Mathias, NYC to Pay $280,000 Over Cop Who Exposed City’s Quota System , HUFFPOST (Dec. 7, 2015, 3:48 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/craig-matthews-nypd- quotas_n_5665cab8e4b072e9d1c6d86b.
196 Mathias, supra note 195.
197 See Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2016 WL 54684, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y.

Jan. 5, 2016) (describing how the City failed to issue a litigation hold until three years after the complaint was filed, maintained a policy that provided for the destruction of evidence, destroyed materials related to CompStat meetings, destroyed activity reports, failed to preserve text messages, produced few responsive documents, was “grossly negligent,” and acted in “bad faith”); Benjamin Weiser, New York City to Pay Up to $75 Million Over Dismissed Summonses , N.Y. T
IMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/ nyregion/new-york-city-agrees-to-settlement-over-summonses-that-were-dismissed.html. 198 Weiser, supra note 197.
199 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 596–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing the pressure that quotas impart on officers to increase their stop numbers); see also Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, Continuing to Reform the NYPD’s Stop and Frisk Practice , D EMOS (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.demos.org/blog/continuing-reform-nypds-stop-and-frisk- practice (noting the NYPD norm of officers being judged “on how many stops they do”). 88 | Page

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On the other side of the country, the City of Los Angeles has paid millions in settlements to police officers who claim that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) illegally required them to comply with ticket quotas. All of the settlements derive from allega- tions that Captain Nancy Lauer ordered officers to write at least eighteen traffic tickets each shift and required that eighty percent of citations be for major violations.
200 Officers who did not comply
would be denied overtime or receive undesirable work assignments.201 Despite the City’s claim that the number was a goal and not a man- date, a jury awarded two officers over $1 million in damages. 202 Two
years later, the City agreed to pay a settlement of almost $6 million to eleven police officers in a separate lawsuit over the same quota system.
203 In 2016, the City paid $950,000 to a former officer who also claimed that he was retaliated against for not participating in a ticket quota system.
204 Most recently, the City of Whittier, located in Los Angeles County, settled for $3 million with six officers who refused to participate in an arrest quota scheme.
205
Miami Gardens, which has the largest Black population in Florida and has been called the “stop-and-frisk capital of America,”206 has produced two settlements tied to quota-based policing. The first involved Earl Sampson, a Black man who was stopped more than four hundred times between 2008 and 2013, often for trespassing at his place of work.
207 Sampson led a class of Black and Latinx defendants
who sued the City of Miami Gardens, arguing that the City’s police department violated their constitutional rights by adhering to a racial- ized system of quota-based policing that led officers to selectively stop and frisk Black males ages fifteen to thirty.
208 A few weeks after a
200 Joel Rubin & Catherine Saillant, LAPD to Pay $10 Million in Traffic Ticket Quota Controversy, L.A. T IMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/ 10/local/la-me-ln-ticket-quota-20131210.
201 Id.
202 Special Verdict, Chan v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC 418750 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2011); Andrew Blankstein & Joel Rubin, LAPD Officers Who Complained About Ticket Quotas Are Awarded $2 Million , L.A. T IMES (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:00 AM), https:// www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2011-apr-12-la-me-ticket-quotas-20110412-story.html. 203 Rubin & Saillant, supra note 200.
204 Branson-Potts & Reyes, supra note 26.
205 Sprague, supra note 26; see also Rivera v. City of Whittier, No. BC574443, 2017 WL 3579659, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 7, 2017) (evaluating the six plaintiffs’ claims that they had been retaliated against for whistleblowing the existence of an illegal quota). 206 Meg O’Connor, Inside ‘The Stop-and-Frisk Capital of America ,’ APPEAL (Feb. 21, 2019), https://theappeal.org/inside-the-stop-and-frisk-capital-of-america. 207 Id.
208 Sampson v. City of Miami Gardens, No. 13-CV-24312, 2015 WL 11202372, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2015).
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federal court declined a motion for summary judgment on those issues, the City settled with the plaintiffs for an undisclosed amount.209 During the litigation and subsequent settlement, a dispute about the use of quotas took place inside the police department. Wanda Gilbert, a Black crime analyst responsible for the police department’s statistics, grew concerned about dubious arrests and quota-based policing that she claimed were tied to five percent yearly raises. 210 She
corroborated the testimony in the Sampson litigation and claimed that the Black police chief, Matthew Boyd, directed officers “to stop all Black males between the ages of 15 and 30 years old.”
211 She also
described how “boys as young as seven,” and adolescents “riding their bikes home from school” were accosted by police.
212 Gilbert wrote
multiple memos to Boyd and met with City administrators, who told her not to put her concerns in writing because they would become public record.
213 She was fired after she wrote a final memo in 2011
protesting the department’s practices. After Gilbert’s own protracted legal battles, which made their way to the Eleventh Circuit, the City settled with her for approximately $1 million.
214
Quota-based policing can also be fatal, as was the case in Atlanta when police officers killed an elderly woman during an illegal raid of her home. Officers in the Atlanta Police Department’s narcotics unit, operating under a quota, pulled a gun on a man they had previously arrested, planted marijuana on him, and demanded that he tell them where they could find drugs.
215 He made up an address, which hap-
pened to be the residence of ninety-two-year-old Kathryn Johnston and had a wheelchair ramp in the front.
216 The officers made false
statements to a magistrate judge to secure a no-knock search war- rant.
217 They could not kick down the security gate, so they used a pry bar and a battering ram during the nighttime raid. 218 Johnston lived 209 See Order and Notice of Settlement, Sampson v. City of Miami Gardens, No. 13-CV- 24312 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2015), ECF No. 228.
210 See Charles Rabin, She Was Fired After Speaking Out About Bad Arrests. She Sued and Just Won $1 Million , M IAMI H ERALD (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:01 PM), https:// www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article222442315.html. 211 Heather Dunhill, Retired Crime Analyst Wanda F. Gilbert on Police Reform and Growing Up in Segregated South Florida , S ARASOTA M AG. (Aug. 17, 2020, 11:42 AM), https://www.sarasotamagazine.com/news-and-profiles/2020/08/wanda-f-gilbert. 212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Rabin, supra note 210.
215 Radley Balko, The Militarization of America’s Police Forces , 11 C ATO’S LETTER 1, 1–2 (2013).
216 Ted Conover, A Snitch’s Dilemma , N.Y. T IMES M AG. (June 29, 2012), https:// www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/alex-white-professional-snitch.html. 217 Id.
218 Id.
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alone in a dangerous neighborhood, where an elderly neighbor was recently raped.219 She fired one shot, which provoked 39 shots by the officers, some of which ultimately killed her.220 After the shooting, the officers searched the home, found no drugs, and subsequently planted three bags of marijuana they had seized earlier that day in Johnston’s basement.
221 Afterward, the officers conspired to fabricate a story that they then shared with homicide investigators. 222 An FBI investigation found that the narcotics unit had a performance quota of nine arrests per month.
223 In her sentencing of the three officers, U.S. District Judge Julie Carnes concluded that the pressure to adhere to the quotas played a role in the killing.
224 The City of Atlanta ultimately
awarded a $4.9 million settlement to the family of Kathryn Johnston.
225
It would be a mistake to understand quota settlements as a big city phenomenon. Some of these settlements have surfaced in small towns across the country. Local governments have settled cases involving allegations of quota-based policing in the City of Mendham in central New Jersey,
226 S m y r n a , D e l a w a r e ,227 L e h i g h t o n , Pennsylvania,228 Novi, Michigan,229 Byrnes Mills, Missouri, 230 and the central California city of Paso Robles. 231 Financially, law professors Joanna Schwartz and John Rappaport have explained how these kinds 219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Third Atlanta Police Officer Pleads Guilty in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Woman , DEPT. OF J UST. (Oct. 30, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08- crt-972.html.
222 Id.
223 Bill Rankin, Ex-Cops Get 5–10 Years for Drug Raid – Judge Agrees Atlanta Police Quotas Influenced Officers’ Behavior , ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 25, 2009, at C1. 224 Id.
225 Ernie Suggs, City to Pay Slain Woman’s Family $4.9 Million , A TLANTA J.-C ONST. (Aug. 11, 2012), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/city-pay-slain-woman-family-million/ GWqsgDArzmOhvpb7iPY6FI.
226 See Wright, supra note 26.
227 ACLU Reaches Settlement with Smyrna Police over Wrongful Arrests , ACLU (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-reaches-settlement-smyrna-police-over- wrongful-arrests.
228 See Hall, supra note 49.
229 See Phillips, supra note 26.
230 See Robert Patrick & Jeremy Kohler, Former Byrnes Mill Police Chief Stole $12,800 from Suspects, Feds Say , S T. L OUIS P OST-DISPATCH ( A p r . 2 0 , 2 0 1 7 ) , h t t p s : / / www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/former-byrnes-mill-police-chief-stole-from- suspects-feds-say/article_faa278bd-25ef-5a8d-953a-534bc11f62c0.html. 231 See Scott Brennan, City Pays $125,000 to Settle Lawsuit over Ticket Quotas , P ASO ROBLES DAILY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014, 8:23 PM), https://pasoroblesdailynews.com/city-pays- 125000-settle-lawsuit-ticket-quotas/15896.
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of settlements can be consequential for smaller jurisdictions. 232 Socially, such settlements—which circulate in mainstream media out- lets as well as in local papers of the day—can lead to the kinds of distrust in police that exists in bigger cities. The crucial difference is that many of these localities are not freighted by the same racial politics of large urban cities.
233 The geographical diversity of these set-
tlements highlights how disputes about quota-based policing impact not only racial minorities—the presumed subjects of mass incarcera- tion—but a broader and unassuming public.

Overall, one can glean a few themes from the legal challenges to police quotas discussed in this Part. First, many hurdles preclude these cases from being meaningfully heard by courts. Some obstacles reflect the general “closing of the courthouse doors” to civil rights litigants and criminal defendants.
234 Other impediments, like the code of
silence, are specific to police culture and jurisprudence. Second, cases that do make it to a trial on the merits are still unlikely to win. Third, and relatedly, quota litigation is especially likely to settle. Settlements sit alongside victories, allegations, memoirs, police recordings, and criminological scholarship that all point to the existence of police quotas. With the definitional, statutory, and jurisprudential landscape sketched out, the Article will now turn to consider policy considera- tions both for and against the practice of police quotas.

III
T

HE THEORETICAL CONTOURS OF POLICE QUOTAS
Most observers of the criminal justice system typically understand quotas through a pejorative lens. In scholarly literature, robust defenses of quotas are relatively rare. The closest thing to a defense is the claim by criminology scholars and law enforcement officials that police need to be evaluated and monitored in some way. This Part begins by considering the best possible rationales for why quotas 232 See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police , 130 H ARV. L.

REV. 1539, 1565–66 (2017) (describing how large municipalities have “broad tax bases and big budgets” that allow them “to absorb the shock of large judgments and settlements that might seriously damage a smaller city”); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform , 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1174 (2016) (“Smaller jurisdictions will presumably feel the financial effects of lawsuits more acutely.”). 233 See KIM P ARKER ET AL ., P EW R SCH. C TR., W HAT U NITES AND D IVIDES U RBAN, SUBURBAN, AND R URAL C OMMUNITIES 4 (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social- trends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/05/Pew-Research-Center-Community-Type-Full- Report-FINAL.pdf (describing the racial makeup and attitudes across different types of geographical communities).
234 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136 (describing how the Supreme Court’s decisions have resulted in restricted access to the courts for those hoping to enforce their constitutional rights).
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might be desirable and defensible. Despite the normative position this Article adopts, it is analytically unsatisfying to oppose police quotas without confronting possible arguments.

Although some of the arguments in favor of quotas are weighty, Section III.B contends there are more compelling reasons on the side of prohibiting them. This Section builds on arguments that have been raised by opponents by offering a more comprehensive view of why quotas constitute bad policy. Moreover, it situates these objections within the definitional, statutory, and jurisprudential context described in Parts I and II. In doing so, Section III.B lays the ground- work for Part IV’s normative claims.

A. Defenses
There are at least four possible defenses of quotas that surface in criminology, in the media, and in public statements made by law enforcement officials. The first is that quotas protect against police shirking and idleness. The second is that quotas make the police more productive (e.g., through “performance targets,” “goals,” “expecta- tions”). Both of these defenses assume that there is a specific amount of illegal activity occurring in the world, and that officers should respond to some portion of it. The third defense involves the evalua- tive utility of quotas and maintains that quotas provide an ostensibly neutral way to assess police performance. The final defense of quotas is rare and accepts the profit-generating nature of policing.

1. Police Idleness
The cultural stereotype of lazy, underactive police officers is tied to a longstanding anxiety about police productivity. Concerns about shirking invoke basic agency theory where police officers act as agents for the principal. It is assumed that police officer-agents, “will shirk their responsibilities when given half a chance.”
235 If they are not “suf-
ficiently monitored or bonded, agents will be lazy or irresponsible—or at least not entirely selfless in their motivations.”
236 Quotas are an
attempt to reduce the agency costs that come with police administra- tion. Although concerns about shirking exist across many organiza- tions,
237 these worries have unique expressions in policing. In 1909, Leonhard Fuld, one of the earliest scholars of American urban 235 Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm , 16 Y ALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 276–77 (1998).
236 Id.
237 See generally JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (1997) (studying shirking in federal, state, and local bureaucracies in order to debunk the concept of the “lazy bureaucrat”). 93 | Page

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policing, observed that “the policeman’s life is a lazy life . . . as much of his time is spent doing nothing.” 238 Fuld also noted that police are different because “[t]he authority with which they are invested . . . create in them an inordinate desire to shirk their work or, as they themselves express it, ‘to take it easy.’”
239 NYPD spokesman Al
O’Leary captured this sentiment in the 1990s. When six transit cops donned nooses at a news conference to protest their “bondage” to quotas, O’Leary lambasted: “If the union is suggesting we should go back to the days of coffee-drinking, doughnut eating, do-nothing cops, then they’re way out of sync with policing today.”
240
Most defenses of quotas reject the formal label but embrace the idea of evaluating officers because of a concern about laziness. When Atlanta Police Chief Richard Pennington rejected the idea that his department utilized quotas, he conceded to maintaining a related euphemism and admitted, “Yes, we have performance measures in the Atlanta Police Department. We have to have performance measures because if we don’t have them, the officers would come in every day with nothing on their sheets.”
241 Departments certainly cannot elimi-
nate shirking, but quotas can address this concern by demanding a minimum amount of law enforcement activity while utilizing employ- ment sanctions to ensure compliance. Considering the significant amount of money spent on policing,
242 it is reasonable to expect some
minimum output level, whether in the seemingly mundane realm of traffic enforcement or the more serious world of arrests. 243
238 LEONHARD FELIX FULD, POLICE ADMINISTRATION: A C RITICAL STUDY OF POLICE ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 91 (2d ed. 1910). 239 Id. at 48–49.
240 Dean Chang, Tix Quota No Token Rule: TA Cops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 1992, at 15.
241 Brenda Goodman, Atlanta’s Mayor Defends Chief Against Misconduct Accusations , N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/us/01atlanta.html. 242 See Niall McCarthy, How Much Are U.S. Cities Spending on Policing in 2020? , FORBES (June 12, 2020, 5:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/06/12/ how-much-are-us-cities-spending-on-policing-in-2020-infographic (stating that police budgets run as high as billions of dollars in several major cities in the United States, including New York ($5.61 billion), Los Angeles ($1.73 billion), and Chicago ($1.68 billion)).
243 See generally CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDER- MARKEL, P ULLED O VER: H OW P OLICE S TOPS D EFINE R ACE AND C ITIZENSHIP (2014) (describing the impact of police stops on racial disparities and perceptions of citizenship in the United States); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (examining the consequences of arrests and the implicit fusion of arrests and guilt); Rachel A.

Harmon, Why Arrest? , 115 M
ICH. L. R EV. 307 (2016) (arguing against the outsized role arrests play in policing); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation , 67 S TAN. L. R EV. 809 (2015) (examining how arrests are systematically used as a regulatory tool outside of the criminal justice system).
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2. Productivity
Ensuring sufficient police activity is another rationale for quotas.244 While related to idleness, this defense is premised on the idea that there is a certain amount of illegal activity in the world (i.e., traffic violations or criminal offenses) and that officers should attend to some portion of it.
245 Lieutenant Colonel Kelly of Chesterfield
County, located outside of Richmond, Virginia, captured this senti- ment when he stated, “Our officers are on the road 12 hours a day, so, if in a 12-hour period of time they stop three cars, I don’t think that’s unfairly targeting our citizens.”
246 Productivity rationales also osten-
sibly ensure the fair distribution of work within a police force. 247 An officer in Georgia recently recounted how one of his colleagues refused to answer calls or provide backup to other officers, and admitted that the department would “need a quota system to get a guy like that moving or he’d just park his car and sleep.” 248
To make this productivity rationale more concrete, consider the case of drunk driving. Although Americans generally agree that driving while drunk is wrong and dangerous, many still tolerate it. 249
Setting aside real and often consequential issues of implementation,250 as a general matter, one might argue that the careful dedication of police resources to drunk driving is uncontroversial. It would also be 244 See Bronstein, supra note 21, at 551–53.
245 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2 M ANUAL FOR POLICE T RAFFIC S ERVICES P ERSONNEL P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION S YSTEM 1 (1977) (“Productivity is not another name for ‘quotas.’ Productivity refers to measures of job performance to be used in comparison to expected levels of performance.”). 246 Melissa Hipolit, Former Police Officer Exposes Chesterfield’s Ticket Quota Goals , WTVR (July 15, 2014, 6:04 AM), https://wtvr.com/2014/07/14/chesterfield-quota- investigation.
247 See ATLANTA CITIZEN REV. BD., STUDY AND INQUIRY INTO THE ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEATH OF MS. KATHRYN JOHNSTON 24 (2010) (“A manager must ensure that officers are working and the work is fairly distributed.”). 248 Bill Torpy, Did DeKalb’s Cops Have Arrest and Ticket Quotas? , ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/bill-torpy-large-did-dekalb-cops-have- arrest-and-ticket-quotas/GxkflThnOJIuaFTSQ5Fd7N.
249 See generally BARRON H. L ERNER, O NE FOR THE R OAD: D RUNK D RIVING S INCE 1900 (2011) (tracing the history of drunk driving and efforts to stop it); J AMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK D RIVING: A N A MERICAN D ILEMMA (1989) (analyzing Americans’ drunk driving problem and anti-drunk driving policies); Fredrick Kunkle, Americans Are Still Way Too Tolerant of Drunken Driving , W ASH. P OST (Aug. 31, 2016, 8:02 AM) https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2016/08/31/americans-are-still-way-too-tolerant-of- drunk-driving-safety-advocates-say (discussing the problem of drunk driving in the United States today).
250 Implementation questions are related but not necessarily fatal to this rationale; instead such administrative issues—which unavoidably implicate questions of race, poverty, gender, and sexual orientation—can be attended to by training, oversight, and compliance.
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reasonable to expect results, particularly in places where drunk driving is likely to occur (e.g., large sporting events) or during times of the year when people may be more willing to drink and drive (e.g., holidays). The absence of a numerical goal or a threat of adverse employment action would render this enforcement priority an empty mandate. For supporters of this defense, ticket quotas raise the stakes.

3. Evaluation
One might also argue that quotas can be useful for evaluative purposes. Various arguments are available on this front. First, as a general matter, employment-based, numerical expectations are unremarkable. In its discussion of quotas, the Atlanta Citizen Review Board explained, “Production quotas are a common part of modern life. Almost all of us work at jobs were [sic] we have explicit or implicit numerical goals.”
251 The power to arrest and a legally sanc-
tioned monopoly over violence differentiate police from typical employees, but it is not obvious that these extraordinary powers should exempt law enforcement from standard models of employer evaluation. In fact, such an exemption might add another layer to “police exceptionalism,” much to the chagrin of criminal justice reformers.
252 Defenders of quotas might argue that numbers-based
imperatives should not be the only standards for evaluating police officers, but they would certainly include quotas among them. They would likely point to the fact that many statutes expressly prohibit law enforcement from relying exclusively on numbers when assessing officers.
253 This argument for the evaluative utility of quotas focuses on the standard nature of numbers-based evaluations in the employ- ment world and highlights the need to consider numbers alongside other factors.

Besides the normalcy of quantitative requirements in work set- tings, evaluation-based defenses of quotas also focus on their per- ceived tangibility and neutrality. On the former, Joe Giacalone, a former New York City law enforcement officer who defends the use 251 ATLANTA CITIZEN REV. BD., supra note 247, at 22.
252 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 1827, 1843 (2015) (“Policing agencies—for that is what they are, agencies of executive government—fail to play by the rules of administrative governance.”). 253 See, e.g. , N.J. S TAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181.2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.126 and J.R. No. 2) (“The department or force shall not use the number of arrests or citations issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal, or the earning of any benefit provided by the department or force.”); N.C. G EN.

STAT. ANN. § 20-187.3 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) (“Pay and promotions of members of the Highway Patrol shall be based on their overall job performance and not on the basis of the volume of citations issued or arrests made.”). 96 | Page

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of quantitative benchmarks, claims that “[t]here are very few ways we can evaluate police officers’ activity.” 254 Since it is impossible to “count how many times [police officers] shake someone’s hand on the street,” Giacalone is unbothered by critiques of quotas and insists that “it’s written in the job description to make arrests and write sum- mons.”
255 Alongside this results-oriented approach to policing is the idea that quotas are straightforward and empirically superior to sub- jective assessments. Indeed, criminologists have acknowledged that quotas are sometimes justified because “such numbers are easy to cal- culate and compare.”
256 Some describe these quantitative metrics as
less vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of police management. 257 The idea of objectivity is significant because promotion in policing is notoriously nepotistic and subject to interpersonal politics.
258 Quotas, it could be argued, provide a more impersonal way to assess employee productivity and address longstanding concerns about diversity in law enforcement. 259
254 George Joseph, NYPD Commander’s Text Messages Show How the Quota System Persists, A PPEAL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://theappeal.org/nypd-commanders-text-messages- show-how-the-quota-system-persists.
255 Id.
256 STEVEN M. C OX, S USAN M ARCHIONNA & B RIAN D. F ITCH, I NTRODUCTION TO POLICING 243–44 (3d ed. 2017).
257 See FRANK J. LANDY,P ERFORMANCE APPRAISAL IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 6 (1977) (“One of the major issues in performance measurement is the nature of the information gathered . . . . Most critics of subjective or judgmental performance evaluation imply that the judgment made by the supervisor is more related to personal idiosyncrasies than to the behavior of the person being rated.”).
258 See THOMAS J. G RADEL & D ICK S IMPSON, C ORRUPT I LLINOIS: P ATRONAGE, CRONYISM, AND CRIMINALITY 136 (2015) (discussing how a Chicago police officer failed to receive a promotion for failing to follow the directions of a corrupt local politician); S
TEVEN L EINEN, B LACK P OLICE, W HITE S OCIETY 136 (1984) (discussing how promotion for detectives in the NYPD relied on both quantitative factors (number of arrests), and the leveraging of personal connections (“having ‘sponsors’ or ‘personal contacts’ on the job”)); Andrea Shalal & Jonathan Landay, Black Cops Say Discrimination, Nepotism Behind U.S.

