Item E-1 Agenda Report — Beverly Hills City Council, May 6, 2025

AGENDA REPORT
Meeting Date: May 6, 2025
Item Number:

To: Honorable Mayor & City Council
From: Chloe Chen, Principal Planner
Masa Alkire, AICP, Assistant Director of Community Development / City Planner
Subject: AN URGENCY ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS

AMENDING SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

REGULATIONS AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR TWO-PRIMARY

UNIT PROJECTS AND URBAN LOT SPLITS
Attachments: 1. Draft Ordinance

2. Redline BHMC Sections

3. Ordinance No. 23-O-2880

4. Wildfire Evacuation Route Map

5. Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) Map

6. Street Functional Classification Map

7. General Plan Goals and Policies

8. Planning Wildfire Evacuation in the Wildland–Urban Interfaces of Portugal

9. Wildfire Risk Management in the Era of Climate Change

10. Grand Jury Report Butte County 2008-2009 (Excerpt)

11. Draft Evacuation Planning Technical Advisory (LCI)

RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to Government code section 65858, staff recommends the City Council adopt an interim urgency ordinance entitled: “AN URGENCY ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF

BEVERLY HILLS AMENDING SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

REGULATIONS AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR TWO-PRIMARY UNIT PROJECTS AND URBAN LOT SPLITS” (Attachment 1).

Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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INTRODUCTION
This report recommends adopting an interim urgency ordinance to update zoning regulations to implement Senate Bill (SB) 9i
, which was recently updated by SB 450.

Among other things, the recent update requires that jurisdictions apply the same development regulations to SB 9 projects that uniformly apply to all development in the underlying zone. The existing objective standards applicable to SB 9 projects are codified in Article 49 of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) in the Beverly Hills Municipal Code (BHMC). The draft interim ordinance will bring these standards into compliance with the new state law provisions. In addition, the draft interim ordinance would require that the City's Building Official review any proposed SB 9 Project located in the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) to find whether there is a specific, adverse impact to public health and safety. As such, the draft ordinance regulations include updates to the single-family residential development standards in each zoning area of the city (Central, Hillside, and the Trousdale Estates areas), as well as the subdivision improvement requirements, such as lot standards. Recently updated state law provisions (per SB 450) also allow jurisdictions to apply objective standards that are less restrictive than those in the underlying zone, although there are certain standards that are set by state law.

DISCUSSION
SB 9 Provisions
SB 91 is a state law signed by Governor Gavin Newsom on September 16, 2021 that requires local agencies in California to ministerially approve urban lot splits and the development of a two-primary unit project, which allows up to four residential units per single-family residential lot. SB 9 allowances and state ADU law are complementary in the sense that state ADU law can be utilized to develop the maximum number of units per SB 9 provisions. SB 9 allows up to four residential units to be constructed through a few scenarios:

1. Urban Lot Split Scenario: An urban lot split allows the subdivision of an existing single-family residential parcel into two approximately equal new lots, on which up to two residential units can be constructed. These two units may be either two primary residential units, or any combination of a primary residential unit (main residential structures that are not accessory dwelling units) and accessory dwelling unit (ADU) or junior accessory dwelling unit (JADU) as permitted under state and local law provisions. By building up to two units on each lot, the total of four units is also achieved.

2. Two-Primary Unit Project Scenario: A two-primary unit project refers to an SB 9 project on a single-family residential parcel in which an urban lot split does not occur, and up to four housing units may be constructed on site. The four housing units may be any combination of up to two primary residential units, and accessory dwelling unit (ADU) or junior accessory dwelling unit (JADU) as permitted under state and local law provisions.
1 SB 9 is codified as Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7.

Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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State law allows local agencies to apply objective development standards such as setbacks and heights, objective subdivision standards (lot size criteria, etc), and objective design standards, as long as the standards allow up to two primary units that are at least 800 square feet on the parcel or up to two primary units that are at least 800 square feet on each parcel created by an urban lot split. In addition, the law has certain other development standards that jurisdictions may not preclude, such as a minimum 4-foot side and rear setback.

However, SB 9 was recently updated by SB 450 (effective January 1, 2025), which stated that jurisdictions can only apply objective standards on SB 9 projects that uniformly apply to all developments within the underlying zone. This means that any existing development standards in zones in which SB 9 projects are proposed would also need to apply to SB 9 projects, and vice versa, and no specific regulations that do not apply to other types of development in the same zone may apply to SB 9 projects in that zone. For example, if an SB 9 project was proposed in the R-1 Zone in the Central Area, the regulations of Article 4 (R-1) and Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) would apply to an SB 9 project. Any objective standards for urban lot splits must only relate to the design or to improvements to the parcel, and standards for units shall not prohibit the construction of duplex structures on the new lots created through an urban lot split. However, state law also allows objective standards to be applied to SB 9 projects that are more permissive (or less restrictive) than the standards in the underlying zone. As such, the draft interim urgency ordinance removes existing standards that are no longer permitted to apply to SB 9 projects and adds some new standards to the underlying zoning regulations that will result in SB 9 projects more consistent with the existing development patterns in single-family residential zones.

Another notable change made to state law is that cities are now required to make decisions on an SB 9 project within 60 days of receiving a complete application and must provide detailed instructions if an application is denied and is deemed incomplete. Additionally, SB 450 changed the adverse impact findings to remove the reference to the physical environment; as such, the specific, adverse impact findings are only related to an impact on public health and safety.

Existing Regulations for SB 9 Projects
At its November 2, 2021 Study Session Meeting, the City Council discussed the regulations of SB 9 and its potential impacts on the single-family residential zones of the City. The City Council directed staff to draft an interim ordinance to establish objective development standards for SB 9 construction projects and adopted Ordinance No. 21-O2853. The City Council subsequently extended this interim ordinance to the maximum period allowed under state law, and on September 19, 2023, the Council adopted an ordinance to create permanent regulations for SB 9 projects (Ordinance No. 23-O-2880, Attachment 3), as codified in Article 49 of the BHMC.

Proposed Regulations
As shown in the redline of the existing SB 9 regulations (Article 49, Title 10, Chapter 3 of BHMC), certain regulations may no longer apply because they are more restrictive than those of the underlying zone and have been struck. These include the maximum unit size limitation, which has been replaced with a minimum unit size requirement consistent with Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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the underlying zoning, the inclusionary housing requirement, and the additional standards applicable to Hillside and Trousdale Estate areas, since these limitations already exist in the underlying zoning. A summary of the existing and proposed regulations is shown below, with the changes in the draft interim urgency ordinance distinguished with the use of bolded text. These changes include but are not limited to the following:

Definitions
• Definitions for “front lot”, “rear lot”, and “urban lot split” remain unchanged • Definitions for the following have been added:
o Primary entrance: the main point of ingress and egress to a residential building
o Primary residential unit: a building that serves as a main living space on a property and does not qualify as an accessory dwelling unit or structure
o Two-primary unit project: a housing project on a single-family residential zoned property that allows up to four units to be constructed, including the construction of two primary residential units and accessory dwelling unit(s) on a single lot or on two separate lots created by an urban lot split, through a ministerial approval process
• Definitions for “rear lot front setback”, “SB 9”, and “urban lot split” have been updated:
o Rear lot front setback definition was changed to be measured from the alley and/or the lot line furthest from and parallel to the street frontage.
o SB 9 definition was removed and was integrated into the definitions of “two-primary unit project” and “urban lot split”
o Urban lot split definition was updated to reflect information from the definition of SB 9 and reference to state law code sections Covenant Requirement
• Requires that any short term rental of any units and ADUs on the site comply with applicable regulations;
• Prohibits non-residential uses on the site;
• Prohibits a subsequent urban lot split of land that was subdivided with an urban lot split;
• Requires that the owner of the property sign an affidavit declaring that the owner shall inhabit one unit on the site as a primary residence for at least three years after completing an urban lot split;
• Removes requirement related to inclusionary housing; and • Adds statement regarding compliance with underlying zoning regulations.

Standards for Urban Lot Splits (Subdivision Improvements):
• No lot resulting from an urban lot split shall be smaller than 1,200 square feet; • The two resulting lots shall be approximately equal, and in no event less than 48% and more than 52% of the lot area of the original parcel; Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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• Prohibits creation of flag lots from an urban lot split if the subject property is adjacent to an alley, located on a corner, or on a through lot and adds that a flag lot may only be created if there is no through lot or corner lot and shall comply with the definition of a flag lot; in addition, the lot width of the front lot may only be reduced by the required width for a driveway to provide access to the rear lot; and
• No right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects.

Development Standards for Units2
:
• Sets a maximum number of four units for SB 9 projects, which can be any combination of two primary residential units and ADUs or JADUs as permitted under state and local law provisions;
• Removes previous maximum unit size of 800 square feet and sets a maximum cumulative floor area for all primary residential units on site not to exceed the maximum floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots3
;
• Requires a minimum unit size pursuant to the underlying zoning of the property (a minimum of 1,600 square feet);
• Removes previous height restriction of maximum 14 feet in height and no more than one-story;
• Rear and side setbacks shall be four feet, front setbacks for front lots (those immediately adjacent to the street) shall be the front setback that has already been established by the City on each lot per the underlying zoning. • Removes front setback for rear lot requirement, and instead applies the established front setback requirement consistent with the underlying zone; • Requires a minimum building width of 20 feet for any residential unit constructed as part of an SB 9 project;
• Removes the requirement that the front most unit must have a door facing the street, and instead states that there may only be one primary entrance permitted to face the lot line from which the front setback is measured; • Each unit on each lot shall have a separate entrance; • Removes the requirement that a unit other than the front most unit shall be completely screened by either other unit(s) on the lot or landscaping; • One parking space is required per unit (unless parking cannot be required per state law); and
• Removes prohibition for parking to be provided within a front setback, and refers to the underlying zoning requirement (such prohibition already exists).

Inclusionary Housing Requirement
2 Please note that Article 49 of Title 10, Chapter 3 of the BHMC includes the development standards that are specifically applicable to SB 9 projects, and the other articles containing single-family residential development standards (Articles 24, 25, and 26) have been updated to be consistent with these provisions as needed.
3 In order to comply with state law restrictions, the maximum cumulative floor area restriction would apply to any lot that is subdivided, not just those subdivided through an urban lot split.

Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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• Removes the inclusionary housing requirement reference, since the inclusionary housing requirement would apply if a project meets the criteria (though currently the requirement only applies to projects with more than 4 units total)
Additional Requirements for Hillside and Trousdale Areas:

Removes existing regulations that added specific requirements for the Hillside and Trousdale Estates areas of the city, since these already apply from the underlying zone:
• Prohibiting the creation of level pad areas for purposes of adding a new unit; • Prohibiting the construction of units off the existing level pad areas on a site; and • Allowing a flag lot if there is no alley access or the lot of not a through lot or corner lot.

Adverse Impact Findings
• Updates this section to require the City’s Building Official to review an SB 9 project to determine whether there is a specific, adverse impact (as defined per state law) related to the project, if it is located within the designated Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ), and removes the reference to the finding of a specific, adverse impact on the physical environment; • In addition, the Building Official (or their designee) may review any other SB 9 project not located within the VHFHSZ for a specific, adverse impact; Specific Adverse Impact Assessment
Government code section 65852.21(d) states that a local agency may deny a proposed housing development project if the Building Official makes a written finding, based on the preponderance of evidence, that the proposed housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact on public health and safety for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid such impact. A specific adverse impact is defined as "a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions”, pursuant to Government code section 65589.5(d)(2). The two significant wildfires that occurred in January 2025 in close proximity to the City of Beverly Hills, known as the Palisades and Eaton fires, have demonstrated the real risk that wildfire poses to the greater Los Angeles area. These wildfires were historic with regard to the severity of the wildfire, destruction of structures (the majority of which were residential structures), the amount of land affected within an urbanized area, and the speed with which the destruction occurred. The Palisades fire burned 23,448 acres, and the Eaton fire burned 14,021 acres, and early estimates show economic losses at upwards of $250 billion. The Palisades fire resulted in the destruction of 6,837 structures and damaged 1,017 structures, and the Eaton fire destroyed 9,418 structures, and damaged 1,073 structures. Unfortunately, the wildfires also resulted in loss of life, with 12 people dying from the Palisades fire, and 17 people dying from the Eaton fire. In addition to the destruction caused by the wildfires, the contamination and pollution to water and air resources may have longer term negative effects on public health and safety.

The risk of wildfire is especially pertinent as climate change and its impacts, including more extreme weather patterns, become more pronounced. The City’s Safety Element, updated recently in 2022, identifies wildfires as “a substantial hazard to life and property Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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in areas of Beverly Hills that are built within or adjacent to hillsides and mountainous areas commonly referred to as the Wildland Interface.” In addition, the Safety Element notes that climate change weather changes and trends over time will likely include warmer temperatures, decreased precipitation, and increasing incidence of extreme weather and storms (such as the Santa Ana wind conditions), which can contribute to a greater likelihood of wildfire on a more frequent basis. While the City takes many precautions to mitigate fire risk, including the enforcement of fire code standards, fire prevention and suppression plans, and vegetation management requirements (fuel modification standards), the risk of wildfire will undoubtedly increase in the future.

The majority of the northern area of the city is located in the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ), which includes all land north of Sunset Boulevard, and extends further south, inclusive of the majority of homes north of Lomitas Avenue (see map in Attachment 54 ). As shown on the City’s Wildfire Evacuation Route Map (Attachment 4), the designated evacuation routes serving the VHFHSZ area only allows the vast majority of evacuation to move north-south. The only designated east-west evacuation route for the majority of the VHFHSZ is Sunset Boulevard. The limited directional movement of the evacuation routes north-south in the VHFHSZ are mainly the result of the street patterns and historic development in the area due to geographic and topographic conditions, which allowed for the main, wider public rights-of-way to traverse up and down the sloped areas of the Hillside and Trousdale Estates areas, and limited or much narrower streets providing eastwest access. All residents in the VHFHSZ have access to at least two evacuation routes (if on a cul-de-sac, upon exiting such cul-de-sac). The Beverly Hills Fire Department (BHFD) have noted that evacuation routes are selected based on the width of the roadway and ease of access from cross streets or connecting streets. While there are portions of the designated evacuation routes that traverse east-west, each route’s ultimate connection runs north-south5 to a principal arterial or major collector that can accommodate the volume of traffic that would be experienced during a wildfire evacuation (see Street Functional Classification Map in Attachment 6). Sunset Boulevard is identified as a principal arterial, and varies from 50 to 54 feet in width, with two lanes of through traffic in each direction. The second largest streets identified as evacuation routes are Coldwater Canyon Drive and Benedict Canyon Drive, which are both identified as major collector streets. These streets have widths of around 40 feet on average, and one lane of through traffic in each direction. Every other street identified on the Wildfire Evacuation Route Map in the VHFHSZ is a local street, meaning it is narrower than the designated principal arterial or major collector streets. As demonstrated during the evacuations of residents during the onset of the Palisades and Eaton wildfires, evacuation routes serving 4 The Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) Map was recently updated in March 24, 2025 by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and will need to be adopted by the Fire Department and City Council to become effective. The map is required to be adopted within 120 days, and the Fire Department anticipates this adoption to occur in a timely manner. 5 According to the Safety Element, the City’s multiple evacuation routes in the VHFHSZ include Benedict Canyon Drive, Lexington Road, North Beverly Drive, Coldwater Canyon Drive, Schuyler Road, Loma Vista Drive, Doheny Road, North Hillcrest Road, and Carla Ridge. The evacuation routes direct residents to the north and out of the VHFHSZ or to the south onto Sunset Boulevard. While there are some cul-de-sacs within the VHFHSZ that would have one ingress or egress, by definition, residents would have access to reach at least two emergency evacuation routes upon exiting the cul-de-sac. Therefore, there are no residential developments in the VHFHSZ that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes upon exiting the culde-sac. All roads in the BHFD’s jurisdiction meet or exceed the standards referenced in Title 14, California Code of Regulations, Division 1.5, Chapter 7, Subchapter 2, Articles 2 and 3.

Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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the majority of residents within an affected area must be able to accommodate a large number of vehicles at one time in order to allow the safe evacuation and maximum preservation of life and minimize risks to life or health impacts. While the City has identified sufficient evacuation routes, there are still potential risks associated with having a limited number of evacuation routes (which are also limited by directional movement to northsouth) during a wildfire event, which include but are not limited to:
• Traffic Congestion and Evacuation Delays: In wildfire emergencies, a single evacuation route can become congested, leading to significant delays. The study "Planning Wildfire Evacuation in the Wildland–Urban Interfaces of Portugal6 "
(Attachment 8) emphasizes that densely populated communities with limited road networks can experience congestion and unsafe evacuation conditions during wildfires.
• Challenges in Wildland–Urban Interface (WUI) Areas: The WUI, where urban development meets wildland, poses unique challenges for fire suppression and emergency response. The article "Wildfire risk management in the era of climate change"7 (Attachment 9) highlights that the proximity of structures to wildlands, combined with limited evacuation routes, increases vulnerability during wildfires. • Case Study of the Camp Fire in Paradise, California: The 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, California, serves as a poignant example. A 2009 Grand Jury report (Attachment 10) identified "significant constraints" and "capacity limitations" of the roads leading from Paradise, noting sharp curves and inadequate shoulders, which increased fire danger and the possibility of road closures due to fire and smoke.

Despite these warnings, insufficient improvements were made, contributing to the disaster.
• Draft Technical Advisory from the Governor’s Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation (LCI): The 2023 draft of this advisory (Attachment 11) intends to provide guidance as cities update their Safety Elements to comply with recently adopted state law related to evacuation requirements. These laws require that Safety Elements identify any developed areas in cities that have limited evacuation routes (this exercise was completed in the 2022 Safety Element update) and notes that this information can be used to inform land use decisions.

These studies underscore the critical need for comprehensive evacuation planning that includes multiple, well-maintained evacuation routes, especially in areas susceptible to wildfires. In the event of a wildfire starting in the northern area of the VHFHSZ and spreading south, which is consistent with historical fire patterns, the evacuation routes become more limited, with the only feasible movement on the evacuation routes to the south towards Sunset Boulevard. The City’s Safey Element also notes that besides the direct risk that wildfires pose to structures and residents in affected areas, wildfires can create indirect impacts to health and safety due to blocked evacuation routes. These impacts can include health risks due to smoke inhalation, and potential loss of life in the event of an inability to evacuate in time8
.
6 mdpi.com
7 pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
8 The Fire Department and Police Department are currently working on drafting standard operating procedures for wildfire evacuations.

Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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SB 9 allows the creation of additional housing units through either the development of additional units on an existing single-family residential lot, or the creation of new lots through an urban lot split, on which new units can be constructed. SB 9 allows up to four units to be created, either on one existing lot or two lots created by the urban lot split. If SB 9 projects create additional lots through urban lot splits, this results in the need for additional curb cuts for driveways to provide access for vehicles. Such curb cuts will be utilized as egress points by vehicles during wildfire evacuations and will create further cumulative vehicular congestion on the limited evacuation routes. BHFD has noted that more cars on the roadways presents a greater risk to public safety, as this can result in longer evacuation times. Given the limitations of the designated evacuation routes in the VHFHSZ, the development of additional housing units or urban lot splits in the VHFHSZ and associated increase in vehicle use could likely exacerbate a public health and safety risk of delayed evacuation during a wildfire event.

Therefore, the draft interim ordinance includes findings that limited wildfire evacuation routes present a threat to public health and safety related to the limited evacuation routes in the VHFHSZ and the increasing likelihood of wildfire that poses an immediate threat to public safety and welfare necessitates the adoption of the ordinance. In addition, the draft interim urgency ordinance requires that the Building Official review proposed SB 9 projects in the VHFHSZ since this area is specifically limited with respect to the availability of eastwest evacuation routes, and since the development of additional housing units or urban lot splits in the VHFHSZ could likely exacerbate or further delay evacuation during a wildfire event.

GENERAL PLAN GOALS AND POLICIES3
The General Plan includes numerous goals and policies intended to help guide development in the City. Some of the policies relevant to this topic are included as Attachment 7.

PUBLIC OUTREACH AND NOTIFICATION
An interim urgency ordinance does not require public notification in addition to the publication of the meeting agenda.

INTERIM URGENCY ORDINANCE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Government Code section 65858, a legislative body may adopt an interim urgency ordinance upon a four-fifths vote, for an initial period of forty-five (45) days. After the initial adoption and 45-day period, the legislative body may extend the effective period of the interim urgency ordinance for another 22 months and 15 days, for an overall total of two years. The legislative body shall only adopt such ordinance if the legislative body finds that there is a current and immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare.

The draft ordinance includes findings related to the immediate threat of wildfire, especially in the VHFHSZ area of the city, and the potential adverse impact of limited evacuation routes in the VHFHSZ. The adoption of the draft interim urgency ordinance addresses these immediate public health and safety concerns.

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
The Amendments were assessed in accordance with the authority and criteria contained in the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the State CEQA Guidelines, and the environmental regulations of the City. The ordinance is not considered a project under Meeting Date: May 6, 2025

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CEQA pursuant to Government Code Sections 65852.21(j) and 66411.7(n) which provide that ordinances that implement Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7, respectively, shall not be considered projects under CEQA. Staff recommends that the City Council consider finding the project exempt from CEQA for the reasons set forth above.

FISCAL IMPACT
The interim urgency ordinance would amend certain land use regulations applicable to single-family residential properties. Therefore, no fiscal impact is anticipated as a result of this action.

Michael Forbes, AICP
Director of Community Development
Approved By
i Please note that this report refers to “SB 9 Projects” to mean a two-primary unit project and an urban lot split. The draft interim urgency ordinance removes this reference, and instead replaces it with the aforementioned terms and references to state law code sections, however, for ease of reference and understanding in this report, the “SB 9 Project” term is used.

Attachment 1
Draft Ordinance
[DRAFT] ORDINANCE NO. 25-O-____

AN URGENCY ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF BEVERLY

HILLS AMENDING SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL

DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS AND OBJECTIVE

STANDARDS FOR TWO-PRIMARY UNIT PROJECTS AND

URBAN LOT SPLITS

THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. WHEREAS, during the 2021 legislative session, the California Legislature passed, and the Governor signed Senate Bill 9 (SB 9), which requires local agencies to ministerially approve urban lot splits and development to two residential units per single family residential lots provided the projects meet certain criteria. SB 9 became effective on January 1, 2022.

Section 2. WHEREAS, the City Council previously adopted an interim urgency ordinance (Ordinance No. 21-O-2853) in response to SB 9, as the Council found that SB 9 projects had the potential to impact the health, safety, and welfare of residents in the City, and particularly on the character of single family residential neighborhoods, the garden quality of the City, vehicular and pedestrian safety, on-street parking demand and impacts, and housing affordability.

The City Council declared that an interim urgency ordinance was required to establish objective zoning and subdivision standards for SB 9 projects in order to protect the public health, safety, and welfare to provide time for the City to develop permanent land use regulations for such projects and to ensure SB 9 does not have a detrimental impact on single family residential neighborhoods within the City. The City Council extended the interim urgency ordinance subsequently through the adoption of Ordinance Nos. 22-O-2856, and 22-O-2869.

Section 3. WHEREAS, On October 3, 2023, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 23-O-2880 to create permanent regulations for SB 9 projects, which set forth objective standards for housing units and urban lot splits constructed under SB 9 provisions. These regulations were codified as Article 49 of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning), Chapter 3 (Zoning) of the Beverly Hills Municipal Code (BHMC).

Section 4. WHEREAS, in 2024, the California Legislature passed and the Governor signed SB 450, which updates certain provisions of SB 9, as codified in Government Code section 65852.21. Among other things, SB 450 requires that jurisdictions apply development regulations to SB 9 projects that uniformly apply to development in the underlying zone. As such, the existing SB 9 regulations require amendments to ensure compliance with new state law provisions and add new regulations to ensure that SB 9 projects are consistent with existing development patterns in single-family residential zones.

Section 5. WHEREAS, on January 7, 2025, two significant wildfires began burning in Los Angeles County, in close proximity to the City of Beverly Hills. These wildfires are known as the Palisades and Eaton wildfires and were historic with regard to the severity of the wildfire, destruction of structures (the majority of which were residential structures), the amount of land affected within an urbanized area, and the speed with which the destruction occurred. The Palisades fire burned 23,448 acres, and the Eaton fire burned 14,021 acres, and early estimates show economic losses at upwards of $250 billion. The Palisades fire resulted in the destruction of 6,837 structures and damaged 1,017 structures, and the Eaton fire destroyed 9,418 structures, and damaged 1,073 structures. Unfortunately, the wildfires also resulted in loss of life, with 12 people dying from the Palisades fire, and 18 people dying from the Eaton fire. In addition to the destruction caused by the wildfires, the contamination and pollution to water and air resources may have longer term negative effects on public health and safety.

Section 6. WHEREAS, the risk of wildfire is increasing as weather becomes more extreme as a result of climate change. The City’s Safety Element, updated recently in 2022, identifies wildfires as “a substantial hazard to life and property in areas of Beverly Hills that are built within or adjacent to hillsides and mountainous areas commonly referred to as the Wildland Urban Interface.” In addition, the Safety Element notes that climate change weather changes and trends over time will likely include warmer temperatures, decreased precipitation, and increasing incidence of extreme weather and storms (such as the Santa Ana wind conditions), which can contribute to a greater likelihood of aggressive wildfire spread on a more frequent basis.

Section 7. WHEREAS, a large portion of the City of Beverly Hills is designated as a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ), which currently includes all land north of Sunset Boulevard, and additional parcels to the south of Sunset Boulevard (the majority of parcels located north of Lomitas Avenue), in the northern area of the Central Area of the City (see Exhibit A). As shown on the City’s Wildfire Evacuation Route Map (Exhibit B), the designated evacuation routes serving the VHFHSZ allow the vast majority of evacuation to move north-south, with the only designated east-west evacuation through route being Sunset Boulevard. The limited directional movement of the evacuation routes north-south in the VHFHSZ are mainly the result of the street patterns and historic development in the area due to geographic and topographic conditions, which allowed for the main, wider public rights-of-way to traverse up and down the sloped areas of the Hillside and Trousdale Estates areas, and limited or much narrower streets providing east-west access. All residents in the VHFHSZ have access to at least two evacuation routes (if on a cul-de-sac, upon exiting such cul-de-sac). The Beverly Hills Fire Department (BHFD) have noted that evacuation routes are selected based on the width of the roadway and ease of access from cross streets or connecting streets. While there are portions of the designated evacuation routes that traverse east-west, each route’s ultimate connection runs north-south to a principal arterial or major collector that can accommodate the volume of traffic that would be experienced during a wildfire evacuation. Sunset Boulevard is identified as a principal arterial, and varies from 50 to 54 feet in width, with two lanes of through traffic in each direction. The second largest streets identified as evacuation routes are Coldwater Canyon Drive and Benedict Canyon Drive, which are both identified as major collector streets. These streets have widths of around 40 feet on average, and one lane of through traffic in each direction. Every other street identified on the Wildfire Evacuation Route Map in the VHFHSZ is a local street, meaning it is narrower than the designated principal arterial or major collector streets. As demonstrated during the evacuations of residents during the onset of the Palisades and Eaton wildfires, evacuation routes serving the majority of residents within an affected area must be able to accommodate a large number of vehicles at one time while still allowing for access of fire department equipment in order to allow the safe evacuation and maximum preservation of life.

Section 8. WHEREAS, SB 9 allows the creation of additional housing units through either the development of additional units on an existing single-family residential lot, or the creation of new lots through an urban lot split, on which new units can be constructed. SB 9 allows up to four units to be created, either on one existing lot or two lots created by the urban lot split. If SB 9 projects create additional lots through urban lot splits, this results in the need for additional curb cuts for driveways to provide access for vehicles. Such curb cuts will be utilized as egress points by vehicles during wildfire evacuations, and will create further cumulative vehicular congestion on the limited evacuation routes. BHFD has noted that more cars on the roadways presents a greater risk to public safety, as this can result in longer evacuation times.

Section 9. WHEREAS, given the increased likelihood of wildfire affecting the City, the risks posed by the development of additional housing units through the use of SB 9 provisions and associated vehicle use on limited evacuation routes, and that existing evacuation routes that only provide north-south access, there is the potential for specific, adverse impacts in the VHFHSZ area of the city (all of the property located north of Sunset Boulevard, and majority of property north of Lomitas Avenue, Exhibit A) that could result from the development of SB 9 projects in this area. Therefore, the Building Official shall review any proposed housing development project pursuant to SB 9 in the VHFHSZ due to a preponderance of evidence that the limited wildfire evacuation routes present a threat to public health and safety, and the development of additional housing units or urban lot splits in the VHFHSZ would exacerbate or further delay evacuation during a wildfire event (see Exhibit B – Wildfire Evacuation Route Map).

Section 10. General Plan Consistency. The draft interim urgency ordinance is consistent with the objectives, principles, and standards of the General Plan. General Plan Land Use (LU) Goal 2 – calls for development and a built environment that is sensitive to the natural setting and context. Similarly, General Plan LU Policy 2.1 – City Places: Neighborhoods, Districts, and Corridors encourages the maintenance of qualities that distinguish the City’s unique residential and business areas, including aesthetics of commercial corridors. General Plan LU Policy 5.1 - Neighborhood Conservation encourages the maintenance of the uses, densities, character, and quality of the residential neighborhoods, and LU Policy 5.7 - Neighborhood Transitions requires that the development of residential areas should assure smooth transitions in regard to scale, form, and character. Additionally, LU Goal 6 – Single-Family Residential Neighborhoods encourages that the identity, scale, and character of single-family residential neighborhoods is maintained.

Similarly, LU Policy 6.1 - Neighborhood Identity specifies that new development shall be consistent with existing characteristics in single-family neighborhoods such as topography, lot size, housing scale and form, and public streetscapes. LU Policy 6.2 - Housing Character and Design requires that new housing be located and designed to conserve the distinguishing characteristics and qualities of the neighborhood context, including architectural design, relationship to street frontages, scale, massing, and property setbacks. Furthermore, the Housing Element of the General Plan includes Goal H1 – Maintenance and Conservation, which encourages the maintenance of the quality and character of existing housing and residential neighborhoods.

Section 11. Findings. SB 9 projects will have the potential to significantly impact the character of the City's well-established single-family neighborhoods. SB 9 projects have the potential to impact the health, safety, and welfare of residents in the City, and particularly on the character of single-family residential neighborhoods, the garden quality of the City, vehicular and pedestrian safety, on-street parking demand and impacts, and housing affordability. In addition, there is the potential for SB 9 projects to create a specific, adverse impact that SB 9 projects present for the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) area of the city, which currently includes all of the property located north of Sunset Boulevard and the majority of the property north of Lomitas Avenue. This potential for a specific, adverse impact in the VHFHSZ is due to the limited availability of east-west evacuation routes to accommodate a large-scale evacuation that would occur during a wildfire event. The state law provisions governing SB 9 projects was recently updated with the adoption of SB 450. As such, the City of Beverly Hills City Council finds that there is an immediate need to update the existing objective zoning and subdivision standards for SB 9 projects to comply with new state law provisions, and in order to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. While the interim urgency ordinance is in effect, the City will study and develop permanent land use regulations for such projects to understand if regulations need to be further amended or if the single-family residential regulations also require further updates.

However, the City wishes to ensure that the regulations are updated to be consistent with state law as soon as possible and to protect against development that may exacerbate wildfire evacuation risks; therefore, the City Council wishes to adopt an interim ordinance that will take effect immediately to ensure that the health, safety and welfare is not impacted by SB 9 projects. The interim urgency ordinance is therefore required because of the benefit to the publict, health, safety, or general welfare, and that the regulations in the ordinance are consistent with the general objectives, principles, and standards of the General Plan.

Section 12. Authority. Pursuant to Government Code Section 65858, the City Council may adopt, as an urgency measure, an interim ordinance that prohibits certain developments that may be in conflict with a contemplated zoning proposal that the City Council is considering, studying or intends to study within a reasonable period of time.

Section 13. Urgency Ordinance Findings. The City Council finds and determines that there is an immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare and that urban lot splits and additional unit development pursuant to SB 9 that does not conform with the certain objective standards established by the City constitutes a threat to the public health, safety, or welfare, as described above. The City Council finds and determines that there is the potential for an immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare in the event of a proliferation of SB 9 projects without local regulatory standards and review of certain projects by the Building Official.

Section 14. CEQA Findings. The Amendments were assessed in accordance with the authority and criteria contained in the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the State CEQA Guidelines, and the environmental regulations of the City. The ordinance is not considered a project under CEQA pursuant to Government Code Sections 65852.21(j) and 66411.7(n) which provide that ordinances that implement Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7, respectively, shall not be considered projects under CEQA. Further, development that would be contemplated under this ordinance must be treated ministerially, and any such projects would be statutorily exempt from the environmental review requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Sections 15061(b)(3) and 15268 of Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations, as separate and independent bases for exemption. Staff recommends that the City Council consider finding the project exempt from CEQA for the reasons set forth above.

Section 15. The title of Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
“ARTICLE 49. OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR TWO-PRIMARY UNIT PROJECTS AND URBAN LOT SPLITS IN SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONES” Section 16. Section 10-3-4900 (Purpose) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
“10-3-4900: PURPOSE:

The provisions of this article establish standards and procedures for projects developed pursuant to the regulations of Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7 (as originally established by Senate Bill 9 and any successor statute), including two primary residential units constructed on a single-family residential lot and two-lot subdivision (urban lot split) projects, respectively.”
Section 17. Section 10-3-4901 (Definitions) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
“10-3-4901: DEFINITIONS:

For the purposes of this article, certain words and phrases used in this article are defined as follows:

FRONT LOT: When an urban lot split creates two lots where there was previously one lot, the lot with the most frontage on the primary street shall be considered the front lot.

PRIMARY ENTRANCE: The entrance to a residential building that serves as the main point of ingress and egress.

PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL UNIT: A residential building that serves as a main living space on a property and does not qualify as an accessory structure or accessory dwelling unit, as defined in section 10-3-100 of this chapter.

REAR LOT: When an urban lot split creates two lots where there was previously one lot, the lot with the least frontage on the primary street shall be considered the rear lot.

REAR LOT FRONT SETBACK: The front lot line of such rear lot shall be the lot line closest to the alley and/or furthest from and parallel to the primary street. The rear lot front setback shall be considered the distance between the front lot line of the rear lot and closest element of a building or structure on the site area of the rear lot.

TWO-PRIMARY UNIT PROJECT: A housing project on a single-family residential zoned property that allows up to four units to be constructed, including the construction of two primary residential units and accessory dwelling unit(s) on a single lot or on two separate lots created by an urban lot split, through a ministerial approval process. This type of project is authorized pursuant to Government Code section 65852.21 (as originally established in Senate Bill 9 by the California state senate and the Governor on September 16, 2021, and any successor statute, including Senate Bill 450, passed by the California state senate and approved by the Governor on September 19, 2024).

URBAN LOT SPLIT: A parcel map subdivision of a single-family residential parcel that creates no more than two parcels of approximately equal lot area through a ministerial approval process as permitted pursuant to Government Code section 66411.7 (as originally established in Senate Bill 9 by the California state senate and the Governor on September 16, 2021, and any successor statute, including Senate Bill 450, passed by the California state senate and approved by the Governor on September 19, 2024).” Section 18. Section 10-3-4902 (Applicability) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4902: APPLICABILITY:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter and Chapter 2 of Title 10, the provisions of this Article shall apply to two-primary unit projects and urban lot splits.

Except as expressly provided in state law or in this Article, all other regulations of the underlying zone of a property developed with a two-primary unit project or urban lot split shall apply, along with all other applicable regulations of chapter 2, title 10 as related to an urban lot split."
Section 19. Section 10-3-4903 (General Requirements; Covenant Required) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
“10-3-4903: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS; COVENANT REQUIRED:

A property owner seeking to complete an urban lot split, or develop a two-primary unit project on a single-family residential property and the standards in this article, shall be subject to the following general requirements, which shall be accepted and acknowledged by the property owner by signing and recording a covenant against the property. The covenant shall be supplied by the City and provide as follows:

A. The short term rental (defined as a "single-family transient use" in section 10-3-100 of this chapter) of any units and Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) on the site shall comply with applicable regulations for the underlying zone, as enumerated in chapter 3, title 10, and any rental of a unit built pursuant to this article shall be longer than thirty (30) days; B. Non-residential uses on the site shall be prohibited; C. Any subsequent urban lot split of land that was previously subdivided with an urban lot split shall be prohibited;
D. The owner of the property for which an urban lot split is proposed shall sign an affidavit stating that the owner intends to occupy one of the housing units as their principal residence for at least three years from the date of the approval of the urban lot split; and E. Compliance with underlying zoning: Any project developed pursuant to Government code section 65852.21. shall comply with the standards of this article in addition to any provision applicable to the underlying zone.”
Section 20. Section 10-3-4904 (Urban Lot Split Regulations) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4904: URBAN LOT SPLIT REGULATIONS:

Upon approval of a tentative parcel map or parcel map, a single-family residential lot may be subdivided into two lots, also referred to as an urban lot split as follows:

A. No lot resulting from an urban lot split shall be smaller than 1,200 square feet.

B. The two resulting lots shall be approximately equal, and no smaller than 48% or larger than 52% of the lot area of the original parcel.

C. No flag lots shall be created as a result of an urban lot split as a mechanism to avoid minimum frontage requirements if the subject property is adjacent to an alley, located on a corner, or on a through lot. If there is no alley access, or the lot is not a through lot or a corner lot, the rear lot shall comply with the definition of a flag lot in section 10-3-100 of this chapter and access to the rear lot shall be provided. If a flag lot is created, the lot width of the front lot may be reduced by the required width for a driveway to provide access to the rear lot.

D. No right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects." Section 21. Section 10-3-4905 (Maximum Number of Units) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4905: MAXIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS:

A. For projects that include an urban lot split, no more than two units may be located on a site.

B. For two-primary unit projects that do not include an urban lot split, no more than four units (the four units may be any combination of up to two primary residential units, and any ADUs and Junior ADUs allowable under state and local law) may be located on a site. The units must conform to the objective standards included in this article and as otherwise regulated by ADU or Junior ADU regulations of this chapter." Section 22. Section 10-3-4906 (Maximum Unit Size) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4906: MAXIMUM UNIT SIZE:

For any primary residential units constructed as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, the maximum floor area shall be calculated pursuant to the limitations of the underlying zone in this chapter. The maximum cumulative floor area of the primary residential units developed on separate lots after any subdivision of lots shall not exceed the maximum cumulative floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots."
Section 23. Section 10-3-4907 (Maximum Unit Height) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4907: MINIMUM UNIT SIZE:

All primary residential units constructed as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split shall have a minimum floor area pursuant to the limitations of the underlying zoning of this chapter."
Section 24. Section 10-3-4908 (Setbacks) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4908: SETBACKS:

A. Side and rear setbacks. Any units constructed as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split shall have a minimum four-foot setback from all side and rear lot lines.

B. Front setbacks shall be provided pursuant to the regulations of the underlying zoning standards of this chapter.

C. Setbacks for existing structures. No setbacks shall be required if a unit is constructed within the footprint of an existing structure on a lot." Section 25. Section 10-3-4909 (Minimum Width of Building) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4909: MINIMUM WIDTH OF BUILDING:

All residential buildings, including the primary residential unit, on a site area constructed as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split shall have a minimum width consistent with the regulations of the underlying zone." Section 26. Section 10-3-4910 (Design of Unit) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4910: DESIGN OF UNIT:

A. Only one primary entrance of a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split shall be permitted to face the lot line from which the front setback is measured.

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance." Section 27. Section 10-3-4911 (Parking) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4911: PARKING:

A. Parking required: One parking space is required for each primary residential unit created as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project.

B. Parking location restrictions:

1. Parking location shall be limited by underlying zoning of this chapter." Section 28. Section 10-3-4912 (Adverse Impact Findings) in Article 49 (Objective Standards for Housing Projects and Urban Lot Splits in Single-Family Residential Zones Pursuant to Senate Bill 9) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-4912: ADVERSE IMPACT FINDINGS:

The building official, or his or her designee, may make a written finding to deny an urban lot split or the construction of a primary residential units as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split. Such findings shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence that the proposed housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact (as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Government Code Section 65589.5) upon the public health and safety, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific, adverse impact. In addition, the building official, or his or her designee shall review any urban lot split or two-primary unit project to determine if the housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact if the project is located within the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) to determine whether the proposed urban lot split or urban infill two-unit development would have a specific, adverse impact upon public health and safety."
Section 29. Section 10-2-303 (Lots) in Article 3 (Subdivision Improvements) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-2-303: LOTS:

A. Zones: For the purposes of this chapter, the city shall be divided into three (3) zones as follows:

1. Northerly Zone: The northerly zone shall consist of all property lying between Sunset Boulevard and the northerly boundary of the city.

2. Southerly Zone: The southerly zone shall consist of all property lying southerly of the northerly lines of Santa Monica Boulevard and Wilshire Boulevard, together with all lots fronting on Doheny Drive.

