Beverly Hills City Council
July 2, 2024

WRITTEN PUBLIC

COMMENTS RECEIVED
From: Lee Pasternak
To: City Clerk
Subject: E 1, 9229 Wilshire
Date: Tuesday, July 2, 2024 6:14:57 PM
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Please read my comment at the meeting.

To Our Beverly Hills City Council,
It seems to me that the comments which should be given the most weight are those of residents who will be most affected by this project.

I am not in a position to review all of the comments, but I am aware of some comments in support of the project which should not be given much weight.

One is by one Rita Bofman and I wonder if she is even a person who actually exists. A similar comment was sent in to the February 8 planning commission meeting, but that time she used the name Henriette Rita Bofman who supposedly lives in the 500 north block of Maple, nowhere close to the project, and therefore would not be affected if she does exist. She is not listed as a BH voter, and we find no references to her from the usual search companies or any internet reference to her whatsoever other than having made comments on this project. Could these be fake comments?
Another comment favoring the project is one by Grant Sheehan who lives at , who will not be affected at all by this project.

We also have a comment approving of the project by one Spencer Scharff who does not mention where he lives but we believe that he is a century city attorney, perhaps associated with the builder, who appears to live in the block of .

On a different subject, we were contacted by a developer who does not want to oppose another developer, but he has strongly indicted that this wouldn’t be a good project for the area, not only because it is way out of scale to the nearby single family residences, but he thought that multiple families will rent the larger units, and that it hasten proven that where there are interior hallways in buildings which house multiple families, it results in problems with crime. Just something to think about.

Thank you.

Lee Pasternak

The increased traffic and lack of parking can lead to safety issues, particularly in residential areas. Increased street congestion can pose risks to pedestrians, especially children, and might slow down emergency response times if vehicles are unable to park or navigate efficiently
I respectfully urge the city council and planning commission to reconsider the parking provisions for the new 8-story project. Adequate parking is crucial to maintaining the quality of life for current residents and ensuring that new developments integrate.

This should be comparable with the other buildings in the area.

Thank you for concerning our safety and our residence.

Thank you very much,
"My commitment is to provide individualized client care, premier service from beginning to end & to make each real estate transaction a positive experience for all those involved."

July 2, 2024
To: City Clerk
Re: Agenda item E1 9229 Wilshire Blvd.

Honorable Mayor and Councilpersons:

As a long-time resident (47 years), a former employee, a former Commissioner, and someone who lives in close proximity to the above project, I am writing to put forth my objections. I intended to be at the meeting to but find I have an obligatory conflicting meeting.

If I am correct, the City has a General Plan and Zoning laws (3 stories – 45’) which lay out how the City should look, how future developments should fit in, and how to keep the balance between commercial and residential. This project defies those Plans.

First, yes, Wilshire is a commercial corridor and has some larger buildings.

However, this particular corner is still primarily low rise.

Second, it is way too big for the parcel on which it is to be developed. It will totally block any sun from neighboring homes.

Third, it will impact traffic beyond tolerance. I live on Palm and the traffic is a nightmare now. I sometimes have to wait close to five minutes to cross Palm, Dayton, Clifton, or Maple when walking my dog to avoid us both being killed.

Fourth, it is only luck that no one has been killed in any of the accidents at the intersections of any of those streets. I realize that that is a result of bad or distracted drivers not stopping at boulevard stops but just a few days ago there was a roll-over accident. Increasing the number of cars using these streets both during construction and afterward will just increase the problem.

Fifth, there is not enough parking projected.

Sixth, if this project is allowed to proceed, it will open the way for more massive structures thereby totally changing the area.

The present neighboring buildings on Wilshire have been great neighbors.

The area has maintained its charm and beauty. Even the newly built large single-family homes have not impacted the current resident’s enjoyment of their homes. I fear this will not be the case if this project is allowed to go through at its current height.

Thank you.

Sonia Berman

Beverly Hills, California 90210
310-285-1162
[email protected]
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F om Da ian Bo eaux
To Ci y Cle k Alexand a Sm lle
Cc <a ia@dt usa com> Sab na Venskus emoelle @lawsv com
Subject 9229 W lshi e Tomo ow Night
Date Monday July 1 2024 2 31 43 M
Attachments h - -

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I would like this diagram to be presented to the council members and also I want o be able to show it on the monitors when I speak tomorrow night on E 1 and some others may want o use it as well.

Can you please confirm that such a showing will be set up? Thank you.

Darian
(310) 270-7221 (cell)

We do not contend that 9229 Wilshire is not entitled to additional height, but it is not entitled to unlimited height, and the Bankers Hill project in a high rise zone, has no application to the 9229 Wilshire project.

Thank you.

Darian
(cell)

From: Morris emanuel
To: City Clerk
Subject: Maple & Wilshire project
Date: Tuesday, July 2, 2024 12:03:25 PM
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Hello there: Hope this email finds you well.

My name is Morris Emanuel owner of the property at
Maple Dr has been one the most beautiful, safe and family friendly streets which is the result of caring and attention of the city and city staff for long time.

It is so heartbreaking to know all these hard work to keep Maple Dr the way it is and has been now will fade away with this new project to build a 8 stories building on wilshire and Maple. Which will bring lots of car traffic and unknown people. Just imagining our kids won’t be able to play on the street with peace of mind and god knows what other upcoming trouble that this project will bring into our neighborhood is mind-boggling.

I would like to ask all respectful members of the city to please reconsider and stop this project. So our neighborhood will stay as beautiful and safe as city of Beverly Hills worked for it.

Thank you
Morris Emanuel

I understand that the builder is seeking much greater height than he is entitled to, even given the density bonus, and that he succeeded by assuring that the city would be threatened with an even larger Builder’s Remedy project.

If they were serious about the Builder’s Remedy project, they wouldn’t have to bother with this proposed monstrosity. I understand that the Builder’s Remedy project has the very same very hideous appearance, again telling us that the developer and owners are working in concert.

And if the owners are so motivated to pursue the Builder’s Remedy, why do they continue to display an “Available” sign on their building? Since the owners only have until mid-August to perfect their Builder’s Remedy application, why not continue this hearing to after that time, so we can see what we are actually working with. After all, if they really wanted to build that huge repulsive building, they would do it anyway.

Or, let the Planning Commission exercise their discretion which they were prevented from doing by being erroneously directed by the city attorney’s office, that the law required them to approve the project.

I appreciate your time and consideration.

Nancy Heimler

developer bully us into approving something that our planning commission did not want and that we, who have so much invested, do not want. Send the matter back to the planning commission so they can do what they do.

Thank you.

Saeed and Mary Javaheri
Sent from Saeed’s iPhone

From: Eric Lavi
To: City Clerk
Subject: 9229 Wilshire -AGAINST
Date: Monday, July 1, 2024 8:42:16 PM
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Hello. I am a resident at . I have lived here with my family for over 20 years.

I am completely against this project that will totally ruin our neighborhood and the city. Please reject this development in its current state.

I am opposed to such a giant tall building being brought here.

Thank you,
Eric Lavi
Sent from my iPhone

From: [email protected]
To: City Clerk
Subject: Concerns Regarding Project at 9229 Wilshire Blvd Date: Tuesday, July 2, 2024 4:28:48 PM
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Dear Councilmembers,
I am writing to express my deep concerns regarding the proposed project at 9229 Wilshire Blvd. I believe that this project poses significant dangers to our community and should not be approved.

The proposed project raises several issues that are of great concern to me and other members of the community. The increased traffic congestion and potential safety hazards that may result from this development are particularly troubling. The current infrastructure in the area is already strained, and adding more vehicles and pedestrians to the mix could exacerbate existing problems.

Furthermore, the proposed project does not seem to align with the character of our community. The scale and design of the development are out of place with the surrounding area and could negatively impact the quality of life for residents.

I urge you to carefully consider the potential negative impacts of this project on our community and to reject the proposal. It is important that any development in our city be in line with the needs and values of the residents who call this area home.

1 603 WEST OJAI AVE., SUITE F
OJAI, CALIFORNIA 93023
TEL: 805-272-8628
700 SOUTH FLOWER ST., SUITE 1000
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017
TEL: 213-482-4200
July 1, 2024

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City Council
City of Beverly Hills
455 N. Rexford Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
Email:

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City Council Member: [email protected]
Re: Letter Supporting Appeal of the City of Beverly Hills Planning Commission’s Approval of Design Plan Review, Density Bonus Permit and Finding of CEQA Exemption for a Proposed Mixed-Used Development at 9229 Wilshire Boulevard
Dear Honorable City Councilmembers;
This firm and the undersigned represent appellant Mr. Aria Ahdoot, as well as the Beverly Hills Citizens Coalition (“BHCC”), a non-profit organization (hereinafter 2 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
collectively referred to as “our clients”).
1 BHCC’s mission is to ensure balanced growth
that supports truly affordable housing for those in need, while working to ensure new developments fit in with the surrounding neighborhood so as to preserve the City of Beverly Hills’ unique culture, community, and environment. Our clients advocate for affordable housing, but this Project does not provide the requisite amount of truly affordable housing; instead, it provides a windfall to real estate speculators and developers at the expense of the community.2 Indeed, this proposed development would severely and adversely impact the surrounding neighborhood and broader Beverly Hills community in exchange for a pittance of supposedly affordable housing units.3 The City can and must do better for affordable housing and require many, many more truly affordable housing units in this project.

We submit this letter in support of Appellant’s appeal that was submitted by Mr.

Ahdoot in response to the Beverly Hills Planning Commission’s (“Planning Commission”) approval of the Design Plan Review and Density Bonus Permit for the Project proposed for 9229 Wilshire Boulevard (hereinafter “Project”). Such approval seeks to allow a mixed-use development project that represents an 86% increase in height over and above the height standard, with no setback whatsoever from the alley (ie, zero amount of distance) abutting a residential neighborhood, causing pedestrian and traffic dangers, and severely impacting the neighborhood. Our client has appealed the Planning Commission’s approval of the entitlements for the Project, and the Planning Commission’s finding that the Project is exempt from environmental review (ie, the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) requirement) pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).

Appellant urges the City Council to uphold the appeal and reject the application and the legally deficient analysis performed by the Planning Commission. We submit that the Project application cannot be approved since it violates, inter alia, the City’s Design Review requirements, the California State Density Bonus Law (DBL) (California Government Code [Government Code] §§ 65915, et seq.), and CEQA (Public Resources Code §§21000, et seq).
1 Please keep this office on the list of interested persons to receive timely notice of all hearings, votes, determinations, and official filings related to the above-referenced matter as well as any filings pertinent to the property at 9229 Wilshire Boulevard. 2 Exh 1, article by Michael Friedrich, https://newrepublic.com/article/179147/case-againstyimbyism-yimbytown2024#:~:text=A%20decade%20since%20the%20YIMBY,t%20solve%20the%20housing%20crisi swhich; and Vacancy Report.
3 See state income limits at Exh 2, also located at
https://www.hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/files/docs/grants-and-funding/income-limits-2024.pdf 3 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
In addition, the developer has submitted two different project applications on the same property,
4 both of which are in front of the City simultaneously, yet set to be reviewed at two different times, confusing the public and constituting a violation of due process. In the alternative to simply overturning the Planning Commission’s approval of the Project and voting to reject the present Project Application (hereinafter “First Application”), we request that the City Council continue this matter5until after the developer’s other application (hereinafter “Second Application”) is processed so that the public and the Council can be fully apprised of what Project is truly being proposed for the property at 9229 Wilshire Boulevard.6
I. The City’s Process of Considering Two Separate Applications For Two Different Developments At the Exact Same Address Undermines Local Planning Decisions, and Violates CEQA, Appellant’s Constitutional Due Process Rights, And the Public’s Right To Notice of, and To Meaningfully Participate in, Land Use Decisions.

In California, transparency and public participation are fundamental principles governing land use decisions, particularly in the realm of development projects. The issue at hand involves a developer submitting two separate development applications, with the apparent intent for them to be processed independently by the city planning department with the goal of using a larger project’s application as leverage on the City Council to approve the other smaller project’s application.
7 This behavior and strategy raises
significant problems regarding the public’s right to access accurate and comprehensive information about proposed projects. Proceeding with the present appeal without the full picture of the Second Application violates California law, our client’s due process rights and undermines the public’s right to meaningful participation in the planning process. 4 The second application was filed for the Property on April 15, 2024. We hereby incorporate herein all records included in City Planning files for both applications. 5 The Council may “refer the matter back to the board, commission, or official, with directions for further consideration, or the Council may reverse, affirm, or modify the decision or may make such decision or determination as may appear just and reasonable.” Beverly Hills Municipal Code (BHMC) § 1-4-107.
6 The Ralph M. Brown Act (“Brown Act”), codified as Section 54950 et seq., states that the public must be permitted to comment on every item on the agenda. (E.g., Section 54954.3(a).) It is questionable whether the July 2, 2024 agenda is proper under the Brown Act, but in any event, since the developer appears to be attempting to use the Second Application as leverage to attempt to get the City Council to approve its First Application, agendizing the two applications separately means that the public is not able to fully participate meaningfully on the consequences of the Council’s action to either approve or disapprove the First Application. 7 Exh. 3 [City Planner Michael Forbes’ email].
4 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
A. Violation of CEQA Principles
Under CEQA, the public has a right to be informed about the environmental impacts of proposed projects and to participate in the environmental review process.

CEQA requires a full disclosure of the environmental effects of a project, which includes disclosing the scope, location, and nature of the project. Allowing a developer to file two separate applications for the same project obscures the true scope and environmental impacts of the development. This lack of clarity directly contravenes the purpose of CEQA, which is to ensure informed decision-making and public participation. (See Section III and IV, below for specific CEQA violations.) B. Violation of Due Process and Fair Notice
The due process clause of the California Constitution guarantees individuals and communities fair notice and an opportunity to be heard in governmental proceedings affecting their rights. As a land use appellant in a quasi-adjudicatory proceeding, our clients, are entitled to receive a fair hearing (including notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard) before the Planning Commission and the City Council.8 Moreover, the Beverly Hill Municipal Code (BHMC) requires the City to process applications in a manner that comports with “justice.”9 Processing two separate applications for what could be a single project undermines these principles by depriving the public and Appellant of clear and accurate information. Residents and stakeholders have a right to know the full extent and details of a proposed development to effectively participate in public hearings, submit comments, and raise concerns. Allowing fragmented applications leads to confusion, reduced participation, and an unfair advantage to the developer in shaping public perception and regulatory outcomes.

The two applications submitted simultaneously is clear evidence that the developer and/or their attorneys are trying to game the land use process resulting in due process violations of our clients and the neighborhood. The current notices given to the public are confusing - in fact the appeal notice and the developer's Second Application 8 Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605.
9 “The provisions of this code and all proceedings under it are to be construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.” BHMC § 1-1.04; see also BHMC §1-1.07 [the Council “may make such decision or determination as may appear just and reasonable in the light of the evidence”].
5 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
notice are posted side-by-side on the current 9229 Wilshire building.10 The City Staff even admits the two simultaneous applications are “confusing.”11 Therefore, the City Council should vote to continue the hearing on the appeal12 until the City knows which development project the developer actually wants -- the current project on appeal or the Second Application’s project. Doing otherwise will undermine the public’s confidence in the City Council’s decision on the Project: If the Council approves the present Project on this record, the public will not know whether the decision was based on the evidence and the law or on the threat by the Developer to follow through on a larger project application (i.e., the threat of the highly contested and questionable “Builder’s Remedy” and potential litigation flowing from the shifting legal grounds on which it stands).13 The developer is running a shell game, and the City Planning Department appears to be condoning it by allowing two separate development application proceedings to continue with respect to the same property. No meaningful public input can be given when the public cannot discern what Project is truly being pursued by the developer. The public is on its back foot in proceedings in which recommendations by Staff capitulate to developers who have no incentive to reduce harm to the community, but to maximize monetary value on their property. The Planning Commission’s disregard of public interest participants, the City’s enormous appeal filing fees in the thousands of dollars, and the City’s failure to set over this matter until it is heard with the Second Application, demonstrate an institutional bias in favor of private developers,14 15 is a major threat to the community, and undermines fairness, public participation and due process.16 Furthermore, Appellant was not placed on the interested parties list for the property at 9229 Wilshire and thus was not informed of the Second Application until he walked by the property and saw the notice of Second Application posted. Appellant then learned that the Second Application was filed just after he had filed the present appeal, having spent over $6500 to file said appeal (an amount that is unconstitutional, as further argued below).
10 Exh. 4 [images of notices].
11 Exh. 3.
12 In the alternative, the Council could “refer the matter back to the commission,” to “rehear the matter,” and include both applications in one proceeding. BHMC §1-4-105. 13 The use of alternative project applications to influence the City to approve the first one also calls into question the legal validity of the City’s findings on the Project, as they could be a subterfuge for approving a Project for reasons other than on the record. 14 As evidenced by City Planning personnel’s comments concerning the applications. See Exh. 3. 15 Exhibit 5 [email exchange with city planner Smille]. 16 See Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977. 6 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
C. Violation of Design Plan Review
A developer does not have the unfettered right to develop its property in any manner it chooses, but must conform to reasonable regulations.17 The City’s Design Plan Review procedure requires an applicant to complete Planning Form P-09. The Developer’s P-09 left blank the Project Description, which requires a developer to “Explain the overall scope of the project, including other project elements that are not part of the Development Plan Review Request.”18 As even the developer’s attorney admitted, “cities must assess the validity of waivers based on projects as they are proposed rather than as they may theoretically be designed…”19 Here, there are two proposals, creating a confusion as to what is theoretical and what is ultimately proposed, and violating Design Plan Review regulations.

C. Potential for Abuse and Circumvention of Local Planning Regulations Local planning regulations are designed to ensure that developments comply with zoning ordinances, land use plans, and community standards. Allowing a developer to file multiple applications for what is essentially a single development on the same property could enable them to circumvent these regulations. If the City condones this Developer’s strategy, it will encourage future developers, for instance, to strategically divide a larger project into smaller parts to exploit loopholes or avoid certain regulatory requirements that would apply to a larger, consolidated project. This undermines the integrity of the planning process and diminishes the ability of local authorities to enforce consistent and fair development standards.

D. Precedent and Consistency in Decision-Making
Consistency in decision-making is crucial for maintaining public trust in the planning process. Allowing separate processing of two applications that are effectively part of the same project sets a problematic precedent. It could create confusion among city planners, elected officials, and the public regarding the true nature and scope of the development. Decisions made based on incomplete or misleading information could lead to unintended consequences for the community and erode confidence in local government.
17 HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 508, 515. 18 Development Plan Review Application, at p. 6, (emphasis added). 19 Snow Letter, December 21, 2023, at p.3 [emphasis added]. 7 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
In conclusion, permitting a developer to file two separate housing development applications and process them independently by the city planning department in California raises serious legal and policy concerns. It jeopardizes the public’s right to accurate information, participate meaningfully in the land use planning process, and undermines the integrity of local planning regulations. Therefore, it is imperative that city officials uphold transparency, consistency, and adherence to legal requirements when considering such applications to protect the public interest and ensure fair and informed decision-making.

To avoid these violations and issues, the present appeal hearing must be postponed until the Second Application is either deemed complete by the City or one or both Applications are formally rejected or abandoned.

II. The $6,694.00 Appeal Fee Is Unconstitutional
Adding insult to injury on the constitutional and fairness fronts, the City required Appellant to pay an exorbitant fee to file the present appeal, in the amount of $6,694.00.

This fee impacts Appellant’s right to minimum procedural due process on its appeal.20 The four-figure filing fee is outlandish and places an undue burden on administrative appellants (such as and including our client) and thus represents a violation of our client’s due process rights. In addition, this fee violates our client’s rights under Article I, section 3 of the California constitution.21 Since pursuing an administrative appeal of the Project is required for Appellant to access both the City Council and the courts, charging this exorbitant fee implicates the right of access arising from the right to “petition the government for redress of grievances” contained in article I, section 3, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.22 The fee of $6,694.00 is nowhere near constitutionally reasonable as evidenced by the fact that the amount charged by the City is nowhere near the amount most cities would charge an administrative appellant. For example, the appeal fee in the City of Los Angeles is $166.
23 If the City of Beverly Hills is to so prevent
access to the City Council by administrative appellants such as our client, an appellant that represents the public interest and the people who will be impacted by approvals, we question the propriety and fairness of the underlying process employed by the City Council in making these decisions. In any event, our client objects to this fee and demands that the unreasonable portion above $200 ($6,494) be reimbursed to him. 20 See Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605.
21 See e.g., Lubin v. Panish (1974) 415 U.S. 709 [requiring payment of high filing fee violates First and Fourteenth Amend rights].
22 Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 814, 821. 23 LAMC Article 9, sec. 19.01(B)[appeal to City Council of a project].

City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
8 III. The Developer Is Engaging In Illegal Piecemealing Under CEQA An environmental impact report (EIR), the heart of the California Environmental Quality Act, is, with narrow exceptions, required whenever a public agency proposes to undertake or approve a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. Its purpose is to provide public agencies and the general public with detailed information about the proposed project's likely environmental impacts; to list ways those effects might be minimized; and to identify alternatives to the project as proposed.24 The EIR protects the environment and helps ensure enlightened public debate by informing the public and its responsible officials of the environmental consequences of their decisions before they are made.25
A CEQA “project” is “an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment” and refers to “the whole of an action[.]”26 “[E]nvironmental analysis ‘should be prepared as early as feasible in the planning process to enable environmental considerations to influence project program and design and yet late enough to provide meaningful information for environmental assessment.’”27 Further, “CEQA forbids ‘piecemeal’ review of the significant environmental impacts of a project,”28 and “[t]his standard is consistent with the principle that ‘environmental considerations do not become submerged by chopping a large project up into many little ones – each with a minimal impact on the environment – which cumulatively may have disastrous consequences.’”29
The anti-piecemealing rule provides that an EIR must include an analysis of the environmental effects of future expansion or other action if: (1) it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the initial project; and (2) the future expansion or action will be significant in that it will likely change the scope or nature of the initial project or its environmental effects.30
24 Pub. Resources Code, § 21061.
25 Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California (2023) 88 Cal. App. 5th 656, 656.
26 Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1220. 27 Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 395.
28 Berkeley Keep Jets Over The Bay Com. v. Board of Port Comr’s. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1358.
29 Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 396.
30 Make UC a Good Neighbor, supra, 88 Cal. App. 5th 656, 683. 9 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
Here, the scope of the Project includes both the First Application and the Second Application, as evidenced by the same property location, the same purposes of the applications (mixed-use development) and by the fact that the developer is apparently using the Second Application as a cudgel to force the First Application to be approved. 31 In that sense, it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the first proposed project.