Police Race Gap , R
EUTERS (July 2, 2020, 10:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us- minneapolis-police-blackofficers/black-cops-say-discrimination-nepotism-behind-u-s- police-race-gap-idUSKBN2432T8 (stating that discrimination in hiring and promotion has hampered Black representation in police forces in the United States). 259 On diversity, see M ANGAI NATARAJAN, WOMEN POLICE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY:

BACK DOOR TO EQUALITY (2008) (describing the development of women police over the past twenty years); D AVID E. B ARLOW & M ELISSA H ICKMAN B ARLOW, P OLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: AN AMERICAN STORY (2018) (describing the role that social, political, and economic relationships have played in the historical development of the police); see generally David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement , 96 J. C RIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209
(2006) (describing the recent dramatic shift in the demographics of police departments). 97 | Page

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4. Revenue Generation
The image of mercenary police officers seizing civilians to meet quantitative goals is unsavory and makes explicitly revenue-based defenses of quotas rare. However, administrative practices across the country reveal an undeniable fact: law enforcement helps generate money for municipal coffers. This stark reality became clear in Nevada a few years ago, when state legislators vigorously protested the decriminalization of traffic tickets.
260 They argued that such an
action would lead to an annual loss of $33 million in the counties of Washoe and Reno.
261
The profitability of law enforcement also helps explain why cities get nervous when police officers engage in purposeful work slow downs. Public safety is an issue, but so is money. “Cops not writing summonses is usually very effective” and garners immediate attention “because it affects the city finances greatly.”
262 Perhaps the most
obscene version of policing for profit was the well-documented debacle in Ferguson, Missouri, where the federal government found that revenue, rather than public safety needs, shaped the city’s racially discriminatory policing.
263 Defenders of revenue-based policing might
concede that profit-motivated arrest quotas are indefensible and instead limit their defense to quotas for traffic tickets and violations, which represent the core feature of all anti-quota statutes and pending bills.
264
A revenue-based defense of police quotas would highlight the fact that, in many jurisdictions, revenue from traffic violations helps finance socially valuable goods. Pennsylvania imposes a two-dollar surcharge on traffic violations that goes to its Access to Justice Account, which funds civil legal services in the state. 265 A recent
California law imposes a four-dollar fee on moving violations to sup- port emergency air medical services.
266 In a driver-friendly state with
260 James DeHaven, Do Traffic Tickets Unfairly Hurt the Poor? Nevada Lawmakers Eyeing Traffic Law Reforms , R ENO G AZETTE-J. (Dec. 21, 2017, 4:42 PM), https:// www.rgj.com/story/ news/politics/2017/12/21/do-traffic-tickets-unfairly-hurt-poor-nevada- lawmakers-again-eyeing-traffic-law-reforms-despite-city/975423001. 261 Id.
262 Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, Police Have Traditionally Protested Anti-Police Rhetoric by Making Fewer Arrests. Right Now That’s Exactly What the Public Wants , INSIDER (June 16, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.insider.com/police-have-historically-protested-by-making- fewer-arrests-its-become-2020-6.
263 See Ferguson Report, supra note 17.
264 See infra Appendices A & B.
265 42 P A. S TAT. AND C ONS. S TAT. A NN. § 3733.1(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95).
266 Governor Signs Bipartisan Bill to Extend Funding for Emergency Air Medical Services, PR N EWSWIRE (Oct. 8, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news- 98 | Page

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the country’s largest population, this surcharge directly helps the crit- ical victims of automobile accidents 267 and improves services to rural residents who need critical care in urban centers. 268 Surcharges for traffic violations in New Jersey fund research on spinal cord repair, brain injury, and autism treatment.
269 In Michigan during the 2017-
2018 fiscal year, penal fine revenues, including fines from traffic tickets, generated approximately $24.6 million, with $24.2 million dis- tributed to public libraries and $392,800 distributed to law libraries. 270
Notably, all of these states have quota prohibitions on the books. 271 Government benefits derived from traffic violations, defenders would argue, are not extraordinary.

With this reality of government-generated profit in mind, a defender of quotas would argue that the remaining issue is whether quotas are an ideal way to actualize the subsidies that flow out of traffic laws. This is a question of tradeoffs.

Many jurisdictions rely on these kinds of cross-subsidies because of the legislative and electoral unpopularity of raising taxes. Jeff Cumins, a political scientist and expert in state budgets, captures this problem: “Legislators can get creative in ways to find revenue. Partic- ularly in the last decades we’ve been in an anti-tax orientation, and so this is one way to raise money for legislators’ pet projects and pro- grams.”
272 Funding by traffic violations is particularly salient in rural parts of the country as well as states in the southeast, where research has shown that jurisdictions have an unusually high reliance on fees and fines.
273 These localities have small property tax bases and collect fewer sales taxes than their urban counterparts because of relatively lower commerce.
274 Thus, “[e]ven when the ethical and fiscal
problems with financing government through fines are apparent, releases/governor-signs-bipartisan-bill-to-extend-funding-for-emergency-air-medical- services-300934138.html; C AL. G OV’T C ODE § 76000.10(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
267 § 76000.10(e)(1).
268 Governor Signs Bipartisan Bill to Extend Funding for Emergency Air Medical Services, supra note 266.
269 Laura Herzog, We Paid $405M in Tickets Last Year; See Where the Money Went , NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2016/05/where_your_ticket_payment_ money_goes_funds_new_jer.html.
270 MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FISCAL AGENCY, FISCAL BRIEF: TRAFFIC CITATION R EVENUE 5 (2019), https://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/pdf/alpha/fiscal_brief_traffic_ citation_revenue.pdf.
271 See infra Appendix A.
272 Liz Gonzalez, Special Report: Why Traffic Tickets in California Are So High , FOX26 NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019), https://kmph.com/news/local/special-report-why-traffic-tickets-in- california-are-so-high.
273 See Maciag, supra note 5.
274 Id.
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viable alternatives remain hard to find.” 275 Defenders of quota-based policing would contend that such regimes are just one part of a larger set of tradeoffs when policymakers are considering how to diversify money streams. They would argue that this version of policing should be openly debated and carefully considered instead of categorically rejected based on grotesque examples. Implementation and the specter of discrimination still loom, but defenders of quotas would maintain that these issues are analytically distinct and correctable. 276
B. Counterarguments
Law enforcement, scholars of policing, critics of the police, and the media have all offered insights that quickly dispense with some of these rationales for quotas. This subsection supplements these insights with new objections. It offers a point-by-point refutation of the above- described defenses of quotas—some of which are compelling at first glance but suffer from practical and empirical problems.

1. The Allure of Activity
First, quota-based policing does not guard against shirking.

Quotas may produce law enforcement activity, but officers who want to shirk will still find ways to cut corners even when there are quotas in place designed to keep them productive.
277 Consider the cases of
Blaine Morgan and Michael Baker, two police officers in Charleston, South Carolina. Both officers disclosed that they falsified traffic tickets in an effort “to boost their respective citations totals” and sub- sequently resigned.
278 Their scam involved writing bogus traffic tickets
without motorists’ knowledge. 279 The officers had the tickets dis- missed because they had no intention of following through on them in court. But, as one news article said at the time, “one of the officers apparently slipped up. He did not dismiss a ticket in time for court 275 Matt Ford, The Problem with Funding Government Through Fines , ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-problem-with-funding- government-through-fines/389387.
276 See supra note 249.
277 See TOM BARKER, POLICE ETHICS: CRISIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 131 (3d ed. 2011) (“Supervisors who impose quotas . . . increase the risks that officers will cut corners or bend the laws . . . to meet the quotas . . . .”); R
OGER G. DUNHAM & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT,
CRITICAL I SSUES IN P OLICING: C ONTEMPORARY R EADINGS 207 (7th ed. 2015) (“Management practices may encourage corruption by imposing pressures for arrest quotas or make it acceptable to cut corners to effect arrests.”). 278 Michael Majchrowicz, 2nd Charleston Police Officer Who Falsified Traffic Tickets Resigns from Department , POST & C OURIER ( S e p t . 1 4 , 2 0 1 9 ) , h t t p s : / / www.postandcourier.com/news/2nd-charleston-police-officer-who-falsified-traffic-tickets- resigns-from-department/article_16b6279e-a334-11e9-a925-87076f916396.html. 279 Id.
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and the driver was notified.” 280 After Officer Morgan resigned; the Charleston Police Department admitted that Morgan artificially inflated the number of tickets written in an attempt to conceal the fact that he was not actively and appropriately patrolling his area. 281 This
statement casts doubts on whether quotas can mitigate shirking and highlights the perverse incentives they invite.

A similar case involving the termination of a ticket-falsifying, quota-fulfilling officer made it to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

The state fired officer Sammy William Ray for writing “ghost tickets.”
282 In a sworn statement, he confessed, “During the time I have been employed with the [Mississippi Department of Public Safety], I have written 20–25 tickets that may or may not be factual tickets . . . . This was done to increase my ticket activity.” 283 In an
interview where he was questioned about his motives, he unambigu- ously added, “I was just trying to play a numbers game. You know, just trying to stay out of hot water.”
284
A massive overtime abuse scandal in Massachusetts also injects doubt into whether police quotas actually make officers more produc- tive. The overtime scandal dated back to 1996 and involved more than twenty officers in the now-defunct Troop E of the Massachusetts State Police (MSP), which patrolled the Massachusetts Turnpike. 285 Prose-
cutors claimed that officers were “expected to issue a minimum of 8- 10 citations” for each shift.
286 Inability to meet this requirement “had
to be explained to supervisors and command staff,” and “[r]epeated failures to meet this quota often resulted in a trooper being blocked from receiving [such] overtime opportunities.”
287
Because MSP received federal funding, the Department of Justice became involved and ultimately charged and convicted eight people of 280 Anne Emerson, CPD Chief: Full-Scale Investigation into Unwarranted Ticket Writing, ABC4 NEWS (July 11, 2019), https://abcnews4.com/news/local/cpd-chief-full-scale- investigation-into-unwarranted-ticket-writing.
281 Id.
282 Ray v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 172 So. 3d 182, 184 (Miss. 2015). 283 Id. at 186.
284 Id. at 185.
285 Matt Rocheleau, State Police Overtime Scheme, Illegal Ticket Quota Was Devised by Higher-Ups 20 Years Ago, Former Trooper Says , B OS. G LOBE (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:56 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/02/07/metro/state-police-overtime-scheme-ticket-quota- system-stretches-back-20-years-former-trooper-says.
286 Scott J. Croteau, Were Mass. State Police Troopers in OT Scandal Told to Fill Ticket Quotas? Agency Denies New Allegation in Federal Court Filing , M ASS. L IVE (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/03/were-mass-state-police-troopers-in-ot- scandal-told-to-fill-ticket-quotas-agency-denies-new-allegation-in-federal-court-filing.html. 287 Id.
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various embezzlement-related charges. 288 Quotas were a motivating factor in the overtime scheme. According to one of the Department of Justice’s sentencing announcements, the officers “admitted that they had been paid for hours they did not work, and for overtime shifts from which they left early.”
289 The scheme was so elaborate that the
federal judge directed prosecutors to revisit whether the parties should be charged with conspiracy.
290
Elsewhere, quota-based policing has led officers to plant crack on innocent people, 291 lazily dump summonses on clearly abandoned cars,292 cite fictitious drivers, 293 and ticket dead people. 294 Such mal- feasance is not only in the domain of individual decisionmaking but can shape organizational culture. Police supervisors who require officers to meet quotas are also beholden to numbers in ways that encourage the aforementioned forms of misconduct.
295 The absence of
empirical scholarship on quota-based shirking, coupled with the exis- 288 See, e.g. , U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Mass., Former Massachusetts State Trooper Sentenced to Three Months in Prison for Overtime Fraud (Mar. 26, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-massachusetts-state-trooper-sentenced-three-months- prison-overtime-fraud.
289 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office: District of Mass., Two Massachusetts State Troopers Sentenced in Overtime Abuse Investigation (June 4, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/two-massachusetts-state-troopers-sentenced-overtime-abuse- investigation.
290 Matt Rocheleau, Judge Orders Federal Prosecutors to Explore Whether State Police OT Scandal Was a ‘Conspiracy ,’ BOS. G LOBE (Jan. 30, 2020, 3:45 PM), https:// www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/30/metro/judge-wolf-orders-federal-prosecutors-explore- whether-state-police-overtime-scandal-was-conspiracy.
291 See Oren Yaniv, Ex-Cop Jason Arbeeny Cries for Judge, Gets Probation; Judge Gustin Reichbach Could Have Given Him 4 Years , N.Y. D AILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), https:// www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ex-cop-jason-arbeeny-cries-judge-probation-judge-gustin- reichbach-4-years-article-1.1016083; Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, Former NYPD Detective Testifies that Police Regularly Plant Drugs on Innocent People to Meet Arrest Quota (Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2011/10/former-nypd-detective- testifies-police-regularly-plant-drugs-innocent-people-meet-arres; Jim Dwyer, The Drugs? They Came from the Police , N.Y. T
IMES (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/
14/nyregion/those-drugs-they-came-from-the-police.html. 292 ELIZABETH R EUSS-IANNI, T WO C ULTURES OF P OLICING: S TREET C OPS AND MANAGEMENT COPS 112 (1983).
293 Tom Jackman, Md. Trooper Wrote DWI Tickets to Fictitious Drivers, Pleads Guilty to Perjury, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020, 6:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/ 2020/08/06/md-trooper-wrote-dwi-tickets-fictitious-drivers-pleads-guilty-perjury. 294 Paul Pizzuto, Ex-NYPD Officer, Says He Ticketed Dead People to Meet Quotas , HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2012, 11:17 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/paul-pizzuto-ex- nypd-officer-ticketed-dead-people-quotas_n_1864310.
295 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It , 67 U.

COLO. L. R EV. 1037, 1044 n.32 (1996) (“[P]olice supervisors, driven by the same crime control and quota pressures that drive field officers, actively encourage testilying.”). 102 | Page

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tence of widespread evidence of police corruption, 296 leads to the rea- sonable conclusion that these requirements do not incentivize diligent policing and instead contribute to the scourge of wrongful convictions.
297

2. Arbitrariness
Arbitrariness and inattention to quality foil the expectation that quotas will enhance police productivity. It bears noting that how one measures productivity depends on how one envisions the function of police. The purpose of law enforcement is usually tied to standard conceptions of crime control, public safety, and private property pro- tection. But many critics of the criminal justice system attribute other, less uplifting goals, to the police, including enforcement of the racial order and oversight of the poor. There is much evidence to support the latter understanding.
298 However, this Section’s analysis will pro-
ceed, for argument’s sake, with the former, good-faith conception of the police.

Even assuming that police serve the socially beneficial purpose of protecting life and property, numbers will not be completely impeach- able and have a role in how this division of government is evaluated.

But per se quotas are blunt objects that do not neatly get at public 296 See IVKOVIC, supra note 116; Rudovsky, supra note 116; Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions , 90 W ASH. U. L. R EV. 1133, 1133 (2013); Carroll Seron, Joseph Pereira & Jean Kovath, Judging Police Misconduct: “Street-Level” Versus Professional Policing , 38 L. & S OC’Y R EV. 665 (2004) (surveying New York City residents’ accounts of instances where police officers engaged in prohibited behavior such as use of unnecessary force and abuse of authority).
297 See JESSICA S. HENRY, SMOKE BUT NO FIRE: CONVICTING THE INNOCENT OF CRIMES THAT N EVER H APPENED 66 (2020) (“Quotas result in no-crime wrongful convictions because they motivate the police to arrest people for crimes that never happened and cause innocent people to plead guilty [to them] so they can go home.”). 298 See, e.g. ,P AUL B UTLER, C HOKEHOLD: P OLICING B LACK M EN (2017); S ALLY E.

HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LA W AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS (2001); ALEXES HARRIS, A P OUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016); T ALITHA L. L EFLOURIA, C HAINED IN S ILENCE: B LACK W OMEN AND CONVICT L ABOR IN THE N EW S OUTH (2015); A LEXANDRA N ATAPOFF,P UNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES A MERICA M ORE U NEQUAL (2018); A NDREA J. R ITCHIE, I NVISIBLE N O M ORE:

POLICE V IOLENCE A GAINST B LACK W OMEN AND W OMEN OF C OLOR (2017); L O¨IC WACQUANT, P UNISHING THE P OOR: T HE N EOLIBERAL G OVERNMENT OF S OCIAL INSECURITY (2009); NEIL WEBSDALE, POLICING THE POOR: FROM SLAVE PLANTATION TO PUBLIC H OUSING (2001); Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution , 104 A M. J. S OC. (1999).
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safety. Scholars and legislative supporters have noted their arbitrari- ness,299 but there is more to unearth.

The arbitrariness of police quotas is highlighted by their overin- clusive and underinclusive nature. Unreasonably high quotas can extract officers’ time and prevent them from addressing more serious threats that, if attended to, could lead to greater public safety bene- fits.
300 When quotas are low, as supporters claim, public safety bene- fits are questionable.301 A quota of two arrests every six weeks led one cop to offer the following query: “Suppose the officer makes two arrests the first two weeks? What does he do the next four?” 302 If the
productivity rationale governs, the officer could technically coast.

Ultimately, the productivity defense for quotas is rife with incoher- ence. It can be irresponsive to public safety by serving as a distraction from more serious criminal wrongdoing. This rationale can also be insensitive to public safety by only scratching the surface of illegality and allowing officers to satisfy a minimal threshold quota that may not correspond with actual criminal offending.

3. Thin Evaluations
It is undeniable that law enforcement leadership needs some method to evaluate officers, but quotas are subpar instruments for such assessments. Critics of quotas inside and outside of law enforce- ment have taken the laziness rationale and deployed it against super- visors, with one online commenter arguing that “[q]uotas are management’s lazy attempt to make a very few lazy employees pick up the pace.”
303 But a simpler, less loaded critique is available: Quotas poorly capture the qualitative dimensions of policing and misguidedly 299 See, e.g., Bronstein, supra note 21, at 545; Mitch Smith, New Law Bans Police Use of Ticket Quotas , C HI. T RIB. (June 16, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm- 2014-06-16-chi-quinn-signs-into-law-bill-banning-police-ticket-quota-20140615-story.html (noting support for Illinois’s quota statute and quoting one legislator who stated, “Arbitrary quotas on the number of tickets that have to be issued by police officers undermines the public trust in the police departments’ priorities . . . [b]y eliminating these quotas, we can restore that trust and ensure that police officers are free to do their job protecting the public”).
300 David I. Dewar, Goal Displacement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 196 (David Andrew Schultz & James A. Beverly eds., 2004). 301 See id.
302 Athelia Knight & Benjamin L. Weiser, Street Cops , W ASH. P OST (July 12, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/07/12/street-cops/68359866-8b67- 4514-a6a2-3aa39b4a1b38.
303 Stephen Cain, Comment to Ticket Quota for Ypsilanti Police Officers Is Illegal, Arbitrator Finds , A NN A RBOR N EWS (Feb. 5, 2010, 6:04 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/ news/ticket-quota-for-ypsilanti-police-officers-is-illegal-arbitrator-finds. 104 | Page

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privilege quantity. The insights of criminologist Malcolm Sparrow are helpful here. Professor Sparrow writes:

Some departments set targets for functional outputs, including enforcement activities such as arrests, stops, searches and traffic citations. This . . . should never be the default position or become normal practice. If you want quality work from a carpenter, it makes no sense to demand that he or she drill a certain number of holes or hammer a quota of nails. The essence of craftsmanship involves mastery of all the tools and the ability to select among them based on a clear understanding of the specific task in hand.

Functional quotas make little sense in this context.
304
The obsession with quantity sacrifices a long list of qualitative con- cerns that are relevant to policing, namely good judgment, fairness, reasonableness, and legality.
305 Defenders of quotas may point to stat-
utes that prohibit exclusive consideration of citations and arrests and require evaluations to be holistic. Nevertheless, the constellation of case law, settlements, officer testimony, and media accounts described in this Article suggests that, at a bare minimum, holistic evaluation of police is not a typical practice.
306
304 Sparrow, supra note 34, at 18.
305 Id. at 18–20; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“For the purposes of performance review, an unconstitutional stop is no less valuable to an officer’s career than a constitutional one—because the two are indistinguishable.”); Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why it Matters , 54 W M. & MARY
L. REV. 1865, 1875–80 (2013) (describing rightful policing, which focuses on the fairness of police conduct, as opposed to the traditional emphases on lawful or efficient policing). The obsession with numbers is not unique to policing: Scholars have criticized how prosecutors, too, overemphasize convictions and their win-loss records at the expense of fair criminal justice outcomes. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. P
A. L. REV. 959, 992, 987 (2009) (suggesting that “prosecutors view their jobs as maximizing convictions” and, along the lines of Professor Sparrow, noting how “conviction statistics ignore other important outcomes, such as declinations, sentences, and victim satisfaction”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law , 61 S TAN. L. R EV. 869, 883
(2009) (“Prosecutors may feel the need to be able to point to a record of convictions and long sentences if they want to be promoted or to land high-powered jobs outside the government.”); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, 23 C
RIM. J UST. 24, 28 (2008) (remarking that most of the prosecutors the author, a criminal procedure scholar and former director of the D.C. Public Defender Service, engaged with “seemed to focus almost exclusively on securing convictions, without consideration of whether a conviction would result in the fairest or most satisfactory result for the accused or even the victim”).
306 STAMPER, supra note 22, at 3 (“In fact, many supervisors believe that counting and recapping activity is the only way to evaluate police performance.”). 105 | Page

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4. Tradeoffs and Revenue-Based Defenses
Finally, it should go without saying that the police should not be tasked with generating revenue. Though such a normative claim may seem obvious, it chafes against the entrepreneurial realities of American policing. “Economic sanctions,” Beth Colgan explains, “constitute the most common form of punishment in the United States.”
307 If the profit-based defense of police quotas rests on a ques- tion of tradeoffs—that is, tickets allow localities to generate revenue when they cannot raise taxes—then the tradeoffs at least need to be named and assessed.

