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28 Maria C. Roberts, SBN 137907
mroberts@greeneroberts. com
Ryan Blackstone -GardnerSBN 208816
rbg@greeneroberts. com
GREENE & ROBERTS
402 West Broadway, Suite 1025
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: ( 619) 398- 3400
Facsimile: ( 619) 330- 4907
Attorneys for DefendantMater Dei Catholic High
School of San Diego, Inc.
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego
09MM0J2020 at 04: 06: 00 PM
Clerk of the Superior Court
By Gen Dieu.Deputy Clerk
SUPERIORCOURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION
MICHAEL INZUNZA, an individual, I CaseNo. 37-2020-00019173-CU-OE-CTL Plaintiff,
V.
MATER DEI CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL
OF SAN DIEGO, INC., an unknown business
entity; DIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO
EDUCATION & WELFARE
CORPORATION, an unknown business
entity, and DOES 1through 25, Inclusive,
Defendants.
Judge: Hon. Timothy B. Taylor
Action Date: June 5, 2020
Trial Date: Not Yet Set
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION BY DEFENDANT MATER DEI
CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL OF SAN
DIEGO, INC. TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FILED BY PLAINTIFF MICHAEL
INZUNZA
ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS:
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION;
JOINT REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE;
JOINT DECLARATION OF RYAN
BLACKSTONE- GARDNER; AND
PROPOSED) ORDER
Date: October 2, 2020
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: 72
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY PLAINTIFF MICHAEL INZUNZA NO
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3 II
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8 IV.
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19 VI.
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28 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1 FACTUALBACKGROUND................................................................................... 2 A. Meet and Confer Efforts............................................................................... 2 B. Allegations of INZUNZA' s FAC Relevant to Motion to Strike .................. 2 C. Other Facts Relevant to Defendant' s Motion to Strike................................. 4 LEGALAUTHORITY............................................................................................. 4 LEGALARGUMENT.............................................................................................. 5 A. ThereisNo Contractualor StatutoryBasisfor Attorneys' Feesin this Case........................................................................................... 5
1. INZUNZA Failed to Plead a Contractual Right to
Attorneys' Fees................................................................................. 5
2. Thereis No StatutoryBasisfor Attorneys' Fees ..............................5
3. INZUNZA'sAnticipatedClaimfor Attorney's FeesUnder
CCP Section 1021. 5 Also Fails......................................................... 5 B. INZUNZA Failed to State a Proper Claim for Punitive Damages ............... 8
1. INZUNZA Cannot Seek Punitive Damages Against a Religious Institution Without Leave of Court ................................................... 8
2. INZUNZA' s Facts Are Insufficient to Support a Claim for Punitive Damages............................................................................................ 8 THIS MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND ... 11 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 12 i
MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHEFIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILED BY PLAINTIFFMICHAEL INZUNZA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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28 Cases
Altman v. PNC Mortgage ( E.D. Cal. 2012)
850 F.Supp.2d 1057.................................................................................................................... 9 Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. ( 2008)
158 Cal .App.4th 1582................................................................................................................. 5 Blank v. Kirwan ( 1985)
39 Ca1.3d 311............................................................................................................................ 11 Brousseau v. Jarrett ( 1977)
73 Cal.App. 3d 864...................................................................................................................... 9 Cityof ChulaVistav. CountyofSanDiego (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 1713.................................................................................................................11 College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court ( 1994)
8 Cal. 4th 704............................................................................................................................ 8 Conservatorshipof Whitley (2010)
50 Ca1. 4th 1206........................................................................................................................... 6 Cyrus v. Haveson ( 1976)
65 Cal. App. 3d 306...................................................................................................................... 9 Davaloo v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2005)
135 Ca1.App.4th 409.................................................................................................................11 Davis v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 1302.............................................................................................................6, 8 Flannery v. California Highway Patrol ( 1998)
61 Cal.App.4th 629.................................................................................................................6, 7 Grieves v. Superior Court ( 1984)
157 Ca1.App.3d 159..........................................................................................................4, 9, 11 Little Co. of Mary Hospital v. Superior Court ( 2008)
162 Cal.App. 4th 261................................................................................................................... l Millview County WaterDistrict v. State WaterResourcesBoard (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 759.......................................................................................................................6 Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. ( 1992)
4 Cal.App. 4th 306....................................................................................................................... 9 Norberg v. California Coastal Corn. (2013)
221 Ca1.App. 4th 535................................................................................................................... 6
REQUIS I FUR PRODUCT ION OF DOCUMENTS ( SET ONE) BY DEFENDANT CONAM MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION TO PLAINTIFF RANDY ULLOA
1 Santisas v. Goodin ( 1998)
17 Cal. 4th 599 ..............................
Serrano v. Priest ( 1977)
3 20 Cal. 3d 25.....................................