3. Central Zone: The central zone shall consist of all property in the city not included within the northerly and southerly zones.

B. Frontage: Where a lot adjoins a primary or secondary street, it shall front on such street; otherwise, a lot shall front upon the street which parallels the long dimensions of the block. A key lot shall not be permitted unless it is established that it cannot be avoided. A double frontage lot shall not be permitted, unless the planning commission, in the exercise of its discretion, approves the same after it has been established that a double frontage lot cannot be avoided if the dimensions set forth in this section are to be secured for a majority of other lots in the same subdivision. The side lot lines of each rectangular lot, and each other lot (so far as possible), shall be at approximate right angles to the street on which the lot fronts.

C. Large Lots: When parcels of land are subdivided into larger lots than building lots, such parcels shall be divided so as to allow for the opening and ultimate extension of adjacent local streets. When parcels are so divided, each lot indicated shall be of such size and shape as to permit any individual owner to resubdivide, giving each lot legal size, shape, and access, independent of the adjoining owners.

D. Size And Shape: Each subdivided lot shall have a depth in its longest dimension of at least one hundred fifty feet (150'), shall conform as nearly as practicable to other lots in the vicinity, and shall have its building site located, so far as possible, to prevent the rear portion of one lot from being adjacent to the front portion of another lot. In addition:

1. In the southerly zone, each lot shall have at least fifty feet (50') of frontage on a public street and shall have an area of at least seven thousand five hundred (7,500) square feet;

2. In the central zone, each lot shall have at least ninety feet (90') of frontage on a public street and shall have an area of at least thirteen thousand (13,000) square feet; and

3. In the northerly zone:
a. Each lot shall be compatible in shape and topography with other lots in the vicinity;
b. Each lot shall have at least one hundred feet (100') of frontage on a public street and shall have an area of at least forty three thousand five hundred sixty (43,560) square feet;
c. Each lot shall have a building site of at least four thousand (4,000) square feet, no part of which shall have a slope greater than one vertical in five (5) horizontal feet, either existing or guaranteed to be constructed under the subdivider's surety bond.

E. Notwithstanding the lot size and shape provisions for the southerly, central, and northerly zones, any lot and urban lot splits created pursuant to Government Code section 66411.7 shall comply with the following, if less restrictive than the otherwise applicable requirements:

1. No lot shall be smaller than 1,200 square feet.

2. The two resulting lots shall be approximately equal, and no smaller than 48% or larger than 52% of the lot area of the original parcel.

3. No flag lots shall be created as a result of an urban lot split as a mechanism to avoid minimum frontage requirements if the subject property is adjacent to an alley, located on a corner, or on a through lot. If there is no alley access, or the lot is not a through lot or a corner lot, the rear lot shall comply with the definition of a flag lot in section 10-3-100 of this chapter and access to the rear lot shall be provided. If a flag lot is created, the lot width of the front lot may be reduced by the required width for a driveway to provide access to the rear lot. -

4. No right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects.

F. City Boundary: For any property located in a one-family residential zone, a lot line shall not be adjusted which would either create or expand a lot that crosses the City boundary. Further, a lot line that is coterminous with the boundary of the City shall not be adjusted away from the City boundary.

1. Exemption: The property known as 1276 Beverly Green Drive, located on the eastern side of Beverly Green Drive, and more specifically described as: Lots 15 and 16 of Tract 11178 in the City of Beverly Hills, Los Angeles County, State of California, as per the maps recorded in map book 203, pages 49-50 of the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office, shall be exempted from the requirement in subsection E above.

G. Variances: Whenever the size of the parcel of land to be subdivided or altered as the result of a lot line adjustment, its street and alley frontage, its contour, and its location with reference to surrounding property, are such that the requirements of this section work undue and unusual hardship, and a different size and arrangement would not result in undue detriment to surrounding property or the residents thereof, the planning commission may, in its discretion, approve a different size and arrangement of the lots in the proposed subdivision."
Section 30. Section 10-2-308 (Dedications) in Article 3 (Subdivision Improvements) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-2-308: DEDICATIONS:

A. As a condition of approval of a map, the subdivider shall dedicate or make an irrevocable offer of dedication of all parcels of land within the subdivision that are needed for streets, alleys, including access rights and abutters' rights, drainage, public utility easements, and other public easements. In addition, the subdivider shall improve or agree to improve all streets, alleys, including access rights and abutters' rights, drainage, public utility easements, and other public easements.

1. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects.

B. Reserved strips of land controlling access to or egress from other property, or to or from any street or alley, or having the effect of restricting or damaging the adjoining property for subdivision purposes, or which will not be taxable or assessable for special improvements, shall not be permitted in any subdivision unless such reserved strips are conveyed to the city."
Section 31. Section 10-3-2402 (Floor Area) in Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2402: FLOOR AREA:

The following minimum and maximum floor area restrictions shall apply to buildings in the Central Area of the city:

A. Minimum Restrictions: Any building that serves as the primary residential building on a site area shall have a minimum floor area of one thousand six hundred (1,600) square feet and shall have a minimum width, at its widest point, of twenty feet (20').

B. Maximum Restrictions: The cumulative floor area of all buildings located on a single site area in a single-family residential zone in the Central Area of the city, inclusive of units built as part of a two-primary unit project, shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) square feet plus forty percent (40%) of the site area on which those buildings are built. The maximum cumulative floor area of the primary residential units developed on separate lots after any subdivision of lots shall not exceed the maximum cumulative floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots.

Further, if a portion of a site area is to be dedicated to the city for the purposes of establishing or enlarging a street or an alley, and such dedication is to be made in conjunction with a development approval, then, for the purposes of calculating the maximum permitted floor area for the proposed development pursuant to this section, the site area shall include that portion of the site area that is to be dedicated to the city.

However, the dedicated area shall not be included in the calculation of floor area for subsequent development, including additions to the original development.

The maximum floor area restrictions set forth in subsection B of this section may be modified by a Central Area R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 24.5 of this chapter." Section 32. Section 10-3-2405 (Rear Setbacks) in Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows, with all other provisions of this section remaining unchanged:
"10-3-2405: REAR SETBACKS:

The rear setback of a site area located in the Central Area of the city shall equal thirty percent (30%) of the lot depth minus nine feet (9'). The rear setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’)."
Section 33. Subsection "E" is hereby added to Section 10-3-2406 (Side Setbacks) in Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC, with all other provisions of this section remaining unchanged:
"E. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’)."
Section 34. Section 10-3-2407 (Street Side Setbacks) in Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2407: STREET SIDE SETBACKS:

The street side setbacks for site areas located in the Central Area of the city shall be as shown on the "residential street setback map of the city of Beverly Hills", on file in the office of the department of building and safety.

If a street side setback for a site area is not established on the residential street setback map, then the street side setback shall be five feet (5') for those site areas located south of Santa Monica Boulevard and fifteen feet (15') for those site areas located north of Santa Monica Boulevard. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the street side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’)."
Section 35. Section 10-3-2416.5 (Entrance Requirements) is hereby added to Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC to read as follows:
"10-3-2416.5: ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS:

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.” Section 36. Subsection "D" is hereby added to Section 10-3-2419 (Parking Requirements) in Article 24 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Central Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC, with all other provisions of this section remaining unchanged:
"D. One parking space is required for each primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project." Section 37. Section 10-3-2502 (Floor Area) in Article 25 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Hillside Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2502: FLOOR AREA:

The following minimum and maximum floor area restrictions shall apply to buildings in the Hillside Area of the City:

B. Maximum Restrictions: The standards set forth in this subsection shall govern the maximum cumulative floor area that may be developed on any site area within the Hillside Area. These maximum restrictions for a site are applicable to any primary residential unit built as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split. The maximum cumulative floor area of the primary residential units developed on separate lots after any subdivision of lots shall not exceed the maximum cumulative floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an owner of a site within the Hillside Area may develop buildings or structures on that site which cumulatively contain up to four thousand five hundred (4,500) square feet of floor area even if the application of the standards set forth in this section would not permit that amount of development.

Provided, however, that up to one thousand six hundred (1,600) square feet of basement garage area and up to three hundred (300) square feet of basement mechanical area shall not be included within the calculation of the floor area of a basement for the purposes of this paragraph.

1. For site areas which have no level pad, or a level pad of less than seven hundred fifty (750) square feet in area, and the average slope of the site area is twenty percent (20%) or greater, then the maximum cumulative floor area for all buildings and structures shall be twenty percent (20%) of the site area.

2. For those sites not governed by subsection B1 of this section, the maximum permitted cumulative floor area of all buildings and structures shall be calculated as follows:
a. If the area of a site is fifteen thousand (15,000) square feet or less, then the maximum permitted cumulative floor area for buildings and structures on the site shall be forty percent (40%) of the area of the level pad plus ten percent (10%) of the area of the slope.
b. If the area of a site is between fifteen thousand one (15,001) and twenty five thousand (25,000) square feet, then the maximum permitted cumulative floor area for buildings and structures on the site shall be thirty seven percent (37%) of the area of the level pad plus ten percent (10%) of the area of the slope. c. If the area of a site is between twenty five thousand one (25,001) and thirty thousand (30,000) square feet, then the maximum permitted cumulative floor area for buildings and structures on the site shall be thirty four percent (34%) of the area of the level pad plus ten percent (10%) of the area of the slope. d. If the area of a site is greater than thirty thousand (30,000) square feet, then the maximum permitted cumulative floor area for buildings and structures on the site shall be thirty one percent (31%) of the area of the level pad plus ten percent (10%) of the area of the slope.

3. If the area of a site equals or exceeds two (2) acres, the maximum cumulative floor area may exceed the limitations set forth in subsections B1 and B2 of this section if permitted by a Hillside R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 25.5 of this chapter.

C. Additional Requirements: Notwithstanding any other ordinance or provision of this Code, a level pad area must contain a level square shaped area with minimum dimensions of twenty feet (20') per side for the level pad to be used to calculate the maximum permitted cumulative floor area of buildings and structures in the Hillside Area pursuant to subsection B of this section. "Level pad" shall have the meaning set forth in section 10-3-100 of this chapter.

Notwithstanding any other ordinance or provision of this Code, the maximum cumulative floor area of the portion of any buildings and structures located off the existing level pad of any lot in the Hillside Area of the City shall be one thousand (1,000) square feet, unless a Hillside R-1 permit is issued pursuant to subsection 10-3-2550K of this chapter. "Level pad" shall have the meaning set forth in section 10-3-100 of this chapter, and "existing level pad" shall mean the level pad in existence on the effective date hereof (September 30, 2016).

For the purposes of this section, the maximum cumulative permitted floor area shall be calculated based upon the finished grade of the site.

Further, if a portion of a site area is to be dedicated to the City for the purposes of establishing or enlarging a street or an alley, and such dedication is to be made in conjunction with a development approval, then, for the purposes of calculating the maximum permitted floor area for the proposed development pursuant to this section, the site area shall include that portion of the site area that is to be dedicated to the City.

However, the dedicated area shall not be included in the calculation of floor area for subsequent development, including additions to the original development.” Section 38. Section 10-3-2505 (Rear Setbacks) in Article 25 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Hillside Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2505: REAR SETBACKS:

The rear setback for site areas located in the Hillside Area shall equal fifteen percent (15%) of the lot depth or twenty feet (20'), whichever is greater. The rear setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’)."
Section 39. Section 10-3-2506 (Side Setbacks) in Article 25 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Hillside Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2506: SIDE SETBACKS:

Except as provided in this section, each side setback, including street side setbacks, for buildings in the Hillside Area shall be ten feet (10') or twelve percent (12%) of the lot width for each setback, whichever is greater. The side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’).

A. Street Side Setbacks: A street side setback shall be as indicated on the "residential street setback map of the city of Beverly Hills", if such setback is greater than the minimum setback otherwise required by this section.

If the street side setback is not shown on the "residential street setback map of the city of Beverly Hills" then the setback shall be governed by the provisions of this section regarding side setbacks.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the street side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’).

B. Side Setback Extension: If a legally constructed existing building does not conform to the setback requirements of this section, then the building may be enlarged through the extension of the existing, nonconforming, side setback provided that the existing setback is not less than three feet (3') and the enlarged portion of the building does not exceed fourteen feet (14') in height.

1. Minor Accommodation: If the existing setback is not less than three feet (3') and the extension exceeds fourteen feet (14') in height, then the extension may be permitted by a minor accommodation permit issued pursuant to article 36 of this chapter provided that the floor area of the extension is less than one thousand (1,000) square feet and less than twenty percent (20%) of the existing floor area authorized by building permit as of September 2, 1988, and provided that the reviewing authority finds that the extension will not have an adverse impact on: a) the scale and massing of the streetscape, b) neighbors' access to light and air, c) neighbors' privacy, and d) the garden quality of the city.

2. Hillside R-1 Permit: If the existing setback is not less than three feet (3'), the extension exceeds fourteen feet (14') in height, and the area of the extension exceeds one thousand (1,000) square feet or twenty percent (20%) of the existing floor area authorized by building permit as of September 2, 1988, then the extension may be permitted by a Hillside R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 25.5 of this chapter.

C. Structures Built Into Uphill Slopes: If a building is built into an uphill slope located between the level pad and a rear property line, then the sum of the side setbacks for the portion of the building built into the uphill slope shall be the setbacks otherwise required by this section plus thirty percent (30%) of the lot width. Furthermore, in no case shall any side setback be less than the setback otherwise required by this section.

D. Application Of Side Setback Requirements To Existing Legally Nonconforming Side Yards: In all cases that the side setback requirements of this section are applied to construction on lots with existing legally nonconforming side setbacks, the largest setback required by this section shall be applied to the side of the lot with the largest existing side yard."
Section 40. Subsection "E" is hereby added to Section 10-3-2515 (Garage and Other Parking Requirements) in Article 25 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Hillside Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC to read as follows, with all other provisions of the section remaining unchanged:
"E. One parking space is required for each unit created as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within onehalf mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project."
Section 41. Section 10-3-2514.5 (Entrance Requirements) is hereby added to Article 25 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Hillside Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC to read as follows:
"10-3-2514.5: ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS:

A. Only one primary entrance of any primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split shall be permitted to face the lot line from which the front setback is measured.

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.” Section 42. Subsection “E” of Section 10-3-2515 (Garage Entrance Requirements) of Article 25 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Hillside Area of the City) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby added to read as follows, with all other sections remaining unchanged:
“E. One parking space is required for each primary residential unit created as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project.” Section 43. Section 10-3-2602 (Floor Area) in Article 26 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Trousdale Estates) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2602: FLOOR AREA:

The following minimum and maximum floor area restrictions shall apply to buildings in the Trousdale Estates:

B. Maximum Restrictions: The cumulative floor area of all buildings located on a single site area in Trousdale Estates, inclusive of units built as part of a two-primary unit project, shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) square feet plus forty percent (40%) of the site area on which those buildings are built. The maximum cumulative floor area of the primary residential units developed on separate lots after any subdivision of lots shall not exceed the maximum cumulative floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots.

However, the dedicated area shall not be included in the calculation of floor area for subsequent development, including additions to the original development." Section 44. Section 10-3-2607 (Rear Setbacks) in Article 26 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Trousdale Estates) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2607: REAR SETBACKS:

The rear setback for site areas located in Trousdale Estates shall be ten feet (10'). The rear setback for a primary residential unit built as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’)." Section 45. Section 10-3-2608 (Side Setbacks) in Article 26 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Trousdale Estates) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC is hereby amended to read as follows:
"10-3-2608: SIDE SETBACKS:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, and except as otherwise provided in section 10-3-2606 of this chapter for street side setbacks, the side setback for site areas located in Trousdale Estates shall be five feet (5'). The side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’).

A. Exception: For those buildings located on site areas that consist of two (2) or more lots as subdivided on July 3, 1984, the side setback shall be twenty feet (20').

B. Additional Setback Required: In addition to any other side setback required, if the width of a site area exceeds one hundred feet (100'), then the side setback shall be increased by ten percent (10%) of the width in excess of one hundred feet (100').

C. Side Setback Prolongation: If a legally constructed existing building does not conform to the setback requirements of this section, the building may be enlarged through the prolongation of the existing, nonconforming, side setback provided that the existing setback is not less than three feet (3') and the enlarged portion of the building does not exceed fourteen feet (14') in height.

1. Trousdale R-1 Permit: If a building lawfully exceeded fourteen feet (14') in height on October 15, 1987, then a side setback prolongation authorized by this subsection C may exceed fourteen feet (14') in height if permitted by a Trousdale R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 26.5 of this chapter."
Section 46. Subsection "D" is hereby added to Section 10-3-2615 (Parking Requirements) in Article 26 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Trousdale Estates) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC to read as follows, with all other sections remaining unchanged:
"D. One parking space is required for each primary residential unit created as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project." Section 47. Section 10-3-2623 (Entrance Requirements) is hereby added to Article 26 (Single-Family Residential Development Standards for the Trousdale Estates) of Chapter 3 (Zoning) of Title 10 (Planning and Zoning) of the BHMC to read as follows:
"10-3-2623: ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS:

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.”

Section 48. Severability. If any section, subsection, subdivision, sentence, clause, phrase, or portion of this Ordinance or the application thereof to any person or place, is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the final decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this Ordinance shall be and remain in full force and effect.

Section 49. This Ordinance, being an interim urgency ordinance adopted as an urgency measure for the immediate protection of the public safety, health, and general welfare, containing a declaration of the facts constituting the urgency, and passed by a minimum four-fifths (4/5) vote of the City Council, shall take effect immediately upon its adoption and shall continue in effect for a period of no longer than forty-five (45) days. After notice pursuant to Section 65090 of the California Government Code and public hearing, the City Council may extend the effectiveness of this interim urgency ordinance as provided in Government Code Section 65858.

Adopted:

Effective:

SHARONA R. NAZARIAN, PSYD
Mayor of the City of Beverly Hills,
California
ATTEST:
_________________________(SEAL)

HUMA AHMED
City Clerk
APPROVED AS TO FORM: APPROVED AS TO CONTENT:
___________________________ _____________________________ LAURENCE S. WIENER NANCY HUNT-COFFEY
City Attorney City Manager
EXHIBIT A: Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone Map
EXHIBIT B: Wildfire Evacuation Route Map

EXHIBIT A
Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone
(VHFHSZ) Map
City and County boundaries as of 10/22/24 (CA Board of Equalization) CAL FIRE State Responsibility Areas (SRA25_1)
CAL FIRE Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZSRA23_3, FHSZLRA_25_1) Data Sources:

Daniel Berlant, State Fire Marshal, CA Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Joe Tyler, Director/Fire Chief, CA Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Wade Crowfoot, Secretary for Natural Resources, CA Natural Resources Agency The State of California and the Department of Forestry and Fire Gavin Newsom, Governor, State of California Protection make no representations or warranties regarding the accuracy of data or maps. Neither the State nor the Department shall be liable under any circumstances for any direct, special, incidental, or consequential damages with respect to any claim by any user or third party on account of, or arising from, the use of data or maps. and other relevant factors including areas where winds
have been identified by the Office of the State Fire Marshal as a major cause of wildfire spread.
statewide criteria and based on the severity of fire hazard that is expected to prevail in those areas. Moderate, high, and very high fire hazard severity zones shall be based on fuel loading, slope, fire weather, Government Code section 51178 requires the State Fire
Marshal to identify areas in the state as moderate, high, and very high fire hazard severity zones based on consistent Waterbody
Federal Responsibility
Area (FRA)
Unzoned LRA
Incorporated City
Projection: NAD 83 California Teale Albers
Scale: 1:29,000 at 11" x 17"
Km 0 1 2
Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) in Local Responsibility Mi 0 1 Area (LRA), as Identified by the State Fire Marshal
Beverly Hills
2 UNINCORPORATED
LOS ANGELES CO.

LOS ANGELES

LOS ANGELES
WEST

HOLLYWOOD
March 24, 2025
As Identified by the
State Fire Marshal
Local Responsibility Area
Fire Hazard Severity Zones
CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS – LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Very High High Moderate

EXHIBIT B
Wildfire Evacuation Route Map

N RODEO DR

S SANTA MONICA BLVD

N CANON DR

WHITTIER DR

DOHENY RD

A NGELO DR
LA
U
R
EL W
Y

BEVERLY BLVD
COLDW
ATER
CA
N
Y
O
N
D
R
N
PALM
DR
N

BEVERLY
D
R

SUNSET BLVD

BENEDICT CANYON DR

DAYTON WY

BURTON WY
W 3RD ST

ALDEN DR

W SUNSET BLVD

N REXFORD
DR

SUMMIT DR

ELEVADO AV

CARMELITA AV

LEXINGTON
RD
N
MAPLE
DR
F
RA
N
KLIN
CA
NY
O
N
D
R
S

UMMITRIDGEDR

CINTHIA ST
N M
APLE D
R
N PALM
D
R
N O
A
KHUR
S
T
D
R

MOUNTAIN
DR
LOMA
VIS
TA
D
R

W SUNSET BLVD
N
D
O
HE
N
Y
D
R

B RIDLE
LN

BEVERLY
FO
O

THILL R
D
S
C
HUYLER
R
D

N ALPINE DR

CHEROKEE LN
ALTO
CEDRO
DR

FLCI KER W Y

N CAMDEN DR

WALDEN DR

LOMITAS AV
TOW
E
R
RD
SIER
RA
ALTA
W
Y
N

ROXBURY DR
TOW
E
R
G
R
OV
E
DR
LAK
E
D
R

N CRESCENT DR
SAN
YSID
RO
D
R
W

OODLAND
DR

N FOOTHILL RD
SANCIR
CA
RLA
RD
G
E

ARKELL D
R

CIVIC CENTER DR

HARTFORD WY
N
SIE
R
RA
D
R

HILLCREST DR

N BEVERLY
DR
GILCR
E
S
T
DR
N

HILLCREST RD

N LINDEN DR
N

HILLCREST
RD
MA
RILYN
D R
N
ALTA
D
R
N
ARDE
N
DR
N
ELM
DR

HAZEN DR

TULIS DR
OXFORD
W
Y

CALLE VISTA DR
B
EVE
RLY
PARK

BETTY LN
N O
A
KHUR
ST D
R

PARK WY
N

HILLCREST RD
C
RES

TWICK DR

READCRE
ST DR

COLD WA TERCA NYON
B
R
DI LE
P
TH

CHEVY CH ASE DR
GLEN
W Y

EVELYN PL
BR
AI R

CREST RD

N BEDFORD DR

LAKE FRA
NKLIN
DR
B
O
W
M
O
N
T
D
R

S H ADOW

HILL WY

U SHER PL

CASTLE PL

HEATHER RD

WALLACE
R
D
G
E

LADE RA DR

CLARIDGE
DR

HAYNES AV

TRO U SDAL E
PL

ROBERT LN

DELRES T O
DR
K
MI RID
G
E
RD
FE

R RA R I DR

MON T E
CIE
LO
DR
COVE
WY

M A R TI N
LN
M
O

RELA ND
DR

CHALETTE DR

HAS TAIN
FIRE
R D
Wildfire Evacuation Routes - City of Beverly Hills
City Boundary
Evacuation Route
Parcel
Fire Hazard Severity Zone
Very High
This map is for informational purposes. The City of
Beverly Hills makes no representations or warranties
of any kind with respect to the accuracy of the
information or data furnished herein.

Map produced by: City of Beverly Hills - IT - GIS
455 N. Rexford Dr. Beverly Hills, CA 90210
July 2022
E 0 0.125 0.25 0.5
Miles
0 500 1,000 2,000
Feet
1:13,120
Attachment 2
Redline BHMC Sections
TITLE 10 (PLANNING AND ZONING), CHAPTER 3 (ZONING)
ARTICLE 49. OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR HOUSING PROJECTS
TWO-PRIMARY UNIT PROJECTS AND URBAN LOT SPLITS IN SINGLEFAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONES PURSUANT TO SENATE BILL 9 10-3-4900: PURPOSE:

The provisions of this article establish standards and procedures for projects developed pursuant to the regulations included in state Senate Bill 9 (SB 9), under the authority of Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7 (as originally established by Senate Bill 9 and any successor statute), including two housing primary residential units constructed on a single-family residential lot and two-lot subdivision (urban lot split) projects, respectively.
10-3-4901: DEFINITIONS:

For the purposes of this article, certain words and phrases used in this article are defined as follows:

FRONT LOT: When an urban lot split creates two lots where there was previously one lot, the lot with the most frontage on the primary street shall be considered the front lot.

PRIMARY ENTRANCE: The entrance to a residential building that serves as the main point of ingress and egress.

REAR LOT: When an urban lot split creates two lots where there was previously one lot, the lot with the least frontage on the primary street shall be considered the rear lot.

REAR LOT FRONT SETBACK: The distance between the front lot line and closest element of a building or structure on the site area of a rear lot created by an urban lot split. The front lot line of such rear lot may also be the rear lot line of the front lot, and shall be the lot line closest to, and parallel to the primary street shall be the lot line closest to the alley and/or furthest from and parallel to the primary street. The rear lot front setback shall be considered the distance between the front lot line of the rear lot and closest element of a building or structure on the site area of the rear lot.

SENATE BILL 9 OR SB 9: Senate Bill 9 or SB 9 means the state law passed by the California state senate and approved by the Governor on September 16, 2021. As applicable in this Article, the bill enacted Government Code sections 65852.21 and 66411.7, and became effective on January 1, 2022.

URBAN LOT SPLIT: A parcel map subdivision of a single-family residential parcel as permitted pursuant to SB 9 that creates no more than two parcels of approximately equal lot area through a ministerial approval process as permitted pursuant to Government Code section 66411.7 (as originally established in Senate Bill 9 by the California state senate and the Governor on September 16, 2021, and any successor statute, including Senate Bill 450, passed by the California state senate and approved by the Governor on September 19, 2024).
10-3-4902: APPLICABILITY:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter and Chapter 2 of Title 10, the provisions of this Article shall apply to residential two-primary unit projects and urban lot splits that are proposed pursuant to the regulations in SB 9. Except as expressly provided in state law SB 9 or in this Article, all other regulations of the underlying zone of a property developed with a two-primary unit project or urban lot split pursuant to SB 9 shall apply, along with all other applicable regulations of chapter 2, title 10 as related to an urban lot split.
10-3-4903: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS; COVENANT REQUIRED:

A property owner seeking to complete an urban lot split, or develop up to two units a twoprimary unit project on a single-family residential property pursuant to the regulations set forth in SB 9 and the standards in this article, shall be subject to the following general requirements, which shall be accepted and acknowledged by the property owner by signing and recording a covenant against the property. The covenant shall be supplied by the City and provide as follows:

A. The short term rental (defined as a "single-family transient use" in section 10-3- 100 of this chapter) of any units and Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) on the site shall be prohibited comply with applicable regulations for the underlying zone, as enumerated in chapter 3, title 10;
B. Non-residential uses on the site shall be prohibited; C. Any subsequent urban lot split of land that was previously subdivided with an urban lot split shall be prohibited;
D. The owner of the property for which an urban lot split is proposed shall sign an affidavit stating that the owner intends to occupy one of the housing units as their principal residence for at least three years from the date of the approval of the urban lot split; and E. If an inclusionary housing unit is required pursuant to article 48 of this chapter, upon request from the City, the property owner shall furnish a copy of the rental or lease agreement of any unit that is rented or leased and has resulted from an SB 9 project.

Compliance with underlying zoning: Any project developed pursuant to Government code section 65852.21. shall comply with the standards of this article in addition to any provision applicable to the underlying zone. 10-3-4904: URBAN LOT SPLIT REGULATIONS:

Upon approval of a tentative parcel map or parcel map, a single-family residential lot may be subdivided into two lots, also referred to as an urban lot split, pursuant to the regulations contained in SB 9 as follows:

A. No lot resulting from an urban lot split shall be smaller than 1,200 square feet.

B. The two resulting lots shall be approximately equal, and no smaller than 48% or larger than 52% of the lot area of the original parcel.

D. The width of any lot resulting from an urban lot split shall not be less than 75% of the original lot width.

E. D. No right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects. 10-3-4905: MAXIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS:

A. For projects that include an urban lot split, no more than two units may be located on a site. The units must conform to the objective standards included in this article.

B. For two-primary unit projects that do not include an urban lot split, no more than four units (the four units may be any combination of up to two primary residential units, and including one any ADUs and one Junior ADUs allowable under state and local law) may be located on a site. The units must conform to the objective standards included in this article and as otherwise regulated by ADU or Junior ADU regulations of this chapter.
10-3-4906: MAXIMUM UNIT SIZE:

No unit constructed pursuant to SB 9 regulations shall be more than 800 square feet in size. For the purposes of this article, basements shall count as floor area. For any primary residential units constructed as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, the maximum floor area shall be calculated pursuant to the limitations of the underlying zone in this chapter. The maximum cumulative floor area of the primary residential units developed on separate lots after any subdivision of lots shall not exceed the maximum cumulative floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots.
10-3-4907: MAXIMUM UNIT HEIGHT: MINIMUM UNIT SIZE:

No unit constructed pursuant to SB 9 regulations shall exceed fourteen feet (14') and one story in height.

A. Side and rear setbacks. Any units constructed pursuant to the provisions of SB 9 as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split shall have a minimum four-foot setback from all side and rear lot lines.

B. Front setbacks for front lots shall be provided pursuant to the regulations of the underlying zoning standards of this chapter the setback as established in the records for each site area maintained by the City's Community Development Department, unless that setback is not established in the city's records, or it is zero. If the front setback for a particular site area is zero or is not established in the City's records, then the front setback for that site area shall be determined as follows:

1. For developed site areas, the front setback shall be the lesser of either:
a. The distance between the front lot line and the closest element of the existing primary residence; or
b. The average of the front setbacks of the other site areas on the same side of the street in the same block.

2. For undeveloped lots, the front setback shall be the average of the front setbacks of the other site areas on the same side of the street in the same block.

C. Front setbacks for rear lots. The rear lot front setback shall be ten feet. The front lot line shall be the lot line closest to, and parallel to the primary street.

D. C. Setbacks for existing structures. No setbacks shall be required if a unit is constructed within the footprint of an existing structure on a lot. 10-3-4909: MINIMUM WIDTH OF BUILDING:

A. The front most unit constructed on a front lot shall have a front door facing the street. Only one primary entrance of a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split shall be permitted to face the lot line from which the front setback is measured.

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.

C. Any unit other than front most unit, or the front most unit on the front lot, shall be completely screened by either: 1) other unit(s) on the lot; or 2) landscaping. 10-3-4911: PARKING:

A. Parking required: One parking space is required for each primary residential unit created pursuant to SB 9 as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project.

B. Parking location restrictions:

1. Parking location shall be limited by underlying zoning of this chapter shall not be provided within a front setback.

2. Rear lot parking shall be accessed via an alley, if there is an alley adjacent to the site.
10-3-4912: AFFORDABLE RENTAL RATE REQUIRED:

Any projects constructed pursuant to SB 9 shall comply with inclusionary housing requirements as enumerated in article 48 of this chapter. 10-3-4913: ADDITIONAL STANDARDS FOR HILLSIDE AND TROUSDALE:

In addition to the objective standards outlined in this article, the following regulations shall apply to any SB 9 projects that are developed in the Hillside or Trousdale Estates area of the City.

A. No level pad area may be created for purpose of constructing units.

B. No units, or part of units, may be constructed off of the existing level pad area on any site.

C. Lots created from an urban lot split shall conform to the regulations provided in this article, unless there is no alley access, or the lot is not a through lot or a corner lot, in which case, the rear lot shall comply with the definition of a flag lot in this chapter and access to the rear lot shall be provided.
10-3-49124: ADVERSE IMPACT FINDINGS:

The building official, or his or her designee, may make a written finding to deny an urban lot split or the construction of a primary residential units as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split pursuant to SB 9. Such findings shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence that the proposed housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact (as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Government Code Section 65589.5) upon the public health and safety or the physical environment, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific, adverse impact. In addition, the building official, or his or her designee shall review any urban lot split or two-primary unit project to determine if the housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact if the project is located within the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) to determine whether the proposed urban lot split or urban infill two-unit development would have a specific, adverse impact upon public health and safety.
_____________________________________________________________________ TITLE 10 (PLANNING AND ZONING), CHAPTER 2 (SUBDIVISIONS), ARTICLE 2 (TENTATIVE MAPS)
10-2-303: LOTS:

A. Zones: For the purposes of this chapter, the city shall be divided into three (3) zones as follows:

1. Northerly Zone: The northerly zone shall consist of all property lying between Sunset Boulevard and the northerly boundary of the city.

3. Central Zone: The central zone shall consist of all property in the city not included within the northerly and southerly zones.

A double frontage lot shall not be permitted, unless the planning commission, in the exercise of its discretion, approves the same after it has been established that a double frontage lot cannot be avoided if the dimensions set forth in this section are to be secured for a majority of other lots in the same subdivision. The side lot lines of each rectangular lot, and each other lot (so far as possible), shall be at approximate right angles to the street on which the lot fronts.

1. In the southerly zone, each lot shall have at least fifty feet (50') of frontage on a public street and shall have an area of at least seven thousand five hundred (7,500) square feet;

2. In the central zone, each lot shall have at least ninety feet (90') of frontage on a public street and shall have an area of at least thirteen thousand (13,000) square feet; and

1. No lot shall be smaller than 1,200 square feet.

2. The two resulting lots shall be approximately equal, and no smaller than 48% or larger than 52% of the lot area of the original parcel.

4. No right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects.

E. F. City Boundary: For any property located in a one-family residential zones, a lot line shall not be adjusted which would either create or expand a lot that crosses the City boundary. Further, a lot line that is coterminous with the boundary of the City shall not be adjusted away from the City boundary.

F. G. Variances: Whenever the size of the parcel of land to be subdivided or altered as the result of a lot line adjustment, its street and alley frontage, its contour, and its location with reference to surrounding property, are such that the requirements of this section work undue and unusual hardship, and a different size and arrangement would not result in undue detriment to surrounding property or the residents thereof, the planning commission may, in its discretion, approve a different size and arrangement of the lots in the proposed subdivision. (1962 Code § 10-903; amd. Ord. 1161, eff. 11-2-1962; Ord. 75- O-1561, eff. 3-4-1975; Ord. 91-O-2111, eff. 3-22-1991; Ord. 21-O-2833, eff. 1-26-2021; Ord. 21-O-2834, eff. 3-2-2021; Ord. 22-O-2855, eff. 1-18-2022; Ord. 23-O-2870, eff. 2-3- 2023)
10-2-308: DEDICATIONS:

1. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects.

B. Reserved strips of land controlling access to or egress from other property, or to or from any street or alley, or having the effect of restricting or damaging the adjoining property for subdivision purposes, or which will not be taxable or assessable for special improvements, shall not be permitted in any subdivision unless such reserved strips are conveyed to the city. (1962 Code § 10-903; amd. Ord. 75-O-1561, eff. 3-4-1975) ___________________________________________________________ TITLE 10 (PLANNING AND ZONING), CHAPTER 3 (ZONING), ARTICLE 24 (SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS FOR

THE CENTRAL AREA OF THE CITY)
10-3-2402: FLOOR AREA:

The following minimum and maximum floor area restrictions shall apply to buildings in the Central Area of the city:

The maximum floor area restrictions set forth in subsection B of this section may be modified by a Central Area R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 24.5 of this chapter. 10-3-2405: REAR SETBACKS:

A. Principal Residential Building: Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a principal residential building may encroach into a maximum of five percent (5%) of the area of the rear yard and such encroachment shall be governed by the height restrictions set forth in section 10-3-2403 of this chapter.

B. Doheny Drive And Olympic Boulevard: Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, for those lots located easterly of Doheny Drive and southerly of Olympic Boulevard, a maximum of four hundred fifty (450) square feet of floor area of the principal residential building may encroach into the rear yard provided that a ten foot (10') rear setback is provided, the encroachment conforms with the height restrictions contained in subsection 10-3-2403C1 of this chapter, and no other building is located in the accessory structure area.

C. Rear Setback Extension: If a legally constructed existing building does not conform to the setback requirement of this section, enlarging the building through extending the existing nonconforming rear setback can be permitted provided that:

1. The existing rear setback is maintained, and the addition is not less than fifteen feet (15') from the rear property line;

2. The existing principal residential building, the addition and any accessory structure do not cover more than fifty percent (50%) of the rear yard area, excluding porches or decks that are attached to the building, and constructed in accordance with subsection 10-3-2409C of this chapter; and

3. The height of the addition located within the rear yard area does not exceed fourteen feet (14') in height and the floor area of the extension is the lesser of one thousand (1,000) square feet or twenty percent (20%) of the existing floor area, inclusive of any floor area granted pursuant to subsection 10-3-2406C of this chapter; and the height of any porch or deck attached to a principal residential building and located within the rear setback is not more than three feet (3') above natural grade or higher than the finished floor of the first story whichever is lower.

If an extension of a principal residential building meets the criteria of subsections C1 and C2 of this section, but does not meet the criteria of subsection C3 of this section, then the extension may be permitted by a Central R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 24.5 of this chapter.
10-3-2406: SIDE SETBACKS:

The following side setback requirements shall govern the Central Area of the city:

A. North Of Santa Monica Boulevard: The sum of the side setbacks from the two (2) longest side lot lines shall be at least fifteen feet (15') plus thirty percent (30%) of the lot width in excess of seventy feet (70'). In addition, except as otherwise provided in this section, each side setback for site areas located north of Santa Monica Boulevard shall be at least seven and one-half feet (7.5').

1. Exception: Site area in excess of one hundred feet (100') in width. In addition to any other side setback required, if the width of a site area exceeds one hundred feet (100'), then the side setback from the two (2) longest side lot lines shall be at least ten feet (10') plus ten percent (10%) of the width of the site area in excess of one hundred feet (100').

2. Exception; Two Or More Lots: For those site areas that consist of two (2) or more lots as subdivided on July 3, 1984, the side setback shall be at least fifteen feet (15'). In addition, the sum of the side setbacks adjacent to the two (2) longest side lot lines shall be at least twelve feet (12') plus thirty percent (30%) of the lot width in excess of one hundred feet (100').

B. South Of Santa Monica Boulevard: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the minimum side setback for buildings located south of Santa Monica Boulevard shall be five feet (5') on one side. On the other side, the minimum side setback shall be nine feet (9'). Encroachments in side setbacks otherwise permitted pursuant to section 10-3- 2409 of this chapter may not be permitted in this nine foot (9') setback area except for: 1) roof eaves pursuant to subsection 10-3-2409B of this chapter, and 2) encroachments along the side property line for side yard fences, walls, or hedges, provided that a flat area with a minimum width of nine feet (9') is maintained between the side property line wall, fence or hedge, and any structure or building. Parking, including a porte-cochere covering said parking may be provided in this nine foot (9') setback area pursuant to section 10-3-2419 of this chapter.

1. Exception: The setback requirements set forth in this subsection B shall not be applicable to: a) any corner lot, b) those site areas located south of Olympic Boulevard and west of Roxbury Drive, nor c) those site areas located south of Olympic Boulevard and east of Doheny Drive.
a. Corner Lots And All Lots South Of Olympic Boulevard And West Of Roxbury Drive: The side setbacks for all corner lots located southerly of Santa Monica Boulevard and those site areas located southerly of Olympic Boulevard and westerly of Roxbury Drive shall be at least five feet (5'). In addition, the sum of the side setbacks adjacent to the two (2) longest side lot lines shall be at least twenty percent (20%) of the lot width. b. South Of Olympic Boulevard And East Of Doheny Drive: The side setbacks for site areas southerly of Olympic Boulevard and easterly of Doheny Drive shall be five feet (5').

2. Exception; Two Or More Lots: For those buildings located on site areas that consist of two or more lots as subdivided on July 3, 1984, the side setback shall be ten feet (10') plus ten percent (10%) of the width of the lot in excess of one hundred feet (100').

3. Exception; Accessory Dwelling Units. Accessory dwelling units and junior accessory dwelling units are permitted encroachments in the nine foot (9') setback area pursuant to article 50 of this chapter.

C. Side Setback Extension: If a legally constructed existing building does not conform to the setback requirements of this section, the building may be enlarged through the extension of the existing, nonconforming side setback provided that:

1. The existing setback is not less than three feet (3') and

2. The enlarged portion of the building does not exceed fourteen feet (14') in height. a. Minor Accommodation: If the existing setback is not less than three feet (3') and the extension exceeds fourteen feet (14') in height, then the extension may be permitted by a minor accommodation permit issued pursuant to article 36 of this chapter provided that the floor area of the extension is less than one thousand (1,000) square feet and less than twenty percent (20%) of the existing floor area inclusive of the area of any rear yard setback extension concurrently or previously approved pursuant to subsection 10-3- 2405C of this chapter, and provided that the reviewing authority finds that the extension will not have any adverse impact on:
(1) The scale and massing of the streetscape,
(2) Neighbors' access to light and air,
(3) Neighbors' privacy, and
(4) The garden quality of the city.