Fortunately, empiricists are beginning to name the costs of for- profit policing. Many of their studies focus on the disproportionate racial effects of policing for profit.
308 But even when measured only in
terms of the public-safety purpose of policing, quotas come with con- siderable costs. Rebecca Goldstein and her colleagues have studied how municipal reliance on fees, fines, and forfeitures, as opposed to taxes, produce “undesirable outcomes that may not have been antici- pated by policymakers aiming simply to cover a revenue shortfall.” 309
Relying on census data that collected the revenue and expenditure data of approximately 90,000 local governments, they found that real- locating police resources to money-generating activity was “associated with neglect of other important police functions, namely, the investi- gation of violent crimes.”
310 This revenue-based orientation ultimately
“compromises their ability to perform their traditional functions.” 311 According to the study, a one percent increase in the share of reve- nues from fees, fines, and forfeitures is associated with a 3.7 per- 307 Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform , 69 DUKE L.J. 1529, 1537 (2020).
308 See generally , Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments , 56 URB. A FFS. R EV. 1132 (2020); Allison P. Harris, Elliott Ash & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Fiscal Pressures and Discriminatory Policing: Evidence from Traffic Stops in Missouri , 5 J. RACE, ETHNICITY, & P OL. 450 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10; Kelsey Shoub, Leah Christiani, Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kevin Roach, Fines, Fees, Forfeitures, and Disparities: A Link Between Municipal Reliance on Fines and Racial Disparities in Policing, 0 P OL’Y STUD. J. 1 (Aug. 7, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12412. 309 Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service , 56 U RB. A FFS. R EV. 5, 24 (2018); see also Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations? , 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 510 (2009) (finding in empirical study that “the likelihood and dollar amounts of fines [for speeding tickets] are decreasing functions of local property tax revenue” and also that “the likelihood of receiving a speeding fine is higher in towns that are in a fiscal crunch caused by a rejected increase in the property tax limit”).
310 Id.
311 Id.
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centage point decrease in the clearance rate for violent crimes. 312 Economist Anna Harvey has similarly concluded that “fiscal incen- tives can distort the allocation of law enforcement effort[s]” in ways that have distributional consequences for public safety. 313 Notwith-
standing empirical work that highlights the compromising cost of profit-based policing, there are a host of other constituent-specific problems with police quotas.

C. Additional Objections
It is essential to not let defenses of quotas and counterarguments to them totally consume how quotas are understood. This subsection offers a series of additional reasons why quotas constitute lousy policy. To highlight the unique possibility for building consensus on prohibiting quotas, this subsection focuses specifically on three con- stituents: law enforcement, the general public, and racial minorities.

1. Law Enforcement Objections
Police officers and police unions have been some of the most prominent opponents of quotas. Two criticisms often offered by unions stand out. The first concerns how quotas curtail the discretion of officers.
314 Patrick Lynch, head of the Police Benevolent
Association, the police union for the NYPD, has been vocal on this issue. In an op-ed that was relatively dismissive of the racial dimen- sions of police-citizen encounters, Lynch argued that quotas were the source of New York City’s policing woes.
315 Such requirements, he
complained, “risk turning officers into automatons.” 316 The Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, which supported Illinois’s quota statute, echoes a similar sentiment on its website, stating that “[q]uotas turn police officers into tax collection machines instead of 312 Id.
313 Anna Harvey, Fiscal Incentives in Law Enforcement , 22 A M. L. & E CON. REV. 173, 173 (2020). In his support for Illinois’s statute, Chicago State Senator Bill Cunningham relevantly noted, “Policing should not be used as a revenue enhancement strategy by municipalities. . . . Officers will no longer be distracted from their regular law enforcement duties in order to meet ticket quotas.” See Cunningham Bill Signed into Law , B EVERLY
REV. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.beverlyreview.net/news/community_news/ article_618a47fe-aae8-11e8-9a28-872a66178e5c.html; see also Michael D. Makowsky, Thomas Stratmann & Alex Tabarrok, To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (2019) (finding in empirical study “that revenue-driven law enforcement can distort police behavior and decision- making, . . . altering the quantity, type, and racial composition of arrests”). 314 See Bronstein, supra note 21, at 550.
315 Patrick J. Lynch, The Real Fix for Stop-and-Frisk , N.Y. D AILY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013, 4:20 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/real-fix-stop-and-frisk-article-1.1476893. 316 Id.
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professional law enforcement officers. It distracts police officers in the exercise of their day-to-day law enforcement activities.” 317 Quotas are legal in Arizona, but the Tucson Police Officers Association has advocated for a statutory prohibition. Jason Winsky, government affairs director for the union, declared, “We’re just philo- sophically opposed to any kind of quota . . . . It’s a morale issue for us because the officer no longer has discretion.”
318 In Washington, where
quotas are also legal, retired Spokane police officer and Washington State Senator Jeff Holy sponsored a bill prohibiting the practice. 319
For Holy, “[a]n officer’s ability to make an independen[t] decision allows them to apply the level of enforcement action they believe to be appropriate for the situation. An officer being directed to apply enforcement action to comply with an employer policy or ticket quota reflects badly on law enforcement.”
320 These discretion-based objec-
tions are organized around the belief that quotas lead officers to be ruled by numbers instead of common-sense judgment.

Curtailed discretion bleeds into the second major criticism offered by police: that quotas limit the scope of their work. This cri- tique works in two different directions. On one end is a concern that quotas prevent officers from attending to more serious crimes. Quan- titative studies of law enforcement priorities lend support to this idea.
321 On the other end is a concern that quotas disincentivize police from engaging in socially beneficial activity that is less penal and harder to quantify. “If I break up a fight between two boys and send them home, I don’t get credit,” an officer explained.
322 “If I help
deliver a baby in an emergency, I get no credit. But I score points if I issue a seat belt summons . . . .”
323
When quotas distract from serious crimes and preclude the osten- sible services that law enforcement holds itself out as offering (officers 317 Brenda Schory, New Law to End Ticket Quotas; Locally, Most Local Police Agencies Say They Never Had Them Anyway , K ANE C NTY. C HRON. (July 31, 2014, 10:48 PM), https://www.kcchronicle.com/2014/07/29/new-law-to-end-ticket-quotas-most-local-police- agencies-say-they-never-had-them-anyway/afzdt5z.
318 Yoohyun Jung, Police Union Calls for Elimination of Traffic-Ticket Quota , A RIZ.

DAILY S TAR (Oct. 9, 2014), https://tucson.com/news/blogs/police-beat/police-union-calls- for-elimination-of-traffic-ticket-quota/article_2cde50a7-10a0-5e18-8908- 7335510ce811.html.
319 New WA Bill Would Discourage Traffic-Ticket Quotas for Officers , MYNORTHWEST (Feb. 17, 2020, 2:44 PM), https://mynorthwest.com/1723060/ticket-quotas-officers- washington.
320 Senate Passes Holy Bill that Seeks to Discourage Traffic-Ticket Quotas for Officers , WASH. S TATE S ENATE R EPUB. C AUCUS (Feb. 17, 2020) (emphasis added), https:// jeffholy.src.wastateleg.org/tag/sen-jeff-holy.
321 See supra text accompanying notes 309–13.
322 POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, supra note 14, at 3.
323 Id.
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pledge to protect and serve), the nature of police work narrows, and public safety is compromised. Of course, quotas are not diametrically opposed to public safety, but they create scenarios where the public safety objective is deprioritized. Adherence to quotas leads police officers to be more concerned about obtaining a reward or avoiding a penalty.
324 Many officers are unbothered by this state of affairs and play the numbers game, but some disapprove. Their objections supply a powerful internal critique.

It is critical to understand that police unions are not typically torchbearers of criminal justice reform. In many ways, they have impeded reform.
325 As organizations tasked with ensuring optimal
work conditions for their members, union concerns about quotas are far from selfless. Officers who protest quotas in their individual capac- ities typically do so as a response to employment grievances rather than altruistic civil rights concerns. These sobering realities do not, however, mean that the police’s insights on quotas are bankrupt. In fact, their complaints are consonant with scholarly observations and warrant meaningful consideration.

2. Racial Vulnerability
Vulnerability to violent police encounters, and the racial subjuga- tion that has been a feature of policing, make racial minorities fore- seeable critics of quotas. This opposition is well warranted. Officers have confessed to using racial minorities to fulfill their quotas and pad their statistics.

In New Jersey, one officer described quota compliance as a sport that took place in minority communities. “Guys were going out. They were competing for how many tickets each guy could get,” he revealed.
326 “They’re saying they’re going out hunting. You go to traffic court and you see the impact. 90% of the people you see there are blacks and latinos.”
327 The practice of “hunting” occurred in New
York, too. In an affidavit in one of many cases involving police quotas, former NYPD officer Christopher LaForce said that he had decided 324 Molly Davis, Why the Utah Legislature Banned Police Quotas , LIBERTAS INST. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://libertasutah.org/op-eds/why-the-utah-legislature-banned-police-quotas. 325 See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions? , 120 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1333, 1340–46 (2020) (describing the critiques of police unions); Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions , 85 G EO. W ASH. L. R EV. 712, 747–56 (2017) (discussing how police unions have been obstacles to criminal justice reform); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts , 66 D UKE L.J. 1191, 1191 (2017) (arguing that internal disciplinary procedures developed by police unions during the collective bargaining process can hinder criminal justice reform).
326 Wallace, supra note 44.
327 Id.
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to retire because of the fatigue that quota-inspired racial profiling induced. “I got tired of hunting Black and Hispanic people because of arrest quotas,” he complained.
328 In addition to civilians, quotas also
impact minority officers. These officials, who some hold out as a solu- tion to racist policing, are sometimes forced to comply with a practice that facilitates discrimination and jeopardizes police relations with minority communities.
329 Additional empirical evidence suggests that
minorities bear the brunt of the kinds of revenue-based policing that sometimes informs quota regimes.

On the federal level, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has long had formal arrest quotas that impact the undocu- mented population and the predominantly Latinx community that is subject to ICE raids.
330 The Department of Justice’s investigation into
the City of Ferguson led it to conclude that “[F]erguson’s police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias,” and specifically recommended that the Ferguson Police Department “[p]rohibit the use of ticketing and arrest quotas, whether formal or informal.”
331
The vulnerability of racial minorities to being targeted by quotas can lead to unnecessary, and sometimes violent, contact with the police. Recall that South Carolina passed its quota statute in response to a police officer’s killing of Walter Scott, an unarmed Black man.

The defense team argued that the encounter stemmed from the officer’s attempt to fulfill his department-mandated quota of three minor violations every shift.
332 A desire to decrease unnecessary
police and citizen contact also motivated Tennessee’s recent quota 328 Joseph Goldstein & Ashley Southall, ‘I Got Tired of Hunting Black and Hispanic People,’ N.Y. T IMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/nyregion/nyc- police-subway-racial-profiling.html.
329 See id. ; CRIME + P UNISHMENT, supra note 68; Sklansky, supra note 259 (discussing how the diversification of police departments affects their relationships with the communities they serve).
330 See Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (D. Conn. 2010); Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids , 89 N.C. L. R EV. 507, 560–61 (2011); Michael J.

O’Brien, “Widespread” Uncertainty: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil-Removal Proceedings , 81 U. C HI. L. R EV. 1883, 1898–99 (2014).
331 Ferguson Report, supra note 17, at 2, 91.
332 Cynthia Roldan, Ticket Quota Limit Proposal for Law Enforcement Heads for Senate Floor, P OST & C OURIER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/ticket- quota-limit-proposal-for-law-enforcement-heads-for-senate/article_14f44c11-d0f2-57c0- 91b1-69b23bd536c8.html.
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statute,333 which levies criminal fines on law enforcement officials who impose quotas.334
A pause is necessary here, lest causal mechanisms get confused.

Quotas do not cause police brutality and killings. Rogue officers and legal cultures of impunity are better explanations. But quotas can create the conditions for violent or even lethal interactions. Quotas figured prominently in an almost 200-page decision where a federal judge painstakingly described how the NYPD maintained a racist stop-and-frisk policy that flouted constitutional rules. 335 That policy
encouraged officers to “crush the fucking city,” and indiscriminately stop Black and Latinx people without any legal reason because they “‘can always articulate’ some basis for a stop after the fact.” 336 Testi-
monies given to the Center for Constitutional Rights, which litigated the Floyd case, described how stops often resulted in excessive use of force by police against minorities who were slapped, thrown against walls, tasered, and brutalized.

Moreover, quotas subject racial minorities to police interactions that are often devoid of legal remedies and exacerbate their marginal- ization. Devon Carbado’s insights into the relationship between racial vulnerability and police misconduct are clarifying. “The more vulner- able a group is to predatory policing, the greater that group’s police contact and thus the greater the exposure to the possibility of vio- lence.”
337 Such predation “trades on and compounds the marginaliza- tion of an already marginalized group” and “facilitates police violence by increasing the frequency [of minority contact] with the police.” 338
An intersectional analysis further reveals how quotas exacerbate social inequality and make marginalized groups easy targets for police misconduct. Women of color, low-income people, and members of the LGBTQ community are particularly susceptible to being targeted by quota-fulfilling police officers. Police whistleblower Adhyl Polanco explains:
[W]hen you go hunting, when you put any type of numbers on a police officer to perform, we are going to go for the most vulner- able. Of course, we’re going to go for the LGBT community, we’re 333 See Arnold, supra note 95.
334 Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub. Acts, https://publications.tnsosfiles. com/acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf.
335 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 336 Id. at 598–99.
337 Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing , 85 UMKC L. R EV. 545, 561 (2017). 338 Id.
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going to the black community, we’re going to those that have no vote, that have no power. 339
Quotas exacerbate social vulnerability and make marginalized groups easy targets for police misconduct. When set against the larger context of police corruption, the predatory nature of quotas demonstrates why the practice constitutes bad policy.

3. The General Significance of Quotas
Police quotas should concern the general population. Some people may be undisturbed or feel unaffected by the problems police quotas invite either because they occupy a demographic group that is not a posterchild for mass incarceration or because they imagine themselves as law-abiding and invulnerable to quota-based policing.

Criminal law theorist Doug Husak invites skepticism of such beliefs.
340 He observes that “[o]ffenses are so far-reaching that almost everyone has committed one or more at some time or another; the criminal law no longer distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them.’” 341 Going a step
further, Professor Husak estimates that “over 70% of living adult Americans have committed an imprisonable offense at some point in their life.”
342 Thus, the average person should be concerned about
quotas because they likely engage in activities that come under the purview of this kind of policing.

Quotas can also lead to routine violations of constitutional rights and civil liberties. An officer who is forced to comply with a quota “will find it difficult to be sympathetic to procedural due process guidelines which stand in the way of filling his quota.” 343 In addition
to due process issues, quotas invite equal protection problems, impli- cate Fourth Amendment issues related to unconstitutional police stops, and raise First Amendment concerns involving a police officer’s ability to speak out about quotas without fear of retaliation. Constitu- tional problems with quotas have arisen in large, diverse metropolitan areas like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles as well as small cities like Mount Enterprise, Texas (with a population of approximately 450 339 Sarah Wallace, More NYPD Officers Say There’s Proof of Quota-Driven Arrests , NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2016, 8:48 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nypd-officers- arrest-quota-exclusive-interview-pressure-numbers.
340 See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24 (2008).
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 A M. J. C RIM. L. 25, 31 (1978).
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people) and racially homogenous states like Utah (approximately ninety percent white). 344
James Spadola, a former Delaware officer who has advocated for anti-quota legislation in his state, argues that “quotas transform civil- ians into a performance measure and potential arrest statistic, as opposed to an American with constitutional rights and protections that should be served and protected by the police.”
345 The availability
of more sanitized euphemisms (e.g., performance standards, targets, activity) and the lack of rigorous investigations into quotas keep the general public from realizing how common they are in law enforce- ment. In a country that is only beginning to understand the problems of over-policing, quotas are a poorly understood practice that compro- mise an already fragile body of constitutional law.

For conservatives and liberals who believe that the police serve a public safety function, quotas are distortive and jeopardize the legiti- macy of law enforcement. These distortive features may be of partic- ular concern to law-and-order conservatives. John Eterno, a criminologist who spent two decades as an officer and retired as a captain in the NYPD, explains how quotas pervert police goals in his book The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation . 346
Eterno and his co-author Eli Silverman (also a criminologist) argue that quotas encourage police to focus on less difficult crimes “at the expense of more significant and arduous arrests.”
347 In a society
where consensual crimes like drug trafficking leave no discernible complainant, murders often go unsolved, sexual assault is underre- ported, and white-collar crimes go unpunished. This should be a cause of concern for fiscal conservatives, law-and-order advocates, and sup- porters of victims’ rights.

Deeper questions of legitimacy also abound, as quotas undermine liberal concerns about procedural justice and the rule of law. Laurie Robinson, who was responsible for developing recommendations after the Department of Justice’s Ferguson investigation, explained how quotas and numbers-policing can shape public opinion: “If citizens believe that tickets are being issued or arrests are being made for rea- 344 Mount Enterprise, Texas Population 2020 , W ORLD P OPULATION R EV., https:// worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/mount-enterprise-tx-population (last visited Jan. 9, 2020); Utah Population 2020 , W ORLD P OPULATION R EV., https://worldpopulationreview. com/states/utah-population (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 345 James Spadola, Delaware Should Ban Police Quotas , D EL. O NLINE (July 28, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2017/07/28/ delaware-should-ban-police-quotas-james-spadola/519661001. 346 JOHN A. E TERNO & E LI B. S ILVERMAN, T HE C RIME N UMBERS G AME:

MANAGEMENT BY MANIPULATION (2017); see also Bronstein, supra note 21, at 555–56. 347 ETERNO & S ILVERMAN, supra note 346, at 11.
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sons other than the goal of law enforcement,” she contends, “then their trust in the legitimacy of the system is really eroded.” 348 Others have echoed this view. 349 As liberal reformers and some conservative allies work to repair a criminal justice system riddled with imperfec- tions, they need to address how quotas influence internal enforcement priorities and shape public conceptions of fairness.

Skeptics of incremental criminal justice reform—a group in which I find membership—may believe that reforming the practice of police quotas fails to confront the incorrigible nature of American policing.

The strongest version of this critique would likely come from aboli- tionists who resist reformist reforms that tinker at the edges of the criminal justice system, as opposed to non-reformist reforms, which “have as their end goal the eventual dismantling of that system and are understood to be individual elements or steps in a larger strategy of structural transformation.”
350 This is a valid concern. Eliminating
police quotas cannot solve the problems of white supremacy and pov- erty management that are central to the criminal justice system, but there are at least three reasons why abolitionists and radicals should care about police quotas. These reasons are theoretical, tactical, and temporal.

First, addressing the problem of quotas can be an important interim step toward reducing the imprint of the penal state, which is one goal of abolitionism.
351 Enforcing quota statutes and stamping out
the practice elsewhere could shift the police away from understanding civilians as “stats to be harvested” and reduce unnecessary police encounters.
352 Taken one step forward, addressing quotas could also turn out to be especially necessary if the previously unorthodox, but increasingly recognizable, goal of defunding the police is achieved. 353
There is a strong reason to believe, based on the Camden example, 348 Joel Rose, Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based Policing Lingers , NPR (Apr. 4, 2015, 4:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/despite-laws-and-lawsuits- quota-based-policing-lingers.
349 See Smith, supra note 299; Jonathan Banks, Thing Blue Lies: How Pretextual Stops Undermine Police Legitimacy , 66 C ASE W. R SRV. L. R EV. 931 (2016). 350 Marina Bell, Abolition: A New Paradigm for Reform , L AW & S OC. I NQUIRY 1, 14 (2000).
351 See, e.g. , Abolition Can’t Wait , 8 TO A BOLITION, https://www.8toabolition.com/why (last visited Jan. 9, 2020); Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, What Abolitionists Do, J ACOBIN (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolition- reform-mass-incarceration.
352 The Big Reason Tampa Police Write So Many Tickets: They’re Told To , TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/theres-a-big- reason-tampa-police-write-so-many-tickets/2252912.
353 See Peter Simek, What ‘Defunding’ the Dallas Police Department Could Look Like , D MAG. (June 12, 2020, 11:14 AM), https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2020/06/what- defunding-the-dallas-police-department-could-look-like. 114 | Page

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that quotas could become more prominent in police forces with reduced personnel.354
Finally, quotas speak directly to an emerging discourse about the purpose of police. As this Article has shown, quota-based policing applies sharp pressure to common-sense assumptions about the public safety, crime-fighting conception of law enforcement. Attacking quotas—which have demonstrable connections to financial exploita- tion and racial subjugation—is at least consonant with the abolitionist insistence on rethinking punishment and reimagining the state’s rela- tionship to vulnerable communities and the general population.

IV
N

ORMATIVE PATHS FORWARD
What is one to do with these descriptive and definitional insights? This Part offers some recommendations on how to curb police quotas.

Before beginning, I want to stress two things. First, any solution to the problem of police quotas cannot be strictly legal. A gauntlet of obsta- cles—white supremacy,
355 some jurisdictions’ narcotic addiction to
profit-based policing, 356 judicial hostility to the enforcement of civil rights in federal courts, 357 and many others—are too mountainous for any set of neat positive law or policy prescriptions. Any attempt to curb quotas must be multi-pronged and multi-disciplinary.

Second, I do not try to propose better mechanisms for evaluating or incentivizing the police. I resist that normative move because it has already been taken up by criminologists
358 but more importantly
because strategies for better policing dangerously invert the analysis.

Almost half of American states have legislatively determined that police quotas are impermissible, and a few others have pending bills.

The crucial normative issues are not about substitute incentives or evaluation metrics, but instead about how existing statutory schemes can be improved and how they can be introduced to jurisdictions that have not yet recognized the imprudence of police quotas. 354 See supra text accompanying notes 177–88; Fussell, supra note 31; Rushin & Michalski, supra note 30.
355 See FBI, W HITE S UPREMACIST I NFILTRATION OF L AW E NFORCEMENT 4 (2006), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf; Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and What to Do About It , 23 LEWIS & C LARK L. R EV. 205, 211 (2019).
356 See Maciag, supra note 5.
357 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
358 See Sparrow, supra note 34; NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING 15–20 (2020); G UL & O’C ONNELL, supra note 13, at 51–98. 115 | Page

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A. A Prospective Research Program
Legal scholars must scrutinize police quotas as a critical compo- nent of the criminal justice system and as a practice that interacts with other areas of law. Police quotas matter because they animate and intersect with issues that legal scholars wrestle with, wrangle over, and consider to be fundamental to ideas about quality and justice. Tradi- tionally, legal scholars have relinquished the study of quotas to crimi- nologists who have a different set of intellectual interests and commitments. Instead of engaging directly with quotas, legal scholars have either overlooked them, subsumed them within other categories (e.g., broken windows policing), or given no more than pat acknowl- edgment of their existence. This Article supplies a framework for understanding how police quotas work, how they are defended, and why they are indefensible, but these formulations are only initial steps.

The demonstrated existence of police quotas abrades core under- standings of criminal law and constitutional procedure. What does it mean when criminalization is not a product of wrongdoing, but is instead spawned by police attempts to thwart employment sanctions or garner occupational rewards? On the procedural side, the existence of race-based police quotas has been verified by federal courts, police officers, and sponsors of legislative prohibitions. How can this reality be reconciled with our country’s frail Equal Protection jurispru- dence
359 or with an exception-riddled Fourth Amendment 360 that makes satisfying quotas at the expense of minorities fairly straightforward?
For civil rights scholars, litigation involving police quotas high- lights the disparity between actual government practices and stingy judicial interpretations of what constitutes a custom or policy under § 1983. Civilians are not the only aggrieved subjects of quota-based policing. Most of the relevant statutes are about work conditions.