4 Smithson v. Sparber ( 1932)
123 Cal.App. 225..................................................................................................... 5 SummitMediaLLC v. CityofLosAngeles (2015)
6 240 Cal.App.4th 171........................................................................... 7 Turmanv. TurningPointof Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 101 C. 1
4h
5 5
9 6
a. pP- t 53 ........................................... . 9, 108 WoodlandHillsResidentsAssn., Inc. v. CityCouncil (1979) 9 23 Cal. 3d 917.......................................................................................................................... 6 10 Statutes
11 Civ. Code § 3294( c)( 2).................................................................................................................... 9 12 Civ. Code § 3294( c)( 3)..................................................................................................................... 9 13 Civ. Code § 3294( c)( 1 ) ......................................................................... . 14 Civ. Code, § 3294( a)......................................................................................................................... 8 15 Code Civ. Proc., § 425. 14............................................................................................................. 1 8 16 Code Civ. Proc., § 435( b)( 1)............................................................................................................. 4 17 Code Civ. Proc., § 436( a)............................................................................................................. 4 5 18 Code Civ. Proc., § 436( b)............................................................................................................ 4, 5 19 Code Civ. Proc., § 437( a)................................................................................................................. 4 20 Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.................................................................................................................... 5 21 Gov. Code, § 12900.......................................................................................................................... 7 22 Labor Code § 1 102. 5( f) .................................................................................................................... 5 23 Labor Code § 1105........................................................................................................................... 5 24 Other Authorities
25 BAJI No. 14.72. 1 ( 1989 rev.).......................................................................................................... 9 26 CACI 3 943........................................................................................................................................ 9 27 iii
REQUESTFORPRODUCTIONOFDOCUMENTS (SETONE) BY DEFENDANTCONAMMANAGEMENT
CORPORATION TO PLAINTIFF RANDY ULLOA
I.
2 INTRODUCTION
3 OnJune5, 2020, PlaintiffMICHAELINZUNZAfiledaComplaintarisingoutofhis 4 shorttermemploymentwithDefendantMaterDeiCatholicHighSchoolofSanDiego, Inc. 5 Mater Dei"). HealsonamedtheDioceseofSanDiegoEducationandWelfareCorporationasa 6 defendant. Aftermeetingandconferringregardingtheallegationspledandreliefsought, 7 INZUNZAsubsequentlyagreedtodismisshisFEHAcauseofaction, agreedtodismissthe 8 DioceseofSanDiegoEducationandWelfareCorporation, andhisclaimforpunitivedamages. 9 OnAugust25, 2020, INZUNZAfiledhisFirstAmendedComplaint ("FAC"), which 10 allegedtwolegallyandfactuallydeficientclaimsforretaliationandintentionalinflictionof 11 emotional distress.' And, althoughINUZUNZAdismissedhisprayerforpunitivedamages, he 12 improperlyincludedseveralallegationsintheFACwhichrequestpunitivedamages. Moreover, 13 afterdismissinghisFEHAclaimandhavingnoreminingbasistoseekattorneys' fees, INZUNZA 0 14 included in his FAC aclaim for attorneys' fees. By this motion, Mater Dei moves to strike o 15
INZUNZA'sallegationsandprayerforattorneys' feesandhisallegationsregardingpunitive O
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17 INZUNZAcannotrecoverattorneys' feesasthereisnostatutoryorcontractualbasisfor c 2 N a,
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C#) himtorecoverfeesbasedontheclaimspled. Regardingpunitivedamages, CodeofCivil co
19 Proceduresection425.14precludespunitivedamagesagainstareligiouscorporation (suchas Or 20
MaterDei) absentacourtorderbaseduponafindingof "substantialprobability" thattheplaintiff 21 will prevailonhisclaims, whichsupporttheimpositionof punitive damages. ( Code Civ. Proc., 22 425.14; LittleCo. ofMaryHospitalv. SuperiorCourt (2008) 162Cal.App.4th261, 264-265.) 23 INZLTNZAhasfailedtoseekorobtainsuchanorderandhisallegationsdonotandcouldnot 24 support a claim for punitive damages.