Even the Developer seems to be mixing up the First and Second Applications: in its latest letter responding to the appeal, it relied on the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), which is not relevant in the First Application, but rather to the Second Application.32 Just because the Developer self-servingly describes the two development applications “different” and “unrelated,”33 does not make it so. The City cannot approve the first proposed Project on the record before it without running afoul of CEQA’s prohibition on piecemealing.

IV. The Description of the “Project” Under Review and Consideration is Misleading and Incomplete and Therefore Approval of the Project Would be an Abuse of Discretion.

A project is “an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment”34 undertaken, supported, or approved by a public agency. The term “project” refers to the whole of the action and to the underlying physical action being approved, not to each government approval.35 “’Project’ is given a broad interpretation in order to maximize protection of the environment.”36 Here, the conduct by the Developer in proposing alternative project descriptions for the same mixed-use purpose on the same property renders the project description for the CEQA exemption invalid.37 It is undisputed that the outcome of the First Application will trigger the Developer’s completion of the Second Application and thus the procedural split of the two results in the “fallacy of 31 Exh. 3.
32 Snow letter, at p. 3.
33 In response to City Planning’s request on behalf of the Appellant to move the present hearing out until the second application is heard, the developer responded, “The builder’s remedy application is a separate application for a different and unrelated project. This appeal hearing is for the project that the Planning Commission approved.” Exh. 5 [email from City Planner Alexandria Smille].
34 Pub. Res. Code § 21065.
35 Guidelines §15378(c).
36 McQueen v. Bd. of Dirs. (1988) 202 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1143 37 Id. at 1143-47 [Court ruled the project description invalid for an exemption due to being incomplete and misleading].
10 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
division” (ie, “overlooking its cumulative impact by separately focusing on isolated parts of the whole”) which is disallowed by CEQA.38
An unstable and incomplete project description “stultifies” public participation.39 Courts have held that “[o]nly through an accurate view of the project may affected outsiders and public decision makers balance the proposal’s benefit against its environmental cost, consider mitigation measures, assess the advantage of terminating the proposal [] and weigh other alternatives in the balance.”40 Thus, approval of the Project with a CEQA exemption under these circumstances would be an abuse of discretion and a violation of CEQA.

V. Even if the Project Description Could Be Considered Valid, The Project Cannot Be Approved With A CEQA Exemption.

Despite the fact that this Project more than doubles the amount of stories allowed and represents an 86 percent increase over the allowable height, massively increasing density abutting a low-density residential area, the Project did not undergo any public environmental review of potential impacts on the environment, including the surrounding neighborhood, or consider mitigation of those impacts. This is because the developer claimed that the Project qualified for a CEQA “Infill” exemption under CEQA Guidelines Section 15332 (hereinafter Section 15332 Categorical Exemption) and the Planning Commission summarily accepted that claim. Because the Project does not meet the criteria under CEQA Guidelines section 15332, the Planning Commission’s categorical exemption determination was in error, and the Project cannot be approved without full environmental review in the form of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR).

A. The Section 15332 Categorical Exemption cannot apply because the Project is not consistent with all applicable General Plan policies.

The use of the Section 15332 Categorical Exemption provision requires, among other provisions, consistency with “the applicable general plan designation and all applicable general plan policies as well as the applicable zoning designation and regulations.” As noted in United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1097, consistency with “all applicable general plan policies” does not mean consistency with just some policies. 38 Id. at 1144.
39 San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 656. 40 County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) Cal.App.3d at 71 Cal. App. 3d 188, 192-193. 11 City of Beverly Hills
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The Project is demonstrably inconsistent with a number of the General Plan’s objectives and policies, and zoning regulations, most notably height. According to the General Plan Land Use Map, the maximum building height allowed for Commercial, Low Density General is 45 feet. The project currently proposes a mixed-use building with eight stories (up to approximately 84 feet) in height, including rooftop common space and appurtenances. Thus, the Project does not conform to the General Plan requirement.

BHMC §§10-3-1880 and 10-3-2804 establish the maximum allowable height for development proposed in the City’s MU Overlay Zone. The project site is located in Height District A and subject to a maximum allowable height of 45’. The developer is requesting a waiver to allow additional height (38’-11”) for a total maximum building height of 83’-11”. Thus, the Project would be nearly double the allowable height and thus cannot utilize the CEQA infill exemption.41
BHMC §§10-3-1880 and 10-3-2804 establish the maximum number of stories allowed for development proposed in the City’s MU Overlay Zone. The project site is located in Height District A and subject to a maximum of three (3) stories. The developer is requesting a waiver to allow an additional five stories, to include the fourth through seventh stories of the project, as well as the proposed 180 SF of rooftop restrooms, which is counted as an eighth story to the building in the BHMC. Thus, the Project would exceed the maximum number of stories by more than double. The Project is inconsistent with this requirement and thus cannot utilize the CEQA infill exemption.42 BHMC §10-3-1952.A. establishes the required setbacks for development of projects located in the City’s Commercial-Residential Transition Area. Pursuant to this section, a nonresidential site that abuts an alley separating a nonresidential zone from a residential zone, no structure or improvement shall be located within 6’-0” of the edge of the alley. The developer is requesting a waiver to allow for a reduction in the required rear setback. The proposal would reduce the required setback to NONE, or 0’-0”. This is a clear inconsistency with the setback requirement and thus the CEQA exemption cannot apply.43
41 The Project is not eligible for a waiver due to adverse impacts upon public health and safety as detailed herein.
42 The Project is not eligible for a waiver due to adverse impacts upon public health and safety as detailed herein.
43 The Project is not eligible for a waiver due to adverse impacts upon public health and safety as detailed herein.
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BHMC § 10-3-1955 states that “it shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any building, structure, or improvement, or any part thereof, on a site located in a nonresidential zone and located adjacent to a residential zone unless all of the following conditions are met:
**
C. No loading dock faces any residential use; provided, however, this subsection shall not apply to any site which is not a corner site and which abuts an alley which separates the nonresidential zone from the residential zone; and D. The building, structure, or improvement is designed to allow for adequate sight lines for vehicular ingress to and egress from each adjacent residential use or alley.
(Emphasis added.)
The only ingress and egress for the commercial load-in for the Project will be located from the alley. Thus, any loading dock will face a residential use and since the Project is proposed on a corner site, it is not exempt from this requirement. Moreover, the gargantuan building abutting a residential neighborhood does not allow for adequate sight lines for ingress and egress from the alley.44 No waiver was requested for this requirement.45 As such, the Project is inconsistent with BHMC § 10-3-1955 and thus does not qualify for the CEQA infill exemption.

Moreover, the Developer’s CEQA Class 32 Report states that the Project will be required to obtain a permit pursuant to BHMC § 8-2-3, but the Project would not qualify for any of those permits for the Project’s commercial operational use of oversized vehicles. BHMC §8-2-3 provides:

Permits may be issued for the following types of activities under the provisions and conditions designated in this chapter:

A. Class A permits shall be required for the following types of activities:

1. Use of the public property in conjunction with construction type activity occurring on the abutting private premises, including the standing or parking of trucks or equipment; loading and unloading materials, and other related types of construction activity which impose a minor and temporary burden on public property.

2. Maintenance of construction barricades, canopies or protective walkways, provided further, no portion of any construction barricade, canopy, or walkway 44 Exh. 6 [images of the north side alley]. 45 As such, on a separate ground than CEQA, the Project cannot be approved as it does not comply with the requirement in BHMC § 10-3-1955 and thus cannot pass Design Plan Review.

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13 extends in any roadway, or extends a distance more than one foot (1') into any alley.

3. Repair, construction, or reconstruction of curbs, gutters, sidewalks, driveway approaches, and other types of surface improvements, not exceeding twenty thousand (20,000) square feet in area.

B. Class B permits shall be required for excavation and construction on public property, including, but not limited to, street and alley improvements, storm drains, sanitary sewers, and any excavation or construction of any kind or nature which is not authorized by a class A permit.

C. Class C permits shall be required in lieu of class A or class B permits, for all franchised public utilities to engage in any type of excavation, or physical disturbances or intrusion into public property for the purpose of constructing, repairing or maintaining franchised utilities.

D. Class D permits designating street routing shall be required for any truck in excess of six thousand (6,000) pounds, or in excess of eight feet six inches (8'6") in width, which is engaged in hauling debris, excavated or fill material, or equipment from any site in which a grading or demolition permit has been issued under provisions of the building code; or for the hauling of materials or equipment in conjunction with any class A, class B, or class C permit issued under this section.

The Developer cannot rely on obtaining this permit, therefore, to determine traffic impacts will be less than significant. On the contrary, since the commercial load-in during operation of the Project will be using a narrow public alley abutted by curbs and utilizing a small ingress and egress driveway to back into the Project, there will be significant impacts to traffic and access to Maple Drive from Palm Drive. 46 The Project is also inconsistent with Policy LU 5.7 entitled “Neighborhood Transitions” which requires the City to “Regulate the setback, rear elevation design of buildings, and landscaping of backyards where neighborhoods of differing housing type and density abut to assure smooth transitions in scale, form, and character.” There is by no stretch of the imagination a “smooth transition in scale, form and character” between the Project and the residential area to the north. No attempt has been made to provide any setback, moderate the rear elevation of the building or provide rear landscaping (aside from the scant landscaping to take place atop the building’s 8 stories, which can hardly be considered a buffer between the mammoth building façade and the abutting residential 46 Exh. 6 [images of curbs].
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homes). The following image from the developer’s schematics illustrates the failure to provide a smooth transition between the Project and the abutting residential homes:

In addition, the following rendering demonstrates the lack of smooth transition, as seen from Maple Drive:

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15 Instead of ensuring a smooth transition in scale, form and character as part of the Project design, the Developer claims there is already a buffer between the Project and the residential neighborhood, stating that “[t]he project also has an approximate 35-feet wide parkway, alley, and planters along the northern portion of the project which creates a buffer zone to the neighboring single-family residences to the north. Additionally, the single-family residences currently have an eight-foot high wall between the residences and the proposed project, which would provide further buffer. This buffer helps ease the transition between different development types.” Clearly, these current features do not “buffer” the mammoth 8-story building from the one- and two- story residences to the north. Additionally, aside from the paultry “planters along the northern portion of the project,” none of the above-described features were brought about by the developer, yet were claimed by the developer as part of the “Project’s” buffer benefits. This is another example of the developer’s deceptive practices. Regardless, none of the features the developer points to (alley width, residential wall, and planters) provide a “smooth transition” in scale and character between the Project and the adjacent residences when the Project size represents an incredible sheer spike in elevation to 8 stories abutting a one- and two-story residential neighborhood. Thus, the Project is inconsistent with policy LU 5.7.

Beverly Hills General Plan Project Policy LU 2.1 entitled “City Places:

Neighborhoods, Districts, and Corridors” requires that the City must “Maintain and enhance the character, distribution, built form, scale, and aesthetic qualities of the City’s distinctive residential neighborhoods, business districts, corridors, and open spaces.” (Emphasis added.) The Planning Commission omitted the obvious inconsistency between 16 City of Beverly Hills
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the Project’s scale and the residential neighborhood it abuts, stating that “the proposed building design would be consistent with the visual character, form, scale, and aesthetics of other existing commercial buildings along Wilshire Boulevard and in the project area.” (Emphasis added.) There was no discussion of character, scale and built form of the immediately adjacent residential neighborhood, which by definition under Policy LU2.1, must also be considered. Clearly, the Project is inconsistent with this Policy (as the Project does not maintain, by any stretch of the imagination, the scale of the adjacent residential area) and thus not entitled to a CEQA exemption.

Because the Project is not in conformance with all applicable general plan policies, and zoning regulations, the Project does not meet the conditions specified in CEQA Guideline section 15322 for a CEQA Exemption.

B. The 15322 Categorical Exemption Does Not Apply Because Traffic Impacts Will Be Significant Due To The Project’s Incredibly Massive Additional Vehicle Trips Through A Narrow Alley Without Signals Or Setbacks.

Under CEQA, lead agencies (such as the City of Beverly Hills) must determine whether a proposed project has the potential to cause significant environmental impacts.

This determination must be based on factual data and scientific methods of analysis. The Planning Commission erred in approving the Project under a CEQA Guideline section 15332 Infill categorical exemption because it erroneously concluded that the project's traffic would have less than significant environmental effects.

Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates significant traffic impacts would result from the Project. The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Technical Memorandum shows the Project will add 548 average daily vehicle trips on weekdays, and a whopping 620 average daily trips on Saturdays alone, and will use the narrow North alley daily.. This is an extraordinary number of vehicles to use a 20-foot-wide alley. Even so, these numbers do not account for the number of cars for the commercial portion of the building, only for the new residents. The traffic analysis must include a full assessment of all daily vehicle trips estimated for the Project: commercial and residential.

Vehicular egress and ingress would be located on the northern portion of the project, accessible only via the one-way westbound alley from North Palm Drive, which is 20 feet wide. This means that all of the Project access traffic will travel through the unsignalized intersections at North Palm Drive and the alley, and the alley and Maple Drive. However, no analysis of the impact of the Project on the functioning and safety of 17 City of Beverly Hills
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these two intersections was addressed in the traffic analysis for the Project. The traffic analysis needs to be corrected to account for the correct peak hour traffic volumes that will result from the Project, especially since the GHG Technical Memorandum provides that nearly 500 to 600 average daily trips will occur using those intersections.47 The Project represents a high-level danger to pedestrians using the alley. Without the setback and with the average daily vehicle trip estimated to be over 500 to 600, the Project will force pedestrians to attempt to use a dangerous path along the tree ridgeline to the north of the alley driveway. The tree line path is not ADA compliant, has no cement sidewalks, only uneven asphalt, and most importantly, contains dangerous manhole covers maintained by SoCal Gas, one of which in recent years exploded.48 The Project will force a large amount of pedestrians who historically and currently use the alleyway (including school children and members of two local synagogues)49 to choose between the dangers of the tree line path or the dangers of the Project’s increased traffic in the alley. Furthermore, the neighborhoods surrounding this project contain sensitive populations more vulnerable to impacts on pedestrian safety, including children, the elderly, walking-dependent, and the low-income transit-dependent.

The rate of pedestrian injuries in an area is dependent on several environmental factors such as vehicle volume, vehicle type (truck vs. car), vehicle speed, pedestrian volume, roadway width, vehicle speed, pedestrian facilities (sidewalk width, driveway conflicts, buffers), intersection design (crossing distance, signal phasing and timing, corner radii, cross walk treatments, median islands, curb extensions), lighting, and weather.
50 One recent study found that traffic volume, traffic speed and lateral separation 47 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Technical Memorandum, Appendix C to CEQA Class 32 Report [hereinafter GHG Technical Memorandum], at p. 14.
48 Exhs. 6 [images of path location and path itself] 7 [images of manhole covers and fire truck response to explosion]; see article re dangers of manhole covers - https://www.cniguard.com/insights/manhole-events-and-risk-management-strategies/. 49 Exh. 8 [map showing nearby synagogues][videos of pedestrian use, found at https://www.canva.com/design/DAGJuPIzKic/nj6TkguLd1PpNx4we1zhxw/watch?utm content= DAGJuPIzKic&utm campaign=designshare&utm medium=link&utm source=editor]. 50 La Scala EA, Johnson FW, Gruenewald PJ. Neighborhood Characteristics of Alcohol-related Pedestrian Injuries. Prevention Science. 2001: 2:123-134. 51Taylor M, Lynam D, Baruay A The effects of drivers speed on the frequency of road accidents.

Transport Research Laboratory. TRL Report 421 Crowthorne, UK, 2000. 50 Morrison DS, Petticrew M, Thomson H. What are the most effective ways of improving population health through transport interventions? Evidence from systematic reviews. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 2003:57:327-333.
50 Evidence shows that pedestrian and bicycle injuries vary with the 0.4 power of the proportion of trips made by walking or bicycle. Jacobsen PL. Safety in numbers: more walkers and bicyclists, safer walking and bicycling. Injury Prevention. 2003: 9: 205-209. 18 City of Beverly Hills
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between pedestrians and traffic explained 85% of the variation in perceived safety and comfort for pedestrians.51
The Developer admits that the alley behind the Project is a highway under state law.52 As such, it is subject to review by Caltrans and the City should request district guidance from Caltrans as to vehicular and pedestrian safety due to this Project and others in the vicinity.53 Moreover, Caltrans guidance suggests “Pedestrian and bicyclist traffic safety mitigation should be proposed at intersections where a project will negatively impact these modes of travel.”54 Yet no safety mitigation is proposed with this Project because it was incorrectly determined to be exempt from CEQA. The City should require an EIR that identifies these safety issues and proposes mitigation to alleviate significant impacts.

As the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research stated:

Generally speaking, the safety of vulnerable road users (e.g. pedestrians and bicyclists) should be given relatively more attention, due to their vastly increased risk of serious injury and fatality…Impacts to potential vulnerable road users should be considered whether or not specific facilities for those users are present…And, any decision about whether to apply a safety measure that restricts access by pedestrians and cyclists should consider (1) the reduction in walking and biking that will result, and the resulting reduction in “safety in numbers” as well as overall health, and (2) the risk created by pedestrians or cyclists 50 Leden L. Pedestrian risk decrease with pedestrian flow. A case study based on data from signalized intersections in Hamilton, Ontario. Accident Analysis and Prevention. 2002: 34:457- 464.
51 Landis BW, Vatttikuti VR, Ottenberg RM, McLeod DS, Guttenplan M. Modeling the Roadside Walking Environment: A Pedestrian Level of Service. TRB Paper -1-0511 Tallahassee. 2000.
52 David Snow Letter, December 21, 2023, at p. 5, states, “The additional height and stories are all the more reasonable when one considers that the Project, which fronts 100-foot wide on Wilshire Boulevard, is (i) set back from the northerly residential zone by an extra-wide 35-footwide alley and parkway, which is a “Highway” under state law and (ii) within short walking distance of buildings that are ten to 12 stories tall.” 53 Caltrans Safety Review Guidelines - https://lede-admin.cal.streetsblog.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/52/2021/01/2020-12-22-updated-interim-ldigr-safety-review-guidancea11y.pdf 54 Caltrans Safety Review Guidelines - https://lede-admin.cal.streetsblog.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/52/2021/01/2020-12-22-updated-interim-ldigr-safety-review-guidancea11y.pdf City of Beverly Hills
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19 subverting the design purpose for convenience (e.g. crossing a street where prohibited) that might lead to additional safety risk.55 Pedestrian safety experts echo these same considerations. 56 None of these factors were
considered by the Planning Commission.

Additionally, according to Caltrans CEQA guidance,57 some of the elements that may have to be considered in a Project safety review include:
• Degradation of the walking and bicycling environment and experience • New pedestrian and bicyclist desire lines [where people want to go, as opposed to where they are forced to go by design and infrastructure that inhibits their movement]
• Multimodal conflict points, especially at intersections and project access locations
• Change in traffic composition, such as an increase in bicyclists or pedestrians, where features such as shoulders or sidewalks may not exist or are inconsistent with facility design (sidewalks, bicyclist and multi-user paths, multimodal roadways, etc.)
(Emphasis added.)
Notably, the Project would impact safety relating to all of the emphasized language quoted above. The walking environment and experience of the city’s right of way alley would be degraded by the huge influx of vehicle trips resulting from the Project. Moreover, the Project would create multimodal conflict points at project access locations from the alleyway. Finally, due to removing the 6-foot setback from the alleyway the Project increases a safety risk due to no shoulder or sidewalk provided. Yet none of these safety issues were considered by City Planning because it simply rubber stamped the Developer’s CEQA exemption.

C. The Section 15332 Categorical Exemption Is Not Applicable Because There Will Be Significant Impacts Related To The Project’s Noise. 55 State of California 2017 General Plan Guidelines, Appendix B, Governor's Office of Planning and Research, 2017, on transportation safety, at p. 351, https://opr.ca.gov/docs/OPR_Appendix_B_final.pdf
56 See authorities listed above.
57 State of California, Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”), INTERIM LOCAL

DEVELOPMENT INTERGOVERNMENTAL REVIEW SAFETY REVIEW PRACTITIONERS GUIDANCE, at p. 6, found at https://lede-admin.cal.streetsblog.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/52/2021/01/2020-12-22-updated-interim-ldigr-safety-review-guidancea11y.pdf 20 City of Beverly Hills
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The Developer conveniently only analyzed the Project’s increase in traffic noise on Wilshire Boulevard, not on Maple Drive and Palm Drive, nor on the public alley where all of the Project’s trips will go. The Developer claims, “There is not enough information related to the ADT along these roadways. However, the estimated daily trips from the proposed project would represent a nominal increase in daily traffic compared to existing traffic conditions on these surrounding roadways. As such, a less than significant impact would occur.” This is not substantial evidence to support a finding of less than significant impact because it is no evidence at all. Given that the Project will generate upwards of 600 daily trips on a currently peaceful alley abutting a residential neighborhood, there is substantial evidence of a significant impact due to increase vehicular noise caused by the Project.

In addition to increased vehicular noise, there will be significant noise impacts from the Project amenities described below in the Design Plan Review section.

C. The Section 15332 Categorical Exemption Is Also Unavailable Because The Cumulative Impacts Exception To The Exemption Exists In This Case.

The Section 15332 Categorical Exemption is inapplicable when the cumulative impact of successive projects of the same type in the same place, over time are significant. The record reflects that successive projects in the site area are known or expected to occur over time that would result in cumulatively considerable impacts. The City documented some of these projects and noted that they all requested a 50% increase in density, yet the City failed to include all related Projects in its cumulative impacts analysis.

The Planning Commission omits a finding on cumulative impacts from increased traffic, despite documenting some of the related projects that would cumulatively impact traffic in the area. Projects in the vicinity of the Project, as well as other nearby projects in the planning stages are reasonably foreseeable. Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985), 172 Cal.App.3d 151, made it clear that consideration must reach beyond those projects currently under environmental review: “Related projects currently under environmental review unequivocally qualify as probable future projects to be considered in a cumulative analysis. [Citation.] In addition, even projects anticipated beyond the near future should be analyzed for their cumulative effect.” Id. at 168, citing Bozung v. Local Area Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d at 284.

Here, the Planning Commission does not properly quantify the increase in traffic from the proposed Project, along with related projects, particularly the new condominum project located across the street on Wilshire Boulevard between Maple and Palm as well as
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several projects approved in the mixed use zone at 55 N. La Cienega Blvd., a 25-unit building at 8800 Burton Way, a 42-unit building at 8811 Wilshire Blvd. In addition, there are nearby “Builder’s remedy” projects that were not considered.58 Cumulative impacts must be addressed as the City admits that “every mixed use project under review by the City has utilized the state density bonus law and has requested additional height and stories as part of their project.”59
D. The Section 15332 Categorical Exemption Is Also Unavailable Because The Unusual Circumstances Exception To The Exemption Exists In This Case.