Criminal justice scholars are increasingly devoting their attention to labor law and employment law, and police quotas fit neatly into such considerations.
361 Examining the issue of police quotas may provide a
new entry point into thinking about live controversies in criminal jus- tice administration and civil rights more generally.
359 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection , 68 S TAN. L. R EV. 151, 154 (2016) (discussing how “the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection Clause”).
360 See RIC S IMMONS, S MART S URVEILLANCE: H OW TO I NTERPRET THE F OURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 174 (2019).
361 See supra text accompanying note 324.
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Quotas also showcase intragovernmental tensions that matter to local government law scholars and legislative experts. In states where they are prohibited, law enforcement leadership often imposes quotas to demonstrate productivity.
362 Scholars who study how governments
work could provide fruitful insights on how to enforce anti-quota stat- utes and how to counteract pathologies that stand in the way. Tax law scholars could also help clarify the relationship between local tax policy and policing for profit—which often serves as a substitute for increased taxing.
363 Police quotas are often the mechanisms for such
“taxation by citation” 364 and make critical tax law scholars relevant interlocutors.365
Outstanding empirical questions remain. Besides litigation out- comes and settlements, scholars and the general public do not have any empirical data on the efficacy of quota statutes. It would be helpful to know how jurisdictions with prohibitions compare to juris- dictions where quotas are permissible. Scholars should examine how prohibitions affect a jurisdiction’s incidence of police misconduct, the size of its misdemeanor docket, clearance rates, its reliance on legal financial obligations (e.g., fees and fines), and the satisfaction of its citizens. The results could help shed light on issues specific to criminal justice as well as broader questions at the intersection of law and inequality.

B. Investigative Agendas and Public Awareness
The media should continue to play an important role in uncov- ering and publicizing the existence of police quotas. As Justice Brennan correctly observed, “[c]ommentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citi- zens concerned with the administration of government.”
366 Interest-
ingly, Justice Brennan’s comments were in a decision that involved media reporting on a murder trial. This felony-centric, trial-oriented understanding of criminal justice does not represent the bulk of cases 362 See NATAPOFF, supra note 298, at 59.
363 See supra notes 308, 312; Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources , 79 J. P OLITICS 1090 (2017).
364 DICK M. CARPENTER, KYLE SWEETLAND & JENNIFER MCDONALD, INST. FOR JUST., THE PRICE OF TAXATION BY CITATION 5 (2019), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ Taxation-by-Citation-FINAL-USE.pdf.
365 See Nancy J. Knauer, Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform? , 9 NW. J.L. & S OC.

POL’Y 206, 254 (2014); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2008) (discussing the concept of tax equity and its applications). 366 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976). 117 | Page

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that are currently churned through the system. Slapdash misdemeanor processing better approximates the criminal justice system. 367 Never- theless, Justice Brennan’s observations maintain relevance. Journalism still “contribute[s] to the public’s understanding of . . . the . . . criminal justice system” and can address some of its failures.
368
The task of local news outlets and investigative journalists is to look beyond trials and examine police conduct and practices. This is not a simple task, but our current political climate is ripe for such scrutiny. First, many news outlets are increasingly reexamining their longstanding fidelity to police accounts. They are more willing to dis- believe how police describe criminal justice administration. 369 This
reconsideration is undoubtedly influenced by social protest move- ments and video evidence of brutality that often contradicts initial police accounts. This journalistic skepticism should apply to the long- standing insistence of police leaders that they do not administer quotas despite evidence suggesting otherwise.
370 Second, the current
legal landscape will also enable journalistic investigation into police quotas. The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, which generally does not protect officers from retaliation if they object to quotas in their employee capacity, essentially funnels their speech into the public sphere. Many of the litigated quota cases involve officers who leaked information to the media.
371 Finally, the general public’s
increasing recognition of the bias and brutality of American law enforcement is creating space for a more receptive audience to jour- nalistic accounts of police quotas.
372
Local news, mainstream media, and nonprofit investigative reporters are well-situated to more robustly examine police quotas. In places like Charleston, Rhode Island, and Damascus, Arkansas, media reporting on police quotas have led to the ACLU sending letters to all 367 NATAPOFF, supra note 298 at 218 (describing the misdemeanor process, which represents the bulk of criminal justice cases, as “sloppy, inaccurate, unpredictable and disrespectful”).
368 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587.
369 See Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, Journalists Are Reexamining Their Reliance on a Longtime Source: The Police , WASH. P OST (June 30, 2020), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/journalists-are-reexamining-their-reliance-on-a- longtime-source-the-police/2020/06/30/303c929c-b63a-11ea-a510-55bf26485c93_story.html (discussing how some journalists are now unwilling to take the police’s account of events “at face value”).
370 See supra text accompanying notes 35, 240, 245.
371 See CRIME + P UNISHMENT, supra note 68; Rayman, supra note 120; Rayman, supra note 121; Rayman, supra note 122; Tracy Oppenheimer, Auburn Cop Fired for Resisting Quotas Gets Online Support; City Officials Deny Deny Deny , REASON (July 26, 2013, 10:45 AM), https://reason.com/2013/07/26/online-community-comes-to-whistle-blower. 372 See Cohn & Quealy, supra note 8.
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police chiefs in the state reminding them of the illegality of quotas 373 and the loss of the right to issue tickets, 374 respectively. Mainstream news outlets like the socialist Jacobin,375 the moderate New York Times,376 the libertarian Reason,377 and the conservative Washington Examiner378 have all reported on police quotas and done so in unfa- vorable terms. The same is true for criminal justice-specific outlets such as The Marshall Project 379 and The Appeal .380
All of these organizations have the infrastructure to probe how police quotas operate. They know how to gather difficult-to-obtain documents and data like evaluation reports that demonstrate the exis- tence of quotas and testimonial evidence.
381 Drawing from these
sources, the media can shape public understanding by giving coverage to officers and civilians who have persuasive evidence that they have been governed by or subject to police quotas. Since, as discussed in Part II, many allegations of police quotas do not make it to courts or get quietly settled, journalistic accounts can be crucial to encouraging policy changes or legislative reform.

Reporters can also probe the connections between quotas and other pathologies. In states that do not have prohibitions on quotas, journalists—armed with a deeper understanding of how quotas operate—could examine how this practice is tied to police misconduct, policing for profit, and racial profiling. In states that have legislated against police quotas, reporters should consider these requirements within the larger category of police corruption that has been of interest to journalists. Overall, the public has traditionally understood 373 Patrick Anderson, RI ACLU to Police Departments: Traffic Ticket Quotas Are Illegal, PROVIDENCE J. (Nov. 28, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/ 20171128/ri-aclu-to-police-departments-traffic-ticket-quotas-are-illegal. 374 Debra Hale-Shelton, Arkansas Town’s Bid to Lift Speed-Trap Sanctions Denied: Still Can’t Write Tickets , A RKANSAS D EMOCRAT-GAZETTE (May 17, 2018, 4:30 AM), https:// www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/may/17/damascus-bid-denied-still-can-t-write-t. 375 See Nick Tabor, The Mayor Who Cracked Down on Baltimore , J ACOBIN (May 14, 2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/05/omalley-baltimore-clinton-democratic- primary-president.
376 See Goldstein et al., supra note 309.
377 See Oppenheimer, supra note 371.
378 See Editorial, Arrests Should Be Based on Crimes, Not Quotas , W ASH. E XAMINER (June 6, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/editorial-arrests-should- be-based-on-crimes-not-quotas.
379 Ken Armstrong, How to Fix American Policing , MARSHALL PROJECT (July 13, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/13/how-to-fix-american-policing. 380 See George Joseph, NYPD Commander’s Text Messages Show How the Quota System Persists , A PPEAL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://theappeal.org/nypd-commanders-text- messages-show-how-the-quota-system-persists.
381 See DAVID CUILLIER & CHARLES N. DAVIS, THE ART OF ACCESS: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUIRING P UBLIC R ECORDS 114–26 (2011) (chronicling methods for handling evasive agency responses and noting the success of some news organizations’ tactics). 119 | Page

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the media as a government watchdog. 382 This oversight function is no different in the area of police quotas.

C. Statutory Reform
The remaining issues concern getting quota provisions enacted in states without them and improving existing statutes. Enacting new statutes is simultaneously straightforward and challenging. It is straightforward because bipartisan support has already helped get quota bills passed in many states and objections to police quotas have been made by interest groups across the ideological spectrum. At the same time, getting quota statutes on the books is not easy, as demon- strated by the nine states that have drafted bills but have not been able to convert them to enacted legislation; some of these bills were drafted more than a decade ago.
383 Police chiefs and politicians worry
that these bills will hamper their ability to evaluate officers. 384 The research and investigative agendas mentioned above could engender more public awareness, whereas intentional partnerships could move the legislative ball forward. South Carolina, Missouri, and Tennessee—all states that recently adopted statutes—did so by con- sidering and representing that quotas impacted a cross-section of diverse interests.
385
The other task is to shore up existing statutes. Most anti-quota laws have appreciable shortcomings, including ambiguity about whether they apply to informal requirements, and loopholes for stops and warnings. To this end, the Appendix includes the skeleton of a model statute addressing some of these shortcomings and collating the best features of existing legislation.
386 It is far from comprehensive
since this Article cannot supply answers to critical questions about future implementation. But, it is a starting point for statutory amend- ments as well as consideration of new anti-quota laws.

The model statute also proposes an additional provision that is not found in existing quota statutes and requires explanation: Pension forfeiture should be a consequence of violating the statute. This may 382 See JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 12 (2005).
383 See infra Appendix B.
384 See, e.g. , N.J. S TATE A SS’N OF C HIEFS OF P OLICE, L EGISLATIVE P OSITION P APER:

OPPOSITION TO S 1 1 0 5 / A 2 1 2 6 ( 2 0 1 6 ) , h t t p s : / / w w w . n j s a c o p . o r g / F i l e s / N J S A C O P % 20Position%20Paper%20-%20Opposition%20to%20S1105%20%20A2126.pdf (opposing amendments to state anti-quota law).
385 See supra Section I.B.
386 See infra Appendix C.
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sound like an extraordinary ramification. 387 But many states already have laws that either revoke, reduce, or suspend the pensions of public employees who have been convicted of a felony 388 or any crime related to their public employment. 389 West Virginia’s pension forfei- ture law is arguably the most liberal, simply stating that “honorable service is a condition to receiving any pension, annuity, disability pay- ment or any other benefit under a retirement plan.”
390 The efficacy of
quota statutes is still an open empirical question, but it is clear from the litigation discussed in Part II that police continue to implement police quotas even in states that prohibit them. Where judicial ave- nues for redress are limited, pension forfeiture can be a potential deterrent. The measure has been proposed by police abolitionists, 391
and economists have tentatively found that states with stronger pen- sion forfeiture laws experience lower rates of police misconduct. 392
Adding a pension forfeiture provision could add teeth to existing stat- utes and help stamp out stubborn police quotas.
387 James Jacobs and his colleagues have analyzed arguments for and against pension forfeiture and conclude that imprisonment and fines would be better sanctions. This suggestion might be subject to concerns about “progressive punitivism” that uses incarceration to advance social justice goals. Jacobs and his colleagues do suggest a model for pension revocation that would be less harsh than some states’ schemes. See James B.

Jacobs, Coleen Friel & Edward O’Callaghan, Pension Forfeiture: A Problematic Sanction for Public Corruption, 35 A
M. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 89–91 (1997); Hadar Aviram, Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends , 68 BUFF. L. R EV. 199, 201–02 (2020).
388 See, e.g. , 40 I LL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-156 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.13 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); O HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.192 (West, Westlaw through File 60 of 133d Gen. Assemb. 2019-2020); N.C.

GEN. STAT. ANN. § 135-18.10 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 389 MASS. GEN. LA WS ANN. ch. 32, § 15(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 226 of 2020 2d Ann. Sess.) (“In no event shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance.”); G
A. CODE ANN. § 47-1-21(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis.

Sess.) (“If a public employee commits a public employment related crime . . . in the capacity of a public employee and is convicted for the commission of such crime, such employee’s membership in any public retirement system shall terminate on the date of final conviction and such employee shall not at any time thereafter be eligible for membership in any public retirement system.”); see also A LASKA STAT. ANN. § 37.10.310
(West, Westlaw through ch. 32 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.); M E. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17062 (West, Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.); N.J. S TAT. A NN. § 43:1-3.1(b)(17) (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.127 & J.R. No.2); 43 P A. S TAT. AND C ONS. S TAT. A NN. § 1313(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); 36 R.I. G EN. LA WS ANN. § 36-

10.1-3 (West, Westlaw through ch. 79 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.). 390 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-10A-1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 391 See Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing , C RITICAL R ESISTANCE, https://www.criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CR_NoCops_reform_vs_ abolition_REV2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2020).
392 See D. Bruce Johnsen & Adam David Marcus, Pension Forfeiture and Police Misconduct, 14 J.L. E CON. & P OL’Y 1, 30 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
Although police quotas have escaped serious in-depth scrutiny, a diverse cross-section of the public rejects their use and believes that criminal sanctions should not be tied to law enforcement statistics or incentives. This Article provides descriptive insights into how police quotas work and why they are a pressing criminal justice issue.

Moving forward, interim and long-term strategies must confront the reality that, across the country, quotas are a basic feature of policing. 122 | Page

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APPENDIX A. S TATE STATUTES
Statutory Prohibitions on Police Quotas
State Statute Title Statute Overview
Arkansas
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-6-
302 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 1st
Extraordinary Sess. and
2020 Fiscal Sess.)
No state or local agency employing law
enforcement officers engaged in the enforcement of
any motor vehicle traffic laws of this state or any
local ordinance governing motor vehicle traffic may
establish any policy requiring any law enforcement
officer to meet an arrest quota . . . .

California
CAL. VEH. CODE § 41602
(West, Westlaw through
Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg.

Sess.)
No state or local agency . . . may establish any
policy requiring any peace officer or parking
enforcement employees to meet an arrest quota.

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-282d (West, Westlaw
through 2020 Reg. Sess.)
Imposition of traffic ticket
quotas prohibited
x No municipal police department may impose any
quota with respect to the issuance of . . .
summonses for motor vehicle violations upon
any policeman in such department.
x “Quota” means a specified number of . . .
summonses for motor vehicle violations to be
issued within a specified period of time.
x Nothing in this section shall prohibit such
department from using data concerning the
issuance of . . . summonses in the evaluation of an
individual’s work performance provided such
data is not the exclusive means of evaluating such
performance.

Florida
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.640
(West, Westlaw through
Ch. 184 of 2020 2d Reg.

Sess.)
8(b): A traffic enforcement agency may not
establish a traffic citation quota.

Illinois
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
2610/24 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 101-651)
State Police quotas
prohibited
The Department may not require a Department of
State Police officer to issue a specific number of
citations within a designated period of time.
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-1-12 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 101-651)
Quotas prohibited
x A municipality may not require a police officer
to issue a specific number of citations within a
designated period of time. This prohibition shall
not affect the conditions of any federal or State
grants or funds awarded to the municipality and
used to fund traffic enforcement programs.
x A municipality may not, for purposes of
evaluating a police officer’s job performance,
compare the number of citations issued by the
police officer to the number of citations issued by
any other police officer who has similar job
duties.
x Nothing in this Section shall prohibit a
municipality from evaluating a police officer
based on the police officer’s points of contact.
123 | Page

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Louisiana
LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2401.1 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 2d
Extraordinary Sess.)
Prohibition against quotas
No municipality or any police department . . . shall
establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan
to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a
law enforcement officer on the basis of the officer
making a predetermined or specified number of any
type or combination of types of arrests or require or
suggest to a law enforcement officer, that the law
enforcement officer is required or expected to make
a predetermined or specified number of any type or
combination of types of arrests within a specified
period.

Maryland
MD. CODE ANN. PUB.

SAFETY § 3-504 (West,
Westlaw through 2020
Reg. Sess.)
(a) In this section, “quota” means the mandating of
a finite number of arrests made or citations issued
that a law enforcement officer must meet in a
specified time period.
(b) A law enforcement agency may not: (1)
establish a formal or informal quota for the law
enforcement agency or law enforcement officers of
the agency; ௗor (2) use the number of arrests made
or citations issued by a law enforcement officer as
the sole or primary criterion for promotion,
demotion, dismissal, or transfer of the officer.
(c) This section does not preclude a law
enforcement agency from: (1) using quantitative
data for arrests, citations, and other law
enforcement activities as management tools or in
evaluating performance; (2) collecting, analyzing,
and applying information concerning the number of
arrests and citations in order to ensure that a
particular law enforcement officer or group of law
enforcement officers does not violate an applicable
legal obligation; ௗor (3) assessing the proportion of
the arrests made and citations issued by a law
enforcement officer or group of law enforcement
officers.

Michigan
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 257.750 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 2020, No.
256 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)
x A police officer shall not be required to issue a
predetermined or specified number of citations
for violations of this act or of local ordinances
substantially corresponding to provisions of this
act, including parking or standing violations.
x A police officer’s performance evaluation system
shall not require a predetermined or specified
number of citations to be issued.

Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169.985 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 Reg. Sess.)
A law enforcement agency may not order, mandate,
require, or suggest to a peace officer a quota for the
issuance of traffic citations, including administrative citations authorized under section 169.999, on a
daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis.

Missouri
MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125
(West, Westlaw through
2020 2d Reg. Sess.)
No political subdivision or law enforcement agency
shall have a policy requiring or encouraging an
employee to issue a certain number of citations for
traffic violations on a daily, weekly, monthly,
quarterly, yearly, or other quota basis. This section
shall not apply to the issuance of warning citations.
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Nebraska
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-235 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2020 2d
Reg. Sess.)
A state agency or political subdivision shall not
directly require a law enforcement officer employed
by the state agency or political subdivision to issue a certain number or percentage of traffic citations,
police citations, memoranda of traffic violations,
memoranda of faulty equipment, or any other type
of citation on any periodic basis.

New Jersey
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-
181.2 (West, Westlaw
through L.2020, c.136 and
J.R. No. 2)
x A State, county or municipal police department
. . . shall not establish any quota for arrests or
citations.
x The department or force shall not use the
number of arrests or citations issued by a law
enforcement officer as the sole criterion for
promotion, demotion, dismissal, or the earning of
any benefit provided by the department or force.

New York
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a
(McKinney, Westlaw
through L.2019, ch. 758
and L.2020, chs. 1 to 387)
Discrimination against
employees for failure to
meet certain ticket quotas
No employer or his or her duly authorized agent
shall transfer or in any other manner penalize or
threaten . . . based in whole or in part on such
employee’s failure to meet a quota . . . .

North
Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-187.3 (West, Westlaw
through S.L. 2020-97 of
2020 Reg. Sess.)
Quotas prohibited
x The Secretary of Public Safety shall not make or
permit to be made any order, rule, or regulation
requiring the issuance of any minimum number
of traffic citations, or ticket quotas . . . .
x Pay and promotions of members of the Highway
Patrol shall be based on their overall job
performance and not on the basis of the volume
of citations issued or arrests made.

Pennsylvania
71 PA. STAT. AND CONS.

STAT. ANN. § 2001 (West,
Westlaw through 2020
Reg. Sess. Act 95)
No political subdivision or agency of the
Commonwealth shall have the power or authority
to order, mandate, require or in any other manner,
directly or indirectly, suggest to any police officer
. . . that said police officer . . . shall issue a certain number of traffic citations, tickets or any other type
of citation on any daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly
or yearly basis.

Rhode
Island
31 R.I. GEN. LAWS 31-27-
25 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 79 of 2020 2d
Reg. Sess.)
Ticket quotas prohibited
x No state or municipal agency engaged in the
enforcement of any motor vehicle traffic or
parking laws of this state, or any local ordinance
governing motor vehicle traffic or parking, may
establish or maintain any policy, formally or
informally, requiring any officer to meet a quota.
x “Quota” means any requirement regarding the
number of arrests or investigative stops made, or
summonses or citations issued, by an officer
regarding motor vehicle traffic or parking
violations.
x Nothing contained herein shall preclude a local
or municipal agency from using data concerning
arrests or investigative stops made, or
summonses or citations issued, and their
disposition in the evaluation of an officer’s work
performance, provided such data is not the
exclusive means of evaluating such performance.
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South
Carolina
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-
245 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 Sess.)
x A law enforcement agency, department, or
division may not require a law enforcement
officer employed by the agency, department, or
division to issue a specific amount or meet a
quota for the number of citations he issues
during a designated period of time.
x An employee of a law enforcement agency,
department, or division who files a report with an
appropriate authority alleging a violation of the
provisions contained in this section is protected
by the provisions contained in Chapter 27, Title

8. (D) As contained in this section: (1) “law
enforcement agency, department, or division”
includes, but is not limited to, municipal police
departments, sheriff departments, the Highway
Patrol, SLED, and other agencies that enforce
state and local laws; (2) “quota” means a fixed or
predetermined amount; (3) “points of contact”
means a law enforcement officer’s interaction
with citizens and businesses within their
jurisdictions and the law enforcement officer’s
involvement in community-oriented initiatives.
x Nothing in this section shall prohibit a law
enforcement agency, department, or division
from evaluating an officer’s performance based
on the officer’s points of contact.

Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
16-516 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2020 2d
Extraordinary Sess.)
Traffic offense citation
quotas — Performance
standards

Replaced by Act of July
15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020
Tenn. Pub Acts, https://
publications.tnsosfiles.
com/acts/111/pub/
pc0801.pdf.

See also T
ENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-304
(West, Westlaw through
end of 2020 2d
Extraordinary Sess.)
(Whistleblower Act)
x A public official or employee shall not establish
or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to
evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a
law enforcement officer solely by the issuance of
a predetermined or specified number of any type
or combination of types of traffic citations.
x A public official or public employee shall not
require or suggest to a law enforcement officer
that the law enforcement officer is required or
expected to issue a predetermined or specified
number of any type or combination of types of
traffic citations within a specified period.
x Nothing in this section shall prohibit a municipal
corporation, a political subdivision or any agency
of this state, from establishing performance
standards for law enforcement officers that
include issuance of traffic citations, but do not
require issuance of a predetermined or specified
number or any type or combination of types of
citations as the sole means of meeting such
performance standards.
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Texas
TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 720.002 (West,
Westlaw through end of
2019 Reg. Sess.)
Prohibition on Traffic-
Offense Quotas
x A political subdivision or an agency of this state
may not establish or maintain, formally or
informally, a plan to evaluate, promote,
compensate, or discipline a peace officer
according to the officer’s issuance of a
predetermined or specified number of any type
or combination of types of traffic citations . . . .
x A political subdivision or an agency of this state
may not require or suggest to a peace officer, a
justice of the peace, or a judge of a county court,
statutory county court, municipal court, or
municipal court of record . . . that the peace
officer is required or expected to issue a
predetermined or specified number of any type
or combination of types of traffic citations within
a specified period.

Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-
27 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 6th Spec.

Sess.)
Quotas for arrest, citation
prohibited
A political subdivision or law enforcement agency
employing a peace officer may not require or direct
that a peace officer meet a law enforcement quota.

Subsection (2) does not prohibit a political
subdivision or law enforcement agency from
including a peace officer’s engagement with the
community or enforcement activity as part of an
overall determination of the peace officer’s
performance.