25 PursuanttoCodeofCivilProceduresections431.10, 435and436, thefollowing 26 allegationsshouldbestrickenfromtheFAC: theallegationsregardingattorneys' feesreferenced 27 I//
28 ITheseclaimshavebeenattackedbytheaccompanyingdemurrerfiledbyMaterDei.
MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHEFIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILED BY PLAINTIFFMICHAEL INZUNZA I in the FAC ¶ 49 andprayerfor relief ¶ 5; andhisallegationsandreferencesto punitivedamages 2 in the FAC,¶¶ 8and11.
3 II.
4 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5 A. Meet and Confer Efforts
6 1. INZUNZA filed his original complaint in this action on June 5, 2020. ( RBG 7 Decl., ¶ 3.) Followingameetandconfereffort, INZUNZAagreedtodismisshisFEHAclaim, 8 hisclaimforpunitivedamagesandtodismissDioceseSanDiegoEducation & Welfare Corp. asa 9 defendant. ( Exh. 1; RBG Decl., ¶ 3.)
10 2. INZUNZA filed a first amended complaint (" FAC") on August 25, 2020, butpled 11 twocausesof actionthatarelegallybarredandaclaimforattorneys' feesandallegationrelated 12 to punitive damages. ( Exh. 1.) In response, defensecounselengagedin meetandconfer 13 communications, inwritingandbytelephone, withINZUNZA'slawyertoaddresstheproblems 14 withtheFAC. Despitetheseefforts, INZUNZAhasrefusedtodismisstheseclaims. (RBGDecl., 15 ¶ 4.)
16 B. Allegationsof INZUNZA' sFAC Relevantto Motion to Strike 17 ThefactualallegationspledintheFACthatarerelevanttothismotiontostrikeare 18 summarized as follows:
19 •
MaterDei hiredINZUNZA in May 2018asAssistantPrincipal. (Exh. 1, ¶ 13.) 20 INZUNZA'sdutiesincludedimplementingschoolpoliciesandproceduresforall 21 students, leadingareviewboardoverseeingthedutiesofallfaculty. (Exh. 1, ¶ 14.) 22 •
INZUNZA felt he could fulfill the needs of Mater Dei. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 16.) 23 ItwasbelievedbyINZUNZAwouldfaceresistanceinenforcingrulesbuthoped 24 the school would acclimate to his new standards. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 17.) 25 •
INZUNZA didnotreceivethesupporthehopedfor fromtheadministrationat 26 Mater Dei. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 18.)
27 • INZUNZA oncereportedto Mater Dei Administration that he hearda rumor about anothermemberof staff havinga relationshipwith a student. The responseof 28 Administration was, " Thanksfor letting meknow." ( Exh. 1, ¶ 19.) 2 MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHEFIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILED BY PLAINTIFFMICHAEL INZUNZA I •
INZUNZAwasaskedtoanddidcontactschoolsfromwhichstudentswere 2 applyingtotransfertoMaterDeitodiscusstheirdisciplinaryhistory. (Exh. 1,
20.)
INZUNZAdiscoveredthatrequestingstudentinformationrequiredparental 3 consentandbroughtthistotheattentionofadministration, wherehisconcerns were purportedly " minimized and ignored." ( id)
4 INZUNZAbelievesthathemadeinquiryaboutdisciplinaryhistoryofstudents5 whoseparentshadgivenpermissiontoobtainthatinformation, butnowclaimsthe 6 permission was not given which, embarrassed him. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 21.) 7 • INZUNZAlearnedthat "theITdepartmentfoundanexternaldrivecontaining pornography," whichhereportedandwas "completelyignored." (Exh. 1, ¶ 22.) 8 INZUNZApurportedly "sawagunfallfromthepocketofasecurityguard" at9 Mater Dei. When he reported this, " Defendants were annoyed," and he felt 10 humiliatedandconfusedby theresponse. (Exh. 1, ¶ 23.) 11 • INZUNZAwaspurportedlytoldthatasecurityofficerhuggedfemalestudentsand hereprimandedthesecurityofficer. Herequestedthatthisbereportedtothe 12 Dioceseandwasallegedlytoldheneededto "backoff." ( Exh. 1, ¶ 24.) 13 •
INZUNZAwantedtodisciplineastudentforconductthatoccurredoff -campus, 14 afterhoursataHalloweenparty, andwasupsetthattheadministrationdidnot agreebecausethe conduct "didn' t happenhere." ( Exh. 1, ¶ 25.) 15 INZUNZAwasresponsibleforenforcingthehairanddresscodeatMaterDei, and16 issuedwarnings, detentions, andotherreprimands. (Exh. 1, ¶ 27.) 17 •
InJanuary2020, INZUNZAtoldanAfricanAmericanstudentthathishairwas 18 toolongandlaterthatheneededtoremoveearringshehadin bothearsanda duraghewaswearingonhishead. Thestudentwasvisiblyupsetbutcomplied. 19 INZUNZA thenorderedthestudentto waitfor him in theAttendanceOffice.
