Written Communications (updated 4-7-26) — Cupertino City Council, April 1, 2026 (part 4 of 5)

MEMORANDUM
TO: Cupertino City Council
FROM: Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents
DATE: March 31, 2026
RE: Evidentiary Deficiencies in the SCCFD Supplemental Memorandum of Assistant Fire Chief Estrada Regarding the Same Practical Effect Exception for the Proposed Development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015)
I. Introduction and Summary
This memorandum responds to the supplemental report submitted by Assistant Fire Chief Hector Estrada of the Santa Clara County Fire Department (“SCCFD”), dated March 2026 and included as Attachment Z in the supplemental packet for the April 1, 2026 City Council hearing on the proposed 51-unit residential development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive.

The Estrada memorandum purports to explain and defend SCCFD’s approval of a Same Practical Effect exception under the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270 et seq.) for the reduction of mandatory 30-foot setbacks to as little as 10 feet. The memorandum concludes that the exception “provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation.”
We submit that this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence, contradicted by the City’s own adopted data, and fails to satisfy the evidentiary standard required for the AB 130 CEQA exemption (PRC § 21080.66) in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. Specifically, the memorandum suffers from five critical deficiencies:

1. Unsupported evacuation finding. The memorandum asserts that safe civilian evacuation has been provided but offers no data, analysis, methodology, or modeling to support that conclusion.

2. Failure to address contrary evidence. The memorandum does not reference, address, or reconcile its evacuation finding with the City’s own Fehr & Peers Health and Safety Element Update, which documents that the Linda Vista Drive evacuation corridor operates at approximately four times its design capacity.

3. Incomplete application of the regulatory standard. The memorandum narrows its analysis to structure-to-structure ignition mitigation while the regulatory definition of “Same Practical Effect” requires a five-part finding that includes safe civilian evacuation, emergency equipment access, signing, water supply, and fuel modification.

Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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4. Impermissible deferral of compliance. The memorandum defers key fire safety compliance to the building permit phase, while the AB 130 CEQA exemption requires that fire hazard mitigation measures be adopted at the entitlement stage.

5. Procedural recharacterization of the approval process. The memorandum recharacterizes the approval as a Fire Safe Regulations exception rather than an Alternative Means and Methods Request (AMMR). This shift has the effect of bypassing the dual sign-off requirement that the Building Official has not satisfied under CBC § 104.11.

Each of these deficiencies is analyzed below.

II. The Evacuation Finding Is Unsupported by Any Evidence in the Record The final substantive paragraph of the Estrada memorandum states:

County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety.

This sentence is the only statement in the entire memorandum addressing evacuation. It is a bare conclusion. The memorandum provides:
• No evacuation study or analysis;
• No traffic modeling or vehicle count data;
• No volume-to-capacity analysis of the evacuation corridor; • No assessment of the impact of adding 51 units and 102 vehicles to a single-access culde-sac; • No reference to any methodology by which “safe civilian evacuation” was evaluated; and • No explanation of what “safe civilian evacuation” means in the context of a corridor the City’s own data shows is already failing.

Under established principles of California administrative law, a conclusory statement by an agency, unsupported by evidence in the record, does not constitute substantial evidence. (Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [implicit in the substantial evidence standard is the requirement that the agency must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between raw evidence and the ultimate decision].) The Estrada memorandum does not set forth the findings necessary to bridge the analytic gap between the evidence in the record and the evacuation conclusion, as Topanga requires.

Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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III. The Finding Contradicts the City’s Own Adopted Evacuation Data The Estrada memorandum does not merely fail to provide evidence for its evacuation finding. It makes that finding in the face of contrary evidence already in the City’s possession.

The City’s Health and Safety Element Update, prepared by Fehr & Peers, documents the following conditions for evacuation zone CUP-029, which includes the Linda Vista Drive corridor serving the project site:
• McClellan Road, the primary evacuation outlet: volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio of 4.2 • Foothill Boulevard: V/C ratio of 4.0
• Evacuation zone CUP-029 generates 38% of all modeled evacuation trips A volume-to-capacity ratio above 1.0 indicates an oversaturated roadway. Ratios of 4.0 to 4.2 mean the corridor is operating at approximately four times its design capacity during a wildfire evacuation — at current densities. The Fehr & Peers study models the project site at its existing 4-unit residential density. It does not account for the proposed 51-unit development with 102 onsite parking spaces, which would approximately double the evacuation vehicle load generated from this parcel.

SCCFD’s memorandum does not mention this data. It does not distinguish it. It does not explain why its conclusion is consistent with it. An agency finding that is contradicted by evidence in the administrative record, and that provides no explanation for the contradiction, does not constitute substantial evidence. (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516 [requiring agencies to disclose “the analytic route the agency traveled from evidence to action”].) IV. The Memorandum Applies the Wrong Standard
A. The Regulatory Definition of “Same Practical Effect” The Fire Safe Regulations define “Same Practical Effect” at 14 C.C.R. § 1271.00 (formerly § 1270.01(aa)) as follows:
“Same Practical Effect: As used in this subchapter, means an exception or alternative with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (a) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (b) safe civilian evacuation, (c) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (d) available and accessible water to effectively attack wildfire or defend a structure from wildfire, and (e) fuel modification sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” SCCFD acknowledges this definition. Footnote 4 of the Estrada memorandum reproduces it in full. The memorandum therefore cannot claim ignorance of the standard.

Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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B. The Analysis Addresses Only One of Five Required Elements Despite reproducing the five-part definition, the substantive analysis in the body of the memorandum focuses almost entirely on a single element: structure-to-structure ignition. The memorandum devotes two paragraphs to explaining how the four proposed mitigation measures reduce “the risk of structure-to-structure ignition.” It identifies which measures correspond to the alternatives listed in § 1276.01(b). This analysis is detailed and specific.

By contrast, the evacuation finding consists of a single sentence with no supporting analysis. The memorandum provides no discussion of:
• How a 51-unit development on a dead-end cul-de-sac satisfies the requirement for “safe civilian evacuation”;
• Whether the existing road network can support simultaneous emergency equipment access and civilian evacuation, as required by § 1273.00; • Whether the signing requirements of element (c) have been satisfied; • Whether the water supply requirements of element (d) have been evaluated at the entitlement stage; or
• How the four proposed mitigation measures — which address building materials and construction standards — provide any capability for civilian evacuation.

The evacuation finding is unsupported by any technical analysis in the memorandum, in contrast to the detailed substantiation provided for the structure-to-structure ignition mitigation. This disparity creates an internally inconsistent record in which building-level safety is documented but corridor-wide life safety is addressed only by assertion.

C. The Proposed Mitigations Have No Functional Relationship to Evacuation The four mitigation measures identified in the Estrada memorandum are: (1) Class A fire-rated roofing, (2) non-combustible exterior wall siding, (3) tempered glass windows, and (4) automatic fire sprinkler systems. Each of these measures addresses structure-to-structure ignition resistance. None of them increases the width of a road, adds an evacuation route, reduces the vehicle count on the Linda Vista Drive corridor, or otherwise has any functional relationship to evacuation capacity.

A finding that reduced setbacks achieve the “same practical effect” as the 30-foot requirement must address all five elements of § 1271.00, including safe civilian evacuation. Mitigations that harden buildings against radiant heat do not, by themselves, demonstrate that residents can safely evacuate through a corridor already operating at four times its design capacity. The memorandum does not explain how building-level mitigations substitute for the evacuation capacity that the 30-foot setback requirement was, in part, designed to protect.

Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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D. Article 2 of the Fire Safe Regulations Requires Concurrent Evacuation Capacity The Estrada memorandum does not reference Article 2 of the Fire Safe Regulations (§§ 1273.00–1273.09), which governs emergency access and egress. Section 1273.00 states:
“Roads and driveways, whether public or private, unless exempted under 14 CCR § 1270.02(d), shall provide for safe access for emergency wildfire equipment and civilian evacuation concurrently, and shall provide unobstructed traffic circulation during a wildfire emergency.”
This is not a general aspiration. It is a mandatory standard: roads serving the development must support firefighting access and civilian evacuation at the same time. The Fehr & Peers data shows that the Linda Vista Drive corridor is already at approximately four times its design capacity for evacuation alone, before accounting for concurrent emergency vehicle access. The Estrada memorandum does not address whether the Evulich Court cul-de-sac and the Linda Vista Drive corridor can meet this requirement, either at current densities or with the proposed 51-unit addition.

V. The Memorandum Impermissibly Defers Compliance to the Building Permit Stage
Footnote 1 of the Estrada memorandum states: “At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applications for compliance with additional fire safety requirements, including those related to construction.” The final paragraph further states that the applicant “will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application.” This deferral creates a legal problem for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) provides that the VHFHSZ exclusion “does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures.” The operative word is “adopted” — past tense. The fire hazard mitigation measures must be in place at the time the CEQA exemption is claimed, not promised for a future permitting stage.

The items deferred to the building permit phase — a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan — are not ministerial verification tasks.

They involve substantive design decisions that determine whether the mitigation measures actually achieve the same practical effect as the 30-foot setback. If the fire protection plan has not been finalized, the City cannot assess at the entitlement stage whether the mitigation measures are adequate. This is precisely the problem identified in case law regarding deferred mitigation.

Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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A CEQA exemption determination is made at the entitlement stage. If material fire safety compliance is deferred to the building permit stage, the exemption condition has not been satisfied at the time the exemption is invoked. The City cannot rely on future compliance to justify a present exemption. (Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 306–307 [agency cannot defer mitigation to future date when adequacy of mitigation cannot be assessed at time of project approval].)
VI. The Recharacterization of the Approval Process Sidesteps the Missing Building Official Signature
Footnote 3 of the Estrada memorandum states: “The process and standards for approving Same Practical Effect exception requests in the Fire Safe Regulations are distinct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code.”
This footnote is procedurally significant. The AMMR form used by the applicant includes signature lines for both the Fire Official and the Building Official. The Fire Official (SCCFD) has signed. The Building Official (City of Cupertino) has not. Under the California Building Code (§ 104.11) and the California Fire Code (§ 104.10), both officials must independently determine that the proposed alternative is “not less than the equivalent” of the code standard.

By recharacterizing the approval as a Fire Safe Regulations exception under § 1270.06 rather than a Building Code AMMR, the Estrada memorandum establishes a framework in which the Building Official’s signature is not required. This recharacterization should be scrutinized for three reasons:
• The applicant submitted an AMMR form — not a § 1270.06 exception request. The form itself requires dual sign-off.
• The DJP AB 130 qualification memorandum references the AMMR, not a Fire Safe Regulations exception, as the basis for the fire safety compliance finding. • Regardless of the regulatory pathway, the Building Official retains an independent obligation under CBC § 104.11 to evaluate and approve any departure from building standards. That obligation is not discharged by SCCFD’s approval under a different regulatory framework.