Wisconsin
WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 349.025 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Act 186)
Quotas relating to the
enforcement of traffic
regulations prohibited
No state agency or political subdivision of this state
may require a law enforcement officer to issue a
specific number of citations, complaints or warning
notices during any specified time period for
violations of traffic regulations.
127 | Page

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APPENDIX B. S TATE BILLS
State Bills on the Prohibition of Police Quotas
State Bill Title Bill Overview
Arizona H.R. 2410, 52d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015)
Prohibits municipalities, police departments, boards of supervisors, sheriffs and DPS from:
x implementing or establishing a traffic complaint
quota for peace officers (officers) employed by a
police department, sheriff’s department or DPS;
x basing the determination of an officer’s rank or
classification on the number of traffic complaints
the officer issues; or
x consider[ing] the number of traffic complaints an
officer issues as a factor when determining the
officer’s rank or classification.

Colorado
S. 84, 67th Gen.

Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2010)
16-2.5-311. Arrest Quotas.
x An employing agency may not establish any policy
requiring any peace officer to meet an arrest quota.
x An employing agency may not use the number of
arrests or citations issued by a peace officer as the
sole criteria for promotion, demotion, reprimand
. . . .

District of
Columbia
Sense of the Council in
Support of Enhanced
Metro Transit Police
Department Oversight
Resolution of 2020, 67
D.C. Reg. 14611 (Dec.
1, 2020)
x Finding that “some MTPD officers had created and
were participating in a ‘game’ in which officers were
rewarded for making arrests and issuing citations.”
x Establishing an independent review body to
address officer complaints.

Georgia
H.R. 738, 2009 Gen.

Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2009) 2009 Bill
Text GA H.B. 738
x No local governing authority, law enforcement unit,
or peace officer shall by influence or demand
require that peace officers employed by a law
enforcement unit meet quotas for arrests or the
issuance of citations or otherwise increase or
maintain the number of arrests or citations for the
purpose of providing or increasing revenue.
x No local governing authority shall withhold or
decrease or threaten, suggest, or imply that such
local governing authority will withhold or decrease
any funding, revenues, or the operation budget for
a law enforcement unit that fails to meet quotas for
arrests or the issuance of citations or otherwise fails to increase or maintain the number of arrests or
citations for the purpose of maintaining or
increasing revenue.
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Nevada S. 390, 1999 Leg., 70th
Sess. (Nev. 1999)
[A] state or local law enforcement agency in this state shall not:
x establish or carry out a policy that requires or
encourages, either directly or indirectly, a police
officer employed by the law enforcement agency to
meet a quota for issuing citations or making arrests.
x consider the number of citations issued or arrests
made by police officers employed by the law
enforcement agency when determining the needs of
the agency with respect to equipment, funding or
staffing.

Virginia H.R. 1376, 2015 Sess.
(Va. 2015)
A sheriff shall not . . .
x establish a formal or informal quota that requires a
deputy to make a specific number of arrests or issue
a specific number of summonses within a
designated period of time.
x use the number of arrests made or summonses
issued by a deputy as the sole criterion for
evaluating a deputy’s job performance.

Washington S.R. 6316, 66th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020)
The number of citations issued by a law enforcement
officer for traffic infractions, or the amount of
penalties assessed from the issuance of such citations, may not be considered in any performance review,
evaluation, rating, assessment, salary, promotion, or
assignment of the law enforcement officer.

West
Virginia
1992 Bill Tracking W.

Va. H.R. 4037
Prohibiting the use of
ticket writing quotas by
the Department of
Public Safety

H.B. 2984 (W. Va. 2000)
Prohibiting arrest
quotas
Any state or local agency . . .
x May not establish policy or expectations requiring
any officer to meet an arrest quota or use the
number of arrests or citations issued by an officer as
the criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal or
the earning of any benefit provided by the agency.
x May not use the number of arrests or citations
issued by their officers as the criterion for funding,
staffing or equipment needs.
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APPENDIX C. M ODEL STATUTE
No political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a law enforcement officer shall require or suggest, directly or indirectly, that a law enforcement officer should follow a quota.
“Quota” means a specified average, percentage, or number of warnings, stops, citations, or arrests to be issued on any daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly basis.

No political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a law enforcement officer shall use the number of warnings, stops, cita- tions, or arrests issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole or primary criterion for an officer’s demotion, penalization, transfer, ter- mination, constructive dismissal, promotion, or earning of any benefit.

Any officer penalized for failing to adhere to a quota system shall be fully compensated and shall be provided an avenue of legal remedy beyond the unit’s internal complaint system.

A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor, subject to pension forfeiture only.

A court of this State shall enter an order of pension forfeiture pursuant to this section immediately upon a finding of guilt by the trier of fact or a plea of guilty entered in any court of this State unless the court, for good cause shown, orders a stay of the pension forfei- ture pending a hearing on the merits at the time of sentencing.

Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the authority of the board of trustees of any State or locally-administered pension fund or retirement system created under the laws of this State from ordering the forfeiture of all or part of the earned service credit or pension or retirement benefit of any member of the fund or system for misconduct occurring during the member’s public service. 130 | Page

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2021
Police Quotas Police Quotas
Shaun Ossei-Owusu
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
Repository Citation Repository Citation
Ossei-Owusu, Shaun, "Police Quotas" (2021). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2835. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2835 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 131 | Page

ATTACHMENT 2.

Arrest Quotas Update Memorandum from Charles
Clarke, February 19, 2024 to the City of Berkeley
Police Accountability Board and Director of Police
Accountability
132 | Page

1 Arrest Quotas Update
Memorandum from Charles Clarke, February 19, 2024
To the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board
and Director of Police Accountability

My earlier Arrest Quotas memorandum1 reported absence of quantitative evidence for the operation of an alleged arrest quota among the members of the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) Bike Unit (formerly known as the DTF, Downtown Task Force). The presence of qualitative evidence, mainly intra-Bike Unit/DTF text messages, prompted my recommendation that this Board and the Director continue their investigation of the alleged arrest quota.

One issue of potential interest to this Board that I identified in my earlier memorandum concerned arrest quality, not just quantity:2

4. The arrest quantities reported in this memorandum are separate from their quality, most notably their adequacy for prosecution by the Alameda County District Attorney (ACDA). This Board should seek from ACDA the prosecutorial outcomes for the cases brought by Bike Unit arrests and for the Department as a whole. In particular, charges that ACDA deems legally insufficient (possibly indicating inadequate police work) should be distinguished from charges dropped for other reasons such as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The consultation of an outside source as to arrest quality would benefit the Board’s understanding of BPD arrest activity.

Berkeley Copwatch has recently issued a report on the alleged arrest quotas. 3 Part of Copwatch’s effort included publication of a dataset recording Alameda County District Attorney (ACDA) decisions whether to charge BPD arrestees.4 This update memorandum addresses arrest quality using the data provided by Berkeley Copwatch.

I find the vast majority of dismissed charges may have been more due to pandemic- caused change in ACDA charging practice, than to policing deficiencies.

1 Arrest Quotas: Memorandum from Charles Clarke to the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board and Director of Police Accountability, August 18, 2023
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14oJZkx43301MQxsLYO7oqA_pi3AAxlsi/view 2 Arrest Quotas, supra n. 1, pp. 15-16
3 Purging The Poor: Arrest Quotas, Racist Texts and the Role of City Leadership in the ‘Textgate’ Scandal, Berkeley Copwatch, January 16, 2024 (accessed February 18, 2024) https://www.berkeleycopwatch.org/_files/ugd/9faa72_175f75bda71646b983857d0a0e352434.pdf 4 Filename combined-arrests-built20230421.xlsx (accessed February 18, 2024) https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/148YRpAp2cOvcUjnIqfgS3TYaY0xcHEJO/edit#gid=1464294616 133 | Page

2 What Are The Data?
ACDA’s case management system, DALITE, tracks all phases of a case’s prosecutorial lifecycle from intake of an arrestee through electronic filing of charges with the Alameda County Superior Court (ACSC)’s Odyssey criminal case management system.5 On occasion a case’s path is more complicated than basic filing through Odyssey, in which case DALITE records the variance with a disposition (“T”) code.

The disposition codes are elaborated in a decade-old guide sheet6 that mentions Odyssey’s predecessor system, CORPUS (replaced in 2016). Despite its age the guide sheet seems to document current disposition codes, a sample of which is in Table 1.

Table 1. Sample of Alameda County District Attorney Disposition Codes Disposition Code Illustrative Subcodes
T1 – Lack of Corpus Conduct lawful; Insufficient proof of value T2 – Lack of Sufficient Evidence
Insufficient corroboration;
Insufficient evidence to connect suspect;
Insufficient quantity of drugs
T3 – Admissibility Factors
Questionable execution (search warrant);
Questionable probable cause for arrest/officer not
present;
Questionable search and seizure problem
T4 – Victim Factors Victim credibility issues;
Victim uncooperative
T5 – Witness Factors Necessary witness credibility issues T6 – Other Cases and/or Counts Declined in favor of other counts/case T7 – Interest of Justice
Defendant provided immunity;
Exonerating evidence/information revealed;
Nature of offense/relationship of parties
T8 – Other Referred to State Attorney General
T9 – Prosecutor Prefiling Deferral DA Corrective Intervention Program Source: T Series for Refusals, ACDA, via Berkeley Copwatch. See Exhibit 1.

The Copwatch dataset includes an ACDA disposition code for about four-fifths of BPD arrests in calendar years 2018-2022. Copwatch interprets the remaining one-fifth of recorded arrests lacking a disposition code as having not been dropped by the District Attorney.7 I concur with this interpretation.

5 Alameda County Information Technology Department, Projects: District Attorney’s Case Management System DALITE, https://itd.acgov.org/projects/ (accessed February 18, 2024) 6 ACDA, T Series for Refusals: 02/03/2014, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rd8Cy9hsal- Tj1Wh5EaJ5CDz_dYlKvUi/view (accessed February 18, 2024) Attached as Exhibit 1. 7 Purging the Poor, supra n. 3, p. 13
134 | Page

3 The T Codes. From the perspective of constitutional policing the most troubling reasons for a DA to decline to prosecute an arrestee would be codes T1 (lack of corpus, meaning lack of legally valid grounds for arrest); T2 (insufficient evidence of arrestee culpability); and T3 (evidence admissibility problems). Copwatch has (properly) flagged these codes for scrutiny, given the possibility of unconstitutional police work.

Three other T codes pertain to non-police actors whose actions bear less directly on arrest quality: T4 (victim factors), T5 (witness factors), and T6 (prosecutorial decision to charge an arrestee in a different case or with different counts than those arrested for).

Copwatch has (properly) not flagged these codes.

However, Copwatch has also flagged T7, a very broad “interest of justice” category encompassing grounds in which (with one exception) the police seem to play no role. The phrase seems to draw upon, for example, the California statute that confers discretion upon a court to dismiss a criminal prosecution, either on its own motion or at the prosecutor’s request, “in furtherance of justice.”8 “Interest of justice” seems to be a term of legal art (with a fuzzy meaning to outsiders like myself), so I will henceforth preserve the quotation marks around the phrase “interest of justice.” The one T7 subcode that does directly implicate police is subcode T7-K, “Police request no prosecution.” California statute allows such a request, for example, in connection with citations for misdemeanors.9 Unfortunately the T7 subcodes are not reported in the Copwatch dataset, so a more specific basis for the DA’s declining to prosecute a T7-coded arrest is not known.

In my view, unless contrary evidence becomes known, prosecutions dropped due to code T7 should be viewed as the District Attorney’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not as “unnecessary” arrests by BPD (as Copwatch would have it).10 On this view, the disposition codes of greatest concern to the people and police of Berkeley should be T1, T2, and T3, not T7.

8 California Penal Code § 1385(a), Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&sectionNum=1385. 9 California Penal Code § 853.6(j)(3), Citations for Misdemeanors (“If…the arresting officer determines that, in the interest of justice, the citation or notice should be dismissed, the arresting agency may recommend, in writing, to the magistrate that the charges be dismissed. The recommendation shall cite the reasons for the recommendation and shall be filed with the court.”) (italics added) https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&sectionNum=853.6. 10 Purging the Poor, supra n. 3, p. 13
135 | Page

4 The COVID-19 Pandemic and the “Interest of Justice.” This more benign view of the T7 disposition code is grounded in recent history. There is reason to suspect that in early 2020 the ACDA made its charging standards more lenient due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. An April 2020 ACDA press release announced:11 The DA’s Office is only filing cases that involve serious or violent felony crimes.

In fact, our average week’s filings since the Shelter in Place Order was given are down nearly 70% from an average week’s filing of new cases a year ago. The Court is only open two days a week (Tuesday and Friday) to arraign defendants on new cases. [italics added]
Reduced court availability due to Alameda County’s COVID-19 Shelter In Place Order 12 clearly figured in ACDA’s limiting its charging to only serious or violent felonies.

ACDA did not issue a press release announcing when its pre-pandemic charging standard had been restored, but the Superior Court did announce its gradual reopening over the next two years. Specifically, all courthouses reopened on June 15, 2021,13 and courtrooms reopened to the public on April 25, 2022.14 This latter reopening preceded by 10 months the official termination of California’s COVID-19 state of emergency on February 28, 2023,15 but court availability would likely not have constrained ACDA beyond April 2022.

I use the courts’ state of reopening as a (very imperfect) proxy for the timing of pandemic-related prosecutorial changes. This proxy’s main virtue is that courts’ reopening is observable and bears some correlation with ACDA’s changes. Its main imperfection is the risk of erroneously inferring the District Attorney’s substantive legal

11 Office of the Alameda County District Attorney, “DA O’Malley Makes Statement on Release of Individuals from Santa Rita Jail,” April 9, 2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200628234909/https://www.alcoda.org/newsroom/2020/apr/stateme nt_on_release_from_santa_rita_jail (accessed February 18, 2024) Attached as Exhibit 2. 12 Order of the [Alameda] County Health Officer to Shelter in Place, March 16, 2020 (accessed February 18, 2024) https://www.acgov.org/documents/Final-Order-to-Shelter-In-Place.pdf Attached as Exhibit 3. 13 Alameda County Superior Court press release, June 14, 2021 (accessed February 18, 2024) https://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/system/files/june-14-2021-press-release-re-further-reopening.pdf Attached as Exhibit 4.
14 Alameda County Superior Court press release, April 14, 2022, (accessed February 18, 2024) https://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/system/files/april-14-2022-press-release-re-reopening-courtrooms- and-expanded-office-hours-final_1.pdf Attached as Exhibit 5. 15 Executive Department, State of California, A Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California Terminating State of Emergency, February 28, 2023 (accessed February 18, 2024) https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/COVID-SOE-Termination-Proclamation-

2.28.23.pdf?emrc=1db54f Attached as Exhibit 6.
136 | Page

5 decisionmaking from the Superior Court’s scheduling availability. Therefore I use this proxy solely to demarcate when ACDA likely modified its charging practices in some degree due to the pandemic, but I do not measure that degree.

The Main Hypothesis. Following the reasoning of the previous paragraph my main hypothesis is that the District Attorney dismissed more arrests “in the interest of justice” due to the pandemic between March 17, 2020 (the onset of Shelter In Place) and April 25, 2022 (when public access to courtrooms resumed). Within this 25-month period I expect more frequent dropping of less serious charges “in the interest of justice” – that is, more frequent appearance of code T7 during the pandemic than before or after it.

The phased court reopening dates suggest distinguishing the “early” pandemic (after March 2020 but before the June 2021 courthouse reopenings) from the “late” pandemic (after June 2021 but before the April 2022 courtroom reopenings). These phases of the pandemic are associated with increased COVID-19 vaccination rates in Alameda County, which I also expect to be associated with resumption of normal (pre- pandemic) ACDA charging practice. As it happened Alameda County (2020 population:

1.68 million16) had administered 1.03 million full vaccination series by June 15, 2021 (61% of the population, up from zero in March 2020) and 1.37 million full vaccination series by April 25, 2022 (82% of population).17 Leniency due to the pandemic would likely have lost explanatory power by the latter date.

A more sophisticated econometric approach to analyze the ACDA “regime change” in charging decisions due to COVID-19 would be switching regression, a well- studied technique that would take more time to implement than the one afternoon I spent to write this memorandum.
18 With this direction for future research in mind, the results I report in this memorandum should be viewed as suggestive – perhaps even strongly suggestive – but not conclusive.

16 United States Census Bureau, Alameda County, California, Populations and People (accessed February 18, 2024) https://data.census.gov/profile/Alameda_County,_California?g=050XX00US06001#populations-and-people 17 California Department of Public Health, Statewide COVID-19 Vaccines Administered By County (accessed February 18, 2024) https://data.ca.gov/dataset/covid-19-vaccine-progress-dashboard- data/resource/317f8cd8-7225-4b7e-99d1-6ea441043a51
18 For more on switching regression, see Lung-Fei Lee and Robert H. Porter, “Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample Separation Information – With an Application on Cartel Stability,” Econometrica 52:2 (March 1984), pp. 391-418, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911495 137 | Page

6 What Do The Data Say?
The Copwatch dataset contains a slightly different sample of arrests than the one I reported in my August 2023 memorandum. Copwatch has observations on 10,159 BPD arrests across calendar years 2018-2022 whereas my August dataset observed 10,330 arrests over the same period. For this memorandum I analyze the Copwatch sample without investigating this discrepancy further.

It turns out that the Bike Unit had zero arrests dropped due to T1 (invalid detention) and T3 (admissibility problem) in the 2018-2022 sample period. The rest of BPD (other than the Bike Unit) had 0.2% of arrests dropped due to T1 and 0.07% due to T3. In view of the paucity of these events I choose to focus on the relative prevalence of codes T2 and T7, which Copwatch has lumped together (unjustifiably, in my view) in their figure below.
19 Figure 1. Copwatch’s Summary of the Data

A more informative approach would distinguish T2 (insufficient evidence, which raises the possibility of a policing problem) from T7 (“interest of justice,” which doesn’t) to display their relative prevalence, as in Figure 2 below.

19 Purging the Poor, supra n. 3, p. 13
138 | Page

7 Figure 2. Distinguishing ‘Interest of Justice’ from ‘Insufficient Evidence’

Source: Author’s tabulation of ACDA data via Copwatch
In Figure 2 the left column (colored more vividly) within each year’s cluster displays the fraction of Bike Unit arrests dropped by the District Attorney; the right column (colored more mutedly) is the same fraction for the rest of BPD. Each orange bar refers to prosecutions dropped due to insufficient evidence (code T2); each blue bar to prosecutions dropped “in the interest of justice” (code T7).

The most remarkable feature of Figure 2 is the twin spikes of Bike Unit arrests dropped in the “interest of justice” in 2020 (31% of arrests!) and 2022, particularly when compared to the much lower levels exhibited by the rest of the Police Department. This feature seems to be the confluence of (1) the Bike Unit’s community-policing orientation that focused on lesser offenses before they became serious20 and (2) the District Attorney’s pandemic-related shift in focus predominately (or exclusively) toward serious or violent felonies.

Mixed support for my main hypothesis comes from the time pattern of prosecutions dropped “in the interest of justice” during the pandemic (both early and late) compared to before the pandemic – the pandemic exhibited more frequent “interest of justice” dismissals, as hypothesized. However, the post-pandemic rate of dismissals did not return to the pre-pandemic rate and, in the case of BPD (excluding

20 Arrest Quotas, supra n. 1, esp. pp. 4-5 (“The Downtown Task Force/Bike Unit Has Met A City Policing Priority”) and pp. 9-12 (“Did the Bike Unit Charge Different Violations From the Rest of BPD?”) 139 | Page

8 the Bike Unit), actually increased substantially (from 12.8% to 15.2%). Table 2 summarizes these patterns.

Table 2. Prosecutions Dropped As % Of Arrests, by Pandemic Phase Disposition
Code Unit Pre-
Pandemic
Early
Pandemic
Late
Pandemic
Post-
Pandemic
Insufficient
Evidence T2
Bike Unit 3.5% 3.9% 3.0% 3.0%
Rest of BPD 4.5% 5.4% 7.7% 10.4%
“Interest of
Justice” T7
Bike Unit 16.7% 20.6% 24.7% 22.9%
Rest of BPD 8.9% 7.9% 12.8% 15.2%
Notes Pre-Pandemic=01/01/2018 to 03/16/2020 Early Pandemic=03/17/2020 to 06/14/2021 Late Pandemic=06/15/2021 to 04/24/2022 Post-Pandemic=04/25/2022 to 12/31/2022 The 2021 “trough” between the twin spikes of Figure 2 is not explicable from the recent history already discussed, thereby illustrating a limitation of using calendar dates of pandemic phases to proxy for ACDA charging policy.

A second remarkable feature of Figure 2 is the much lower incidence of Bike Unit arrests dropped due to insufficient evidence (about 3-4%) compared to the rest of BPD (rising to 10.4% in the post-pandemic period). Although the focus of this memorandum (and its prequel) is the Bike Unit, the higher and increasing proportion of rest-of-BPD arrests dropped for insufficient evidence would be worth explaining, which I cannot do with the time and data now available. Part of the explanation would be greater detail about the circumstances under which ACDA records a T2 code, as well as the Police Department explaining what (if anything) it does in response to ACDA’s dropping a prosecution due to insufficient evidence (T2), as well as the association of T2 codes with various statutory violations (charges).

A third remarkable feature of Figure 2 circles back to the reason for its creation :
the preponderance of prosecutions dropped “in the interest of justice” relative to those dropped due to insufficient evidence, particularly for the Bike Unit but also (to lesser degree) for the rest of BPD. This feature reinforces the need for greater detail about the circumstances under which ACDA issues a T7 code (starting with the relevant subcode) so as to better understand the operation of the Alameda County criminal justice system and BPD’s role within it.

From this cursory analysis of the data obtained thus far, to label any of BPD’s arrests as “unnecessary” (as Copwatch does) would be as recklessly premature as declaring them flawless. Two additional analyses support this caution: The first asks 140 | Page

9 about variation across officers of the Bike Unit (and potentially the rest of BPD). The second asks about variation of prosecutions dropped across the arrestees’ races.

Bike Unit and BPD Performance. Table 3 presents the prosecutions dropped due to T2 and T7 for the individual Bike Unit officers, their performance as a whole (which is just the average across officers, weighted by each officer’s arrest count), and the performance of the rest of BPD as a whole. Table 3 echoes the earlier analysis that found (1) a much higher proportion of Bike Unit arrests dropped “in the interest of justice” relative to the rest of BPD (nearly double, 20.1% vs. 10.4%), and (2) a much lower proportion (a bit more than one-half, 3.4% vs. 6.2%) of Bike Unit arrests dropped for insufficient evidence, relative to the rest of BPD.

Table 3. Prosecutions Dropped as % of Arrests, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD, 2018-2022 Disposition
Code Kacalek Breaux Michalczyk Pickett Schikore Seaton Shedoudy Stern DTF/
Bike
Unit
Rest
of
BPD
Insufficient
Evidence T2 0% 3% 2% 8% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3.4% 6.2%
“Interest of
Justice” T7 10% 18% 26% 12% 23% 17% 17% 31% 20.1% 10.4%

A more thorough analysis than presented here would investigate how consistently ACDA dropped the same offenses across different arresting officers, particularly across the four calendar subdivisions of Table 2. As a polar example, if all arrests for a statutory violation were dismissed during the pandemic but prosecuted before and after the pandemic, then the pandemic-era dismissals should not be ascribed to reduced arrest quality but rather to more lenient ACDA charging policy. Another polar example could posit that if all arrests by exactly one officer were dismissed, but prosecuted for all the other officers, then the quality of that officer’s arrests would warrant additional scrutiny.