Exh. 1, ¶ 29.)
20 Thestudent "disrespected" INZUNZA, soINZUNZAorderedhimto "followhim21 to his office." There, INZUNZAtoldthestudenthewasbeingsuspendedfor 22 " disrespect and insubordination." INZUNZA ordered the student to wait outside his office. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 30.)
23 INZUNZAnotifiedthestudentandhismotherthathewasbeingsuspendedfor24 defianceand insubordinationin violation of Mater Dei policies. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 32.) 25 •
INZUNZA alsotold thestudenthecouldnotreturnto schooluntil hewasin 26 compliance with the Mater Dei hair code. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 32.) 27 •
INZUNZA'streatmentof thestudentresultedin publicuproarabouthis 28 discriminatory treatment of the student. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 33.) 3 MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHE FIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILEDBY PLAINTIFFMICHAEL INZUNZA INZUNZA wassubsequentlyquestionedabouthisinteractionswiththestudent andthestudent'smotherandwas "confusedbythetoneandlevelofquestioning." Exh. 1, 1135.) 35.)
INZUNZAlaterreceivedcallsandhadpeopleaccusehimof beinga racist. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 36.)
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28 OnJanuary31, 2020, INZUNZA wasplacedonpaidadministrativeleavethrough theendofhisone-yearcontract, whichendedinJuly2020, andthathewouldnot beofferedanewcontractforthenextacademicyear. (Exh. 1, ¶ 39.) INZUNZAbelievesthathisoppositionto "unlawfulpractices" isthereasonMater Deidid notofferhim anewcontractafterhisapproximate18monthsof employment. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 40.)
Asaresult, INZUNZAsufferedemotionaldistress, anxiety, depression, lossof sleep, worry and humiliation. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 41.)
C. Other Facts Relevant to Defendant' s Motion to Strike MaterDeiis aNonprofitReligiousCorporationsorganizedundertheCalifornia Nonprofit Religious Corporation Law. ( Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 2.)
LEGAL AUTHORITY
CaliforniaCodeof CivilProceduresection435allowsanypartyto "serveandfileanotice of motionto strikethewholeoranypart [of apleading]." (Code Civ. Proc., § 435( b)( 1).) " The groundsforamotiontostrikeshallappearonthefaceofthechallengedpleadingorfromany matterof whichthecourtisrequiredto takejudicial notice." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437( a).) Courts areempoweredtostrikeout "anyirrelevant, false, orimpropermatterinsertedinanypleading" and "alloranypartof anypleadingnotdrawnorfiledinconformitywiththelawsofthisstate, a court rule, or an order of the court." ( Code Civ. Proc., §§ 436( a) and ( b).) A motion to strike is a favoredproceduralmechanismforattackingimpermissibleclaimsforpunitivedamages. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157Cal.App.3d 159, 166-168.) For the reasonssetforth morefully below, Defendantsseeksan orderstriking INZUNZA' s improper claims for attorneys' feesand punitive damagesasallegedby INZUNZA in his FAC.
4 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORTOF MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY PLAINTIFF MICHAEL INZUNZA 1 2
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IV.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.