The recharacterization does not eliminate the Building Official’s independent review authority over building setbacks and fire-resistive construction. Because the AMMR form remains unsigned by the Building Official, the dual-approval requirement of CBC § 104.11 remains unfulfilled, rendering the current fire safety approval procedurally incomplete.

VII. The AB 130 CEQA Exemption Cannot Rest on This Memorandum Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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The AB 130 CEQA exemption (PRC § 21080.66) requires that the project satisfy the site requirements of Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6). For sites in a VHFHSZ, § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) requires that the project have “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including, but not limited to, standards established under Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code.” The DJP AB 130 qualification memorandum relies on SCCFD’s approval as the evidence that fire hazard mitigation measures have been adopted. The Estrada memorandum is the most detailed articulation of that approval in the record. If the Estrada memorandum does not constitute substantial evidence that the state fire mitigation measures have been satisfied — and we submit it does not, for the reasons stated above — then the AB 130 exemption lacks its evidentiary foundation.

The deficiency is particularly acute with respect to evacuation. The Fire Safe Regulations define “Same Practical Effect” to include “safe civilian evacuation” (§ 1271.00). Article 2 requires roads to support evacuation and emergency access concurrently (§ 1273.00). PRC § 4291, specifically named in the statute, was returned as “NOT APPROVED” by SCCFD. The Estrada memorandum asserts evacuation safety but provides no evidence. The City’s own Fehr & Peers data contradicts the assertion. Under these circumstances, where the project’s primary defensible space requirements (PRC § 4291) were marked as “NOT APPROVED” and the evacuation finding is at odds with the City’s own traffic data, the record does not support a finding that “fire hazard mitigation measures” have been legally adopted as required by Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D).

VIII. Request
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the City Council:

1. Decline to approve the project under the AB 130 CEQA exemption until the evidentiary deficiencies in the fire safety record are addressed, including a documented evacuation analysis that accounts for the proposed density increase on the Linda Vista Drive corridor;

2. Direct staff to obtain from SCCFD a written analysis — not a conclusory statement — explaining how the Same Practical Effect exception satisfies the five-part definition at § 1271.00, with specific attention to safe civilian evacuation under the conditions documented in the Fehr & Peers study;

3. Require the Building Official to complete the evaluation required under CBC § 104.11 and either sign or decline to sign the AMMR form, as the Building Code requires; and

4. If the Council determines it must approve the project notwithstanding these deficiencies, amend the resolution to acknowledge the unresolved evacuation and fire safety concerns, Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response

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as proposed in the separate memorandum submitted by these residents on March 31, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,
Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents
From: DerChang Kau
To: Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council
Subject: PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:57:23 AM
Attachments: img-2d323928-064e-46e2-9283-8cf784fbb15a
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20260330 From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3
From: DerChang Kau <[email protected]>
Date: Monday, March 30, 2026 at 2:50 PM
To: Kitty Moore <[email protected]>, Cupertino City Council <[email protected]>, Liang Chao <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>, Tina Kapoor <[email protected]>, Mark Shumate <[email protected]>, Hector Estrada <[email protected]>, Maryanne Casas-Perez <[email protected]>
Subject: How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct, Cupertino – From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility
This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing.

To: City Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council Members Cc: City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor
SCCFD Deputy Chief Shumate and Assistant Chief Estrada
San Jose Spotlight Maryanne Casas-Perez
Bcc: Residents of Linda Vista Corridor
From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino
Date: March 30, 2026
Subject: How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct, Cupertino – From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility
Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council members
There is a significant discrepancy between the developer’s (SummerHill Homes) approach to safety and the emergency‑evacuation modeling conducted by residents and by the City’s own commissioned experts.

Communications between the City Planning Division and SummerHill Homes—along with the Kau‑Bull face‑to‑face meeting and subsequent emails—reveal a troubling timeline: both SummerHill Homes and the City of Cupertino shifted from acknowledging evacuation risks to actively avoiding a formal study. Instead, they relied on a “voluntary” analysis that sidesteps the physical realities of wildfire behavior and evacuation constraints.

What emerges is a clear storyline: a progression from awareness of the risk, to avoidance by seeking loopholes in health and safety requirements, and ultimately a retreat from evaluating specific, adverse impacts on public safety toward a narrow focus on code compliance and waivers for the project’s own defensible space.

Event 1.The Baseline: High-Hazard Reality (March 2025)
The story begins with the March 2025 CAL FIRE update, which officially designated the Linda Vista corridor as a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ). Subsequently, the City's own consultant, Fehr & Peers, determined that major evacuation routes like Foothill Boulevard and McClellan Road were already at or over capacity, identifying them as "critical bottlenecks" with Volume-to-Capacity (V/C) ratios greater than 2.0. (Oct/2025)
Event 2.The Acknowledgement of Due Diligence (October 10, 2025) Early in the process, SummerHill appeared to recognize that a wildfire evacuation analysis was a required part of their project scope.

Steve Bull explicitly asks the City for "the criteria for the evacuation route study" and notes that their submitted traffic report "does not yet include the evacuation route analysis".

Event 3.Discovery of the "Legal Hook" Dodge (October 16, 2025) Just six days later, the City provided SummerHill with a way to bypass formal safety scrutiny by citing Assembly Bill 130.

The City senior planner Sugiyama informs SummerHill: "Now that the project is in review under AB 130, the City is no longer requesting an evacuation study to address fire safety concerns under CEQA". Crucially, she adds that any voluntary study provided "will not require... peer review".

Event 4.The Good-Faith Disclosure (January 15, 2026)
Alice Lin and DerChang Kau met with SummerHill’s leadership (Steve Bull, VP and Kevin Ebrahimi , SVP) to provide a full disclosure of the corridor's life-safety risks, offering data to seek a "win-win solution ". DerChang handed Steve and Kevin a hardcopy of Linda Vista Corridor Emergency Evacuation analysis and proposed a win-win strategy.

In a follow-up email, DerChang provided electronic copy of the disclosure showing that increasing density beyond the R1 baseline triples the non-survivable window, extending evacuation times from 30 minutes to over 90 minutes. Steve Bull replied on Jan 16, stating they were "reviewing your analysis with our consultant team" Event 5.The Pivot to "Defensive Fiction" (February – March 2026) Rather than using Kau’s data to adjust the project for safety, SummerHill utilized its consultant, Hexagon, to generate a counter-narrative.

Hexagon modeled the evacuation using "Steady-State" metrics—modeling only 30 vehicles per hour (essentially a daily commute) to claim a negligible 2-minute delay.

DerChang Kau submitted a technical rebuttal in the City record.It counters that a real wildfire surge involves 250+ vehicles attempting to exit in a 30-minute window, which pushes the corridor to 110% saturation and a 93.5-minute evacuation time.

Event 5-2.SummerHill’s substituting Hardening for Egress (March 2026) Rather than address the road capacity failure, SummerHill shifted focus to structural hardening (sprinklers and fire-rated walls).

This email submits a review from Jensen Hughes that confirms compliance with building codes but explicitly states that "compliance with relevant codes and standards does not imply... eliminating all hazards and risks" and focuses strictly on structural hardening rather than evacuation egress.

The timeline shows that SummerHill was aware of the evacuation requirements, was granted a legal exemption by the City to avoid formal peer review, and then used a community meeting to identify technical threats to their project approval. Instead of addressing those threats with safer density, they submitted a study based on "flawed metrics" that erases thousands of neighbors already living in the "peninsula" of the Linda Vista corridor from the survival map.

Respectfully,
DerChang Kau
Resident of Cupertino
This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing.

To: City Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council Members Cc: City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor
SCCFD Deputy Chief Shumate and Assistant Chief Estrada
San Jose Spotlight Maryanne Casas-Perez
Bcc: Residents of Linda Vista Corridor
From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino
Date: March 30, 2026
Subject: How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct, Cupertino – From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility
Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council members
There is a significant discrepancy between the developer’s (SummerHill Homes) approach to safety and the emergency-evacuation modeling conducted by residents and by the City’s own commissioned experts.

Communications between the City Planning Division and SummerHill Homes—along with the Kau-Bull face-to-face meeting and subsequent emails—reveal a troubling timeline: both SummerHill Homes and the City of Cupertino shifted from acknowledging evacuation risks to actively avoiding a formal study. Instead, they relied on a “voluntary” analysis that sidesteps the physical realities of wildfire behavior and evacuation constraints.

2.0. (Oct/2025)
Event 2. The Acknowledgement of Due Diligence (October 10, 2025) Early in the process, SummerHill appeared to recognize that a wildfire evacuafon analysis was a required part of their project scope.

Steve Bull explicitly asks the City for "the criteria for the evacua-on route study" and notes that their submiged traffic report "does not yet include the evacuafon route analysis".

Event 3. Discovery of the "Legal Hook" Dodge (October 16, 2025) Just six days later, the City provided SummerHill with a way to bypass formal safety scrutiny by citing Assembly Bill 130.

DerChang handed Steve and Kevin a hardcopy of Linda Vista Corridor Emergency Evacuation analysis and proposed a win-win strategy.

In a follow-up email, DerChang provided electronic copy of the disclosure showing that increasing density beyond the R1 baseline triples the non-survivable window, extending evacuation times from 30 minutes to over 90 minutes. Steve Bull replied on Jan 16, stating they were "reviewing your analysis with our consultant team"
Event 5. The Pivot to "Defensive Fiction" (February – March 2026) Rather than using Kau’s data to adjust the project for safety, SummerHill utilized its consultant, Hexagon, to generate a counter-narrative.

Event 5-1. The Submission of "Evacuation Fiction" (February 2026) Following this exemption, SummerHill submitted a "voluntary, non-CEQA, informational assessment" prepared by Hexagon Transportation Consultants.
o Hexagon modeled the evacuation using "Steady-State" metrics—modeling only 30 vehicles per hour (essentially a daily commute) to claim a negligible 2-minute delay. o DerChang Kau submitted a technical rebuttal in the City record. It counters that a real wildfire surge involves 250+ vehicles attempting to exit in a 30-minute window, which pushes the corridor to 110% saturation and a 93.5-minute evacuation time.

Event 5-2. SummerHill’s substituting Hardening for Egress (March 2026) Rather than address the road capacity failure, SummerHill shifted focus to structural hardening (sprinklers and fire-rated walls).

Respectfully,
DerChang Kau
Resident of Cupertino
From: James Lloyd
To: Kitty Moore; Liang Chao; Sheila Mohan; J.R. Fruen; R "Ray" Wang Cc: Piu Ghosh (she/her); City Attorney"s Office; Cupertino City Manager"s Office; City Clerk; City of Cupertino Planning Dept.