The variation across individual officers on display in Table 3 represents some combination of the quality of an officer’s arrests and the ACDA’s policy toward the offenses alleged against an arrestee (which could vary across pandemic phases).

Explaining that variation would be a worthy direction for future research.

141 | Page

10 Race. Table 4 below presents the prosecutions dropped due to T2 and T7 according to the race of the arrestee. To simplify presentation and to avoid diluting non-white groups, I have consolidated arrestees of more than one race/ethnicity with one of the main race/ethnicity groups to which they belong. Thus, Hispanic includes Hispanic/White and Hispanic/Other; Black includes Black/Hispanic and Black/Other.

Table 4. Prosecutions Dropped as % of Arrests, By Race, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD, 2018-2022
Race Bike Unit Rest of BPD All BPD
T2% T7% T2% T7% T2% T7%
Black 1.5% 8.6% 2.9% 4.7% 2.7% 5.2%
White 1.5% 9.4% 1.6% 3.6% 1.6% 4.3%
Hispanic 0.3% 1.5% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 1.3%
Asian 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Other 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.6%
Total 3.4% 20.1% 6.2% 10.4% 5.8% 11.6%
Notes T2=Insufficient Evidence, T7=”Interest of Justice” Black includes ‘Black,’ ‘Black/Hispanic,’ and ‘Black/Other’ Hispanic includes ‘Hispanic,’ ‘Hispanic/White,’ and ‘Hispanic/Other’ Asian includes ‘Asian’ and ‘Asian/Other’
Other includes ‘Other and ‘White/Other’
Over the entire 2018-2022 sample period the officers of the Bike Unit had prosecutions dropped due to insufficient evidence (code T2) at an equal rate for Black and white arrestees (1.5%), whereas the rest of BPD had a noticeably higher rate for Black arrestees (2.9%) than white arrestees (1.6%). Keeping in mind that insufficient evidence is a possible indicator of inadequate policing, this disparity (as well as the higher rest-of-BPD insufficient-evidence rates) warrants further examination.

The Bike Unit’s arrests dropped “in the interest of justice” (code T7) were more heavily weighted toward white arrestees (9.4%) than Black arrestees (8.6%). The proportionately fewer arrests by the rest of BPD dropped “in the interest of justice” were weighted more toward Black arrestees (4.7%) than white arrestees (3.6%).

As I noted in my August memorandum, the Center for Policing Equity has explained such disparities as due to community factors (e.g. racially disparate crime rates) and policing factors (e.g. officer discretion),21 now with the added consideration of pandemic-caused change to ACDA charging practice toward certain crimes that could have affected observed outcomes according to race.

21 Arrest Quotas, supra n. 1, p. 13
142 | Page

11 A more sophisticated analysis would study the variation of disposition codes (T2, T7) across races, during various pandemic phases, taking into account the crime types that had given rise to arrest. As with the earlier discussion of Table 3, explaining the variation in Table 4 would be a worthy direction for further research.

Issues of Potential Interest to the Police Accountability Board The main finding of this memorandum is the preponderance of BPD, especially Bike Unit, arrests whose prosecution was dropped “in the interest of justice,” especially compared to the relative few dropped for lack of sufficient evidence. See Figure 2.

The many Bike Unit arrests dropped “in the interest of justice” seem related to a pandemic-era change in ACDA charging standards. Offenses for which the Bike Unit would likely make arrests would not (and did not) rise to the District Attorney’s pandemic-era standard of “serious or violent felony crimes.” I suggest several investigative directions following this analysis:

1. Direct inquiry to the Alameda County District Attorney office about the meaning of the various T codes, particularly T7; the meaning of “in the interest of justice” as it pertains to the dropping of a criminal charge; and whether T7 can be equated with “the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”

2. Request to ACDA for data about the subcodes that more specifically identify the basis for declining prosecution.

3. Direct inquiry to the ACDA about the pandemic-related change to the office’s charging practice.

4. Request to ACDA of other measures of arrest quality that might exist from the prosecutorial perspective.

5. Elicitation from BPD of its usage, if any, of prosecutorial decisions to evaluate officer performance, especially usage of codes T1, T2, and T3.

6. More detailed analysis of prosecutions dropped due to Insufficient Evidence (code T2), including patterns associated with specific officers, specific offenses, arrestee race, and (for the rest of BPD) its growth over time.

Conclusions

1. A large fraction of Bike Unit arrests has not been prosecuted by the District Attorney “in the interest of justice,” especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. 143 | Page

12 2. The interruption of Superior Court availability during the pandemic may have led the District Attorney to decline to prosecute “in the interest of justice,” so these dismissals do not immediately indicate a problem with policing (e.g. “unnecessary” arrests).

3. The fraction of Bike Unit arrests dropped due to insufficient evidence is much smaller than those dropped “in the interest of justice,” and proportionately smaller than the rest of BPD.

4. The rest of BPD has had a larger, and growing, fraction of arrests declined prosecution due to insufficient evidence.

I recommend that the Police Accountability Board continue its investigation to ascertain more completely the quality of BPD arrests from the viewpoint of the Alameda County District Attorney. This independent view of BPD performance would be, in my opinion, a valuable perspective for this Board to have.

Exhibit 1 – Alameda County District Attorney Disposition Codes, 02/03/2014 Exhibit 2 – Alameda County District Attorney Press Release, April 9, 2020 Exhibit 3 – Alameda County Health Officer, Shelter In Place Order, March 16, 2020 Exhibit 4 – Alameda County Superior Court Press Release, June 14, 2021 Exhibit 5 – Alameda County Superior Court Press Release, April 14, 2022

Exhibit 6 – Governor of State of California Proclamation Terminating State of Emergency, February 28, 2023

Erratum to August 18, 2023, Memorandum

Footnote 28 (p. 10) misidentified the statute governing possession of drug paraphernalia and of methamphetamine. Those are governed by the California Health and Safety Code, specifically the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode =HSC&division=10.&title=&part=&chapter=&article=&nodetreepath=12

The footnote should have read:

28 Cal. H&S.C. §§ 11364(A), 11377(A), P.C. § 647(F)
144 | Page

EXHIBIT 1

145 | Page

146 | Page

EXHIBIT 2

147 | Page

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DA O’Malley Makes Statement on Release of Individuals
from Santa Rita Jail
Since the COVID-19 crisis began, this office has worked together with all justice partners to take dramatic steps to reduce the number of individuals detained in custody at Santa Rita Jail. The District Attorney has been working diligently for weeks with the public defender, defense attorneys and the justice partners to systematically release individuals who do not pose a risk of harm to the community or to a victim of crime. We have met at least twice a week, if not more, and remain in constant contact with staff at the Public Defender’s Office.

Ultimately, regardless of the actions of the DA or defense, it is the Judge who makes the final decision whether someone will be released.
“The District Attorney’s Office is doing everything we can, and should do to address this pandemic. However, we also have the obligation to protect the community from serious and violent offenders,” says DA O’Malley “we cannot and will not agree to everyone being released from Santa Rita Jail, as we must also protect the safety of the public. I will also note that it is the constitutional obligation of the District Attorney, which we accept freely, to notify victims of crime if there is a change in circumstances, such as early release. We do all we possibly can to ensure that every victim of a charged crime understands the changes being made and why.”
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“This Office takes very seriously the duty to balance a defendant’s rights with public safety. It is very disappointing that the Public Defender has chosen this time of crisis to grandstand and to make politically divisive and disingenuous statements when what the circumstances demand of all public officials is unity and collaboration.” Efforts to minimize the jail population are being made on multiple fronts:

The DA’s Office is only filing cases that involve serious or violent felony crimes. In fact, our average week’s filings since the Shelter in Place Order was given are down nearly 70% from an average week’s filing of new cases a year ago. The Court is only open two days a week (Tuesday and Friday) to arraign defendants on new cases. Last Friday, we filed three (3) new serious felony crimes. All other crimes presented to us we filed and set dates 60 days out so the defendants could be released from custody.

Efforts also encompass the setting of bail and the negotiation of sentences, which we are doing with an eye on minimizing the jail population. On April 2, 2020 by agreement with Presiding Judge Tara Desautels of the Alameda County Superior Court, all requests for “release on one’s own recognizance” for individuals with pending criminal matters, and all requests for “early release” for individuals who were already serving jail sentences issued by Alameda County Superior Court Judges, would receive “judicial review” by a designated judge before releases would be made. Since that time, Supervising Deputy District Attorneys have worked with the defense bar and agreed with defense requests for “O.R” releases and early sentence releases on appropriate cases, always balancing public safety in this time of “Shelter in Place”.

The DA’s Office is also agreeing to early release of people who are serving a previously imposed sentence.

On March 19, 2020 the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office agreed to the early release of 247 individuals already sentenced by the Alameda County Superior Court with scheduled release dates all the way up to April 30, 2020. By doing so, office effectively agreed to take off up to 80 days of an individual’s previous court ordered sentence.

On March 20 and March 27, 2020 the office further agreed to the early release of another 9 individuals deemed by Santa Rita Jail as having “vulnerable health conditions”. The office is reviewing a list of people 149 | Page

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containing individuals whose sentence would end by the end of May.

While the release of “Medically Fragile” individuals is also taking place. Due to HIPAA, the DA cannot know which individuals in the jail are of vulnerable health or compromised immune system. However, without giving any information, on our request ACSO provided a list of individuals who may fall in that category. We agreed to most of those people. However, we did not agree to everyone on the list being released. For example, we did not agree with the release of a woman who repeatedly tortured her 5 year old child.

As of today, April 9, 2020, with the latest information from Santa Rita Jail, the jail population of individuals that are serving out their court ordered sentences is currently at 115 – less than half the number of individuals who have already been released by District Attorney agreement these past three weeks.

Regardless of whether or not a defense attorney makes a request, the District Attorney’s Office continues to look at individuals with less than 60 days left on their sentence and are making recommendations to the reviewing judge that we do not oppose early release in appropriate cases.

The District Attorney has set up a system whereby any defense attorney can contact one of four attorneys in the DA’s Office to ask us to look at a specific case for release, and we are doing that every day.

The court has assigned two judges to whom we take cases for consideration of early release.

Review of the cases is vital for public safety; cannot jeopardize the safety of victims or the community by abandoning this duty. We must take the necessary care and precaution to ensure the health of those incarcerated and the staff working at the jail without sacrificing the security of victims or well-being of the county. To do otherwise would be irresponsible.

This office has and will continue to work with all justice partners, including the Superior Court, the Alameda County Sheriff, the Probation Department, the defense bar and the Public Defender’s Office to make effective and smart decisions.

Posted on Apr 9, 2020
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EXHIBIT 3

152 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

ORDER OF THE HEALTH OFFICER

OF THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA DIRECTING

ALL INDIVIDUALS LIVING IN THE COUNTY TO SHELTER AT THEIR

PLACE OF RESIDENCE EXCEPT THAT THEY MAY LEAVE TO

PROVIDE OR RECEIVE CERTAIN ESSENTIAL SERVICES OR

ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES AND WORK FOR
ESSENTIAL BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES;

EXEMPTING INDIVIDUALS EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS FROM

THE SHELTER IN PLACE ORDER BUT URGING THEM TO FIND
SHELTER AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO PROVIDE IT;

DIRECTING ALL BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES TO

CEASE NON-ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS AT PHYSICAL LOCATIONS IN THE COUNTY; PROHIBITING ALL NON-ESSENTIAL GATHERINGS
OF ANY NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS; AND ORDERING CESSATION OF

ALL NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL

DATE OF ORDER: MARCH 16, 2020

Please read this Order carefully. Violation of or failure to comply with this Order is a misdemeanor punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. (California Health and Safety Code § 120295, et seq.)

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTIONS 101040, 101085, AND 120175, THE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA (³HEALTH OFFICER´) ORDERS:

1. The intent of this Order is to ensure that the maximum number of people self-isolate in their places of residence to the maximum extent feasible, while enabling essential services to continue, to slow the spread of COVID-19 to the maximum extent possible. When people need to leave their places of residence, whether to obtain or perform vital services, or to otherwise facilitate authorized activities necessary for continuity of social and commercial life, they should at all times reasonably possible comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in Section 10 below. All provisions of this Order should be interpreted to effectuate this intent. Failure to comply with any of the provisions of this Order constitutes an imminent threat to public health.

2. All individuals currently living within the County of Alameda (the ³CRXQW\´) aUe ordered to shelter at their place of residence. To the extent individuals are using shared or outdoor spaces, they must at all times as reasonably possible maintain social distancing of at least six feet from any other person when they are outside their residence. All persons may leave their residences only for Essential Activities, Essential Governmental Functions, or to operate Essential Businesses, all as defined in Section 10. Individuals 153 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

experiencing homelessness are exempt from this Section, but are strongly urged to obtain shelter, and governmental and other entities are strongly urged to make such shelter available as soon as possible and to the maximum extent practicable (and to utilize Social Distancing Requirements in their operation).

3. All businesses with a facility in the County, except Essential Businesses as defined below in Section 10, are required to cease all activities at facilities located within the County except Minimum Basic Operations, as defined in Section 10. For clarity, businesses may also continue operations consisting exclusively of employees or contractors performing activities at their own residences (i.e., working from home). All Essential Businesses are strongly encouraged to remain open. To the greatest extent feasible, Essential Businesses shall comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in Section 10 below, including, but not limited to, when any customers are standing in line.

4. All public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring outside a household or living unit are prohibited, except for the limited purposes as expressly permitted in Section 10. Nothing in this Order prohibits the gathering of members of a household or living unit.

5. All travel, including, but not limited to, travel on foot, bicycle, scooter, motorcycle, automobile, or public transit, except Essential Travel and Essential Activities as defined below in Section 10, is prohibited. People must use public transit only for purposes of performing Essential Activities or to travel to and from work to operate Essential Businesses or maintain Essential Governmental Functions. People riding on public transit must comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in Section 10 below, to the greatest extent feasible. This Order allows travel into or out of the County to perform Essential Activities, operate Essential Businesses, or maintain Essential Governmental Functions.

6. This Order is issued based on evidence of increasing occurrence of COVID-19 within the County and throughout the Bay Area, scientific evidence and best practices regarding the most effective approaches to slow the transmission of communicable diseases generally and COVID-19 specifically, and evidence that the age, condition, and health of a significant portion of the population of the County places it at risk for serious health complications, including death, from COVID-19. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the general public, which is now a pandemic according to the World Health Organization, there is a public health emergency throughout the County. Making the problem worse, some individuals who contract the COVID-19 virus have no symptoms or have mild symptoms, which means they may not be aware they carry the virus.

Because even people without symptoms can transmit the disease, and because evidence shows the disease is easily spread, gatherings can result in preventable transmission of the virus. The scientific evidence shows that at this stage of the emergency, it is essential to slow virus transmission as much as possible to protect the most vulnerable and to prevent the health care system from being overwhelmed. One proven way to slow the transmission is to limit interactions among people to the greatest extent practicable. By 154 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

reducing the spread of the COVID-19 virus, this Order helps preserve critical and limited healthcare capacity in the County.

7. This Order also is issued in light of the existence of 15 cases of COVID-19 in the County, as well as at least 258 confirmed cases and at least three deaths in the seven Bay Area jurisdictions jointly issuing this Order, as of 5 p.m. on March 15, 2020, including a significant and increasing number of suspected cases of community transmission and likely further significant increases in transmission. Widespread testing for COVID-19 is not yet available but is expected to increase in the coming days. This Order is necessary to slow the rate of spread and the Health Officer will re-evaluate it as further data becomes available.

8. This Order is issued in accordance with, and incorporates by reference, the March 4, 2020 Proclamation of a State of Emergency issued by Governor Gavin Newsom, the Declarations of Local Health Emergency issued by the Health Officer on March 1 and 5, the March 10, 2020 Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Alameda Ratifying the Declarations of LRcaO HeaOWh EPeUgeQc\, aQd GRYeUQRU NeZVRP¶V MaUch 12, 2020 Executive Order N-25-20.

9. This Order comes after the release of substantial guidance from the County Health Officer, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the California Department of Public Health, and other public health officials throughout the United States and around the world, including a variety of prior orders to combat the spread and harms of COVID-

19. The Health Officer will continue to assess the quickly evolving situation and may modify or extend this Order, or issue additional Orders, related to COVID-19.

10. Definitions and Exemptions.

a. For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence only to perform any of the following ³EVVeQWLaO Activities.´ But people at high risk of severe illness from COVID-19 and people who are sick are urged to stay in their residence to the extent possible except as necessary to seek medical care. i. To engage in activities or perform tasks essential to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including, but not limited to, pets), such as, by way of example only and without limitation, obtaining medical supplies or medication, visiting a health care professional, or obtaining supplies they need to work from home.
ii. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves and their family or household members, or to deliver those services or supplies to others, such as, by way of example only and without limitation, canned food, dry goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, pet supply, fresh meats, fish, and poultry, and any other household consumer products, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of residences.
155 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

iii. To engage in outdoor activity, provided the individuals comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in this Section, such as, by way of example and without limitation, walking, hiking, or running. iv. To perform work providing essential products and services at an Essential Business or to otherwise carry out activities specifically permitted in this Order, including Minimum Basic Operations.
v. To care for a family member or pet in another household.

b. For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence to work for or obtain services at aQ\ ³HeaOWhcaUe OSeUaWLRQV´ LQcOXdLQg hRVSLWaOV, cOLQLcV, dentists, pharmacies, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, other healthcare facilities, healthcare suppliers, home healthcare services providers, mental health providers, or any related and/or ancillary healthcare services. ³Healthcare Operations´ also includes veterinary care and all healthcare services provided to animals. This exemption shall be construed broadly to avoid any impacts to the delivery of healthcare, broadly defined. ³Healthcare Operations´ does not include fitness and exercise gyms and similar facilities.

c. For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence to provide any services or perform any work necessary to the operations and maintenance of ³EVVeQWLaO IQfUaVWUXcWXUe,´ LQcOXdLQg, but not limited to, public works construction, construction of housing (in particular affordable housing or housing for individuals experiencing homelessness), airport operations, water, sewer, gas, electrical, oil refining, roads and highways, public transportation, solid waste collection and removal, internet, and telecommunications systems (including the provision of essential global, national, and local infrastructure for computing services, business infrastructure, communications, and web-based services), provided that they carry out those services or that work in compliance with Social Distancing Requirements as defined this Section, to the extent possible.

d. For purposes of this Order, all first responders, emergency management personnel, emergency dispatchers, court personnel, and law enforcement personnel, and others who need to perform essential services are categorically exempt from this Order. Further, nothing in this Order shall prohibit any individual from performing or accessing ³EVVeQWLaO GRYeUQPeQWaO Functions,´ as determined by the governmental entity performing those functions. Each governmental entity shall identify and designate appropriate employees or contractors to continue providing and carrying out any Essential Governmental Functions. All Essential Governmental Functions shall be performed in compliance with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in this Section, to the extent possible.

e. For the purposes of this Order, covered businesses include any for-profit, non- profit, or educational entities, regardless of the nature of the service, the function they perform, or its corporate or entity structure.
156 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

f. For the purposes of this Order, ³EVVeQWLaO BXVLQeVVeV´ means:
i. Healthcare Operations and Essential Infrastructure;
ii. Grocery stores, certified faUPeUV¶ markets, farm and produce stands, supermarkets, food banks, convenience stores, and other establishments engaged in the retail sale of canned food, dry goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, pet supply, fresh meats, fish, and poultry, and any other household consumer products (such as cleaning and personal care products). This includes stores that sell groceries and also sell other non- grocery products, and products necessary to maintaining the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of residences;
iii. Food cultivation, including farming, livestock, and fishing; iv. Businesses that provide food, shelter, and social services, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals;
v. Newspapers, television, radio, and other media services; vi. Gas stations and auto-supply, auto-repair, and related facilities; vii. Banks and related financial institutions;
viii. Hardware stores;
ix. Plumbers, electricians, exterminators, and other service providers who provide services that are necessary to maintaining the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of residences, Essential Activities, and Essential Businesses;
x. Businesses providing mailing and shipping services, including post office boxes;
xi. Educational institutions²including public and private K-12 schools, colleges, and universities²for purposes of facilitating distance learning or performing essential functions, provided that social distancing of six-feet per person is maintained to the greatest extent possible; xii. Laundromats, drycleaners, and laundry service providers; xiii. Restaurants and other facilities that prepare and serve food, but only for delivery or carry out. Schools and other entities that typically provide free food services to students or members of the public may continue to do so under this Order on the condition that the food is provided to students or members of the public on a pick-up and take-away basis only. Schools and other entities that provide food services under this exemption shall not permit the food to be eaten at the site where it is provided, or at any other gathering site;
xiv. Businesses that supply products needed for people to work from home; xv. Businesses that supply other essential businesses with the support or supplies necessary to operate;
xvi. Businesses that ship or deliver groceries, food, goods or services directly to residences;
157 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

xvii. Airlines, taxis, and other private transportation providers providing transportation services necessary for Essential Activities and other purposes expressly authorized in this Order;
xviii. Home-based care for seniors, adults, or children; xix. Residential facilities and shelters for seniors, adults, and children; xx. Professional services, such as legal or accounting services, when necessary to assist in compliance with legally mandated activities; xxi. Childcare facilities providing services that enable employees exempted in this Order to work as permitted. To the extent possible, childcare facilities must operate under the following mandatory conditions:

1. Childcare must be carried out in stable groups of 12 or fewer (³VWabOe´ PeaQV that the same 12 or fewer children are in the same group each day).

2. Children shall not change from one group to another.

3. If more than one group of children is cared for at one facility, each group shall be in a separate room. Groups shall not mix with each other.

4. Childcare providers shall remain solely with one group of children.

g. For the purposes of this Order, ³Minimum Basic Operations´ include the following, provided that employees comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined this Section, to the extent possible, while carrying out such operations:
i. The PLQLPXP QeceVVaU\ acWLYLWLeV WR PaLQWaLQ Whe YaOXe Rf Whe bXVLQeVV¶V inventory, ensure security, process payroll and employee benefits, or for related functions.
ii. The minimum necessary activities to facilitate employees of the business being able to continue to work remotely from their residences.

h. For the purposes of this Order, ³Essential Travel´ includes travel for any of the following purposes. Individuals engaged in any Essential Travel must comply with all Social Distancing Requirements as defined in this Section below. i. Any travel related to the provision of or access to Essential Activities, Essential Governmental Functions, Essential Businesses, or Minimum Basic Operations.
ii. Travel to care for elderly, minors, dependents, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
iii. Travel to or from educational institutions for purposes of receiving materials for distance learning, for receiving meals, and any other related services.
iv. Travel to return to a place of residence from outside the jurisdiction. v. Travel required by law enforcement or court order.
vi. Travel required for non-residents to return to their place of residence outside the County. Individuals are strongly encouraged to verify that their transportation out of the County remains available and functional prior to commencing such travel.
158 | Page

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

i. For purposes of this Order, residences include hotels, motels, shared rental units and similar facilities.

j. For purposes of this Order, ³Social Distancing Requirements´ includes maintaining at least six-foot social distancing from other individuals, washing hands with soap and water for at least twenty seconds as frequently as possible or using hand sanitizer, covering coughs or sneezes (into the sleeve or elbow, not hands), regularly cleaning high-touch surfaces, and not shaking hands.