ThereisNoContractualorStatutoryBasisforAttorneys' FeesinthisCase
1. INZUNZAFailedtoPleadaContractualRighttoAttorneys' Fees Withrespecttoclaimsforattorneys' feesinlitigation, CaliforniafollowstheAmerican IRule. "Exceptasattorney'sfeesarespecificallyprovidedforbystatute, themeasureandmodeof compensationofattorneysandcounselorsatlawislefttotheagreement, expressorimplied, of the parties...." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; seealso, Santisasv. Goodin (1998) 17Cal.4th599, 612 Attorneys' feesarenotrecoverablefromanopposingpartyintheabsenceofexpressstatutoryor contractual authority].) Unlessacontractorstatuteprovidesotherwise, eachpartytoalawsuit paytheirownattorneyfees. (Amtowerv. PhotonDynamics, Inc. (2008) 158Cal.App.4th1582.) TheFACincludesaprayerforattorneys' feeswithoutidentifyinganycontractualbasis forit, withoutattachingacontract, orcitingtoanylawthatpermitstherecoveryofcontractual feesbasedontheallegationspled. (See, Exh. 1.) BecauseINZUNZA hasnot allegeda contract - basedclaim, attachedorcitedtoacontractoridentifiedanycontractinhiscomplaintcontaininga provisionfor attorneys' fees, hehasnocontractualbasisto recoverattorneys' fees.
2. There is No Statutory Basisfor Attorneys' Fees
INZUNZAalsohasnotpledastatutoryclaimorbasistorecoverattorneys' feesagainst MaterDei. Thereisnostatutoryrighttorecoverattorney'sfeesunderLaborCodesection1102.5 orunderaclaimfir IIED. LaborCodesection1102.5limitsitsremediestotheemployee'sactual damagesandacivil penalty. (Labor Code § § 1102. 5( f), 1105.) Thus, thereisnostatutorybasis for INZUNZA to recoverattorneys' fees. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 436(a) and (b); see also, Amtower- v. PhotonDynamics, Inc. (2008) 158Cal.App.4th 1582.)
3. INZUNZA' sAnticipatedClaim for Attorney'sFeesUnder CCPSection 1021. 5 Also Fails
TotheextentINZUNZAarguesheisentitledtoattorney'sfeesunderCodeofCivil Proceduresection1021.5, heiswrong. Section1021.5codifiesthe "privateattorneygeneral" doctrineofattorneyfeesasarticulatedinSerranov. Priest (1977) 20Cal.3d25 [141Cal.Rptr. 5 MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESIN SUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHE FIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILED BY PLAINTIFFMICHAELINZUNZA 315, 569 P.2d 1303] ( SerranoIII) andotherjudicialdecisions. (Flanneryv. CaliforniaHighway Patrol (1998) 61Cal.App.4th629, 634, citing, WoodlandHillsResidentsAssn., Inc. v. City Council ( 1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933.) Codeof Civil Proceduresection1021.5 onlypermitsatrial 9 10
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courtto awardattorneys' feesto apartywhosucceeds "in theenforcementof animportantright affectingthepublicinterest. However, torecoverfeesunder1021.5, theplaintiffmustprove: he conferredasignificantbenefitonthegeneralpublicoralargeclassofpersons; thenecessityand financialburdenofprivateenforcementoftheclaimpledmakeanattorneyfeeawardappropriate; and, in theinterestofjustice, feesshouldnotbepaidoutoftherecovery. (Flannery, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 634.) None of those facts exist here.
Tothecontrary, INZUNZAhassuedonlyonbehalfofhimself, haspledclaimsuniqueto hisindividual, shorttermemploymentatMaterDeiandseeksdamagesonly for himself. ( Exh.
1.) Further, where, ashere, INZUNZA hasapersonalfinancialstakein thelitigation "sufficient towarrant [the] decisiontoincursignificantattorneyfeesandcostsinthevigorousprosecution" ofthelawsuit, anawardundersection1021.5isinappropriate. (MillviewCountyWater Districtv. StateWaterResourcesBoard (2016) 4Cal.App.5th759, 769, quotingSummitMedia LLC v. CityofLosAngeles (2015) 240Cal.App.4th 171, 193-194 (emphasis added).) Indeed, s]ection1021.5wasnotdesignedasamethodforrewardinglitigantsmotivatedbytheirown pecuniaryinterestswhoonlycoincidentallyprotectthepublicinterest." (See, Davis v. Farmers InsuranceExchange (2016) 245Cal.App.4th 1302, 1329 [feesundersection1021.5 inappropriate whereplaintiff expectedfinancial recovery" from thelitigation].) The burdenis on theparty requestingsection 1021.5 feesto demonstrateall of the elementsofthestatute, includingthatthelitigationcoststranscendhisorherpersonalinterest.