Subject: public comment re item 3 for tonight"s Council meeting Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:46:53 AM
Attachments: Cupertino - 10857-87 Linda Vista Drive- HAA Letter - CC - 1 Apr 2026.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Cupertino City Council,
The California Housing Defense Fund (“CalHDF”) submits the attached public comment re item 3 for tonight's Council meeting, the proposed 51-unit housing development project at 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive, which includes 10 median- and moderateincome units.

Sincerely,
James M. Lloyd
Director of Planning and Investigations
California Housing Defense Fund
[email protected]
CalHDF is grant & donation funded
Donate today - https://calhdf.org/donate/
Apr 1, 2026
City of Cupertino
10300 Torre Avenue
Cupertino, CA 95014
Re: Proposed Housing Development at 10857-87 Linda Vista Drive By email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
CC: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
Dear Cupertino City Council,
The California Housing Defense Fund (“CalHDF”) submits this letter to remind the City of its obligation to abide by all relevant state laws when evaluating the proposed 51-unit housing development project at 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive, which includes 10 median- and moderate-income units. These laws include the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), the Density Bonus Law (“DBL”), Housing Element Law, and AB 130.

The HAA provides the project legal protections. It requires approval of zoning and general plan compliant housing development projects unless findings can be made regarding specific, objective, written health and safety hazards. (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j).) The HAA also bars cities from imposing conditions on the approval of such projects that would reduce the project’s density unless, again, such written findings are made. (Ibid.) As a development with at least two-thirds of its area devoted to residential uses, the project falls within the HAA’s ambit, and it complies with local zoning code and the City’s general plan.

Increased density, concessions, and waivers that a project is entitled to under the DBL (Gov.

Code, § 65915) do not render the project noncompliant with the zoning code or general plan, for purposes of the HAA (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(3)). The HAA’s protections therefore apply, and the City may not reject the project except based on health and safety standards, as outlined above. Furthermore, if the City rejects the project or impairs its feasibility, it must conduct “a thorough analysis of the economic, social, and environmental effects of the action.” (Id. at subd. (b).)
2201 Broadway, PH1, Oakland, CA 94612
www.calhdf.org
Of note, the City has planned for housing development on the site by including it in its current Housing Element site inventory. Specifically, the City has planned for 84 units on the site including 31 lower-income units.

CalHDF also writes to emphasize that the DBL offers the proposed development certain protections. The City must respect these protections. In addition to granting the increase in residential units allowed by the DBL, the City must not deny the project the proposed waivers and concessions with respect to height, setback, floor area ratio, outdoor space, parking dimensions, and unit mix. If the City wishes to deny requested waivers, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (e)(1) requires findings that the waivers would have a specific, adverse impact upon health or safety, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific adverse impact. If the City wishes to deny requested concessions, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (d)(1) requires findings that the concessions would not result in identifiable and actual cost reductions, that the concessions would have a specific, adverse impact on public health or safety, or that the concessions are contrary to state or federal law. The City, if it makes any such findings, bears the burden of proof. (Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (d)(4).) Of note, the DBL specifically allows for a reduction in required accessory parking in addition to the allowable waivers and concessions. (Id. at subd. (p).) Additionally, the California Court of Appeal has ruled that when an applicant has requested one or more waivers and/or concessions pursuant to the DBL, the City “may not apply any development standard that would physically preclude construction of that project as designed, even if the building includes ‘amenities’ beyond the bare minimum of building components.” (Bankers Hill150 v. City of San Diego (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 755, 775.)
Finally, the project is exempt from state environmental review pursuant to AB 130 (Pub. Res.

Code, § 21080.66). Caselaw from the California Court of Appeal affirms that local governments err, and may be sued, when they improperly refuse to grant a project a CEQA exemption or streamlined CEQA review to which it is entitled. (Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 890, 911.)
As you are well aware, California remains in the throes of a statewide crisis-level housing shortage. New housing such as this is a public benefit: it will increase the city’s tax base; it will bring new customers to local businesses; and it will reduce displacement of existing residents by reducing competition for existing housing. It will also help cut down on transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions by providing housing in denser, more urban areas, as opposed to farther-flung regions in the state (and out of state). While no one project will solve the statewide housing crisis, the proposed development is a step in the right direction. CalHDF urges the City to approve it, consistent with its obligations under state law.
2 of 3
CalHDF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation whose mission includes advocating for increased access to housing for Californians at all income levels, including low-income households. You may learn more about CalHDF at www.calhdf.org.

Sincerely,
Dylan Casey
CalHDF Executive Director
James M. Lloyd
CalHDF Director of Planning and Investigations
3 of 3
From: Benjamin Fu
To: Lauren Sapudar; Luke Connolly; Emi Sugiyama
Cc: City Clerk; Tina Kapoor; Floy Andrews
Subject: RE: Written Communications Item 3
Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:29:10 AM
Attachments: Cupertino-HAU-033026.pdf
Hi Lauren,
We also received a letter from HCD on Monday afternoon. Tina already shared with City Council but should also be included in written communications.

Thanks,
Ben
Benjamin Fu
Director of Community Development
Community Development
[email protected]
(408) 777-3247
From: Lauren Sapudar <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 9:45 AM
To: Benjamin Fu <[email protected]>; Luke Connolly <[email protected]>; Emi Sugiyama <[email protected]>
Cc: City Clerk <[email protected]>
Subject: FW: Written Communications Item 3
FYI
Lauren Sapudar
City Clerk
City Manager's Office
[email protected]
(408) 777-1312
From: Kitty Moore <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2026 6:29 PM
To: Lauren Sapudar <[email protected]>; Kirsten Squarcia <[email protected]>; Tina Kapoor <[email protected]>; City Clerk <[email protected]> Cc: Liang Chao <[email protected]>
Subject: Written Communications Item 3
Dear City Clerk,
Please provide the attached Evacuation Study performed under the direction and expense of the City of Cupertino into the record for Item 3, Summerhill proposed project. I do not know if it has been included in the public record for the hearing yet.

Thank you,
Kitty Moore
Kitty Moore
Mayor
City Council
[email protected]
(408) 777-1389
STATE OF CALIFORNIA - BUSINESS, CONSUMER SERVICES AND HOUSING AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

DIVISION OF HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT
651 Bannon Street, Suite 400, Sacramento, CA 95811
(916) 263-2911 / FAX (916) 263-7453
www.hcd.ca.gov
March 30, 2026
Ben Fu, Community Development Director
Cupertino City Hall
10300 Torre Avenue
Cupertino, CA 95014
Dear Ben Fu:

RE: City of Cupertino – 10857 Linda Vista Drive – Letter Support and Technical Assistance
The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) understands that on April 1, 2026, the City Council of the City of Cupertino will consider a Tentative Map, Architectural and Site Approval, and Tree Removal Permit for the construction of a housing development project that includes moderate income affordable units (Project) on a

2.53-acre site located at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (APNs: 356-06-001, -002, -003, and - 004). The purpose of this letter is to assist the City with its decision making by providing technical assistance related to the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) and State No Net Loss Law.

Background
HCD understands that the Project is proposing 51 for-sale townhome units, including 10 units deed restricted for moderate income households. The Project is located within the R-3/TH (Multiple-Family Residential, Townhome) zoning district and the Residential – Medium High Density General Plan Land Use Designation. The Project is utilizing the State Density Bonus Law (SDBL)1 to utilize five waivers and one concession from applicable standards of the General Plan and Zoning Code. HCD additionally understands that the Project is consistent with the General Plan,2 Zoning,3 and state and local regulations applicable to Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZ). 4 On
February 24, 2026, the City’s Planning Commission voted to recommend the City Council approve the Project.5
1 Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (b)(1)(D).
2 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 2.
3 Ibid. See page 3.
4 Ibid. See page 9: “The Santa Clara County Fire Department has found that the project has demonstrated consistency with these requirements.”
5 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Minutes.

Ben Fu, Community Development Director

Page 2 ends

Analysis
Housing Accountability Act
The Project meets the definition of a “housing development project” under the HAA.6 The Project may only be disapproved or approved at a lower density if the City makes written findings, supported by a preponderance of evidence on the record, that (1) a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety would result from the project and (2) mitigation of the adverse impact is not possible.7 Specific, adverse, impact means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions.8 “Objective” means, “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the public official.”9 Additionally, the Legislature has clarified that these impacts are intended to arise “infrequently.”10
Housing Element No Net Loss Law
No Net Loss Law requires that a jurisdiction ensure there is development opportunity remaining throughout the planning period to accommodate the jurisdiction’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA). Because the approval of the Project would result in capacity becoming inadequate to accommodate the RHNA, the City will have up to 180 days from the approval to identify or rezone “sufficient additional, adequate, and available sites” to accommodate the remaining RHNA.
11 HCD understands that the Project site consists of four contiguous lots listed in the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element and the approval of the project may trigger a No Net Loss Law obligation for the City in the moderate income and lower-income categories. In the Planning Commission Staff Report for the Project, the City has stated that, while it “is unable to identify additional sites to accommodate its RHNA concurrently with this project’s approval, it is working toward being compliant with State law in a timely manner. 12” HCD reminds the City that Housing Element No Net Loss Law specifically provides that the City may not disapprove a housing project on the basis that approval of the development would trigger the identification or zoning of additional adequate sites to accommodate the remaining RHNA.13
6 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(2). 7 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1). 8 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1)(A).
9 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(9).
10 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(3).
11 Gov. Code, § 65863., subd. (c)(2).
12 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 18.
13 See HCD’s October 2, 2019 No Net Loss Law Memo, page 1, available at:
https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/housing-elementmemos/docs/sb-166-final.pdf.

Ben Fu, Community Development Director

Page 3 ends

Conclusion
For purposes of entitling AB 130-eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase. This prevents the entitlement review process from becoming bogged down in technical details that are strictly governed by other laws.

HCD informs the City that AB 712 (Government Code Section 65914.2.) went into effect on January 1, 2026. Among other things, the new law increases penalties that a court may impose on a local government if the local government was advised in writing prior to the commencement of a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General or HCD that the local government’s decision, action, or inaction would represent a violation of specified housing laws.

HCD hopes this technical assistance is helpful. HCD has enforcement authority over the HAA and Housing Element Law, among other state housing laws. Accordingly, HCD may review local government actions to determine consistency with these laws. Pursuant to Government Code section 65585, subdivision (j), if HCD finds that a jurisdiction’s actions do not comply with state law, HCD may notify the California Office of the Attorney General.

HCD remains committed to supporting the City of Cupertino in facilitating housing at all income levels and hopes the City finds this clarification helpful. If you have questions or need additional information, please contact Brandon Yung at [email protected].