A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.60 This is commonly referred to as the “unusual circumstances exception.” A person asserting this exception must show that (i) “unusual circumstances” exist and (ii) those unusual circumstances create a “reasonable possibility” of a significant environmental impact.61 The record shows that unusual circumstances exist and that there is a reasonable possibility that the project will have a significant impact.62
Although the statute does not define the term, “whether a circumstance is ‘unusual’ is judged relative to the typical circumstances related to an otherwise typically exempt project.”63 The sensitive location of this project near a small scale residential neighborhood, makes the circumstances of this development per se unusual and therefore within the exception.

The Project itself is “so unusual in the vicinity as to constitute the type of unusual circumstance required to support application of this exception.”64 The City simply cannot find the project categorically exempt in the face of these facts and circumstances with an 86% increase in height and more than doubling the allowable stories. 58 19-story mixed-use development at 125-129 S. Linden Drive, among others - https://la.urbanize.city/post/beverly-hills-battles-builders-remedy-project-129-linden-avenue 59 City Planning, July 18, 2023 Agenda Report, at p. 5. 60 Guidelines § 15300.2(c).
61 Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley [“Berkeley Hillside”] (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 1086, 1115.
62 Id. at 1104.
63 San Lorenzo Valley Cmty. Advocates for Responsible Educ. v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified Sch.

Dist. (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1381.
64 Association for Protection etc. Values v. City of Ukiah, (1991) 2 Cal. App. 4th 720, 736. 22 City of Beverly Hills
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As addressed above, given that the unusual pedestrian traffic and increased vehicle trips on a narrow one-way alley with no setback, there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant impact due to unusual circumstances.

Further, the negative declaration for the City’s mixed use overlay zone specifically relies on the assumption that: “Buildings that would be developed in accordance with the regulations in the mixed use overlay zone would be similar in scale and mass to existing buildings in commercial areas of the City and are unlikely to block any scenic vistas.”
65 The negative declaration also relied on the assumption that: “[A]ny mixed use projects proposed in the future would be subject to review under CEQA prior to approval.”66 An infill exemption is not public environmental review, and the City cannot approve a Project this out of scale with the neighborhood without an EIR.

The only credible evidence in the record supports the conclusion that even if the Section 15332 Categorical Exemption applies (which it does not), the unusual circumstances exception to the infill exemption applies and the Project must undergo environmental review in the form of an EIR. An EIR is required to address critical issues such as traffic, safety, air quality, and visual impacts, among others. Without an EIR, the true extent of the project's environmental impacts cannot be accurately determined.

VI. The City Cannot Make The Findings Necessary To Approve The Project Under Design Plan Review And, As Such, The Project Cannot Be Approved As Proposed.

Despite clear evidence in the record to the contrary, the Planning Commission made the following proposed findings for the Project:

1. The proposed plan is consistent with the general plan and any specific plans adopted for the area.

2. The proposed plan will not adversely affect existing and anticipated development in the vicinity and will promote harmonious development of the area.

3. The nature, configuration, location, density, height, and manner of operation of any commercial development proposed by the plan will not significantly and 65 Mixed Use Overlay Zone MND, at p. 50.
66 Ibid.

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23 adversely interfere with the use and enjoyment of residential properties in the vicinity of the subject property.

4. The proposed plan will not create any significantly adverse traffic impacts, traffic safety hazards, pedestrian-vehicle conflicts, or pedestrian safety hazards.

5. The proposed plan will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, or general welfare.

The above findings are in error. None of the findings are supported by the facts surrounding this Project. There is no rational explanation in the record justifying why the Commission adopted these Design Review Findings.67 Agency action that is arbitrary, capricious or lacking in evidentiary support may be struck down.68 As addressed above, the Project is clearly not consistent with the General Plan and thus the Planning Commission’s Design Plan Review finding number 1 is in error.

Regarding Design Plan Review finding number 2, in exchange for a mere 6 units of purported “affordable” housing, the developer is seeking a waiver to increase the allowable height from 45’ to 83’-11”, which would provide an additional 38’-11”, an incredible 86% increase in height. The Project would situate an 8-story building adjacent to an R-1 zone – (One-Family Residential Zone (Single Family Residences)) consisting of one- to two-story residences along North Maple Drive, which would dwarf the neighborhood and represent a nearly 7-fold increase in stories. This is the very antithesis of “harmonious development” required to pass Design Review and there is no reasonable or legal way the City can make the required finding.69
Regarding finding 4, the Planning Commission summarily found that “the proposed Project will not create any significantly adverse traffic impacts, traffic safety hazards, pedestrian-vehicles conflicts, or pedestrian safety hazard.” Yet, as addressed above, the record demonstrates that the Project will in fact create a significant impact on traffic, traffic safety, conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles using the alley, and pedestrian safety hazards due to the use of the alley by a steady stream of pedestrians impacted by a massive increase in vehicle trips and no alternative route given the lack of sidewalk or setback.
67 See City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc., (2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 668, 681, [“findings must be internally consistent and logical”]. 68 McGill v. Regents of University of California, (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1776, 1786. 69 See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Cty. of L.A. (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506. 24 City of Beverly Hills
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The Project is proposing eliminating what was an existing 53-foot setback in the rear of the building to a zero-foot setback.
70 The lack of any setback poses a direct threat
to public safety in that it would cause a pedestrian and traffic hazard, as well as impact the privacy and well-being of hundreds of homes located north of Wilshire. A zero rear setback would compromise the yards and living spaces of more than one hundred City residents. Compounding these impacts to the neighboring residences is the fact that the Project provides an array of rooftop amenities that will cause a nuisance, including a pool, a sun deck, canopies, BBQ, and restrooms.71 The rooftop is designed to provide 5,430 SF of common outdoor living space, and the developer is choosing to place the noisier, more heavily trafficked amenities such as the pool, sun deck, canopies, BBQ, restrooms and lounge areas on the north side of the building’s rooftop, closer to the residential neighborhood.72 The Staff Report admits that the developer’s paltry attempts at rooftop “setbacks” and landscaping such as immature grasses and shrubbery may not provide privacy to neighboring residences.73 The Planning Commission assumes that once these trees and shrubs reach maturity (which can take years), they “may provide an additional privacy buffer between residential properties that abut the project site to the north of the proposed development.”74 This is not substantial evidence supporting the Planning Commission’s finding that “[t]he proposed plan will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, or general welfare.”
Thus, the Planning Commission’s finding that the Project “will not adversely affect existing and anticipated development in the vicinity” and “will promote harmonious development of the area,” is completely undermined by the facts in the record. Given this record, the City cannot make a finding that “the nature, configuration, location, density, height, and manner of operation…will not significantly and adversely interfere with the use and enjoyment of residential properties in the vicinity of the subject property.” The use and enjoyment of residential properties abutting the Project will be severely impacted by the sheer size of the Project. Most importantly, the Project will create a “significantly adverse traffic impacts, traffic safety hazards, pedestrian-vehicle 70 Design Plan Review Application, p. 2.
71 Planning Commission Report [February 8, 2024] [hereinafter “Staff Report”], 2-8. 72 Staff Report, 2-7 – 2-9 and Figure 5 at p. 2-8.
73 Staff Report, at pp. 2-8 to 2-9. Our client is also troubled by the allocation of two entire stories for amenities within the proposed building. While amenities are undoubtedly important for the residents of any housing development, the potential for these spaces to be converted into future Additional Dwelling Units (ADUs) raises serious concerns. Allowing for such conversions could significantly impact the character and density of the surrounding neighborhood, potentially exacerbating issues related to traffic, parking, and infrastructure strain. 74 Staff Report, at p. 2-8 [emphasis added].
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conflicts, or pedestrian safety hazards,” by locating a large mixed-use commercial building with zero setbacks along a dangerously narrow alley. The Planning Commission concluded, without proper analysis of the facts relevant to the Project’s actual relationship to the neighborhood, that the DBL waivers must be granted. In doing so, the Commissioners failed to bridge the analytical gap between the raw data presented and its determination that the Project would not adversely impact the residential properties in vicinity of the Project.75
The City cannot make the findings necessary to approve the Project under Design Plan review and, as such, the Project cannot be approved as proposed. “A reasonable person could not reach the conclusions reached by”
76 the Planning Commission.77
Finally, the Planning Commission’s findings under Design Plan Review are based in part on a false premise of law. The Staff Report advised:

In regard to the provision of amenity space within a density bonus project, the Commission should note a recent court case, Bankers Hill 150 v. City of San Diego, where the court ruled that a city may not apply any development standards that would physically preclude the construction of a density bonus project as designed, even if the building includes amenities beyond the bare minimum of building components required for the project. Essentially, a city is constrained in its ability to require the removal of an amenity to bring a project that otherwise complies with state density bonus law into compliance with local development standards for which waivers are sought.
(Staff Report, p. 2-10.)
Thus, the City Staff gave the Planning Commission (and apparently the Commission accepted) the incorrect premise that simply because the developer asked for amenities the City must approve the Project with those amenities if the Project otherwise complies with the DBL. Here, the amenities severely impact the neighborhood and as such, the City cannot make the required findings under its Design Plan Review, regardless of whether the Project complies with the DBL. 75 Topanga, supra, 11 Cal. 3d 506 [the City must set forth analysis to “bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order”]. 76 Under the substantial evidence standard, courts may reverse an agency's decision if, based on the evidence before the agency, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency. La Costa Beach Homeowners' Assn. v. California Coastal Com. (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 804, 814.
77 Lindstrom v. California Coastal Com.(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 73, 93 City of Beverly Hills
Re: Appeal of 9229 Wilshire Project
July 1, 2024
26 VII. The Project Does Not Comply With The Requirements of the Density Bonus Law (“DBL”)
The Planning Commission erred as a matter of law in concluding it was powerless under the DBL to impose any development standards impacting height, stories and setbacks. This conclusion was reached due to the incorrect advice of counsel. Under the Density Bonus Law, a City may impose development standards despite requested waivers if not doing so “would have an adverse impact on any real property that is listed in the California Register of Historical Resources, or to grant any waiver or reduction that would be contrary to state or federal law.” (§ 65915, subd. (e)(1).) In addition, the DBL does not require cities to waive development standards if the waiver or reduction would have a significant adverse impact on the health, safety or physical environment that cannot be mitigated or avoided. (§§ 65915, subd. (e)(1), 65589.5.) Here, as addressed above, the developer has requested three waivers that would severely impact the neighborhood, health and safety, and violate CEQA. As such, to grant the waivers violates the DBL.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Our clients respectfully request that, for all the foregoing reasons, the City Council grant the appeal and deny the Project. In the alternative, we request that the City Council continue this matter until after the Second Application is processed.

Sincerely,
Sabrina Venskus
Attorney for Appellant Mr. Ahdoot
and BHCC
EXHIBIT 1
SARAH L. VOISIN/THE WASHINGTON POST/GETTY IMAGES
A two-story row house converted into a five-story condo building in Washington, D.C.

Michael Friedrich /
March 15, 2024
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Sonja Trauss, the charismatic founder of the YIMBY movement, recently spoke at a conference of fellow travelers about the importance of supporting small home builders. “Most neighborhoods are still zoned low-density, and so if you’re seeing new housing, it’s going to be small projects,” she said at Austin’s YIMBYtown 2024, a gathering of people who believe that saying “yes in my backyard” to private development will fix America’s housing crisis. Trauss bemoaned the onerous regulations, fees, and paperwork—not to mention meddling homeowners—that make it so hard for small firms to build. Her organization, YIMBY Law, sues cities that create barriers to new construction. “What we’re doing, a lot of it is really for the small 7/1/24, 3 31 PM The Case Against YIMBYism | The New Republic https //newrepublic com/article/179147/case-against yimbyism yimbytown 2024# text=A decade since the YIMBY,t solve the housing crisi swhich 2/21

If only it worked. A decade since the YIMBY movement launched, there’s little serious evidence that its policies are the magic supply-increasing bullet that proponents claim, nor that they meaningfully decrease rents for working families. The YIMBY agenda can’t solve the housing crisis. But there are solutions: ones that provide the homes we need without ceding power to the profiteers who rigged the system.

The housing shortage is real. Households are forming faster than developers are building new homes, and by some estimates the country is short 2.3 million units. For several decades this problem has been squeezing renters in big coastal cities like San Francisco and New York, but in recent years it has mounted into a national crisis, reaching formerly affordable bastions like Spokane, Boise, and Reno. The result is an increasingly brutal market, where the typical American tenant is rent-burdened and homelessness is on the rise.

According to YIMBYs, the big problem is exclusionary zoning policies: in short, laws that restrict the size and type of buildings in many neighborhoods, often those dominated by single-family homes. Cemented in place in the twentieth century by segregationists and maintained for decades by NIMBY—“not in my backyard”— homeowners who resist any changes that might compromise their “neighborhood character,” these rules effectively ban apartments on 75 percent of residential land. “We’ve significantly constrained the production of new housing in major cities, and increasingly in other places too,” Ned Resnikoff, the policy director at California YIMBY and a YIMBYtown speaker, told me. “The only housing that private developers have any incentive to produce is extremely expensive.” Since around 2014, YIMBYs have been vigorously trying to loosen these and other development constraints through legislation and local activism. Whether their ideas emerged from the depths of right-wing think tanks or from the passions of Bay Area populists like Trauss is a point of some contention. What’s certain is that YIMBY policies satisfied elite consensus, promising workforce housing for tech-sector donors while scratching a deregulatory itch that libertarians had long been trying to reach. 7/1/24, 3 31 PM The Case Against YIMBYism | The New Republic https //newrepublic com/article/179147/case-against yimbyism yimbytown 2024# text=A decade since the YIMBY,t solve the housing crisi swhich 4/21 Over the years, YIMBYs have supported “legalizing” all sorts of new homes—highrises, “fourplexes,” backyard apartments, and, in some cases, forms of subsidized and social housing—often mouthing a social justice motivation. But they are also explicit that deregulation alone won’t help those struggling at the bottom of the market, and the movement has found itself at odds with low-income tenants of color who oppose new developments that herald gentrification. YIMBYism was always “a promise that we didn’t need to redistribute anything,” said Alexander Ferrer, a planner and researcher at Strategic Actions for a Just Economy, a Los Angeles tenant advocacy organization. “We could just make more property.”
That cities would benefit from more market-rate apartments appears true enough.

Studies show that new development slows rent growth both in neighborhoods and citywide, and it’s relatively well documented that when developers build new highend apartments, it eventually frees up more low-cost apartments, in a process that housing scholars call “filtering.”
But evidence undermines this simple story, as even the sunniest supply-side forecasts show very modest impacts. One 2019 study of New York City found that every 10 percent increase in housing stock yields a 1 percent decrease in rents nearby.

For YIMBYs like Trauss and Resnikoff, such research presents important proof that, on the margins, building moves rents in the right direction. (“Adding more reduces prices,” Trauss told me, “so adding even more reduces prices more.”) But as a practical matter, marginal changes don’t add up to affordability for most. Even if developers somehow built 50 percent more housing in New York City, the median one-bedroom unit would still rent for $3,548 per month (if applying the study’s findings to today’s market). “In the best-case scenario, we’re talking about throwing a pebble in the ocean compared to the scale and scope of the need,” said Anthony Damiano, a housing researcher at the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs at the University of Minnesota.

Market-rate development can even drive prices up for renters in low-income buildings: In a 2020 paper on Minneapolis, Damiano found that new construction increased rents by 6.7 percent in lower-priced housing nearby, even while it decreased rents slightly for high-priced units. Meanwhile, the fabled “filtering” effect can take years or even decades, and it’s unclear that it reaches the people in greatest need. Such outcomes are hard to square with YIMBYs’ social justice aspirations. 7/1/24, 3 31 PM The Case Against YIMBYism | The New Republic https //newrepublic com/article/179147/case-against yimbyism yimbytown 2024# text=A decade since the YIMBY,t solve the housing crisi swhich 5/21 And then there’s the question of how we might cajole developers into building more in the first place. YIMBYs treat it as self-evident that upzoning will largely do the trick, but the evidence is weak. “We just don’t have the wins to show that here’s a city that was overzoned, and now it’s less zoned, and here’s how it changed,” said Kevin Erdmann, a senior affiliated scholar at the Mercatus Center, author of Building from the Ground Up, and a firm believer in the power of zoning liberalization.

The one major study of land-use reforms across the United States shows that, during the three to nine years after a city enacts upzoning and other density-increasing measures, new housing supply increases by less than 1 percent. That increase occurs primarily at the high end of the market, and there’s little evidence that new supply frees up additional low-cost units or makes them cheaper. Faced with these results, Resnikoff pointed to a wish list of other needed policy changes, like permitting reforms and rule changes to cut developers’ construction costs. But needless to say, upzoning produces nowhere near the dramatic supply spike that YIMBYs promise.

At the same time, studies show that upzoning can actually increase housing prices.

Cameron Murray, an Australian economist and author of The Great Housing Hijack, found that just 2 percent of land was used in the 20 years following an upzoning of Brisbane and that prices rose. “You can certainly zone for high density in areas that are high-value, and things will get developed over time in that location,” Murray said. “But prices won’t be cheaper. That’s typically not what happens.” To support their claims, YIMBYs instead cite a few recent success stories. In the last decade, both Minneapolis and Auckland, New Zealand, enacted large-scale zoning reforms, followed by upswings in building and downswings in prices. But Erdmann has questioned the supply-side success of Minneapolis, raising alternative explanations for the change, such as the effects of the 2020 George Floyd protests and the city’s low population growth, and Murray has shown that the Auckland data was flawed, undermining claims that the city’s trends were different from those of peers whose policies remained unchanged. New construction is now crashing in Auckland, and rents are rising again, Murray said. “We’re sort of back to square one.” 7/1/24, 3 31 PM The Case Against YIMBYism | The New Republic https //newrepublic com/article/179147/case-against yimbyism yimbytown 2024# text=A decade since the YIMBY,t solve the housing crisi swhich 6/21 Ultimately, the solution to the housing crisis is political and economic, not a matter of technocratic tweaks. Zoning reform is neither necessary nor sufficient to fix it. It’s true that exclusionary zoning rules are rooted in harmful racist policy. Abolishing them is justified. But relying on that approach to induce new housing supply, especially for the lowest-income residents, is a losing proposition. High interest rates, soaring construction costs, and developer land-hoarding present major impediments to building. Intensified corporatization and concentration of ownership make it increasingly difficult to protect vulnerable tenants from rent hikes and eviction by landlords, no matter how many towers the industry erects.

With so many people straining to pay the rent, those invested in housing justice might harness today’s tremendous pro-housing political will to demand more broadly beneficial policy. “There is, one hundred percent, a left-wing politics for building stuff, but I don’t think it can be founded in any positive orientation toward YIMBYism,” Ferrer said, noting that it makes no sense for downtrodden tenants to align with a movement so cozy with real estate and the political right wing.

A first step would be agitating to repeal the Faircloth Amendment, another artifact of twentieth-century racism, which has blocked construction of new public housing for more than two decades. From there, the federal government should reinvest public funds in building homes to rent affordably. In practice, that could mean creating a system like that of Vienna, which provides high-quality, low-cost housing to a huge portion of its citizens. Progressive organizations like California YIMBY, despite their support for a limited statewide social housing model, hold that this approach on its own would simply take too long. “If we focus exclusively on non-market solutions, I just don’t think we’re going to get the scale of housing construction we need in a reasonable time frame,” Resnikoff said. But the private market makes no guarantees, and it’s clear that governments are capable of building large public projects quickly when the incentives are right—think of the postwar public housing boom or construction for the Olympics.

In addition to building, federal and state legislators should implement rent regulations and protections for current tenants. Rent control, a variety of methods for capping rent increases, can shield working tenants from displacement without reducing housing quality or new construction. “Just-cause eviction” laws make it harder for landlords to remove tenants arbitrarily and easier for tenants to unionize.

Some YIMBY organizations, to their credit, have supported versions of these 7/1/24, 3 31 PM The Case Against YIMBYism | The New Republic https //newrepublic com/article/179147/case-against yimbyism yimbytown 2024# text=A decade since the YIMBY,t solve the housing crisi swhich 7/21 Michael Friedrich @mfriedrichnyc
Michael Friedrich is a journalist who writes about culture and cities. measures—although most draw the line at stricter forms of rent control, citing claims that they discourage developers from building.*
“There needs to be a lot more state intervention and funding for housing, and we’re not going to get that without a political confrontation with the state,” said Shanti Singh, communications and legislative director of the California renters’ coalition Tenants Together. “One of my biggest criticisms of YIMBYs is that they’re focused on policies that don’t require that political confrontation.” YIMBYs have prioritized other political confrontations, such as picking fights with obstructionist homeowners, anti-gentrification politicians, and low-income tenant organizers in service of supporting private developers. At YIMBYtown, Trauss urged attendees to focus on the “afflict-the-comfortable side of the project, like enjoying that the NIMBYs are mad.”
But fighting so-called NIMBYs, while perhaps satisfying, is not ultimately effective.

There’s no reason on earth to believe that the same real estate actors who have been speculating on land and price-gouging tenants since time immemorial can be counted on to provide safe and stable places for working people to live. Tweaking the insane minutiae of local permitting law and design requirements might bring marginal relief to middle-earners, but it provides little assistance to the truly disadvantaged. For those who care about fixing America’s housing crisis, their energies would be better spent on the fight to provide homes as a public good, a change that would truly afflict the comfortable arrangements between politicians and real estate operators that stand in the way of lasting housing justice. * This article has been updated.
7/1/24, 3 31 PM The Case Against YIMBYism | The New Republic https //newrepublic com/article/179147/case-against yimbyism yimbytown 2024# text=A decade since the YIMBY,t solve the housing crisi swhich 8/21

R E P O R T S
7/1/24, 2 41 PM The Vacancy Report How Los Angeles Leaves Homes Empty and People Unhoused ACCE Institute https //www acceinstitute org/thevacancyreport 1/6
7/1/24, 2:41 PM The Vacancy Report: How Los Angeles Leaves Homes Empty and People Unhoused - ACCE Institute https://www.acceinstitute.org/thevacancyreport 2/6
Because of the unprecedented housing crisis in Los Angeles, few people will be surprised by this report.

Our housing system fails to house tens of thousands of the city’s residents and leaves hundreds of thousands more struggling under astronomical rents. But for some, the housing market is working exactly as they would prefer, delivering unprecedented profits to a privileged class of investors who have bent the housing market to their interests. Rampant speculation has resulted in a housing system that works in the interest of a few, to the detriment of the many, along lines of race and class.