11. Pursuant to Government Code sections 26602 and 41601 and Health and Safety Code section 101029, the Health Officer requests that the Sheriff and all chiefs of police in the County ensure compliance with and enforce this Order. The violation of any provision of this Order constitutes an imminent threat to public health.

12. This Order shall become effective at 12:01 a.m. on March 17, 2020 and will continue to be in effect until 11:59 p.m. on April 7, 2020, or until it is extended, rescinded, superseded, or amended in writing by the Health Officer.

13. Copies of this Order shall promptly be: (1) made available at the County Administration Building at 1225 Oak Street, Oakland, California 94612; (2) posted on the County Public HeaOWh DeSaUWPeQW¶V ZebVLWe (acShd.RUg); aQd (3) SURYLded WR aQ\ PePbeU Rf Whe SXbOLc requesting a copy of this Order.

14. If any provision of this Order to the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held to be invalid, the reminder of the Order, including the application of such part or provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected and shall continue in full force and effect. To this end, the provisions of this Order are severable.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

_______________________________
Dr. Erica Pan Dated: March 16, 2020
Interim Health Officer of the County of Alameda

159 | Page

EXHIBIT 4

160 | Page

Superior Court of California

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Tara M. Desautels, Presiding Judge
Charles Smiley, Assistant Presiding Judge
Chad Finke, Executive Officer
René C. Davidson Courthouse
1225 Fallon Street
Oakland, California 94612
@AlamedaSuperior
www.alameda.courts.ca.gov

For more information about this news
release, please contact:

Executive Office
[email protected]
510-891-6012

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEAS E
Monday , June 14 , 20 21
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA: Superior Court of Alameda County announces the physical reopening of all courthouses and restoration of additional in-person services beginning June 15, 2021.

Consistent with Governor Newsom’s “Beyond the Blueprint” plan, the Superior Court of Alameda County (Court) announced today that it will reopen all courthouses to the public and restore additional in-person services beginning June 15, 2021.

On March 17, 2020, the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and related shelter- in-place orders required the Court to close its courthouses to the public.

Since that date, Court services have been provided almost exclusively through remote access. However, in recent months, improving COVID-19 conditions in Alameda County have enabled the Court to gradually restore in-person services.

On June 8, 2021, for the first time since the establishment of the tier system, Alameda County moved to the “Yellow Tier,” easing some COVID restrictions. On Friday, June 11, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) issued an order that, among other things, mandated new face covering requirements effective June 15. In addition, the tier system will be eliminated. As an employer, however, the Court is required to comply with regulations issued by Cal/OSHA. Thus, all who enter court facilities will be required to wear a face covering at all times and maintain social distancing until such time as the current regulations are modified by Cal/OSHA or through executive action.

Just as court operations have consistently followed public health guidance, on June 15, with the greatly improved health conditions in Alameda County and throughout the State, the Court will continue and significantly expand its in-person reopening efforts.

Specifically, starting on June 15, 2021, the following clerk’s offices will physically re-open to the public for in-person services from 8:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday (with the exception of Friday, June 25):

 Rene C. Davidson Courthouse (RCD), 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland (Criminal).
 Wiley W. Manuel Courthouse, 661 Washington Street, Oakland (Criminal and Traffic).
 East County Hall of Justice, 5151 Gleason Drive, Dublin (Criminal and Traffic).
161 | Page

June 14, 2021

 Fremont Hall of Justice, 39439 Paseo Padre Parkway, Fremont (Criminal, Traffic).  Juvenile Justice Center, 2500 Fairmont Drive, San Leandro (Juvenile).

Telephone services will continue to be offered during those business hours, and drop boxes will be available at each of the above locations from 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. every day.

Then, starting June 21, the following services will be offered at the Berkeley Courthouse (Probate), RCD (Civil and Appeals), George E. McDonald Hall of Justice (Records) and Hayward Hall of Justice (Civil, Family), with the exception of Friday, June 25:

 In-person clerk’s office hours: 8:30 a.m. – 2:30 p.m.  Drop box hours: 2:30 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.
 Telephone hours: 10:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m.

The Court asks all who visit court facilities not to enter if they have been diagnosed with COVID within the last 10 days, if they live or have had “close contact” with a COVID-positive person within the last 14 days, or if they have any symptoms of COVID. Litigants and members of the public can continue to access the Court’s services remotely, as explained on the Court’s dedicated COVID-19 web page.

The Court looks forward to continuing to expand its in-person court offerings while also maintaining remote access to our Court to the extent permitted by public health and safety guidelines and other applicable authorities. Please continue to check our website and follow @AlamedaSuperior on Twitter for the most current information. 162 | Page

EXHIBIT 5

163 | Page

Superior Court of California

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Charles A. Smiley III, Presiding Judge
Thomas Nixon, Assistant Presiding Judge
Chad Finke, Executive Officer
René C. Davidson Courthouse
1225 Fallon Street
Oakland, California 94612
@AlamedaSuperior
www.alameda.courts.ca.gov

For more information about this news
release, please contact:

Executive Office
[email protected]
510-891-6012

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEAS E
Thursday , April 14 , 20 22
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA: Superior Court of Alameda County announces reopening of cŽƵƌƚƌŽŽŵƐ ƚŽ ƚhe ƉƵbůic aŶd edžƉaŶƐiŽŶ Žf cůeƌŬ͛Ɛ Žffice hŽƵƌƐ͘

The Superior Court of Alameda County (Court) announced today that, effective April 25, 2022, it will begin reopening courtrooms to the public.

For the duration of the COVID pandemic, the public has been unable to observe court proceedings in person, although access has been available through live audio streaming. While the live streaming option will remain, the public also will now be able to be physically present in the courtroom for proceedings that are open to the public generally.

The process of reopening courtrooms will occur on a rolling basis, driven by resource availability. The Court will maintain an up-to-date list of which courtrooms are open to the public on its dedicated COVID-19 web page.

Please note that courtrooms will only be open during times when court is in session. In some courthouses, lists of the daily proceedings are printed and posted, and litigants, attorneys, and members of the public may also check the appropriate case management system online to determine the date, time, and location of hearings:

x Odyssey (Criminal)
x TCMS (Traffic)
x eCourt (Civil/Small Claims)
x DomainWeb (Family/Probate)

The Court continues to require face coverings in all courthouses at all times under General Directive 2022-03A. And while the Court does not currently have any social distancing mandate, it requests that courtroom spectators attempt to maintain a safe distance from each other, including leaving empty seats if possible. Judicial officers will have the authority to limit the number of persons in a courtroom if necessary for the health and safety of the public or Court personnel.

In addition, beginning April 25, Civil, Family, Probate, Records, and Appeals cůeƌŬ͛Ɛ ŽfficeƐ ǁiůů once again open at 8:30 a.m. for in-person and telephone services, and will close at 2:00 p.m. Criminal clerk͛s offices will continue to open at 8:30 a.m. and close at 3:00 p.m., while Tƌaffic cůeƌŬ͛Ɛ ŽfficeƐ ǁiůů open at 8:00 a.m. and close at 3:00 p.m. Drop boxes will be available from when each office closes until 4:00 p.m. every day.
164 | Page

April 14, 2022

Civil e-filing will still be available 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, along with Criminal and Juvenile e-filing. Fax filing also remains available for Family and Probate filings.

The CŽƵƌƚ͛Ɛ Seůf-Help Center will remain closed for in-person service at this time, although assistance is still available by telephone and LiveChat. The Court is planning to resume in-person Self-Help services by appointment only within the coming weeks.

For additional information ƌeůaƚed ƚŽ ƚhe CŽƵƌƚ͛Ɛ COVID ƌeƐƉŽŶƐe͕ ƉůeaƐe Ɛee ŽƵƌ dedicaƚed COVID-19 page, and please follow @AlamedaSuperior on Twitter for immediate updates. 165 | Page

EXHIBIT 6
166 | Page

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TERMINATING STATE OF EMERGENCY
I, GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State of California, having found pursuant to Government Code section 8629 that the conditions of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property declared in the State of Emergency proclamation listed below no longer exist, therefore proclaim that the State of Emergency proclaimed on the following date and in the following jurisdiction no longer exists, effective at 11 :59 p.m. on February 28, 2023. Accordingly, any Executive Orders related to the terminated State of Emergency will also no longer be in effect as of 11 :59 p.m. on February 28, 2023.

PROCLAMATION
Emergency Date Jurisdiction
Proclaimed
COVID-19 March 4, 2020 Statewide
I FURTHER DIRECT that as soon as hereafter possible, this Proclamation be filed in the Office of the Secretary of State and that widespread publicity and notice be given of this Proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have
hereunto set my hand and caused
the Great Seal of the State of
California to be affixed this 28th day
of February 2023.

Governor of California
ATTEST:

SHIRLEY WEBER, PH.D.

Secretary of State
167 | Page

Brent Blackaby
Councilmember District 6
2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7160 ● TDD: (510) 981-6903 ● Fax: (510) 981-7166 E-Mail: [email protected]

CONSENT CALENDAR
April 15, 2025
To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
From: Councilmember Blackaby (Author)
Subject: Resolution: Affirming Support for Berkeley Police Department, Police Accountability Board, and Office of the Director of Police Accountability in Response to Downtown Task Force Texting Offenses Investigation

RECOMMENDATION
Adopt a Resolution affirming our community’s support for the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) and acknowledging the work of the Police Accountability Board (PAB) & the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) in investigating BPD’s Downtown Task Force texting offenses, ultimately making recommendations to increase trust, transparency, and accountability. Additionally, the Resolution condemns any and all racism and misconduct, affirms the City Council’s opposition to arrest quotas, and asks the California Legislature to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, which are currently limited to the California Vehicle Code.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
None

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Council’s Public Safety Policy Committee reviewed Item #3: Berkeley Police Department Texting Offenses: An Independent Investigation by the Police Accountability Board at its February 25, 2025 meeting and voted to return it to Council with a negative recommendation.

Instead, this resolution serves to acknowledge the importance of the Police Accountability Board and the Director of Police Accountability and the critical role they play in ensuring the Berkeley Police Department's accountability to the community as well as identifying & resolving policy or personnel issues as they occur. Berkeley has been a leader in police accountability, and that is a history to honor. The resolution also affirms our confidence in BPD, PAB, and ODPA.

The City of Berkeley condemns any and all racism and misconduct. Misconduct of any kind—whether on-duty or off-duty—is unacceptable behavior from anyone in our community, particularly from those who are sworn to protect vulnerable populations.

This is especially true regarding racial, economic, or other types of bias.

11b

PSPC Resolution Regarding BPD Texting Offences CONSENT CALENDAR April 15, 2025

BACKGROUND
The Police Accountability Board (PAB) submitted a report on the Downtown Task Force Texting Offenses Investigation for the City Council’s October 1, 2024 agenda, which the Agenda Committee referred to the Public Safety Policy Committee (PSPC). The item was withdrawn from the PSPC as requested by a PAB vote during their September 25, 2024 meeting. The Office of the Director of Police Accountability and the Police Accountability Board submitted a new report for the January 21, 2025 Council Meeting.

The Agenda and Rules Policy Committee referred the item to the Public Safety Policy Committee. The PSPC heard the item on February 25, 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS
None

CONTACT PERSON
Councilmember Brent Blackaby Council District 6 510-981-7160 Attachments:
1: Resolution

RESOLUTION NO. ##,###-N.S.

AFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICE

ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, AND OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE

ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESPONSE TO DOWNTOWN TASK FORCE TEXTING

OFFENSES INVESTIGATION
WHEREAS, community safety is best served when the Berkeley Police Department (BPD), the Police Accountability Board (PAB), and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) are all operating at their best; and WHEREAS, we have full confidence in the Berkeley Police Department and Chief Louis and are proud of the work of our Department and its dedication to keeping the community safe; and
WHEREAS, citizen oversight plays a critical role in ensuring BPD’s accountability to the community and identifying & resolving policy or personnel issues as they occur. Through the PAB, ODPA, and previously the Police Review Commission (PRC), Berkeley has long been a leader in police accountability; and
WHEREAS, the PAB and ODPA contributed countless hours of work to the investigation of texting offenses in BPD’s Downtown Task Force that occurred between 2019 and 2020 and became public in November 2022, making thoughtful recommendations to mitigate future instances of potential misconduct. Reading the text messages identified instances of racial insensitivity and poor judgment, highlighting the need for increased awareness and sensitivity to issues of race and inclusion; and WHEREAS, whether on-duty or off-duty, misconduct of any kind is unacceptable behavior for our Police Officers. This is especially true with regard to racial, economic, or other types of bias; and

WHEREAS, we are grateful that BPD and PAB are working together with the Berkeley Police Association (BPA) to implement an Early Intervention System that will help identify personnel concerns, stresses, or challenges much earlier, before they materialize into misconduct or other problems in our community; and WHEREAS, the City encourages BPD and PAB to work together through their existing collaborative process to make any needed changes to existing BPD policies on the use of personal communications devices, off-duty conduct, traffic function and responsibility and other important areas.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Berkeley that we encourage the Berkeley Police Department, the Police Accountability Board, and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability to continue to work together in good faith in order to keep our community safe. The successful missions of each of these organizations are essential to maintaining the trust of all Berkeley residents.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Berkeley City Council has full confidence in Berkeley’s Police Accountability Board, the Office of the Director of Police Accountability, and the Berkeley Police Department.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Berkeley City Council affirms the PAB’s ability to access relevant information to conduct specific investigations, under authority granted by the Charter. The particular types of documents that should be accessible during different types of investigations (i.e., personnel misconduct, policy reviews, policy & practice reviews) are necessarily limited by state law and due process considerations.

Therefore, we urge the PAB, OPDA, and BPD to adopt their final regulations as expeditiously as possible, after completing the “meet and confer” process with the BPA, to clarify how investigations will be conducted with appropriate information provided by BPD.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Berkeley City Council condemns any and all racism and misconduct.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Berkeley City Council affirms its strong opposition to arrest quotas and supports BPD’s existing practice against using arrest quotas.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Berkeley City Council urges the California State Legislature to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, which are currently limited to the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600-41603) to all types of arrests in California.

CONSENT CALENDAR
April 15, 2025
To: Honorable Members of the City Council
From: Mayor Adena Ishii (Author), Councilmember Brent Blackaby (Co-Sponsor), Councilmember Cecilia Lunaparra (Co-Sponsor), Councilmember Terry Taplin (Co-Sponsor)
Subject: Referral to City Attorney for Sanctuary City Ordinance

RECOMMENDATION
Referral to the City Attorney to return to City Council in June with an analysis and recommendation regarding the codification of Berkeley’s Sanctuary policies and protections through a city ordinance.

BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2025, the Berkeley City Council adopted a Resolution Reaffirming Berkeley As a Sanctuary City1 and asking the City Clerk to send a copy to each City Department Director, requesting they inform their staff of the City’s Sanctuary City standing and the City’s policies and procedures regarding staff interaction with U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) related to enforcement of federal immigration law. Additionally, the item gave a referral to the City Attorney to explore the possibility of pledging the City’s legal support to help “sensitive sites”2 defend themselves against civil litigation. The resolution called for the Mayor to create a taskforce of Councilmembers, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), immigration and civil rights organizations, faith leaders, legal experts, school and university officials, and community activists to continually assess threats to Berkeley’s immigrant communities and participate in the process to codify Berkeley’s Sanctuary protections through a city ordinance.

Several cities across California are moving beyond resolutions and adopting Sanctuary City ordinances to provide greater protection to the immigration community in their jurisdiction. For example, on March 11, 2025, the Richmond City Council passed the first reading of a Sanctuary City Ordinance3 “An Ordinance of the City Council of the City of Richmond Limiting the Use of City Resources for Federal Immigration Enforcement.”4 and on November 19, 2024, 5 the Los Angeles City Council 1 See Resolution No. 71,658-N.S. “Reaffirming Berkeley As a Sanctuary City” 2 Sensitive areas such as schools, after-school programs, hospitals, community health centers, and places of worship.
3 See: https://pub-richmond.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=56701 4 See: https://pub-richmond.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=56704 5 See: https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2023/23-0243_CAF_11-19-24.pdf

12

Referral to City Attorney for Sanctuary City Ordinance CONSENT CALENDAR April 15, 2025
unanimously passed a City Ordinance to “Prohibit the Use of City Resources for Federal Immigration Enforcement”, 6 codifying their Sanctuary policies into law.

Per the January 21, 2025, resolution, Mayor Ishii convened the first Sanctuary City Task Force meeting on February 20th. Over 30 representatives attended where they shared what work is currently happening in Berkeley to support the immigrant community and identified gaps and areas for increased coordination. The Task Force meets again on March 26th. The frequency of subsequent meetings will be determined then.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION
Per the resolution, members of the Task Force have expressed a sense of urgency and interest in establishing a Berkeley Sanctuary City Ordinance that could provide additional protections to Berkeley’s immigrant community. The Berkeley City Attorney has a critical role in ensuring the research and development of a Sanctuary City Ordinance that aligns with the City’s existing ordinances, resolutions, and policies and provides substantive protections for Berkeley’s immigrant community. An ordinance would exceed the action of a resolution because an ordinance would codify the City’s position into the City’s municipal code, thus creating a permanent law7 regulating conduct and procedure.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
None.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
No identifiable environmental effects from taking this action.

CONTACT PERSON
Mayor Adena Ishii 510-981-7100
Julie Sinai [email protected]
Attachments:

1. Resolution No. 71,658-N.S. “Reaffirming Berkeley As a Sanctuary City” dated January 21, 2025
6 See City of Los Angeles Ordinance No. 188441 (https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2023/23- 0243_ord_%20188441_12-19-24.pdf)
7 Until another law changes.

Rashi Kesarwani
Councilmember, District 1

CONSENT CALENDAR
April 15, 2025
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM: Councilmember Rashi Kesarwani (Author)
SUBJECT: Budget Referral: Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project Unfunded Balance

RECOMMENDATION
Refer to the fiscal year 2025-26 budget process $150,000 to fund the outstanding balance for consultant costs to finalize the design concepts to complete the Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project, which has already been awarded $5.3 million in construction funds to complete the project.

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project to Enhance Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety by Improving Street Crossings, Widening Path, and Enhancing Lighting . . . The Ohlone Greenway is a high volume shared-use pathway for pedestrians and cyclists that offers an off-street connection between the North Berkeley and El Cerrito Plaza BART stations. The city has been planning improvements along part of the Ohlone Greenway from Virginia Gardens (southern end) to the Santa Fe Avenue intersection (northern end) to better accommodate the needs of all users and improve safety particularly at roadway intersections. Planned upgrades will include:
● Improving safety of pathway/roadway intersections, including more clear sightlines, at seven intersections–Virginia Gardens, Cedar Street, Rose Street, Hopkins Street, Peralta Avenue, Gilman Street, and Santa Fe Avenue. ● Widening the pathway to a minimum of 12 feet where feasible to better separate users of different speeds (e.g., pedestrians and bicyclists). ● Improved connection at pathway gap on Peralta Avenue, including wayfinding (signage) and traffic calming features.

13

2 2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
● Enhanced pathway lighting to improve safety and security of pathway users at intersection approaches, benches, and other locations where potential security issues exist.
● Landscaping to trim back and/or remove vegetation to increase effectiveness of lighting and to improve visibility and security.
. . . Yet a Relatively Small Budget Shortfall Keeps Ohlone Safety Enhancements from Moving Forward. Despite receiving grants from various county and BART funds, the project’s budget still falls short of covering all design costs due to additional community outreach efforts to ensure broad participation and greater input and the re-evaluation of some design elements as a result of internal and external stakeholder coordination. These technical elements include adjustments to the intersection treatments at Gilman/Curtis, updates to the Peralta Avenue connection, and adjustments to electrical elements to comply with latest practices.

Exhibit 1: Planning Project Area for Ohlone Safety Improvements Project Source: Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project - Project Information Sheet, Dec. 8, 20231

BACKGROUND
1 Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project - Project Information Sheet, Dec. 8, 2023:
https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20231208- Project%20Information%20Sheet_rev2.1.pdf

3 2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
Several Berkeley Plans Identify the Ohlone Greenway as a Key High-Volume Pathway in Need of Safety Improvements. The Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project is designed to implement Berkeley’s 2017 Bicycle Plan Tier 1 priority recommendations for pathway and intersection improvements to the Ohlone Greenway as this pathway is highly used by pedestrians and cyclists.2 The project also addresses the City’s 2020 Vision Zero Action Plan as the pathway crosses two high-injury segments at Cedar and Rose Streets and recommends improvements identified in that plan.3 The proposed pathway improvements are also included in the 2016 Berkeley Strategic Transportation (BeST) Plan, which designates the improvement project as a priority within the city’s multimodal program.4 Pathway Widening Is Among Project Safety Improvements.The portion of the pathway within the project area is considered a two-way shared-use pathway with all users sharing the same path that has no separate spaces for cyclists or pedestrians.

Berkeley’s 2017 Bicycle Plan recommends a shared pathway with a minimum total width of 12 feet for this project where feasible.5 Currently, the width of the pathway varies by segment. The current widths of the segments as well as the proposed widths are shown in Exhibit 2 below.

Exhibit 2: Current and Proposed Widths by Pathway Segment Source: Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project - Project Information Sheet, Dec. 8, 20236

Save a 200-foot stretch of the pathway within Cedar Rose Park, the planned widening for the rest of the pathway would achieve the recommended 12 feet width for a standard two-way shared-use pathway. The additional width will allow for multiple users in both directions to travel more comfortably. 2 Berkeley’s 2017 Bicycle Plan Chapter 5: Proposed Bikeway Network https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Berkeley-Bicycle-Plan- 2017_Ch5_ProposedBikewayNetwork.pdf, pp 5-28 - 5-32.
3 Berkeley’s Vision Zero Action Plan: https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/Berkeley- Vision-Zero-Action-Plan.pdf, p. 17
4 Berkeley Strategic Transportation Plan Chapter 3: Achieving the Vision:
https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Berkeley-Strategic-Transportation-Plan- Chapter3.pdfp. 41
5 Berkeley’s 2017 Bicycle Plan Chapter 5: Proposed Bikeway Network https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Berkeley-Bicycle-Plan- 2017_Ch5_ProposedBikewayNetwork.pdf, p. 5-28
6 Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project Information Sheet, Dec. 8, 2023:
https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20231208- Project%20Information%20Sheet_rev2.1.pdf

4 2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
Improved Intersection Crossings are Among Project Safety Improvements.