Millview CountyWaterDistrict, supra, 4 Cal.App.5that769, citingNorbergv. California Coastal Com. ( 2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 535, 545-546.) In meetingthis burdentheparty must providesubstantialevidencethatpursuingthelawsuitplacedaburdenonthemoutof proportion to their individual stake in the matter. ( Millview, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at 769, citing Conservatorshipof Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1215.) III
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORTOF MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY PLAINTIFF MICHAEL INZUNZA In Flannery, a former statehighway patrol traffic officer broughtanactionagainstthe 2 3
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California highway patrol andothers, assertingharassmentandwrongful termination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act ( FEHA) ( Gov. Code, § 12900, et seq.). The matter wentto trial andthecourtenteredjudgmentonthejury'sverdictin favorof Flannery. Thereafter, the court enteredanorder awardingFlanneryattorneyfeesandcostsunderFEHA andsection 1021. 5 and the Defendants appealed.
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration of the amount of feesawarded, finding the plaintiff wasnot entitled to feesundersection1021.5 becausethe lawsuit did not confer a significant benefit on the generalpublic or on a largeclassof persons within the meaningof the statute. In finding feesunder 1021.5 wereimproper, the courtheld:
When the recordindicatesthat theprimary effect of a lawsuit wasto advanceor vindicate aplaintiffs personaleconomicinterests, anawardof feesundersection 1021. 5 is improper. [ Citations omitted] " Section 1021. 5 was not designed as a methodfor rewarding litigants motivatedby their own pecuniaryinterestswho only coincidentally protect the public interest." [ Citations omitted.] " Instead, its purpose is to provide some incentive for the plaintiff who acts as a true private attorneygeneral, prosecutinga lawsuit that enforcesanimportant public right and confers a significant benefit, despite the fact that his or her own financial stake in the outcome would not by itself constitute an adequate incentive to litigate." Citations omitted.]
Here, thetrial court found thatplaintiffs lawsuit necessarilyconferreda significant benefit on a largeclassof personsbecauseit senta messageto the CHP andother governmentagenciesthat sexualdiscrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of the FEHA will not be tolerated. ...[' 1j] Whileplaintiffs lawsuitwasbasedontheimportantrightto befreefromunlawful discrimination, its primary effect wasthe vindication of her own personalright and economic interest. The evidence does not support the trial court' s finding that the lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on the general public or on a large class of personswithin themeaningof section1021.5, andthefeeawardcannotbe upheld based on that statute.
Flannery, supra, 61 Ca1.App. 4th at 635-637.)
Flannery is controlling here. INZUNZA' s primary purposeandincentivein filing this lawsuitis thevindicationof hisownpersonalrightsandeconomicinterests. If heprevails, the soleeffect of the lawsuit will bea financial recoveryfor INZUNZA. ( See, Exh. 1.) Inasmuch as the primary purposeand effect of INZUNZA' s lawsuit is to vindicate his own personalrights and
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY PLAINTIFF MICHAEL INZUNZA economicinterests, hisrequestfor attorneys' feesundersection1021.5 is improperandmustbe stricken. (Seealso, Davis, supra, 245Cal.App.4that 1329 [feeawardunderCCP1021.5 inappropriatewhereplaintiffexpected "asubstantialfinancialrecovery" fromthelitigation].) B. INZUNZA Failed to State a Proper Claim for Punitive Damages
1. INZUNZA Cannot SeekPunitive DamagesAgainst a Religious Institution Without Leave of Court
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In additionto pleadingacompletelyimproperandunfoundedclaimfor attorneys' fees, INZUNZAhasincludedinhisFAC, allegationsagainstMaterDeiforpunitivedamages, despite dismissinghisprayerfor punitivedamages. Thisruns afoul of California law — which prohibits punitivedamagesagainstanon-profit religiouscorporation (suchasMaterDei) withoutleaveof courtand, only uponapropershowing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425. 14.) Under section 425. 14:
No claimfor punitiveorexemplarydamagesagainstareligiouscorporationor religiouscorporationsoleshallbeincludedin acomplaintorotherpleading unlessthecourtentersanorderallowinganamendedpleadingthatincludesa claimforpunitiveorexemplarydamagesto befiled.
Code Civ. Proc., § 425. 14.)