Some of the outcomes of this dynamic are detailed in this report. With more than 36,000 unhoused residents, Los Angeles simultaneously has over 93,000 units sitting vacant, nearly half of which are withheld from the housing market. Thousands of luxury units across the city are empty, owned as second homes or pure investments. At a time when the city should be doing everything in its power to house people, over 22 square miles of vacant lots are owned and kept vacant by corporate entities. The power of finance, which has brought 67% of the city’s residential units under its control, is also manifest in the ability of speculative developers to remake neighborhoods to fit their own vision. The pattern of development occurring all across Los Angeles further contributes to the vacancy and houselessness crises, as new units are priced beyond the reach of most Angelenos, leading to an excess supply of high-rent housing that fails to lease and therefore fails to house people, coupled with a crisis of unmet need for housing for the most vulnerable.

High vacancy rates in expensive luxury housing developments are a core symptom of a broader speculative housing system that is failing to benefit our communities. Speculative practices yield an unbalanced production of vacant luxury development at a time when evictions are fueling a loss of affordable rental units, increasing numbers of corporate landlords are unaccountable to lowincome tenants, and we are failing to build enough covenanted, deeply affordable housing. All of this accelerates our houselessness crisis. We must prioritize using housing to actually house people and reorganize the market to meet this goal.
(https://assets.nationbuilder.com/acceinstitute/pages/1322/attachments/original/1600360400/TheVacancyRep 1600360400)
T H E V A C A N C Y R E P O R T : H O W L O S A N G E L E S L E A V E S H O M E S

E M P T Y A N D P E O P L E U N H O U S E D
7/1/24, 2:41 PM The Vacancy Report: How Los Angeles Leaves Homes Empty and People Unhoused - ACCE Institute https://www.acceinstitute.org/thevacancyreport 3/6
This report suggests a place to start, by proposing a suite of policies to curb the speculative excesses of the housing market and promote the use of housing for homes. Los Angeles is currently suffering through an unprecedented public health crisis. COVID-19 has made the immediate shelter of all Angelenos, already a moral and political crisis, into a public health crisis as well. Beyond the immediate need for shelter, the economic devastation that has resulted from the pandemic has put hundreds of thousands of renters at risk for eviction and houselessness, magnifying the already desperate need for new permanently affordable and stable housing. The policies suggested in this report can help mitigate some of the effects of the current crisis on renters.

COVID 19 has also deeply impacted the city’s coffers, and the need for revenue generating policies to fund the necessary expansion of affordable housing and service provision is apparent The city should not fail to act on policies that will provide much needed revenue for affordable housing and services for the unhoused, and curb harmful and speculative behavior in the housing market at a time when disaster capitalists circle

K E Y F I N D I N G S
Thousands of units are held off the market in Los Angeles. Although normal vacancy occurs when units are waiting for new residents to move in, tens of thousands of units in Los Angeles are being withheld from the housing system for other purposes. Over 46,000 units are held in a state of non-market vacancy—more than one for every unhoused person in Los Angeles. Many thousands more units are withheld from the housing system by landlords listing them at high rents that keep them vacant long-term. This is a real issue with significant implications for addressing the housing crisis. Many of these units are kept vacant by owners seeking to profit by speculating on the increase in property value, returning properties to the market only when rents are high enough for their liking.

We are building homes, but only for the rich. Amid an unprecedented shortage of housing for the people who need it most, Los Angeles is building plenty of homes. Unfortunately, much of it is accessible only to the wealthy, with 97% of rental units currently under construction in downtown L.A. classified by the commercial real estate data service Co-Star in the most expensive and luxurious “4 & 5 star” category, in which rents average over $2,800 per month. Additionally, the benefits of such luxury construction do not simply “trickle down.” At similar rents, newer buildings are consistently more vacant than older ones, and high-rent units are plagued by higher vacancy rates at every affordability level. This suggests that the pattern of development in Los Angeles, which incorrectly prioritizes the construction of luxurious units on the assumption that this increases access to housing for all, will never resolve the housing crisis.

Property in Los Angeles is increasingly financialized. Los Angeles is increasingly a city that is owned not by people but by corporate entities of all kinds Nearly 67% of all residential units in the city are directly owned by investment entities The same is true for over 22 square miles of vacant lots, a massive amount of land going undeveloped to benefit corporations and a small class of investors With only a tiny fraction of people having investments of any kind, this massive concentration of ownership represents a speculative property market set up to build wealth for the few, not the many Additionally, the lack of financial disclosure requirements that apply to corporate property owners as well as the ease of creating shell companies make it nearly impossible to identify who is benefiting from owning housing in Los Angeles Speculation removes thousands of units a year from the market. Rent control keeps thousands of families in their homes by preventing them from being forced out because of rent hikes, but unfortunately, many landlords use loopholes to evade rent control regulations and raise rents as high as they want when the unit becomes vacant—a process called vacancy decontrol. Additionally, the vast majority of tenants facing eviction lack legal representation. Speculative landlords commonly exploit the rent control system by 7/1/24, 2 41 PM The Vacancy Report How Los Angeles Leaves Homes Empty and People Unhoused ACCE Institute https //www acceinstitute org/thevacancyreport 4/6
forcing tenants out through illegal means to benefit from vacancy decontrol. In addition, thousands of rentstabilized housing units are removed from the housing supply every year through the use of the Ellis Act—a legal tool favored by speculators to mass-evict tenants.

We are not building nearly enough affordable housing. Though luxury construction is booming, construction of affordable housing is not Against a backdrop of mass eviction and displacement, a persistent lack of deeply affordable housing construction has led to a shortfall of more than 500,000 affordable units in Los Angeles County The gap between the housing that is most needed and the housing that is actually being built continues to widen, intensifying an unprecedented affordable housing crisis Cities across North America are turning to vacancy taxes to combat speculation and generate revenue for affordable housing. Many North American cities, especially those with housing problems similar to Los Angeles’, have enacted vacancy tax policies to combat speculation and raise revenue for the construction of affordable housing. Inspired by community groups mobilizing for housing justice, many cities have passed and implemented such policies (including some in California). These efforts should serve as a model in Los Angeles.

A vacancy tax can be done here. A penalty for keeping units vacant is not only desperately needed but also is achievable within the confines of California law. Taking other cities’ policies as examples and diving into the legal context surrounding taxation, policymakers in Los Angeles can craft and implement a vacancy penalty policy.

Complementary policies are needed. A vacancy penalty, although important, is not enough to solve the housing crisis. Other complementary policies are necessary to advance a comprehensive response to the harms of the speculative housing market, including municipal disclosure requirements, better data collection, limits on condominium conversions and demolitions, a real estate transfer tax, flipping tax, and an out-ofstate transaction tax.

Los Angeles needs better public data on vacancy. Vacancy is a complex issue, and good data about vacancy are hard to find Given the ongoing housing crisis and the many ways in which vacancy can have deleterious effects on a city’s housing system, understanding vacancy in Los Angeles is crucial The structural factors that undergird vacancy are not all benign, and good data are paramount to address these issues at their cause
You can read the full report here.
(https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/acceinstitute/pages/1322/attachments/original/1600360400/TheVaca 1600360400)
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i
Table of Contents
iii
v
vi
viii
ix
22 1
2 11
16 24
28 31

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREWORD

KEY FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS

METHODOLOGY
PART ONE:

HOW SPECULATIVE FINANCE KEEPS HOMES VACANT AND PEOPLE UNHOUSED I. VACANCY IS A STRUCTURAL FEATURE OF THE HOUSING MARKET II. THE MARKET IS OVERPRODUCING LUXURY HOUSING, MUCH OF WHICH SITS VACANT III. IT DOESN’T END WITH VACANCY: THE SPECULATIVE HOUSING MARKET PRODUCES UNSTABLE

HOUSING, DISPLACEMENT, AND HOUSELESSNESS
PART TWO:

REDUCING VACANCY AND PROMOTING AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN LOS ANGELES IV. U.S. AND CANADIAN CITIES ARE INCREASINGLY USING VACANCY TAXES TO FIGHT SPECULATIVE

VACANCY
V. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING A VACANT HOMES PENALTY IN LOS ANGELES VI. RECOMMENDED POLICY TOOLS TO ADDRESS SPECULATIVE VACANCY IN LOS ANGELES ii
Table of Figures
Figure 1. Vacancy in Los Angeles: The Numbers.........................................................................................................................................3 Figure 2. Vacancy Rate by Census Tract...........................................................................................................................................................5 Figure 3. Who Owns L.A.: The Numbers ..........................................................................................................................................................7 Figure 4. Corporate Ownership and Vacancy in Greater Central Los Angeles ......................................................................8 Figure 5. Vacancy and Corporate Ownership in Los Angeles Census Tracts .........................................................................9 Figure 6. Vacancy Rate by Rent in Los Angeles.........................................................................................................................................12 Figure 7. Vacancy Rate by Rent for L.A. Structures Built Before and After 1980...................................................................13 Figure 8. Ellis Act Filings and Vacancy in Greater Central Los Angeles.....................................................................................19 Figure 9. Houselessness by Census Tract......................................................................................................................................................21 Figure 10. Vacancy Policies in North America.............................................................................................................................................27

iv

ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONS
Strategic Actions for a Just Economy
SAJE is a 501c3 nonprofit organization in South Los Angeles. SAJE builds community power and leadership for economic justice. Since 1996 SAJE has been a force for economic justice in our community by focusing on tenant rights, healthy housing, and equitable development. SAJE has taken many notorious slumlords to court, established a land trust, and helped implement innovative popular education programs. SAJE runs a regular tenant clinic, helps connect local residents to jobs, and fights for community benefits from future development through private agreements and public policies. SAJE, believing that the fate of city neighborhoods should be decided by those who dwell there, convenes with other organizations to ensure this occurs in a manner that is fair, replicable, and sustainable.

Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment
The Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE) Action is a grassroots, member-led, statewide community organization working with more than 15,000 members across California. ACCE is dedicated to raising the voices of everyday Californians, neighborhood by neighborhood, to fight for policies and programs to improve our communities and create a brighter future.

UCLA School of Law Community Economic Development Clinic The Community Economic Development (CED) Clinic at the UCLA School of Law provides transactional and policy-oriented legal support to community-based organizations throughout Los Angeles, working to ensure affordable housing and living wage jobs for all. For over 15 years, the CED Clinic has represented groups building community-controlled economic institutions and promoting empowerment through the meaningful participation of communities in development and planning decisions that fundamentally affect their lives.

Acknowledgements
v
Foreword
Because of the unprecedented housing crisis in Los
Angeles, few people will be surprised by this report.

Our housing system fails to house tens of thousands
of the city’s residents and leaves hundreds of
thousands more struggling under astronomical rents.

But for some, the housing market is working exactly
as they would prefer, delivering unprecedented
profits to a privileged class of investors who have
bent the housing market to their interests. Rampant
speculation has resulted in a housing system that
works in the interest of a few, to the detriment of the many, along lines of race and class.

Some of the outcomes of this dynamic are detailed
in this report. With more than 36,000 unhoused
residents, Los Angeles simultaneously has over
93,000 units sitting vacant, nearly half of which
are withheld from the housing market. Thousands
of luxury units across the city are empty, owned as
second homes or pure investments. At a time when
the city should be doing everything in its power to
house people, over 22 square miles of vacant lots
are owned and kept vacant by corporate entities.

The power of finance, which has brought 67% of
the city’s residential units under its control, is also manifest in the ability of speculative developers
to remake neighborhoods to fit their own vision.

The pattern of development occurring all across
Los Angeles further contributes to the vacancy
and houselessness crises, as new units are priced
beyond the reach of most Angelenos, leading to
an excess supply of high-rent housing that fails to
lease and therefore fails to house people, coupled
with a crisis of unmet need for housing for the most
vulnerable.

High vacancy rates in expensive luxury housing
developments are a core symptom of a broader
speculative housing system that is failing to
benefit our communities. Speculative practices
yield an unbalanced production of vacant luxury
development at a time when evictions are fueling a
loss of affordable rental units, increasing numbers
of corporate landlords are unaccountable to lowincome tenants, and we are failing to build enough covenanted, deeply affordable housing. All of this
accelerates our houselessness crisis. We must
prioritize using housing to actually house people
and reorganize the market to meet this goal. This
report suggests a place to start, by proposing a suite
of policies to curb the speculative excesses of the
housing market and promote the use of housing for
homes.

Los Angeles is currently suffering through an
unprecedented public health crisis. COVID-19 has
made the immediate shelter of all Angelenos, already
a moral and political crisis, into a public health crisis as well. Beyond the immediate need for shelter, the
economic devastation that has resulted from the
pandemic has put hundreds of thousands of renters
at risk for eviction and houselessness, magnifying
the already desperate need for new permanently
affordable and stable housing. The policies
suggested in this report can help mitigate some of
the effects of the current crisis on renters. COVID-19
has also deeply impacted the city’s coffers, and the
need for revenue-generating policies to fund the
necessary expansion of affordable housing and
service provision is apparent. The city should not
fail to act on policies that will provide much-needed
revenue for affordable housing and services for
the unhoused, and curb harmful and speculative
behavior in the housing market at a time when
disaster capitalists circle.
vi
Thousands of units are held off the market in
Los Angeles.

Although normal vacancy occurs when units
are waiting for new residents to move in, tens
of thousands of units in Los Angeles are being
withheld from the housing system for other
purposes. Over 46,000 units are held in a state of
non-market vacancy—more than one for every
unhoused person in Los Angeles. Many thousands
more units are withheld from the housing system by
landlords listing them at high rents that keep them
vacant long-term. This is a real issue with significant implications for addressing the housing crisis. Many
of these units are kept vacant by owners seeking
to profit by speculating on the increase in property
value, returning properties to the market only when
rents are high enough for their liking.

We are building homes, but only for the rich.

Amid an unprecedented shortage of housing
for the people who need it most, Los Angeles is
building plenty of homes. Unfortunately, much of it
is accessible only to the wealthy, with 97% of rental
units currently under construction in downtown L.A.
classified by the commercial real estate data service
Co-Star in the most expensive and luxurious “4 & 5
star” category, in which rents average over $2,800
per month. Additionally, the benefits of such luxury
construction do not simply “trickle down.” At similar
rents, newer buildings are consistently more vacant
than older ones, and high-rent units are plagued
by higher vacancy rates at every affordability level.

This suggests that the pattern of development
in Los Angeles, which incorrectly prioritizes the
construction of luxurious units on the assumption
that this increases access to housing for all, will
never resolve the housing crisis.

Property in Los Angeles is increasingly
financialized.

Los Angeles is increasingly a city that is owned
not by people but by corporate entities of all kinds.

Nearly 67% of all residential units in the city are
directly owned by investment entities. The same is
true for over 22 square miles of vacant lots, a massive amount of land going undeveloped to benefit
corporations and a small class of investors. With
only a tiny fraction of people having investments of
any kind, this massive concentration of ownership
represents a speculative property market set up to
build wealth for the few, not the many. Additionally,
the lack of financial disclosure requirements that
apply to corporate property owners as well as the
ease of creating shell companies make it nearly
impossible to identify who is benefiting from owning
housing in Los Angeles.

Speculation removes thousands of units a year
from the market.

Rent control keeps thousands of families in their
homes by preventing them from being forced out
because of rent hikes, but unfortunately, many
landlords use loopholes to evade rent control
regulations and raise rents as high as they want
when the unit becomes vacant—a process called
vacancy decontrol. Additionally, the vast majority
of tenants facing eviction lack legal representation.

Speculative landlords commonly exploit the rent
control system by forcing tenants out through
illegal means to benefit from vacancy decontrol. In
addition, thousands of rent-stabilized housing units
are removed from the housing supply every year
through the use of the Ellis Act—a legal tool favored
by speculators to mass-evict tenants.

We are not building nearly enough affordable
housing.

Though luxury construction is booming, construction
of affordable housing is not. Against a backdrop of
mass eviction and displacement, a persistent lack
of deeply affordable housing construction has led to
a shortfall of more than 500,000 affordable units in
Los Angeles County. The gap between the housing
that is most needed and the housing that is actually
being built continues to widen, intensifying an
unprecedented affordable housing crisis.

Key Findings
vii
Cities across North America are turning to
vacancy taxes to combat speculation and
generate revenue for affordable housing.

Many North American cities, especially those with
housing problems similar to Los Angeles’, have
enacted vacancy tax policies to combat speculation
and raise revenue for the construction of affordable
housing. Inspired by community groups mobilizing
for housing justice, many cities have passed and
implemented such policies (including some in
California). These efforts should serve as a model
in Los Angeles.

A vacancy tax can be done here.

A penalty for keeping units vacant is not only
desperately needed but also is achievable within
the confines of California law. Taking other cities’
policies as examples and diving into the legal
context surrounding taxation, policymakers in Los
Angeles can craft and implement a vacancy penalty
policy.

Complementary policies are needed.

A vacancy penalty, although important, is
not enough to solve the housing crisis. Other
complementary policies are necessary to advance
a comprehensive response to the harms of the
speculative housing market, including municipal
disclosure requirements, better data collection, limits on condominium conversions and demolitions, a
real estate transfer tax, flipping tax, and an out-ofstate transaction tax.

Los Angeles needs better public data on
vacancy.

Vacancy is a complex issue, and good data about
vacancy are hard to find. Given the ongoing housing
crisis and the many ways in which vacancy can
have deleterious effects on a city’s housing system,
understanding vacancy in Los Angeles is crucial.

The structural factors that undergird vacancy are
not all benign, and good data are paramount to
address these issues at their cause.

Key Findings
viii
Recommendations
Vacancy Tax
Adopt a comprehensive Vacant Homes Penalty
measure in the City of Los Angeles.
• Apply the penalty citywide.
• Apply the penalty to rental unit vacancies,
ownership unit vacancies, and commercial
vacancies.
• Apply the penalty to undeveloped properties
that are zoned for housing and have had rental
housing onsite in the previous 10 years.
• Apply the penalty to dwelling units that are
unoccupied for more than 90 days annually.
• Create a rebuttable presumption that units are
vacant and subject to the penalty using DWP
metering information and other best-available
data.
• Create a progressive structure that penalizes
speculative vacancies and maximizes revenue
for community-centered housing justice
programs.
• Include reasonable exemptions.
• Allocate the penalty revenue exclusively to
community-serving uses that create nonprofit
affordable housing and advance housing
justice.
• Include registry, audit, and enforcement procedures, and ensure appropriate data management. • Ensure comprehensive community oversight of
program implementation.

Supplementary Policies
• Municipal Disclosure Requirements to make it
clear who owns Los Angeles
• Public Access to Accurate Data on Vacancy
so communities and policymakers can work to
make a housing system that actually houses
people
• A Prohibition on Condominium Conversions
and Demolitions of Rent-Stabilized Units until
appropriate vacancy monitoring procedures
are in place
• A Flipping Tax to deter speculative behavior
in which buyers sell buildings for profit rather
than using them to house people
• A Real Estate Transfer Tax to limit speculation
and make the tax system less regressive
• An Out-of-State Transaction Tax targeting the
deep-pocketed corporate entities that extract
value from Los Angeles
• An Increased Gross Receipts Tax to ensure the
largest corporate landlords pay their fair share
for their role in the housing crisis.
• Other means to use vacant units to house
the unhoused, recognizing the gravity of the
current crisis and need for action.
ix
Methodology
Vacancy is a complex phenomenon, and multiple
sources informed our analysis. Even defining
vacancy presents considerable difficulty. The
U.S. Census Bureau, for example, considers units
vacant when a unit is unoccupied at the time of
interview, unless the residents are temporarily
absent, or if occupants are present at the time of
interview but have a primary residence elsewhere.1
Given that the entire housing supply of the United
States is estimated from a sample of about 3 million
addresses, there is obviously much error involved.2
The difficulty of obtaining reliable data on vacancy
of any kind, especially in Los Angeles, posed several
problems that guided the choices we made for
source data. Given the restrictions, there are a few
potential approaches to collecting information on
vacancy, though they all have shortcomings.

For the empirical portions of this report, we
collected vacancy information citywide, on a census
tract scale, from the Census Bureau’s 2017 American
Communities Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates, the
most recent and reliable data set available to us.

The same data set provided us with information
about rents, housing cost burdens, and other useful
demographic and socioeconomic indicators that we
used in our analysis throughout at the census tract
and citywide scale. ACS data, though imperfect,
are regarded as the standard and widely used by
researchers.3 In Part One’s empirical section—

1. United States Census Bureau. (2017). American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey 2017 Subject Definitions. https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2017_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf?#.

2. Census Bureau. (n.d.). Vacancies Fact Sheet. https://www.census.gov/housing/vacanciesfactsheet.html.

3. In calculating vacancy, the Census Bureau collects data monthly, ultimately sampling 3% of units, then uses statistical models to estimate overall vacancy. Ibid.

4. Census Bureau. (2017). American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey 2017 Subject Definitions. https://www2. census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2017_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf?#.

5. Census Bureau/ (n.d.). Definitions and Explanation. https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/definitions.pdf. which deals with the associations between vacancy,
building age, and rents—we also used data from the
2017 ACS 5-year estimates from Individual Public
Use Microdata Statistics (IPUMS) but in this case
the individual level data for the PUMAs constituting
the City of Los Angeles, which is generated
from 83,699 housing observations. We identified
corporate ownership by querying ownership data as
recorded in the Los Angeles County Assessor rolls,
dated 10/13/2019, to find properties owned directly
by a variety of entity types (Trust, Limited, Corp,
Inc, Co, LP, and common variations of these are the
search terms used).

Problems arise for researchers even in defining
vacancy. The Census Bureau defines vacancy
as a condition of units unoccupied at the time of
interview or are occupied by persons who maintain
a primary residence elsewhere.4
Vacancy is further
broken down into subcategories. Vacant units
curently for rent, vacant units for sale, units sold but not occupied, and units leased but not occupied
constitute one group of classifications of vacancies,
which we term market vacancies. The other group,
which we term non-market vacancies, includes
what the Census Bureau describes as “vacant
units held off the market.”5
This category of nonmarket vacancies comprises units “for seasonal, recreational, or occasional use” and “other vacant”
units. Vacancies “for seasonal, recreational, and
x
occasional use” are vacation homes including
beach houses, seasonal workers’ quarters, and
timeshare-type units. “Other vacant” applies to all
non-market vacancy that is not captured in the first
category. Generally, the assignment of a vacancy
categorization to a unit is made at the discretion of
the survey taker.

Other definitions of “vacant” could potentially
yield different results. Theoretically, more accurate
data based on metering information are available
from the DWP, which samples every residence
in the city daily. DWP’s metering information can
demonstrate which units are vacant even when
rented out. Physical vacancy, however, is a fairly
different conception of vacancy than the Census
Bureau’s. In many ways, the DWP data set is less
useful in investigating the function of a housing
system because, unlike the ACS, it does not record
the characteristics of the units associated with
the physical vacancy. These data, in any case, are
currently inaccessible to policymakers and the
public.6
In calculating its own vacancy rates, the
Department of City Planning uses the same ACS
2017 5-year data used in this report, and according
to a 2017 report filed with the housing committee,
the department considers this data set the best
available, aside from the DWP data.7
Since the completion of the analysis in this report, the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment
Department (HCIDLA) has acquired DWP vacancy
data. In a recent report, HCIDLA found the data
are largely consistent with the Census Bureau’s

6. Los Angeles City Council Department of City Planning. (2017, Sept. 21). Supplemental Report Relative to Strengthening Enforcement of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance and Ellis Act Provisions. https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2017/17-0480_misc_09-21-2017.pdf.