Extension of a nonconforming side setback permissible by a minor accommodation at the same time as extension of a nonconforming rear setback pursuant to section 10-3- 2405 of this chapter shall be reviewed as one project and may be permitted by a single Central R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 24.5 of this chapter. b. Central R-1 Permit: If the existing setback is not less than three feet (3'), the extension exceeds fourteen feet (14') in height, and the area of the extension, inclusive of any rear yard setback extension approved pursuant to section 10-3-2405 of this chapter, exceeds one thousand (1,000) square feet or twenty percent (20%) of the existing floor area, then the extension may be permitted by a Central R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 24.5 of this chapter.

E. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’).
10-3-2407: STREET SIDE SETBACKS:

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.
10-3-2419: PARKING REQUIREMENTS:

Three (3) parking spaces shall be provided for each single-family residential site area in the Central Area of the city that contains no more than four (4) bedrooms; four (4) parking spaces shall be provided for each single-family residential site area in the Central Area of the city that contains five (5) or six (6) bedrooms; five (5) parking spaces shall be provided for each single-family residential site area in the Central Area of the city that contains seven (7) bedrooms; six (6) parking spaces shall be provided for each singlefamily residential site area in the Central Area of the city that contains eight (8) bedrooms; and seven (7) parking spaces shall be provided for each single- family residential site area in the Central Area of the city that contains nine (9) or more bedrooms.

A. The dimensions of each parking space shall comply with the parking standards adopted by the city council and on file in the department of building and safety. However, if the width of a portion of an existing paved driveway is restricted by the location of an existing residence or existing porte-cochere to a width less than that required by the parking standards, but not less than eight and one-half feet (8.5'), then, notwithstanding its inadequate width, such portion of the driveway shall be considered to comply with the parking standards provided that such area complies with all other requirements of the parking standards.

B. No required parking space shall be provided within a front yard or street side yard.

C. Parking areas, or portions thereof, located in any side or rear yard or exposed to view from a street shall be completely screened from the view of the adjacent property by a fence or hedge at least six feet (6') in height and from any street by a fence or a hedge at least three feet (3') in height, except that an entryway not to exceed ten feet (10') in width may be provided from the street. Such screening shall not encroach into the required dimensions of the parking space.

D. One parking space is required for each primary residential unit built as part of an urban infill two-unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project. ____________________________________________________________________ TITLE 10 (PLANNING AND ZONING), CHAPTER 3 (ZONING), ARTICLE

25. SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS FOR

THE HILLSIDE AREA OF THE CITY
10-3-2502: FLOOR AREA:

The following minimum and maximum floor area restrictions shall apply to buildings in the Hillside Area of the City:

B. Maximum Restrictions: The standards set forth in this subsection shall govern the maximum cumulative floor area that may be developed on any site within the Hillside Area. These maximum restrictions for a site are applicable to a primary residential unit built as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split. The maximum cumulative floor area of the primary residential units developed on separate lots after any subdivision of lots shall not exceed the maximum cumulative floor area calculation for the site prior to the subdivision of lots.

In addition, notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the cumulative floor area developed on any one site area, in combination with the floor area of all basements constructed on that site, shall not exceed fifteen thousand (15,000) square feet unless permitted by a Hillside R-1 permit issued pursuant to article 25.5 of this chapter. Provided, however, that up to one thousand six hundred (1,600) square feet of basement garage area and up to three hundred (300) square feet of basement mechanical area shall not be included within the calculation of the floor area of a basement for the purposes of this paragraph.

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.
10-3-2515: GARAGE AND OTHER PARKING REQUIREMENTS:

No less than four (4) parking spaces shall be provided for each primary residence located within the Hillside Area unless the primary residence has a floor area of less than six thousand (6,000) square feet. If the primary residence has a floor area of less than six thousand (6,000) square feet, then only three (3) parking spaces shall be required.

A. At least two (2) of the parking spaces required by this section shall be covered by a permanent structure.

B. The dimensions of each parking space shall comply with the parking standards adopted by the city council and on file in the department of building and safety. However, if the width of a portion of an existing paved driveway is restricted by the location of an existing residence, or if the width of a portion of a paved driveway is restricted by the construction of a porte cochere, to a width less than that required by the parking standards, but not less than eight feet (8'), then, notwithstanding its inadequate width, such portion of the driveway shall be considered to comply with the parking standards provided that such area complies with all other requirements of the parking standards.

C. No required parking space shall be provided within a front yard. Furthermore, any additional parking areas that are not required by this code shall be set back a minimum of five feet (5') from any front lot line or street side lot line. Such five foot (5') setback area shall be landscaped.

D. Parking areas, or portions thereof, located in any side or rear yard or exposed to view from a street shall be completely screened from the view of the adjacent property by a fence or hedge at least six feet (6') in height and from any street by a fence or a hedge at least three feet (3') in height, except that an entryway not to exceed ten feet (10') in width may be provided from the street, such screening shall not encroach into the required dimensions of the parking space.

E. One parking space is required for each primary residential unit created as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project.

TITLE 10 (PLANNING AND ZONING), CHAPTER 3 (ZONING), ARTICLE

26. SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS FOR

TROUSDALE ESTATES
10-3-2602: FLOOR AREA:

The following minimum and maximum floor area restrictions shall apply to buildings in the Trousdale Estates:

However, the dedicated area shall not be included in the calculation of floor area for subsequent development, including additions to the original development. 10-3-2607: REAR SETBACKS:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, and except as otherwise provided in section 10-3-2606 of this chapter for street side setbacks, the side setback for site areas located in Trousdale Estates shall be five feet (5').The side setback for a primary residential unit built as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, as defined in this chapter, shall be four feet (4’).

A. Exception: For those buildings located on site areas that consist of two (2) or more lots as subdivided on July 3, 1984, the side setback shall be twenty feet (20').

Two (2) parking spaces shall be provided for each residential site area in Trousdale Estates with no more than four (4) bedrooms. Three (3) parking spaces shall be provided for each residential site area in Trousdale Estates with five (5) bedrooms, and four (4) parking spaces shall be provided for each residential site area in Trousdale Estates with six (6) or more bedrooms.

A. The dimensions of each parking space shall comply with the parking standards adopted by the city council and on file in the department of planning and community development. However, if the width of a portion of an existing paved driveway is restricted by the location of an existing residence, or if the width of a portion of a paved driveway is restricted by the construction of a porte-cochere, to a width less than that required by the parking standards, but not less than eight feet (8'), then, notwithstanding its inadequate width, such portion of the driveway shall be considered to comply with the parking standards provided that such area complies with all other requirements of the parking standards.

B. No required parking space shall be provided within a front yard or street side yard.

D. One parking space is required for each primary residential unit created as part of a two-primary unit project or urban lot split, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block of the project. [New section:]
10-3-2623: ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS:

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.

Attachment 3
Ordinance No. 23-O-2880
ORDINANCE NO. 23-0-2880

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS AMENDING

THE BEVERLY HILLS MUNICIPAL CODE TO ADOPT OBJECTIVE

STANDARDS FOR HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS WITH NO MORE

THAN TWO PRIMARY UNITS AND URBAN LOT SPLIT PARCEL

MAPS IN SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONES PURSUANT TO
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 65852.21 AND 66411.7 (SENATE
BILL 9,2021), AND MAKING A DETERMINATION OF EXEMPTION

UNDER THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
(CEQA)
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. During the 2021 legislative session, the California Legislature passed, and the Governor signed Senate Bill 9 (SB 9), which requires local agencies to ministerially approve urban lot splits and development to two residential units per single family residential lots provided the projects meet certain criteria. SB 9 became effective on January 1, 2022.

Section 2. At its December 7, 2021 regular meeting, the City Council voted to adopt Interim Ordinance No. 2 1-0-2853 to create objective standards for Senate Bill (SB) 9 residential development projects under the authority of Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7.

The standards apply to the ministerial review and approval of a two-lot subdivision (“urban lot split”) and/or development projects with up to two units per lot in single-family residential zones constructed pursuant to SB 9 regulations. The interim ordinance adopted on December 7, 2021 took effect immediately, and was in effect for an initial 45-day period ending on January 21, 2022.

This interim ordinance was subsequently extended for an additional ten (10) month and fifteen (15) day period through the adoption of Ordinance No. 2 1-0-2856, and for an additional one-year period through the adoption of Ordinance No. 22-0-2869. The interim ordinance will expire on December 6, 2023, and this ordinance enacts permanent regulations. -1-
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Section 3. On August 10, 2023, the Planning Commission held a duly noticed public hearing to discuss the draft ordinance to create permanent objective standards for urban lot split / SB 9 projects, after which it adopted Resolution No. 2034 recommending that the City Council amend the Beverly Hills Municipal Code to adopt the permanent regulations (collectively, the “Amendments”). On September 19, 2023, the City Council held a duly noticed public hearing, received public testimony, and thereafter introduced this Ordinance.

Section 4. This Ordinance and the Amendments were assessed in accordance with the authority and criteria contained in the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the State CEQA Guidelines, and the environmental regulations of the City. The City Council finds the ordinance is not considered a project under CEQA pursuant to Government Code Sections 65852.21(j) and 664 11.7(n) which provide that ordinances that implement Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7, respectively, shall not be considered projects under CEQA.

Therefore, this ordinance is statutorily exempt from CEQA.

Section 5. The Amendments are consistent with the objectives, principles, and standards ofthe General Plan. General Plan Land Use (LU) Goal 12— Community Character and Quality calls for a built environment that is distinguished by its high level of site planning, architecture, landscape design, and sensitivity to its natural setting and history Similarly, General Plan LU Policy 2.1 — City Places: Neighborhoods, Districts, and Corridors encourages the maintenance ofqualities that distinguish the City’s unique residential and business areas, including aesthetics of the built form and scale of residential neighborhoods. General Plan LU Policy 5.1 - Neighborhood Conservation calls for the maintenance ofthe uses, densities, character, amenities, and quality of the City’s residential neighborhoods, recognizing their contribution to the City’s identity, economic value, and quality of life. General Plan LU Policy 5.7 - Neighborhood -2-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.cioc
Transitions calls for the regulation of the setback, rear elevation design of buildings, and landscaping of backyards where neighborhoods of differing housing type and density abut to assure smooth transitions in scale, form, and character. General Plan LU Goal 6 - Single-Family Residential Neighborhoods calls for the maintenance of the identity, scale, and character of the distinct single-family residential neighborhoods. General Plan LU Policy 6.1- Neighborhood Identity calls for the maintenance of characteristics that distinguish the City’s single-family neighborhoods from one another in such terms as topography, lot size, housing scale and form, and public streetscapes. Similarly, General Plan LU Policy 6.2 - Housing Character and Design calls for requiring new, renovated, and additions to housing to be located and designed to maintain the distinguishing characteristics and qualities of the neighborhoods in which they are located, including prevailing lot sizes, building form, scale, massing, relationship to street frontages, architectural design, landscaping, property setbacks, and other comparable elements. Amending sections ofthe Beverly Hills Municipal Code to create objective standards for projects constructed pursuant to SB 9 will help to preserve the scale and character ofthe residential neighborhoods, as well as the distinct aesthetic of the residential built environment. In addition, the Amendments will further protect the identity of residential neighborhoods by maintaining certain qualities such as the lot size, housing form, and public streetscapes. For the foregoing reasons, the public interest, health, safety, morals, peace, comfort, convenience, or general welfare requires the code amendments. Further, the Amendments are consistent with the objectives, principles, and standards ofthe General Plan as set forth above.

Section 6. The City Council rescinds Article 49 ofChapter 3 of Title 10 ofthe Beverly Hills Municipal Code, as enacted by Ordinance No. 2 1-0-2853, and extended by Ordinances Nos. 21-0-2856 and 21-0-2869, as ofthe time that this Ordinance takes effect. -3-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
Section 7. The City Council hereby adopts a new Article 49 of Chapter 3 of Title 10 ofthe Beverly Hills Municipal Code, to read as follows:
“ARTICLE 49. OBJECTIVE STANDARDS FOR HOUSING PROJECTS AND URBAN

LOT SPLITS IN SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONES PURSUANT TO SENATE BILL 9.
10-3-4900: PURPOSE:

The provisions of this article establish standards and procedures for projects developed pursuant to the regulations included in state Senate Bill 9 (SB 9), under the authority of Government Code Sections 65852.21 and 66411.7 including two housing units constructed on a single-family residential lot and two-lot subdivisions (urban lot split) projects, respectively.
10-3-4901: DEFINITIONS:

For the purposes of this article, certain words and phrases used in this article are defined as follows:

FRONT LOT: When an urban lot split creates two lots where there was previously one lot, the lot with the most frontage on the primary street shall be considered the front lot.

REAR LOT: When an urban lot split creates two lots where there was previously one lot, the lot with the least frontage on the primary street shall be considered the rear lot.

REAR LOT FRONT The distance between the front lot line and closest element of a building or structure on the site area of a rear lot SETBACK: created by an urban lot split. The front lot line of such rear -4-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
lot may also be the rear lot line of the front lot, and shall be the lot line closest to, and parallel to the primary street.

URBAN LOT SPLIT: A parcel map subdivision of a single family residential parcel as permitted pursuant to SB 9 that creates no more than two parcels of approximately equal lot area.
10-3-4902: APPLICABILITY:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter and Chapter 2 of Title 10, the provisions of this Article shall apply to residential projects and urban lot splits that are proposed pursuant to the regulations in SB 9. Except as expressly provided in SB 9 or in this Article, all other regulations of the underlying zone of a property developed pursuant to SB 9 shall apply, along with all other applicable regulations from Chapter 2 of Title 10 as related to any urban lot split.
10-3-4903: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS; COVENANT REQUIRED:

A property owner seeking to complete an urban lot split, or develop up to two units on a single-family residential property pursuant to the regulations set forth in SB 9 and the standards in this article, shall be subject to the following general requirements, which shall be accepted and acknowledged by the property owner by signing and recording a covenant against the property. The covenant shall be supplied by the City and provide as follows:
-5-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
A. The short term rental (defined as a “single-family transient use” in section 10-3- 100 ofthis chapter) of any units and Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) on the site shall be prohibited;
B. Non-residential uses on the site shall be prohibited; C. Any subsequent urban lot split of land that was previously subdivided with an urban lot split shall be prohibited;
D. The owner ofthe property for which an urban lot split is proposed shall sign an affidavit stating that the owner intends to occupy one ofthe housing units as their principal residence for at least three years from the date ofthe approval ofthe urban lot split; and
E. If an inclusionary housing unit is required pursuant to article 48 ofthis chapter, upon request from the City, the property owner shall furnish a copy of the rental or lease agreement of any unit that is rented or leased and has resulted from an SB 9 project.
10-3-4904: URBAN LOT SPLIT REGULATIONS:

A. No lot resulting from an urban lot split shall be smaller than 1,200 square feet. -6-
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B. The two resulting lots shall be approximately equal, and no smaller than 48% or larger than 52% ofthe lot area ofthe original parcel.

C. No flag lots shall be created as a result of an urban lot split ifthe subject property is adjacent to an alley, located on a corner, or on a through lot.

D. The width of any lot resulting from an urban lot split shall not be less than 75% of the original lot width.

E. No right-of-way dedications shall be imposed upon urban lot split projects. 10-3-4905: MAXIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS:

A. For projects that include an urban lot split, no more than two units may be located on a site. The units must conform to the objective standards included in this article.

B. For projects that do not include an urban lot split, no more than four units (including one ADU, and one Junior ADU) may be located on a site. The units must conform to the objective standards included in this article and as otherwise regulated by ADU or Junior ADU regulations.
10-3-4906: MAXIMUM UNIT SIZE:

No unit constructed pursuant to SB 9 regulations shall be more than 800 square feet in size. For the purposes of this article, basements shall count as floor area. -7-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
10-3-4907: MAXIMUM UNIT HEIGHT:

No unit constructed pursuant to SB 9 regulations shall exceed fourteen feet (14’) and one story in height.
10-3-4908: SETBACKS:

A. Side and rear setbacks. Any units constructed pursuant to the provisions of SB 9 shall have a minimum four-foot setback from all side and rear lot lines.

B. Front setbacks for front lots shall be the setback as established in the records for each site area maintained by the City’s Community Development Department, unless that setback is not established in the city’s records, or it is zero. Ifthe front setback for a particular site area is zero or is not established in the City’s records, then the front setback for that site area shall be determined as follows:

1. For developed site areas, the front setback shall be the lesser of either:
a. The distance between the front lot line and the closest element ofthe existing primary residence; or
b. The average ofthe front setbacks ofthe other site areas on the same side ofthe street in the same block.

2. For undeveloped lots, the front setback shall be the average of the front setbacks ofthe other site areas on the same side ofthe street in the same block.
80785-0009\2864142v2.doc
C. Front setbacks for rear lots. The rear lot front setback shall be ten feet. The front lot line shall be the lot line closest to, and parallel to the primary street.

D. Setbacks for existing structures. No setbacks shall be required if a unit is constructed within the footprint of an existing structure on a lot. 10-3-4909: MINIMUM WIDTH OF BUILDING:

The front most unit constructed on a site with street frontage shall have a minimum unit width of 40 feet or 75% of the lot width, whichever is less. 10-3-4910: DESIGN OF UNIT:

A. The front most unit constructed on a front lot shall have a front door facing the street.

B. Each unit on each lot created by an urban lot split shall have a separate entrance.

C. Any unit other than front most unit, or the front most unit on the front lot, shall be completely screened by either: 1) other unit(s) on the lot; or 2) landscaping. 10-3-4911: PARKING:

A. Parking required: One parking space is required for each unit created pursuant to SB 9, unless the parcel upon which the unit is created is within one-half mile of a high-quality transit corridor or a major transit stop or there is a car share vehicle located within one block ofthe project.
-9-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
B. Parking location restrictions:

1. Parking shall not be provided within a front setback.

2. Rear lot parking shall be accessed via an alley, if there is an alley adjacent to the site.
10-3-4912: AFFORDABLE RENTAL RATE REQUIRED:

Any projects constructed pursuant to SB 9 shall comply with inclusionary housing requirements as enumerated in article 48 of this chapter. 10-3-4913: ADDITIONAL STANDARDS FOR HILLSIDE AND TROUSDALE:

In addition to the objective standards outlined in this article, the following regulations shall apply to any SB 9 projects that are developed in the Hillside or Trousdale Estates area of the City.

A. No level pad area may be created for purpose of constructing units.

B. No units, or part of units, may be constructed off of the existing level pad area on any site.

The building official, or his or her designee, may make a written finding to deny an urban lot split or the construction of units pursuant to SB 9. Such findings shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence that the proposed housing development project would have a specific, adverse impact (as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Government Code Section 65589.5) upon the public health and safety or the physical environment, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific, adverse impact.”
Section 8. Severability. If any section, subsection, subdivision, sentence, clause, phrase, or portion of this Ordinance or the application thereof to any person or place, is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the final decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder ofthis Ordinance shall be and remain in full force and effect.

Section 9. Publication. The City Clerk shall cause this Ordinance to be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published and circulated in the City within fifteen (15) days after its passage in accordance with Section 36933 ofthe Government Code, shall certify to the adoption of this Ordinance, and shall cause this Ordinance and her certification, together with proof of publication, to be entered in the Book of Ordinances ofthe Council ofthis City. //
I
/I
I
/I
II
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B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
Section 10. Effective Date. This Ordinance shall go into effect and be in full force and effect at 12:01 a.m. on the thirty-first (31st) day after its passage.

Adopted: October 3, 2023
Effective: November 3, 2023
ATTEST:
(SEAL)

H MA AHMED
City Clerk
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
<
I
LAURENCE S. WIENER
City Attorney
APPROVED AS TO CONTENT:

I
NANCY NT-COFFEY ‘fj
City Man r
M.D.
of Beverly Hills,
-12-
B0785-0009\2864142v2.doc
Attachment 4
Wildfire Evacuation Route Map

N RODEO DR

S SANTA MONICA BLVD

N CANON DR

WHITTIER DR

DOHENY RD

A NGELO DR
LA
U
R
EL W
Y

BEVERLY BLVD
COLDW
ATER
CA
N
Y
O
N
D
R
N
PALM
DR
N

BEVERLY
D
R

SUNSET BLVD

BENEDICT CANYON DR

DAYTON WY

BURTON WY
W 3RD ST

ALDEN DR

W SUNSET BLVD

N REXFORD
DR

SUMMIT DR

ELEVADO AV

CARMELITA AV

LEXINGTON
RD
N
MAPLE
DR
F
RA
N
KLIN
CA
NY
O
N
D
R
S

UMMITRIDGEDR

CINTHIA ST
N M
APLE D
R
N PALM
D
R
N O
A
KHUR
S
T
D
R

MOUNTAIN
DR
LOMA
VIS
TA
D
R

W SUNSET BLVD
N
D
O
HE
N
Y
D
R

B RIDLE
LN

BEVERLY
FO
O

THILL R
D
S
C
HUYLER
R
D

N ALPINE DR

CHEROKEE LN
ALTO
CEDRO
DR

FLCI KER W Y

N CAMDEN DR

WALDEN DR

LOMITAS AV
TOW
E
R
RD
SIER
RA
ALTA
W
Y
N

ROXBURY DR
TOW
E
R
G
R
OV
E
DR
LAK
E
D
R

N CRESCENT DR
SAN
YSID
RO
D
R
W

OODLAND
DR

N FOOTHILL RD
SANCIR
CA
RLA
RD
G
E

ARKELL D
R

CIVIC CENTER DR

HARTFORD WY
N
SIE
R
RA
D
R

HILLCREST DR

N BEVERLY
DR
GILCR
E
S
T
DR
N

HILLCREST RD

N LINDEN DR
N

HILLCREST
RD
MA
RILYN
D R
N
ALTA
D
R
N
ARDE
N
DR
N
ELM
DR

HAZEN DR

TULIS DR
OXFORD
W
Y

CALLE VISTA DR
B
EVE
RLY
PARK

BETTY LN
N O
A
KHUR
ST D
R

PARK WY
N

HILLCREST RD
C
RES

TWICK DR

READCRE
ST DR

COLD WA TERCA NYON
B
R
DI LE
P
TH

CHEVY CH ASE DR
GLEN
W Y

EVELYN PL
BR
AI R

CREST RD

N BEDFORD DR

LAKE FRA
NKLIN
DR
B
O
W
M
O
N
T
D
R

S H ADOW

HILL WY

U SHER PL

CASTLE PL

HEATHER RD

WALLACE
R
D
G
E

LADE RA DR

CLARIDGE
DR

HAYNES AV

TRO U SDAL E
PL

ROBERT LN

DELRES T O
DR
K
MI RID
G
E
RD
FE

R RA R I DR

MON T E
CIE
LO
DR
COVE
WY

M A R TI N
LN
M
O

RELA ND
DR

CHALETTE DR

Map produced by: City of Beverly Hills - IT - GIS
455 N. Rexford Dr. Beverly Hills, CA 90210
July 2022
E 0 0.125 0.25 0.5
Miles
0 500 1,000 2,000
Feet
1:13,120
Attachment 5
Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone
(VHFHSZ) Map
City and County boundaries as of 10/22/24 (CA Board of Equalization) CAL FIRE State Responsibility Areas (SRA25_1)
CAL FIRE Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZSRA23_3, FHSZLRA_25_1) Data Sources:

LOS ANGELES

LOS ANGELES
WEST

HOLLYWOOD
March 24, 2025
As Identified by the
State Fire Marshal
Local Responsibility Area
Fire Hazard Severity Zones
CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS – LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Very High High Moderate
Attachment 6
Street Functional Classification Map

W PICO BLVD
W 3RD ST

CASHIO ST

N DOHENY DR

MELROSE AV

LAKE DR

BEVERLY BLVD

N ORLANDO AV

SAN YSIDRO DR

BURTON WY

SUNSET PLAZA DR

S HOLT AV

COMSTOCK AV

HUNTLEY DR

N SAN VICENTE BLVD

ALDEN DR

HEATH AV

CENTURY PARK E

S WOOSTER ST

WHITWORTH DR

N LA CIENEGA BLVD

N CROFT AV

N BEVERLY DR

SANTA MONICA BLVD

ALVIRA ST

S BEVERLY GLEN BLVD

WESTBOURNE DR

LARRABEE ST

WILSHIRE BLVD

TOWER GROVE DR

SUMMITRIDGE DR

WONDERLAND AV

W OLYMPIC BLVD

FRANKL NI CANYON DR

S BEDFORD ST

BENECIA AV

PALM AV

S LA CIENEGA BLVD

CLUB VIEW DR

AVENUE OF THE STARS

QUEENS RD

LAKE FRANKLIN DR

HOLLOWAY DR

COLDWATER CANYON DR

RISING GLEN RD

FOX HILLS DR

WARNALL AV
W 4TH ST

WESTMOUNT DR

LITTLE SANTA MONICA BLVD

WEST KNOLL DR

BLUE JAY WY

ASHCROFT AV

S ALFRED ST

SCHUYLER RD

ALCOTT ST

N ROBERTSON BLVD

RANGELY AV

APPIAN WY

S LA JOLLA AV

ROXBURY DR

ROSEWOOD AV N ALFRED ST

S SHERBOURNE DR

OLIVE DR

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AV

S SHENANDOAH ST

WARING AV

HILLCREST DR

KIRKWOOD DR

HOLMBY AV

HOLLYWOOD BLVD

LAUREL WY

BEVERW LI DR

CENTURY PARK W

S CORNING ST

S SAN VICENTE BLVD

RIDPATH DR

S BEVERLY DR

S DOHENY DR

EDRIS DR

FOUNTAIN AV

THAYER AV

DORRINGTON AV

STANLEY HILLS DR

WALNUT DR

BRIER DR
W 5TH ST

OAKWOOD AV

DREXEL AV

S ORLANDO AV

HASTAIN FIRE RD

HILLDALE AV

ENSLEY AV

COLGATE AV

GALAXY WY

S SWEETZER AV

HOLT AV

YUCCA TR

LIVONIA AV

DICKS ST

KEITH AV

CHEROKEE LN

LLOYD PL

TOWER RD
W 1ST ST

NORMA PL

N FLORES ST

REEVES ST

BLACKBURN AV

MILLER DR

HAMMOND ST

CARDIFF AV

ROMAINE ST
KEW DR

BEVERLY PARK

S CREST DR

SCHUMACHER DR

FLICKER WY

N WETHERLY DR

ROBIN DR

N CLARK ST

GILCREST DR

WILLOUGHBY AV

FRANKL NI AV

PHYLLIS ST

PICO BLVD

HANCOCK AV

MORELAND DR

EASTBORNE AV

THRASHER AV

MISSISSIPPI AV RIDGEMONT DR

SIERRAALTA WY

S CAMDEN DR

MOORE DR

GRAND VIEW DR

DOHENY RD

REXFORD DR

UTICA DR

S ROBERTSON BLVD

SUMMIT DR

MARMONT AV

LA COLLINA DR

CORDELL DR

CONSTELLATION BLVD

DANIELS DR

HORN AV

CLINTON AV

VIDOR DR

GLENVILLE DR

KINGLET DR

N K NI GS RD

S CANFIELD AV

DEVON AV

W SUNSET BLVD

BOWMONT DR

S WILLAMAN DR

S PECK DR

S SWALL DR

S CLARK DR

COLE CREST DR

CRESTWICK DR

S LA PEER DR

DAVIES WY

PANDORA AV

S OAKHURST DR

NORWICH DR

CALVIN AV

SAN CIR

S ALMONT DR

LADERA DR

BELFAST DR

BEVERLY

FAIRBURN AV

VIEWMONT DR

LANIA LN KERWOOD AV

SAINT IVES DR

S ARNAZ DR

MELROSE PL

S CASTELLO AV

CRESCENT DR

S BEDFORD DR

DELRESTO DR

HEATHER RD

LE DOUX RD ALTA LOMA RD

FERRARI DR

ANGELO DR

LA GRANGE AV

WILLEY LN

ROCHESTER AV

ELUSIVE DR

BETTY LN

EVANVIEW DR

AS/MELROSE AV

TULIS DR

RUGBY DR

AW R/ OBERTSON BL

CLARIDGE DR

S WETHERLY DR S DURANGO AV

NIGHTINGALE DR

EMPYREAN WY

OZETA TER

ASHTON AV

SATURN ST

LLOYDCREST DR

BEECH KNOLL RD

DAWNR DI GE DR

BONNER DR

MISSOURI AV

MOUNTCREST AV

MONOVALE DR

TOWER LN

BEVERLY PL

N CLARK DR

KIMRIDGE RD

CYPREAN DR

SWALLOW DR

VIREO DR

ORIOLE LN

HEDGES WY

WYNDHAM RD

LOMA VISTA DR

ORIOLE WY

HOLMAN AV

WILKINS AV WOODRUFF AV

SUNSET CREST DR

S ROXBURY DR

CORY AV

BRAERIDGE DR

CARLTON WY OLYMPIC PL

HASLAM TER

DUNKIRK AV

COLDWATER CANYON BRIDLE PTH

GRACIE ALLEN DR

SMITHWOOD DR

NELLAS ST

CRISLER WY

AW/DOHENY DR

S SANTA MONICA BLVD

JANICE PL

S CROFT AV

LA CIENEGA BLVD

PEERLESS PL

MCKIM CT

ROYALTON DR

NASH DR

CORDELL MEWS

EMPYREAN

S LE DOUX RD

S RODEO DR

STANLEY HILLS PL

ROSILLA PL

LINNINGTON AV

S HAMEL RD

REMBERT LN

WETHERLY DR

BETH PL

LEANDER PL

FOREST KNOLL DR

SIERRA MAR PL

VADO DR

MEREDITH PL

PEG PL LAWLEN WY

AS/STA MONICA BL

MARISCAL LN

BLUEBIRD AV

TANAGER WY

VERONA AV

CERROCREST DR

FENNELL PL

HILLGREEN DR

PEAVINE DR

DALEGROVE DR

WARBLER PL

MILLER WY

DEVLIN PL

STEBBINS TER

FLICKER PL

NASH DR

W SUNSET BLVD

N BEVERLY DR

S CASTELLO AV

ROCHESTER AV

WEST KNOLL DR

CLINTON AV

EDRIS DR

CRESCENT DR

W OLYMPIC BLVD

N FLORES ST

N KINGS RD

BURTON WY

N KINGS RD

ROSEWOOD AV

N KINGS R
N
D

DOHENY DR

HOLT AV

S CLARK DR

S LA PEER DR

HILLDALE AV

S DOHENY DR

S WETHERLY DR

S SAN VICENTE BLVD

S HOLT AV

S BEDFORD ST

S ORLANDO AV

HEATHER RD

S LA C EI NEGA BLVD

N ALFRED ST

S CREST DR

S SHERBOURNE DR

S SWALL DR

WILSHIRE BLVD

ELEVADO AV

SUNSET BLVD

N BEVERLY DR

LOMITAS AV
LO
M

A VISTA DR

CLIFTON WY

CARMELITA AV

N CANON DR

N REXFORD DR

N CRESCENT DR

CHARLEVILLE BLVD

N ALPINE DR

N RODEO DR

N ROXBURY DR

W OLYMPIC BLVD
N
ELM
DR

N CAMDEN DR

CARLA RDGE

DAYTON WY

WHITTIER
DR

N BEDFORD DR

N FOOTHILL RD

S ELM DR
N
PALM
DR

S PECK DR

N ALTA DR

S PALM DR
N

MAPLE DR

SUMMIT DR

N LINDEN DR

LEXINGTON RD

DOHENY RD

S RODEO DR

S SWALL DR

S MAPLE DR

S CLARK DR

N ARDEN DR

S SPALDING DR

S CANON DR

N SIERRA DR

LAUREL WY

S CAMDEN DR

S ALMONT DR

S DOHENY DR
W 3RD ST

S LA PEER DR

TOWER RD

WALDEN DR

S BEDFORD DR

S REXFORD DR

S ROXBURY DR

BENEDICT CANYON DR

GREGORY WY

S CRESCENT DR

S WETHERLY DR

S EL CAMINO DR

S OAKHURST DR

S LINDEN DR

S REEVES DR

BURTON WY

S ROBERTSON BLVD

SCHUYLER
RD

S MCCARTY DR COLDWATER CANYON DR

S BEVERLY DR

ALDEN DR

MORENO DR

HARTFORD WY

N SWALL DR

N CLARK DR

N HILLCREST RD

N OAKHURST DR

WALLACE RDGE

N DOHENY DR

PARK WY

ANGELO DR
COVE
WY

CINTHIA ST

BEVERLY BLVD

CIVIC CENTER DR

FOOTH LI L RD

TRENTON DR

WOODLAND
DR

S LA C EI NEGA BLVD

MARILYN DR

ARKELL DR

N LE DOUX RD

N HAM LI TON DR

ROBERT LN

GREENWAY
DR

N STANLEY DR

S GALE DR

LAGO VISTA DR

N HAMEL DR

MOUNTAIN DR

SANTA MONICA BLVD

N ARNAZ DR

CASTLE PL

N W LI LAMAN DR

VIRGINIA PL

MONTE CIELO
DR

S SHIRLEY PL

TROUSDALE PL

DABNEY LN

MARTIN LN

N ROBERTSON BLVD

COPLEY PL

ENDRINO PL

LASKY DR
WALKER
DR

VICK PL

CARLA LN

BURK PL

WHITWORTH DR

N PALM DR

BURTON WY

N REXFORD DR

N OAKHURST DR

GREGORY WY

N HILLCREST RD

N MAPLE DR

N ELM DR
Ü
Street Functional
Classification
0 0.5
Miles
West Hollywood
Los Angeles
Legend
Street Functional Classification
Principal Arterial
Minor Arterial
Major Collector
3/2021
This map is for informational purposes. The City of Beverly Hills makes no representations or warranties of any kind with respect to the accuracy of the information or data furnished herein.

Visit www.beverlyhills.org/municode for the latest information.

Attachment 7
General Plan Goals and Policies

GENERAL PLAN GOALS AND POLICIES
The General Plan goals and policies with which the ordinance are consistent are described further below:

Land Use Element
• Land Use (LU) Goal 2 - Community Character and Quality. A built environment that is distinguished by its high level of site planning, architecture, landscape design, and sensitivity to its natural setting and history.
• LU Policy 2.1 - City Places: Neighborhoods, Districts, and Corridors. Maintain and enhance the character, distribution, built form, scale, and aesthetic qualities of the City’s distinctive residential neighborhoods, business districts, corridors, and open spaces. • LU Policy 5.1 - Neighborhood Conservation. Maintain the uses, densities, character, amenities, and quality of the City’s residential neighborhoods, recognizing their contribution to the City’s identity, economic value, and quality of life. • LU Policy 5.7 - Neighborhood Transitions. Regulate the setback, rear elevation design of buildings, and landscaping of backyards where neighborhoods of differing housing type and density abut to assure smooth transitions in scale, form, and character. • LU Goal 6 - Single-Family Residential Neighborhoods. Maintenance of the identity, scale, and character of the distinct single-family residential neighborhoods. • LU Policy 6.1 - Neighborhood Identity. Maintain the characteristics that distinguish the City’s single-family neighborhoods from one another in such terms as topography, lot size, housing scale and form, and public streetscapes.
• LU Policy 6.2 - Housing Character and Design. Require that new, renovated, and additions to housing to be located and designed to maintain the distinguishing characteristics and qualities of the neighborhoods in which they are located, including prevailing lot sizes, building form, scale, massing, relationship to street frontages, architectural design, landscaping, property setbacks, and other comparable elements.

Housing Element
Goal H1 – Maintenance and Conservation. Maintain and enhance the quality and character of existing housing and residential neighborhoods.

Attachment 8
Planning Wildfire Evacuation in the
Wildland–Urban Interfaces of Portugal
Citation: Nunes, A.N.; Pinto, C.D.;
Figueiredo, A.; Lourenço, L. Planning
Wildfire Evacuation in the Wildland–
Urban Interfaces of Central Portugal.

Fire 2024, 7, 199. https://doi.org/

10.3390/fire7060199
Academic Editors: Yuchun Zhang,
Wei Xie, Eric Lee and Tao Li
Received: 6 May 2024
Revised: 10 June 2024
Accepted: 11 June 2024
Published: 14 June 2024
Copyright: © 2024 by the authors.

Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/

4.0/). fire
Article
Planning Wildfire Evacuation in the Wildland–Urban Interfaces of Central Portugal
Adélia N. Nunes 1,2,* , Carlos D. Pinto 1
, Albano Figueiredo 1,2 and Luciano Lourenço 1,2
1 Department of Geography and Tourism, NICIF—Centre of Scientific Investigation for Forest Fires, University of Coimbra, 3000-214 Coimbra, Portugal; [email protected] (C.D.P.); [email protected] (A.F.); [email protected] (L.L.)
2 CEGOT—Centre for Studies in Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Coimbra, 3004-530 Coimbra, Portugal
* Correspondence: [email protected]
Abstract: In recent decades, wildfires have become common disasters that threaten people’s lives and assets, particularly in wildland–urban interfaces (WUIs). Developing an effective evacuation strategy for a WUI presents challenges to emergency planners because of the spatial variations in biophysical hazards and social vulnerability. The aim of this study was to map priority WUIs in terms of evacuation. The factors considered were the seriousness of the risk of wildfire exposure, and the population centres whose greatest constraints on the evacuation process stemmed from the nature of the exposed population and the time required to travel to the nearest shelter/refuge. An integrated framework linking wildfire hazard, social vulnerability, and the time taken to travel by foot or by car to the nearest refuge/shelter was applied. The study area includes two municipalities (Lousã and Sertã) in the mountainous areas of central Portugal that are in high-wildfire-risk areas and have very vulnerable and scattered pockets of exposed population. The combination of wildfire risk and travelling time to the nearest shelters made it possible to identify 20% of the WUIs that were priority areas for evacuation in the case of Sertã. In the case of Lousã, 3.4% were identified, because they were highly exposed to wildfire risk and had a travelling time to the nearest shelter of more than 15 min on foot. These results can assist in designing effective pre-fire planning, based on fuel management strategies and/or managing an effective and safe evacuation.

Keywords: wildfire risk; evacuation; hazard; vulnerability; Central Portugal

1. Introduction
In recent decades, researchers have observed an increasing trend in the destructiveness of wildfires around the world [1–3]. Humanity and fire have always coexisted, but the ability to manage fire has not been achieved and could become increasingly complex due to climate change [1,4]. Furthermore, it is expected that wildfire risk will become much more common in areas that are not currently classified as prone [5].

Moreover, when wildfire enters wildland–urban interfaces (WUI) areas, where human development meets or intermingles with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels [6] that are both fire-dependent and fire-prone, the effects on communities can be catastrophic, causing environmental and socioeconomic devastation. In the recent past, major forest fires all over the world have resulted in the loss of human life and have forced people to evacuate. In 2009 in Australia, for example, there were 173 deaths, and, in 2014 in Sweden (the Vastmanland Fire), around 1000 people were forced to evacuate, with one death recorded. In Portugal, in 2003, 2005, and 2017 (June and October), there were 21, 16, and 116 fatalities, respectively, while in 2017/18 in California, 44 deaths were recorded. In Greece (Mati) in 2018, dozens of people were surprised by fire inside their homes and cars, resulting in around 100 deaths and 187 injured [7–11].

Fire 2024, 7, 199. https://doi.org/10.3390/fire7060199 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/fire Fire 2024, 7, 199 2 of 17
Multiple investigations into deaths and injuries caused by fires around the world show that more than two thirds of those injured and more than half of those killed could have been evacuated [12–14]. Despite the intrinsic characteristics of combustion, which make it difficult to evacuate due to smoke, incandescent particles, and flames [15], several professionals linked to the subject argue that the safest action residents can take when faced with the threat of a forest fire is to evacuate [16,17]. Thus, when faced with the threat of a wildfire, evacuation is mandatory in the USA and Canada [18]. In Greece, after the Mati fire in 2018, early evacuation was favoured, as was evident during the recent 2021 fire season [19].

However, an evacuation exercise may not be the most appropriate response, especially in places with poor accessibility or in biophysical settings that trigger the rapid movement of flames [20,21]. There are also some complexities associated with evacuation: notification, timing, evacuating pets and evacuating individuals who refuse to leave or who delay leaving [22]. In addition, since evacuation is a contingency exercise, there are always associated risks. The work in [23], which analysed fatalities in Australia in the period 1900–2008, showed, for example, that 32% of fatalities occurred during late evacuations, while only 8% occurred when people remained sheltered in a property that could be protected. Looking at the economic aspect, too, post-fire studies have shown, for example, that a significant percentage of homes are destroyed by falling incandescent particles/embers before or after the fire front passes close to or through the structure, something that could be avoided by people remaining in their homes [24,25].

In this context, there are other alternatives to evacuation, such as the stay and defend strategy used in North America and Australia, for instance [26]. Another alternative is to shelter in place in a specific location, which can be a dwelling or a common area, defined in advance [27]. Evacuation is always complex [28,29], prompting numerous studies on the subject through evacuation simulations [30,31], fire progression and evacuation simulations [32], and models that make it possible to identify a threshold around communities.