Despitetheplain languageof thisstatute, INZUNZA hasincludedin hisFACallegations indicatingarequestfor punitivedamages. (Exh. 1, ¶¶ 8, 11.) However, INZUNZA has not soughtor obtainedleaveof courttoallegeaclaimfor punitivedamagesagainstMaterDei, which isfatalto hisallegationsorclaimforpunitivedamages. Thus, suchallegationsmustbestricken.
2. INZUNZA' sFactsAre Insufficient to Supporta Claim for PunitiveDamages Evenif punitivedamagescouldbesoughtagainstMaterDeiwithoutleaveofcourt, any suchclaimwouldfailasamatteroflawasit isnotsupportedbythefactsnecessarytopursue punitivedamages. CivilCodesection3294authorizespunitivedamagesonlywhere "itisproven byclearandconvincingevidencethatthedefendanthasbeenguiltyofoppression, fraud, or malice...." ( Cal. Civ. Code, § 3294( a).) To stateaprima facie claim for punitive damages, the complaint must allegefacts to demonstratetheseelements. (CollegeHospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) According to section3294:
MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHEFIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILEDBYPLAINTIFFMICHAELINZUNZA Malice is definedas "conductwhich is intendedby the defendantto causeinjury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and consciousdisregardof the rights or safetyof others." ( Civ. Code § 3294( c)( 1).) Oppressionis "despicableconductthatsubjectsapersonto cruelandunjusthardship in consciousdisregardof thatperson's rights." (Id. at § 3294( c)( 2).) Fraud is " an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact knownto thedefendantwith theintentiononthepartof thedefendantof thereby deprivingapersonof propertyor legalrightsorotherwisecausinginjury." (Id. at § 3294( c)( 3).)
Despicable," as used in the statute, is conduct that is "... so vile, base, contemptible, 10 11
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28 miserable, wretchedor loathsomethatit wouldbelookeddownuponanddespisedbyordinary decentpeople." (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. ( 1992) 4 Ca1.App. 4th 306, 331, quoting BAJI No. 14.72.1 (1989 rev.), accord, CACI 3943.) It is also well - settled that boilerplate languagecannotsupportaclaimfor punitivedamages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett ( 1977) 73 Cal.App. 3d 864, 872 ["conclusory characterization of conduct as `intentional, willful and fraudulent' is patently insufficient within section3294."]; Grieves v. Superior Court ( 1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (1984) ["Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but factsmust be allegedin the pleadingto supportsucha claim."].) Conclusorystatementsin pleadingswhichdonothingmorethanstateaparty's conclusions can be stricken and disregarded. ( Smithsonv. Sparber (1932) 123Cal.App. 225, 232; Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317.) As held in Smithson:
Whateverwordsarefoundin apleading (such, for instance, ascarelessly, negligently, willfully, wrongfully, and in fraud of therights of the plaintiffs) going to state the pleader' s conclusions may be disregarded. A motion to strike .. would bethe properway to seektheir elimination.
Smithson, supra, 123Cal.App. 225 at 232.) In other words, the complaint " must allege ultimate facts of the defendant's oppression, fraud, or malice." ( Altman v. PNC Mortgage ( E. D. Cal. 2012) 850F.Supp.2d 1057, 1085, quotingCyrusv. Haveson, supra, 65Cal.App.3dat316-317.) In Turmanv. TurningPointof Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191Cal.App.4th53, 63, the courtheldthatdespiteallegationsof extremelyoffensiveconduct, theconductdidnotriseto the levelof constitutingmalice, oppressionor fraudasrequiredby Civil Codesection3294. In that
MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSAND AUTHORITIESIN SUPPORTOFMOTION BY DEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHE FIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILEDBY PLAINTIFFMICHAEL INZUNZA case, theplaintiff wasemployedat ahalfwayhouseandwassubjectedto maleresidentswho propositionedher for sex, madesexualgesturestowardher, called her a "whore," and other derogativenames. Whentheplaintiff complainedabouttheconduct, hersupervisortoldherto try to be nicer to them," andthatthey "didnotreallymeanit." ( Id. at 56.) The abuse in alleged inTurmancausedtheplaintifftofeeldegradedandsick, andcontinuedonadailybasisfortwo 10 11
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28 yearsuntil shewasterminated. Nonetheless, theTurmancourtobservedthatthesefacts, though sufficientto withstandademurrer, werenotadequatetopleadoppression, fraud, ormalice, as required under section 3294. ( Id. at 63.) Inasmuchastheconductin Turmandidnotsatisfythe requirementsofsection3294, thecomplaintdoesnotcomeclosetomeetingthisstandard.