Sincerely,
Melinda Coy
Housing Accountability Unit Chief
From: DerChang Kau
To: Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council
Subject: PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:04:17 AM
Attachments: Evacuation modeling methodology and Linda Vista Wildfire Evacuation analysis.pdf 20260324 To AC Estrada - Quantitative Wildfire Evacuation Modeling .pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3
From: DerChang Kau <[email protected]>
Date: Tuesday, March 24, 2026 at 11:21 AM
To: Hector Estrada <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Shumate <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project)
To:Assistant Chief Estrada, SCCFD Fire Prevention
Cc:Deputy Chief Shumate, SCCFD
From:DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino
Date:March 24, 2026
Subject: Quantitative Wildfire Evacuation Modeling & Risk Assessment for the Monta Vista Foothills
Dear Assistant Chief Estrada,
Thank you for taking the time to engage so directly with the residents of the Linda Vista corridor.

Your willingness to listen to our concerns regarding the intersection of local development and public safety is greatly appreciated by the community.

I particularly valued our discussion regarding the technical nuances of evacuation modeling. As a career engineer, I have always believed that data-driven transparency serves as the most effective bridge between community anxiety and operational reality. To that end, I am pleased to share the enclosed assessment, which provides a rigorous engineering framework for evaluating wildfire evacuation risks within our unique geography.

In organizing this document, I wanted to move beyond mere observation and into a structured analysis of the physics of movement. The report begins by establishing the methodology, specifically contrasting the steady-state metrics used in standard transportation engineering with the dynamic requirements of evacuation science. From there, it explores the "Physics of Failure," detailing the Utilization Ratio (V/C) and explaining why system performance collapses non-linearly when volume exceeds capacity. I have concluded the study with a series of comparative "Stress Test" scenarios that match our current R1 baseline against the planned R3 intensification at Evulich Court, supported by technical appendices rooted in established Industrial and Civil Engineering queuing standards.

Ultimately, this work is intended to help us better navigate the delicate balance between the forces of Mother Nature and the necessity of Human Intervention. While we use Fire Hazard Severity Zones to respect the natural reality of our landscape, the efficacy of our intervention depends on how we harmonize three distinct levels of planning. It begins with the robustness of our physical infrastructure (such as road, power, water and etc.) to handle worst-case scenarios, followed by the strategic coordination of local government to ensure that density allocation never exceeds the "lifesafety bandwidth" of those roads. Only when these two foundations are set can we move to the third level: the execution of urban development with strict wildfire hardening.

As you and your department hold the unique jurisdiction to see the holistic "connective tissue" between these stages, I would like to formally invite you to utilize this modeling as a resource. The Evulich Court project offers a timely opportunity for the SCCFD to lead by example, helping to guide City leadership toward a more thoughtful alignment between density and the physical laws of a safe evacuation.

I look forward to our continued collaboration in making the Monta Vista foothills a model of wildfire resilience.

Respectfully,
DerChang Kau
Retired Intel Fellow
Adjunct Professor, National Taiwan University
From: Hector Estrada <[email protected]>
Date: Thursday, March 19, 2026 at 1:51 PM
To: DerChang Kau <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Shumate <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project)
DerChang,
It was a pleasure speaking with you and your neighbors on Tuesday evening after the City Council Meeting. It's always valuable to speak to members of the community and to discuss concerns. I look forward to receiving the additional information that you offered to clarify your work and methodology. I hope I provided useful information and I thank you for the discussion.

Respectfully,
Hector R. Estrada
Assistant Chief
Fire Prevention Division
Santa Clara County Fire Department
Office: (408) 341-4420
On Wed, Mar 4, 2026 at 3:56 PM DerChang Kau <[email protected]> wrote:

Dear Assistant Chief Estrada,
Thank you for acknowledging my previous email.

I am a retired Intel Fellow and Engineering Professor and have modeled the Linda Vista corridor under the project density which is pending approval. The analysis shows the road reaches 110% utilization under emergency evacuation conditions, which produces a standing queue that does not clear within the 30 minute safety window established by the 2025 Palisades Fire data.

I would welcome 20 minutes to walk your team through the methodology and findings before the City Council hearing. If the analysis contains errors, I want to know. If it does not, your department should have it before the vote.

I am available early next week. Please let me know what works.

Respectfully,
DerChang Kau
10847 Linda Vista Dr
(408) 398-6086
From: Hector Estrada <[email protected]>
Date: Wednesday, March 4, 2026 at 1:07 PM
To: DerChang Kau <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project)
Good afternoon Mr. DerChang Kau,
I am in receipt of your email and the attached documents regarding the Evulich Court Project. We will review the documents you have submitted.

Respectfully,
Hector R. Estrada
Assistant Chief
Fire Prevention Division
Santa Clara County Fire Department
Office: (408) 341-4420
On Fri, Feb 27, 2026 at 3:22 AM DerChang Kau <[email protected]> wrote:

To: Assistant Chief Hector Estrada, Santa Clara County Fire Department CC: Cupertino City Council & Clark, Cupertino Planning Commissioners & division, Mercury Newspaper, Alice Lin and Frank Swanson From:DerChang Kau
Date:Feb. 27, 2026
Subject:Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project)
Dear Assistant Chief Estrada,
I am DerChang, a 3-decade Cupertinian. I am writing to you as a resident of the Linda Vista corridor.I know you are a hands-on leader who prioritizes public safety and operational readiness over theoretical paperwork. This is why I am bringing a critical "cumulative impact" safety concern to your attention regarding the proposed 51-unit townhome development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive.

I am seeking your advocacy regarding the proposed 51-unit development at Evulich Court.

Currently, your department’s "Finding of Consistency" is being used by the developer to bypass CEQA environmental review. However, that finding appears limited to the interior of the project site (hydrant pressure, turn radii, and hose-pull).

We are deeply concerned that the “cumulative impact” on the Linda Vista "Spine" during a wildfire has not been modeled and the risk is not properly assessed. The implications for life safety are catastrophic.

The Tactical Reality: A Single-Point-of-Failure
Imagine a wind-driven wildfire encroaching from the South/Southwest (Stevens Creek County Park). The tree canopy over Linda Vista becomes a "fuel tunnel." Residents have only one exit:

North, funneling toward East bound of McClellan Road.

In this scenario, the Fire Department’s ability to defend the neighborhood depends on the residents being able to clear the road. Our analytical modeling—based on the current VHFHSZ classification— shows that at the proposed R3 density, the addition of 51 high-density units will push the road Utilization Ratio of 110%. Mathematically, this creates a "System Failure." Once the evacuation surge begins, cars will be trapped in a standing queue.From an operational standpoint, this is a significant "trap hazard." If the road capacity is exceeded, the bottleneck at the intersection will prevent not just residents from leaving, but emergency vehicles from efficiently entering the corridor to stage for structure protection or rescue operations.

The Hexagon Report Gap: The developer's traffic study models only 30 cars per hour.

The Evacuation Reality: We are facing a surge of 250+ vehicles attempting to exit in a 30-minute window.

The Result: A mathematical "System Failure" where the exit rate at McClellan is slower than the arrival rate. This creates a standing queue that stretches the length of the spine.

Why the Current Assessment is Incomplete
The developer’s counsel argues that because the project meets internal Fire Code, it is exempt from further CEQA review. We believe this is an operational oversight.

1. Merging Shockwaves: Concentrating 51 units at one entry point creates a "forced merge" scenario. Our models show this adds 28 minutes of stutter-delay to the uphill residents already in the queue.

2. Order-to-Safety Time: Total evacuation time jumps from a survivable less than 30 minutes to 90+ minutes. In a fire moving 200 acres in 20 minutes, a 90 plus-minute bottleneck is a non-survivable event.

Our Request to the Fire Department
We believe this project cannot be adequately reviewed through a standard site-plan exemption.

To ensure the safety of our neighborhood, we respectfully ask the Fire Department to:

1. Expand the Scope: Review the cumulative impact of this density on the entire Linda Vista evacuation corridor, rather than just the project interior.

2. Model the "Surge": Evaluate whether the egress route can maintain a "Total Order to Safety" time within the 30-minute critical fire-spread window (200 acres in 20 minutes) as established by recent regional wildfire events (eg. 2025 Pacific Palisade Fire).

If our neighborhood’s evacuation capacity is mathematically compromised, we believe this project does not meet the "safety requirements" necessary for a CEQA exemption. We cannot allow "paper compliance" to override the physical reality of a wildfire. We would welcome the opportunity to walk the corridor with you or a member of your team to show you the physical bottlenecks that our models have identified.

Again, our ask is your review of Emergency Evacuation Corridor Analysis for the entire "Spine," not just the project interior. Specifically, we request that the Fire Department clarify to the Planning Commission that:

Internal site compliance does not equate to neighborhood evacuation safety.

A CEQA exemption is inappropriate without a Cumulative Evacuation Surge Study that accounts for the 155-unit total load on the Linda Vista bottleneck.

Attached you will find 4 documents

1. Detailing the evacuation model and assumption

2. Our plead to the public hearing of Cupertino City Planning Commission.

3. Technical Rebuttal to Hexagon Transportation Analysis

4. This letter.

Thank you for your dedication to the safety of our community. We are eager to provide you with our full analytical data package to assist in your review.

Respectfully,
DerChang Kau
Intel Fellow, Retired
Adjunct Professor, National Taiwan University
10847 Linda Vista Drive
[email protected]
Home: (408)446-5150
Mobil: (408)298-6086

QUANTITATIVE WILDFIRE EVACUATION MODELING

METHODOLOGY & LIFE SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
March 24, 2026
DerChang Kau
Retired Intel Fellow
Adjunct Professor of NTU
Resident of Cupertino

A Comparative Analysis of
Dynamic Egress vs.

Static Transportation Engineering for
Linda Vista Corridor
Transitioning from Static Transportation Engineering to Dynamic Emergency Flow:

Evaluating Systemic Failure and Entrapment Risks under R3 Density Intensification

Prepared For:

Assistant Chief Estrada, Santa Clara County Fire Department ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 2
Table of Content
Preface
Abstract
Section 1: Transportation Engineering vs. Evacuation Science

1.1 Static vs. Dynamic Metrics: Convenience vs. Survival

1.2 The Volume-Capacity (V/C) Divergence

1.3 Modeling Application: Equilibrium vs. Dynamic

1.4 Roadway Topology: The "Spine & Rib" Problem

1.5 Evacuation Clearance Model is used
Section 2: Survival Window vs. Evacuation Processes (ASET vs. RSET)

2.1 Defining the Survival Window (ASET)

2.1.1 Speed of Spread (The "Explosion")

2.1.2 Spatial Tolerance of 30 minutes ASET

2.2 Analytical Breakdown: Required Safe Egress Time (RSET)

2.3 The Survival Calculus: RSET vs. ASET on Current vs. Planned Density Section 3: Evacuation Modeling of the Linda Vista Spine

3.1 Housing Inventory and Projected Density Increases

3.1.1 Housing Inventory

3.1.2 Vehicle Load

3.2 Road Capacity Degradation and Functional Collapse

3.2.1 Effective Capacity Degradation due to Density

3.2.2 Additional degradation – Wildfire Reality, Static Model Overestimates Capacity

3.2.3 Effective Capacity: Degradation Affected by Density

3.3 The V/C Surge: Sunday Afternoon Peak Occupancy Scenario

3.3.1 The Scenario: "Sunday Afternoon Peak Occupancy"

3.3.2 The Trigger: "The Red Flash Warning & Instantaneous Surge"

3.3.3 Model Assumption Table: R1 vs. R3 Scenarios

3.4 Dynamic Delay Math: Queuing and Merging Friction

3.4.1 When V/C is < 1.0 (The R1 Baseline)

3.4.2 When V/C Approaches or Exceeds 1.0 (The R3 Failure)

3.4.3 The Answer: RSET (𝑇!"!#$)

3.4.4 Analytical Conclusion
Conclusion
Reference
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 3
Preface
The analysis presented in this report is born out of a critical necessity to bridge the gap between municipal zoning logic and tactical fire safety reality. As a career engineer and resident of the Linda Vista corridor, I have observed that current land-use decisions often rely on "Steady-State" transportation metrics (VMT and LOS) that were never intended to model lifesafety outcomes during a wildfire surge.