Once this threshold is breached by the fire, communities should be triggered for evacuation [33,34]. To this end, various software programs have been developed to work with evacuation at different scales and with different possibilities [35]. However, these models typically lack detailed features that account for the interaction between wildfire behaviour and the evacuation behaviour of WUI residents. In fact, factors such as age, sex, culture, race, impairments, occupation type (whether residents or tourists), and income influence each evacuee’s decision-making process and should be considered. Moreover, proximity to wildfire hazards significantly impacts evacuees’ decision and behaviour [35].

In Portugal, evacuation plans are at an early stage. Rodrigues et al. [36], in an investigation into the Pedrogão fire in 2017, wherein 66 people died, found that 65% of deaths were linked with leaving the site (fleeing/evacuating) without orders or information from the authorities. The author adds that the safety of communities, particularly in the WUIs, depends on risk assessment, planning, and qualified emergency management [36]. This is in line with Thompson et al. [37] and North et al. [38], who state that improving the safety and effectiveness of response to fire requires a multi-faceted approach, i.e., an effective response requires effective pre-fire planning. The work by Oliveira et al. [39], carried out in a Portuguese mountain parish with a very significant history of fires and an elderly population, concluded that knowing the level of risk of each village and the time needed to reach a safe spot by different routes can help define priorities for emergency intervention.

It also states that this information is essential to establish safety and evacuation protocols adapted to each village.

Thus, identifying the areas with the most vulnerable inhabitants, especially from the point of view of evacuation, and cross-referencing them with the territory’s biophysical favourability to the progression of fires, seems to be a necessary exercise that can produce effective results in terms of risk assessment and evacuation planning. Taking the above perspectives into consideration, the main objective of this study was to identify priority WUIs in terms of evacuation in two municipalities in Portugal (Lousã and Sertã), located Fire 2024, 7, 199 3 of 17
in the central mountain range, notable for repeated forest fires. To achieve this objective, the following steps were undertaken: (i) the hazard level of and social vulnerability to forest fires, by combining biophysical and sociodemographic variables to support the evacuation decision, were assessed; (ii) evacuation times in two scenarios, namely walking to nearby shelters/refuges and driving to large shelters, were modelled; and (iii) high and very high fire risk classes at WUI scale and highest evacuation times were correlated.

The final goal was to produce maps that identify the WUIs with high and very high wildfire vulnerability, i.e., where communities and assets are more liable to damage in a wildfire scenario. This information can both influence the decision to evacuate or not by the organisations responsible for managing the national emergency system, and also result in a safer and well-timed community response. Moreover, it allows fire risk mitigation measures to be designed that can reduce the danger to people and their exposure to the need to evacuate in the context of a forest fire.

2. Study Area
Located in the central region of Portugal, the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã are characterised by being extremely suitable for forest growth, their hilly terrain, high ageing indices (around a third of the total population), strong population variation, high recurrence of forest fires, and past episodes where deaths, injuries, and evacuations were recorded.

Sertã and Lousã have very different areas, 446.7 km2 and 138.4 km2, respectively, with the respective WUI boundaries being 942.64 km and 341.77 km (Figure 1). Around half of the municipality of Lousã has a slope of more than 20◦ and only 27% has a slope of less than 10◦. In the case of Sertã, there is a very similar proportion between the classes (<5; 5–10; 10–15; 15–20; and >20◦) of around 20% in each.

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both cases, the worst affected areas are associated with higher altitudes, steeper slopes and unbroken forest cover.

Figure 1. Location, elevation, and wildland–urban interfaces (WUIs) of the municipalities of Lous and Sertã.

Figure 1. Location, elevation, and wildland–urban interfaces (WUIs) of the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

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According to the 2021 census [40], 17,006 and 14,769 people lived in the Lousã and Sertã municipalities, respectively, with a population density of 123 inhabitants/km2in Lousã and 33 inhabitants/km2in Sertã. Between 1950 and 2021, the two municipalities showed very different population variations; Lousã increased its population by 10% and Sertã showed a decrease of around 48%. In both municipalities, more than 70% of their territory is occupied by forests, with coniferous forests predominating, although eucalyptus and invasive species also feature significantly (Table 1).

Table 1. Land use and occupation in the municipalities of Sertã and Lousã in 1995 and 2018.

Land Use and Occupation Classes
Sertã Lousã
1995 2018 1995 2018
km2 % km2 % km2 % km2 %
Artificialized land 11.18 2.50 14.64 3.28 6.22 4.50 9.25 6.68 Agricultural areas 30.36 6.80 56.89 12.74 9.69 7.00 16.76 12.11 Pastures and agroforestry areas 33.09 7.41 1.60 0.36 9.74 7.04 0.35 0.25 Woodlands and open spaces 9.97 2.23 33.09 7.41 14.24 10.29 6.78 4.90 Oak, hardwood and chestnut forests 5.41 1.21 6.30 1.41 22.51 16.26 18.41 13.30 Eucalyptus forests and invasive species 55.60 12.45 111.30 24.91 22.22 16.05 31.37 22.67 Coniferous forests 291.29 65.21 214.63 48.05 53.38 38.57 54.79 39.59 Wetlands 9.82 2.20 8.27 1.85 0.40 0.29 0.68 0.49
Data source: Land Use and Occupation Maps for 1995 and 2018, Directorate-General for Territory.

Both municipalities have a history of recurrent fires (Figure 2). Thus, between 1980 and 2020, Sertã recorded more than 100,000 hectares burnt and Lousã recorded 63,200 hectares burnt [41]. In Lousã, several areas have been ravaged by fire four or five times, while, in Sertã, around 44% of its territory has been ravaged by fire two or three times. In both cases, the worst affected areas are associated with higher altitudes, steeper slopes, and unbroken forest cover.

In view of the significant burnt area, all the parishes in the two municipalities under study were identified as priorities in accordance with Despacho [Order] 3780/2023 of 24 March, which identifies the priority parishes for the purposes of monitoring fuel management in 2023.

Also, after the disastrous year of 2017, in terms of forest fires, the Portuguese government prioritised boosting the safety of the residents, creating the ‘Safe Village’ and ‘Safe People’ programmes. The first programme aims to establish ‘structural measures to protect people, property, and buildings at the urban–forest interface, whilst the second aims to promote ‘awareness-raising actions for the prevention of risky behaviour, self-protection measures and evacuation plan drills, in conjunction with local authorities’ [42].

The programme’s online site (https://aldeiasseguras.pt/, accessed on 10 May 2022) shows that there are 17 ‘Safe Villages’ in the two municipalities as a whole. Sixteen are in the municipality of Lousã and just one is in the municipality of Sertã (Figure 3). Even though the 16 villages in the municipality of Lousã have signed up to the programme, none of them has an evacuation plan, no drills have been carried out, and no places of shelter or refuge have been identified. There is only a reference to the existence of a Local Safety Officer. In the case of the municipality of Sertã, specifically the village of Trízio, the following actions are stipulated: collective shelter, collective refuge, safety officer, and evacuation plan.

However, both municipalities have identified in their respective Municipal Civil Protection Emergency Plans (PMEPC) places that can accommodate people in the event of an evacuation. In the case of Sertã, the document dates from 2012 [43] and identifies 66 sites, classified into two types: temporary shelters and local concentration zones. Temporary shelters are only referenced for primary evacuations, i.e., the removal of the inhabitants from risk areas to a place of safety, followed by the second phase of evacuation, i.e., travelling to shelter facilities, where all basic needs can be met. In the case of Lousã, the Fire 2024, 7, 199 5 of 17
PMEPC [44] identifies 12 sites. Although no typology is specified, all the sites are large and capable of sheltering a significant number of people. The final selection of these sites basically involves schools, day centres, parish councils, pavilions, and sports centres, i.e., fixed structures that are well known to the population.

Figure 1. Location, elevation, and wildland–urban interfaces (WUIs) of the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

Figure 2. Recurrence of forest fires (1975 and 2020). (Data source: Portuguese National Authority for Nature Conservation, 2021).

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Figure 2. Recurrence of forest fires (1975 and 2020). (Data source: Portuguese National Authority for Nature Conservation, 2021).

Figure 3. Location of ‘safe villages’, refuges, and shelters.

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3. Methodology
With the aim of mapping priority WUIs to be evacuated in a wildfire scenario, an integrated framework was applied based on the following components: wildfire hazard, social vulnerability, and wildfire risk assessment, in support of evacuation and modelling the travel time—either on foot or by car—to the nearest refuge or shelter. Figure 4 shows the integration of these components.

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Figure 4. Implementation flow chart components to map priority WUIs for evacuation [45–48].

3.1. Wildfire Risk Assessment in Support of Evacuation
The methodological proposal was adapted from the work of Chakraborty et al. [46], applied to evacuation in the context of hurricanes in the Florida region. This methodology is applied to the risk of forest fire in support of evacuation because these two risks have some similarities, identified by Folk et al. [49] and Intini et al. [38], including, (i) the problem of predicting the direction of travel, (ii) the ability to displace a large number of people, and (iii) a change in direction without warning. In addition to these issues, in an evacuation situation for either of these risks, an early warning allows people to leave by driving vehicles [50]. The original methodology of the work by Chakraborty et al. [46] is based on the following steps: (i) assessing the hazard, (ii) assessing the social vulnerability for evacuation support (SVES), and (iii) assessing the degree of support needed for evacuation resulting from the hazard x social vulnerability for evacuation support.

3.1.1. Wildfire Hazard
The hazard assessment was based on the methodology used in the work by Nunes et al. [45] and involved the following steps: (i) assessing susceptibility, using the slope, altitude, and land use and occupation variables, (ii) calculating probability based on the areas burnt between 1975 and 2020, and (iii) calculating hazard by multiplying susceptibility by probability. The validation process was supported by the ArcSDM toolbox, ArcGIS 10, which helped calculate the AUC (area under the curve). This assessment summarises the ROC (receiver operating characteristics) curve into a value that basically measures the quality of the model’s forecasts, i.e., if the model’s forecasts were 100% correct, the AUC value would be 1. The results indicate that the model performed well, with an AUC of over 0.80.

Figure 4. Implementation flow chart components to map priority WUIs for evacuation [45–48].

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3.1.2. Social Vulnerability for Evacuation Support (SVES) The data used in the SVES assessment were taken from the Geographic Base for Referencing Information (BGRI), relating to the year 2011. The limited list of data for the year 2021 meant that more recent census information could not be used. A total of nine variables were selected. They are subdivided into three important characteristics of the population from an evacuation standpoint, identified in the work by Chakraborty et al. [46] as the following: (i) population and structure, (ii) differential access to resources, and (iii) population with special needs for evacuation (Table 2).

Table 2. Variables included in the calculation of social vulnerability for evacuation support.

Approaches (APP) Statistical Subsection (BGRI2011)
(1) Population and structure Total number of residents
Classic buildings
(2) Differentiated access to resources
Residents who can neither read nor write
Residents who are pensioners
Residents with no economic activity
(3) People with special needs for evacuation
Residents between 0 and 4 years old
Residents over the age of 64
Classic detached buildings
Total number of institutionalised families
The procedure used by Chakraborty et al. [46] to calculate SVES consisted of adapting the procedure used by Cutter et al. [51]. In the present study, the Chakraborty et al. [46] approach was retained, and the assessment consists of the following three stages:
• Step 1: Calculate Ri. For each variable i determine the ratio of variable i to the total number registered in the municipality.
• Step 2: Standardisation for each variable, as follows:

Ri
Rmax
where Rmax = maximum value of the ratio calculated previously. • Step 3: Combining the multiple variables by calculating the arithmetic mean.

The author presents the final SVES as the result of combining the three above-mentioned approaches (population and structure, differentiated access to resources, and population with special needs for evacuation).

The Natural Breaks (Jenks) classifying method was used to prioritise wildfire risk (Hazard × SVES) into five categories, since the variance within each class is minimised while the variance between classes is maximised [48].

3.2. Modelling Travel Time to Refuges and Shelters
Two exercises were carried out for both municipalities under study, namely determining the time it takes to walk to identified shelters and refuges, and determining the time it takes to drive to larger shelters. As both municipalities have high rates of an ageing population (22.9% in Lousã and 31.1% in Sertã), we adopted the figures obtained by Rodrigues et al. [47] in real evacuation tests on foot in Cabanões, a village in the municipality of Lousã. Rodrigues et al. [47] identified the following average speeds: for individuals over 65 without mobility difficulties, 3.13 km/h uphill and 3.65 km/h downhill; for individuals over 65 with mobility difficulties, 2.24 km/h uphill and 2.47 km/h downhill; and for group evacuation, 2.5 km/h. The average speed in a group falls thanks to the support and mutual help given to people with difficulties. We therefore opted for the group average speed, i.e.,

2.5 km/h. The travelling time was assessed using the Network Analysis extension, with the Service Area tool in the ArcGis Pro 3.0 software [48].

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The exercise of travelling by car has a dynamic speed depending on the speed limits of the localities. The service area shows the road networks that can be reached within different times, in minutes from the assembly points, and have been applied in evacuation route planning in disaster-susceptible areas (disasters such as floods and tsunamis) [52,53]. These outputs were then cross-referenced with the urban–forest interfaces of the two municipalities to find the travel times between these contact areas and the refuges and shelters.

Finally, the travel times of the different WUIs were then cross-referenced with the fire risk maps to highlight the WUIs with a high or very high fire risk and travel times of more than 15 min.

4. Results

4.1. Spatial Variability in Wildfire Hazards
The results show the significant expression of the highest hazard classes in the municipalities under study. Sertã has almost 80% of its territory in the highest hazard classes (40.7% very high and 38.2% high), while, in Lousã, this figure is around 70%. In both municipalities, the lowest hazard classes coincide with the central area, where the larger settlements and lower slopes are located (Figure 5).

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The exercise of travelling by car has a dynamic speed depending on the speed limits of the localities. The service area shows the road networks that can be reached within different times, in minutes from the assembly points, and have been applied in evacuation route planning in disaster-susceptible areas (disasters such as floods and tsunamis) [52,53]. These outputs were then cross-referenced with the urban–forest interfaces of the two municipalities to find the travel times between these contact areas and the refuges and shelters.

Finally, the travel times of the different WUIs were then cross-referenced with the fire risk maps to highlight the WUIs with a high or very high fire risk and travel times of more than 15 min.

4. Results

Figure 5. Hazard results for forest fires in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

4.2. Spatial Distribution of Social Vulnerability
The results of assessing the social vulnerability components are shown in Figure 6.

In the case of Lousã, the results obtained through the APP1, APP2, and APP3 approaches show a concentration of the most vulnerable areas in the main population centre and settlements located in the north-east and north-west of the municipality. These coincide, respectively with the União de Freguesias [Union of Parishes] (UP) da Lousã e Vilarinho, and the parish of Gândaras.

Figure 5. Hazard results for forest fires in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

4.2. Spatial Distribution of Social Vulnerability
The results of assessing the social vulnerability components are shown in Figure 6.

Fire 2024, 7, 199 Fire 2024, 7, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 18 9 of 17 Figure 6. Social vulnerability to evacuation support (SVES) in the in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

In the case of Sertã, considering the three approaches, the highly vulnerable settlements are scattered throughout the territory. Consequently, it can be seen that the municipality of Sertã has a greater number of areas with high and very high vulnerability than the municipality of Lousã.

4.3. Wildfire Risk in Support of Evacuation
The fire risk maps show quite different results from the previous ones. In the case of the municipality of Lousã, its population centre, previously classified as very vulnerable, is now classified as “Very Low”, “Low”, and “Moderate” in terms of fire risk for evacuation support (Figure 7).

In the case of the municipality of Sertã, the localities in the eastern strip are very problematic, especially when all the approaches are combined (Figure 7). Compared to Lousã, the municipality of Sertã has a predominance of small settlements that are spread throughout the municipality, with a very high risk of fire.

Figure 6. Social vulnerability to evacuation support (SVES) in the in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

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Figure 7. Fire risk in support of evacuation in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

4.4. Travelling Time to the Nearest Refuge/Shelter
In the municipality of Lousã, around 70% of the WUIs are more than 20 minutes’ walk from the nearest refuge or shelter, while, in Sertã, the figure is slightly lower, at around 66.6% (Figure 8). If we analyse the results at a parish level, the situation is quite critical in all the parishes in the municipality of Lousã, because between 66 and 72% of their WUIs are more than 20 min away on foot. In the case of Sertã, the most problematic Figure 7. Fire risk in support of evacuation in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

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In the case of the municipality of Sertã, the localities in the eastern strip are very problematic, especially when all the approaches are combined (Figure 7). Compared to Lousã, the municipality of Sertã has a predominance of small settlements that are spread throughout the municipality, with a very high risk of fire.

66.6% (Figure 8). If we analyse the results at a parish level, the situation is quite critical in all the parishes in the municipality of Lousã, because between 66 and 72% of their WUIs are more than 20 min away on foot. In the case of Sertã, the most problematic parishes are Pedrogão Pequeno, Cabeçudo, Troviscal, and the UF of Cumeada and Marmeleiro, with figures of over 70%.

Figure 7. Fire risk in support of evacuation in the municipalities of Lousã and Sertã.

4.4. Travelling Time to the Nearest Refuge/Shelter
In the municipality of Lousã, around 70% of the WUIs are more than 20 minutes’ walk from the nearest refuge or shelter, while, in Sertã, the figure is slightly lower, at around 66.6% (Figure 8). If we analyse the results at a parish level, the situation is quite critical in all the parishes in the municipality of Lousã, because between 66 and 72% of their WUIs are more than 20 min away on foot. In the case of Sertã, the most problematic parishes are Pedrogão Pequeno, Cabeçudo, Troviscal, and the UF of Cumeada and Marmeleiro, with figures of over 70%.

Figure 8. Travel time on foot to the nearest refuge or shelter.

When it comes to travel time by car (Figure 9), the municipality of Lousã is generally more straightforward when it comes to travelling to shelters and refuges than Sertã. Almost 80% of Lousã’s WUIs are within a five-minute drive of a shelter. In Sertã, only 42% of the WUIs are in similar conditions, i.e., five minutes or less away from a shelter. Additionally, in Sertã, 36% of the WUIs are between 5 and 10 min from a shelter, 16% are between 10 and 15 min away, and 7% are more than 15 min away. In Lousã, 16% of the WUIs are between 5 and 10 min from a shelter and 3% of them are more than 25 min by car from a shelter.

In the UF of Ermida and Figueiredo, in the municipality of Sertã, around 60% of its WUIs require travelling for between 15 and 20 min by car to reach a shelter and 32% spend between 20 and 25 min on the journey. This is not the case in the municipality of Lousã, as all the parishes there assure residents that around 91% of WUIs are no more than 10 min travel by car from a shelter. The most worrying situation in the municipality of Lousã concerns the 5.1% of WUIs in the Lousã and Vilarinho parish union where it takes residents more than 25 min to reach the nearest shelter.

4.5. Correlating the Wildfire Risk with Evacuation Time The correlation between forest fire risk classes and evacuation times, especially the highest fire risk classes with the highest evacuation times on foot or by car (Figures 10 and 11), makes it possible to identify the priority interfaces in terms of evacuation. The results for Fire 2024, 7, 199 11 of 17
the two municipalities are quite different, since, in the case of Lousã, there are practically no WUIs more than 15 min’ walk from the shelter points (refuge or shelter) with a high or very high fire risk. In the case of Sertã, the situation is particularly critical in more than 20% of the municipality’s WUIs, which are characterised by a high or very high risk of fire and are located more than 15 min from the shelter points. These WUIs are predominantly located in the outlying areas of the municipality (Figure 10). When using a car to travel to the nearest shelter points, in the case of Lousã, all the WUIs with a high or very high risk are less than 15 min away, while in Sertã this figure is 3.4% (Figure 11).

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of the WUIs are in similar conditions, i.e., five minutes or less away from a shelter. Additionally, in Sertã, 36% of the WUIs are between 5 and 10 min from a shelter, 16% are between 10 and 15 min away, and 7% are more than 15 min away. In Lousã, 16% of the WUIs are between 5 and 10 min from a shelter and 3% of them are more than 25 min by car from a shelter.

Figure 9. Travel time by the nearest refuge or shelter.

4.5. Correlating the Wildfire Risk with Evacuation Time The correlation between forest fire risk classes and evacuation times, especially the highest fire risk classes with the highest evacuation times on foot or by car (Figures 10 and 11), makes it possible to identify the priority interfaces in terms of evacuation. The results for the two municipalities are quite different, since, in the case of Lousã, there are practically no WUIs more than 15 minutes’ walk from the shelter points (refuge or shelter) with a high or very high fire risk. In the case of Sertã, the situation is particularly critical in more than 20% of the municipality’s WUIs, which are characterised by a high or very high risk of fire and are located more than 15 min from the shelter points. These WUIs are predominantly located in the outlying areas of the municipality (Figure 10). When using a car to travel to the nearest shelter points, in the case of Lousã, all the WUIs with a high or very high risk are less than 15 min away, while in Sertã this figure is 3.4% (Figure 11).

Figure 9. Travel time by the nearest refuge or shelter.

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Figure 10. Correlation between the highest forest fire risk classes and evacuation times on foot longer than 15 min.

Figure 10. Correlation between the highest forest fire risk classes and evacuation times on foot longer than 15 min.

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Figure 10. Correlation between the highest forest fire risk classes and evacuation times on foot longer than 15 min.

Figure 11. Correlation between the highest forest fire risk classes and evacuation times by car longer than 15 min.

5. Discussion
Over the past few decades, wildfires have impacted extensive regions of Portugal, frequently damaging and threatening urban areas ranging from small rural villages to the outskirts of large towns and cities in central Portugal [54]. The most catastrophic, measured by the number of victims and material damage caused, occurred in 2017 (June and October). After these events, early evacuations began to take place more often in Portugal to prevent human causalities. The two municipalities studied are located in the extensive territory that Lourenço et al. [55] define as favourable to the cyclical progression of large forest fires, thanks to natural features such as orography and vegetation cover, but also Figure 11. Correlation between the highest forest fire risk classes and evacuation times by car longer than 15 min.

After these events, early evacuations began to take place more often in Portugal to prevent human causalities. The two municipalities studied are located in the extensive territory that Lourenço et al. [55] define as favourable to the cyclical progression of large forest fires, thanks to natural features such as orography and vegetation cover, but also due to human influence. In the central region, these areas include the more mountainous and inland areas [48,56]. Because of the topographical conditions, the type of occupation, which is predominantly forest/woodland, and sociodemographic characteristics, the cases studied belong to the group of municipalities with the highest hazard [48] as well as vulnerability to wildfires [56].

When the preponderance of coniferous and eucalyptus forests with high combustibility and flammability [57] is combined with steep slopes, the rapid progression of flames is assured. A number of authors confirm that areas occupied by coniferous forests and scrubland are the most prone to fire [45,58,59] compared to other uses of the land, notably agricultural. In fact, the very low and low wildfire hazard classes are dominant where agriculture is the most widespread land use. The less fire-proneness of agricultural areas has been recognised in several works in different geographical areas [45,58–61] where farmland around isolated houses and villages can act as a buffer zone against wildfires.

This only fails in the case of extreme wildfire events when fire selectivity in specific land cover types is drastically reduced [62,63]. Various studies have shown that wildfire hazard can be changed by interventions based on fuel management at the landscape scale to reduce the probability that a wildfire would reach a given settlement [64,65].

Analysing this variable in isolation in the context of evacuation planning makes it possible to prioritise intervention areas with specific biophysical conditions, although the population to be evacuated is a determining component to be considered in conjunction with hazard [46]. Thus, when the hazard is cross-referenced with the SVES, resulting in the forest fire risk, it is possible to identify the most critical zones in terms of evacuation. The Fire 2024, 7, 199 13 of 17
combination of high hazard classes and high social vulnerability, plus the greater dispersion of population centres in its territory, means that Sertã has a greater preponderance of high and very high fire risk classes than Lousã. In the case of Lousã, the combination of these two single dimensions has tended to attenuate the level of risk, with one component counterbalancing the other. The results are in line with those reported in Oliveira et al. [39].

These state that settlements with more exposure to hazard do not necessarily have the highest social vulnerability, in a parish located near the Lousã municipality. For most villages, they found that the aggregation of these two components tend to decrease the level of fire risk.

On the other hand, when we look at the time it takes to walk to the nearest shelters, we see that the situation is almost the same for the two municipalities, with around 70% of the WUIs more than 20 min from the shelter. When travelling by car, Lousã has better results than Sertã. However, when travel times are correlated with the degree of fire risk, Sertã shows very significant weaknesses, as more than 20% of its WUIs are characterised by a high fire risk and are more than 15 min from the shelter/refuge sites. The combination of high fire hazard classification and a very elderly population (higher than 30%), together with the greater dispersion of the population, explain the high number of WUIs in critical situations in terms of evacuation.

Many studies have shown that older people are particularly vulnerable during the evacuation process, noting the importance of considering the elderly when planning for evacuation [66,67], the physical difficulties that they may have with evacuation, especially without social support [68–70], and the community-level support. Also, several studies indicate that significant numbers of people delay evacuation during a wildfire event, which often increases evacuation danger [15]. Tedim [71] also points out that people often resist or choose to stay in their homes in an attempt to defend their property. This behaviour is associated with low levels of preparedness both for defending the home and for evacuation, which can heighten the risk to life and loss of property [72]. Many individuals will prefer to wait and assess the development of the fire while carrying out measures to protect their homes and property rather than evacuating immediately [73]. In this context, Melton et al. [74] note that the ways people in general and the more elderly in particular respond to or are impacted by wildfires are still relatively new and need further development and exploration to better learn from and support this population in the face of worsening wildfire disasters.

Portugal does not have a compulsory evacuation system and so the efficiency of this strategy depends on the willingness of the residents and the capacity of the authorities.

Furthermore, in the municipality of Sertã only one “Aldeia Segura” was identified and in the “Aldeias Seguras” of Lousã there were no evacuation plans. In addition, there is no explicit reference to places of shelter or refuge, even though they are identified in the PMEPCs. These findings are in line with the results obtained by Vaqueiro [75], who stated that of the total of 2057 settlements that had signed up to the “Safe Village” programme at the time, only 172 had a set of planned actions, stating that only these could be considered “safe villages”. The results of Tedim et al. [76] further reinforce these difficulties; in a questionnaire applied to 139 municipalities that had joined the programme, 91% reported constraints in its implementation.

In this context, taking into account the level of risk of each WUI, it is urgent to set priorities for emergency intervention, as well as to establish safety and evacuation protocols suited to each village. Moreover, considering that more and more catastrophic wildfires will occur with climate change, institutional and suppression capacities will probably be overridden [77–79]. For these reasons, fire management approaches must include strategies to mitigate the wildfire hazard and improve community preparedness and people’s coping capacity, tailored to their needs and abilities, and so enable a suitable adaptation to fireprone environments.

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6. Conclusions
The main focus of this study was to map the urban–forest interfaces that are exposed to the worst wildfire risk, while at the same time identifying the population centres with the greatest constraints on the evacuation process. These could be due to the nature of the population exposed and the time it takes to reach the nearest shelter/refuge. The lack of integration of biophysical hazards, social factors in community vulnerability, and the evacuation time analysis proved to be a gap in the evacuation process planning in Portugal.

The key research findings are based on two case studies. They have shown that risk levels depend on different combinations of hazard and vulnerability. The intersection of the fire risk as time taken to travel to the nearest refuge made it possible to identify the WUIs that need to be prioritised with respect to protection and emergency actions on a local scale. The maps obtained at WUI scale, which is an innovative approach in wildfire risk management in Portugal, might be a useful tool since they can assist in designing suitable prevention measures and improving the effectiveness of fire prevention. This approach can also provide support for environmental and civil protection policies, such as the allocation of firefighting resources, and enhance the development of evacuation and safety strategies suited to each local context. This methodological approach also can be applied successfully to map priority WUIs in terms of evacuation in different Portuguese settings, particularly in rural areas in the mountainous and inland areas of Portugal, which are dominated by small, scattered villages with ageing populations.

However, future research must aim at a better understanding of the integration of strategies focused on community preparedness and people’s coping capacity, according to their needs and abilities, in the identified fire-prone environments. Understanding residents’ intended evacuation behaviours must also be an increasingly important component in the complex fire management approaches, as a way to ensure the safety of both firefighters and residents during fire events, which continue to grow in size and severity.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.N.N., A.F., C.D.P. and L.L.; methodology, A.N.N., A.F., C.D.P. and L.L.; software, A.F. and C.D.P.; formal analysis, A.N.N., A.F. and L.L.; writing—original draft preparation, A.N.N., A.F. and L.L.; visualization, A.F. and C.D.P. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) within the framework of the research project PCIF/AGT/0061/2019– EVACUARFLORESTA—Decisões e planos de evacuação em cenários de incêndio florestal, financed by the FCT through national funds. This research also received funding from the Centre for Studies in Geography and Spatial Planning (CEGOT), financed by national funds through the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), under the reference UIDB/04084/2020.

Data Availability Statement: Dataset available on request from the authors.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Attachment 9
Wildfire Risk Management in the Era of
Climate Change
Wildfire risk management in the era of climate change
Costas Emmanuel Synolakis a,* and Georgios Marios Karagiannis b a
Viterbi School of Engineering, University of Southern California, 3620 South Vermont Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA b
Resilience First, 16 Great Queen Street, Covent Garden, London WC2B 5AH, UK *To whom correspondence should be addressed: Email: [email protected] Edited By: Cristina Amon
Abstract
The August 8, 2023 Lahaina fire refocused attention on wildfires, public alerts, and emergency management. Wildfire risk is on the rise, precipitated through a combination of climate change, increased development in the wildland–urban interface (WUI), decades of unmitigated biomass accumulation in forests, and a long history of emphasis on fire suppression over hazard mitigation. Stemming the tide of wildfire death and destruction will involve bringing together diverse scientific disciplines into policy. Renewed emphasis is needed on emergency alerts and community evacuations. Land management strategies need to account for the impact of climate change and hazard mitigation on forest ecosystems. Here, we propose a long-term strategy consisting of integrating wildfire risk management in wider-scope forest land management policies and strategies, and we discuss new technologies and possible scientific breakthroughs.

Keywords: wildland fire risk, emergency management, climate adaptation, evacuation modeling, satellite fire observations Significance Statement
Here, we draw from research on wildland–urban interface (WUI) fires from forestry and climate science to emergency management and economics, and we summarize the complexity and offer recommendations for policy making. Its significance stems from the analysis of emergency response in recent deadly fires, and our integrated approach which brings together multiple, diverse disciplines to explore policy-related, strategic, and operational approaches for addressing wildland fire risk in the era of climate change.

Competing Interest: The authors declare no competing interest.

Received: November 21, 2023. Accepted: March 29, 2024
© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact reprints@oup.com for reprints and translation rights for reprints. All other permissions can be obtained through our RightsLink service via the Permissions link on the article page on our site—for further information please contact [email protected].

Introduction
Wildland fires have existed since the beginning of history, with Paleontological evidence suggesting that early forest fires started to spread about 383 million years ago (1). As humanity evolved, forest fires were allowed to burn, depending on the objectives of human settlers (2). For example, even with the advent of fire suppression capabilities in the late 19th century, fire control efforts in the United States focused around settlements, and those beyond were left to burn unabated (3).

Despite impressive advances in forestry, fire science and firefighting technologies, and the leaps in wildland firefighting capabilities compared to 200 years ago, wildfire deaths are on the rise. The early February 2024 wildfires in Valparaiso, Chile killed over 130 persons and were the deadliest natural disaster in the country since the 2010 Mw∼8.8 earthquake and tsunami (4) and occurred in what has been called a “megadrought” (5). The August 8, 2023 Maui fires resulted in the highest death toll in the United States since the 1918 Cloquet and Moose Lake fires, and they amount to the fifth deadliest incident on record nationwide (6). It has been argued that at least some of these casualties might have been prevented had there been evacuation orders or emergency alerts (7, 8). Less than two months after this catastrophe in Hawaii, the nationwide test of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a state-of-the-art capability which has served as a model for countries around the world, came as a stark reminder of the complexity of wildfire risk.

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine (9) point out that wildfire smoke can be transported over fairly long distances downwind and contaminate indoor and outdoor air, indoor surfaces, soil, and surface and even drinking water. Air pollution by plume transport is an insidious yet potent source of morbidity and mortality. In Europe alone, Kollanus et al. (10) estimated 1,080 premature deaths in 2008 from wildfireoriginated fine particles in the atmosphere, with southern and eastern Europe disproportionately affected. The 2018 Camp Fire (Butte County, CA) resulted in PM2.5 concentrations in downtown San Francisco, 240 miles away, peaking about six times higher than, and about double the US benchmark, for two weeks after the event (11). Chen et al. (12) found that fine particulate matter from wildfires was significantly associated with increased PNAS Nexus, 2024, 3, pgae151
https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae151
Advance access publication 7 May 2024
Perspective
cardiovascular and respiratory mortality at a global level, and estimated the associated death toll at 33,000, or approximately 0.6% of all deaths in 749 cities in 43 countries and regions, in 2000–2016.

The devastation caused by many wildfires does not come without nontrivial societal and political ramifications. Communities affected by wildfires face the trauma of death, injury, loss of livelihoods, damage to homes, and psychological effects.

Notwithstanding the provision of relief aid, more often than not, decision-makers face the outrage of their constituents for everything they didn’t do, for example, issuing alerts and evacuation orders. Electorates tend to punish incumbents for wildfire deaths and damage, so there is scapegoating and denial of responsibility by officials, which makes forensic analysis exceptionally difficult.

Wildfire risk lies in the confluence of climate change and development in the WUI. According to the NASEM (9) report, the WUI in the United States has expanded by 50% in the past 50 years, the fastest growing land use type, and another 10% increase is projected by 2030. Stemming the tide of wildfire death and destruction will involve bringing together diverse scientific disciplines into policy. Here, we will first review three fires to elucidate challenges posed, then we discuss how climate change is projected to increase fire activity, that is the frequency and intensity of fires.

We will explore how governments are responding, and we argue that improvements in fire suppression capabilities, although required in the short term, may be financially unsustainable in the long run.

Three catastrophic fires in the past five years
Lahaina, Maui, HI
On August 8, 2023, fires broke out in different parts of Maui, Hawaii. One of the fires destroyed the historic town of Lahaina and claimed 98 lives, becoming the deadliest US wildfire in more than a century.

Maui is no stranger to vegetation fires. However, on August 8, dry vegetation and strong descending winds climbed up to about 125 kilometers per hour and caused the fire to quickly spread out of control. Firefighting resources were stretched thin, responding to multiple incidents on the island. Lahaina was ravaged, and the majority of its about 1,800 buildings were completely burned. Some people sought refuge at sea, whereas others burned in their cars while trying to evacuate (7, 8).

As fires broke out, broadcast emergency messages and social media posts from the County of Maui provided updates, alerts, and evacuation calls for some areas but apparently not Lahaina, a densely populated area with limited escape routes. Confusing messaging and delayed evacuation alerts (if they even took place) did not help.

Looking at milestones in the timeline, around 3:30 PM, a major road was closed just north of Lahaina because of what appeared then as just a flare-up of an earlier fire. Maui County’s social media page didn’t announce the closure until 4:46 PM Evacuation orders for the entire area appear not to have been issued when the road was closed, or even soon thereafter. Maui officials claimed that text alerts were sent out, but that power and cellular disruptions prevented residents from receiving them. Some survivors have reported receiving no warning messages before the fire reached them, whereas at least one visitor reported receiving an emergency alert on their cellphone at 4:17 PM, 47 minutes after the road closure. Many local residents reported that they didn’t know the flames were approaching until the fire was nearby, and some said that they were informed by neighbors to evacuate.

By 5:19 PM the fire had reached the waterfront in Lahaina, and by 5:33 PM people were seeking shelter in the water.

All this is quite surprising. Not only was there a fire in Maui in 2018 with similar problematic issues, but Hawaii has one of the most sophisticated tsunami warning systems in the world, finetuned since 1946, when a 17-meter tsunami hit the islands in the aftermath of the 1946 Aleutian tsunami (13), claiming 159 lives. Sirens are an integral part of the islands’ warning capabilities, yet local authorities defended their decision not to activate them in this fire. Mechanical sirens, as in Hawaii’s All-Hazard Statewide Outdoor Warning Siren System produce a single tone, alerting people of an impending hazard, but provide no information about the nature of the hazard, its severity and, most importantly, protective action guidance. Note that the siren system is referred to as all-hazard, including wildfires, and claimed as the largest in the world.

To be effective, sirens need to be associated with a single clear protective action (14). In fact, Maui County had advised people that “[w]hen a siren tone is heard other than a scheduled test, tune into local Radio/TV/Cable stations for emergency information and instructions by official authorities. If you are in a lowlying area near the coastline; evacuate to high grounds, inland, or vertically to the 4th floor and higher of a concrete building”.

In other words, Maui residents were given incomplete information—the reference to evacuating to high ground is likely for tsunami emergencies, yet there is no reference in the instructions to tsunamis. This confusing messaging is exactly what emergency managers are taught to avoid yet, in the aftermath, local authorities claimed they couldn’t have done anything differently.

A High Wind Watch issued on August 6 spoke of gale-force winds from the northeast on Maui until the night of August 8, as Hurricane Dora passed south of the Hawaiian Islands. It was upgraded to a High Wind Warning for Maui on August 7, with forecasts of gale-force winds from the east. Fire danger in Hawaii is weather-dominated, as vegetation grows rapidly with subtropical rainfall extremes, and dries rapidly during drought periods (15).

On August 8, dry conditions on the island, strong easterly winds, and densely populated areas on the west coast of the island combined to create a dangerous situation. With hindsight, this combination may have fulfilled the criteria for issuing a warning of potential extreme fire behavior.

The Maui disaster triggered political backlash and legal battles.

State and national levels came under scrutiny over their handling of the situation. The Maui County Emergency Management
Administrator resigned in the weeks following the disaster.

Three months following the fire, the Governor announced the creation of a $150 million recovery fund to help those who were injured in the fires or lost family members if they waive their right to file associated legal claims. The fund is initially paid for by the State of Hawaii, Maui County, Hawaiian Electric, and Kamehameha Schools, all of which have been named in legal actions over the wildfires.

Mati, Greece
Emergency and civil defense managers in Hawaii should have known better. Five years earlier, almost to the day, on July 23, 2018, a fairly small brush fire claimed 104 lives in Mati, Greece.

Mati is a seaside community of about 5,000, approximately 30 km west of Athens, and a popular summer destination. On July 23, very strong winds descending from Mount Penteli at about 95 km/h (gusting to over 110 km/h) pushed the fire rapidly over dry vegetation, causing it to spread quickly, covering one-half mile in about half an hour from the nearest highway east of the town to the sea. In total, the fire took two hours to spread from 2 | PNAS Nexus, 2024, Vol. 3, No. 5
where it started to the nearest beach—there is security camera video that captured the ignition. About 1,200 buildings were destroyed by the fire.

People were burned in their cars as they attempted to flee, while hundreds of people escaped to nearby seaside cliffs, hiked down to the beach, and were evacuated hours later from the water. A large number of firefighting resources had already been committed to a major incident about 80 km to the east, leaving limited resources available for the Mati fire.

In Mati, there was no warning, and people self-evacuated when flames were hundreds of feet away or did so at the encouragement of neighbors. Some police officers and firefighters reportedly went door-to-door to urge people to evacuate, but the lack of evacuation planning led to a series of traffic management failures, including, in one case, leading evacuees back toward the fire. The government and civil defense denied responsibility and claimed they couldn’t have done anything differently, even with hindsight (16). Despite the rapid spread of the fire, our calculations using agent-based evacuation models showed that, with a proper evacuation plan and public warning, the area could have been evacuated in time.

Unlike Maui, the legal and political fallout of the Mati disaster had historic proportions. At first, there were ad hominem attacks against scientists who spoke out about the lack of evacuation orders as contributing to the high death toll. This is also what happened in several countries in the first months of the COVID pandemic—governments were shooting the messengers.

Eventually, however, the Alternate Minister for Citizen Protection, the Secretary General for Civil Protection, the Chief of the Hellenic Fire Service and the Chief of the Hellenic Police resigned. A series of negligence lawsuits were filed against the government by those who had lost loved ones and/or their homes. In addition, a four-year criminal investigation culminated with a trial which began on October 31, 2022, with twentyone senior elected and appointed officials facing felony charges. On April 29, 2024, six of the twentyone defendants were found guilty of negligent homicide. Some have argued that the handling of the aftermath of this fire led to the government losing national elections a year later.

The new government that took over rolled out the 112
Emergency Communications Service, following our relentless advocacy, editorials in major newspapers, and actual implementation work. The new service integrates a unified, multi-agency public safety answering capability, based on the European emergency number 1-1-2 with a nationwide, integrated public alert and warning system. This system is now used by the General Secretariat for Civil Protection (i.e. the country’s national emergency management agency) to deliver effective life-saving information to the public. Alert messages are delivered primarily through cell phone SMS and additional communications pathways. In addition, new legislation voted in 2020 established an allhazards planning approach, and municipalities are required to prepare a single emergency operations plan with hazard-specific and function-based annexes, as required. An evacuation annex is now mandatory.