7. Ibid.; appendix item 3.

8. Twum-Akwaboah, N., & Abood, M. (2020, p. 20). Council Report Back on the Amount of Vacant, Habitable Housing Units in Los Angeles. Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department. https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2019/19-0623_rpt_ HCI_06-12-2020.pdf.
estimates. HCIDLA’s publication of the data is a
significant step toward transparency, though much
more work is necessary to ensure that DWP data is
accessible, transparent, and workable by the public.8
Section I explores the phenomenon of vacancy in Los
Angeles, assessing data from the Census Bureau’s
most recent ACS in the context of an increasingly
speculative housing market. This section also details
how the financialization of the housing sector has
led to vast corporate entity ownership of residential
property in Los Angeles, fueling the expansion of
vacancy-inducing speculation to the benefit of a
small minority of investors.

Section II provides a citywide analysis of
differentiated vacancy rates in Los Angeles, outlining
the characteristics of buildings associated with
higher or lower rates of vacancy. The implications
of this analysis cast doubt on simplistic narratives
of housing market operation and show that the
dominant development pattern is the overproduction
of luxury development and the corresponding failure
to produce sufficient affordable housing.

Section III documents the human costs of this
speculative system, demonstrating that the
overproduction (and consequently high vacancy)
of luxury housing occurs at the same time that
existing affordable units are lost and new affordable
units are underproduced. This process is driven by
eviction and is ultimately a root cause of increased
houselessness.

Methodology

4 I. Vacancy is a Structural Feature of the Housing Market (about half of all vacant units in the city) as nonmarket vacancies.12 These vacancies are generally second homes or other non-market vacancies.

Over 12,000 housing units, about 13% of all vacancies
in the city, are in properties held “for seasonal,
recreational, or occasional use”—that is, properties
held for the leisure of the well-heeled as second
homes or vacation homes.13 In some locations,
housing is plentiful, and the maintenance of “beach
houses” and “hunting lodges” in the Census Bureau’s
definition for the category may have a benign
effect on overall affordability. But in a city like Los Angeles, dealing with an extreme affordability and
houselessness crisis, it is concerning to see so much
housing that benefits only people who can afford a
second home. Moreover, in Los Angeles, a second
home is almost never just a leisure property. For
many owners in a market where property values are
as consistently elevated as in Los Angeles, second
homes are also investments: used either to store
wealth for the long term or to profit from increasing
property values. In both cases, the value captured
from these properties by the rich precludes their
primary usefulness as housing, constricting supply
and exacerbating the city’s affordability problem.

The other major category of non-market vacancy
is “other vacant,” a catchall term for all non12. Census Bureau, IPUMS NHGIS. (2019). American Community Survey 2013-2017 5-Year Estimates [Data set]. https://www.nhgis. org/user-resources/datasets-overview#dsg76; Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority. (2017).

13. “For Seasonal, Recreational, or Occasional Use – These are vacant units used or intended for use only in certain seasons or for weekends or other occasional use throughout the year. Seasonal units include those used for summer or winter sports or recreation, such as beach cottages and hunting cabins. Seasonal units also may include quarters for such workers as herders and loggers. Interval ownership units, sometimes called shared-ownership or timesharing condominiums, also are included here.” Census Bureau. (2017, p. 42). American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey 2017 Subject Definitions. https:// www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2017_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf?#.

14. “Other Vacant” serves as a catchall category for non-market vacancy: “If a vacant unit does not fall into any of the categories specified above, it is classified as ‘Other vacant.’ For example, this category includes units held for occupancy by a caretaker or janitor, and units held for personal reasons of the owner.” Census Bureau. (2017, p. 42). American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey 2017 Subject Definitions. https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2017_ ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf?#.

15. Mallach, A. (2018). The Empty House Next Door: Understanding and Reducing Vacancy and Hypervacancy in the United States.

Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

16. According to a query of properties identified as vacant in the Los Angeles County Assessor’s roll. market vacancy that does not fit into the previous
category.14 Some of these units are held in a form of
abandonment, either “literal,” in which the owner has
totally ignored the unit, or “constructive,” in which
the owner is present but fails or refuses to maintain
the property, which perpetuates direct harm on their
communities.15 In Los Angeles, buildings that have
been cleared of tenants through an Ellis Act eviction
and are yet to be demolished or redeveloped are
an example of this type of non-market vacancy. In
other cases, flippers and other speculative buyers
can receive higher sale prices for properties that
they “deliver empty” (that is, cleared of tenants
through eviction, harassment, and/or non-renewal)
to developers seeking to rehabilitate and re-rent, or
redevelop, a site. Many buildings are left partially or mostly vacant for months or years while the landlord
tries to drive out the last tenants. These types of
non-market vacancy can be particularly damaging,
because many of the properties that fall into this
category play no part in housing people, serving
only to build or store wealth for their owners.

Beyond housing units, speculators also invest in
vacant undeveloped property. Los Angeles has
more than 800 million square feet of vacant lots,
accounting for about 6% of the entire area of the
city.16 The purchase of land and housing for the
purpose of speculating on the long-term increase

6 I. Vacancy is a Structural Feature of the Housing Market Vacancy in Los Angeles also has a particular
geography. As seen in the map above, vacancy
is concentrated in areas with hot housing
markets and gentrification, including Downtown,
Hollywood, East Hollywood, North Hollywood,
Venice, and Koreatown, and in some of the city’s
Westside neighborhoods. A recent HCIDLA report
corroborates these findings, noting that Hollywood,
Venice, and Koreatown have a disproportionate
share of the city’s vacant units, and confirming that
the data suggest “prolonged periods of housing
units sitting idle in these neighborhoods.”17 HCIDLA
concludes that this is probably because these
neighborhoods contain new, high-end units that are
disproportionately vacant (an analysis we detail in
the following section). Regardless of how properties
are left vacant, the spatial concentration of vacancy,
and its association with rapid development and
expensive neighborhoods, reveal the speculative,
damaging nature of development occurring in Los
Angeles today.

Speculation hoards units that are sorely needed in
the housing system today, monopolizes land that
could be developed into deeply affordable housing or
otherwise be used for the benefit of the community,
and props up a massively unbalanced system of
housing production. The increasing prevalence
of speculation-fueled vacancy in housing to the
benefit of a wealthy minority is just one symptom
of a much larger problem: the transformation of
land and buildings from homes to financial assets
for a wealthy few through a process known as
financialization.

17. Twum-Akwaboah, N., & Abood, M. (2020, p. 20). Council Report Back on the Amount of Vacant, Habitable Housing Units in Los Angeles. Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department. https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2019/19-0623_rpt_ HCI_06-12-2020.pdf.

18. Aalbers, M., (2019). Corporate Financialization. In Richardson, D., Castree N., Goodchild, M.F., Kobayashi, A., Liu, W., & Marston, R.A., (Eds), The International Encyclopedia of Geography: People, the Earth, Environment, and Technology.

19. Rolnik, R. (2019). Urban Warfare: Housing Under the Empire of Finance.

20. A terminology borrowed from the Census Bureau’s definitive Rental Housing Finance Survey. [Data set]. https://www.census.gov/ programs-surveys/rhfs.html.

FINANCIALIZATION OF HOUSING IN
THE U.S. AND SPECULATIVE FINANCE

IN CITIES
In the past few decades, the housing sector in the
United States has undergone a dramatic process
of financialization, akin to a corporate takeover.

Financialization has been described as “the
increasing dominance of financial actors, markets,
practices, measurements and narratives, at various
scales, resulting in a structural transformation of
economies, firms (including financial institutions),
states and households.”18 Through financialization,
property is increasingly concentrated into the hands
of private equity and corporate interests for use as
an interest-bearing investment. In her book Urban
Warfare: Housing Under the Empire of Finance,
Raquel Rolnik, former United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Housing, describes the “long process
of deconstruction of housing as a social good and
its transformation into a commodity and a financial
asset.”19 This takeover has driven the transformation
of housing into a commodity and accelerated the
many deleterious and speculative trends detailed in
this report.

The Los Angeles County Assessor’s 2019 data show
the impacts of financialization in Los Angeles, with
a dramatic portion of the city’s housing owned by
investment vehicles. Corporate entities and other
non-individual investors20 own about 67% of all

9 Although correlation is not causation, and the
available data don’t link specific corporate-owned
units to vacant units, it does suggest that corporate
ownership and vacancy may be driven by related
forces. Corporate landlords are investing in the
same high-rent, rapidly developing neighborhoods
that are host to a disproportionate share of the city’s vacancies.

Figure 5. Vacancy and Corporate Ownership in
Los Angeles Census Tracts 25

25. The correlation coefficient between these two variables across all City of Los Angeles census tracts ® is 0.5679, indicating a strong association in a context as overdetermined as the housing market, and the coefficient of determination (R2= 0.3225) similarly indicates that increasing numbers of investment-vehicle-owned properties in a tract is fairly predictive of the amount of units that will be vacant in the same tract. The portion of buildings that are vacant is derived from the ACS survey, and the portion of units that are corporate owned is derived from the assessor’s data set. The analysis is intended to demonstrate spatial correlation of the two phenomena rather than to establish any causal link.

Vacant Units in Tract
Investment Vehicle Owned Units in Tract
Vacancy and Corporate Ownership in Los Angeles Census Tracts I. Vacancy is a Structural Feature of the Housing Market 10 Working-class Angelenos struggling with housing
insecurity are overwhelmingly not the ones
benefiting from an investment-driven housing
system. Only 4.2% of families have trusts, which is the entity type that owns the largest share of corporateowned properties in Los Angeles.26 Most trusts are not family-owned and are investment vehicles
of another sort.27 Only 10% of households own
any type of pooled investment fund shares, which
includes those types of trusts and an alphabet soup
of other investment companies and partnerships.

Identifying those who ultimately benefit from
corporate investment in land and housing is
extremely difficult. As other researchers have
noted, it is easier to start a shell corporation than it is to get a library card in many cities.28 Any of the
corporate entities surveyed could have a number of
investors that themselves may be corporate entities,
or might be run wholesale by another corporation
to begin with.29 Many types of property investment
companies are also securitized to some degree,
meaning they issue shares as securities either on
the public stock markets or privately to institutional
investors, private equity, and high-net-worth people.

Gaining a clearer picture of who owns cities is
a crucially important issue for further research
and one of the reasons we call for Los Angeles to
adopt Municipal Disclosure Requirements in the

26. Only 4.2% of families have trusts, which is the entity type that owns the largest share of corporate-owned properties in Los Angeles.

United States Federal Reserve. (2017, September). Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances. https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2017-September-changes-in-us-family-finances-from-2013- to-2016.htm

27. According to a query of Los Angeles County Assessor property records, fewer than a third of trusts owning property in Los Angeles are explicitly “family” trusts; this accounts for less than a quarter of all properties owned by corporate entities. In contrast, entity names containing common corporate markings like “LP, LLP, Inc, Ltd, Co or Corp” constitute more than 37% of all properties owned by corporate entities. Furthermore, “family trusts” are sometimes the preferred vehicle of the largest corporate landlords. Consider the Donald Sterling T Family Trust, which owns over 5,000 units in Los Angeles and is one of the city’s largest property owners, or the Frederick Leeds Family Trust, which directly or indirectly owns over 2,000 units in the city. In any case, the inclusion of trusts in classifications of investment-vehicle-owned properties is standard, as is the case in the RHFS. Los Angeles County Assessor. (2019). Secure Basic File [as of June 2019]. https://assessor.lacounty.gov/secured-basic-file-abstract/.

28. Collins, C., and de Goede, E. (2018, Sept. 10). Towering Excess: The Perils of the Luxury Real Estate Boom for Bostonians. Institute for Policy Studies, https://ips-dc.org/report-towering-excess/.

29. Collins, C. (2019). Who is Buying Seattle? The Perils of the Luxury Real Estate Boom for Seattle. Institute for Policy Studies. https:// inequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/IPS-SEATTLE-REPORT-FINAL.pdf.

Recommendation section of this report. Generally,
however, what this all means is that the vast majority
of vacant land and many vacant properties are
vacant for no reason other than to pad the pockets
of the richest investors and corporations, at a huge
cost to communities.

I. Vacancy is a Structural Feature of the Housing Market

12 A glut of housing is already being produced in
this category, leading to a high vacancy rate of

16.3% for units of this kind, driving up the overall
vacancy rate in Downtown to 13.1% by CoStar’s calculation. In comparison, the vacancy rate for the units not under this super-luxury
designation is under 5%. This disparity will only
be compounded going forward, with 3,402 of the
3,500 units under construction the most luxurious
class.31 An HCIDLA analysis of contemporary
Co-Star figures found a similar phenomenon
across the city, with vacancy concentrated in
high-rent areas and more luxurious buildings.32

31. Ibid.; Co-Star. (2019). Underwriting Report.

32. Twum-Akwaboah, N., & Abood, M. (2020, p. 20). Council Report Back on the Amount of Vacant, Habitable Housing Units in Los Angeles. Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department. https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2019/19-0623_rpt_ HCI_06-12-2020.pdf.

High rates of vacancy for newer and higherrent buildings are not confined to recent megadevelopments Downtown. A clear citywide trend of higher vacancy rates exists in buildings with
higher rents and buildings that are newer. Using
ACS data, we analyzed the 83,699 housing units in
Los Angeles that the Census survey captures and
that are used to generate the citywide estimates to
get deeper insights into the city’s housing market.

Figure 6. Vacancy Rate by Rent in Los Angeles
II. The Market Is Overproducing Luxury Housing in Los Angeles, Much of Which Sits Vacant Vacancy Rate
Contract Rent
Vacancy Rate by Rent in Los Angeles
13 Figure 6 shows the association between vacancy
rates and rents in ACS-surveyed buildings that are for
rent in Los Angeles. Generally, the higher the asking
rent, the more likely the unit is vacant. Significantly, the vacancy rate increases more rapidly for units
with rent higher than $1,500 a month (which is the
same rent level at which median-earning residents
of Los Angeles become rent-burdened).33
Figure 6 suggests segmentation in the housing
market, with different patterns evident in lowerand higher-rent segments. Especially striking is the comparative tightness of the low-rent housing
segment in comparison to the high-rent segment.

This indicates a relative oversupply of high-rent
housing at high rents and an undersupply of lowrent housing. This is hardly a radical conclusion, but it implies that current housing production, which

33. United States Census Bureau, IPUMS NHGIS. (2019). American Community Survey 2013-2017 5-Year Estimates [Data set]. favors the construction of market-rate and luxury
units while failing to generate substantial numbers
of low-cost units, will fail to alleviate the housing
crisis.

In addition to this general relationship, there is
evidence that, at higher levels of rent, tenants are
more likely to occupy older buildings than newer
Figure 7. Vacancy Rate by Rent for L.A. Structures
Built Before and After 1980
buildings—leaving the newer buildings with higher
vacancy rates as similar price points. As shown in
Figure 7, at lower rents, pre-1980 buildings have
higher vacancy rates than post-1980 buildings. This
would be expected because of the likelihood of
high-quality amenities and general conditions in the
newer buildings (though it must be emphasized that
Vacancy Rate
Contract Rent
Vacancy Rate by Rent for L.A. Structures Built Before and After 1980 II. The Market Is Overproducing Luxury Housing in Los Angeles, Much of Which Sits Vacant

17 This trend—building new extremely expensive
housing while inexpensive housing is converted or
destroyed—is not unique to Downtown. Across Los
Angeles, rent-stabilized units are being lost at an
alarming rate, and expiring covenants are leading to
the permanent loss of existing affordable housing.

Since 2001, more than 26,000 rent-stabilized units
have been removed from the market through Ellis
Act evictions, and covenants have expired at over
5,000 units of affordable housing since 1997.38 This
accounts for a 3% reduction of the rent-stabilized
housing stock and a 5% reduction of covenanted
affordable units. Even worse, the City of Los Angeles
estimates that 8,597 affordable units will become
market rate because of expiring covenants in the
next five years citywide.39 Thousands more have
had dramatic rent increases because of vacancy
decontrol.

The remaining rental housing stock is undergoing
a dramatic transformation. Since the 2008 housing
crash, the Los Angeles region, like many parts of
the country, has experienced a consolidation and
corporatization of ownership of rental properties—
or what the Right to the City Alliance has called
“the rise of the corporate landlord.” Also known as
Wall Street landlords, speculating corporate entities
like Invitation Homes have bought thousands of
foreclosed single-family homes and put them on
the rental market.40 In Los Angeles, single-family
homes now make up a significant portion of rental

38. Coalition for Economic Survival & Anti-Eviction Mapping Project. (2020). Map of Ellis Act Evictions in Los Angeles. Retrieved Aug. 12, 2020, http://www.antievictionmappingproject.net/losangeles.html. [Perma: https://perma.cc/YDB4-Z39R].

39. Chandler, J. (2019, June 25). The Big Problem with Affordable Housing. Curbed LA.

40. Abood, M. (2017). Wall Street Landlords Turns American Dream Into American Nightmare: Wall Street’s Big Bet on the Home Rental Market, and the Bad Surprises in Store for Tenants, Communities, and the Dream of Homeownership. ACCE Institute, Americans for Financial Reform, Public Advocates. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/acceinstitute/pages/1153/attachments/ original/1570049936/WallstreetLandlordsFinalReport.pdf?1570049936.

41. Ibid.

42. Call, R. (2014). Renting From Wall Street: Blackstone’s Invitation Homes in Los Angeles and Riverside. The Right to the City Alliance. http://homesforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/LA-Riverside-Blackstone-Report-071514.pdf.

43. Bonnet, G., McKeon, K., Harshbarger, T., Moya, B. M., McGraw, C., & Nelson, K. (2019). Priced Out, Pushed Out, Locked Out: How Permanent Tenant Protections Can Help Communities Prevent Homelessness and Resist Displacement in Los Angeles County.

Public Counsel & UCLA Law Community Economic Development Clinic, Unincorporated Tenants United Coalition. http://www. publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/1188.pdf. When eviction is perpetrated through the legal system, tenants are almost always left unrepresented. Guaranteeing tenants access to a lawyer is a crucial issue that could help prevent speculators from putting tenants out of their homes through spurious legal action or illegal harassment. www.rtcla.org. housing, having increased 67% from 2005 to 2015.41
Financialization and the rise of the corporate
landlord can have serious impacts on tenants. A
survey of Southern California tenants of Invitation
Homes, notorious corporate landlords, produced by
SAJE (an authoring organization of this report) found
that their tenants face higher rates of eviction, worse housing conditions, and higher rents than other
tenants, and also receive poor customer service.42

EVICTION FUELS THE LOSS OF

AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING
Speculative landlords are often incentivized to
evict tenants by the promise of higher rents, higher
sale prices for vacated buildings, and the ability
to renovate to attract higher-income residents
to pay higher rents. As evident from Figure 6, the
continued desirability of older, high-rent housing to
affluent tenants makes it attractive for landlords to
remove low-income renters through eviction and
rehabilitate units to luxury standards. Vacancies are
commonly created by this process, when property
owners let housing units sit vacant after eviction
until the building is completely emptied and ready
to be sold or converted. Evictions are an epidemic in
Los Angeles, with more than half a million unlawful
detainer lawsuits filed in Los Angeles County since
2010.43 Even when these issues culminate in a legal
battle, tenants are almost always unrepresented
when they face landlords in court, a significant
III. It Doesn’t End with Vacancy: The Speculative Housing Market Produces Unstable Housing, Displacement, and Houselessness 18 and unjust disadvantage.44 And these are only the
most visible evictions: many more occur informally
through unreasonable and possibly illegal rent
increases, buyouts, long-term harassment and
intimidation, and spurious notices. Many bad-acting
speculator landlords drive out tenants simply by
perpetuating slum conditions that make living in a
unit unbearable.45
Unfortunately, California law has aided speculators
in removing people from their homes. The Ellis Act
allows landlords to evict all the tenants in a building at once to go out of the rental business. But since
it passed in 1985, it has been used primarily by
speculators who want to evict rent-controlled tenants
in cities throughout California. Commonly, an Ellis
Act eviction precedes the building’s redevelopment
or conversion to condominiums. There is no limit
to the number of times a building owner can “go
out of business,” meaning that owners can buy and
Ellis multiple buildings over time.46 In Los Angeles,
from 2001 to 2019, the Ellis Act was responsible
for removing 26,251 rent-controlled units from the
market, roughly 4% of the rent-controlled housing
stock in the city.47 The mass eviction of tenants in
properties bought by speculative developers is a
clear abuse of the intended purpose of an already

44. See Los Angeles’ Right to Counsel Coalition. www.rtcla.org.

45. Reyes, E. A. (2019, May 14). “L.A. Set Up a System to Protect Renters. What Happens When It’s Used Against Them?” Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-tenant-habitability-plan-rent-stabilized-housing-landlord-evict-20190514- story.html.

46. Coalition for Economic Survival & Anti-Eviction Mapping Project. (2020). Ellis Act Evictions. https://www. antievictionmappingproject.net/ellis.html.

47. Ibid.

48. Said, C. (2018, Jan. 14). Airbnb Loses Thousands of Hosts in SF as Registration Rules Kick In. San Francisco Chronicle. https://www. sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-loses-thousands-of-hosts-in-SF-as-12496624.php. problematic law. Some of these buildings—now “out
of business”—are also showing up for rent as illegal
vacation rentals on Airbnb and VRBO, although Los
Angeles’ new restrictions on short-term rentals may
help end this.48 And although there are penalties for
re-renting units that have been subject to an Ellis
Act eviction within five years, some property owners
may just choose to wait it out and leave units
vacant instead of providing inexpensive housing for
someone who may otherwise become unhoused.

Units sitting vacant after an Ellis Act filing add to
the category identified by the Census Bureau as
“other vacant” units, that is, the units left vacant for legal and procedural reasons such as evictions or
foreclosures, which make up a significant share of
non-market vacancies.

As Figure 8 shows, Ellis Act filings coincide spatially with high rates of vacancy and corporate ownership
in Hollywood, East Hollywood, and Venice, which are
experiencing rapid development and gentrification.

The spatial concentration of these harmful trends
in such neighborhoods should raise concerns
about the pace and nature of development there
and how it may be impacting those at high-risk for
displacement and houselessness.