Here, INZUNZAhasallegedsimplythathewasnotofferedanewcontractafterhewas suspendedandaninvestigationwasconducteddueto hisrolein thedisciplineof ablackstudent basedondresscodeviolations. INZUNZA alsocomplainsaboutvariouscommonworkplace issuesthatoccurredfromthestartofhisemploymentwhichhavenothingwhatsoevertodowith thereasonsfor hissuspensionorfor hisnotbeingofferedanewcontract. It is absurdfor INZUNZAtoevensuggestthisconductcouldeversupportaclaimforpunitivedamages.
Additionally, thefactspledbyINZUNZAtosupportpunitivedamagesareboilerplate recitationswhichdonotadequatelypleadoppression, fraud, or malice:
Defendantscommittedtheactsallegedhereinmaliciously, fraudulently, oppressively, andwiththewrongfulintentionof injuringPlaintiff, andactedwith animproperandevil motiveamountingto maliceor despicableconduct.
Alternatively, Defendant's wrongful conductwascarried out with a conscious disregard for Plaintiff' s rights. ( Exh. 1, ¶ 8.)
Defendants' conductwarrantstheassessmentof punitivedamagesin anamountto punishDefendantsandto deterothersfromengagingin similarconduct. (Exh. 1,
11.)
Asisclear, theFACdoesnotallegefactsorconductthatcouldeversatisfythelegal requirementsof section3294. Theallegationsareafarcry fromthe "vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretchedor loathsome" conductthatis requiredfor punitivedamagesto be imposed. Conductdoesnotrisetothelevelofmalice, oppression, orfraudnecessaryunderCivil Codesection3294tostateaclaimforpunitivedamagessimplybecauseonecomplainsofand reportsbadconduct. (See, Turman, supra, 191Cal.App.4that63.) 10 MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESIN SUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
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INZUNZA' s allegations do not demonstrate that Mater Dei engaged in conduct that is fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive, or could in anyway provide a basisfor punitive damages. In the absenceof suchultimate facts, his claim for punitive damagesis improperandshouldbe stricken. ( Grievesv. Superior Court, supra, 157Cal.App.3d at 166-168.) Therefore, the Court should strike paragraphs 8 and 11 from the first amended complaint.
V.
THIS MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
It isnotproperto grantleaveto amendwhereit isclearthattheproblemswiththe pleading cannotbe curedby amendment. (Davaloo v. State Farm Ins. Co. ( 2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 415 ["Leaveto amendshouldnot begrantedwhereamendmentwould be futile"].) Thiscasewasfiled monthsagoandINZUNZAhashadampleopportunitytoplead factsin supportof his complaint andhis FAC. Nonetheless, his claims for attorneys' feesand punitivedamagesarelegallybarred. Therefore, leaveto amendwouldbefutileandshouldbe denied. ( Davaloo, supra, 135Cal.App.4that415; Cityof ChulaVistav. CountyofSanDiego 1994) 23 Ca1.App.4th 1713; Blank v. Kirwan ( 1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [burdenis onthe plaintiff to show how defectcanbecuredby amendment].)
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28 VI.
CONCLUSION
ThefactspledbyINZUNZAinhisFACdonotprovidehimwitharighttorecover attorneys' fees. TheFACcomplaintalsofailstocomplywiththerequirementsofCodeofCivil Proceduresection425.14orto providefactsthatmeettherequirementsof Civil Codesection 3294with regardto pleadingaclaimforpunitivedamages.
Therefore, theCourtshouldgrantthismotiontostrikein itsentiretywithoutleaveto amendandstriketheallegationsrelatingtopunitivedamagesandtheallegationsandprayerfor attorneys' fees from the FAC as requested herein.
Dated: September 10, 2020 GREENE & ROBERTS
By:
Mari. R erts
Ry 1 stone - Gar er
Attorneys for Defendant Mater Dei Catholic
High School of San Diego, Inc.
MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIESINSUPPORTOFMOTIONBYDEFENDANTTOSTRIKE
PORTIONSOFTHEFIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINTFILEDBYPLAINTIFFMICHAELINZUNZA