The Maui and Mati fires bear eerie similarities. Dry vegetation and high winds, which pushed the fires downslope to densely populated areas with poor evacuation routes, and insufficient firefighting resources combined to cause both fires to quickly spread out of control. Preparedness failures, poor warning capabilities, and an apparent deficiency in evacuation planning led to the high death tolls. In both locales, people were burned in their cars, in Mati some because of a lack of evacuation planning that resulted in drivers being redirected back to the inferno, while in Lahaina possibly because of delays in evacuation and confusion with closed roads. In both cases, officials claimed that call centers were overwhelmed. Both events had political repercussions, and in both cases officials abdicated responsibility, claiming they wouldn’t have done anything differently even with hindsight.

WUI fires need not be so ghastly.

Rhodes, Greece
On July 18, 2023, a fire broke out on the Greek island of Rhodes.

The fire was initially confined to the island’s mountainous center, but spread to the south on the fourth day, fanned by strong, northerly seasonal winds. By July 23, the fire had reached the southern coast of the island, scorching more than 16,000 ha. With multiple fires burning simultaneously throughout the country, resources were stretched thin, despite the reinforcements sent by EU countries and the United States. The island is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the Mediterranean, exceeding 2 million visitors every year, and roughly the same size as Maui.

When it comes to evacuations, visitors are a vexing challenge, not least because of their limited proficiency in the host country’s language, and their lack of familiarity with the area they are visiting. Yet, Greek authorities were able to evacuate over 20,000 local residents and tourists from the affected areas in Rhodes, within half a day, making it Greece’s largest ever wildfire evacuation (17, 18). The country’s public alert and warning system was used to send multiple evacuation messages, as the fire approached residential areas. The slower overall rate of spread of the Rhodes fire may have allowed for the timely evacuation.

However, the scale of the evacuation was considerable for Greece, and much more so for an island like Rhodes, and we that without a public warning system and a tried emergency management program, such as 112, the outcome would have been quite different. Ultimately, the fire devastated homes, hotels, and other businesses, yet the only casualty was the tragic loss of a volunteer firefighter. The efficacious crisis management in the aftermath bears noting, as most evacuees were sheltered in hotels or hosted by locals from night one. While at first tourist arrivals drastically fell, and hundreds of incoming flights were canceled, normalcy was restored within three weeks.

Wildland–urban interface risk and climate
change
The wildland–urban interface challenge
More people living in WUI areas enhance ignition opportunities.

Moritz et al. (19) identified several socioecological linkages and have focused on the impact to ecosystems by and their interdependencies with humans. While fires in remote areas are usually triggered by lightning storms, most wildfires appear to be humancaused (20). It is therefore hardly surprising that hot spots of fire activity have been identified in the WUI in the United States (21), and 95% of wildfires in Europe are reportedly caused by human negligence or arson (22). Radeloff et al. (23) state that the number of houses within wildfire perimentes has doubled since the 1990s, due to both increased number of houses and larger burned areas.

The number of wildfire-related deaths worldwide in the last four decades, based on the global EM-DAT database (24) shows that 10% of the fires appear responsible for 78% of the deaths (Figure 1). Furthermore, the single deadliest fire each year was responsible for 65% of all the deaths in that year, on average. In other words, a small number of fires produce the vast majority of deaths, while eight out of the ten deadliest fires occurred in the WUI.

Synolakis and Karagiannis | 3
Fires in the WUI pose unique challenges to fire suppression and emergency response. First, whereas urban and wildland firefighting tactics are fundamentally different, WUI fire suppression inherently involves both in close proximity, and tactical incompatibilities may appear. Urban fires will typically have multiple exposures with a fixed source, and direct fire attack using water or foam is the norm. On the other hand, wildland firefighting techniques very often involve indirect attack (25, 26). For example, a fireline may be used to interrupt fuel continuity or a backfire may be employed to deprive the fire of oxygen. In the WUI, exposure usually involves a long flame front and multiple sources of ignition. In WUI fires, structural firefighters operate in close proximity with their wildland counterparts, which often creates challenges in communications and coordination, especially when they come from different organizations and jurisdictions.

Different firefighting tactics also mean different equipment.

Wildland firefighting personal protective equipment is lighter because structural and atmospheric hazards are more limited in the open, and mobility is essential (26). Wildland firefighting engines are typically smaller and carry less equipment to remain mobile.

This essential mobility in the wilderness may become a limiting factor, and possibly a source of danger, to firefighters in the WUI.

In addition, delayed fire reporting or increased response times increase fire risk to isolated homes and other structures (27).

Fireline access can be challenging, as small backcountry roads and covered bridges might constrain anything but the smallest fire engines, and mutual aid resources could find navigating poorly charted rural roads a hindrance. Also, water supply may be scarce because of a lack of fire hydrants or failures during a power outage (28). This was the case in Lahaina, in both 2018 and 2023 and in the 2024 Viña del Mar fires in Chile, which took place while this paper was under review.

Second, evacuations are often required in WUI fires but are substantially different than organized evacuations implemented before river floods, landslides, and other natural hazards, or following accidents involving hazardous materials. Wildfire evacuations usually are decided and implemented on very short notice, notably because of difficulties in forecasting weather and predicting fire behavior. In Australia, in particular, there was debate about “stay and defend or go”, but the discussion seems to have settled in favor of “go” (29). Emergency planning helps alleviate some of that uncertainty. A small number of evacuation courses of action may be analyzed and included in emergency plans, offering options depending on the relative position of residential areas and the fire perimeter, as well as the current and projected weather, topography, and fuels. In Portugal, for example, predesigned evacuation routes and shelter locations are communicated to the public before disaster strikes, thus reducing clearance times when evacuations are warranted (30).

Regardless, many WUI areas have poor evacuee egress options, not only because of narrow, winding roads, but also traffic congestion (31). For instance, 23 people, including three seasonal firefighters, were trapped and perished while evacuating the village of Artemida, Greece during the 2007 fire south of ancient Olympia (32), over a narrow backcountry road that was the only option (33). In the 2018 Camp Fire in Northern California, staff evacuated patients from the local hospital in their own vehicles.

On one occasion, the drive to safety out of the heavily wooded area allegedly took about three hours. This was a very difficult terrain for timely evacuations, nonetheless over 40,000 managed to evacuate. Alerts were reportedly not received by at least 50% of the residents, but completely without them the death toll would likely have been much higher than the 84 who perished. In another example, serious traffic congestion ensued when residents in West Kelowna, British Columbia were asked to evacuate during the 2015 Munt Law wildfire (34).

With this inadvertently rapid operational tempo, reducing the time between decision-making and the actual evacuation by providing people advanced notice is paramount. Mati and Maui and, to a lesser extent, Paradise—all three incidents were haunted by the lack or failure of public alert and warning systems (35).

Third, wildfires can rapidly spread out of control and increase in complexity. Large fires are among the most complex incidents, not least because of the geographic area involved, the large number of resources involved, organizational complexity, jurisdictional boundaries, weather, and difficulty in predicting fire spread (36– 39). WUI fires add more layers of complexity, due to the threat to life, property and critical infrastructures, as well as political Figure 1. Wildfire deaths per year, 1970–2023 (24).
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sensitivities. For example, it has been reported that, during the Mati fires, politicians were calling the fire department asking for prioritization of resources to favor friends and relatives. Climate change is one of the factors increasing the potential for extreme fire behavior, therefore making firefighting less routine while making fires themselves more routine.

Fourth, wildland fires are intricately related to critical infrastructure and form complex feedback loops which lead to compound events (40, 41). The risk to energy production and generation assets and the power grid increases with wildfire incidence. Power lines can ignite wildfires through a variety of mechanisms, and fires can damage power utility assets, causing widespread power outages (42). California’s largest utility, Pacific Gas and Electric, pleaded guilty to manslaughter charges and filed for bankruptcy in early 2019, accepting responsibility for its downed power lines that triggered the 2018 Camp Fire, allegedly the costliest natural disaster in that year worldwide.

Hawaiian Electric is currently facing lawsuits for alleged negligence in the Maui fires. On the other end, in Mati, the country’s national electricity corporation steadfastly refused to entertain even the suggestion that one of its power lines near the point of ignition may have triggered the fire, and thus far has gotten away with it.

The cascading effects of wildland fires increase agentgenerated demands and complicate response-generated demands (40, 43). Almost any critical infrastructure asset may be affected by wildland fires, even water treatment plants. Fires can melt underground water pipes, thus affecting firefighting, and they can destroy communication towers and power substations.

Operators then need to find workarounds or make temporary repairs to restore service to priority customers, typically other critical infrastructure systems. At the same time, governments need to work with operators and affected critical customers to provide backup solutions. A vicious circle ensues, as infrastructure damage delays response and short-term recovery efforts, which in turn slow down restoration and repair (44).

Climate change and wildfire risk
Wildland fires have an intricate relationship with climate change.

Bowman et al. (45) estimated that wildland fires are responsible for 19% of the anthropogenic radiative forcing. Climate change does yield higher temperatures and drier conditions that prime the landscape for fires to catch and spread more easily.

Flannigan et al. (46) estimate that fire seasons will last 20 days per year longer in the northern high latitudes by the end of the century. The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (47) notes that fire weather is expected to increase in many parts of the world and, a 2-degree global warming scenario is projected to increase burned area globally by 35%. These estimates are corroborated by regional studies, which point to an increase in the number of human-induced wildfires, burned area, and wildfire risk (21, 48–56).

These scenarios are hardly fictitious, as climate change is already increasing wildfire risk around the world. Fire-prone areas are extending poleward to areas previously unaffected. Jolly et al. (2015) found that, by 2013, fire seasons had lengthened in about one-quarter of the Earth’s vegetated surface, resulting in an increase of the global average fire season length by 18.7%, compared to 1979. They also estimated that, between 1979 and 2013, the burnable area affected by longer fire weather seasons had doubled. Furthermore, the frequency of long fire-weather seasons increased across more than half of the global vegetated area between 1996 and 2013, compared with 1979–1996. Regional studies corroborate these global findings by showing an increase in the number of fires and the burned area during fire seasons, as well as in the size, extent, and frequency of large fires (49, 56–61).

Consensus is emerging that the conventional suppressioncentered wildfire and forest management strategies applied so far no longer efficiently address megafires, variously defined, but usually as fires that burn over 40,000 hectares.

Furthermore, overnight burning events (OBE), defined as fires that burn through the night, have recently been changing what used to be a familiar diurnal fire cycle. Luo et al. (62) found that 20% of the 1084 fires burning over 1000 hectares in the period 2017–2020 were OBEs, peaked in the summer, and were primarily associated with droughts. Balch et al. (50) claimed that, worldwide over the past 30 years, flammable nights have increased by seven, across all burnable lands, and found that night fires are about 7% more intense, while the vapor pressure deficit has increased by 25%. For the western United States, they estimated an 11-day increase over the same period. There is little doubt that there has been an acceleration of OBEs.

Figure 2 depicts megafires between 2012 and 2022 in Europe, Canada, and the United States, compiled out of three different datasets. The European Forest Fire Information System is operated by the European Commission Joint Research Center. Burned areas are estimated from satellite imagery, and information was available until 2023. Natural Resources Canada maintains the Canadian Wildland Fire Information System, based on a compilation of information provided by Canadian fire management agencies including provinces, territories, and Parks Canada. At the time of this writing, data was available only until 2021. In the United States, the National Interagency Fire Center Open Data Site provides a wealth of wildfire-related geospatial information. This dataset includes wildland fires reported to the Integrated Reporting of Wildland Fire Information incident service until 2023.

One conclusion from the map in Figure 2 is the lack of a unified system for reporting wildfires around the world. Wildfire data collection around the world is a highly localized endeavor. Data collection techniques vary widely, from the compilation of reports from fire services to highly sophisticated uses of satellite imagery.

Although most G20 countries publish quasi-regularly annual wildfire statistics in their official languages, data on individual fires is generally scarce. To make matters worse, there is hardly any consistency in either content or the granularity of the information reported across countries.

Finally, although the short- and long-term effects of wildfires on forests vary with the ability of tree species to regenerate after fires, both the size and costs of wildland fire suppression operations are growing. The increase in cost is partially driven by the high cost of protecting property in the WUI, and urbanization will drive costs even higher. Wildfire suppression costs in the United States have increased fourfold from 1985 to 2016 (21).

Discussion and recommendations:

Improving wildfire risk reduction efforts
Wading into uncharted waters, governments have mobilized funding for improving suppression capabilities, with aerial firefighting absorbing the lion’s share. Improvements in preparedness tend to follow particularly destructive fires or very active fire seasons. For example, following an increase in wildfire incidence across EU countries, the European Commission established “rescEU”, for procuring fixed and rotary wing firefighting aircraft, to create a last-resort capability buffer. Thus, rescEU’s aerial Synolakis and Karagiannis | 5
firefighting fleet was doubled in 2023, reaching 28 aircraft in 2023, with 12 additional aircraft on order (66, 67).

Greece has relied on a combined aerial firefighting fleet of nationally owned and leased aircraft. The country found itself in a double predicament, facing increasingly devastating fire seasons, just as it was getting out of a deep financial crisis, which had essentially prevented the acquisition of expensive assets. It has been progressively leasing more firefighting helicopters and airplanes. Following a series of devastating fire seasons, in 2020, the government announced “Aegis”, a behemoth two-billion-euro program, a third of which will serve to essentially double the country’s aerial fighting fleet. In 2022, the Hellenic Fire Service also instituted helitack crews, that is, teams of firefighters transported by helicopter to poorly accessible wildfire flare ups.

France faced a particularly active season in 2022. The total burnt area was 72,000 hectares, or almost five times that of 2021 and about three times that of 2017. Preparing for 2023, it added nine additional fixed and rotary wing aircraft to its 38. It also increased the number of wildland fire-engine strike teams from 44 in 2022 to 51 in 2023 (68). According to the US Congressional Budget Office (69), the federal government spent $17.5 billion on wildfire suppression and disaster assistance between 2016 and 2020. In California, following expanding fire seasons and a series of devastating fires, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection recently acquired 12 new firefighting helicopters and is planning to add seven air tankers to its fleet (70).

On the other hand, wildfire mitigation and prevention have traditionally received less attention and funding. For instance, the Greek Forest Service had been understaffed, and activities poorly coordinated and underfunded, for decades (71). Feo et al. (72) noted a “long history of underinvestment in prevention and mitigation” in California. These are examples of how voters often reward politicians for delivering disaster relief, but not for investing in preparedness, and even less so for mitigation and adaptation, hence governments underinvest (73).

Moritz et al. (19) have argued that “cultural and institutional systems affect public response to wildfire, as do psychological and social dynamics”. While true overall, the death toll in recent WUI fires suggests the public is inching towards favoring evacuation. Recent research suggests that public education can motivate voter support in favor of mitigation and preparedness (74). Anecdotal wildfire policy examples suggest that climate change education in the last few years may have helped to sway public opinion in favor of wildfire mitigation. For instance, in preparation for the 2022 fire season, the Greek government spent 72 million euros, equivalent to the cost of two medium-sized firefighting airplanes, in two nationwide wildfire hazard mitigation programs, involving (i) fuel reduction and clearing and (ii) forest thinning; such an investment was unthinkable five years earlier.

It also reorganized the Forest Service to improve coordination and funding. In 2020 and 2021, the State of California
appropriated $2.7 billion over a four-year period to wildfire prevention and mitigation, a number which dwarfs the Federal Government’s $4 billion through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (75).

With rising fire activity brought on by climate change and human development, and increased exposure of people and property in WUI areas, it is unlikely that today’s suppression-focused paradigm will remain sustainable, possibly not even in the near future.

Here, we present a new paradigm in wildfire risk management that goes beyond suppression and even mitigation, by integrating science-based land management.

First, in light of the projected increase in fire activity and decades of unmitigated biomass accumulation in forests around the world, maintaining adequate fire suppression capabilities, even through mutual aid agreements, may no longer be a fiscally responsible option. On the other hand, the cost-to-benefit ratios of wildfire hazard mitigation measures, including retrofitting buildings to meet or exceed building code standards, range from ¼ to ½ (76). Communities should consider mitigation strategies that have worked for other hazards, such as insurance and drastically limiting development in the WUI. Fuel treatment strategies, such as prescribed burning, fuel reduction and clearing, and forest thinning, have all shown potential in mitigating wildland fire risk (2, 77). In addition, retrofitting properties in the WUI to resist fire hazards has paid off time and again (78). For instance, a Figure 2. Megafires in Europe (63), Canada (64) and the United States (65) between 2012 and 2022. 6 | PNAS Nexus, 2024, Vol. 3, No. 5
photograph of a 100-year-old wooden house in Lahaina became viral in the aftermath of the August 8 fire, as it was left unscathed while surrounded by piles of charred debris (Figure 3). It was later revealed that the owners had retrofitted the home to mitigate wildfire risk. Furthermore, learning from indigenous fire stewardship practices can help mitigate wildfires and increase biodiversity (79).

Nevertheless, even with increased investment, implementing hazard mitigation strategies and developing additional capabilities will take time. Therefore, improving wildfire response is still needed. Given resource constraints, communities will likely have to prioritize the development of both suppression and mitigation capabilities by accounting for the effects of climate change on forest ecosystems. Multi-year, integrated wildfire risk management plans extending beyond electoral cycles can help reduce the sensitivity of risk management to shifting political short-term priorities and ensure sustainable strategies. Governments need to avoid the established pitfalls of short-sighted, political decisionmaking and policy choices shaped by what just happened instead of planning for future expectations (80).

Second, the growing number of megafires indicates that land management strategies need to account for the impact of climate change on forest ecosystems, as well as local effects, such as the rate at which biomass re-accumulates. Governments need to work closer with the forest products industry to integrate land management and wildfire risk management policies.

Heterogeneity in vegetation type, age, and structure can help ecosystem resilience to climate change and reduction of biodiversity loss. Fire hazard mitigation measures can be adapted to deliver the needed heterogeneity, for example, by diversifying the conditions of prescribed burns (19). Moreover, novel uses of wood products and creating markets for excess biomass and smallwood removal and utilization can create local economic development opportunities, while increasing the ecosystem’s resilience to wildfires. Several funding mechanisms are now being considered to support appropriate public/private partnerships. Examples include green bonds and more complex schemes, such as partial subsidization of economic opportunities, contingent on the implementation of wildfire mitigation or post-wildfire restoration measures, including landslide and flood mitigation.

Third, in terms of crisis management, a fundamental shift is needed from a mindset of fire suppression to one of emergency response. The increased exposure of people reinforces the need for community-based evacuation planning. Evacuation plans identify transportation routes and ways to increase evacuation throughput (such as contraflow), transportation modes, including mass transit, and shelter locations, so that emergency managers know how little time they have to issue evacuation orders. It is thus clear that public alert and warning systems are becoming an increasingly critical link in the process. These systems provide emergency information to the public, and save lives when disasters are about to strike. Early disaster research (81, 82) highlighted that to be effective warning messages need to be received from multiple communication pathways and issued from credible sources. Modern public alert and warning systems enable emergency management agencies to disseminate information through multiple pathways, including mobile and landline phones, radio, television, highway variable-message signs and others. The combination of evacuation plans, public education before disaster strikes, and public alert and warning systems can create a powerful defense against wildland fires and can reduce the loss of life.

Because of the inherent complexity in combining all those technologies, these systems should be tested to the limit of their abilities at regular intervals. In addition to the obvious maintenance benefit, these tests are opportunities for informing the public about the capabilities of alert and warning systems, as well teaching individual and family self-protection in disasters. In the United States, nationwide tests of the Emergency Alert System (which is based on radio and television, cable systems, and satellite radio and television) and the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, (which delivers alerts from cellular towers to mobile devices using a one-to-many technology called Cell Broadcast (CB)), they have been required no less than every three years since 2015. Nonetheless, the third nationwide test on October 4, 2023 (Figure 4, left), which came after the Maui catastrophe (83), was treated by the major news media everywhere as if it was the first ever. In one way it was, because people paid attention to it and could not have opted out, as was the case with the second test message. For the record, the first test was conducted on October 3, 2018, using the Presidential Alert classification and the second on August 11, 2021, using the State/Local WEA Test classification, which requires users to opt in to receive the test alert.

As of December 2018, and likely following the realization that lives could have been saved in the Mati fires earlier that year had there been warnings, European Union countries have been legally required to put in place public alert and warning systems using location-based SMS, or similar technologies, no later than June 2022. However, there are no testing requirements. Although such systems were already used in several European countries before that deadline, Greece was one of the first countries to use Cell Broadcast for wildfire evacuations. Tests are not legally required in Greece as in the United States, but its first nationwide alert was sent on March 11, 2020 (Figure 4, right), in response to mounting cases of COVID-19, and served as a demonstration of the capability.

Warning and evacuation processes also need to account for populations with access and functional needs. Effective systems can alert populations with disabilities or other special needs, include those with limited proficiency in the main language(s) used in alert and warning messages and, ultimately, anyone who may have difficulties obtaining alert and warning SMS and information.

A combination of forward and reverse planning is required to prepare such plans (84, 85). Forward planning builds the evacuation process by describing potential decisions and actions sequentially. Plans should address both agent-generated demands (for example, transportation and shelter) and response-generated demands (for example, information management and logistics).

Then, reverse planning determines the time required to complete each task, given the resources that can realistically be made available. Working backwards and using time estimates and task dependencies, emergency managers can identify the times required to complete evacuations once the decision is made.

The combination of forward and reverse planning informs the development of time or land-benchmark triggers for evacuation decision-making. For example, there will be evacuations regardless of conditions, if a fire reaches a particular critical location, or if there is less than x minutes for the fire to spread from its point of ignition to the nearest shoreline.

Fundamentally, hard as it may be in practice, evacuations need to be completed before the flame front spreads close enough to populated areas. Fire smoke may cause serious injury to sensitive individuals; this needs to be accounted for as well. Evacuation modeling is necessary to inform evacuation planning and decision-making. It can provide estimates of the time needed to evacuate areas threatened by wildfires, as well as pedestrian Synolakis and Karagiannis | 7
and vehicle traffic flow rates, in different scenarios and allows analysis of different courses of action (86, 87). As was done postfacto in Mati (88, 89), combined with wildfire spread simulation, evacuation modeling can be a powerful tool in setting triggers for evacuation decision-making (90). Stefanakis et al. (91) used an AI statistical model of a tsunami “experiment” constantly updated as new results arrived, then future query points were selected according to the objectives, until achieved. In this manner, they identified worst-case scenarios that were previously only obvious with 100% hindsight. Such active experimental design and machine learning algorithms can reduce the exceptionally large number of numerical simulations needed to identify time-optimal escape routes in advance, particularly in the presence of projectiles (embers), which change the spread dynamics.

Evacuation modeling is also a powerful tool in public outreach, as people at risk can expect how much time they really have.

Coupled with avatars, people can visualize themselves evacuating, at different speeds, temperatures, and visibilities. Such an approach could become the gold standard for planning evacuations and educating people.

Fourth, science and technology can be leveraged to improve strategic, operational, and tactical emergency planning.

Evaluating variables, such as meteorological conditions, fire danger, fire location, time of day, and fire size at the time of dispatch are now increasingly used in setting dispatch levels and resource estimates, along with lessons learned from previous fires and institutional memory. Machine learning, again, can streamline these processes. For example, Lam et al. (92) show how it can best medium-range numerical weather predictions (NWP) forecasts very quickly. Introducing AI fire prediction operationally remains vexing, given the varied locations, diverse data, and one-of-a-kind fires, even in a single locale.

Even when such timely predictions materialize, resource management should become more dynamic and anticipatory through the employment of other tools. For instance, mutual aid agreements can be activated preemptively based on risk estimates. In 2023, Greece activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (the European equivalent to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact in the United States) to preposition fire engines and hand crews from other countries in high-risk areas, during the hottest and driest summer months. The Hellenic Fire Service hires seasonal firefighters every year, aiming to increase its force by 10% during the “hot” season (8). These actions are particularly useful in islands, which present additional tactical challenges, not the least of which is related to their insularity and limited options for evacuation. Emergency management worldwide needs to consider the option of evacuating to beaches, which has made fires on Greek islands far less deadly than the mainland.

Earlier, we discussed how advances in forestry and biology can support integrated management of wildfire risk, how cutting-edge communications systems enable alert and warning messages to reach millions of people in seconds, and how evacuation modeling can support emergency planning and rapid decision-making.

Satellite images are a staple in many crisis management centers. Landsat has been around for decades, but the time windows between images do not allow for effective proactive modeling.

Algorithms convert observations of the Earth’s surface in the visible and infrared domains from meteorological and other satellites into measurements of fire hot spots and assessments of wildfire impacts in near real-time (93–95). Recently, advances in Figure 3. Red-roofed Lahaina home left unscathed by the August 8 fire (Source: Getty Images). 8 | PNAS Nexus, 2024, Vol. 3, No. 5
earth observation have allowed scientists, at least in Europe and North America, to track wildfires and even calculate fire spread, every twelve hours, based on satellite imagery (96). NASA’s Fire Events Data Suite is claimed to provide more frequent monitoring of fire activity, growth, and behavior than has ever been available (59). In a significant breakthrough, private operating satellite constellations now claim they are able to provide end users with predictions of the spread of wildfires and floods, informed through data assimilation, as images become available from successive satellite passes. In one example, a satellite constellation of Portugal and Spain, possibly to be augmented by Greek satellites, beginning (it’s been claimed) in 2024, will provide high resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images about every four hours. The consortium will also provide estimates of the projected evolution of the fire perimeter, until the next set of images becomes available. When augmented by thermal imaging and comprehensive vegetation spatial distributions, the evolution predictions can improve further and can become game changers in megafire suppression. Once such analyses become standard, AI fire modeling could become routine, given that there will be uniform image datasets associated with specific weather parameters to mine from.

Moreover, artificial intelligence is already in use to streamline real-time or near real-time detection of wildfires in poorly accessible areas (97, 98). State-of-the-art robots provide situational awareness, and autonomous systems operating closer to the fireline are under development for improving information management (99). The integration of satellite imagery with feeds from other sources, such as thermal, surveillance and traffic cameras and weather stations, they can vastly accelerate information management in the Emergency Operations Centers of the next decade.

Conclusion
Climate change, increased development in the WUI, and a long history of emphasis on fire suppression over hazard mitigation has increased wildfire risk worldwide. Governments are exploring the issue, but spending is mostly geared toward fire suppression.

Here, we propose a long-term approach, incorporating wildfire risk management in wider-scope forest land management policies and strategies. The latter need to account for the impact of climate change and hazard mitigation on forest ecosystems.

Improving suppression capabilities is like performing CPR on a cardiac arrest patient: it buys needed time until a more sustainable strategy takes effect, but will not, in and by itself, suffice for longevity. A renewed focus and increased spending on hazard mitigation and fire prevention is also required to stem the impact of megafires threatening human settlements and ecosystems in the WUI. Furthermore, a fundamental shift is needed from a mindset of fire suppression to one of emergency response.

Evacuation planning supported by public alert and warning capabilities always saves lives, and more so with prior planning.

Last, we urge the wildland fire community to invest in the uptake of scientific breakthroughs and new technologies, including machine learning and earth observation, to help improve decisionmaking and, ultimately, save more lives. Until then, in at-risk WUI areas, everyone needs to understand that a threatening wildfire could happen anytime from spring to fall and that they may need to leave immediately.

Funding
The authors declare no funding.

Figure 4. Screenshots of the 2023 nationwide WEA test in the United States (left) and the first nationwide Cell Broadcast message ever in Greece, in 2020 (right). An estimated 300 national messages have followed since then this 11 March 2020 first CB message.

Synolakis and Karagiannis | 9
Author Contributions
Both authors designed and performed research, analyzed the data, and wrote the paper.

Data Availability Statement
The following data were used in the preparation of this manuscript:

1. [dataset] CRED/UCLouvain, n.d., “EM-DAT”. Brussels,
Belgium: University of Louvain. www.emdat.be.

2. [dataset] European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), n.d., “Burnt Areas database”. European Commission. [accessed 2023 Nov 12]. https://forest-fire.emergency.copernicus.eu/ apps/effis.statistics/estimates.

3. [dataset] Natural Resources Canada (NRC), n.d., “National Fire Database fire point data”. [accessed 2023 Nov 12]. https://cwfis. cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/datamart/download/nfdbpnt.

4. [dataset] National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), n.d., “Wildland Fire Incident Locations”. [accessed 2023 Nov 12]. https://data-nifc.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/nifc::wildlandfire-incident-locations/explore.

All of the data listed above are publicly available to download at no charge by the respective organizations.

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Attachment 10
Grand Jury Report Butte County 2008-
2009 (Excerpt)
45 BUTTE COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 2008/2009

WILDFIRE & SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR BUTTE COUNTY GENERAL PLAN 2030

SUMMARY
The wildfires in the foothills of Butte County during the summer of 2008 were the most severe in recent history. Some of the grim statistics were:
60,000 acres burned
200 homes lost or heavily damaged
One fire related death reported
Injuries to fire personnel
By some miracle, the Humboldt Fire Incident did not cross the West Branch of the Feather River. Had this occurred, property damage could have been huge and thousands of lives could have been threatened in Paradise and the Upper Ridge.

Three of four major evacuation routes south from Paradise, Skyway, Neal and Clark Roads, were closed due to heavy smoke and fire. The fourth evacuation route, Pentz Road, was jammed with single-lane traffic, making the trip from Paradise to Highway 70 nearly three hours long.

Forest Route 171 north of Magalia, currently does not qualify as a viable evacuation route. This route includes ten miles of dirt road between Inskip and Butte Meadows. Even if upgraded as planned, this route will not be classified as an evacuation route. Additional evacuation routes are necessary.

The Grand Jury recommends that affected communities come together to form a Benefit Assessment District to address their safety needs.

While this report focused on the areas affected by the 2008 wildfires, the Grand Jury is equally concerned about other communities in the Butte County foothill areas, including Cohasset, Berry Creek, Forbestown, Forest Ranch, and others.

Butte County is in the process of developing General Plan 2030 to direct the growth of the County for the next two decades. It is imperative that safety considerations be adequately addressed in the referenced General Plan.

GLOSSARY
BCGP2030 - Butte County General Plan 2030
BCBS - Butte County Board of Supervisors
BCAG - Butte County Association of Governments
46 BCOES - Butte County Office of Emergency Services
Upper Ridge - areas above Paradise, including Paradise Pines and Magalia Benefit Assessment District - A benefit assessment places an annual levy on property that receives a “special benefit” from the assessment.

BACKGROUND
The foothill areas east of Highway 99 in Butte County are especially prone to disastrous wildfires. In the summer of 2008, Butte County experienced one of the worst wildfire seasons in its history. Many citizens lost their homes, and many had a difficult time evacuating from areas under immediate threat of fire.

It is the responsibility of the Butte County government and individual citizens to be prepared, and plan for any action necessary to limit the danger created by wildfires. It is important to incorporate these safety requirements into BCGP2030. The unpredictability, intensity, and locations of the 2008 wildfires near the towns of Magalia, Paradise, Concow, and Forest Ranch emphasized the critical shortcomings of the area’s readiness for extreme fire situations.

The major problems discovered as a result of the 2008 fires were limited evacuation routes and lack of compliance by the public concerning fire prevention regulations.

APPROACH
The Grand Jury reviewed the BCGP2030 and interviewed several Butte County Supervisors, BCAG, Butte County department directors, managers, employees of fire and emergency services departments, and informed, concerned citizens. The Grand Jury concentrated on safety issues, evacuation possibilities in high fire-danger areas, and how the experiences from last year can be incorporated into BCGP2030.

DISCUSSION
Paradise and the Upper Ridge have about 50,000 residents. It is a beautiful place to live with many desirable features such as:

Clean air
Secluded forest setting
Above the fog line
Nice views
Light snow in the winter
47 There are less-desirable safety related features that must be considered when living on the Ridge such as:

Limited water supply, including emergency water supply
High population density
Vast amounts of fire fuel on steep terrain
Earthquake and flood concerns related to Magalia Dam
Limited number of emergency evacuation routes
Development of a General Plan
Each county in California is required by the state to develop a general plan for its future growth.

Butte County has responded by initiating BCGP2030, which will govern the development of Butte County for the next twenty years. BCGP2030 is being prepared as a comprehensive update by Butte County Development Services, in cooperation with most departments of Butte County, the Citizens Advisory Committee, and individual citizens. Final approval of the plan rests with the BCBS.

There are specific land use requirements for specific unincorporated parts of the County.

BCGP2030 is divided into thirty four functional areas called Preferred Land Use Alternatives (PLUA). Each area is being analyzed by many different agencies. In addition, information is being gathered from citizen comments at public meetings.

It is in the opinion of this Grand Jury that there is a need to modify some parts of BCGP2030 to pay specific attention to safety requirements for citizens of Butte County. A moratorium on all multi-home development in fire-prone areas is recommended until all fire safety, traffic, and emergency water supply issues are resolved.

The Upper Ridge currently has approximately 18,000 residents; however there is only one viable southbound evacuation route from Magalia over Magalia Dam. The road over the Dam is one lane in each direction and has width limitations. In the case of an accident on the Dam, traffic would be disrupted. Current building requirements state that a minimum of two exit roads should be provided from any developed area.

Summary of Foothill Roads
As outlined in the road index in Appendix A and Table I below, all roads out of Paradise and the Upper Ridge, with the exception of Skyway below Paradise, have significant constraints, limiting their use as evacuation routes during a major event, especially another event of multiple fires. Even Skyway was closed during the summer 2008 fires due to fire and smoke.

Constraints include:

A single lane per direction
Moderate to sharp curves
Inadequate shoulders for parking disabled vehicles
No surfacing to limited gravel surfacing
48 Fire hazard areas adjacent to the shoulders, due to dense fire fuel and steep slopes, which increases the fire danger and the possibility of being closed due to fire and or smoke
Even if passable, most of the roads have serious capacity limitations. A convoy of cars traveling bumper to bumper will necessitate all vehicles traveling the speed of the slowest vehicle in front of them. For example, Coutelenc Road has two sharp bends with a speed limit of 20 mph. A vehicle traversing the bends on this road will need to slow to 20 mph and, by chain reaction, all following vehicles on the entire length of the road will be forced to slow to 20 mph. Circumstances that may slow the chain of traffic are: merging traffic, disabled vehicles, and temporary closures to accommodate emergency vehicles. As an example, during the 2008 summer fires, all vehicles exiting Paradise and the Upper Ridge were directed to use Pentz Road, which has a posted speed limit of 40 mph. It took three hours for vehicles to travel from the intersection of Pentz Road and Skyway to Highway 70, a distance of about eleven miles. This is an effective speed of approximately 4 mph.

Evacuation Routes from Paradise
Paradise currently has approximately 30,000 residents. There are four available southbound evacuation routes from Paradise, Skyway, Neal, Clark and Pentz Roads. There are no adequate northbound evacuation routes.

During the Humboldt Fire Incident, Skyway, Neal and Clark Roads were closed to all civilian traffic. This left only Pentz Road available for evacuation, with only one southbound lane being used. It took three hours to travel eleven miles from Paradise to Highway 70. Pentz Road has limited emergency pull off areas for temporarily parking disabled vehicles.

Skyway below Paradise is an existing high capacity road. If the fire fuel was removed in a few areas adjacent to the road between Paradise and Chico, and the grassed median and shoulders were disked in the late spring each year, the availability of this high capacity evacuation route would be improved.

Evacuation Routes from the Upper Ridge
The condition of Skyway between the Magalia Dam and Clark Road is a constraint for vehicles attempting to evacuate the Upper Ridge going south. It should be improved by widening the shoulders and removing adjacent fire fuel.

There is no northbound evacuation route from Magalia, except Forest Road 171, which in some spots is passable by four-wheel drive vehicles only. Forest Road 171 is planned for upgrade starting in 2009. It is planned as a recreational access road only, not an evacuation route. The road is in a high fire-danger area and may not be available to use as an evacuation route. In addition, the road capacity is limited and when completed as proposed, Forest Road 171 will have a speed limit of 25 to 30 mph. A convoy of vehicles trying to evacuate Inskip, Stirling City, and the Upper Ridge on Forest Road 171 will most likely not be able to travel faster than 15 to 20 mph. Thus, the evacuation of 18,000 residents could take up to several hours. 49 Table 1 Paradise and Upper Ridge Road Index
Road From / To Conditions
Evacuation Route
Potential
Mile
s
Lane
s
(out)
Paving Shoulders Curves Speed
(MPH)
Fire
Hazard
Exit Routes From Upper Ridge
Forest Highway
171 (current)
Inskip to Butte
Meadows 9.6 One Dirt none
moderate to
sharp

5.-10 High Not viable
Forest Highway
171 (future)
Inskip to Butte
Meadows 9.6 One Asphalt ? moderate
25-30 High Low
Humboldt
Butte Meadows to Highway 32

5.3 One Asphalt None
sharp to
moderate20 High Low
Skyway
Magalia Dam
to junction
with Clark

1.6 One Asphalt
nonenarrowmoderate
25-30 High Moderate
Doe Mill
Skyway near
DeSabla to
Highway 32
(via Powellton
and Garland)

7.2 One Dirt w/
rocks none
sharp to
moderate5.-20 High Moderate
Centerville /
lower Honey
Run
Skyway near
Nimshew to
Chico
17 One
4 mi.
gravel/
Asphalt
none sharp 5.-20 High Low
Coutelenc
Skyway
(Lovelock) to
Skyway (Old
Magalia)
7 One Asphalt
nonenarrow 2-sharp 20-30 High Low to
Moderate
Jordan Hill Coutelenc to
Highway 70 17 One Dirt none sharp 5.-10 High Not viable Concow
Connects Jordan Hill to
Highway 70
1 One Asphalt none
moderate
25 High Moderate
Exit routes From Paradise
Skyway Paradise to
Chico 10 Two Asphalt wide gentle 55 Low High
Honey Run Skyway to
Chico 11 One Asphalt none sharp 15-20 High Not viable
Neal Skyway to
Highway 99 8 One Asphalt
none to
narrow
moderate
35 High
to
Low
Moderate
Clark Skyway to
Durham Pentz 9.5 One Asphalt
none to
narrow
moderate
45 High
to
Low
Moderate
to high
Pentz Skyway to
Highway 70 11 One Asphalt
none to
narrow
moderate
45 High
to
Low
Moderate
Durham Pentz Highway 70 to
Highway 99 9 One Asphalt
none to
narrow
moderate
50-55 Low Moderate
50 Currently, all funds needed to finish Forest Road 171 are not available (See Appendix B). The development of additional evacuation roads, such as Doe Mill or Centerville Roads, should be should be a part of BCGP2030 (See Appendix A).

The Grand Jury recommends that the County plan for more than one road, suitable for use as an evacuation route, for the Upper Ridge. Possible routes to consider are Doe Mill and Centerville Roads.

Emergency Evacuation Plan
An Emergency Evacuation Plan is a set of instructions and information used by the emergency services support team during a catastrophic event. Currently, there is an Emergency Evacuation Plan for the Upper Ridge. It is very detailed. All other areas need to have similar plans. BCOES should consider creating a synopsis of these plans to be available to fire crews from outside areas.

Emergency Broadcast System
The Butte County Emergency Broadcast System provides taped information for citizens during emergencies. During the wildfires in 2008, this taped message was not updated frequently to match the conditions. More comprehensive, up to date information was available on the Butte County web site. Unfortunately, people without computers only had access to information from taped messages on the emergency radio broadcast. This lack of information could create panic among residents, which complicates the evacuation process.

Benefit Assessment District
A benefit assessment places an annual levy on property that receives a “special benefit” from this assessment. The assessment may be used to pay for services and improvements which confer a benefit; however, the benefit is conferred on real property and not on a person.

There is currently a movement toward development of a Benefit Assessment District to include the areas of Paradise, the Upper Ridge, Concow and Centerville. The Grand Jury endorses this proactive approach.

Butte County Fire Code
Currently, Butte County does not have a Fire Code Ordinance specific to Butte County. The Butte County Fire Marshal is using the California Fire Code.

Fire Safety Information
CAL-FIRE, Butte County Fire Safety Councils, and other organizations publish and distribute pamphlets containing important information regarding: wildfire preparedness, what to do in case of wildfire, maps of possible evacuation routes, gathering locations, and how to obtain current information about wildfire status (See Appendix C). However, none of the members of the 2008/2009 Grand Jury, who live in Paradise and the Upper Ridge, recall receiving or seeing this important information. Printing and distributing these pamphlets on a regular basis are costly, and without guarantee that they will reach all citizens and newcomers to Butte County. 51 The pamphlets could easily be lost in other similar looking mail and not attain needed attention by all citizens. The Grand Jury believes that this information should be updated regularly and incorporated into documents distributed to residents on an annual basis such as in property assessments or phone books.