III. It Doesn’t End with Vacancy: The Speculative Housing Market Produces Unstable Housing, Displacement, and Houselessness

20 THE LOSS OF LOW-COST RENTAL

HOUSING IS COMPOUNDED BY

A DRAMATIC SHORTFALL IN THE

PRODUCTION OF AFFORDABLE

HOUSING
According to the California Housing Partnership
Corp. (CHPC), there is now a shortfall of 568,000
units affordable to low-income renters countywide,
a number that is only increasing. From 2015 to
2016, the CHPC calculates, the affordable housing
shortfall increased by 16,488 homes. The shortage
is most severe for housing that is affordable to the
lowest-income renters, as the shortfall of production
of housing available to deeply low-income renters
increased 8%, and the shortfall of housing produced
for extremely low-income renters increased 9%.

At the same time, though, since 2008, the overall
available funding for affordable housing has dropped
64%.49
Many attempts have been made to address this
crisis. Proposition HHH in Los Angeles is a voterapproved 10-year measure to support construction of supportive housing. Voters passed this $1.2
billion bond in 2016. Thus far, $790 million in public
funds have been committed to 5,410 total units in
the pipeline for development, 4,132 of which are
supportive housing units.50 Though far short of
568,000 affordable units the CHPC estimates are

49. California Housing Partnership Corp. (2018, April 30). Los Angeles County Annual Affordable Housing Outcomes Report. https://1p08d91kd0c03rlxhmhtydpr-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Full-LA-County-Outcomes-Reportwith-Appendices.pdf.

50. Los Angeles Mayor’s Office. (2020, June). Summary of HHH Pipeline. https://www.lamayor.org/summary-hhh-pipeline.

51. Southern California Association of Non Profit Housing. (2019, May). Los Angeles County’s Emergency Housing Update. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58793de5f7e0abe551062b38/t/5ce2fc70af9ae10001c74987/1558379634095/ Los+Angeles+HNR+2019.pdf.

52. Flaming, D., Burns, P., & Carlen, J. (2018, April). Escape Routes: Meta-Analysis of Homelessness in L.A. Economic Roundtable. https://economicrt.org/publication/escape-routes/.

53. Ibid.

54. The Seattle Women’s Commission & the Housing Justice Project of the King County Bar Association. (2018, September). Losing Home: The Human Cost of Eviction in Seattle. https://www.kcba.org/Portals/0/pbs/pdf/Losing%20Home%202018.pdf.

55. Desmond, M. (2015, March). Unaffordable America: Poverty, Housing, and Eviction. Institute for Research on Poverty. needed, it represents a great start and a model for
one type of intervention that should be pursued.51
The inability of tenants to pay rents is a huge driver
of houselessness. In Los Angeles, lack of financial
means to access housing is the top reported factor
precipitating houselessness.52 Eviction is the most
direct path to houselessness for many, and the
Economic Roundtable found that formal eviction
alone victimized 11% of unhoused persons.53
According to a survey of recently evicted persons
in Seattle, nearly 40% were houseless shortly after
their eviction.54 Other researchers have noted that
almost all currently unhoused people have been
evicted at some point, and eviction is one of the
largest drivers of houselessness overall.55
The eviction-fueled loss of relatively affordable
housing, and the continued shortfall of the
production of new deeply affordable housing to
replace it, have led to a crisis of houselessness. And
the juxtaposition of vacant luxury development with
the massive shortfall of deeply affordable housing
presents a stark picture of inequality and injustice
in Los Angeles. Houselessness—like Ellis filings,
corporate ownership, and vacancy—is concentrated
in specific neighborhoods, such as Venice and East
Hollywood, suggesting a relationship among these
phenomena.

III. It Doesn’t End with Vacancy: The Speculative Housing Market Produces Unstable Housing, Displacement, and Houselessness

23 Since the beginning of the 21st century, private
companies have increasingly been able to profit from
our communities through real estate investment. We
have shown in this report that speculative finance is
related to an overproduction of vacant homes and
an unacceptable number of unhoused in our city.

What can Angelenos do to end speculative finance
in our city? How can we reclaim our land and our
homes from speculators and house people? This
section of the report offers suggestions.

We don’t have to wait for structural changes in the
economy or big shifts in federal or state policies to
stand up to speculative investors looking to profit
from our housing. The city has effective tools we can
use.

Chapter IV of this report explains how cities in
the U.S. and Canada have enacted vacancy taxes
to combat speculative vacancy and raise money
for affordable housing and other housing-related
services. Vancouver has a successful vacancy
tax, and Oakland passed a Vacant Property Tax
Act in November 2018. Elements of these cities’
vacancy measures informed our policy proposals.

57. This section was written by the UCLA Community Economic Development Law Clinic. Primary authors are Zachary Frederick and Jacob Woocher under the supervision of UCLA Professors Scott Cummings and Doug Smith.

Chapter V presents the legal framework for
implementing a vacant homes penalty in Los
Angeles. Though Proposition 13 prevents a vacant
homes penalty from being directly tied to a
property’s assessed value, a progressive penalty
can be structured in other ways. In particular, we
show how a special parcel tax could work.

Chapter VI recommends policies to address
speculation and vacancy. We detail our proposed
vacant homes penalty, then suggest seven
complementary policies, in addition to a vacancy
tax, to address speculation and housing insecurity.

Part Two: Reducing Vacancy and Promoting Affordable Housing in Los Angeles

25 In Seattle, a 2019 Institute for Policy Studies report on luxury housing recommended a Seattle-specific
vacancy tax and ordinance.67
Canadian jurisdictions have also passed comprehensive anti-vacancy measures. In November 2016, Vancouver passed an Empty Homes Tax, which
went into effect in 2017.68 It imposes a 1% tax on the
value of vacant or unoccupied residential properties,
subject to several exceptions.69 Property is considered vacant if it is unoccupied for more than six months
per year.70 Revenue from the tax goes to affordable
housing initiatives.71 Similarly, British Columbia (the province encompassing Vancouver) implemented a
Speculation and Vacancy Tax in 2018.72 It imposes
a tax of 0.5% of assessed residential property values on Canadian citizens or permanent residents, and a 2% tax on foreign owners and owners who do
not report most of their income on a Canadian tax
return.73

67. Collins, C. (2019, October 19). Who Is Buying Seattle? The Perils of the Luxury Real Estate Boom. Institute for Policy Studies. https:// ips-dc.org/report-luxury-real-estate-seattle/.

68. City of Vancouver. (n.d.). Empty Homes Tax. https://vancouver.ca/home-property-development/empty-homes-tax.aspx.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. City of Vancouver (n.d.). Will Your Home Be Taxed? https://vancouver.ca/home-property-development/will-your-home-be-taxed. aspx.

73. Government of British Columbia. (n.d.) Frequently Asked Questions About Speculation and Vacancy Tax. https://www2.gov.bc.ca/ gov/content/taxes/property-taxes/speculation-and-vacancy-tax/faq-speculation-and-vacancy-tax.

IV. U.S. and Canadian Cities are Increasingly Using Vacancy Taxes to Fight Speculative Vacancy 26 Vacancy Policies in North America
Jurisdiction
Properties
Taxed
Definition of
Vacancy
Structure of Tax
or Penalty Exemptions Use of Revenue Oversight
Oakland Residential,
nonresidential,
and
undeveloped
parcels; units
in condos,
duplexes, or
townhouses
In use fewer
than 50 days
per year
$6,000 flat annual
tax per vacant
residential,
nonresidential,
or undeveloped
parcel
$3,000 flat annual
tax per vacant
parcel that allows
ground-floor
commercial
activity; and
per vacant
residential unit in
a condo, duplex, or
townhouse
1) Owner is “very low
income” per HUD
2) Owner has financial
hardship
3) Owner has demonstrable,
nonfinancial hardship
4) Exceptional
circumstances prevent use
of the property
5) Parcel is under
construction
6) Owner has a building
permit
7) Owner is 65 or older and
is “low income”
8) Owner receives Social
Security benefits and
income is below a threshold
9) Owner is a nonprofit
10) Owner has applied for
planning permits
Job training for the
homeless; services for
homeless; move-in
expenses; incentive
programs to free up
affordable housing;
relocation assistance;
construction of
affordable housing; blight
alleviation; displacement
prevention; tenant
assistance; emergency
rent assistance.

City has not yet
determined how to
administer
Commission on
Homelessness,
comprising nine
city residents,
reports on
ordinance efficacy
and use of funds
City auditor
analyzes use of
revenue
Vancouver Residential
properties in
the greater
Vancouver
area, including
undeveloped
parcels
Unoccupied
for over six
months a year;
“unoccupied”
means not
the principal
residence of
occupier, or
not occupied
by an arm’slength tenant
for at least 30
consecutive
days
Annual tax of 1% of
assessed taxable
property value
Property owners
must declare
property’s vacancy
status, whether or
not they think the
tax applies (opt-out
system)
1) Owner has died
2) Property is being
redeveloped or renovated
3) Occupiers are living in a
hospital or supportive care
facility
4) Property is part of a
“Strata” complex, a type
of ownership that restricts
rentals
5) Property ownership is
being transferred
6) Owner is physically
employed in the city
7) Owner is pursuing a
court order
8) Law limits use of
property to vehicle parking,
or some physical limitation
preventing building
Affordable housing
initiatives, including
building temporary
modular housing for
homeless; providing
capital grants to nonprofit
housing projects; building
affordable housing units
Collector of Taxes
mails property
status declaration
forms, reviews
them for accuracy
British
Columbia
Residential
properties
(does not apply
if there is no
residence on the
property)
Property is
not owner’s
principal
residence or
property is not
rented out for
at least three
months of the
year
Annual tax of

0.5% of property
value for
Canadian citizens
or permanent
residents; 2% of
property value
for owners who
don’t report most
of their income
on a Canadian tax
return
Opt-out system
1) Applies only in
enumerated areas
2) Property occupied by a
tenant
3) Owner recently bought
or inherited the property
4) Owner has declared
bankruptcy
5) Owner has died
6) Property is in trust
created by a will for a minor
7) Property has rental
restrictions
8) Property includes a
daycare center
Affordable housing
initiatives, including
construction of affordable
housing; greater security
for renters; funds for local
governments to build
and preserve affordable
housing
Local government
administrators
collect owners’
declarations of
vacancy status, file
other pertinent info
Independent
assessor
determines
property values
IV. U.S. and Canadian Cities are Increasingly Using Vacancy Taxes to Fight Speculative Vacancy Jurisdiction 27 Properties
Taxed
Definition of
Vacancy
Structure of Tax
or Penalty Exemptions Use of Revenue Oversight
Boston
(Institute
for Policy
Studies
and City
Council
proposed
policies)
IPS focuses
on residential
housing;
City Council
proposal
targets both
commercial
and residential
properties
Empty for over
six months per
year
Unclear Unclear Affordable housing
initiatives
Unclear
New York
City
(proposed
vacancy
tax)
Primarily
commercial
property;
possibly
residential
property
Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear; tax is primarily
designed to incentivize
landlords to sell or rent
property, not to generate
revenue
Unclear
San
Francisco
(proposed
vacancy
penalty)
Residences and
storefronts
For residences:
three or
more units
unoccupied for
six consecutive
months
For stores:

Unclear
$711 registration
fee to register as a
vacant storefront;
those who don’t
pay the fee face a
$3,000 penalty
Owners of
vacant residential
properties: $250
daily fee until
property is leased
Unclear Unclear; tax is explicitly
designed to incentivize
landlords to sell or rent
property, not primarily to
generate revenue
Unclear
San Diego
(proposed
vacancy
tax)
Residential
property
Empty for over
six months per
year
Unclear, but
modeled on
Vancouver’s, which
assesses annual
tax as a percentage
of property value
Unclear Affordable housing
initiatives
Unclear
Honolulu
(proposed
vacancy
tax)
Unclear; targets
luxury housing
and seasonal
rental properties
Unclear, but
modeled on
Vancouver’s,
which defines
vacant as
empty over six
months per
year
Unclear, but
modeled on
Vancouver’s, which
assesses annual
tax as a percentage
of property value
Unclear Unclear Unclear
Seattle
(Institute
for Policy
Studies
proposed
vacancy
tax)
Unclear; targets
luxury buildings
Empty for over
six months per
year
Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Figure 10. Vacancy Policies in North America
These vacancy penalties all take the form of a
monetary tax on owners of property that remains
empty most of the year. To simplify the tax’s
administration, many of the measures require
property owners to report their vacancy status and
opt out of the tax if their property is not vacant.

Moreover, the measures that designate the revenue
to specific purposes devote at least some of it to
affordable housing initiatives.

IV. U.S. and Canadian Cities are Increasingly Using Vacancy Taxes to Fight Speculative Vacancy

29 property ownership.84 Because a vacancy tax is
assessed on the “real property” of a person, it
would probably have to be a special tax. Unlike
a general tax, a special tax requires a two-thirds
voter approval.85
C. A Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty may
not be assessed on property value. Although
a special tax may be assessed upon a parcel of
real property or as an incident of real property
ownership, Proposition 13 prevents such a tax
from being determined based on the property’s
value.86 In other words, the dollar amount a
property owner must pay under the Los Angeles
Vacant Homes Penalty cannot be directly tied
to the value of the property.

D. A Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty may
be legally structured as a progressive
special parcel tax. Although a parcel tax may
not be assessed on property value, several
other options are available. For example,
a parcel tax may be levied as a flat rate on
property, such as Oakland’s.87 Parcel taxes
in California have been structured with rates
tied to the size of the property88 and that differ
by use of the property89 and the number of
residential or commercial units on a given
parcel.90 In this way, the tax can be progressively

84. Cal. Const., Art. XIII D, § 3, subd. (a), par. (2).

85. Cal. Const., Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b), (d).

86. Constitutional and Statutory Bases for Restrictions 9 Witkin, Summary 11th Tax § 134 (2019); Cal. Consti., Art. XIII A, § 1; Cal. Const., Art. XIII A, § 4.

87. Resolution No. 87319. Code of Ordinances for Oakland, Calif., Oakland City Council, 2018, https://library.municode.com/CA/ oakland/ordinances/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=930534.

88. For example, Measure B, passed by voters of Los Angeles County in 2002 to pay for emergency medical services, levies a tax of roughly $0.03 per square foot of structural improvements. See County of Los Angeles, (2018, Jan. 10). Revised Agenda. County of Los Angeles, Measure B Advisory Board. http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/dhs/1036113_MBAB011018.pdf .

89. For example, in 2004, Huntington Park passed a parcel tax with 17 rates for various property uses. Different rates applied to categories such as vacant properties, single-family homes, residential buildings with three units, residential buildings with four units, residential buildings with five or more units, and so on. See Sonstelie, J. (2015, April). Parcel Taxes as a Local Revenue Source in California. Public Policy Institute of California. https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_415JSR.pdf.

90. Ibid.

91. Mojadad, I. (2019, Jan. 23). Tax on Vacant Properties Emerges for November Ballot. https://www.sfweekly.com/news/tax-on-vacantproperties-emerges-for-november-ballot/. structured, so owners of presumably more
valuable vacant properties pay higher rates.

Other variables may also be considered. For
example, San Francisco’s proposal would tax
landlords owning residential properties with
three or more units that are vacant for six
consecutive months at a rate of $250 per unit
each day until leased.91 Thus, units held vacant for
longer periods of time would face higher taxes.

A special parcel tax is a logical structure for a
Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty, because
parcel taxes apply to property or property
ownership, allow progressive tax rates, and
permit the tax revenue to go toward community
projects designed to alleviate the housing crisis
in Los Angeles.

V. The Legal Framework for Implementing a Vacant Homes Penalty in Los Angeles 30 E. Revenue from a Los Angeles Vacant Homes
Penalty could be devoted to advancing
important housing justice objectives. As
a special tax, the revenue from a Los Angeles
Vacant Homes Penalty could be designated for
many purposes, including projects to advance
housing justice, produce and preserve nonprofit
affordable housing, and address the harms of
speculative investment and gentrification.

Although there is broad discretion to select
these purposes, once the revenue spending
plans are listed in the measure and approved by
voters, the city cannot deviate from them.

F. A Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty
may be placed on the ballot by the City
Council or as a citizens’ initiative. The City
Council could place a Vacant Homes Penalty
measure on the ballot with a majority vote
of the council no later than 110 days before
the election.92 It could also be placed before
voters through the citizens’ initiative process,93
which would require petitioners to collect
more than 60,000 signatures within a 120-day
period, with the entire process of signature and
petition submission, signature verification, and
examination by city officials completed at least
110 days before the targeted election.94

92. Election Code of the City of Los Angeles, Chapter VI, § 601(b), p. 39. Los Angeles City Clerk, https://clerk.lacity.org/sites/g/files/ wph606/f/Election%20Code.pdf.

93. Election Code of the City of Los Angeles, Chapter VI, § 600, p. 39. Los Angeles City Clerk, https://clerk.lacity.org/sites/g/files/ wph606/f/Election%20Code.pdf.

94. Los Angeles City Charter, Vol. I, Article IV, § 452 (b), American Legal Publishing Corp., http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway. dll/California/laac/charter/volumeigovernance/articleivelections?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:losangeles_ca_ mc$anc=JD_Ch452.

95. California Cannabis Coal. v. City of Upland, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 814 (Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded, 372 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2016), and aff’d, 3 Cal. 5th 924, 401 P.3d 49 (2017), as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 1, 2017).

96. California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 814.

97. San Francisco Office of the City Attorney. (2017, Oct. 17). Memorandum Re: Voting Threshold for Initiative Tax Measures Following California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland. https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/CA-CannabisCoalition-Memo.pdf.

98. Borenstein, D. (2019, Oct. 17). Borenstein: California needs clarity on vote requirement for taxes. East Bay Times. https://www. eastbaytimes.com/2019/10/17/borenstein-california-needs-clarity-on-vote-requirement-for-taxes/.

A Note on the Legal Framework: Recent litigation
has questioned the voter threshold required to
pass a special tax measure that is submitted to
the ballot by citizens’ initiative. In a 2017 case,
California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland
(“California Cannabis”), the California Supreme
Court drew a distinction between city council
and citizens’ initiative tax measures.95 The court
held that the California Constitution’s requirement
that general tax proposals placed on the ballot by
“local government” can be voted on only during
general elections does not apply to citizen-initiated
measures.96 Some commentators have argued that
the California Cannabis ruling could open the door to
a broader interpretation of citizen-initiated measures
that would relieve them of other legal restrictions—
creating the possibility that citizen-initiated special taxes could be passed by only a simple majority.97 A
clear answer isn’t likely in the near future, because
the issue is under consideration by numerous
California courts.98 In the meantime, securing twothirds voter approval is still an effective method for enacting a Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty.

V. The Legal Framework for Implementing a Vacant Homes Penalty in Los Angeles

32 3. Apply the penalty to undeveloped vacant properties that are zoned to allow housing and have had rental housing on site in the previous 10 years.

Owners of long-term undeveloped vacant property may face challenges in converting to residential use, and some undeveloped vacant properties may face physical or legal limitations that prevent development. It would be reasonable, therefore, to exclude such undeveloped properties from a penalty. But intentionally holding properties undeveloped after evictions and/or demolition of rental (often rent-stabilized) units is a harmful product of real estate speculation, and such practices should be covered by the penalty.

4. Apply the penalty to units that are unoccupied by residents for more than 90 days annually.

A Vacant Homes Penalty should be imposed on an annual basis, with the penalty applying to any unit that was unoccupied for more than 90 days during the previous year and does not qualify for an exemption.

5. Create a rebuttable presumption that units are vacant and subject to the penalty using DWP metering information and other best available data.

The Vacant Homes Penalty should establish a rebuttable presumption of vacancy using metering information from the DWP, evidence of homeownership exemption, and other available data. If metering information shows that water and power is not connected or that certain utility thresholds are not met for more than 90 days, or if a unit has not been claimed under the homeownership exemption, the unit should be presumed to be vacant and subject to the penalty, with the property owner having the burden to prove otherwise.

6. Create a progressive structure that penalizes speculative vacancies and maximizes revenue for community-centered housing justice programs and enforcement.

As described in Section III, a Vacant Homes Penalty can be progressively structured in several ways, including as a flat fee per vacant unit regardless of the unit’s size, or as a fee per square foot of vacant unit. Fee amounts could escalate based on housing tenure, duration of vacancy, or overall building vacancy rate, although the fee amounts may not be based on property value.

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 33 7. Include reasonable exemptions.

Exemptions to the penalty should be granted to certain units or property, such as those:
• owned by low-income individuals (using metrics adjusted for Los Angeles wages); • owned by a government or nonprofit organization;
• having physical or legal limitations that prevent the owner from building on the property; • covered by an active permit for renovations;
• in the process of ownership transfer;
• actively being marketed in good faith for lease or sale; • whose owner or lessee is recently deceased;
• whose owner or lessee is in a hospital or supportive care facility; • whose owner or lessee is in the military or a service program; • whose owner or lessee is taking an extended vacation but has demonstrated an intent to return to the residence
All of these exemptions are found in other cities’ vacancy tax programs and together will promote fair application of the Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty.

8. Allocate the penalty revenue exclusively to community-serving uses that advance housing justice.

Revenue should be deposited in a special fund dedicated to (a) constructing and improving nonprofit deeply affordable housing and social housing; (b) providing services to the unhoused; and (c) preventing displacement and eviction, particularly for low-income tenants, students, the disabled, and the elderly. Penalty revenue should not be available to any program that involves “blight elimination” or the criminalization of low-income and houseless Angelenos.

9. Include registry, audit, and enforcement procedures; and ensure appropriate data management practices.

Property owners, even if exempt from the Vacant Homes Penalty, should be required to register vacancy status with the city. For example, Vancouver’s policy requires residential property owners to annually declare their property’s vacancy status to the city government, whether or not they think the tax applies to them. A city department should perform random audits to determine and penalize inaccurate reporting from property owners. In addition, the responsible agency should maintain this registry of vacant units and properties to be made available to policymakers and the public, to burnish data access and disclosure as called for in subsequent recommendations.

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 34 10. Ensure comprehensive community oversight of program implementation.

The Vacant Homes Penalty measure should also include the creation of an oversight commission comprising community members affected by the affordable housing and eviction crisis, including at least 50% current or former houseless residents. This commission should be empowered to review citywide and building-level vacancy data and receive periodic progress reports from city staff on implementation, enforcement, and spending of program revenue. The commission should also be empowered and appropriately staffed to produce and present an annual report to the City Council with an assessment of the program’s impact on advancing housing justice and recommendations for improvements. Taking a similar approach, Oakland’s Vacant Property Tax established a Commission on Homelessness that meets at least four times annually and reports on the status of the tax’s implementation and impact on houselessness.

B. Adopt complementary anti-vacancy policies.

Additional policies can augment a Vacant Homes Penalty and provide greater checks on the rampant speculation that is accelerating the affordability and houselessness crisis. The following complementary policies should be considered alongside a Vacant Homes Penalty to form a comprehensive city response.