This report provides a formal methodology for "Evacuation Clearance Modeling." It treats our roadway infrastructure not as a convenience for commuters, but as a finite-capacity pressure pipe during a disaster. The goal of this work is to provide the Santa Clara County Fire Department with a data-driven framework to assess "System Failure" thresholds—the point where density creates mathematical entrapment. It is my hope that this engineering-first approach assists City of Cupertino and the Department in its mission to protect life and property in our Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones.
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 4
Abstract
This report introduces a Dynamic Evacuation Model designed to assess the survivability of wildfire evacuation surges in constrained, single-access hillside corridors. Using the Linda Vista "Spine" in Cupertino as a case study, the model evaluates the transition from current lowdensity (R1) status to proposed high-density (R3) intensification.

Unlike traditional Local Transportation Analysis (LTA), which assumes linear delays, this methodology identifies a Non-Linear Tipping Point centered on the Volume-Capacity Ratio (V/C). The findings demonstrate that while the R1 baseline operates within a safe 30-minute survival window (V/C=0.37), the cumulative R3 intensification pushes the corridor to a state of Oversaturation (V/C=1.10).

The modeling accounts for three critical delay factors: Human/Pre-evacuation timing, Deterministic Queuing, and Forced-Merge Turbulence. The analysis concludes that R3 density results in a "System Failure," extending the total "Order-to-Safety" time to 93.5+ minutes— tripling the non-survivable window and creating a significant risk of stationary entrapment on the corridor's primary evacuation route.
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 5
Section 1 Transportation Engineering vs. Evacuation Science Transportation consultants typically focus on Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT), Intersection Level of Service (LOS), or Local Transportation Analysis (LTA)—metrics designed for everyday traffic operations and CEQA compliance. These frameworks are fundamentally different from Emergency Flow or Evacuation Clearance, which evaluate roadway performance under life-safety conditions.

1.1 Static Metrics vs. Dynamic Metrics: Convenience vs. Survival The divergence between Static Transportation Engineering and Evacuation Science is the difference between optimizing for convenience versus optimizing for survival. While a housing developer looking at a new development (like Evulich Court) might use VMT, LOS or LTA to check for "acceptable" traffic, an evacuation model treats the roadway as a finite-capacity pipe under a highpressure surge. The distinction between these methodologies lies in their temporal resolution and behavioral assumptions. In the engineering world, we separate these into Steady-State (Planning Level) models, which assume an equilibrium over time, and Transient-State (Dynamic Traffic Assignment) models, which track the physics of movement as it evolves second-by-second.

Metric Name Primary Focus Failure Definition
Static VMT Environmental impact Having to wait through two signal cycles at an intersection.

Static LOS Driver comfort/convenience. Same as VMT
Static LTA Daily peak-hour capacity and "fair
share" mitigation.

Adding 10 cars to a turn lane that is
already full.

Dynamic Evacuation
Clearance Total system emptying time. The time when the last car crosses the safety boundary.

Dynamic Emergency
Flow
Throughput stability under extreme
stress and "panic" behavior.

Gridlock where speed drops to 0 mph
(System Lock).

1.2 The Volume-Capacity (V/C) Divergence
In a static model, a V/C ratio of 1.0 is unpleasant, but stable. In an evacuation, V/C = 1.0 is a catastrophic tipping point.
• The "Time-to-Clear" Phenomenon
For the same V/C ratio, the results differ because of Non-Linear Queue Propagation.

Þ Static (LOS/LTA): Assumes "Steady State." If V/C = 1.1, you have a 10% overflow. The model assumes people will eventually clear the light or take a different route.

Þ Dynamic (Evacuation): Assumes "Transient State." If V/C = 1.1, that 10% extra volume creates a backward-propagating shockwave. Since every resident on the "Linda Vista Spine" is trying to leave simultaneously, there is no "alternate route." • The Math of Delay
Static models often use the BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) function for travel time T:

𝑇 = 𝑡% $1 + 𝛼 (
𝑉
𝐶
+
&
,
In an evacuation, the β exponent (the "penalty" for congestion) effectively spikes. While a 10% over-capacity surge in a static model might add 2 minutes to a commute, in an evacuation of a single-exit corridor, that same 10% can add 30+ minutes to the total "Clearance Time" because of the geometric constraints of cul-de-sacs entering the main spine. ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 6

1.3 Modeling Application: Equilibrium vs. Dynamic
• Static Models: These use User Equilibrium. They assume drivers are "smart" and will find the fastest path over many days of commuting.
• Evacuation Models (Dynamic): They account for the "loading" time (how long it takes you to get the kids and pets in the car) and the physical interaction of cars merging from side streets like Rae Lane and Baxley Ct.

1.4 Roadway Topology: The "Spine & Rib" Problem
The models apply differently depending on the "topology" of the road:
• Arterials/Grids: Static LOS works well here because traffic can diffuse into parallel streets. If one intersection is blocked, there are 4 other ways out.
• The "Spine & Rib" Topology (Linda Vista): This is a Single-Exit System.

Þ The LTA view: It sees Linda Vista as a "Local Collector" with plenty of capacity for daily trips.

Þ The Evacuation view: It sees it as a bottlenecked funnel. Every side street (Rae, Baxley, Evulich, Mt. Crest) is a "rib" feeding into a single "spine." If the flow on the spine reaches capacity, the "ribs" cannot merge.

1.5 Evacuation Clearance Model is used
If a Transportation Consultant says a project has "No Significant Impact" based on VMT, LOS or LTA, they are technically correct about the daily environment, but they are ignoring the life safety reality.

In a wildfire, Static Model doesn't matter; Throughput at the Chokepoint (Hyannisport Dr) is the only variable that dictates survival. If the demand at that chokepoint is 155 units but the capacity remains fixed at the current lane width, the "Time-to-Clear" doesn't just increase—it potentially exceeds the ASET (Survival Window) we calculated earlier.

Section 2 Survival Window vs. Evacuation Processes – ASET vs. RSET The January 2025 Palisades Fire serves as a brutal "design basis" for wildfire modeling because it demonstrated that in a wind-driven event (Santa Ana or Diablo winds), the time between ignition and the "critical arrival" at residential structures can be as little as 20 to 30 minutes.

To determine how much time personnel on the Linda Vista "Spine" have to exit the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ), eg. Evulich Ct., before the environment becomes non-survivable, we look at the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) versus the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET).

2.1 The Survival Window (ASET)
In the Palisades event, the fire spread was driven by high-velocity winds and steep terrain— conditions nearly identical to the "Diablo Wind" patterns that affect the Cupertino hills.

2.1.1 Speed of Spread (The "Explosion")
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 7
In the Palisades Fire, the fire spread at a rate of approximately 2.3 miles per hour. For the Linda Vista corridor, which is tucked against the wildland-urban interface (WUI), the "Available Safe Egress Time" is effectively dictated by the speed of the flame front and ember spotting. • Initial Growth: On the morning of January 7, 2025, the fire grew from 10 acres to 200 acres in just 20 minutes.
• Rapid Expansion: By 2:10 p.m., it had reached 700 acres, and just one hour later, it had nearly doubled again to 1,262 acres.
• Analytical Conversion: For a fire to cover that area, the linear Rate of Spread (ROS) is estimated at approximately 180 to 200 feet per minute.
• Linda Vista Application: The distance from the high-density brush at the edge of the Mt.

Crest/Rae Lane ridge to the primary "Spine" (Linda Vista Dr) is often less than 1,500 feet.

𝑇#''()#$ = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑅𝑂𝑆 = 1500𝑓𝑡200𝑓𝑡/𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 7.5 𝑚𝑖𝑛

2.1.2 Spatial Tolerance of 30 minutes ASET
The image below illustrates a 6,000-foot (~1.1-mile) radius centered on the “eye” of the Linda Vista spine (Evulich Ct). A wildfire igniting within the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (red area) yields an Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) of 30 minutes or less. This means residents have no more than half an hour to evacuate before conditions become life-threatening.

When ASET ≤ 30 minutes, evacuation feasibility depends critically on roadway performance. If the Volume-to-Capacity (V/C) ratio approaches or exceeds 100%, Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) surpasses ASET—indicating that the transportation system cannot clear evacuees in time. This mismatch constitutes a failure of evacuation clearance and poses an unacceptable risk to public safety.
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 8

2.2 Analytical Breakdown: Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) To reach safety (defined as crossing the boundary at Hyannisport Dr out of the VHFHSZ), the total time is calculated as:

𝑇!"!#$ = 𝑇#$*'! + 𝑇+'*+ + 𝑇!'#)*$
A. Alert & Recognition (𝑇#$*'!)
• Target: 5 minutes.
• Reality: In the Palisades event, orders were issued 40 minutes late. If residents wait for an official "Go" order, the RSET already exceeds the 30-minute ASET.

B. Preparation & Loading (𝑇+'*+)
This is where the demographic "penalty" occurs. Based on standard evacuation behavior models (e.g., NFPA/FEMA standards):
• Adults: ~5–10 minutes (grabbing go-bags, vehicle positioning). • Seniors/Children: +10 minutes. Reduced mobility and the need for assistance increase the "notification-to-movement" lag.
• Pets: +5–15 minutes. Locating cats or loading dogs into crates/vehicles is a known "bottleneck" in residential evacuations.
• Subtotal 𝑇+'*+: ~20–25 minutes for a diverse household.

Given the diverse demographic characteristics of residents along the Linda Vista spine, this evacuation model applies a 20-minute assumed departure time.