Housing Concentration in Foothill Areas
BCGP2030 designates several areas in the foothills for increased development. Prior to increasing the number of residents at risk, measures should be taken to adequately plan for emergencies.

For example, BCGP2030 forecasts 3,400 additional units or approximately 15,000 people in foothill fire-prone areas. It designates a housing development consisting of 330 houses in PLUA13. The current design will place most of these homes directly on the canyon rim. In case of fire, this will increase the degree of danger for its residents. In an emergency, all residents of this development will have to evacuate by entering onto Pentz Road. Consideration of the increased evacuation requirements and fire safety should be met before the start of this development.

Other Butte County Foothill Communities
This report discusses the problems associated with the 2008 wildfires that affected Paradise and the Upper Ridge. Other communities within Butte County, such as Cohasset, Forest Ranch, Berry Creek, Concow, and Forbestown are located in high fire-danger areas with limited road exits and could be similarly affected. Accordingly, the Grand Jury recommends that the BCGP2030 also address fire safety in all Butte County foothill communities.

FINDINGS
F1. The draft General Plan 2030 does not adequately address all fire and safety issues in the foothill areas of Butte County.

F2. At present, there is only one major evacuation route south from the Upper Ridge and no viable routes north. There is a need for an additional evacuation route from Magalia and Paradise. The upgrade of Forest Road 171, classified as a recreational access road, is not fully funded, and even after completion, will not be sufficient as an evacuation route.

F3. Skyway from Paradise to Chico could be upgraded and used in specific situations as an evacuation route.

F4. With the exception of Skyway, evacuation routes do not have adequate shoulders for temporarily parking disabled vehicles.

F5. An Emergency Evacuation Plan has been developed for the Upper Ridge (Magalia and Paradise Pines) only.

F6. The development of new housing in fire-prone areas of the foothills is ongoing. 52 F7. Butte County does not have a County Fire Code Ordinance specific to Butte County conditions.

F8. During the recent wildfires, information on the County Emergency Broadcast System was often several hours old. Therefore, it did not provide timely information about the evacuation and fire status and locations.

F9. Adequate funding is not in place for foothill evacuation routes. There is currently a movement toward development of a Benefit Assessment District to include the areas of Paradise, the Upper Ridge, Concow, and Centerville.

F10. Fire safety information, about emergency evacuation routes and fire preparedness, is not reaching the public for whom it was intended.

RECOMMENDATIONS
R1. BCGP2030 needs to address emergency evacuation routes and fire preparedness for the foothill areas of Butte County.

R2. Review the limitations of Forest Road 171 such as traffic speeds, volume of cars, and fire prone area and consider other feasible evacuation routes. Additional roads for evacuation of the Upper Ridge, such as Doe Mill Road, should be investigated.

R3. Consider immediate modification of Skyway, from Paradise to Chico, as an emergency evacuation route, by removing trees and brush and creating fire barriers on both sides of the road.

R4. BCGP2030 should address how to handle disabled vehicles on emergency evacuation routes and the use of both traffic lanes for evacuation.

R5. Address the need for creation of Emergency Evacuation Plans for all high-risk fire areas in the Butte County foothills.

R6. Put a moratorium on all multi-home development in fire prone areas until all fire safety, traffic, and emergency water supply issues are resolved.

R7. The Butte County Board of Supervisors should request and implement a County Fire Code Ordinance specifically designed for the Butte County foothill’s environment.

R8. In cases of emergency, the County Emergency Broadcast System should update information frequently, with specific, current information about evacuation recommendations, location and status of the emergency, and the forecast of future actions.

R9. The Board of Supervisors should encourage the formation of a Benefit Assessment District on the Ridge. 53 R10. Consider inserting, in the local phone directory or property assessments, information about emergency travel routes and public assembly points, as shown in Appendix C.

REQUEST FOR RESPONSES
Pursuant to Penal Code Section 933.05, the Grand Jury requests responses as follows:

Butte County Department of Development Services
Butte County Association of Governments
Butte County Department of Public Works
Butte County Office of Emergency Services
Paradise Fire Department

Butte County Board of Supervisors
The governing bodies indicated above should be aware that the comment or response of the governing body must be conducted subject to the notice, agenda and open meeting requirements of the Brown Act.

Reports issued by the Civil Grand Jury do not identify individuals interviewed. Penal Code Section 929 requires that reports of the Grand Jury not contain the name of any person, or facts leading to the identity of any person who provides information to the Civil Grand Jury. The California State Legislature has stated that it intends the provisions of Penal Code Section 929 prohibiting disclosure of witness identities to encourage full candor in testimony in Civil Grand Jury investigations by protecting the privacy and confidentiality of those who participate in any Civil Grand Jury investigation.
54 APPENDIX A
Index of Routes from Paradise and the Upper Ridge
From the Upper Ridge
Highway 171 extends from Inskip to Butte Meadows. At present it is a 9.6 mile long narrow, winding two-lane gravel road, only suitable for four-wheel drive vehicles in wet months. Portions of the road are in high fire-danger areas. There are plans to improve the road, but currently there are insufficient funds.

Skyway from Magalia and Paradise Pines to its intersection with Clark Road in Paradise is a twelve to fourteen foot wide paved road with shoulders and a 35 mph speed limit. There is heavy vegetation on both sides of the road.

Where it crosses Magalia Dam, the shoulders are about two feet wide.

Doe Mill Road/Garland Road extends about seven miles from Powellton Road in Magalia to Highway 32 via Garland Road. Between Powellton Road and a narrow bridge, it is a very rough, winding road with protruding rocks in the road bed. The stretch also has steep side slopes, a few sharp curves, and heavy vegetation. Between the bridge and Highway 70 it is gravel surfaced with mild curves. The old steel girder bridge has a three-ton weight limit and is probably not safe for several vehicles at a time.

Centerville Road/Honey Run Road extends about seventeen miles from Nimshew Road intersection with Skyway to join Honey Run Road, near the old covered bridge. The first four to five-mile stretch of Nimshew Road is a winding, narrow, gravel surfaced road with no shoulders, steep side slopes, and heavy vegetation. The speed limit is probably about 20 mph. The second seven-mile portion is a winding gravel surface with no shoulders, with an approximate speed limit of 20-30 mph. This portion of the road also has steep side slopes and heavy vegetation.

The four mile balance of the road to Skyway is a two-lane paved road with narrow shoulders, gently winding curves, and light to moderate vegetation, with a posted speed limit of 30-35 mph.

Coutelenc Road is a seven-mile long road which intersects Skyway below Stirling City, and reconnects to Skyway near upper Paradise. It traverses east of the Magalia reservoir and does not require crossing the Dam. It is a winding, paved, two-lane road with moderate curves. Two curves have a posted limit of 20 mph, but the balance of the road has a speed limit of about 30 mph. There is heavy vegetation on both sides of the road. Side slopes are flat to moderate.

Jordan Hill Road extends about seventeen miles from the Upper Ridge Coutelenc Road to Concow Road. It is narrow with no shoulders. A portion is dirt, and a portion has some gravel surfacing. It has one narrow bridge, sharp curves, no shoulders, heavy vegetation, and steep side slopes. The estimated speed limit of a convoy of vehicles is 10-20 mph. This road is not suitable for an evacuation route.

Concow Road is a winding, narrow paved road with a posted speed limit of 25 mph that extends from Concow to Highway 70. It has no shoulders with heavy vegetation on both sides.

From Paradise
Skyway is a four-lane, divided road with a wide grass median. It is essentially a straight road with a uniform, mild grade. The distance from Paradise to Chico is about ten miles. It has a 55 mph speed limit and wide shoulders for disabled cars. Portions of the road are essentially free of fire danger due to a golf course, graveled lookout, and residential developments. Fire fuel is essentially wild grass and a few trees. This route could be easily improved to further reduce fire danger.

Neal Road is a paved two-lane road, with mild curves extending about eight miles from Skyway to Highway 99.

The road has non existent, to narrow intermittent shoulders and a posted speed limit of 35 mph. The terrain on each side is flat to moderate slopes. Fire fuel is light to moderate. Residential units are sparse to frequent. 55 Honey Run Road extends from Skyway in Paradise to Skyway about three miles east of Chico. The upper portion near Paradise is a paved, winding, very narrow two-lane road with sharp curves, no shoulders, and a steep slope on the north side. There is heavy vegetation on both sides. The estimated speed of a convoy of vehicles would be less than 20 mph. The lower portion is a winding, two-lane paved road with a speed limit of about 30 mph. The upper portion is not suitable for an evacuation route.

Clark Road (Highway 191) is a paved, two-lane road with a few sharp curves and narrow shoulders. It extends ten miles from Paradise to the Durham-Pentz Road. The speed limit is 45 mph. Much of the upper portions of the road consist of steep slopes with dense vegetation.

Pentz Road is a paved two-lane road extending about eleven miles from upper Paradise to Highway 70 and the Durham-Pentz Road. The upper portions are winding, with narrow shoulders and steep slopes. Fire fuel is abundant.

Durham/Pentz Road is a two-lane paved road, with no shoulders extending from Highway 70 and Pentz Road to Highway 99. It has a posted speed limit of 55 mph. The terrain on both sides is flat and predominately covered with grass vegetation.
56 APPENDIX B
Description of Project: Forest Highway 171
What is the Project?
At the request of Butte County, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Forest Service (FS), and the Central Federal Lands Federal Highway Division (CFLHD), BCAG completed a Project Reconnaissance and Scoping Report (August 16, 2002), investigating the widening and reconstruction of Forest Highway 171 (Upper Skyway).

In December of 2002, BCAG took the lead to develop the environmental document and begin the process of completing the Project Approval and Environmental Document (PA&ED) phase.

Why is the Project being done?
Beginning in late 1999, citizens and local officials living in and representing the communities above Paradise began expressing a concern that in the event of a fire or related natural disaster, there was only one way into and out of these communities. The southerly exit would be through the Town of Paradise on the Skyway.

The northerly route would have to be over the Upper Skyway or FH 171 over a 9.6 mile section of dirt road extending between the community of Inskip and Butte Meadows.

The primary purpose of this project is improved safety for in excess of 25,000 residents living in and around these communities, also known as the Upper Ridge. Improvements to Forest Highway 171 (Upper Skyway) also substantially completes basic infrastructure necessary for the FS to effectively administer and manage the large amount of federal lands in the northeastern portion of Butte County by providing a through route.

The Humboldt, Palermo and Concow fires of 2008 have provided an increased awareness and further support the merits of completing this project.

What is the current status of the Project?
A CEQA Mitigated Negative Declaration was approved by the BCAG Board of Directors in September of 2005.

A NEPA Categorical Exclusion was approved in November 2005.

BCAG, Butte County, FS, FHWA and Caltrans are currently working to continue looking for federal and state sources of funding in an effort to provide the additional dollars needed for the estimated $12 -$15 million construction project. FHWA and the FS have committed $5 million to the construction phase of this project.

An earmark for an additional $5.8 million and another $980,000 was authorized in the current federal transportation bill known as SAFETEA-LU.
$1.3 million in Regional Improvement Program (RIP) was allocated in the 05/06 Fiscal Year (FY) to continue with development of the Plans, Specifications and Estimate (PS&E). Together with the upcoming completion of the project design, the acquisition of Right of Way is currently underway. If all right of way acquisition moves forward as planned a Phase One project could be delivered as soon as the Spring of 2009.

Questions or comments:

Should you have any questions or comments regarding the project please call or e-mail Andy Newsum, Project Manager at (530) 879-2468.
57 APPENDIX C
Following are fire safety pamphlets for a few foothill communities.

These representative pamphlets were developed by local Fire Safety Councils and other organizations.

C-1 Paradise
C-2 Upper Ridge
C-3 Pulga, Concow, and Jarboe Gap
58 59
60 Attachment 11
Draft Evacuation Planning Technical
Advisory (LCI)
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 1
DRAFT
Evacuation Planning
Technical Advisory

GENERAL PLAN TECHNICAL ADVICE SERIES
DRAFT VERSION – April 2023
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 2
Technical Advisory Information
Agency Information
Governor’s Office of Planning and Research
1400 10th Street | Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 322–2318
www.opr.ca.gov
Technical Advisory Leads
Beth Hotchkiss, OPR Program Analyst | Project Manager and Primary Author Erik de Kok, AICP, Former OPR Deputy Director for Planning & Community Development Leila Hakimizadeh, AICP, Planning and Land Use Manager
Interagency Reviewers
Governor’s Office of Planning and Research: Austin Kerr, Brianne Masukawa, Clay Kerchof, Ernest Echeveste, Nikki Caravelli, Parker Friederich, Taylor Carnevale | California Air Resources Board: Caitlin Greenway, Alan Talhelm | California Board of Forestry and Fire Protection: Claire McCoy | California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection/CALFIRE: Brian Barkley | California Department of Transportation: Chris Ganson, Kien Le, Leah Fisher, Lisa Worthington, Sri Balasubramanian | California Energy Commission: Justin Cochran | California Highway Patrol: Vincent Klarcyk | California Office of Emergency Services: Kasmira Kit, Noele Richmond | California Public Utilities Commission: Danjel Bout, Forest Kaser, James Cho, Moustafa Abou-taleb | Federal Emergency Management Agency: Tan Hoang DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 3
Table of Contents
Technical Advisory Information ..........................................................................................................2 Agency Information.........................................................................................................................................2 Technical Advisory Leads.................................................................................................................................2 Interagency Reviewers....................................................................................................................................2 Table of Contents...............................................................................................................................3 List of Figures.....................................................................................................................................4 List of Tables......................................................................................................................................4 Overview ...........................................................................................................................................5

1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................................6

2. General Plan Evacuation Requirements.......................................................................................7

2.1 Related Local Planning Efforts...................................................................................................................9

3. General Plan Evacuation Planning Guidance..............................................................................12

3.1 Engage Early and Often ...........................................................................................................................12

3.2 Plan for a Range of Hazards.....................................................................................................................15

3.3 Identify Residential Developments with Limited Evacuation Route Access............................................15

3.4 Identify Applicable Emergency Scenarios................................................................................................17

3.5 Assess Evacuation Locations ...................................................................................................................19

3.6 Assess the Capacity, Safety, and Viability of Evacuation Routes.............................................................21

3.7 Identify Evacuation Routes and Locations ..............................................................................................28

4. Example General Plan Policies and Programs ............................................................................30

4.1 Increase Evacuation Route and Location Capacity..................................................................................30

4.2 Manage Evacuation Route and Location Demand at the time of Emergency.........................................32

4.3 Reduce Risk and Prepare for Emergency Events.....................................................................................33 References.......................................................................................................................................35 Appendices......................................................................................................................................39 Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations....................................................................................................39 Appendix B. Referenced Legislation and Bill Information .............................................................................41 Appendix C. Glossary.....................................................................................................................................43 Appendix D. State and Federal Frameworks.................................................................................................51 Appendix E. List of Resources........................................................................................................................54 Appendix F. Funding Opportunities...............................................................................................................60 Appendix G. Evacuation Planning Checklist ..................................................................................................62

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 4
List of Figures
Figure 1: Network of interconnected systems that contribute to a successful evacuation process. ............................6 Figure 2: Process for determining when the safety element must be updated to address evacuations. .....................8 Figure 3: Relationship between planning documents and the emergency management cycle (Source: Circle graphic developed by Fairfax County)........................................................................................................................................9 Figure 4: Example timeline of disaster response activities. (Source: FEMA Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning Guide) .11 Figure 5: Evacuation location options available to evacuees during an emergency scenario.....................................19 Figure 6: Forecast cases for light-duty ZEV populations in California (source: CEC) ...................................................24 Figure 7: Safety risks that may occur along evacuation routes under a range of emergency scenarios.....................26 Figure 8: Example TsunamiClear Map (source: Claudine Jaenichen) ..........................................................................29 Figure 9: Coordination process between local, state, and federal partners during an emergency event. (Source:

National Incident Management System, FEMA 2017).................................................................................................51 List of Tables
Table 1: Relationship of Evacuation Planning to the General Plan Required Elements ................................................8 Table 2: Comparison between PRC § 4290.5 and SB 99 as codified in GC § 65302(g). ...............................................16 Table 3: Indicators to help estimate evacuation behavior and needs.........................................................................18 Table 4: Considerations for Evacuation Location Planning..........................................................................................20 Table 5: Evacuation Strategies.....................................................................................................................................25 Table 6: Acronyms and Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................39 Table 7: California legislation referenced in OPR’s Evacuation Planning Technical Advisory .....................................41 Table 8: Evacuation Planning TA Glossary ...................................................................................................................43 Table 9: Funding Opportunities...................................................................................................................................60

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 5
Disclaimer
Because communities throughout California are varied and have different needs, the recommendations in this technical advisory are designed for a wide spectrum of uses and applications. This document is meant to be a resource for the public to use at their discretion; it does not alter or direct public agency discretion or decision-making in preparing planning documents. This document should not be construed as legal advice, nor is the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research enforcing or attempting to enforce any part of the recommendations contained herein. (Refer to Government Code [GC], § 65035 [“It is not the intent of the Legislature to vest in the Office of Planning and Research any direct operating or regulatory powers over land use, public works, or other state, regional, or local projects or programs.”].) Overview
This document is organized into the following sections:
1) Introduction
2) General Plan Evacuation Requirements: This section summarizes evacuation planning requirements for the general plan. It also highlights opportunities for plan alignment by describing related planning frameworks that cities and counties may leverage as they update their general plans.
3) General Plan Evacuation Guidance: This section outlines key steps in the evacuation planning process to help cities and counties navigate potential challenges associated with identifying residential developments with less than two evacuation routes as well as assessing evacuation routes and locations under a range of emergency scenarios. 4) Example General Plan Policies and Programs: This section provides example policies and implementation programs that could be included in general plans to facilitate safe evacuations. 5) Appendices: The appendices include potential resources to support evacuation planning and other technical sections that support the main body of the document.

Reader Note — Phrases that are italicized and are noted in purple text are defined in the glossary.

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 6

1. Introduction
The goal of the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research’s (OPR) Evacuation Planning Technical Advisory (TA) is to guide cities and counties as they update their general plan safety element in accordance with evacuation requirements outlined in Senate Bill (SB) 99 (2019), Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019), and AB 1409 (2021), which were codified in Government Code [GC] Sections 65302, subdivision (g), and 65302.15.

The State of California defines evacuations as the “organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas and their reception and care in safe areas” (Cal OES, 2017). Evacuations are dynamic processes that require close coordination within and across communities, jurisdictions, and agencies. Successful evacuations depend on a network of interconnected systems that work together to protect people from immediate threats (refer to Figure 1).

Within the general plan, local governments are specifically required to address evacuation routes and locations. As cities and counties delve into this topic, they should coordinate with hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, emergency response, disaster recovery professionals, access and functional needs organizations, community-based organizations (CBOs), and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to align their general plan efforts with broader emergency response activities and utilize the whole community approach for emergency planning.

Figure 1: Network of interconnected systems that contribute to a successful evacuation process.

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 7

2. General Plan Evacuation Requirements
Each city and county in California must develop a general plan to guide development within their jurisdiction. These plans serve as blueprints, helping communities reach their long-term vision for the future (see OPR’s General Plan Guidelines Chapter 2). Per Government Code Section 65302, local governments must incorporate the following topics, or “elements,” into their general plans:
• Land use
• Circulation
• Housing
• Conservation
• Open Space
• Noise
• Safety
• Environmental Justice1
• Air Quality2
Evacuation planning requirements are tied directly to the general plan safety element. The purpose of a safety element is to protect communities from “unreasonable” risks associated with floods, fires, geologic hazards, climate change impacts, and more (see OPR’s General Plan Guidelines Chapter 4 – Safety Element). Recent legislation builds upon prior safety element provisions by requiring communities to identify residential developments with less than two evacuation routes and assess evacuation routes and locations under a range of emergency scenarios.

General Plan Evacuation Requirements3
SB 99 (2019) added Government Code Section 65302, subdivision (g)(5) as follows:
“Upon the next revision of the housing element on or after January 1, 2020, the safety element shall be reviewed and updated as necessary to identify residential developments in any hazard area identified in the safety element that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes.” AB 747 (2019) added, and AB 1409 (2021) amended Government Code Section 65302.15 as follows:
“(a) Upon the next revision of a local hazard mitigation plan, adopted in accordance with the federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-390), on or after January 1, 2022, or, if a local jurisdiction has not adopted a local hazard mitigation plan, beginning on or before January 1, 2022, the safety element adopted pursuant to subdivision (g) of Section 65302 shall be reviewed and updated as necessary to identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and viability and evacuation locations under a range of emergency scenarios. A county or city that has adopted a local hazard mitigation plan, emergency operations plan, or other document that fulfills commensurate goals and objectives may use that information in the safety element to comply with this section and, in that event, shall summarize and incorporate into the safety element that other plan or document.” 1 Environmental justice elements are required in cities and counties with one or more disadvantaged communities
per Government Code section 65302, subdivision (h).
2 Air quality elements, while common, are only required in cities or counties within the boundaries of the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District per Section 65302.1. 3 To view the most current version of the general plan
evacuation requirements, please refer directly to the
government code. Legislation and code amendments
developed after 2022 may not be reflected in this TA.

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OPR advises cities and counties to complete
the requirements outlined in Government
Code Sections 65302, subdivision (g), and
65302.15 simultaneously. However,
communities may address these codes
separately so long as they meet the
timeframes specified in legislation (refer to
Figure 2). Moreover, while the safety
element is the statutory “home” for
evacuation planning requirements, the law
does not preclude related policies from being
incorporated into other general plan
elements. Table 1 highlights potential
connections across general plan elements.

Please note, regardless of where in a general
plan content about evacuation planning is
provided, all general plan goals, policies, and
programs must meet internal consistency
requirements per Government Code Section
65300.5.

Figure 2: Process for determining when the safety element must be updated to address evacuations.

Table 1: Relationship of Evacuation Planning to the General Plan Elements General Plan Element Relationship Example Connections
Land Use Related Planning future land uses that balance safety with other goals.

Circulation Related Planning routes and public transit systems that can be utilized and/or adapted during emergency scenarios.

Housing Related Addressing adequate ingress and egress for new and existing residential development.

Conservation Related
Assessing how housing, transportation, and other development impacts the condition of natural resources and vice-versa (e.g., impacts on floodwater accommodation and erosion).

Open Space Related Managing parks and open space areas to reduce risks along evacuation routes and/or serve as potential evacuation locations.

Noise Related
Exempting noise generated by emergency-related activities (e.g., fire truck sirens and emergency construction work) from local noise standards.

Safety Required
Identifying hazard areas and reducing unreasonable risks.

Identifying evacuation routes and locations. Identifying residential developments with less than two evacuation routes. Preparing for future climate-related hazards and promoting resilience.

Environmental Justice Related Reducing disproportionally high levels of risk in disadvantaged communities and protecting climate vulnerable populations.

Air Quality -- --
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2.1 Related Local Planning Efforts
Local governments can address evacuation requirements directly in the general plan and/or incorporate information from emergency operations plans (EOPs), local hazard mitigation plans (LHMPs), disaster recovery plans (DRPs), or other relevant documents by reference. Each of the plans, explained in this section, correspond to different aspects of the emergency management cycle and align with various State and federal frameworks (refer to Figure 3).

Creating plan alignment—between general plans, LHMPs, EOPs, DRPs, and other relevant plans—can help communities reduce duplication of efforts and implement more holistic policy solutions. OPR encourages local governments to align evacuation planning efforts so that local policies and programs work toward a shared vision for community resilience. While navigating plan alignment options, local governments should consider the primary purpose, planning horizon, update cycle, and approval processes associated with each relevant plan. Should cities and counties choose to integrate information from these plans into the general plan by reference, they should clearly describe how the referenced plan(s) meet applicable statutory requirements and ensure that such plan(s) are consistent with the safety element and all other elements of the general plan per Government Code Section 65300.5. For more information, refer to General Plan Guidelines Chapter 2.

Figure 3: Relationship between planning documents and the emergency management cycle (Source: Circle graphic developed by Fairfax County).

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2.1.1 Emergency Operations Plans
EOPs help communities prepare for anticipated hazards by establishing a framework for emergency response. Government Code Section 8610 requires all local governments with an accredited disaster council to develop EOPs to help protect the safety, health, and welfare of their communities during an emergency. These plans should align with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and State Emergency Management System (SEMS). County-level plans must also align with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 and best practices developed by the State per Government Code Section 8593.9. For more information regarding State and federal frameworks, refer to Appendix D. Regarding evacuations, counties preparing EOPs must:
• Engage culturally diverse communities and integrate cultural competence into emergency planning per Government Code Section 8593.3.5;
• Engage representatives from the access and functional needs (AFN) population and integrate AFN into emergency planning per Government Code Section 8593.3; • Integrate evacuation and transportation plans to account for local community resilience centers and integrate evacuation plans to account for specified state grant programs relating to community resilience per Government Code Section 8593.3.

Best practices include engaging representatives from CBOs and NGOs to ensure whole community participation and addressing the needs of people, pets, and large animals. Once updates are made to EOPs, counties must submit their plan to California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) for review per Government Code Section 8593.3.2. More information regarding EOP requirements and review may be found on the Cal OES website and in the FEMA CPG 101.

2.1.2 Local Hazard Mitigation Plans
LHMPs are voluntary plans that help communities prevent or minimize risks within their jurisdiction to reduce response and post-disaster costs. The federal government requires local governments to develop and maintain LHMPs to receive FEMA mitigation project assistance. These plans must be revised by local governments, reviewed by the State Mitigation Officer, and approved by FEMA once every five years.

FEMA's Local Mitigation Planning Guidance outlines how to develop an LHMP and includes a plan review tool. While there are no specific evacuation requirements within LHMPs, these plans should:
• Describe the type, location, and extent of potential natural hazards; • Describe the community’s vulnerability to hazards;
• Identify buildings, infrastructure, and critical facilities within hazard areas; and • Include a mitigation strategy to reduce and/or avoid long-term vulnerabilities.

Government Code Section 8685.9 authorizes the State to use California Disaster Assistance Act funds to cover a portion of local shares for federally funded post-disaster projects when approved by the legislature. This funding incentive is only available to a city or county if the LHMP is adopted and properly incorporated by reference into the general plan safety element.

2.1.3 Disaster Recovery Plans
Local governments may develop DRPs in anticipation of and/or in response to disasters (refer to Figure 4). These plans are meant to clarify a community’s recovery process and outline long-term strategies and priorities for reinvestment following an emergency or disaster event. Pre-disaster recovery plans set DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 11
the stage for recovery by outlining administrative responsibilities, identifying community partners, and creating a shared understanding of potential needs and challenges. Post-disaster recovery plans, meanwhile, help communities assess local damage, identify lessons learned, adjust future development patterns, and recover in a way that fosters resilience. Regarding evacuations, DRPs provide affected areas with a course of action to improve their infrastructure and meet recovery funding objectives. For example, a DRP could:
• Identify evacuation routes and locations as an opportunity to rebuild for resilience; • Layout evacuation route and location planning mandates and project scopes; • Identify additional recovery projects and pre-disaster projects that need to be completed; • Develop an implementation schedule that promotes the efficient use of time and resources; and • Identify recovery (or other) funding sources that can pay for this work.

DRPs should incorporate objectives from the community’s general plan, LHMP, and/or other planning efforts such as capital improvement programs. DRPs may also inform comprehensive plan updates.

Figure 4: Example timeline of disaster response activities. (Source: FEMA Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning Guide) Local Example: Disaster Recovery Plan Addresses Evacuations In 2018, the Camp Fire spread across Butte County into the Town of Paradise. During the event, 86 people lost their lives, including ten evacuees who died in their vehicles while trying to escape.

Thousands more found themselves stuck on congested roadways. This situation served as an impetus for the Town of Paradise to reassess their evacuation plans, identify existing vulnerabilities, and increase resilience. During the recovery process, the community identified evacuation routes as a “Tier 1” priority in its Long-Term Community Recovery Plan. Within the plan, the town mapped out long dead-end streets, missing road segments, and other barriers to evacuation. In addition, town staff articulated clear actions, timelines, and resources to address bottlenecks, update infrastructure, improve responder access, and mitigate future fire hazards.

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3. General Plan Evacuation Planning Guidance
The following section contains process guidance for addressing evacuation planning requirements within the safety element of the general plan.

3.1 Engage Early and Often
As cities and counties update and implement their general plan safety element, they should engage a diverse array of partners early and often. A variety of inputs can strengthen general plan policies and lead to more successful evacuation outcomes. Per Government Code Section 65351, local governments must provide opportunities for involvement through public hearings or other appropriate means. More information may be found in OPR’s General Plan Guidelines Chapter 3.

Integrating Access and Functional Needs into the Evacuation Planning Process While disasters may impact an entire community, certain groups can be more acutely affected than others. Persons with access and functional needs (AFN) often experience extra hurdles which can hamper their ability to evacuate in a timely manner. Local governments should engage representatives from the AFN population early-on in the evacuation planning process to identify those who need additional assistance and understand what services are likely required. When possible, the general plan update should align or build upon AFN engagement efforts that are required for EOPs (refer to section

2.2.1). More information and best practices may be found in Cal OES’s publication Integrating Access and Functional Needs Within the Emergency Planning Process.

3.1.1 Local Partners
The general plan update process, or other planning processes associated with EOPs or LHMPs, can bring local partners together before an evacuation to identify potential vulnerabilities and develop long-term policies and programs to protect health and safety. Partners may include, but are not limited to:
• Hazard and risk experts: Natural resource managers, public works agencies, California Native American Tribes (tribes), local water/irrigation districts, and other experts may possess helpful insight regarding hazards and risks.
4 Cities and counties can leverage local expertise to develop emergency scenarios and determine the adequacy of evacuation routes and locations. • Emergency managers and responders: Sheriff’s offices, police and fire departments, community and/or tribal emergency response teams, local school districts/county offices of education, and medical centers are often responsible for evacuating civilians and protecting populations from harm. In some cases, nearby military bases may also provide support. Local governments should work closely with emergency personnel to bridge the gap between evacuation planning and operations.
• Local service providers: When disasters strike, communities must evacuate and shelter evacuees with a wide range of needs. Local service providers – such as transit agencies, 4 Please note that “hazard” and “risk” are two separate terms. OPR recommends that planners be sensitive to how these terms are used within planning documents and refrain from using them interchangeably. For more information regarding these terms, please refer to the Glossary.

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homeless shelters, public health agencies, schools, prisons, and private entities – can help communities plan for the safe evacuation and sheltering of diverse populations. • Community-based organizations: Social networks play an important role in evacuation response as well as long-term recovery and resilience. Connecting with religious and cultural centers, advocacy organizations, business associations, disadvantaged communities, climate vulnerable communities, and more can help local governments develop solutions that address safety and build adaptive capacity.
• Animal care providers: Engaging animal care providers—such as animal control, humane societies, veterinarians, ranchers, stables, volunteer animal rescue and evacuation groups, and zoos—can help planners meet the unique evacuation needs of households and/or businesses with pets and large animals (e.g., livestock and equine).

Integrating Environmental Justice into the Evacuation Planning Process Due to prior policies and practices (e.g., redlining and underinvestment), communities across California have differential exposure to environmental hazards and access to the resources necessary to adapt and respond to such hazards. As a result, disadvantaged communities may be disproportionately impacted during emergency scenarios. To increase equity and resilience, local governments should consider aligning their general plan environmental justice element and evacuation requirements.

The purpose of an environmental justice element is to reduce unique or compounded health risks in disadvantaged communities by increasing civic engagement, promoting public facilities, and prioritizing improvements and programs to meet community needs. Local governments must identify and work with disadvantaged communities to develop strategies that improve health and reduce environmental disparities. Improving transportation connectivity, increasing access to services, upgrading public facilities, and other solutions can provide co-benefits during emergency scenarios. OPR recommends that local governments work with disadvantaged communities to identify opportunities to advance both safety and environmental justice goals and policies in their general plans.

3.1.2 Regional Partners
Emergency events often cross boundary lines, affecting neighboring jurisdictions. During their general plan update, local governments should engage the following entities:
• Regional Planning Agencies: Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), regional transportation planning agencies (RTPAs), and councils of government (COGs) provide venues for cities and counties to coordinate on planning topics that are of regional concern. Local agencies can engage with these regional agencies and with emergency planning districts to ensure that activities are aligned across jurisdictions. • Highway Patrol and Operations: Cities and counties should connect with the California Highway Patrol Field Division providing service in their jurisdiction as well as the relevant Caltrans District(s), whose maintenance and traffic operations divisions can help communities utilize the State Highway System for evacuations.
• Non-Governmental Partners: To bolster local capacity, communities may develop partnerships with private entities in the region and/or connect with volunteer organizations. For instance, DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 14
cities and counties can leverage the sharing economy (e.g., Lyft, Uber, and Airbnb) to help transport evacuees and provide temporary housing. In addition, they can coordinate with volunteer response organizations, such as the American Red Cross (ARC), and local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD).

3.1.3 State and Federal Partners
State and federal agencies can assist local governments with long-term planning by providing data, guidance, and technical assistance. When local governments update their general plan safety element, they must engage the following State agencies:
• California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES): Per Government Code Section 65302, subdivision (g)(8), Cal OES must be consulted prior to a safety element update. As part of this consultation process, the office can help cities and counties align their general plan safety elements with EOPs, LHMPs, and other plans.
• Department of Conservation (DOC) – California Geological Survey: Per Government Code Sections 65302, subdivision (g)(8), and 65302.5, subdivision (a), DOC must be consulted prior to a safety element update and review the updated draft to determine whether all known seismic and geologic hazards are addressed.
• Central Valley Flood Protection Board (CVFPB): Per Government Code Section 65302, subdivision (g)(8), CVFPB must be consulted prior to a safety element update. In addition, CVFPB must review draft safety elements for cities or counties within the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District in accordance with GC § 65302.7. CVFPB may recommend changes to the safety element to help communities mitigate flood risk and protect areas subject to flooding. • State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection (The Board): Per Government Code Section 65302.5, subdivision (b), The Board must review all draft safety elements for cities or counties that contain a state fire responsibility area or very high fire hazard severity zone. The Board may recommend changes to the safety element to help communities reduce fire risk and improve evacuations. For more information, please refer to OPR’s Fire Hazard Planning Technical Advisory as well as the Board’s website for more information regarding their safety element review.

Cities and counties should also connect with State agencies that have evacuation-related duties, the California State Transportation Agency (CalSTA), California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), California Energy Commission (CEC), California Volunteers, as well as military departments (e.g., the California National Guard) to support evacuation planning. For communities that border Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, or Mexico, OPR also recommends connecting across state lines to plan for evacuation events. In addition, local governments are encouraged to work with FEMA to align their local plans with federal frameworks.

3.1.4 Partnering with California Native American Tribes Cities and counties must adhere to Government Code Section 65352.3 and the provisions of SB 18 (2004) requiring local governments to consult with tribal governments prior to updating or amending their general plans. In addition, local governments must provide notice to tribes at specified key points in the planning process. (Refer to Government Code §§ 65352, 65352.3, 65092.) Prior to initiating consultation, cities and counties should contact the Native American Heritage Commission (NAHC) for a DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 15
list of tribes to consult. For more detailed information, please refer to OPR’s Tribal Consultation Guidelines.

Regarding evacuations, tribes’ “responsibility to protect and promote their citizens’ welfare remains an essential aspect of sovereignty” (CDC, 2017). Many tribes have their own emergency management frameworks embedded into their constitutions, codes, and emergency management plans. To align evacuation planning efforts, local governments should consider partnering with tribes through crossjurisdictional sharing arrangements. Refer to the Toolkit for Cross-Jurisdictional Sharing Between Tribes and Counties for Emergency Management for more information. This resource contains agreement templates, best practices, and case studies to help foster successful collaborations between tribes and local governments.

3.2 Plan for a Range of Hazards
The safety element of the general plan requires cities and counties to address a variety of hazards including fires, floods, seismic risks, landslides, climate change impacts, and dam failure (See General Plan Guidelines Chapter 4 – Safety Element ). As cities and counties address evacuation planning requirements, they should take an all-hazards approach by analyzing applicable climate and non-climate related stressors that could lead to an emergency scenario (see Section 3.4). Additionally, per SB 1000 (2016) as codified in Government Code Section 65302, subdivision (h), jurisdictions may also address environmental justice–related health hazards in a stand-alone element or integrate environmental justice into other general plan elements, including the safety element.

When determining which threats are relevant to an area, cities and counties should review historical events as well as projected hazards. Because hazards often span jurisdictional boundaries, it may be beneficial to check which risks neighboring jurisdictions are planning for and align planning and assessment activities accordingly. Please refer to Appendix E for tools and resources that can be used to plan for a range of hazards.

Leveraging the General Plan Climate Vulnerability Assessment to Inform Evacuation Planning Rising temperatures may exacerbate existing hazards and pose new challenges for evacuation. The climate change vulnerability assessment, required in the safety element per SB 379 (2018) and codified in GC § 65302, can be particularly helpful in identifying evacuation-related risks under a range of future climate scenarios. For the analysis, local governments must assess the impact of climate change on existing and planned development, including structures, roads, utilities, and essential public facilities.

They can build upon the analysis by developing policies and programs that mitigate risk along roadways, increase the resilience of evacuation locations, and protect communities that are disproportionately vulnerable to climate impacts. More information may be found in the General Plan Guidelines Chapter 4 - Safety Element, Defining Vulnerable Communities Guidance, and California Adaptation Planning Guide.

3.3 Identify Residential Developments with Limited Evacuation Route Access SB 99, as codified in Government Code section 65302, subdivision (g), requires local governments to “identify residential developments in any hazard area identified in the safety element that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes.”
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Residential developments may be separately identified, based on the hazard, or presented in a comprehensive list and/or map. As cities and counties work toward compliance, they should consider coordinating these requirements with those in Public Resource Code Section 4290.5. After residential developments are identified, local governments can assess evacuation viability within these areas (refer to Section 3.6) and, if necessary, identify physical improvements and/or modify evacuation management procedures to reduce risk. Communities may also use this information to inform future land use decisions, by encouraging new development in locations that have access to at least two evacuation routes and supporting infill development in alignment with the State Planning Priorities.

3.3.1 Alignment with Public Resource Code Section 4290.5 Public Resource Code Section 4290.5 requires the Board of Forestry and Fire Protection to “survey local governments…to identify existing subdivisions, as defined, in either a state responsibility area or a very high fire hazard severity zone, without secondary egress routes, that are at significant fire risk.” The Board must then provide recommendations to local governments to improve safety in the identified subdivisions. These activities complement general plan activities (refer to table 2) and work toward the same end goal: safer evacuations. For more information, refer to the Board’s Subdivision Review Program and its Development Identification Process.

OPR recommends that communities, particularly those which have wildfire-prone areas, create alignment between Public Resource Code Section 4290.5 and Government Code Section 65302, subdivision (g) where possible. Communities may build upon or adapt the framework developed for the Subdivision Review Program to identify residential developments in additional hazard areas listed in the safety element (refer to Section 3.2). Alignment may enable local governments to identify residential developments with less than two emergency evacuation routes as part of their general plan update that also qualify as subdivisions lacking pursuant to Public Resources Code section 4290.5.

Table 2: Comparison between PRC § 4290.5 and SB 99 as codified in GC § 65302(g).

Aspects PRC § 4290.5 GC § 65302(g)
Timeframe Every 5 years When the safety element is updated* Housing Identify subdivisions with more than 30
dwelling units Identify residential developments
Circulation Determine if the subdivisions are
without secondary egress
Determine if the residential developments have
less than two emergency evacuation routes
Hazards
This applies to State Responsibility
Areas or Very High Fire Hazard Severity
Zones that are at significant fire risk.

This applies to any hazard area identified in the
general plan safety element (refer to Section 3.2).

Responsibility
Local governments identify applicable
subdivisions. The Board reviews the
subdivisions and recommends
improvements to increase fire safety.

Local governments conduct the analysis and work
with their communities to develop general plan
policies and programs.
* Per Government Code Section 65302, subdivision (g)(6), cities and counties shall review and, if necessary, revise the safety element upon each revision of the housing element or local hazard mitigation plan, but not less than once every eight years.

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3.4 Identify Applicable Emergency Scenarios
Government Code Section 65302.15 requires cities and counties to identify evacuation routes and locations “under a range of emergency scenarios.” Analyzing emergency scenarios can help local governments recognize current vulnerabilities and identify opportunities to build resilience. Scenarios should include a range of relevant hazards addressed in the general plan safety element, factor in future climate impacts, and use best available data to predict evacuation movement.

As part of the evacuation analysis, cities and counties should examine scenarios that require significant activation of evacuation routes, resources, and locations. Scenario planning or simulations of moderate to catastrophic events can provide meaningful insight into community preparedness. For catastrophic scenarios, local governments may reference regional catastrophic plans published by Cal OES. In addition, local governments can consider stressing their plans by evaluating worst-case scenarios. This type of analysis may expose additional vulnerabilities and further inform long-range planning strategies.