1. Municipal Requirements for Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership We recommend that the city require disclosure of beneficial ownership interests as part of the property registration. A “beneficial owner” is the natural person who reaps the rewards associated with owning a corporation. When companies are not required to disclose this information, the window for harmful activity is left wide open.

More and more, property owners hide their identities by owning property in the name of shell corporations or shell LLCs (Limited Liability Corporations).  A shell corporation is one designed to shield its owner from liability, but it also makes owners of property anonymous in the public records.

These companies depend on, and profit from, municipalities’ protection of property rights and publicly financed amenities. Yet their beneficial owners are not required to identify themselves to the public.

To unveil these actors, jurisdictions around the world have mandated the disclosure of beneficial ownership in companies, real property, or both.

Legislators addressed corporate transparency in October 2019, when the Corporate Transparency Act of 2019 (the Maloney bill) passed the U.S. House of Representatives with bipartisan support. The bill would require LLCs and corporations to disclose their real owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, an arm of the Treasury Department, at the time of company formation. According to Rep.

Carolyn Maloney, “[T]his bill will also help to crack down on New York’s real estate being used to park illicit money, driving up housing costs and limiting availability.”99 In addition, New York City, 99 Story, L., & Saul, S. (2015, February 7). Towers of Secrecy. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/shell-companytowers-of-secrecy-real-estate VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 35 the European Union, and the United Kingdom are considering legislation requiring transparency in property ownership.100
Implementing municipal disclosure would be simple. The Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office could require the disclosure of real ownership with the recording of deeds. To support code enforcement and regulatory efforts, a registry of properties by ownership should be created. It is also critical that this information be made available to the public.

2. Prohibit Condominium Conversions and Demolitions of Rent-Stabilized Units Until Vacancy Monitoring Procedures Are in Place.

The Ellis Act, harmful though it is, does not prevent the City from adopting and enforcing certain tenant protections. In fact, the Ellis Act explicitly provides that it “is not otherwise intended to … interfere with local governmental authority over land use, including regulation of the conversion of existing housing to condominiums” or “preempt local … controls that govern the demolition and redevelopment of residential property.”101 The City of Los Angeles has already elected to use this discretion, at least with respect to condominium conversions. When evaluating applications for condominium conversions, the Department of City Planning assesses the vacancy rate in the applicable community plan area, denying the application if the vacancy rate is 5% or less and the cumulative impact of successive conversions is significant.102 But as described in this report, Los Angeles hasn’t produced an accounting of vacancy rates for a planning area. Currently, then, L.A.’s entire condominium conversion regulatory framework is predicated on data the city does not have.

The city can take several immediate steps to ensure proper implementation of existing code sections and reduce speculative vacancy created by evictions and demolitions. We suggest that the city:
a. Create a way to deny demolition permits for rent-stabilized units when the vacancy rate in the community plan area is 5% or less, similar to existing policy for condominium conversions. b. Limit the annual number of demolition permits and condominium conversions. c. Prohibit any condominium conversion or demolition of rent-stabilized units until such time that the city can determine vacancy rate for community plan areas. 100. Barbanel, J. (2019, Oct. 8). Secret Manhattan Condo Purchases Are Dead, Thanks to a Suburban Squabble. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-manhattan-condo-purchases-are-dead-thanks-to-a-suburban-squabble11570557635?mod=article_inline; Office Journal of the European Union. (2015, May 20). Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015. www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=EN; Helen Burgaff. (2018, May 2). New Register to Require Public Disclosure of Identity of ‘Ultimate Owners’ of UK Properties. International Investment. www.internationalinvestment.net/regions/uk/new-register-require-public-disclosure-identity-ultimate-owners-buyersuk-properties/. 101. California Government Code Section 7060.7(a)-(b).
102. Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 12.95.2.F.6.

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 36 3. Demand Publicly Accessible Data on Vacancy
Los Angeles agencies have historically used data based on metering information from the DWP to measure vacancy rates. This data set samples every residence in the city on a daily basis.

Unfortunately, in recent years, city agencies have often been unable to acquire this data from DWP, and recent estimates, from 2017, have been deemed too inaccurate to be used in decision making by those agencies.103 In response to a public records request we submitted to access this data, the Los Angeles Department of City Planning (DCP) provided us with its most recent Community Plan Area vacancy calculation. For this it relied on ACS 2017 data, indicating that DCP has yet to secure updated and accurate vacancy information from the DWP. A report from the DCP to the City Council indicates that it considers ACS data the second-best source for vacancy data, behind DWP data,104 which makes it troubling that DWP has yet failed to provide metering-based data to city agencies. Even when vacancy data from DWP were available, city agencies did not calculate and use vacancy information for individual buildings, another shortcoming that should be addressed.

The determination of accurate vacancy rates is critical. Vacancy rates are used to determine whether to approve condo conversions and to evaluate the impact of new developments on the housing market.

These determinations are crucial in the context of L.A.’s ongoing eviction crisis, as an Oct. 15, 2018, motion from Councilman Mike Bonin’s office makes clear.105 The motion calls for the DCP to “cease issuing Ellis Act clearances” until the vacancy rate can be determined and is above 5% in a Community Plan Area. The Ellis Act, as we have discussed, is a major driver of displacement and tool of speculation in Los Angeles. Bonin recognizes the importance of this lack of data in multiple motions that are working through council,106 and the motion includes a plea to the HCIDLA for better vacancy data.107 We applaud the councilman and his colleagues for trying to get reliable vacancy data, but the data should be made publicly accessible to all interested residents and published online. 103. City of Los Angeles, Department of City Planning. (2017, Sept. 21). Supplemental Report Relative to Strengthening Enforcement of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance and Ellis Act Provisions. https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2017/17-0480_misc_09-21-2017.pdf. 104 Ibid.
105. City of Los Angeles, City Council. (2019 October 15). Motion. http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2019/19-1246_mot_10-15-2019.pdf 106 City of Los Angeles, City Council. (2019, June 11). Motion: Empty Homes Penalty. http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2019/19-0623_ mot_06-11-2019.pdf.
107 City of Los Angeles City Council Housing Committee. (2019, Aug. 28). Housing Committee Report Relative to Vacant, Habitable Housing Units and a Potential Empty Homes Penalty Structure in the City of Los Angeles. http://clkrep.lacity.org/ onlinedocs/2019/19-0623_rpt_hsg_8-28-19.pdf.

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 37 4. Real Estate Transfer Tax
Real estate transfer taxes are a promising tool to reduce speculation and raise funds to be used at the local level. California imposes a tax of $1.10 per $1,000 of value (0.11%) of the purchase price on all property sales.108 Cities and counties are free to impose higher rates. Los Angeles, for example, imposes an additional tax of $4.50 per $1,000 of net value (0.45%) on property sales.109 This tax could be made still more progressive. San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley have imposed higher rates for more expensive transactions. In 2016, San Francisco voters approved Proposition W, which increased the real estate transfer tax to 2.25% for properties sold for $5 million to $10 million;

2.75% for properties sold for $10 million to $25 million; and 3% for properties sold for above $25 million.110 The city’s Office of Economic Analysis estimated the measure would raise an average of $44 million in additional revenue each year.111 In November, 2018, voters in Oakland overwhelmingly approved Measure X to implement a tiered transfer tax.112 It increased the previous flat transfer tax of

1.5% to 1.75% for transfers of $2 million to $5 million, and 2.5% on real estate value over $5 million.113 In the same election, 72% of voters in Berkeley approved Measure P, which increased the 1.5% flat transfer tax to 2.5% for sales over $1.5 million.114 The measure also required the city to create a Homeless Services Panel of Experts to advise the City Council on how and to what extent the city should establish and/or fund programs to end or prevent homelessness in Berkeley.115 Los Angeles should consider a similar real estate transfer tax that imposes higher rates on more valuable properties. Revenue should go toward building and improving nonprofit affordable housing; providing services to the unhoused; and preventing displacement and eviction, particularly for lowincome tenants, students, the disabled, and the elderly. 108 Tannenbaum, L., and Pfaff, S. (2014, April 28). Watch Out for California Transfer Taxes in Transactions Involving Real Estate Holdings.

DLA Piper. https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/04/watch-out/ 109. Ibid.
110. San Francisco, California, Real Estate Transfer Tax Increase, Proposition W. (2016, November). Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/ San_Francisco,_California,_Real_Estate_Transfer_Tax_Increase,_Proposition_W_(November_2016). 111. Office of Economic Analysis. (2016, June 29). Transfer Tax Increase on Properties Over $5 Million in Value: Economic Impact Report. http://sfcontroller.org/sites/default/files/160604_economic_impact_final.corrected.pdf . 112. Oakland, California, Measure X, Graduated Real Estate Transfer Tax. (2018, November). Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/Oakland,_ California,_Measure_X,_Graduated_Real_Estate_Transfer_Tax_(November_2018) 113. City of Oakland. (2018, Nov. 6, p. 1). City of Oakland Measure X. https://www.acvote.org/acvote-assets/02_election_information/ PDFs/20181106/en/Measures/20%20-%20Measure%20X%20-%20City%20of%20Oakland.pdf. 114. Berkeley Hills Realty Office. (2018, Dec. 14). What You Need to Know About the New Property Taxes and Laws Going into Effect in the East Bay. Bay Area Living. https://berkhills.com/bay-area-living/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-property-taxes-andlawsgoing-into-effect-in-the-east-bay. 115. Berkeley, California, Measure P, Real Property Transfer Tax Increase. (2018 ,November). Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/ Berkeley,_California,_Measure_P,_Real_Property_Transfer_Tax_Increase_(November_2018).

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 38 5. Flipping Tax
A variation of a transfer tax that more effectively targets rent-seeking speculation is a flipping tax.

This would target investors who sell properties shortly after buying them, quickly cashing in on rising property values. Both the Sen. Bernie Sanders campaign116 and the Homes Guarantee platform released by People’s Action117 have proposed a tax of 25% of the purchase value on non-owneroccupied properties that are sold within five years of the last purchase. A flipping penalty similar to those described above should be built into an increased real estate transfer tax in Los Angeles.

6. Out-of-State Transaction Tax
The city should also consider a tax that targets investors living outside California. In Los Angeles, speculators (often tied to Wall Street financial institutions or global investment pools) tend to have deep pockets and no stake in the communities where they are buying land. Targeting these individuals and corporate entities that seek to profit from our housing crisis could raise much-needed revenue for affordable housing and other services needed by unhoused and rent-burdened Angelenos.

British Columbia incorporated a tax on foreign investors into its Speculation and Vacancy Tax.118 It imposes a vacancy tax of 0.5% on the assessed value of the residential property for British Columbians and other Canadian citizens or permanent residents, but 2% for foreign owners and “satellite families”119 —that is, individuals or spousal units who do not report most of their income on a Canadian tax return.120 B.C.’s government adopted the tax in response to nonresident real estate speculation. A similar provision in the Los Angeles Vacant Homes Penalty could reduce housing speculation and also raise significant revenue.

7. Increased Gross Receipts Tax
The city should consider increasing the gross receipts tax to ensure that the largest landlords and largest perpetrators of speculative rent increases and vacancy pay their fair share for their role in the housing crisis.
116. Sanders, B. (n.d.). Housing for All. https://berniesanders.com/issues/housing-all/. 117. People’s Action. (2019). A National Homes Guarantee. https://homesguarantee.com/wp-content/uploads/Homes-Guarantee-_- Briefing-Book.pdf.
118. British Columbia. (n.d.). Tax Rates for Speculation and Vacancy Tax. https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/taxes/speculationvacancy-tax/how-tax-works/tax-rates. 119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles 39 8. Explore Other Mechanisms For Using Perpetually Vacant Properties to House the Unhoused Immediately and Advance Community Control of Land
Los Angeles should also consider allowing unhoused people to live in perpetually vacant properties and transferring properties to community ownership models, such as a community land trust. This kind of policy could take the form of seizing tax-delinquent vacant properties for use as social or community-controlled housing; using eminent domain to take the property of the worst offenders, who leave units vacant for unconscionable lengths of time; and any other mechanism that might bring long-vacant properties under the control of community or local agencies.

VI. Recommended Policy Tools to Address Speculative Vacancy in Los Angeles

EXHIBIT 2
STATE OF CALIFORNIA - BUSINESS, CONSUMER SERVICES AND HOUSING AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

DIVISION OF HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT
2020 W. El Camino Avenue, Suite 500
Sacramento, CA 95833
(916) 263-2911 / FAX (916) 263-7453
www.hcd.ca.gov
May 9, 2024
MEMORANDUM FOR: Interested Parties

FROM: Megan Kirkeby, Deputy Director
Division of Housing Policy Development
SUBJECT: 2024 State Income Limits
Attached are briefing materials and 2024 State Income Limits that are now in effect, replacing the previous 2023 State Income Limits. Income limits reflect updated median income and household income levels for acutely low -, extremely low-, very low-, low-, and moderate-income households for California’s 58 counties. The 2024 State Income Limits are on the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) website at https://www.hcd.ca.gov/grants-andfunding/income-limits/state-and-federal-income-rent-and-loan-value-limits.

State Income Limits apply to designated programs, are used to determine applicant eligibility (based on the level of household income) and may be used to calculate affordable housing costs for applicable housing assistance programs. Use of State Income Limits are subject to a particular program’s definition of income, family, family size, effective dates, and other factors. In addition, definitions applicable to income categories, criteria, and geographic areas sometimes differ depending on the funding source and program, resulting in some programs using other income limits.

The attached briefing materials detail California’s 2024 State Income Limits and were updated based on: (1) changes to income limits the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) released on April 1, 2024, for its Public Housing, Section 8, Section 202, and Section 811 programs; and (2) adjustments HCD made based on State statutory provisions and its 2013 Hold Harmless (HH) Policy.

For questions concerning State Income Limits, please see the Questions and Answers on page 5 or contact [email protected].
2024 State Income Limits Briefing Materials
California Code of Regulations, Title 25, Section 6932

Overview
The Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), pursuant to Health & Safety Code Section 50093(c), must file updates to its State Income Limits with the Office of Administrative Law.

HCD annually updates these income limits based on U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) revisions to the Public Housing and Section 8 Income Limits that HUD most recently released on April 1, 2024.

HUD annually updates its Public Housing and Section 8 Income Limits to reflect changes in median family income levels for different size households and income limits for extremely low-, very low-, and low-income households. HCD, pursuant to statutory provisions, makes the following additional revisions:
(1) if necessary, increases a county’s area median income to equal California’s non-metropolitan median income, (2) adjusts Area Median Income (AMI) and household income category levels to not result in any year-over-year decrease for any year after 2009 pursuant to HCD’s February 2013 Hold Harmless (HH) Policy. (HCD’s HH Policy was implemented to replace HUD’s HH Policy, discontinued in 2009, to ensure income limits and area median income levels do not fall below a prior year’s highest level), and (3) determines income limits for California’s acutely low-income and moderate-income categories.

Following are brief summaries of technical methodologies used by HUD and HCD in updating income limits for different household income categories. For additional information, please refer to HUD’s briefing materials at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il//il24/IncomeLimitsMethodologyFY24.pdf.

HUD Methodology
HUD Public Housing and Section 8 Income Limits begin with the production of median family incomes.

HUD uses the Section 8 program’s Fair Market Rent (FMR) area definitions in developing median incomes, which means developing median incomes for each metropolitan area, parts of some metropolitan areas, and each non-metropolitan county. The 2024 FMR area definitions for California are unchanged from last year. HUD calculates Income Limits for every FMR area with adjustments for family size and for areas with unusually high or low family income or housing-cost-to-income relationships.

Extremely Low-Income
In determining the extremely low-income limit, HUD uses the Federal Poverty Guidelines, published by the Department of Health and Human Services. The Federal Poverty Guidelines are a simplified version of the Federal Poverty Thresholds used for administrative purposes — for instance, determining financial eligibility for certain federal programs. HUD compares the appropriate poverty guideline with 60% of the very low-income limit and chooses the greater of the two as the extremely low-income limit.

The value may not exceed the very low-income level.

Very Low-Income
The very low-income limits are the basis for the extremely low- and low-income limits. The very lowincome limit typically reflects 50 percent of median family income (MFI), and HUD's MFI figure generally equals two times HUD's 4-person very low-income limit. However, HUD may adjust the very low-income limit for an area or county to account for conditions that warrant special considerations. As such, the very low-income limit may not always equal 50% MFI.

Low-Income
In general, most low-income limits represent the higher level of: (1) 80 percent of MFI or, (2) 80 percent of state non-metropolitan median family income. However, due to adjustments that HUD sometimes makes to the very low-income limit, strictly calculating low-income limits as 80 percent of MFI could 2024 State Income Limits Briefing Materials
California Code of Regulations, Title 25, Section 6932

produce unintended anomalies inconsistent with statutory intent (e.g., very low-income limits being higher than low-income limits). Therefore, HUD’s briefing materials specify that, with some exceptions, the low-income limit reflect 160 percent of the very low-income limit. HUD may apply additional adjustments to areas with unusually high or low housing-costs-to-income relationships and for other reasons. This can result in low-income limits exceeding MFI in certain counties.

Median Family Income/Area Median Income
HUD references and estimates the MFI in calculating the income limits. California law and State Income Limits reference AMI that, pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 50093(c), means the MFI of a geographic area of the State, as estimated annually by HUD for its Section 8 Program.

In estimating FY 2024 median family incomes, HUD uses median family income data (as opposed to median household income data) from the 2022 American Community Survey (ACS) as calculated by the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau produces two types of ACS estimates: the “one-year” data, which represent estimates as of 2022; and the “five-year” data, which represent estimates as of 2018-2022 (but are inflated to 2022 dollars). HUD requires special tabulations of the ACS to match its custom HMFA definitions described above.

HUD uses the 2022 ACS median family income data (as opposed to household income data) as the basis of FY 2024 Income Limits for all areas of California. HUD uses an inflation forecast from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in updating ACS estimates. For FY 2024, CBO has produced a forecast CPI of 310.683, which divided by annual 2022 of 292.613 is 1.062 (an increase of 6.2 percent).

For additional information on MFI’s please see HUD’s briefing materials at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il24/Medians-Methodology-FY24.pdf.

Adjustment Calculations
HUD may apply adjustments to areas with unusually high or low family income, uneven housing-cost-toincome relationship, or other reasons. For example, HUD applies an increase if the four-person very low-income limit would otherwise be less than the amount at which 35 percent of it equals 85 percent of the annualized two-bedroom Section 8 FMR (or 40th percentile rent in 50th percentile FMR areas). The purpose is to increase the income limit for areas where rental-housing costs are unusually high in relation to the median income. In certain cases, HUD also applies an adjustment to the income limits based on the state non-metropolitan median family income level.

In addition, HUD restricts adjustments, so income limits do not increase more than five percent of the previous year's very low-income figure OR twice the increase in the national MFI as measured by the ACS with an absolute cap of 10 percent, whichever is greater. For 2024, the annualized change is measured by the ACS from 2021 to 2022. Twice this change is approximately 14.8 percent, which is greater than the 10 percent absolute cap. So, for FY 2024, the income limits “cap” is 10 percent. HUD first announced this methodology on January 10, 2024 in a Federal Register Notice. The cap and floor rules do not apply to the extremely low-income limits.

Please refer to HUD briefing materials for additional information on the adjustment calculations.

Income Limit Calculations for Household Sizes Other Than 4-Persons The income limit statute requires adjustments for family size. The legislative history and conference committee report indicates that Congress intended that income limits should be higher for larger families and lower for smaller families. The same family size adjustments apply to all income limits, except extremely low-income limits, which are set at the poverty income threshold. They are as follows:

Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Adjustments: 70% 80% 90% Base 108% 116% 124% 132%
2024 State Income Limits Briefing Materials
California Code of Regulations, Title 25, Section 6932

Income Limit Calculations for Household Sizes Greater Than 8-Persons For households of more than eight persons, refer to the formula at the end of the table for 2024 Income Limits. Due to the adjustments HUD can make to income limits in a given county, table data should be the only method used to determine program eligibility. Arithmetic calculations are applicable only when a household has more than eight members. New for FY 2024, family size-adjusted income limits are retested for compliance with the cap and floor rules. Please refer to HUD’s briefing material for additional information on family size adjustments.

HCD Methodology
State law (see, e.g., Health & Safety Code section 50093) prescribes the methodology HCD uses to update the State Income Limits. HCD utilizes HUD’s Public Housing and Section 8 Income Limits.

HCD’s methodology involves: (1) if necessary, increasing a county’s median income established by HUD to equal California’s non-metropolitan county median income determined by HUD, (2) applying HCD’s HH Policy, in effect since 2013, to not allow decreases in AMI levels and household income category levels, (3) applying to the median income the same family size adjustments HUD applies to the income limits, (4) determining income limit levels applicable to California’s acutely low-income households defined by law as household income not exceeding 15 percent of county AMI, and (5) determining income limit levels applicable to California’s moderate-income households defined by law as household income not exceeding 120 percent of county AMI.

Area Median Income and Income Category Levels
HCD, pursuant to federal and State law, adjusts median income levels for all counties so they are not less than the non-metropolitan county median income established by HUD ($87,900 for 2024). Next, HCD applies its HH Policy to ensure AMI and income limits for all household income categories do not fall below any level achieved in the prior year. Health and Safety Code section 50093 requires HCD to adjust the AMI for family size in accordance with adjustment factors adopted by HUD and illustrated on the previous page. This establishes that the MFI published by HUD equals the four-person AMI for California counties.

Acutely low-Income Levels
Beginning in 2022, Health and Safety Code section 50063.5 established California’s acutely low-income household levels. After calculating the 4-person area median income (AMI) level as previously described, HCD sets the maximum acutely low-income limit to equal 15 percent of the county’s AMI, adjusted for family size.

Moderate-Income Levels
HCD is responsible for establishing California’s moderate-income limit levels. After calculating the 4- person AMI level as previously described, HCD sets the maximum moderate-income limit to equal 120 percent of the county’s AMI, adjusted for family size.

Applicability of California’s Official State Income Limits Applicability of the State Income Limits are subject to particular programs as program definitions of factors such as income, family, and household size vary. Some programs, such as Multifamily Tax Subsidy Projects (MTSPs), use different income limits. For MTSPs, separate income limits apply per provisions of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 (Public Law 110-289). Income limits for MTSPs are used to determine qualification levels as well as set maximum rental rates for projects funded with tax credits authorized under Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). In addition, MTSP income limits apply to projects financed with tax-exempt housing bonds issued to provide qualified residential rental development under Section 142 of the Code. These income limits are available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/mtsp.html. 2024 State Income Limits Briefing Materials
California Code of Regulations, Title 25, Section 6932

Questions and Answers
In Los Angeles, as well as several other counties in the state, why does the very low-income limit not equal 50% of AMI (or the low-income limit not equal 80% of AMI)? There are many exceptions to the arithmetic calculation of income limits. These include adjustments for high housing cost relative to income, the application of state nonmetropolitan income limits in low-income areas, and national maximums in high-income areas. In Los Angeles County, as well as several others, the magnitude of these adjustments results in the low-income limit exceeding AMI. These exceptions are detailed in the FY 2024 Income Limits Methodology Document, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il24/Medians-Methodology-FY24.pdf.