C. Travel & Clearance (𝑇!'#)*$)
This is the mechanical constraint of the "Linda Vista Spine." • Current Capacity (~70 Units): Based on the Evacuation Clearance Model, 6.5 minutes is assessed
• Planned Capacity (~155 Units): Adding the ~85 planned units (including the 51 townhomes at Evulich Court) increases the volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio to over 110% resulting in more than 73.5 minutes of 𝑇!'#)*$
Detailed 𝑇!'#)*$model, parameter will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

2.3 The Survival Calculus: RSET vs. ASET on Current vs. Planned Variable Current With Planned Units
Preparation Time 20 Minutes 20 Minutes
Clearance Time (𝑇!'#)*$) 6.5 Minutes 73.5+ Minutes
Total RSET 26.5 Minutes 93.5 Minutes*
Survival Window (ASET) 30 Minutes 30 Minutes
THE GAP None 63.5 Minutes Late
*: Traffic delay is non-linear. As V/C exceeds 1.0, small increases in volume cause exponential increases in delay.
3 4
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 9
5 Section 3 Evacuation Modeling of Linda Vista Spine

5.1 Linda Vista Spine
Based on recent planning documents from the City of Cupertino and real estate data for 2026, the section of Linda Vista Drive between Hyannisport Drive and Santa Teresa Drive is currently an established single-family neighborhood undergoing significant transition due to state-mandated housing laws.

3.1.1 Housing Inventory
This stretch of Linda Vista Drive consists primarily of single-family ranch-style homes built between 1962 and 1973. There are two major housing projects currently moving through the city's approval process that will drastically increase the density in this specific corridor. • Evulich Court / Summerhill Homes II – Located at 10857–10887 Linda Vista Drive, this project is in the final stages of the 2026 approval cycle.

Þ Planned: 51 Townhomes.

Þ Net Change: This replaces the 4 existing houses currently on the site, adding a net of 47 new units.
• Vista Heights (Former McDonald Dorsa Quarry) – Located west of Mt. Crest Drive and south of Linda Vista Park.

Þ Planned: 33 Units (25 single-family homes and 8 condominiums).

Þ Details: This project includes a private community center and uses a single access point through the entry of Linda Vista Park.

The addition of these units is a point of significant local discussion, specifically regarding traffic on Linda Vista Drive during school commute times and fire safety access.

Location Current Planned
Linda Vista Dr (Main) ~32 ~32
Rae Lane ~23 ~23
Baxley Court ~6 ~6
Mt. Crest Pl & Dr ~10 ~10
Evulich Court 4 51
Vista Height 33
Total Units ~75 Units* ~158 Units¶
*: 70 units used in baseline model
¶: 155 units used in Planned model

3.1.2 Vehicle Load
In this study, 1.6 vehicles/household consolidation is used.

5.2 Road Capacity – The Denominator
The reason road capacity degrades from the R1 baseline to the R3 planned scenario is rooted in Traffic Flow Theory[1,2], specifically the transition from "Free-Flow" to "Oversaturated" conditions. While the physical asphalt remains the same width, the Functional Capacity (the ability of the road to actually process vehicles) collapses because of how density changes the physics of the "Spine."

3.2.1 Effective Capacity Degradation due to Density
Here is the analytical breakdown of why R3 density causes this degradation:
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 10
• The "Side-Friction" and Turbulence Effect – In an R1 environment, houses are spaced far apart.

When a car pulls out of a driveway, it usually finds a "gap" in traffic. Cars can maintain a consistent speed (20–25 mph), and the road functions near its theoretical capacity. By concentrating 51 units into a single point (Evulich Court), you create a massive "Conflict Point." Because the road is already near its limit, there are no gaps. Every car exiting the new development must "Force Merge. Each force-merge act causes the car on the main road to brake. This creates a backward-traveling shockwave. In traffic engineering, as turbulence increases, the "discharge rate" (capacity) of the road segment drops significantly. • Intersection Degradation (The "Four-Way Stop" Reality) – Capacity is largely determined by the "Control" at the end of the road. A lane can move ~900 vehicles per hour. However, a highdemand Four-Way Stop — where drivers must negotiate "who goes next" amidst smoke and panic—drops to a maximum of 450~600 vehicles per hour, depending on demand. The R3 density triggers this "Operational Collapse" that the R1 density does not.

3.2.2 Additional degradation – Wildfire Reality, Static Model Overestimates Capacity Static Model assumes the traffic signal at Bubb and McClellan is functioning perfectly with optimized green-light timing. The capacity is calculated based on how many cars can pass during a protected green phase. Emergency evacuation accounts for the high probability of power failure or "All-Red" emergency flashing during a wildfire. When a signal fails, it defaults to a Four-Way Stop.

Static Model focuses on the "Funnel" (the intersection). It assumes the "Pipe" (Linda Vista Drive) is always clear enough to feed the funnel. Evacuation Model recognizes that when density increased to R3 levels, the "Pipe" itself becomes a bottleneck.

Static Model only models one-way flow (concert goers leaving parking lot). Evacuation Model accounts for the Santa Clara County Fire Department engines attempting to enter the "Spine" while residents are leaving.

Static Model assumes "Ideal Conditions"—clear weather, alert drivers, and standard spacing.

Evacuation Model accounts for smoke obscuration and driver panic. When visibility drops, "Headway" (the distance between cars) increases significantly.

3.2.3 Effective Capacity: Degradation Affected by Density Feature R1 Baseline (Current) R3 Planned (High Density) Flow Type Laminar (Smooth) Turbulent (Choppy)
Intersection Minimum Impact Saturated 4-Way Stop
Conflict Minimal High (Resident vs. Fire Engine)
Functional Capacity ~600vph ~450 vph
Hexagon assumes capacity is a constant at theoretic or intrinsic capacity level of 900 vph per lane with 3 lane open. That is a 2700-vph denominator used, 6X reduction in V/C ratio. In reality, capacity is a variable that decreases as density and stress increase. By ignoring this degradation, the applicant is significantly overestimating the safety of the corridor.

5.3 The Volume and V/C Ratio

3.3.1 The Scenario: "Sunday Afternoon Peak Occupancy"
This subsection establishes the High-Probability/Worst-Case baseline. Unlike a Tuesday morning where many residents are at work in other cities, a Sunday afternoon represents "Maximum Neighborhood Load."
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 11
• Occupancy: Households are nearly 100% occupancy as families prepare for the upcoming work/school week.
• Environmental Context: A late-summer North/Northwest wind event has dried the fuel bed of the adjacent Stevens Creek County Park to critical levels (Fuel Moisture < 5%). • Vehicle Availability: Most household vehicles are parked on-site.

3.3.2 The Trigger: "The Red Flash Warning & Instantaneous Surge" This subsection describes the Reactionary Logic of the evacuation. • Alerting: At 2:00 PM, a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) and "Know Your Zone" (Genasys) Red Flash Warning are broadcast to all mobile devices in Zone CUP-029. • The Preparation Window (𝑇+'*+): Residents take an average of 15–20 minutes to gather essentials and load vehicles.
• The Surge: Rather than trickling out over a 2-hour window, the community enters the "Linda Vista Spine" simultaneously. This creates a "Massive Concurrent Entry" event. The demand is not modeled as vehicles-per-hour, but as a Volume-to-Capacity Surge that immediately exceeds the physical limits of the single-lane exit.

3.3.3 Model Assumption Table: R1 vs. R3 Scenarios
This table provides the "hard numbers" that drives 110% Utilization Ratio conclusion.

Parameter R1 Baseline (Current) R3 Planned (Proposed) Analytical Basis Total Households 70 Units 155 Units Includes Evulich Ct & Vista Heights.

Vehicle Consolidation 1.6 Cars / Household 1.6 Cars / Household Families often take two cars in fires.

Total Vehicle Load 112 Vehicles 248 Vehicles The total "Slug" of traffic.

Evacuation Window (ASET) 30 Minutes 30 Minutes The "Survival Window" before fire arrival.

Departure Distribution Log-Normal Surge Log-Normal Surge Peak arrivals occur at the 20-min mark.

Peak Volume (V) 224 Vehicles / Hr 496 Vehicles / Hr (Total Load / 0.5hr Window).

Effective Capacity (C) 600 Vehicles / Hr 450 Vehicles / Hr Capacity drops as density increases.

Utilization Ratio (V/C) 0.37 (37%) 1.10 (110%) V/C ≥ 1.0 = System Failure.

In the R3 scenario, the Volume (V) reaches 496 vehicles per hour during the surge. Because the Road Capacity (C) has degraded to 450 vehicles per hour (due to the "Force Merge" friction and intersection saturation we discussed earlier), the Utilization Ratio (V/C) hits 1.10. Once V/C exceeds 1.0, resulting "Stack", the queue length grows infinitely until the demand stops. In a 30-minute fire window, this means the last 10% of cars (and anyone stuck behind them) never reach the exit.

5.4 Travel & Clearance (𝑇!'#)*$), Part of RSET (𝑇!"!#$) In Dynamic Evacuation Model, once a system reaches a certain density, delays shift from being "incremental" to "exponential." Total delay (𝑇!"!#$) or RSET is the sum of three distinct components:

Human/Pre-evacuation Delay (𝐷,), Queuing Delay (𝐷-) and Merging/Friction Delay (𝐷.).

𝑇!"!#$ = 𝐷, + 𝑇!'#)*$
𝐷, = 𝑇#$*'! + 𝑇+'*+
𝑇!'#)*$ = 𝐷- + 𝐷.

𝐷,, as described in Section 2.2, include two components – Þ 𝑇#$*'! : wildfire start to red flash warning issued, and Þ 𝑇+'*+ : time from alert to vehicle in gear
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 12
Given the diverse demographic characteristics of residents along the Linda Vista spine, this evacuation model applies a 20-minute assumed departure time.

In this model the math for 𝐷- and 𝐷. changes fundamentally based on whether the V/C is below or above 1.0.

5.4.1 When V/C is < 1.0 (The R1 Baseline)
In this state, the road has "spare" capacity. Delays are stable and predictable. • Theoretical Math (Steady-State): Engineers use the M/M/1 Queuing Theory[3,4] or the BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) Function[5,6,7].

𝑇 = 𝑡% $1 + 𝛼 (
𝑉
𝐶
+
&
,
Where 𝑡% is the "free-flow" travel time. Because V/C is low (0.37 in R1 model), the exponent doesn't trigger a spike.
• In practical sense, there are "gaps" between cars. If someone pulls out of a driveway (merging), the car behind them only needs to lift their foot off the gas slightly. • Merging Delay (𝐷.): Calculated as 𝑛 × 𝑡/ (where 𝑡/ is a small gap-acceptance constant). In R1 model, this is only 4 minutes for the entire neighborhood.

5.4.2 When V/C Approaches or Exceeds 1.0 (The R3 Failure) Once V/C ≥ 1.0, the "Steady-State" math used by Hexagon breaks. Deterministic Queuing Analysis[8,9] must be used.
• Theoretical Math (Oversaturation):

Þ The Accumulation Formula: 𝑁(𝑡) = (𝑉 − 𝐶) × 𝑡
Þ Where: V is Arrival Rate (Volume), C is Service Rate (Capacity), and t is Duration of the surge.