Evacuation events may vary widely based on factors, including but not limited to the following:
• Scale of the emergency or emergencies
• Future hazard scenarios
• Future development scenarios
• Time of the event (e.g., day or night)
• Day of the week (e.g., weekday or weekend)
• Time of year (e.g., holiday season)
• Weather conditions
• Time available to warn populations
• Population behavior and needs
• Implementation of evacuation strategies
Looking at a range of scenarios under current and future conditions can help communities understand potential impacts to populations within the hazard area, identify the ways in which evacuation routes/locations may be utilized, provide insight about the effectiveness of emergency management strategies such as contraflow, signal timing, or shelter-in-place (refer to Table 6 for more potential strategies), and inform future land use decisions related to where and how the community should develop. Government Code Section 65302.15 does not specify how many scenarios are appropriate; thus, local governments should consider what is reasonable based on the range of hazards addressed in the safety element along with locally specific issues and context.

Planning for Compounding Disasters and Cascading Effects Hazards are not always singular, sometimes communities may face compounding disasters (e.g., natural hazards during a pandemic) and/or cascading effects (e.g., network disruptions following an earthquake). By incorporating such scenarios into their evacuation planning, local governments can position themselves to adapt to complex challenges.

3.4.1 Understand Population Behavior and Needs
When local authorities order an evacuation, individuals are presented with a variety of choices. They must decide whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place, whom to evacuate (e.g., neighbors, relatives, animals), when to evacuate (e.g., persons outside of the evacuation zone may leave unprompted, creating an evacuation shadow), where, and how to evacuate. Factors such as risk-perception, access to resources, and prior evacuation experiences may influence decision-making. To account for the diversity DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 18
of responses, it is important for local governments to factor population behavior into their planning, particularly when developing clearance time estimates (refer to Section 3.6 – Viability Considerations).

As a starting point, emergency managers can review recent literature, examine past emergency events, or make informed assumptions to guide planning activities. For instance, many EOPs operate under the assumption that 10–15 percent of evacuees will take refuge at public shelters (DHS, 2019). Local governments should determine the extent to which such estimates are appropriate and adjust them to fit their community’s current and/or projected characteristics. To guide this process, OPR recommends engaging a variety of partners to learn about the community’s range of needs (refer to Section 3.1).

Because disasters disproportionately impact populations with AFN and climate-vulnerable communities, engagement with these groups is particularly important. Table 3 highlights a variety of questions and indicators that OPR recommends for the safety element update.

Table 3: Indicators to help estimate evacuation behavior and needs.

Question Impact on Planning Potential Indicators
How many people
are exposed to
potential hazards?
The number of people at risk
influences the scope of
evacuation planning and
operations. In addition, prior
evacuations may influence future
population behavior.
• Hazard exposure
• Frequency of hazards and evacuations
• Population totals in areas at risk
• Average number of people per household
• Percentage of population previously evacuated
How many people
will likely evacuate
and how can
evacuation locations
meet their needs?
Understanding populations’ living
situations can help local
governments predict evacuation
compliance and estimate
demand for public shelters and
other evacuation locations.
• Number of people experiencing homelessness
• Number of people in institutionalized settings
• Prevalence of tourists and commuters
• Households with legacy commitments
• Prevalence of mobile and affordable housing
What are the likely
modes of transport?
A wide range of transportation
modes can facilitate evacuations.

Understanding how people move
can help communities improve
routes, associated infrastructure,
and transportation resources.
• Vehicle ownership
• Prevalence of electric vehicles
• Prevalence of active transport options
• Prevalence of motorhomes and trailers
• Prevalence of private transportation services
• Public transit/rail/ferry ridership
• Vehicle miles travelled (VMT)
What AFN needs are
present in hazard
areas?
Persons with AFN often
experience extra hurdles which
can hamper their ability to
evacuate.
• Household income and employment
• Age distribution
• Literacy and languages spoken at home
• Prevalence of disabilities and chronic conditions
What pets and large
animals are present
in hazard areas?
Households with pets and large
animals are more likely to delay
evacuation or stay in place to
defend their property.
• Percent of households with pets
• Percent of households with large animals
• Pets at risk (e.g., dogs, cats, and birds)
• Large animals at risk (e.g., livestock and equine)
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3.5 Assess Evacuation Locations
As outlined in AB 1409, and codified in Government Code Section 65302.15, cities and counties must identify evacuation locations within their general plan safety element for a range of emergency scenarios. OPR recommends local governments work with their communities to identify the following types of locations:
• Temporary Areas of Refuge: According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 5 these
locations are “used by individuals when a hazard is imminent or occurs with no warning…and are meant to provide temporary and limited protection as an incident occurs” (DHS, 2019).

Located within high-risk zones, these areas can be accessed quickly by evacuees. Examples may include tsunami towers, fire bunkers, as well as other structures and/or open spaces that are resilient to hazards.
• Evacuation Centers: These interim spaces enable evacuees to access basic services and information. Staff at these centers triage the needs of evacuees by helping them transfer to shelters, connect with reunification services, and access additional resources such as vehicle rentals. Evacuation centers may also be referred to as transfer points, information points, or reception centers.
• Evacuation Endpoints: These locations provide a safe place for evacuees to shelter in the days and/or weeks following an emergency scenario. Endpoints may differ based on evacuee needs.

Approximately 10–15 percent of evacuees take refuge at public shelters, but this percentage can vary widely based on local context (DHS, 2019). Animal evacuees may be allowed in certain shelters but are often checked into animal care facilities or other locations that can support household pets and/or large animals (e.g., livestock and equine).

Figure 5: Evacuation location options available to evacuees during an emergency scenario. 5 DHS guidance refers to temporary areas of refuge as “refuges of last resort”. This document uses different terminology in recognition that, for some cases, these locations may be a preferred evacuation option rather than one of last resort.

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Local governments and their community partners should inventory a range of potential venues within the jurisdiction and determine their suitability to function as evacuation locations given the expected hazards and potential emergency scenarios that could impact the jurisdiction. Many types of venues may be designated as evacuation locations such as community resilience centers, public facilities, parks and open spaces, religious spaces, and commercial centers. To determine whether a venue makes a reasonable evacuation location, cities and counties should consider its location, vulnerability to hazards, capacity, accessibility, and resources. More information regarding these factors is outlined in Table 4.

Communities should also identify future land uses and/or developments that have potential to support evacuation operations. Upstream planning can increase resilience, particularly within climate vulnerable and/or disadvantaged communities that have limited access to, or capacity within, current evacuation locations.

In addition to assessing evacuation locations within the local jurisdiction, OPR recommends that local governments more broadly identify pass-through communities that “are not evacuating their populations but are located on the evacuation routes” (DHS, 2019). As evacuees move across city, county, state, and/or international lines, population surges may strain available resources and infrastructure along evacuation routes, particularly during urban-to-rural evacuation events (Meit, Kennedy, & Briggs, 2007). To inform regional coordination efforts, cities and counties should estimate the number of evacuees expected to pass-through neighboring jurisdictions and summarize their needs (e.g., fuel, vehicle charging stations, medical attention, shelter). This information can help receiving jurisdictions pre-identify additional evacuation locations/resources that could support the potential influx of evacuees.

Community Resilience Centers: An Opportunity to Support Evacuation Operations As counties update their emergency operations plans, they must account for community resilience centers during their planning process per Government Code Section 8593.3. These spaces “promote social cohesion and everyday resilience (e.g., economic, health, environmental), as well as disaster preparedness, response, and recovery” (Lou et al., 2020). Managed by trusted community partners, resilience center programming can engage community members and increase climate resilience yearround. When an emergency occurs, local and regional resilience center networks may be activated to support evacuees. Equipped with resources such as first-aid supplies and backup power generators, certain centers can readily transform into evacuation centers or endpoints. Depending on their physical structure, some centers may also be suitable as temporary areas of refuge.

Table 4: Considerations for Evacuation Location Planning.

Question Importance for Planning
Where is the venue located? Evacuation locations within at-risk areas can protect lives when there is limited time to evacuate. In addition, venues nearby can enable transit services to make multiple trips to and from the evacuation zone, improving fleet capacity.

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Question Importance for Planning
How vulnerable is the
location to potential
hazards?
Evacuation locations should provide a safe space for populations to assemble during an emergency event. Communities can assess safety by identifying a venue’s vulnerability to current hazards as well as projected climate impacts.

Some places may be resilient to certain hazards but susceptible others.

How many people and/or
types of animals (pets or
large animals) can the venue
support?
When evacuation locations exceed their maximum capacity, it can cause traffic congestion and complicate evacuation operations. Communities should assess whether potential evacuation locations can accommodate the expected influx of evacuees and their vehicles.

Can the venue accommodate
diverse populations?
Local governments should assess whether venues are compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act or can be modified to become compliant. In addition, venues should be able to safely support evacuees that may have different needs based on their nationality, culture, gender, age, health, education, and ability to access resources.

What resources are readily
available at or near the
venue?
Evacuation locations must be quickly activated during an emergency. Local governments should coordinate with venue owners/managers to assess what types of resources are readily offered at or near the venue that could support evacuee needs (e.g., parking capacity, fuel, vehicle charging stations, storage facilities, food, sanitation, bio security measures) as well as barriers to becoming operational (e.g., locked gates or doors).

3.6 Assess the Capacity, Safety, and Viability of Evacuation Routes The capacity, safety, and viability of evacuation routes must be analyzed under a range of applicable emergency scenarios. This section contains guidance to help cities and counties address general plan evacuation route requirements.

Pursuant to the California Complete Streets Act, which was codified in GC § 65302(b), the general plan circulation element must meet specific requirements for “a balanced, multimodal transportation network that meets the needs of all users of streets, roads, and highways” (for additional information refer to OPR’s Complete Streets Technical Advisory). As local governments assess evacuation route capacity, safety, and viability in the safety element, they should create inter-element consistency by assessing the extent to which different transportation modes—such as driving, walking, biking, and transit—may be used to reach key destinations, including evacuation pick-up points and locations.

3.6.1 Capacity Considerations
Evacuation route capacity focuses on the ability of transportation infrastructure and resources to support evacuees and responders during emergency scenarios. For this assessment, OPR recommends cities and counties consider roadway capacity, transit and fleet capacity, biking and pedestrian route capacity, fuel availability, as well as the feasibility of implementing evacuation strategies.

Roadway Capacity
California’s Road System Map was produced in accordance with the Federal Highway Administration’s functional classification system. It highlights known arterial, collector, and local roads across the state.

For each emergency scenario, cities and counties should identify areas at risk and the associated DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 22
roadways that can be used for ingress and egress. To help with this analysis, OPR recommends local governments divide their planning area into zones6in which evacuees—grouped by traffic analysis zones, evacuation zones, census tracts, subdivisions, zip codes, or other characteristics—rely upon a common set of collectors and/or arterials for evacuation. Identified routes should include applicable portions of California’s Interregional Road System, which consists of county-identified roads that serve as primary evacuation routes in the event of a disaster.

Within the zones, local governments should assess roadway capacity along key segments. Several factors may impact roadway capacity, including but not limited to:
• Road and shoulder widths
• Number of lanes
• Roadway alignment
• Speed Limits
• Weather Conditions
• Bottlenecks7
• Availability of other evacuation modes
• Evacuation Strategies (refer to Table 6)
Local jurisdictions can consult the Highway Capacity Manual to develop baseline capacities for identified roadway segments. Values should be adjusted based upon the evacuation conditions listed above. This information can then be used to estimate clearance times and identify viable ingress and egress options (refer to Section 3.6 – Viability Considerations).

California’s Active Evacuation Zone Map
California’s Active Evacuation Zone Map is updated every 20 minutes to provide timely information that reflects current conditions. Evacuation zones help cities and counties phase evacuee egress and manage traffic demand. Cal OES aggregates evacuation zone information into a state-wide GIS data layer to help the public identify when there is an evacuation warning or advisory, an order to evacuate or shelter-inplace, and clearance to repopulate. Local governments should connect with Cal OES to ensure their evacuation zone data is integrated into this statewide platform.

Biking and Pedestrian Route Capacity
Biking and pedestrian infrastructure can help connect evacuees to nearby pick-up points and/or evacuation locations. When updating the general plan and considering linkages to the circulation element and active transportation plans, local governments should determine which pathways are likely to be used during evacuations and identify any connectivity gaps, particularly in high-hazard areas with limited vehicle ownership. In addition, they should assess the potential for existing and future bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure to enhance evacuation capacity or facilitate emergency operations. For instance, wide roadway shoulders that help communities accommodate pedestrian, bicycle, or equestrian travel in non-emergency times may be adapted to support emergency ingress or egress. 6 In certain instances, it may be appropriate for the entire jurisdiction to be grouped into a single zone. 7 Bottlenecks may be caused by lane reductions, intersections, turn lanes, grade changes, bridges, tunnels, gates, roundabouts, and more. Local governments should identify the extent to which these roadway conditions induce congestion. In some instances, bottlenecks may be located outside of the jurisdiction. Regional collaboration and analyses can provide a holistic view of traffic conditions under emergency scenarios and help cities and counties improve evacuation capacity.

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Additionally, local governments can coordinate with bike associations and non-profits to provide access to bicycle and/or scooter share options during and after emergency scenarios. More information and policy examples may be found in Section 4.1.

Transit and Fleet Capacity
During emergency events, local authorities should mobilize available fleets and other transportation modes to evacuate transit-dependent populations to appropriate evacuation locations. Creating an inventory of local transportation resources can help communities evaluate their ability to support injured persons, AFN populations, stranded evacuees, as well as animals in need of assistance. For example, local governments can pre-identify:
• Medic ambulances
• Paratransit services
• School busses and kneeling busses
• Animal control vehicles
• Livestock trailers and trucks
• Light-rail, subway, or heavy-rail transport
• Ferries or other forms of water transport
• Airplanes or other forms of air transport
• Private transportation services
• Tow trucks and wrecker services
Transit and fleet capacity can be notated by the number of vehicles deployed or the number of evacuees transported over a given time. Factors such as staffing, the location of transportation resources, and the distance between evacuation pick-up points and evacuation locations can influence capacity. Cities and counties should collaborate with transit agencies and other service providers to identify how these, and other factors, affect emergency operations.

Fuel Availability
As evacuees navigate roadways and fleets are deployed, delays may occur due to long queues at gas stations or zero-emission charging stations and impact evacuation capacity. Fuel management can also pose a challenge during the evacuation process. As part of their general plan update, local governments can identify existing fuel stations along evacuation routes and near evacuation locations. This may include gas stations, electric vehicle charging infrastructure, hydrogen fuel stations, and/or other fuel sources.

Because fuel stations rely on power to operate, local governments should determine whether backup power (e.g., battery storage, solar power generators, or traditional internal combustion engine (ICE) generators) is available at the sites. Cities and counties should assess fuel availability for light-, mediumand heavy-duty vehicles (e.g., buses or emergency vehicles) and account for different power requirements (e.g., electric motors and internal combustion engines).

Cities and counties can partner with fuel trade organizations, private sector partners, and neighboring jurisdictions to create redundancies (e.g., create a stockpile of fuel, or establish agreements to secure emergency fuel supplies) and maintain fuel access in the event of power loss. Moreover, local governments can integrate fuel management into their public communications by encouraging vehicle owners to proactively charge their vehicles at home prior to evacuation or keep their tanks close to full, particularly when advanced notices or warnings regarding potentially hazardous conditions, such as red flag warnings, are issued.

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Opportunities to Invest in Zero-Emission Vehicles
California has set ambitious targets to increase the number of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) on the road and the California Energy Commission projects a significant increase in ZEVs statewide (refer to Figure 6). As cities and counties invest in zero emission vehicle infrastructure, they are encouraged to explore a variety of options that simultaneously accelerate sustainable transportation solutions while improving resilience. Solutions communities may consider expanding the number of fast chargers along evacuation routes and procuring temporary EV charging installations. Local governments should coordinate with station managers and other partners to assess charging network capacity and manage demand.

Figure 6: Forecast cases for light-duty ZEV populations in California (source: CEC) Feasibility of Implementing Evacuation Strategies
Assessing the effectiveness of emergency management strategies in tandem with long-term land use changes (refer to Table 6) can help local governments develop holistic policies and programs that will benefit the community during day-to-day operations as well as during emergency scenarios. Cities and counties should engage their communities to find appropriate solutions that balance safety, health, climate, housing, and other important goals.

As part of the emergency scenario analysis, jurisdictions should assess different combinations of strategies to determine what is most feasible and appropriate for their area. In addition, local governments should assess the secondary impacts of potential evacuation strategies. For instance, adding an additional travel lane to a roadway may result in induced demand and increase congestion, vehicle miles traveled, and greenhouse gas emissions over time. Multi beneficial solutions should be developed whenever possible and, when tradeoffs are present, cities and counties should engage a wide range of experts and community members to compare potential solutions and assess options for mitigating negative impacts.

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Table 5: Evacuation Strategies
Evacuation Strategy Example Actions
Increasing Preparedness Staging resources for easy access during an emergency scenario Limiting on-street parking during red flag days in residential areas with limited roadway capacity
Installing microgrids to increase resilience to power loss Maintaining a backup fuel supply for fleets
Creating and maintaining partnerships that may leveraged to increase community preparedness and reliance efforts
Providing Timely Information Utilizing early warning and notification systems Partnering with trusted organizations/leaders to relay information Communicating to the public when extreme conditions are forecasted and promoting pre-evacuations for populations most in harm’s way Managing Traffic Flow Adapting roadways to support partial and/or full contraflow Optimizing signal timing to improve traffic flow
Phasing Traffic Using evacuation zones to identify and prioritize areas to evacuate Facilitating early evacuations for populations that are most at risk Utilizing parking lots to coordinate the release of outbound vehicles Phasing inbound traffic consisting of first responders, emergency response vehicles, and emergency supplies vehicles
Reducing Traffic Congestion Promoting carpooling and ridesharing options for evacuation Closing inbound lanes to prevent motorists from entering the area while an evacuation is underway
Closing outbound on-ramps to reduce traffic originating at intermediate locations along the evacuation route(s)
Coordinating in advance with contractors to provide as much roadway clearance as possible along emergency routes that are undergoing construction
Changing the Built and
Natural Environment
Increasing transportation connectivity
Developing multi-use paths that can be accessed for emergencies Planning parks, open spaces, and/or buildings to be used as temporary areas of refuge or other types of evacuation locations
Developing resilience centers in climate vulnerable communities Roadway alterations8
8 Roadway alterations, such as road widening, should be approached with caution. Though travel times may be reduced in the near-term, road widenings may lead to unwanted secondary impacts such as induced demand and long-term increases in congestion. This could potentially result in negative health, climate, and safety outcomes.

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3.6.2 Safety Considerations
Structural failure, route inundation, falling debris, and limited visibility are potential safety risks associated with a variety of hazards (refer to Figure 6). Cities and counties should use available data, conduct field surveys, and engage their communities to identify these vulnerabilities and other hazardspecific concerns (e.g., heat and smoke impacts from wildfires). On-the-ground insight can also be useful for spotting conditions such as poor route surfaces (e.g., potholes or cracks), environmental risks adjacent to routes (e.g., dense vegetation or unstable soils), adequacy of turnaround points, and other safety concerns.

To support transit-dependent populations, local governments should assess not only roadway safety, but also potential impacts to biking and pedestrian infrastructure as well as public transportation systems. Certain pathways, terminals, and/or services may become inaccessible or unsafe due to hazardous conditions. Cities and counties should estimate the extent to which transit services may be operable during their defined emergency scenarios (refer to Section 3.4) and assess ease of restoration for pathways, terminals, and services that may be negatively affected by emergency event(s). Local governments should integrate this collective information into their route viability assessment and develop policies and programs to avoid or mitigate unreasonable risks. Example policies may be found in Section 4 of this guidance.

Figure 7: Safety risks that may occur along evacuation routes under a range of emergency scenarios.

3.6.3 Viability Considerations
Evacuations are time-sensitive processes in which local authorities’ goal is to guide populations out of harm’s way before disaster strikes. Evacuation routes should support emergency egress by facilitating the safe and timely movement away from potential threats. To assess evacuation route viability, local governments should determine whether current transportation infrastructure and services can reasonably enable populations to leave an area at risk and/or reach temporary areas of refuge under a range of emergency scenarios, within respective time-constraints. This assessment can help cities and counties identify potential vulnerabilities and inform future emergency management strategies, land use decisions, and hazard mitigation efforts.

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 27
Many factors influence route viability, including the scenario type, population behavior, evacuation locations, as well as route capacity and safety. For this reason, local governments should incorporate information from the previous sections (refer to Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6) into this assessment. To analyze route viability, cities and counties may utilize a combination of planning approaches, including:
• Time-based Assessments: Cities and counties can estimate how long it would take for populations to evacuate under a range of emergency scenarios. As part of this assessment, OPR recommends that local governments develop evacuation clearance time estimates. DHS lists clearance times as a “critical consideration” for evacuation planning and defines this metric as “the estimated time to evacuate people from the time an evacuation order is given until the time when the last evacuee can either leave the evacuation zone … or the remaining population must shelter-in-place” (DHS, 2019). This type of analysis can provide the community with a baseline understanding of the time-constraints they may face when evacuating. • Distance-based Assessments: Cities and counties can estimate the distance populations would need to travel to leave the area(s) at risk. This data can be helpful as cities and counties determine the viability of evacuating by foot, bike, or transit. For this type of assessment, OPR recommends that local governments analyze the distribution of operable transit terminals, evacuation pick-up points, and temporary areas of refuge. • Population-based Assessments: Cities and counties can engage specific population groups— such as persons with AFN, persons living in subdivisions with limited egress, or persons who own large animals—to identify additional barriers influencing the viability of evacuation infrastructure and services. Robust engagement can be useful for ground-truthing planning assumptions and understanding community concerns.

A variety of tools may be used to assess route viability. A list is provided in Appendix E. To account for diverse hazards, population dynamics, and multimodal movement, it may be appropriate to use a combination of methods and/or tools. Cities and counties should approach this analysis in a way that is appropriate for their context.

Simulation Tools: Connecting the Housing, Circulation, and Safety Elements Traffic simulations can provide valuable insight into land use challenges and opportunities. For instance, models can be used to analyze evacuee movement within housing developments that have limited route access (refer to Section 3.3) and determine the impact of circulation patterns on evacuation viability.

This information can inform network improvements and emergency management strategies.

Because simulations can be modified to reflect population growth, as well as new roadways and/or development, these tools may also help assess the effects of proposed land use scenarios. To the extent possible, cities and counties should promote new development in areas that are supported by existing evacuation infrastructure, as less compact development may strain responder capacity and the development of additional roads could result in induced demand and increase GHG emissions over time.

Local governments may incorporate information from the general plan housing and circulation elements into their simulations to identify potential consequences of new development on evacuation operations.

Changes may be needed to ensure that general plan policies/programs remain consistent.

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3.7 Identify Evacuation Routes and Locations
Emergencies are dynamic events that evolve rapidly over a short time frame. For this reason, evacuation routes and locations are commonly determined in the moment by emergency response teams and may shift during an event based on changing conditions. In many cities and counties, emergency managers have ultimate authority over which routes and locations are activated. As such, local governments should not prescribe routes and locations within the general plan. Rather, cities and counties should leverage the general plan to support evacuation planning, outreach, and decision-making activities.

Local governments can identify potential routes and locations in either a static or dynamic format based on direction, hazard, and/or condition.

Dynamic Identification Systems
Communities may use dynamic mapping or emergency management tools, such as ArcGIS or Zonehaven, to identify evacuation routes and locations. These tools maintain information in a dynamic format, which allows for routine updates to reflect new shelter locations and lessons learned after emergency events occur. As part of the general plan safety element update, jurisdictions may describe the tools they are using to identify evacuation routes and locations. Links to the platform and example evacuation pre-plans should be incorporated into the general plan to address identification requirements.

Direction-based Identification
Because operations often vary based on where the hazard is originating from, it may be appropriate for local governments to identify evacuation routes and locations based on direction. For example, Sacramento County divided its planning area into several evacuation zones then suggested routes and evacuation locations for each zone based on the direction of travel. Where routes span zonal or jurisdictional boundaries, the county highlighted considerations for interagency coordination. In addition, they listed census tracts within the area, outlined AFN and environmental justice considerations, identified evacuation pick-up points, and provided relevant hazard information. This approach provides a holistic view of evacuation roadways, services, and locations and the information can readily enhance decision making during emergency events.

Hazard-based Identification
As part of the general plan update, local governments can identify hazard zones and the associated routes/ locations that could be activated based on the specific threat. These materials may be leveraged after the safety element is adopted for public outreach, education, and preparedness activities. For example, TsunamiClear and FireClear Maps (refer to Figure 7)—developed through a partnership involving emergency managers, Cal OES, and the California Geological Survey—promote safety by providing the public with transparent and digestible evacuation information. These maps demarcate potential routes and evacuation locations within areas at risk. In addition, they highlight potential road closures.

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Figure 8: Example TsunamiClear Map (source: Claudine Jaenichen) Condition-based Identification
Based on the evacuation analysis outlined in Sections 3.4 through 3.6, local governments can determine which roadways, transit services, and evacuation locations may be suitable for use in an emergency scenario. These may be listed or mapped according to the following conditions:
• Primary routes/services/locations are resilient to hazards, have adequate capacity, and facilitate timely evacuation operations.
• Alternate routes/services/locations are safe for use but may be less desirable due to capacity, location, or other constraints.
• Undesirable routes/services/locations are vulnerable to hazards, have limited capacity, and/or prolong evacuation operations. As a result, they are risky to use during emergency scenarios. • Dysfunctional routes/services/locations are likely to be impassable, inoperable, or unusable during an emergency scenario. They should be avoided during emergencies.

A condition-based identification approach can inform network improvements and development priorities. A similar system has been previously utilized by Amador and Calaveras Counties.

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4. Example General Plan Policies and Programs
The evacuation analyses—discussed in Section 3—should directly inform general plan goals, policies, and programs. This section contains example policy language for communities to reference as they update their general plans. Local governments may adopt or modify these policies at their discretion.

4.1 Increase Evacuation Route and Location Capacity
Cities and counties may adopt policies and programs aimed at improving traffic flow, fleet capacity, and fuel availability within/between jurisdictions. In addition, communities can retrofit or develop new evacuation locations to support a greater number of evacuees during emergency events. Local governments should assess how potential solutions will influence everyday activity in addition to emergency operations and develop policies that are co-beneficial.

Example Policies
Examples of policies or implementation programs that increase evacuation capacity.

Improve Traffic Flow
Policy Require new residential developments to incorporate at least two points of ingress and egress to facilitate traffic flow during evacuation events.

Policy Develop or upgrade multi-use pathways along collectors and/or arterials so they may be utilized by responders for evacuation ingress.

Policy Maintain and increase walking and biking access to a variety of evacuation pick-up points and/or evacuation locations, including temporary areas of refuge.

Program Develop and adopt coordinated emergency notification and evacuation traffic management procedures that may be implemented across jurisdictional boundaries for moderate and catastrophic emergency scenarios.

Program Conduct tabletop exercises on a routine basis to improve agency coordination and identify how evacuation management strategies, such as phased evacuation zones and evacuation notification systems, can be implemented to improve traffic flow during an emergency.

Bolster Fleet Capacity
Policy Expand affordable and reliable transportation options for older adults and persons with disabilities.

Policy Develop agreements with school districts, paratransit services, community-based organizations, and private companies to bolster fleet capacity during emergency events.

Program Support the development of ridesharing and car-sharing programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase transportation options during emergency events.

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Increase Fuel/Electric Vehicle Charging Station Availability Policy Streamline the development of electric vehicle charging stations along key collectors and arterials within the jurisdiction to increase charging capacity during evacuation events and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Policy Establish agreements between government entities and businesses owning direct current fast chargers (DCFCs), allowing public use of these chargers during emergencies along evacuation routes.

Policy Upgrade electric vehicle charging stations to DCFCs along primary evacuation routes and at evacuation locations in partnership with property owners, as applicable.

Program Partner with fuel trade organizations and/or other entities to distribute backup generators to service stations along primary and alternate evacuation routes.

Program Partner with neighborhoods and community-based organizations to develop microgrids which are resilient to power disruptions that may occur during emergencies. Develop agreements so these grids may be utilized by emergency managers.

Program Coordinate the location of DCFC chargers with the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Program (NEVI) to provide an opportunity for the state to provide DCFCs that will serve drivers during non-emergency times and provide charging locations during emergencies. Align the routes with select corridors to help with funding these DCFCs.

Program Establish partnerships to develop web-based app(s) that provide drivers of electric vehicles real-time data on location and status of DCFCs along evacuation routes.

Increase Evacuation Location Capacity
Policy Ensure that critical facilities within hazard areas are built to the highest codes/standards feasible so they can remain operable during emergency events and/or used as temporary areas of refuge.

Policy Preserve and enhance the resilience of parks or other open spaces so they may serve as protective buffers during natural disasters and/or be utilized as evacuation locations.

Program Develop and support community resilience centers to bolster capacity within neighborhoods or census tracts that have limited resources. Prioritize the development of hubs in underserved and at-risk areas with limited access to evacuation locations as well as emergency supplies and services.

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4.2 Manage Evacuation Route and Location Demand at the time of Emergency Evacuation routes, services, and locations may become strained if populations evacuate all at once. To reduce congestion and potential gridlock, local governments can develop policies to manage demand.

Example Policies
Examples of specific policies or implementation programs that manage evacuation route and location demand are listed below.

Manage the Number/Distribution of People Within At-risk Areas Policy Require venues that host large assemblies of people and are within elevated risk areas to reduce their capacity when high-hazard conditions are present.

Policy Inventory and categorize parking facilities according to size, location, or other relevant factors to support the gradual release of privately owned vehicles from urban areas during an evacuation event.

Policy Explore decision-support tools that provide insight into real-time evacuation conditions and can help manage the utilization of roadways and evacuation locations.

Policy Evaluate impact of charging of electric vehicles to the electric grid at the time of emergencies and during heat waves.

Program Develop evacuation zones to phase evacuation operations and educate residents about the evacuation routes, locations, and resources within their zone.

Program Partner with housing services and other entities to provide hotel vouchers to lowincome and vulnerable communities that may be used during voluntary or mandatory evacuation events to address income-related barriers to evacuation and promote quicker evacuation response.

Provide Timely Information During Emergency Events
Policy Identify and procure communication tools that can be leveraged for faster information sharing and develop redundancies should certain communication systems fail.

Policy Improve information dissemination to hard-to-reach populations, including but not limited to those who lack internet access and/or cell phones.

Policy Partner with local community organizations to fill communication gaps and serve as credible sources of evacuation, transportation, and shelter information.

Policy Provide early notification to encourage community preparedness when high hazard conditions are forecasted. Notifications can promote protective actions such as electric vehicle charging and refueling in evacuation zones most at-risk, moving trailers to secure locations, or other preparation activities.

Program Implement the “Ready, Set, Go” campaign or another public preparedness program to encourage residents to prepare go-bags, identify meeting spots, develop checklists, and take additional actions in advance of an evacuation.

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4.3 Reduce Risk and Prepare for Emergency Events
Local governments can decrease the probability of a catastrophic emergency scenario occurring by developing robust adaptation and mitigation policies. Risk reduction activities provide co-benefits to evacuees and emergency responders. Local governments can review the State’s Adaptation Planning Guide and General Plan Guidelines – Safety Element Chapter for more guidance. In addition, cities and counties can develop policies to directly increase the safety of evacuation operations. Examples are included within this section. Any adaptation-focused policies or programs should be assessed from varying viewpoints and timescales to prevent maladaptive or unintended consequences. Policies should also reflect local concerns and target areas of the community that are most vulnerable to hazards.

Example Policies
Examples of specific policies or implementation programs that avoid or mitigate risks to evacuees and emergency responders are listed below.

Promote Upstream Resilience Planning
Policy Locate new essential public facilities (other than areas of refuge) outside of at-risk areas, including, but not limited to, hospitals and health care facilities, emergency shelters, emergency command centers, and emergency communications facilities, or identify construction or other methods to minimize damage if these facilities are in at-risk areas.

Policy Avoid significant expansion of new development, critical facilities, and infrastructure in areas subject to extreme threat unless all feasible risk reduction measures have been incorporated into project designs or conditions of approval.

Policy Incorporate climate change and climate vulnerability into emergency preparedness plans, local hazard mitigation plans, and other local plans to increase preparedness for natural hazards exacerbated by climate change.

Policy Through land use planning, direct new development to occur within areas already served by existing evacuation routes to reduce the need for new roadway construction and increases to vehicle miles travelled (VMT).

Policy Through land use planning, support new development within existing developed and infill areas and incorporate risk reduction measures when necessary to avoid unreasonable risk.

Mitigate Hazardous Conditions Along Roadways and at Transit Stations Policy Partner with utility companies to underground powerlines along key evacuation routes.

Policy Align conservation and open space planning with risk management activities to reduce potential conflict between safety and environmental goals.

Program Develop a local program and leverage the California Vegetation Treatment Program (CalVTP) to reduce wildfire risks along evacuation routes.

Program Develop a local program to retrofit or replace aging infrastructure, including bridges, tunnels, or culverts, to mitigate the risk of structural failure and inundation along evacuation routes.

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Prepare Communities for Emergency Events
Policy Publicly disclose residential development locations with less than two emergency evacuation routes.

Policy Ensure completeness and availability of identified emergency supplies and resources to all segments of the population, focusing especially on climate vulnerable and disadvantaged communities. Examples include temporary housing and road clearing services, as well as items such as medical supplies, water main repair parts, generators, pumps, sandbags, and communications equipment.

Policy Maintain and improve disaster response and recovery capabilities to protect and meet the needs of all members of the community, especially the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.

Policy Translate disaster preparedness and response messaging into the community’s threshold languages and make available in multiple formats.

Program Update existing emergency preparedness and response plans and conduct communityfacing exercises to enhance disaster preparedness and build local capacity to better mitigate health and safety impacts. Engage local organizations as well as regional partners in planning activities and training exercises.

Program Review and update emergency response and evacuation plans and procedures at least every 5 years to reflect changing conditions and community needs.

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https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/whole_community_dec2011__2.pdf FEMA. (2017, February). Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning Guide for Local Governments. Retrieved from FEMA: https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/predisaster_recovery_planning_guide_local_governments.pdf FEMA. (2021, September). Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans. Retrieved from Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101:
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_cpg-101-v3-developingmaintaining-eops.pdf FEMA. (2022, April 19). Create a Hazard Mitigation Plan. Retrieved from FEMA:
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/risk-management/hazard-mitigationplanning/create-hazard-plan Gedney, J., Tupen, J., & Brusatori, A. (2021, June). Amador and Calaveras Counties - Needs Assessment for Extreme Weather and Natural Disaster Prevention and Response Strategies. Retrieved from ACTC: https://actc-amador.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Extreme-Weather-final-report.pdf GoBiz. (2022). Zero-Emission Vehicle Market Development Strategy. Retrieved from GoBiz:
https://business.ca.gov/industries/zero-emission-vehicles/zev-strategy/ DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 37
Jaenichen, C. (2022). FireClear. Retrieved from Design Network for Emergency Management:
https://dnem.org/portfolio/fire-clear/
Jaenichen, C., & Schandler, S. (n.d.). Published. Retrieved from TsunamiClear:
https://tsunamiclear.org/maps/published-maps/
Lou, Z., Raval, A., Young, M., & Appel, S. (2020). Resilience Before Disaster: The Need to Build Equitable Community-Driven Social Infrastructure. Retrieved from APEN: http://apen4ej.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/Resilience-Before-Disaster-FINAL-UPDATED.pdf Meit, M., Kennedy, A., & Briggs, T. (2007, April). Urban-to-Rural Evacuation: Planning for Population Surge. Retrieved from NORC - Walsh Center for Rural Health Analysis:
https://www.norc.org/PDFs/Walsh%20Center/Links%20Out/UrbantoRuralEvacuationPlanningfo rPopulationSurge.pdf
National Academies. (2022). Highway Capacity Manual 7th Edition. Retrieved from National Academies:
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26432/highway-capacity-manual-7th-edition-aguide-for-multimodal-mobility Office of the State Fire Marshal. (2021, October 10). Subdivision Review Program – Development Identification. Retrieved from Office of the State Fire Marshal:
https://osfm.fire.ca.gov/media/o0cpfdtk/cooperators_mapping_examples_101121.pdf Office of the State Fire Marshal. (2022). Subdivision Review Program. Retrieved from Office of the State Fire Marshal: https://osfm.fire.ca.gov/divisions/community-wildfire-preparedness-andmitigation/subdivision-review-program/ OPR. (2005, November 4). Tribal Consultation Guidelines. Retrieved from OPR :
https://opr.ca.gov/docs/011414_Updated_Guidelines_922.pdf OPR. (2018, July). Defining Vulnerable Communities in the Context of Climate Adaptation. Retrieved from OPR: https://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/20200720-Vulnerable_Communities.pdf OPR. (2020, June 24). General Plan Guidelines and Technical Advisories. Retrieved from Governor's Office of Planning and Research: https://opr.ca.gov/planning/general-plan/guidelines.html Sacramento County. (2021, August). Evacuation Functional Annex. Retrieved from Sacramento County:
https://sacoes.saccounty.gov/EmergencyManagement/Documents/Evac%20Annex%20All%20C ombined%20-%20Aug%202021.pdf
Shaheen, S., & Wong, S. (2019). Current State of the Sharing Economy and Evacuations: Lessons from California. Retrieved from University of California Institute of Transportation Studies:
https://www.ucits.org/research-project/shaheen-ucb-sharing-economy-evacuation/ State of California. (2002). Government Code 65041.1. Retrieved from California Legislative Information:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=65041.1.&law Code=GOV
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 38
State of California. (2019, October 10). Assembly Bill No. 747. Retrieved from California Legislative Information:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB747 State of California. (2019, August 30). Senate Bill No. 99. Retrieved from Califorina Legislative Information: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB99 State of California. (2021, October 5). Assembly Bill No. 1409. Retrieved from California Legislative Information:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB1409 State of California. (2022, January 1). Government Code 65302.15. Retrieved from California Legislative Information:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=65302.15.&la wCode=GOV
State of California. (n.d.). Government Code 65302. Retrieved from California Legislative Information:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNu m=65302
Town of Paradise. (2019, June). Long-term Community Recovery Plan. Retrieved from Town of Paradise:
https://www.townofparadise.com/sites/default/files/fileattachments/recovery/page/2071/6.24 .19_long_term_community_recovery_plan.pdf
Zonehaven. (2021). Transforming the evacuation process from start to finish. Retrieved from Zonehaven:
https://www.zonehaven.com/
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 39
Appendices
Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
The following appendix defines acronyms and abbreviations introduced in the TA.

Table 6: Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym /Abbreviation Meaning
AB Assembly Bill
ARC American Red Cross
AFN Access and Functional Needs
Cal OES California Office of Emergency Services
Caltrans California Department of Transportation
CalSTA California State Transportation Agency
CalVTP California Vegetation Treatment Program
CARES California Animal Response Emergency System
CBO Community-Based Organization
CDFA California Department of Food and Agriculture
CEC California Energy Commission
CEQA California Environmental Quality Act
COG Council of Government
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
CVFPB Central Valley Flood Protection Board
DCFC Direct Current Fast Charger
DHS Department of Homeland Security (Federal)
DOC California Department of Conservation
DRP Disaster Recovery Plan
EOP Emergency Operations Plan
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GC Government Code
ICE Internal Combustion Engine
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 40
Acronym /Abbreviation Meaning
LHMP Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPO Municipal Planning Organization
NIMS National Incident Management System
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NAHC Native American Heritage Commission
OPR Governor’s Office of Planning and Research
PRC Public Resources Code
RTPA Regional Transportation Planning Agency
SB Senate Bill
SCCP Solutions for Congested Corridors Program
SEMS State Emergency Response System
TA Technical Advisory
The Board The Board of Forestry and Fire Protection
Tribes California Native American Tribes
VOAD Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster
ZEV Zero-Emission Vehicle

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 41
Appendix B. Referenced Legislation and Bill Information The following appendix contains information regarding California legislation highlighted in the TA.

Table 7: California legislation referenced in OPR’s Evacuation Planning Technical Advisory Legislation Bill Information Description
GC § 65300.5 -- Develop a general plan that is comprised of integrated and internally consistent policies.

GC § 65302 (b) AB 1358 (2008) Plan for multimodal transportation networks in the general plan circulation element.

GC § 65302 (g) SB 379 (2015) Address climate adaptation and resiliency strategies in the general plan safety element.

GC § 65302 (g) SB 99 (2019) Review and update the general plan safety element to identify residential developments in any hazard area identified in the safety element that do not have at least two emergency
evacuation routes.

GC § 65302 (g) -- Consult the Department of Conservation, Office of Emergency Services, and Central Valley Flood Protection Board (if applicable) before the periodic review of the general plan and before preparing or revising the general plan safety element.