For further information on the exact adjustments made to an individual area of the country, please see HUD’s FY 2024 Income Limits Documentation System. The documentation system is available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il2024/select Geography.odn. Once the area in question is selected, a summary of the area’s median income, Very Low-Income, Extremely Low-Income, and LowIncome Limits are displayed. Detailed calculations are obtained by selecting the relevant links.

Why don’t the income limits for my area reflect recent gains? Although HUD uses the most recent data available concerning local area incomes, there is still a lag between when the data are collected and when the data are available for use. For example, FY 2024 Income Limits are calculated using 2018-2022 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) data, and oneyear 2022 data where possible. This is a two-year lag, so more current trends in median family income levels are not available.

HUD estimates Median Family Income (MFI) annually for each metropolitan area and non-metropolitan county. The basis for HUD’s median family incomes is data from the ACS, table B19113 - MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS. A Consumer Price Index (CPI) forecast as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is used in the trend factor calculation to bring the 2021 ACS data forward to FY 2023.

For additional details concerning the use of the ACS in HUD’s calculations of MFI, please see HUD’s FY 2024 Median Family Income methodology document,
at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il23/Medians-Methodology-FY24.pdf Additionally, full documentation of all calculations for MFIs is available in the FY 2024 Median Family Income and the FY 2024 Income Limits Documentation System. These systems are available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il2024/select Geography.odn Why didn’t the income limits for my county change from last year? HCD’s 2013 Hold Harmless Policy likely prevented the income limits from decreasing from last year’s levels and has maintained them despite a decrease in median income and/or income limits published by HUD.

Why do the income limits or area median income for my county not match what was published by HUD?
HCD adjusts each county’s AMI to at least equal the state non-metropolitan county median income, as published by HUD. Further, HCD’s 2013 Hold Harmless Policy prevents any decrease in income limits or median family income published by HUD to be applied to State Income Limits.

Section 6932. 2024 Income Limits
Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Last page instructs how to use income limits to determine applicant eligibility and calculate affordable housing cost and rent
Alameda County
Area Median Income:
$155,700
Acutely Low 16350 18700 21000 23350 25200 27100 28950 30800 Extremely Low 32700 37400 42050 46700 50450 54200 57950 61650 Very Low Income 54500 62300 70100 77850 84100 90350 96550 102800 Low Income 84600 96650 108750 120800 130500 140150 149800 159500 Median Income 109000 124550 140150 155700 168150 180600 193050 205500 Moderate Income 130800 149500 168150 186850 201800 216750 231700 246650 Alpine County
Area Median Income:
$119,300
Acutely Low 12550 14300 16100 17900 19350 20750 22200 23650 Extremely Low 22200 25400 28550 31700 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 37000 42250 47550 52850 57050 61300 65550 69750 Low Income 59200 67650 76100 84550 91350 98100 104850 111650 Median Income 83500 95450 107350 119300 128850 138400 147950 157500 Moderate Income 100200 114500 128850 143150 154600 166050 177500 188950 Amador County
Area Median Income:
$101,900
Acutely Low 10700 12250 13750 15300 16500 17750 18950 20200 Extremely Low 21200 24200 27250 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 35300 40350 45400 50400 54450 58500 62500 66550 Low Income 56450 64550 72600 80650 87150 93600 100050 106500 Median Income 71350 81500 91700 101900 110050 118200 126350 134500 Moderate Income 85600 97850 110050 122300 132100 141850 151650 161450 Butte County
Area Median Income:
$96,600
Acutely Low 10150 11600 13050 14500 15650 16800 18000 19150 Extremely Low 19050 21800 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 31750 36300 40850 45350 49000 52600 56250 59850 Low Income 50750 58000 65250 72500 78300 84100 89900 95700 Median Income 67600 77300 86950 96600 104350 112050 119800 127500 Moderate Income 81150 92700 104300 115900 125150 134450 143700 153000 Calaveras County
Area Median Income:
$96,200
Acutely Low 10100 11550 13000 14450 15600 16750 17900 19050 Extremely Low 20050 22900 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 33400 38150 42900 47650 51500 55300 59100 62900 Low Income 53400 61000 68650 76250 82350 88450 94550 100650 Median Income 67350 76950 86600 96200 103900 111600 119300 127000 Moderate Income 80800 92350 103900 115450 124700 133900 143150 152400 Colusa County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Contra Costa County
Area Median Income:
$155,700
Acutely Low 16350 18700 21000 23350 25200 27100 28950 30800 Extremely Low 32700 37400 42050 46700 50450 54200 57950 61650 Very Low Income 54500 62300 70100 77850 84100 90350 96550 102800 Low Income 84600 96650 108750 120800 130500 140150 149800 159500 Median Income 109000 124550 140150 155700 168150 180600 193050 205500 Moderate Income 130800 149500 168150 186850 201800 216750 231700 246650 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Del Norte County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 El Dorado County
Area Median Income:
$113,900
Acutely Low 11950 13700 15400 17100 18450 19850 21200 22550 Extremely Low 24750 28300 31850 35350 38200 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 41300 47150 53050 58950 63650 68400 73100 77850 Low Income 66050 75450 84900 94300 101850 109400 116950 124500 Median Income 79750 91100 102500 113900 123000 132100 141250 150350 Moderate Income 95700 109350 123050 136700 147650 158550 169500 180450 Fresno County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Glenn County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Humboldt County
Area Median Income:
$88,300
Acutely Low 9300 10600 11950 13250 14300 15350 16450 17500 Extremely Low 18550 21200 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30950 35350 39750 44150 47700 51250 54750 58300 Low Income 49500 56550 63600 70650 76350 82000 87650 93300 Median Income 61800 70650 79450 88300 95350 102450 109500 116550 Moderate Income 74150 84750 95350 105950 114450 122900 131400 139850 Imperial County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Inyo County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Kern County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Kings County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Lake County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Lassen County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Los Angeles County
Area Median Income:
$98,200
Acutely Low 10350 11800 13300 14750 15950 17100 18300 19450 Extremely Low 29150 33300 37450 41600 44950 48300 51600 54950 Very Low Income 48550 55450 62400 69350 74900 80450 86000 91550 Low Income 77700 88800 99900 110950 119850 128750 137600 146500 Median Income 68750 78550 88400 98200 106050 113900 121750 129600 Moderate Income 82500 94300 106050 117850 127300 136700 146150 155550 Madera County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Marin County
Area Median Income:
$186,600
Acutely Low 19600 22400 25200 28000 30250 32500 34700 36950 Extremely Low 41150 47000 52900 58750 63450 68150 72850 77550 Very Low Income 68550 78350 88150 97900 105750 113600 121400 129250 Low Income 109700 125350 141000 156650 169200 181750 194250 206800 Median Income 130600 149300 167950 186600 201550 216450 231400 246300 Moderate Income 156750 179100 201500 223900 241800 259700 277650 295550 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Mariposa County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Mendocino County
Area Median Income:
$90,400
Acutely Low 9500 10850 12200 13550 14650 15700 16800 17900 Extremely Low 19000 21700 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 31650 36200 40700 45200 48850 52450 56050 59700 Low Income 50650 57850 65100 72300 78100 83900 89700 95450 Median Income 63300 72300 81350 90400 97650 104850 112100 119350 Moderate Income 75950 86800 97650 108500 117200 125850 134550 143200 Merced County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Modoc County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Mono County
Area Median Income:
$105,900
Acutely Low 11150 12700 14300 15900 17150 18450 19700 21000 Extremely Low 19650 22450 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 32700 37400 42050 46750 50450 54200 57950 61700 Low Income 52350 59800 67300 74800 80750 86750 92750 98750 Median Income 74150 84700 95300 105900 114350 122850 131300 139800 Moderate Income 88950 101700 114400 127100 137250 147450 157600 167750 Monterey County
Area Median Income:
$103,200
Acutely Low 10850 12400 13950 15500 16750 18000 19200 20450 Extremely Low 27800 31800 35750 39700 42900 46100 49250 52720 Very Low Income 46350 53000 59600 66200 71500 76800 82100 87400 Low Income 74150 84800 95400 105950 114450 122950 131400 139900 Median Income 72250 82550 92900 103200 111450 119700 127950 136200 Moderate Income 86700 99100 111450 123850 133750 143650 153550 163500 Napa County
Area Median Income:
$129,600
Acutely Low 13600 15550 17500 19450 21000 22550 24100 25650 Extremely Low 30850 35250 39650 44050 47600 51100 54650 58150 Very Low Income 51400 58700 66100 73400 79300 85150 91050 96900 Low Income 82150 93900 105650 117350 126750 136150 145550 154900 Median Income 90700 103700 116650 129600 139950 150350 160700 171050 Moderate Income 108850 124400 139950 155500 167950 180400 192800 205250 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Nevada County
Area Median Income:
$112,500
Acutely Low 11850 13500 15200 16900 18250 19600 20950 22300 Extremely Low 21900 25000 28150 31250 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 36500 41700 46900 52100 56300 60450 64650 68800 Low Income 58350 66700 75050 83350 90050 96700 103400 110050 Median Income 78750 90000 101250 112500 121500 130500 139500 148500 Moderate Income 94500 108000 121500 135000 145800 156600 167400 178200 Orange County
Area Median Income:
$129,000
Acutely Low 13550 15500 17400 19350 20900 22450 24000 25550 Extremely Low 33150 37900 42650 47350 51150 54950 58750 62550 Very Low Income 55250 63100 71050 78900 85250 91550 97850 104150 Low Income 88400 101000 113650 126250 136350 146450 156550 166650 Median Income 90300 103200 116100 129000 139300 149650 159950 170300 Moderate Income 108350 123850 139300 154800 167200 179550 191950 204350 Placer County
Area Median Income:
$113,900
Acutely Low 11950 13700 15400 17100 18450 19850 21200 22550 Extremely Low 24750 28300 31850 35350 38200 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 41300 47150 53050 58950 63650 68400 73100 77850 Low Income 66050 75450 84900 94300 101850 109400 116950 124500 Median Income 79750 91100 102500 113900 123000 132100 141250 150350 Moderate Income 95700 109350 123050 136700 147650 158550 169500 180450 Plumas County
Area Median Income:
$92,400
Acutely Low 9700 11100 12450 13850 14950 16050 17150 18300 Extremely Low 19400 22150 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 32250 36850 41450 46050 49750 53450 57150 60800 Low Income 51600 59000 66350 73700 79600 85500 91400 97300 Median Income 64700 73900 83150 92400 99800 107200 114600 121950 Moderate Income 77650 88700 99800 110900 119750 128650 137500 146400 Riverside County
Area Median Income:
$97,500
Acutely Low 10250 11700 13200 14650 15800 17000 18150 19350 Extremely Low 21550 24600 27700 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 35900 41000 46100 51250 55350 59450 63550 67650 Low Income 57400 65600 73800 82000 88600 95150 101650 108250 Median Income 68250 78000 87750 97500 105300 113100 120900 128700 Moderate Income 81900 93600 105300 117000 126350 135700 145100 154450 Sacramento County
Area Median Income:
$113,900
Acutely Low 11950 13700 15400 17100 18450 19850 21200 22550 Extremely Low 24750 28300 31850 35350 38200 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 41300 47150 53050 58950 63650 68400 73100 77850 Low Income 66050 75450 84900 94300 101850 109400 116950 124500 Median Income 79750 91100 102500 113900 123000 132100 141250 150350 Moderate Income 95700 109350 123050 136700 147650 158550 169500 180450 San Benito County
Area Median Income:
$140,200
Acutely Low 14750 16850 18950 21050 22750 24400 26100 27800 Extremely Low 25700 29400 33050 36700 39650 42600 47340 52720 Very Low Income 42850 49000 55100 61200 66100 71000 75900 80800 Low Income 68550 78350 88150 97950 105800 113600 121450 129300 Median Income 98150 112150 126200 140200 151400 162650 173850 185050 Moderate Income 117750 134600 151450 168250 181700 195150 208650 222100 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
San Bernardino
County
Area Median Income:
$97,500
Acutely Low 10250 11700 13200 14650 15800 17000 18150 19350 Extremely Low 21550 24600 27700 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 35900 41000 46100 51250 55350 59450 63550 67650 Low Income 57400 65600 73800 82000 88600 95150 101650 108250 Median Income 68250 78000 87750 97500 105300 113100 120900 128700 Moderate Income 81900 93600 105300 117000 126350 135700 145100 154450 San Diego County
Area Median Income:
$119,500
Acutely Low 12550 14350 16150 17950 19400 20800 22250 23700 Extremely Low 31850 36400 40950 45450 49100 52750 56400 60000 Very Low Income 53050 60600 68200 75750 81850 87900 93950 100000 Low Income 84900 97000 109150 121250 130950 140650 150350 160050 Median Income 83650 95600 107550 119500 129050 138600 148200 157750 Moderate Income 100400 114700 129050 143400 154850 166350 177800 189300 San Francisco County
Area Median Income:
$186,600
Acutely Low 19600 22400 25200 28000 30250 32500 34700 36950 Extremely Low 41150 47000 52900 58750 63450 68150 72850 77550 Very Low Income 68550 78350 88150 97900 105750 113600 121400 129250 Low Income 109700 125350 141000 156650 169200 181750 194250 206800 Median Income 130600 149300 167950 186600 201550 216450 231400 246300 Moderate Income 156750 179100 201500 223900 241800 259700 277650 295550 San Joaquin County
Area Median Income:
$103,800
Acutely Low 10900 12450 14000 15550 16800 18050 19300 20550 Extremely Low 20250 23150 26050 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 33750 38600 43400 48200 52100 55950 59800 63650 Low Income 54000 61700 69400 77100 83300 89450 95600 101800 Median Income 72650 83050 93400 103800 112100 120400 128700 137000 Moderate Income 87200 99650 112100 124550 134500 144500 154450 164400 San Luis Obispo
County
Area Median Income:
$125,600
Acutely Low 13200 15100 16950 18850 20350 21850 23350 24900 Extremely Low 26750 30600 34400 38200 41300 44350 47400 52720 Very Low Income 44600 50950 57300 63650 68750 73850 78950 84050 Low Income 71350 81550 91700 101900 110100 118250 126350 134500 Median Income 87900 100500 113050 125600 135650 145700 155750 165800 Moderate Income 105500 120550 135650 150700 162750 174800 186850 198900 San Mateo County
Area Median Income:
$186,600
Acutely Low 19600 22400 25200 28000 30250 32500 34700 36950 Extremely Low 41150 47000 52900 58750 63450 68150 72850 77550 Very Low Income 68550 78350 88150 97900 105750 113600 121400 129250 Low Income 109700 125350 141000 156650 169200 181750 194250 206800 Median Income 130600 149300 167950 186600 201550 216450 231400 246300 Moderate Income 156750 179100 201500 223900 241800 259700 277650 295550 Santa Barbara County
Area Median Income:
$119,100
Acutely Low 12500 14300 16050 17850 19300 20700 22150 23550 Extremely Low 34200 39050 43950 48800 52750 56650 60550 64450 Very Low Income 56950 65050 73200 81300 87850 94350 100850 107350 Low Income 91200 104250 117300 130350 140800 151250 161600 172050 Median Income 83350 95300 107200 119100 128650 138150 147700 157200 Moderate Income 100050 114300 128600 142900 154350 165750 177200 188650 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Santa Clara County
Area Median Income:
$184,300
Acutely Low 19350 22100 24900 27650 29850 32050 34300 36500 Extremely Low 38750 44250 49800 55300 59750 64150 68600 73000 Very Low Income 64550 73750 82950 92150 99550 106900 114300 121650 Low Income 102300 116900 131500 146100 157800 169500 181200 192900 Median Income 129000 147450 165850 184300 199050 213800 228550 243300 Moderate Income 154800 176900 199050 221150 238850 256550 274250 291900 Santa Cruz County
Area Median Income:
$132,800
Acutely Low 13950 15900 17900 19900 21500 23100 24700 26250 Extremely Low 38050 43500 48950 54350 58700 63050 67400 71750 Very Low Income 63400 72450 81500 90550 97800 105050 112300 119550 Low Income 101750 116250 130750 145300 156950 168550 180200 191800 Median Income 92950 106250 119500 132800 143400 154050 164650 175300 Moderate Income 111550 127500 143400 159350 172100 184850 197600 210350 Shasta County
Area Median Income:
$89,800
Acutely Low 9400 10750 12100 13450 14550 15600 16700 17750 Extremely Low 18750 21400 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 31200 35650 40100 44550 48150 51700 55250 58850 Low Income 49950 57050 64200 71300 77050 82750 88450 94150 Median Income 62850 71850 80800 89800 97000 104150 111350 118550 Moderate Income 75450 86200 97000 107750 116350 125000 133600 142250 Sierra County
Area Median Income:
$90,000
Acutely Low 9450 10800 12150 13500 14600 15650 16750 17800 Extremely Low 18900 21600 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 31500 36000 40500 45000 48600 52200 55800 59400 Low Income 50400 57600 64800 72000 77800 83550 89300 95050 Median Income 63000 72000 81000 90000 97200 104400 111600 118800 Moderate Income 75600 86400 97200 108000 116650 125300 133900 142550 Siskiyou County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Solano County
Area Median Income:
$113,200
Acutely Low 11900 13600 15300 17000 18350 19700 21100 22450 Extremely Low 26450 30200 34000 37750 40800 43800 47340 52720 Very Low Income 44050 50350 56650 62900 67950 73000 78000 83050 Low Income 70450 80500 90550 100650 108700 116750 124850 132850 Median Income 79250 90550 101900 113200 122250 131300 140350 149400 Moderate Income 95100 108700 122250 135850 146700 157600 168450 179300 Sonoma County
Area Median Income:
$128,400
Acutely Low 13500 15400 17350 19250 20800 22350 23850 25400 Extremely Low 29050 33200 37350 41500 44850 48150 51500 54800 Very Low Income 48450 55350 62250 69150 74700 80250 85750 91300 Low Income 77500 88600 99650 110700 119600 128450 137300 146150 Median Income 89900 102700 115550 128400 138650 148950 159200 169500 Moderate Income 107850 123300 138700 154100 166450 178750 191100 203400 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Stanislaus County
Area Median Income:
$92,600
Acutely Low 9750 11100 12500 13900 15000 16100 17250 18350 Extremely Low 19150 21900 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 31900 36450 41000 45550 49200 52850 56500 60150 Low Income 51050 58350 65650 72900 78750 84600 90400 96250 Median Income 64800 74100 83350 92600 100000 107400 114800 122250 Moderate Income 77750 88900 100000 111100 120000 128900 137750 146650 Sutter County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Tehama County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Trinity County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Tulare County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Tuolumne County
Area Median Income:
$97,700
Acutely Low 10250 11700 13200 14650 15800 17000 18150 19350 Extremely Low 20350 23250 26150 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 33900 38750 43600 48450 52350 56200 60100 63950 Low Income 54250 62000 69750 77450 83650 89850 96050 102250 Median Income 68400 78150 87950 97700 105500 113350 121150 128950 Moderate Income 82100 93800 105550 117250 126650 136000 145400 154750 Ventura County
Area Median Income:
$125,600
Acutely Low 13200 15100 16950 18850 20350 21850 23350 24900 Extremely Low 29550 33800 38000 42200 45600 49000 52350 55750 Very Low Income 49250 56300 63350 70350 76000 81650 87250 92900 Low Income 78800 90050 101300 112550 121600 130600 139600 148600 Median Income 87900 100500 113050 125600 135650 145700 155750 165800 Moderate Income 105500 120550 135650 150700 162750 174800 186850 198900 Number of Persons in Household: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Yolo County
Area Median Income:
$117,000
Acutely Low 12300 14050 15800 17550 18950 20350 21750 23150 Extremely Low 24250 27700 31150 34600 37400 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 40400 46150 51900 57650 62300 66900 71500 76100 Low Income 64600 73800 83050 92250 99650 107050 114400 121800 Median Income 81900 93600 105300 117000 126350 135700 145100 154450 Moderate Income 98300 112300 126350 140400 151650 162850 174100 185350 Yuba County
Area Median Income:
$87,900
Acutely Low 9250 10550 11900 13200 14250 15300 16350 17400 Extremely Low 18450 21100 25820 31200 36580 41960 47340 52720 Very Low Income 30800 35200 39600 43950 47500 51000 54500 58050 Low Income 49250 56250 63300 70300 75950 81550 87200 92800 Median Income 61550 70300 79100 87900 94950 101950 109000 116050 Moderate Income 73850 84400 94950 105500 113950 122400 130800 139250 Instructions:

Eligibility Determination:

Use household size income category figures in this chart.

Determine eligibililty based on actual number of persons in household and total of gross income for all persons.

Determination of Income Limit for Households Larger than Eight Persons:

Per person (PP) adjustment above 8: (1) multiply 4-person income limit by eight percent (8%), (2) multiply result by number of persons in excess of eight, (3) add the amount to the 8-person income limit, and (4) round to the nearest $50.

Nine Person Calculation - Example County Ten Person Calculation - Example County + 8 =10 E X A M P L E 4 persons 8% PP Adj persons =9 persons 4 persons 8 person + 8% Adj x 2 persons Acutely Low Income 13,200 1056 17,400 18,450 13,200 17,400 2112 19,500 Extremely Low Income 31,200 2496 52,720 55,200 31,200 52,720 4992 57,700 Very Low Income 43,950 3516 58,050 61,550 43,950 58,050 7032 65,100 Lower Income 70,300 5624 92,800 98,400 70,300 92,800 11248 104,050 Moderate Income 105,500 8440 139,250 147,700 105,500 139,250 16880 156,150 Calculation of Housing Cost and Rent:

Refer to Heath & Safety Code Sections 50052.5 and 50053. Use benchmark household size and multiply against applicable percentages defined in H&SC using Area Median Income identified in this chart.

Determination of Household Size:

For projects with no federal assistance, household size is set at number of bedrooms in unit plus one.

For projects with federal assistance, household size may be set by multiplying 1.5 by the number of bedrooms in unit.

HUD Income Limits release: 4/1/2024
HUD FY 2024 California median incomes:

State median income: $111,300
Metropolitan county median income: $111,900
Non-metropolitan county median income: $87,900
Note: Authority cited: Section 50093, Health and Safety Code. Reference: Sections 50063.5, 50079.5, 50093, 50105 and 50106, Health and Safety Code.

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