Þ If V > C, the queue length 𝑁(𝑡) grows continuously. It does not stabilize. • Queuing Delay (𝐷-): This is the time the last vehicle spends waiting for the "slug" of traffic in front of it to clear the bottleneck.

Þ Math: 𝐷- = 0% 2(3
4 × F
5 6 − 1G
Þ In R3 model, with a surge window of 30 minutes and V/C = 1.10, the last car faces a stationary wait of 45+ minutes just to reach the start of the exit line. • Merging Delay (𝐷.): In an oversaturated "Wall of Cars (n)," 𝑡/ (gap acceptance)[6,10] becomes 𝑡7 (forced merge).

Þ Math: 𝐷. = 𝑛 × 𝑡7
Þ With 51 units at Evulich Court and a 𝑡7 of 30 seconds (time to force into a bumper-tobumper line), conservatively, this adds 25.5 to 28.5 minutes of "stutter delay" to every car behind the merge point.

5.4.3 The Answer: RSET (𝑇!"!#$)
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 13
As prescribed by Dynamic Evacuation Model, Total delay (𝑇!"!#$) or RSET is the sum of three distinct components: Human/Pre-evacuation Delay (𝐷,), Queuing Delay (𝐷-) and Merging/Friction Delay (𝐷.).

𝑇!"!#$ = 𝐷, + 𝐷- + 𝐷.

Component R1 Math (ρ=0.37) R3 Math (ρ=1.10) Impact of R3 𝐷! Constant (20m) Constant (20m) Baseline overhead.

𝐷" ≈ 0 (Free flow) (𝑉 − 𝐶) × 𝑡 Exponential growth; creates a standing queue.

𝐷# 𝑛 × 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑛 × 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒 Turbulence; stops the entire spine flow.

𝑇$%$&' ~26.5 Minutes 93.5+ Minutes System Failure.

5.4.4 Analytical Conclusion
In Hexagon’s Evacuation analysis, the "2-minute adder" assumes the road is a Linear System. However, traffic is a Non-Linear System. When you increase the vehicle load by 2/3 (moving from R1 to R3), you aren't just adding 2/3 more delay. You are pushing the Utilization Ratio over the 1.0 Threshold. • Below 1.0, the road is a Conveyor Belt (everything moves). • Above 1.0, the road is a Parking Lot (everything stops).

By modeling the "Force Merge" and the "Oversaturated Queue", the Dynamic Model proves that the R3 density creates a State Change in the neighborhood. This is why the delay jumps from 26 minutes (safe) to 90+ minutes (fatal), rather than just adding two minutes. This "State Change" is the core technical evidence the Council must consider.

Conclusion
The modeling of the Linda Vista corridor demonstrates that wildfire evacuation is a non-linear system.

While traditional static models might suggest that adding new housing units results in only incremental delays, dynamic modeling proves that the proposed R3 density pushes the infrastructure past a catastrophic tipping point.

The analytical results of this model confirm that the Linda Vista corridor cannot safely absorb the vehicle load of the proposed R3 intensification. The "2-minute adder" conclusion found in previous applicantled studies is a mathematical artifact of an improperly scaled model. When analyzed through the lens of Dynamic Evacuation Science, the impact of adding 51 units to a saturated spine is not incremental; it is a State Change from a functional roadway to a failed system.

The crossing of the 1.0 Utilization (V/C) Threshold marks the transition from "Congestion" to "Entrapment." In the R3 scenario, the 45-minute Queuing Delay and 28.5-minute Merging Delay are physically manifested as a "Wall of Cars." Under these conditions, the physical road width is irrelevant because the discharge rate at the bottleneck is lower than the arrival rate from the new developments.

For the SCCFD and City leadership, the data suggests that any further intensification of the Linda Vista "Spine" without a corresponding increase in physical exit capacity (e.g., a secondary permanent emergency egress) constitutes a significant threat to life safety.

In a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, a model that predicts a 93-minute exit time in a 30-minute firespread window is a prediction of disaster. We recommend that the City of Cupertino and SCCFD adopt Utilization Ratio Modeling as a standard requirement for all high-density developments in the WildlandUrban Interface (WUI) to ensure that zoning approvals do not supersede the physical laws of safe evacuation.
©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 14
Reference
[1] Daiheng Ni, Traffic Flow Theory: Characteristics, Experimental Methods, and Numerical Methods by Elsevier/ButterworthHeinemann [2] B.S. Kerner, The Physics of Traffic. Springer, Heidelberg. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40986-1 [3] Hillier and Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research, McGraw-Hill [4] Alan J. Miller, A Queueing Model for Road Traffic Flow, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1961.tb00391.x [5] Michael Meyer and Eric Miller, Urban Transportation Planning, McGraw-Hill [6] Transportation Research Board (1985) Special Report 209: Highway Capacity Manual. NRC, Washington DC [7] Mtoi and Moses, Calibration and Evaluation of Link Congestion Functions, J of Transportation Technologies, 2014, 4, 141- 149, DOI: 10.4236/jtts.2014.42014
[8] Roger Roess, Elena Prassas, William McShane, Traffic Engineering, Pearson [9] Ford–Fulkerson algorithm, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford%E2%80%93Fulkerson_algorithm [10] W. S. Jewell, Forced Merging in Traffic, DOI: 10.1287/opre.12.6.858 To: Assistant Chief Estrada, SCCFD Fire Preven5on
Cc: Deputy Chief Shumate, SCCFD
From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cuper5no
Date: March 24, 2026
Subject: Quan5ta5ve Wildfire Evacua5on Modeling & Risk Assessment for the Monta Vista Foothills Dear Assistant Chief Estrada,
Thank you for taking the 5me to engage so directly with the residents of the Linda Vista corridor. Your willingness to listen to our concerns regarding the intersec5on of local development and public safety is greatly appreciated by the community.

I par5cularly valued our discussion regarding the technical nuances of evacua5on modeling. As a career engineer, I have always believed that data-driven transparency serves as the most effec5ve bridge between community anxiety and opera5onal reality. To that end, I am pleased to share the enclosed assessment, which provides a rigorous engineering framework for evalua5ng wildfire evacua5on risks within our unique geography.

In organizing this document, I wanted to move beyond mere observa5on and into a structured analysis of the physics of movement. The report begins by establishing the methodology, specifically contras5ng the steadystate metrics used in standard transporta5on engineering with the dynamic requirements of evacua5on science. From there, it explores the "Physics of Failure," detailing the U5liza5on Ra5o (V/C) and explaining why system performance collapses non-linearly when volume exceeds capacity. I have concluded the study with a series of compara5ve "Stress Test" scenarios that match our current R1 baseline against the planned R3 intensifica5on at Evulich Court, supported by technical appendices rooted in established Industrial and Civil Engineering queuing standards.

Ul5mately, this work is intended to help us be^er navigate the delicate balance between the forces of Mother Nature and the necessity of Human Interven5on. While we use Fire Hazard Severity Zones to respect the natural reality of our landscape, the efficacy of our interven5on depends on how we harmonize three dis5nct levels of planning. It begins with the robustness of our physical infrastructure (such as road, power, water and etc.) to handle worst-case scenarios, followed by the strategic coordina5on of local government to ensure that density alloca5on never exceeds the "life-safety bandwidth" of those roads. Only when these two founda5ons are set can we move to the third level: the execu5on of urban development with strict wildfire hardening.

As you and your department hold the unique jurisdic5on to see the holis5c "connec5ve 5ssue" between these stages, I would like to formally invite you to u5lize this modeling as a resource. The Evulich Court project offers a 5mely opportunity for the SCCFD to lead by example, helping to guide City leadership toward a more thoughful alignment between density and the physical laws of a safe evacua5on.

I look forward to our con5nued collabora5on in making the Monta Vista foothills a model of wildfire resilience.

Respecfully,
DerChang Kau
Re5red Intel Fellow
Adjunct Professor, Na5onal Taiwan University
From: DerChang Kau
To: Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council
Subject: PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:04:10 AM
Attachments: image.png
Rebuttal to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 .pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3
From: DerChang Kau <[email protected]>
Date: Saturday, March 21, 2026 at 11:33 PM
To: Kitty Moore <[email protected]>, Cupertino City Council <[email protected]>
Cc: Floy Andrews <[email protected]>, Floy Andrews <[email protected]>, Tina Kappor <[email protected]>
Subject: On Evulich Ct. Project -- Rebuttal to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing.

To:City Mayor Moore and Council
Cc:City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor
From:DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino
Date:March 21, 2026
Subject: Rebuttal to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 – Failure to Address Substantial Evidence of Evacuation Hazard
Dear Mayor Moore and Members of the City Council,
I am writing to formally challenge the City staff’s response to Question Q11-1 and Q11-2 in the Supplemental Staff Report (attached at the end of the message.) The staff’s assertion that the October 2025 Fehr & Peers Evacuation Study "does not pertain to the proposed residential development" is a legal fallacy that invites significant administrative risk and ignores the physical reality of the Linda Vista corridor.

1. The Present-Tense Obligation of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) – Staff argues the Fehr & Peers study is merely for "planning purposes" to inform future policy. However, under Government Code Section 66474(f), the Council is legally prohibited from approving a Tentative Map unless it can find that the design is "not likely to cause serious public health problems".

This safety finding is a present-tense obligation made at the time of the hearing. The Fehr & Peers study provides "substantial evidence" that the neighborhood’s only two exit routes already operate at over 200% of capacity under evacuation conditions. The Council cannot logically or legally conclude that adding 51 units to a corridor that is already failing by 100% will not cause a "serious public health problem."

2. The Circular Logic of "Objective Standards" – Staff justifies the lack of an evacuation analysis by claiming the City has no "adopted objective standards" for evacuation. This is circular reasoning: the City commissioned the Fehr & Peers study specifically to create those standards. Intentionally ignoring the study’s data because the City has not yet finished the paperwork to "adopt" it constitutes an administrative loophole that compromises resident safety. Under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), a study produced by the City’s own consultant qualifies as a "written" objective standard that documents a "significant, quantifiable, and direct" safety impact.

3. Inaccurate Assessment of Cumulative Impact (Q11-2) – Staff’s count of ~90 homes in the response to Q11-2 is artificially narrow. It fails to account for the cumulative evacuation demand from connected single-exit streets like Rae Lane.

4. CEQA Exemption Does Not Waive Safety Findings – Staff suggests that the AB 130 CEQA exemption "precludes" the City from requiring a project-specific evacuation study. This is incorrect.

While AB 130 may exempt the project from certain environmental reporting processes, it does not waive the Subdivision Map Act’s requirement for an affirmative safety finding. AB 130 itself requires that projects in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone adopt fire mitigations that achieve a "practical effect" equivalent to state standards. Without an evacuation capacity analysis, there is zero evidence in the record to prove such an equivalency exists.