GC § 65302 (h) SB 1000 (2016) Develop a general plan environmental justice element if a city or county has a disadvantaged community.

GC § 65302.5 (b) -- Prior to the adoption of or amendment to the general plan safety element, counties that contain state responsibility areas and local jurisdictions that contain a very high fire hazard severity zone must submit a draft to the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection.

GC § 65302.15 AB 747 (2019) Review and update the general plan safety element to identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and viability under a range of emergency scenarios.

GC § 65302.15 AB 1409 (2021) Review and update the general plan safety element to identify evacuation locations under a range of emergency scenarios.

GC § 65351 -- During the preparation or amendment of the general plan, provide opportunities for the involvement of citizens, California Native American Tribes, public agencies, public utility companies, and civic, education, and other community groups, through public hearings and any other means the planning agency deems
appropriate.

GC § 65352.3 SB 18 (2004) Prior to the adoption of or amendment to the general plan, consult California Native American Tribes that are on the contact list maintained by the Native American Heritage Commission.

GC § 8593.3 AB 2311 (2016)
AB 477 (2019)
Counties must integrate access and functional needs into their emergency plans.

GC § 8593.3 AB 2645 (2022) Counties must integrate their evacuation and transportation plans to account for local community resilience centers.

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 42
Legislation Bill Information Description
GC § 8593.3.5 SB 160 (2019) Counties must integrate cultural competence into their emergency plans and provide a forum for community
engagement in geographically diverse locations in order to engage with culturally diverse communities within their jurisdiction.

GC § 8585.7 and
GC § 8612
AB 1317 (2013) The Office of Emergency Services may certify the accredited status of local disaster councils and any disaster council that substantially complies with the rules and regulations established by the Office of Emergency Services shall be certified by the office to become an accredited disaster council.

GC § 8610 -- Cities and counties may create disaster councils by ordinance and such councils shall develop plans for meeting any condition constituting a local emergency or state of emergency.

GC § 8685.9 -- The State may use California Disaster Assistance Act funds to cover a portion of local shares for federally funded post-disaster projects when approved by the legislature. This funding incentive is only available to a city or county if the LHMP is adopted and properly incorporated into the general plan safety element.

PRC § 4290.5 AB 2911 (2018) The State Fire Marshall shall survey local governments to identify existing subdivisions within a state responsibility area or a very high fire hazard severity zone without a secondary egress route that are at significant fire risk.

DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 43
Appendix C. Glossary
The following appendix contains definitions for key planning terms highlighted in the TA.

A-D | E-H | I-L | M-P | Q-T | U-Z
Table 8: Evacuation Planning TA Glossary
Term Definition Source(s)
Access and
Functional Needs
Individuals who have:
• Developmental, intellectual or physical disabilities
• Chronic conditions or injuries
• Limited English proficiency or who are non-English
speaking
Or individuals who are:
• Older adults, children, or pregnant
• Living in institutional settings
• Low-income, homeless, and/or transportation
disadvantaged
GC § 8593.3
Accredited
Disaster Council
Disaster councils which are accredited in accordance with GC § 8585.7 or 8612.

GC § 8585.7 or 8612
Cal OES Disaster
Council Accreditation
Adaptation Making changes in response to current or future conditions (such as the increased frequency and intensity of climate-related hazards), usually to reduce harm and to take advantage of new opportunities.

State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse
Glossary
Cascading Effects Cascading effects are the dynamics present in disasters, in which the impact of a physical event or the development of an initial technological or human failure generates a sequence of events in human subsystems that result in physical, social, or economic disruption.

A Definition of
Cascading Disasters
and Cascading Effects:

Going Beyond the
“Toppling Dominos”
Metaphor
Cities and Counties For the purposes of this guidance, OPR is referring to the cities and counties that must develop general plans per GC § 65302.

The term “local governments” is used interchangeably in this guidance to refer to these same city and county areas.

GC § 65302
Climate Change A change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.

Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions, and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use.

State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse
Glossary
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 44
Term Definition Source(s)
Climate Change
Impacts
As part of the safety element update, communities must
conduct a “vulnerability assessment that identifies the risks that climate change poses to the local jurisdiction and the geographic areas at risk from climate change impacts…”. Impacts may be identified using information from Cal-Adapt, the California Adaptation Planning Guide, historical records, and other agencies.

Examples of climate change impacts include wildfire, heavy precipitation, flooding, extreme heat, drought, rising
temperatures, declining snowpack, sea level rise, and ocean acidification. See Step 1.3 of the Adaptation Planning Guide for more examples.

GC § 65302
Cal-Adapt
California Adaptation
Planning Guide
Climate Vulnerable
Communities
Climate vulnerability describes the degree to which natural, built, and human systems are at risk of exposure to climate change impacts. Vulnerable communities experience heightened risk and increased sensitivity to climate change and have less capacity and fewer resources to cope with, adapt to, or recover from climate impacts. These disproportionate effects are caused by physical (built and environmental), social, political, and/or economic factor(s), which are exacerbated by climate impacts.

These factors include, but are not limited to, race, class, sexual orientation and identification, national origin, and income inequality.

Defining Vulnerable
Communities in the
Context of Climate
Adaptation
Community
Resilience Center
A hydration station, cooling center, clean air center, respite center, community evacuation and emergency response center, or similar facility established to mitigate the public health impacts of extreme heat and other emergency situations
exacerbated by climate change, such as wildfire, power outages, or flooding, on local populations.

GC § 8593.3
Compounding
Disasters
Compounding disasters are when two or more catastrophic events occur simultaneously. This may amplify loss and create complex response and recovery challenges.

Prepare for
Compounding
Disasters
Contraflow A method designed to increase the capacity of transportation roads toward a certain direction by reversing the opposite direction of road segments
Contraflow in
Transportation
Network
Critical Facilities Critical facilities comprise all public and private facilities deemed by a community to be essential for the delivery of vital services, protection of special populations, and the provision of other services of importance for that community. Examples include hospitals, fire stations, police and emergency services facilities, utility facilities, and communications facilities.

FEMA Design Guide
for Improving Critical
Facility Safety from
Flooding and High
Winds
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 45
Term Definition Source(s)
Culturally Diverse
Communities
This term includes but is not limited to, race and ethnicity, including indigenous peoples, communities of color, and immigrant and refugee communities; gender, including women; age, including the elderly and youth; sexual and gender minorities; people with disabilities; occupation and income level including low-income individuals and the unhoused; education level; people with no or limited English language proficiency; as well as geographic location
GC § 8593.3.5
Direct Current Fast
Charger
A high-powered EV charging station that can completely
recharge a typical EV's battery in about 30 minutes. These fast chargers provide an essential backbone for EV drivers, enabling faster corridor travel and emergency charging.

PG&E Site Information
for Electric Vehicle
Direct Current Fast
Chargers
Disadvantaged
Community
An area identified by the California Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to Section 39711 of the Health and Safety Code or an area that is a low-income area that is disproportionately affected by environmental pollution and other hazards that can lead to negative health effects, exposure, or environmental degradation.

GC § 65302 (h)(4)(A)
Disaster Recovery
Plans
For the purposes of this guidance, disaster recovery plans are plans that are developed in anticipation of and/or in response to disasters. These plans are meant to clarify a community’s recovery process and outline long-term strategies and priorities for reinvestment following an emergency or disaster event.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
Emergency
Operations Plan
An ongoing plan for responding to a wide variety of potential hazards. An EOP describes how people and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated.

FEMA Glossary
Emergency
Scenario
A hypothetical situation composed of a hazard, an entity impacted by that hazard and associated conditions, including consequences when appropriate.

FEMA Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide
101
Environmental
Justice
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and national origins with respect to the development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies
GC § 65040.12(e)
Evacuation The organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas and their reception and care in safe areas
2017 State of
California Emergency
Plan
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 46
Term Definition Source(s)
Evacuation Centers For the purposes of this guidance, evacuation centers are interim spaces that enable evacuees to access basic services and information. For instance, evacuation centers may provide food, water, first-aid, restroom facilities as well as fuel and charging stations. Staff at the center triage evacuee needs by helping them transfer to shelters, connect with reunification services, and access additional resources such as vehicle rentals.

Evacuation centers may include transfer points, information points, or reception centers.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
Evacuation
Clearance Time
The estimated time to evacuate people from the time an
evacuation order is given until the time when the last evacuee can either leave the evacuation zone or the remaining
population must shelter-in-place. The calculation is based on various factors such as the type of hazard or threat, level of notice of the incident, population characteristics of the area at the time, and public behavior.

Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Evacuation
Endpoints
For the purposes of this guidance, evacuation endpoints are locations that provide a safe place for evacuees to shelter in the days and/or weeks following an emergency scenario. Endpoints may differ based on evacuee needs. Examples may include hospitals, public shelters, hotels, or second homes.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
Evacuation
Location
For the purposes of this guidance, evacuation location is a general term that refers to all the geographical points that evacuees may go to for safe refuge during an emergency event.

Evacuation locations include temporary areas of refuge, evacuation centers, and evacuation endpoints.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
Evacuation Pick-up
Points
Temporary locations exclusively for evacuation embarkation and transportation coordination in a field setting. They may also be referred to as evacuation transportation sites or assembly points. (e.g., bus stops, parks, aircraft landing sites) Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Evacuation Route
Capacity
For the purposes of this guidance, evacuation route capacity refers to the ability of transportation infrastructure and resources to support evacuees and responders during
emergency scenarios.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
Evacuation Route
Safety
For the purposes of this guidance, evacuation route safety refers to the likelihood of evacuees or responders being harmed while using potential evacuation routes. Such routes may include (but are not limited to) roadways, pedestrian facilities, and public transportation services.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
Evacuation Route
Viability
For the purposes of this guidance, evacuation route viability refers to the ability of transportation infrastructure and services to reasonably enable populations to leave an area at-risk and/or reach temporary areas of refuge under a range of emergency scenarios, given the respective time-constraints.

OPR Evacuation
Planning TA Definition
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 47
Term Definition Source(s)
Evacuation
Shadow
Household evacuation from areas that are not officially designated as part of an evacuation zone.

Large-Scale
Evacuation: The
Analysis, Modeling,
and Management of
Emergency Relocation
from Hazardous Areas
Evacuation Zone A defined area to which residents may be directed to evacuate, depending upon the impacts of the hazard (e.g., tides, storm intensity, path, hazardous material exposure).

Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Hazard An event or physical condition that has the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural losses, damage to the environment, interruption of business, or other types of harm or loss.

Please note, there is a difference between hazard and risk. OPR recommends that planners be sensitive to how hazard and risk are used within planning documents and refrain from using these terms interchangeably.

State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse
Glossary
Infill Development This term refers to building within unused and underutilized lands within existing development patterns, typically but not exclusively in urban areas.

Office of Planning and
Research Infill
Development
Information Point Located on or near main evacuation routes, interstate highways, and state borders. These facilities are generally state-sponsored and located at state points of entry (e.g., rest areas, tourist centers) and provide self-evacuees:
• Information and/or directions to shelter facilities
• Access to restroom facilities
• A temporary rest during their evacuation
• A place to recharge phones or other electronic devices • Limited access to food and water
Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Level-3 Chargers Level 3 charging is the fastest type of charging available and can recharge an EV at a rate of 3 to 20 miles of range per minute.

Unlike Level 1 and Level 2 charging that uses alternating current (AC), Level 3 charging uses direct current (DC). See also Direct Current Fast Chargers.

What Are the
Different Levels of
Electric Vehicle
Charging?
Local Governments For the purposes of this guidance, OPR is referring to the cities and counties that must develop general plans per GC § 65302 (refer to “Cities and Counties”).

GC § 65302
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 48
Term Definition Source(s)
Local Hazard
Mitigation Plans
Hazard mitigation plans reduce loss of life and property by minimizing the impact of disasters. LHMPs begin with local governments identifying natural disaster risks and vulnerabilities that are common in their area. After identifying these risks, they develop long-term strategies for protecting people and property from similar events. Mitigation plans are key to breaking the cycle of disaster damage and reconstruction.

FEMA Hazard
Mitigation Planning
Paratransit
Services
Transit services can be used to transport populations with access and functional needs. Services can consist of a subsidized taxi ride or a small bus that runs on a loosely defined route, stopping to pick up or discharge passengers on request. It also can be a fully demand-responsive form of transportation that offers ondemand, call-up, and/or door-to-door service from virtually any origin to virtually any destination in a service area. Paratransit services are operated by public transit agencies, community groups, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as for-profit private companies and operators.

Bay Area Paratransit
Toolkit
Plan Alignment The process of leveraging connections, information, and resources to build shared language, data foundations, and processes across multiple planning efforts at any scale. Plan alignment, in essence, is based on collaboration. The resulting products of plan alignment are:
• a suite of plans (with different scopes and purposes) that share the same data, similar underlying
assumptions, aligned visions, and complementary goals,
strategies, and actions, and
• a shared understanding, process, and structure for
multiple entities in a community or region to continue
to collaborate and align efforts over the long term.

State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse Plan
Alignment Toolkit
Reception Center An interim site along an evacuation route that provides mass care and other emergency services to evacuees arriving in a host location via government transportation. A Reception Processing Site may be located within an impact jurisdiction (although outside the impact area) or in a host jurisdiction. These locations provide life-sustaining services, such as food, water, basic medical support, and assignment and transportation to a shelter. Additional services may include disaster and local weather information, reunification, and crisis counseling.

Temporary sleeping space may also be provided while evacuee needs are evaluated or if evacuees arrive late at night.

Jurisdictions should arrange separate areas for unaccompanied minors, people without identification, and individuals subject to judicial and/or administrative orders restricting their freedom of movement. These sites may also process evacuees returning to the impact jurisdiction.

Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 49
Term Definition Source(s)
Resilience
(Climate)
The capacity of any entity—an individual, a community, an organization, or a natural system—to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience
State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse
Glossary
Resilience
(Community)
The ability of communities to withstand, recover, and to learn from past disasters to strengthen future response and recovery efforts. This can include but is not limited to physical and psychological health of the population, social and economic equity and well-being of the community, effective risk
communication, integration of organizations (governmental and nongovernmental) in planning, response, and recovery, and social connectedness for resource exchange, cohesion,
response, and recovery.

State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse
Glossary
Risk Risk for the purpose of hazard mitigation planning, is the potential for damage or loss created by the interaction of hazards with assets such as buildings, infrastructure, or natural and cultural resources. For natural hazards, risk tends to be calculated based on evaluation of the probability (likelihood) of a hazard event occurring, vulnerability, and the event’s potential consequences. This method uses data from the past to establish the probability and, in the case of climate change, includes future projections of probability.

Please note, there is a difference between risk and hazard. OPR recommends that planners be sensitive to how hazard and risk are used within planning documents and refrain from using these terms interchangeably.

State of California
Adaptation
Clearinghouse
Glossary
Roadway Capacity The maximum rate at which vehicles can be expected to traverse a section of roadway during a given time period under prevailing roadway, traffic, and control conditions. The unit rate of measurement is typically notated by the number of vehicles per hour.

Criteria for
Development of
Evacuation Time
Estimate Studies
Secondary Egress An adequate secondary egress route is a road, navigable by a passenger vehicle weighing 6,000 pounds or less, of equal construction standard to the primary road. The secondary road does not have to be rated to carry the same quantity of traffic (e.g., a two-lane paved road and a one-lane paved road is acceptable).
ii. An adequate secondary egress route is not:
(A) a road with locked gates or limited access; or
(B) a road that directs traffic to the same outlet road as the primary road or results in a circular traffic flow, to the extent practicable.
14 CCR § 1267.01
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 50
Term Definition Source(s)
Shelter-in-place The use of a structure to temporarily separate individuals from a hazard or threat. Sheltering in place is the primary protective action in many cases. Often it is safer for individuals to shelterin-place than to try to evacuate. Sheltering in place is appropriate when conditions necessitate that individuals seek protection in their home, place of employment, or other location when disaster strikes.

Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Temporary Areas
of Refuge
Locations that are used by individuals when a hazard is imminent or occurs with no warning…and are meant to provide temporary and limited protection as an incident occurs. Please note, the Department of Homeland Security refers to temporary areas of refuge as “refuges of last resort”. This document uses different terminology in recognition that, in some cases, these locations may be a preferred evacuation option rather than one of last resort.

Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Transfer Point If applicable, locations where transportation-assisted evacuees move from their initial evacuation modes of transportation onto other transportation to a reception processing site or a shelter.

Depending on drive times and/or distances, relief drivers and/or vehicles may be needed to comply with state and/or Federal safety regulations.

Planning
Considerations:

Evacuation and
Shelter-in-Place
Transportation
Connectivity
This term encompasses planning activities that increase access to destinations. Examples include locating commercial centers in accessible areas, reducing the distances to destinations that satisfy daily needs, improving pedestrian and bicycle
infrastructure, and managing the transportation system to reduce congestion.

Department of
Transportation
Connectivity Webpage
Threshold
Languages
Languages which are spoken at a high proportional rate within a geographic region of the state and as such may contribute to obstacles of understanding and access for those seeking mental health services.

Medi-Cal Statistical
Brief
Unreasonable Risk This term comes from GC § 65302(g)(1): “A safety element for the protection of the community from any unreasonable risks associated with the effects of seismically induced surface rupture, ground shaking, ground failure, tsunami seiche….”. The statute does not define what constitutes an unreasonable risk nor does OPR expand upon this definition in current guidance.

It’s up to each city and county to define what “unreasonable” means within their context.

GC § 65302(g)
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 51
Appendix D. State and Federal Frameworks
This appendix describes emergency planning frameworks at the State and federal level. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all laws or policies that may exist on these topics. Many of these frameworks work in tandem to assist local governments with planning for and executing a coordinated emergency response process.

Federal Frameworks
National Response Framework
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed the federal government to create a comprehensive plan to support domestic incident management for a broad range of emergencies requiring federal response.

The current National Response Framework (NRF) outlines agency roles, responsibilities, and opportunities for coordination. Information related to evacuation routes can be found in the NRF’s Mass Evacuation Incident Annex.

National Incident Management System
In 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive–5 established the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to enhance coordination between government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and businesses during emergency events. Figure 8 illustrates how these actors can work together to aid those impacted by disasters. NIMS provides a flexible template for emergency operations that can be applied nationwide.

Figure 9: Coordination process between local, state, and federal partners during an emergency event. (Source: National Incident Management System, FEMA 2017)
DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 52
Continuity of Operations and Government
U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 40 led the establishment of a Continuity of Operations Program so that agencies at all levels of government can better delegate authority, communicate, and perform essential functions during an emergency event. Guidance regarding continuity planning in California may be found on the Cal OES Continuity Planning Webpage.

National Disaster Recovery Framework
The Department of Homeland Security published the National Disaster Recovery Framework to establish “a common platform and forum for how the whole community builds, sustains, and coordinates delivery of recovery capabilities”. To complement this framework, FEMA developed a Community Recovery Management Toolkit to help cities and counties bolster their recovery capabilities and meet the needs of their whole community.

State Frameworks
California State Hazard Mitigation Plan
California’s State Hazard Mitigation Plan (SHMP) outlines the State’s priorities, strategies, and actions to reduce long-term risks posed by natural and human-caused disasters. With regards to evacuation, this plan provides historical context regarding prior mass evacuation events and outlines how hazards, exacerbated by climate change, are likely to impact evacuation events in the future. This plan notes how general plans, capital improvement programs, and other activities can mitigate hazards and improve evacuation operations. Summaries of relevant plans, tools, and opportunities are included in the SHMP.

California’s Standardized Emergency Management System
California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) incorporates NIMS requirements and serves as “the cornerstone of California’s emergency response system” (Cal OES). Recognizing the integral role that animals play in evacuation behavior, California’s Animal Response Emergency System (CARES) is also integrated into SEMS to facilitate the evacuation and sheltering of animals. SEMS helps communities across California more readily respond to incidents, manage disasters, and obtain mutual aid. To be reimbursed for response-related costs through the State’s disaster assistance programs, local governments must use SEMS.

State of California Emergency Plan
The State of California Emergency Plan (SEP) helps communities across the State prepare for and manage a range of natural and human-caused disasters by outlining pertinent emergency operations methods, processes, and requirements. With regards to evacuation routes, the 2017 SEP states that evacuation plans “must integrate accessible transportation providers within the planning process and movement of people with mobility impairments and those with transportation disadvantages.

Transportation planning considerations should include staging, embarkation points, transportation centers, evacuee locations, and care and shelter.” Information regarding State transportation planning coordination may be found in the Emergency Support Function 1 - Transportation Annex.

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In addition to transportation considerations, the SEP suggests that local governments develop specific procedures for the evacuation of people located in areas below dams, in accordance with California Government Code Section 8589.5. Recognizing that climate change can exacerbate certain hazards, the SEP also encourages communities to incorporate climate change considerations into their emergency management process.

California Disaster Recovery Framework
California’s Disaster Recovery Framework establishes a coordination structure to facilitate recovery assistance for impacted communities. This framework notes how recovery activities are related to disaster mitigation and preparedness and highlights ways that future resiliency can be addressed during the recovery stage of the emergency management cycle.

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Appendix E. List of Resources
The following appendix contains guidance, tools, and resources to help local communities update their general plan safety element and promote safe evacuations.

Plan Alignment
• Cal OES Planning & Preparedness: Cal OES publishes a variety of resources that can assist local governments as they plan for emergency events.
• Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: FEMA published a comprehensive preparedness guide to support cities and counties with emergency operation plan updates. This guidance incorporates practitioner feedback and identifies lessons learned to advance emergency planning, operations, and response.
• FEMA Local Mitigation Planning Guidance: FEMA published a policy guide to help local planners understand the minimum local hazard mitigation planning requirements. In addition, they published a planning handbook to exemplify various ways to meet, or exceed, federal LHMP requirements. Training opportunities are also available on FEMA’s website. • FEMA Pre-Disaster Recovery Planning Guide for Local Governments: FEMA published a recovery planning guide to help communities establish recovery roles/responsibilities and develop proactive policies to aid the post-disaster recovery process. • Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery - Next Generation: This guidance document highlights how post-disaster recovery plans can be leveraged to increase the speed of recovery, effectively use resources, and provide more opportunities for community betterment.

Community Engagement
• CalCOG Member Directory: This directory contains contact information for councils of governments from across California.
• Cal OES Planning and Preparedness Branch: Cal OES provides emergency planning and guidance for state agencies, local and tribal governments, tribes, businesses and the private sector, CBOs and NGOs, the federal government, and private citizens. • Cal OES Regional Operations: Cal OES maintains information regarding regional emergency operations. There are three regional branches in California: coastal, inland, and southern region. • CDFA Animal Health and Food Safety Services Division: When disasters strike, they impact not only people but also the animals in their care. Many choose to delay evacuation or stay-in-place to protect their pets and large animals (e.g., livestock and equine). Recognizing the integral role animals play in evacuation processes, CDFA published guidance, titled Planning for Animal Health During a Disaster to help governments, volunteer organizations, and industry facilitate the safe movement and care of animals. CDFA’s CARES Unit also collaborates with agencies to implement the California Animal Response Emergency System. • Integrating Access and Functional Needs Within the Emergency Planning Process: While disasters may impact an entire community, certain groups can be more acutely affected than others. Persons with AFN often experience extra hurdles which can hamper their ability to evacuate in a timely manner. This guide help planners better integrate AFN needs into the DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 55
emergency planning process to promote more equitable evacuation outcomes. Additional information may also be found in the Cal OES AFN Library. • Leveraging the Sharing Economy to Expand Shelter and Transportation Resources in California Evacuations: This policy brief highlights how communities can partner with companies - such as Airbnb, Uber, and Lyft – to support emergency evacuation and shelter options. • List of MPOs and RTPAs in California: The California Department of Transportation maintains a complete list of metropolitan planning organizations and regional transportation planning agencies within the state.
• Toolkit for Cross-Jurisdictional Sharing Between Tribes and Counties for Emergency Management: Many tribes have their own emergency management frameworks which are embedded into their constitutions, codes, and emergency management plans. To align emergency management efforts, this guidance highlights ways local governments can partner with tribes through cross-jurisdictional sharing arrangements.

Hazard Identification
• Cal-Adapt: Cal-Adapt provides data and tools to help communities predict climate change impacts within their community. The tools and data can help communities visualize hazards such as extreme precipitation events and decadal fire probabilities. • California Dam Breach Inundation Maps: California’s Department of Water Resources reviews, approves, and publishes dam inundation maps to support emergency planning. Additional resources may also be found on the Cal OES Dam Safety Planning website. • California Flood Management Maps: The Department of Water Resources used best available data to develop and publish maps that highlight 100 and 200-year composite floodplains as well as levee flood protection zones.
• California’s Fourth Climate Change Assessment: California’s climate assessments provide a scientific foundation for understanding vulnerability at a local scale. The statewide, regional, and technical reports offer insight into future hazard scenarios. In addition, the assessment funded and enhanced several tools that may be used to support climate action. • California Geological Survey: The California Department of Conservation provides maps that highlight landslide and tsunami hazards as well as earthquake hazard zones. • Central Valley Flood Protection Board (CVFPB) Maps: The CVFPB provides maps that highlight floodways and levees within the valley region.
• Fire and Resource Assessment Program (FRAP) Maps: The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection provides a map of fire hazard severity zones within local and state responsibility areas, as well as other maps relevant to wildfire planning. • General Plan Mapping Tool: This GIS tool provides access to data to inform general plan decision-making processes. The tool provides data related to flooding, fire, landslides, liquefaction, and more.
• Sea the Future: This resource helps communities across California compare tools that can be used to visualize the impacts caused by sea-level rise and flooding.

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• My Hazards: According the MyHazards website, MyHazards is “a tool for the general public to discover hazards in their area (earthquake, flood, fire, and tsunami) and learn steps to reduce personal risk. Using the MyHazards tool, users may enter an address, city, zip code, or may select a location from a map. The map targets the location and allows users to zoom and scroll to their desired view. The screen then presents information on the risks identified within the search radius and recommended actions.”
• My Plan: According to the My Plan website, My Plan “is an internet-mapping tool for California city, county, special district, state, and tribal emergency managers and planners to assemble and assess GIS information on natural hazards, with the ultimate goal of creating hazard maps. [The tool] allows viewing and creating of maps suitable for preparing, updating, and reviewing:
o Local Hazard Mitigation Plans
o General Plan Safety Elements
o Local Coastal Programs (LCP)
o All hazard mitigation planning efforts”
Residential Development Identification
• Fire Safety Survey Map: This interactive map from CAL FIRE shows subdivisions that have been identified for survey pursuant to PRC § 4290.5, including the results and recommendations from completed surveys.
• Subdivision Review Program: CAL FIRE’s subdivision review program helps local governments respond to PRC § 4290.5 by identifying existing subdivisions with more than 30 dwelling units that are without secondary egress and located in areas with significant fire risk.

Emergency Scenario Considerations
• A Provisional Conceptual Model of Human Behavior in Response to Wildland-Urban Interface Fires: This literature review identifies factors that influence evacuation decision-making during wildfire events.
• California Healthy Places Index: This index contains 25 indicators that represent key social determinants of heath. These include income, employment, transportation, housing and healthcare. Information can be organized by census tract, city, county, as well as by MPO. • Catastrophic Planning: Catastrophic Plans hosted on the Cal OES website — such as the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan and Northern California Catastrophic Flood Response Plan — include information that may be helpful to cities and counties as they plan for catastrophic or worse case evacuation scenarios.
• Climate Change and Health Vulnerability Indicators: The California Department of Public health maintains data for a set of indicators to help California communities assess exposures, social vulnerability, and adaptive capacity.
• COVID-19 Supplement for Planning Considerations: FEMA summarizes potential impacts COVID19 may have on emergency operations and outlines key questions for planners to consider. • Double the Trouble: A Playbook for COVID-19 and Evacuations: The global COVID-19 pandemic presented new challenges for emergency managers. To help communities resolve potential DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 57
conflicts and better respond to compounding disasters this playbook highlights case studies and potential strategies that local governments can implement.

Evacuation Location Considerations
• Review of Resilience Hubs and Associated Transportation Needs: This literature review characterizes resilience hubs and identifies how these spaces can support the needs of residents and evacuees. This paper also highlights opportunities for integrating transportation services into resilience hub planning and operations.

Capacity Considerations
• Bay Area Emergency Services Fuel Consumption Calculator: Recognizing the potential vulnerabilities associated with fuel and supply chain interruption, the Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative developed an emergency services fuel consumption calculator as part of its Critical Transportation Toolkit. When using the calculator, agencies input their vehicle type(s), expected travel distance, and number of people to move OR vehicles granted. Based on this information, the calculator provides the fuel type and total amount of fuel needed. • California’s Interregional Road System Map: This map highlights county-identified roads that serve as primary evacuation routes in the event of a disaster. • California’s Road System Map: This map was produced in accordance with the Federal Highway Administration’s functional classification system. It highlights known arterial, collector, and local roads across the state.
• Highway Capacity Manual: This manual – published and updated by the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine – may be consulted to develop baseline capacities for roadway segments. These estimates should be adjusted to account for prevailing roadway conditions.
• Local Jurisdiction Fuel Planning Toolkit: Washington State’s Department of Commerce developed planning guidance and resources to help local governments estimate their fuel consumption in an emergency and develop contingency plans. • Modeling Electric Vehicle Charging Network Capacity and Performance During Short-notice Evacuations: Researchers developed a model to assess how electric vehicle charging capacity along evacuation operations and outline policy recommendations to increase resilience.

Safety Considerations
• California Adaptation Planning Guide: This planning guide helps local governments identify climate hazards, assess vulnerability, develop strategies, and implement policies to improve resilience. This guidance can help communities meet SB 379 general plan requirements. • FEMA Hazus Program: FEMA provides nationally standardized data to estimate local risk from earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding, and hurricanes. This data source is managed by FEMA’s Natural Hazards Risk Assessment Program.
• Resilience Analysis and Planning Tool (RAPT): FEMA developed a free tool to help communities assess their resilience to hazards. This platform uses GIS to visualize the relationship between people, infrastructure, and hazards.

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Viability Considerations
• Evacuation Management Operations Modeling Assessment: The U.S. Federal Government published a transportation modeling inventory to help jurisdictions select between a range of planning and decision support tools for evacuation planning. This report summarizes each tool and highlights case studies where applicable. Please note, this report was published in 2007 so newer models and methods may not be captured.
• FLEET- Fast Local Emergency Evacuation Times: This free evacuation planning tool enables users to estimate the time required for vehicles to clear a local or regional area. The tool was designed for short notice evacuation scenarios and can be adapted to reflect seasonal population adjustments, evacuation compliance, time of day, evacuation zones, and other factors. • Large Scale Evacuation – The Analysis, Modeling, and Management of Emergency Relocation from Hazardous Areas: This book “offers a step-by-step guide through the key questions needed to model an evacuation and its impacts to the evacuation route system”. This text highlights challenges, strategies, and case studies that may be useful to consider when planning for evacuations.
• Traffic Analysis Tools: The Federal Highway Administration highlights existing tools that may be used for traffic analysis. They also published methodology for selecting appropriate tools. • Traffic Modelling of Potential Emergency Wildfire Evacuation Routes: The Caltrans Division of Research, Innovation, and System Information conducted compiled a list of resources and modelling tools that are being used for evacuation planning in wildfire prone areas. • USGS Pedestrian Evacuation Analyst Tool: The Pedestrian Evacuation Analyst is an ArcGIS extension that estimates how long it would take for someone to travel on foot out of a hazardous area that was threatened by a sudden event such as a tsunami, flash flood, or volcanic lahar.

Evacuation Route and Location Identification
• Zonehaven: This emergency management tool helps communities plan, train for, and execute evacuations. Local governments can use the tool to pre-plan routes and identify evacuation locations in real-time.
• ArcGIS Solutions: According to its website, ArcGIS for Emergency Management solutions “can be used for situational awareness, operations response, and logistics planning. For example, my Hazard Information enables constituents to [access] information about evacuation routes, potential hazards, and information regarding public safety resources in their community.” Strategies to Promote Effective Evacuations
• Cal OES Family Readiness Guide: This guide helps community members prepare for disasters by providing information about home preparation, sheltering and evacuations, common hazards, emergency supplies, and other resources.
• Caltrans Evacuation Route Design Information Bulletin: This Design Information Bulletin (DIB) guides design procedures and recommendations for developing projects along evacuation DRAFT Evacuation Routes TA 59
routes. The guidance is primarily for rural communities where access to and from the community is limited and a State highway is to be used as a primary evacuation route. • Emergency Transportation Operations Publications: The Federal Highway Administration published numerous guides that can inform evacuation planning and policies. • Federal Highway Administration Guidance: To support evacuation planning and operations, the Federal Highway Administration developed a Principals of Evacuation Planning Course and published a “Routes to Effective Evacuation Planning Primer Series” which consists of the following guidance:
o Using Highways During Evacuation Operations for Events with Advance Notice o Using Highways for No-Notice Evacuations
o Evacuating Populations with Special Needs
• FEMA Ready Website: This website helps families and businesses prepare for a range of emergencies. Certain emergency preparedness content is also available in a variety of languages.
• Planning Considerations – Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place: The Department of Homeland Security published this report to help communities develop protective actions for a range of disaster scenarios.
• The National Preparedness Training Center: This center provides training to help communities plan for natural hazards. For instance, they offer a FEMA-certified course titled “Evacuation Planning Strategies and Solutions” which explores data, modeling tools, and simulations that can be used to plan for emergency events. This course offers professional credits. • The Security and Emergency Response Training Center: This center offers courses to increase emergency preparedness and improve response, some of which are offered at no direct cost to agencies.

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Appendix F. Funding Opportunities
The following appendix lists funding programs that can help local communities update their general plan safety element and promote safe evacuations.

Table 9: Funding Opportunities
Name Funding Description
Active Transportation
Program
State and
Federal Funding
This program provides funding to develop and improve active transportation infrastructure. One of the program goals is to increase safety and mobility for non-motorized users. This program could be leveraged to support multi-modal evacuations and trail improvements that could assist with timely evacuations.

California Fire
Prevention Grants
Program
State Funding This grant program, managed by CALFIRE, “provides funding for fire prevention projects and activities in and near fire threatened communities that focus on increasing the protection of people, structures, and communities”. This program funds evacuation plan and general plan safety element updates. In addition, this grant can support vegetation modification adjacent to roads to improve public safety for egress of evacuating residents and ingress of responding emergency personnel.

California Vegetation
Management Program
State Funding This cost-sharing program can reduce wildfire and flooding risk by treating vegetation within the State Responsibility Area, including along roadways.

Community Resilience
Centers Program
State Funding California’s Strategic Growth Council supports community efforts to build new facilities or retrofit existing facilities along with programs that will serve as centers to help vulnerable residents withstand the impacts of extreme heat, wildfires, power outages, flooding, and other emergency situations brought about by climate change.

Fairground and
Community Resilience
Centers Program
State Funding The California Department of Food and Agriculture is funding improvements to fairgrounds and other community centers to enhance emergency preparedness and respond to climate
change.

FEMA Emergency
Management
Performance Grant
Program (EMGP)
Federal Funding Funds from this program may be used “to foster whole community preparedness for disasters and emergencies”. This grant may be used to update EOPs and/or develop sheltering and evacuation plans. Construction and renovation projects are also allowable costs under this program but must be approved by FEMA on a case-by-case basis.

National Electric
Vehicle Infrastructure
Program (NEVI)
Federal Funding The CEC will be managing a $384 million funding solicitation to build out a network of DCFCs along California’s Alternative Fuel Corridor.

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Name Funding Description
Prepare California State Funding This State program is “focused on building community resilience amongst vulnerable individuals living in the areas of the state most susceptible to natural disaster” (Cal OES). Funding may be used for evacuation planning, local capacity building, risk reduction projects, public education, and more.

Promoting Resilient
Operations for
Transformative,
Efficient, and Costsaving Transportation
(PROTECT) Program
Federal Funding This competitive federal grant program provides funding to increase the resilience of local and regional transportation systems. Funds may be used for planning activities and projects that improve evacuation routes and increase infrastructure resilience.

Regional Early Action
Planning Grants 2.0
(REAP 2.0)
State Funding This grant program advances the implementation of adopted regional plans by funding planning and implementation activities that accelerate infill housing and reductions in per capita vehicle miles travelled (VMT). Increasing connectivity to transit corridors, commercial centers, and other destinations may produce cobenefits during evacuation events. As such, this program may be leveraged for strategic planning activities and improvements within the local jurisdiction.

Solutions for
Congested Corridors
Program (SCCP)
State Funding This competitive program provides funding to RTPAs, county transportation commissions, and Caltrans for projects that reduce congestion by implementing a balanced set of transportation, environmental, and community access improvements.

State of Good Repair
(SGR) Program
State Funding This program can be leveraged to upgrade or repair aging transportation infrastructure and modernize or acquire new transit vehicles. Transportation planning agencies and county transportation commissions are eligible for this program.

Sustainable
Transportation
Planning Grants
State Funding Climate Adaptation Planning Grants, a subset of this grant, supports local and regional identification of transportationrelated climate vulnerabilities through the development of climate adaptation plans, and project-level adaptation planning to identify adaptation projects and strategies for transportation infrastructure.

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Appendix G. Evacuation Planning Checklist
Below is a checklist that cities and counties may follow when updating their general plan safety element:

Identify Opportunities for Plan Alignment
Consider alignment with emergency operations plans.

Consider alignment with local hazard mitigation plans.

Consider alignment with disaster recovery plans.

Consider alignment with other relevant plans.

Engage Early and Often
Required: Provide opportunities for public involvement per GC § 65351.

Identify and engage local partners.

Identify and engage regional partners.

Identify and engage State, Federal, and/or international partners. • Required: Consult the Department of Conservation, Office of Emergency Services, and Central Valley Flood Protection Board (if applicable) before the periodic review of the general plan and before preparing or revising the general plan safety element per GC § 65302 (g).
• Required: Prior to the adoption of or amendment to the general plan safety element, counties that contain state responsibility areas and local jurisdictions that contain a very high fire hazard severity zone must submit a draft to the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection per GC § 65302.5 (b).

Identify and engage California Native American Tribes.
• Required: Prior to the adoption of or amendment to the general plan, consult California Native American Tribes that are on the contact list maintained by the Native American Heritage Commission GC § 65352.3.

Plan for a Range of Hazards
Review and update (as necessary) hazard areas identified in the general plan safety element.

Review health hazards identified in the environmental justice element (if applicable).

Leverage the general plan’s climate change vulnerability assessment.

Review historical events and projected hazards.

Align planning and assessment activities with neighboring jurisdictions.

Identify Residential Developments
Required: Identify residential developments in any hazard area identified in the safety element that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes per GC § 65302 (g).

Consider alignment with PRC § 4290.5 which requires the Board of Forestry and Fire Protection to “survey local governments…to identify existing subdivisions, as defined, in either a state responsibility area or a very high fire hazard severity zone, without secondary egress routes, that are at significant fire risk.”

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Identify Emergency Scenarios
Examine scenarios that require the significant activation of evacuation routes and locations.

Consider stressing local plans by examining worst-case scenarios.

Consider examining scenarios under current and future conditions.

Consider examining scenarios in which there are compounding hazards or cascading effects.

Factor population behavior and needs into scenario planning.

Assess Evacuation Locations
Identify temporary areas of refuge, evacuation centers, and evacuation endpoints.

Consider venues’ location, vulnerability to hazards, capacity, accessibility, and resources.

Consider how future land uses and/or developments could support evacuation operations.

To support regional coordination, consider estimating the number of evacuees expected to pass-through neighboring jurisdictions and summarize their needs.

Assess the Capacity, Safety, and Viability of Evacuation Routes Capacity Considerations
Assess the capacity of key roadway segments that may be used during evacuation.

Assess the potential for bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure to enhance capacity.

Inventory local transportation resources to gauge transit and fleet capacity.

Assess the power requirements and fuel availability for a variety of evacuation modes.

Safety Considerations
Assess the potential for structural failure, inundation, falling debris, and limited visibility to impact evacuation routes during identified emergency scenarios.

Identify additional safety risks posed by environmental or infrastructure conditions.

Assess potential impacts to biking and pedestrian infrastructure as well as public transit.

Viability Considerations
Determine whether current transportation infrastructure and services can reasonably enable populations to leave an area at risk and/or reach temporary areas of refuge under a range of emergency scenarios, within respective time-constraints.

Consider time-based viability assessments.

Consider distance-based viability assessments.

Consider population-based viability assessments.

Consider using simulation tools to assess viability in developments with less than two routes.

Consider using simulation tools to assess viability under future land use scenarios.

Identify Evacuation Routes and Locations
Required: Identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and viability and evacuation locations under a range of emergency scenarios per GC § 6302.15.

Consider how to format the information (e.g., static and/or dynamic identification systems).

Consider identifying routes and locations based on the direction of travel.

Consider identifying routes and locations based on the hazard(s).

Consider identifying routes and locations based on the condition of the infrastructure.

Beverly Hills City CouncilMay 6, 2025

Beverly Hills City Council
May 6, 2025