The crossings where the pathway intersects with Cedar, Rose and Gilman Streets are all identified as high injury corridors according to Bekeley’s Vision Zero Action Plan.7 Data from reported collisions over the last ten years (2015-2024) for each of the Ohlone Greenway crossings totaled six pedestrian-vehicle injuries, and seven injuries of bicyclists. Planned improvements for these crossings as well as the crossings for the remaining intersections include the following improvements8:
● Cedar: flashing beacons, raised crosswalk, concrete median, pavement markings
● Rose: bulbouts, raised crosswalk, pavement markings
● Hopkins: raised crosswalk, concrete median, pavement markings ● Peralta: raised crosswalk, pavement markings
● Gilman at Curtis: pavement markings
● Santa Fe: raised crosswalk, pavement crossings

FISCAL IMPACT
The Public Works Department has provided an estimate of $150,000 that would cover the remaining costs needed to fund the consultant to complete the designs for this project.

The total costs for this project, including design and construction, is estimated to be approximately $5.3 million. The vast majority of the Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvement Project has already been funded by several different county and BART funds:
● Alameda County Vehicle Registration Fee Funds (fund 307): $1,271,000 ● Alameda County Measure BB Bike and Pedestrian discretionary funds (Fund 135): $245,319
● Alameda County Measure BB Streets and Roads discretionary funds (Fund 134): $458,000
● Alameda County Measure B Bike and Pedestrian discretionary funds (Fund 131): $225,978
● Safe Route to BART funds (Fund 307): $3,000,000
The remaining funds requested in this budget referral would constitute the only City funds being used for this project.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION
The Ohlone Greenway is a high volume shared-use pathway for pedestrians and cyclists that offers an off-street connection between the North Berkeley and El Cerrito Plaza BART stations. Various segments of the pathway are in great need of 7 Berkeley Vision Zero Action Plan: https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/Berkeley-Vision- Zero-Action-Plan.pdf, p. 17
8 The Final Conceptual Plan for the Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project:
https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20231115-Final%20Concepts.pdf

5 2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
safety improvements to enhance user experience and promote greater use.

Currently, the project’s budget falls short of the necessary funds. Funding of this budget referral would allow this project to move forward into the construction phase.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS
The Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project will create a safer and more seamless low-stress connection for people accessing the North Berkeley BART Station using alternative modes of transportation including cycling and walking. This supports the city’s transit goals of reducing vehicle miles traveled and greenhouse gas emissions.

CONTACT
Councilmember Rashi Kesarwani, District 1 (510) 981-7110 Attachments: Final Conceptual Plan for the Ohlone Greenway Safety Improvements Project, November 15, 2023

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
Rashi Kesarwani
Councilmember, District 1

CONSENT CALENDAR
April 15, 2025
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM: Councilmember Rashi Kesarwani (Author) and Mayor Adena Ishii (Co-Sponsor)
SUBJECT: Establish Rules and Limits When Community-Based Organizations Receive City Funding Without Procurement to Promote
Transparency, Fairness, and Stewardship of Public Funds

RECOMMENDATION
Approve the resolution and refer to the City Manager to establish an open and transparent process for community-based organizations seeking a grant of emergency funds outside of the City’s existing request for proposal (RFP) or other procurement processes. The process to be established should include the following components:
● Annual Funding Limit. Establish a maximum amount of $25,000 annually to be granted to a Berkeley-based non-profit or public organization, and a grand total of $225,000 annually to up to nine community-based organizations operating in Berkeley.
● “Declaration of Need” Form Available on a City Webpage. A Declaration of Need application form should be made available on a dedicated City webpage to ensure all community-based organizations have an equal opportunity to learn about the availability of funds, including the deadline for submitting the completed form.
● Declaration of Need Form Should Require Documentation of Financial Need and Non-Profit Status (When Appropriate). The Declaration of Need form should be short to reduce the burden on community-based organizations but should include at a minimum a request to explain the purpose/need for the funds

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2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
and document the organization’s financial need. In addition, the City should verify that the organization is a registered non-profit organization (if applicable).1 ● Selection Process. The City Manager shall establish a process for selecting qualifying community-based organizations, including establishing a scoring criteria and submitting recommendations to Council as part of the annual budget development process. Pursuant to Budget and Finance Policy Committee discussion, to the extent practicable, consider awarding funds on a rolling basis to better support agencies who may be facing a fiscal emergency. ● Financial Reporting Requirement for Selected Community-Based Organizations. For organizations selected to receive emergency funding of up to $25,000, the City shall enter into a contract that requests documentation at six months and 12 months to ensure that funds were used for the purpose for which they were requested. This financial reporting requirement should apply as soon as practicable to FY2024-25 budget allocations, and continue for future budget years.

POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION
On February 13, 2025 the Budget and Finance Policy Committee adopted the following action: M/S/C (Kesarwani/Blackaby) to send the item to Council with a positive recommendation. Vote: All Ayes. Pursuant to the discussion at that policy meeting the recommendation to consider awarding funds on a rolling basis to better support agencies who may be facing a fiscal emergency has also been added to this item, as noted above.

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Historically, Community-Based Organizations In the Know Have Approached a Member(s) of the Council to Sponsor a Budget Referral for an Award of Funds . . .

Historically, organizations seeking one-time assistance for such needs as capital improvements to facilities, staffing support, and funding of special programs have appealed directly to individual Councilmembers. These requests have been considered by Council in the form of budget referrals during the annual June budget process and mid-year budget adjustment, with organizations receiving awards totalling as much as $4.5 million in FY 2023-24. This process is not transparent to all organizations who may be in need of financial assistance, and therefore privileges certain organizations above others who may be equally or more deserving of financial support. . . . However, Awarding Funds Without an Open and Transparent Procurement Does Not Treat All Organizations Fairly. Smaller and newer Berkeley-based non-profit 1 Generally, these awards should be granted to registered non-profit organizations; however, there are instances in which the Berkeley Unified School District or other similar publicly-funded organizations may receive funding. Only organizations that are registered non-profits (through the California Attorney General’s Office) or are largely publicly-funded are eligible to receive funding.

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
organizations may not be familiar with the City’s budgeting process and the practice of Council budget referrals.

Procurement Via a Request for Proposal or Other Competitive Process Is Considered a Best Practice in Government Contracting.2 The benefit of issuing a request for proposal (RFP) is that an open and transparent process treats all organizations fairly. The RFP clearly indicates the criteria by which organizations will be assessed. A scoring panel comprised of individuals without ties to any organization rates each RFP response based on the standard criteria. This process ensures that all organizations have an equal opportunity to receive funds and that all organizations are considered fairly. An RFP process ensures that public funding is awarded based on merit, rather than personal relationships or other subjective criteria. Further, an RFP process ensures that public funds are awarded to high-performing organizations.

BACKGROUND
Over the last five fiscal years, nearly $8.8 million has been allocated to 25 different community-based organizations.3 Cumulative year-over-year allocations to individual organizations range from $10,000 to as much as $5,050,000. The breakdown of funds allocated through a non-competitive process by fiscal year is noted in Exhibit 1 below.

Exhibit 1: Over Last Five Fiscal Years, City Has Awarded $8.8 Million Without Procurement Process
Fiscal Year Numbers of Community-Based
Organizations Funded Per Year4
Amount Allocated
2021-22 4 $245,000
2022-23 12 $2,542,000
2023-24 11 $4,516,000
2024-25 15 $1,133,665
2025-26 7 $349,665
TOTAL 49 $8,786,330
Source: City of Berkeley data, with analysis conducted by the Office of Councilmember Kesarwani The City Already Has Request for Proposal (RFP) Processes Totalling $15.5 Million Annually for Community Agencies. The City’s Health, Housing and Community Services Department issues an RFP for community funding every four years. These 2 International City/County Management Association, 2008. https://icma.org/sites/default/files/302081_RFP_bestpractices-1.pdf 3 The total of 49 shown in Exhibit 1 is due to the same organizations receiving multiple awards. 4 While the number of allocations to agencies between FY 2022 - 2026 total 49, only 25 different agencies received the funds. Several of the same agencies received funding several years in a row.

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
funds support a variety of programs and services, including childcare and youth services; housing and community facilities rehabilitation; services for people with disabilities; employment support; health care; homelessness services; as well as legal and senior services. The funding is primarily made up of a variety of local funds (89 percent), various federal funds (11 percent), and to a lesser extent state funding (less than 1 percent) to approximately 35-40 community-based organizations.

Two Additional Request for Proposal (RFP) Processes Have Been Established Recently at the Request of Councilmember Kesarwani to Meet Unmet Needs.

Councilmember Kesarwani has introduced items requesting the creation of an RFP process to (1) support arts and cultural organizations in need of one-time capital funds, and (2) provide funding to augment services provided by food insecurity providers. In both cases, the intent is to ensure that all qualified organizations have a fair opportunity to seek funds, thereby ensuring that public funds are awarded to the most qualified organization(s). In October 2019, Councilmember Kesarwani’s Council item, “Referral to the Civic Arts Commission to develop a grant program available for arts and cultural organizations to support retaining and improving creative spaces for artists” was approved unanimously on consent, resulting in an annual allocation of $300,000 to administer and fund an annual Capital Projects Grant Program.5 Today, the Capital Projects Grant program is listed among the several other grant opportunities for artists, festivals and organizations on the City of Berkeley website, giving all arts organizations an equal opportunity to seek support.6 In June 2024, Councilmember Kesarwani’s Council item, “Referral for Development of Request for Proposal (RFP) to Support Berkeley-Based Non-Profit Food Assistance Providers Serving Food Insecure Households” was approved unanimously on consent.7 This referral recommended that the City develop and fund an RFP process to support Berkeley-based non-profit food assistance providers to address capacity needs such as expanding services, purchasing equipment, and hiring staff. In August 2024, the City of Berkeley posted notice of a Berkeley-based Food Assistance RFP and funds were awarded.8

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION
This referral seeks to ensure that the City’s financial resources are more broadly accessible to all community-based organizations while achieving greater transparency in 5 See: Referral Response: Grant Program for Retaining and Improving Creative Spaces, March 21, 2023 Berkeley City Council meeting: https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2023-03- 21%20Item%2018%20Grant%20Program%20for%20Retaining%20and%20Improving%20Creative%2 0Spaces.pdf
6 City of Berkeley’s Civic Arts Grants webpage: https://berkeleyca.gov/community-recreation/civic- arts/civic-arts-grants
7 Annotated Agenda for the June 25, 2024 Berkeley City Council meeting:
https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/city-council-meetings/2024-06- 25%20Annotated%20Agenda%20-%20Council.pdf, page 23
8 CIty of Berkeley:=, Request for Proposals (RFP) Specification No. 25-11675-C for Berkeley-based Food Assistance Proposals: https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/25-11675-C%20- %20Berkeley%20Based%20Food%20Assistance_0.pdf

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
funding allocations. It will also provide greater predictability of the fiscal impacts on the City’s budget.

FISCAL IMPACT
The fiscal impacts of this referral are minimal outside of staff time to develop a well- defined process for addressing the allocation of emergency funds to community-based organizations.

CONTACT
Councilmember Rashi Kesarwani, District 1 (510) 981-7110

ATTACHMENT
Resolution No ##,###-N.S. ESTABLISHING RULES AND LIMITS FOR COMMUNITY-

BASED ORGANIZATIONS RECEIVING CITY FUNDING OUTSIDE PROCUREMENT

TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY, FAIRNESS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
RESOLUTION NO. ##,###-N.S.

ESTABLISHING RULES AND LIMITS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

RECEIVING CITY FUNDING OUTSIDE PROCUREMENT TO PROMOTE

TRANSPARENCY, FAIRNESS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
WHEREAS, the use of a Request for Proposal (RFP) or other open and transparent procurement process is widely recognized as a government best practice that aligns with principles of good governance; and
WHEREAS, the City of Berkeley has allocated $8.8 million over the past five fiscal years to community-based organizations outside of a procurement process, with individual awards ranging from $10,000 to $5,050,000; and
WHEREAS, some community-based organizations have historically bypassed established procurement processes by directly appealing to Councilmembers for a grant of public funds; and
WHEREAS, the City of Berkeley currently administers a number of transparent and competitive RFP processes for community-based organizations, one of which totals $15.5 million annually to fund vital services such as youth programs, housing rehabilitation, disability services, employment support, healthcare, homelessness services, legal assistance, and senior care; and
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the City of Berkeley will establish an open and transparent process for community-based organizations seeking emergency funding outside the RFP or other standard procurement mechanisms; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the City of Berkeley will cap emergency funding allocations at a maximum of $25,000 annually per Berkeley-based nonprofit or public organization, with a total budget of $225,000 annually for up to nine community-based organizations serving Berkeley residents; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that any budget referrals for Berkeley-based nonprofit or public organizations exceeding $25,000 must be accompanied by a formal Request for Proposal (RFP) process to ensure fair and equal access for all Berkeley organizations providing similar services; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the City shall create and maintain a dedicated webpage hosting a “Declaration of Need” application form to ensure equitable access to information about emergency funding opportunities, including submission deadlines; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the “Declaration of Need” form shall be concise to minimize the administrative burden on applicants but must include a clear explanation of the purpose and justification for the emergency funding request; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that funding will only be allocated to organizations that are registered nonprofits and have filed an Internal Revenue Service Form 990, or equivalent financial documentation, to demonstrate accountability; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that all organizations receiving emergency funding must submit progress documentation at six months and a final report at 12 months to verify that funds were used for their stated purposes; and

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7110 ● Fax: (510) 981-7111 E-Mail: [email protected]
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that these requirements shall apply retroactively to any undisbursed funds previously approved in FY 2024-25 and to all future grants and allocations beginning in January 2025, ensuring the responsible stewardship of public funds and adherence to principles of fairness, equity, transparency, and accountability.

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, Floor 5, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7130 ● E-Mail: [email protected]

CONSENT CALENDAR
April 15, 2025
To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
From: Councilmember Ben Bartlett (Author)
Subject: Celebración Cultural Sylvia Mendez (Spring Cultural Celebration) by the Sylvia Mendez School PTA: Relinquishment of Council Office Budget Funds to General Fund and Grant of Such Funds

RECOMMENDATION
Adopt a Resolution approving the expenditure of funds, including $1,500 from the discretionary council office budget of Councilmember Ben Bartlett, to the Sylvia Mendez Elementary School PTA to host a Spring Cultural Celebration event on April 27, 2025, on campus. The funds will be relinquished to the City’s General Fund from the discretionary council office budget of Councilmember Ben Bartlett and the discretionary council office budgets of any other City Councilmembers who would like to contribute.

BACKGROUND
This year, the Berkeley Unified School District’s (BUSD) only Two-Way Immersion school, Sylvia Mendez Elementary (Sylvia Mendez), will host a Cultural Celebration to celebrate the global heritage, various nationalities, and other cultures important to its community. Community members are creating teams to determine the information, tastes, crafts, dress, music, and performances they want to share at the event.

This is the third year of the event. In previous years, teams were formed to represent the following cultures: Eritrea, Mexico, Chile, Cuba, Canada, African American, Croatia, Farm & Garden, Rainbow Families, and Venezuela. Meals were catered by different local ethnic restaurants and supplemented by some of the teams with homemade foods. In addition, the tables shared cultural music in a community playlist, and there was live music. In all, the participants shaped the events, which were well received by the community.

With such great success, the Sylvia Mendez PTA is hosting this event for the third consecutive time, maintaining the same goal of contextualizing our students' cultural influences, backgrounds, and much more. The funds requested are intended to offset some costs associated with the event. Therefore, they should be sent to the Sylvia Mendez PTA organization to distribute accordingly.

This parent-led committee is already funding most of the event's costs, which has been a reliable resource to offset budget shortfalls. The donations ultimately support the program guidelines laid out by BUSD (on the
Sylvia Mendez Elementary website1), which is to “develop 1 https://www.berkeleyschools.net/schools/elementary-schools/sylviamendez-elementary/

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2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, Floor 5, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7130 ● E-Mail: [email protected] long-lasting relationships and cultural appreciation for peers who are often separated by race and language.” This is further defined as the school's vision on its website2 “to seek to honor and understand families.”
Since the pandemic restrictions were lifted in 2022, Sylvia Mendez Elementary has hosted well- attended Spring Events. Scheduled late in the school year, they have proven crucial for the community. Facing heightened challenges this year due to on-site construction that began last summer and will continue at least through next school year, fostering relationships by building a greater understanding of families within and the development of our community is fundamental in uplifting morale.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
No negative impact.

FISCAL IMPACTS OF RECOMMENDATION
No General Fund impact; $1,500 is available from the discretionary council office budget of Councilmember Ben Bartlett.

The cost is Sylvia Mendez School PTA: Celebración Cultural (Spring Cultural Celebration).

CONTACT PERSON
Councilmember Ben Bartlett [email protected] James Chang [email protected]

ATTACHMENT

1. Resolution
2 https://www.sylviamendezschool.org/en/welcome-eng

2180 Milvia Street, Berkeley, Floor 5, CA 94704 ● Tel: (510) 981-7130 ● E-Mail: [email protected] Attachment 1
RESOLUTION NO. ##,###-N.S.

AUTHORIZE THE EXPENDITURE OF SURPLUS FUNDS FROM THE OFFICE EXPENSE

ACCOUNTS OF THE MAYOR AND COUNCILMEMBERS FOR A DONATION TO THE SYLVIA

MENDEZ SCHOOL PTA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR A SPRING CULTURAL CELEBRATION EVENT.

WHEREAS, Councilmember Ben Bartlett has surplus funds in his office expenditure account; and
WHEREAS, Sylvia Mendez School PTA, a California non-profit organization, will receive funds in the amount of $1,500 from Councilmember Ben Bartlett’s office expenditure account; and WHEREAS, the Sylvia Mendez School PTA supports equitable public education for students, families, and our community through grants and volunteer programs; and WHEREAS, the provisions of such services would fulfill the municipal public purpose of providing students and the youth with opportunities through educational programs and activities to encourage them to learn and embrace cultural diversity; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Berkeley that funds relinquished by the Mayor and Councilmembers from their office budgets, of an amount to be determined by each Councilmember, shall be granted to Sylvia Mendez School PTA for this purpose of supporting students and the youth in highlighting cultural heritage that forms the community of the student body.

CONSENT CALENDAR
April 15, 2025
Igor Tregub, Councilmember District 4
Shoshana O’Keefe, Councilmember District 5
Mark Humbert, Councilmember District 8
Adena Ishii, Mayor
To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
From: Councilmembers Igor Tregub (Co-Author), Shoshana O’Keefe (Co-Author), and Mark Humbert (Co-Author), and Mayor Adena Ishii (Co-Sponsor) Subject: Resolution Commemorating April 24, 2025, as Berkeley Holocaust Remembrance Day

RECOMMENDATION
Adopt a Resolution proclaiming April 24, 2025, as Holocaust Remembrance Day in the City of Berkeley, in memory of those who were murdered and in honor of the survivors as well as the rescuers and liberators; and committing to never forgetting the events of the Holocaust, actively working to combat antisemitism, racism, bigotry, and hatred in all forms, and promote human rights and dignity for all.

BACKGROUND
This year, the City of Berkeley will hold its 22nd Annual Holocaust Remembrance Day. The program will take place virtually on April 24, 2025.

The Holocaust was a crime of unimaginable inhumanity, in which six million Jews were targeted for persecution and death—alongside the Roma and Sinti peoples, individuals with mental illness and physical disabilities, members of the queer community, Slavs, Poles, and those who were part of anti-Nazi resistance networks across Europe.

Berkeley’s Annual Holocaust Remembrance Day honors the memory of those who were murdered and those who survived. It gives voice to survivors and their families and invites the broader Bay Area community to reflect on this horrific chapter in human history—so that we may learn from it and choose differently.

16

As false information about the Holocaust spreads, and as antisemitism1,2,3, racism, and violence against historically targeted and oppressed communities continue to rise4, the importance of remembering becomes ever more urgent. Holocaust Remembrance Day offers a vital space to stand against antisemitism, bigotry, and hatred in all forms, to uphold human rights and dignity and reaffirm our resolve to never forget.

FISCAL IMPACTS
None.

CONTACT
Councilmember Tregub, 510-981-7140, [email protected] Councilmember O’Keefe, 510-981-7150, [email protected] Councilmember Humbert, 510-981-7180, [email protected] Attachments:

1. Resolution
1 https://www.adl.org/resources/press-release/us-antisemitic-incidents-skyrocketed-360-aftermath-attack-israel- according
2 https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-releases-2023-hate-crime-report-highlights- continued
3 https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2025-03- 18%20Special%20Item%2001%202024%20Berkeley%20Police%20Department.pdf; https://bpd-transparency- initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/pages/current-trends 4 https://abcnews.go.com/US/hate-crimes-lgbtq-community-rise-fbi-data/story?id=113962673

RESOLUTION NO. ##,###-N.S.

COMMEMORATING APRIL 24, 2025, AS BERKELEY HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE DAY WHEREAS, the Holocaust was a crime of shocking inhumanity, targeting for persecution and death, six million Jews as well as the Roma and Sinti people, those with mental illness and physical disabilities, members of the Queer community, Slavs, Poles, and members of anti-Nazi networks from throughout Europe; and
WHEREAS, Holocaust Remembrance Day serves as an imperative reminder of the appalling crimes and atrocities of the Holocaust so that we may keep them in our memory and continue to condemn them for generations to come; and
WHEREAS, false information on the Holocaust continues to distort, deny, and trivialize the horrendous truth about what took place during the Nazi regimes; and WHEREAS, in January 2024, the Anti-Defamation League reported skyrocketing antisemitic incidents in the U.S., having recorded a total of 3,291 antisemitic incidents in the prior three months, a 361-percent increase compared to the same period one year prior5; and WHEREAS, anti-Jewish bias events in California rose from 189 in 2022 to 289 in 2023, an increase of 52.9%, according to the California Attorney General6; and WHEREAS, the Berkeley Police Department reports that, since October of 2023, there has been an increase overall in the number of anti-Jewish hate incidents and that, in 2024, Anti-Jewish hate crimes made up 18.6% of overall hate crimes, the third-highest category and one of only three categories that are in the double digits7; and
WHEREAS, prejudice, violence and crimes against other communities that historically have been targeted, oppressed or disadvantaged have been rising in recent years8; and WHEREAS, the purpose of Berkeley’s Holocaust Remembrance Day is to come together as a community to remember the Holocaust, to honor survivors who chose to rebuild their lives in Berkeley and the Bay Area, and to reflect on the need to respect all people NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Berkeley City Council does hereby proclaim April 24, 2025, as Holocaust Remembrance Day in the City of Berkeley, in memory of those who were murdered and in honor of the survivors as well as the rescuers and liberators; and 5 https://www.adl.org/resources/press-release/us-antisemitic-incidents-skyrocketed-360-aftermath-attack-israel- according
6 https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-releases-2023-hate-crime-report-highlights- continued
7 https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2025-03- 18%20Special%20Item%2001%202024%20Berkeley%20Police%20Department.pdf; https://bpd-transparency- initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/pages/current-trends 8 https://abcnews.go.com/US/hate-crimes-lgbtq-community-rise-fbi-data/story?id=113962673