In conclusion, Staff’s response to Q11 attempts to dismiss a documented 200% corridor failure as a "planning" issue rather than a "project" issue. Physical reality does not make such a distinction. I urge the Council to reject the findings for TM-2024-009 until the record includes a project-specific Wildfire Evacuation Capacity Study that accounts for the City’s own technical data.

Respectfully,
DerChang Kau
Resident of Cupertino
Excerpted from CC 03-17-2026 Item No. 12 SummerHill Homes_Supplemental Report This correspondence will be submi2ed to the administra5ve record in advance of the April 1 hearing.

To: City Mayor Moore and Council
Cc: City A1orney Andrews and Manager Kapoor
From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cuper<no
Date: March 21, 2026
Subject: Rebu1al to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 – Failure to Address Substan<al Evidence of Evacua<on Hazard
Dear Mayor Moore and Members of the City Council,
I am wri<ng to formally challenge the City staff’s response to Ques5on Q11-1 and Q11-2 in the Supplemental Staff Report (a1ached at the end of the message.) The staff’s asser<on that the October 2025 Fehr & Peers Evacua5on Study "does not pertain to the proposed residen<al development" is a legal fallacy that invites significant administra<ve risk and ignores the physical reality of the Linda Vista corridor.

1. The Present-Tense Obliga5on of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) – Staff argues the Fehr & Peers study is merely for "planning purposes" to inform future policy. However, under Government Code Sec5on 66474(f), the Council is legally prohibited from approving a Tenta<ve Map unless it can find that the design is "not likely to cause serious public health problems".

This safety finding is a present-tense obliga5on made at the <me of the hearing. The Fehr & Peers study provides "substan<al evidence" that the neighborhood’s only two exit routes already operate at over 200% of capacity under evacua<on condi<ons. The Council cannot logically or legally conclude that adding 51 units to a corridor that is already failing by 100% will not cause a "serious public health problem."

2. The Circular Logic of "Objec5ve Standards" – Staff jus<fies the lack of an evacua<on analysis by claiming the City has no "adopted objec<ve standards" for evacua<on. This is circular reasoning: the City commissioned the Fehr & Peers study specifically to create those standards. Inten<onally ignoring the study’s data because the City has not yet finished the paperwork to "adopt" it cons<tutes an administra<ve loophole that compromises resident safety. Under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), a study produced by the City’s own consultant qualifies as a "wri1en" objec<ve standard that documents a "significant, quan<fiable, and direct" safety impact.

3. Inaccurate Assessment of Cumula5ve Impact (Q11-2) – Staff’s count of ~90 homes in the response to Q11-2 is ar<ficially narrow. It fails to account for the cumula<ve evacua<on demand from connected single-exit streets like Rae Lane.

4. CEQA Exemp5on Does Not Waive Safety Findings – Staff suggests that the AB 130 CEQA exemp5on "precludes" the City from requiring a project-specific evacua<on study. This is incorrect. While AB 130 may exempt the project from certain environmental repor(ng processes, it does not waive the Subdivision Map Act’s requirement for an affirma<ve safety finding. AB 130 itself requires that projects in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone adopt fire mi<ga<ons that achieve a "prac<cal effect" equivalent to state standards. Without an evacua<on capacity analysis, there is zero evidence in the record to prove such an equivalency exists.

In conclusion, Staff’s response to Q11 a1empts to dismiss a documented 200% corridor failure as a "planning" issue rather than a "project" issue. Physical reality does not make such a dis<nc<on. I urge the Council to reject the findings for TM-2024-009 un<l the record includes a project-specific Wildfire Evacua5on Capacity Study that accounts for the City’s own technical data.

Respecgully,
DerChang Kau
Resident of Cuper<no
Excerpted from CC 03-17-2026 Item No. 12 SummerHill Homes_Supplemental Report From: Dennis Martin
To: Kitty Moore; Liang Chao; Sheila Mohan; J.R. Fruen; R "Ray" Wang Cc: Emi Sugiyama; City Clerk; City Attorney"s Office
Subject: 4.1.26 Cupertino City Council Agenda Item #3, Linda VIsta Drive Project Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 8:24:23 AM
Attachments: BIABA_Cupertino_AB712_3.31.26.pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mayor, City Council Members, and City Staff,
Please find the attached correspondence from the Building Industry Association of the Bay Area (BIA) regarding the Summerhill Homes project on Linda Vista Drive and the implications of AB 712.

The BIA urges the City Council to follow the guidance of the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) and approve this project. HCD has determined that the project is protected by the Housing Accountability Act and is eligible under AB 130. Please be advised that project denial or failure to approve may violate state law; any subsequent litigation brought under AB 712 may result in significant penalties for the City.

Best regards,
Dennis Martin
--
Dennis Martin
BIA | Bay Area
DATE: March 31, 2026
TO: Hon. Kitty Moore, Mayor and Hon. Members of the Cupertino City Council FROM: Paul Campos, Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs And General Counsel
SENT VIA: Email to the address list below
RE: AB 712 and 10857 Linda Vista Drive Project
Dear Mayor Moore and Council Members:

The Building Industry Association of the Bay Area (BIA) respectfully submits this letter in connection with the City Council’s scheduled April 1, 2026 consideration of the 10857 Linda Vista Drive Project (Project). BIA represents more than 400 companies involved in the entitlement, development, design and construction of new homes throughout the Bay Area.

The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information about the relationship of recently enacted state legislation–AB 712 (Wicks)–to the City Council’s deliberation and decision on the Project. The California Building Industry Association (CBIA), BIA’s state-affiliate, sponsored AB 712 which was enacted in 2025 and became effective Jan. 1, 2026. While we understand that the California Department of Housing and Community Development’s March 30, 2026 Letter of Support and Technical Assistance to the City’s Community Director briefly mentions AB 712, we think the new law’s profound alteration of the monetary consequences for local agencies that improperly deny or refuse to approve housing projects in violation of a housing reform law warrants further discussion.

AB 712 added Section 65914.2 to the Government Code. Section 65914.2 contains three principal provisions:

1. Mandatory award of attorney’s fees and costs to a housing project applicant that is the prevailing party in litigation challenging a city’s failure to comply with a “housing reform law.”1 (65914.2(b)(1)) Importantly, the award of 1The statute defines “housing reform law” broadly to mean “any law or regulation, or provision of any law or regulation, that establishes or facilitates rights, safeguards, streamlining benefits, time limitations, or other protections for the benefit of applicants for housing development projects, or restricts, proscribes, prohibits, or procedural or substantive limitation on a public agency for the benefit of a housing development project.”
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attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party developer is neither discretionary nor subject to any conditions or prerequisites. Unlike other attorney’s fee shifting statutes, AB 712 awards the applicant’s fees automatically. There is no need for the developer to show that the city’s action was taken in bad faith or was objectively unreasonable or undertaken for an improper purpose. Nor is there any exception to a fee award based on the applicant’s financial interest in the project. Based on this provision of AB 712, if the city denies or refuses to approve the Project, and the applicant challenges that action and prevails in a lawsuit, the applicant will be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

2. Mandatory fine imposed on a city if it was advised in writing by either HCD or the Attorney General that its action would represent a violation of a housing reform law, and the project applicant subsequently prevails in litigation on substantially the same issue (Section 65914.2 (b)(2)(A)(i). The fine imposed pursuant to this provision is also mandatory and, unlike the fines in the Housing Accountability Act, is not dependent on a judicial finding that the city failed to comply with a prior court order or acted in bad faith. If a developer successfully brings a legal challenge alleging that a city violated a housing reform law, and the city was previously advised in writing by HCD or the AG that the action would violate that reform law, a mandatory fine of not less than $10,000 for each unit in the proposed project shall be levied. We understand that the Project is proposing 51 units. We also understand that (i) the city has been advised in writing that the Project qualifies for the protections of the Housing Accountability Act and therefore cannot lawfully be denied or have its density reduced unless the city makes the requisite health or safety findings which arise “infrequently”; (ii) HCD’s letter advised the city that it cannot deny the project based on the city’s obligation to find additional housing capacity under the No Net Loss Law; and (iii) HCD’s letter advised the city that the Project is “AB 130-eligible” and that as such, it is exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act and is entitled to establish building code compliance at the appropriate post-entitlement permit stage as provided in other laws (e.g., the post-entitlement statute, Gov’t Code Section 65913.3). Based on this provision of AB 712, if the city were to deny or refuse to approve the Project, and subsequently the applicant files a legal challenge that establishes a violation of the Housing Accountability Act, No Net Loss Law, or AB 130 (all “housing reform laws”) described in HCD’s written notification, the city will be automatically liable for a fine of $510,000.

3. Mandatory fine imposed on a city if it loses a second time in the same housing element planning period in litigation involving a violation of the same housing reform law (Section 65914.2(b) (2) (A)(ii). The fine imposed pursuant to this provision is also mandatory but is $50,000 per unit rather than $10,000. Based on this provision of AB 712, if the city were to deny or refuse to approve the Project, and subsequently the applicant files a legal challenge that establishes a violation of a housing reform law (e.g., the HAA, No Net Loss, AB 130), the city would effectively have “one strike” against it for the current planning period. If, during the remainder of the planning period, the city were to be sued by the Page | 3
same or another developer alleging a violation of the same housing reform law, upon a court finding a second such a violation, the city would be automatically liable for a fine of $2,550,000.

AB 712 reflects the Legislature’s determination to end decades of local governments flouting state housing reform laws. AB 712 was intended to change the longstanding dynamic in which anti-housing pressure could be brought to bear on local elected officials to induce them to ignore state housing reform laws with no consequences other than using public funds to pay for a city’s legal defense costs on the rare occasions when applicants sued to vindicate their rights. Now there are consequences. Potentially very serious ones.

Sincerely yours,
Paul Campos
Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs & General Counsel BIA|Bay Area
1000 Burnett Ave., Ste. 340, Concord, CA 94520
925-951-6844 (office)
[email protected]
Councilmembers:
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
City Staff:
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
From: Kitty Moore
To: City Clerk; Lauren Sapudar; Tina Kapoor; Floy Andrews Subject: Written Communications and Questions Item 3 Summerhill/Evulich Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 7:33:41 AM
Attachments: image.png
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Dear City Clerk,
Please include the following for written communications for Item 3, Summerhill/Evulich:

Vesting Tentative Map:

1. Thank you for providing the Title Report and missing maps for the Council to review for the Vesting Tentative Map. The current/existing parcels are not delineated on the Vesting Tentative Map. The Planning Commission was not provided the Title Report or Parcel Maps which showed the ownership, easements, and street dedication to help them make findings according to the SMA and CMC.
a. The original cul de sac was for an R1-7.5 subdivision of approximately 5 homes. The parcel map from 1969 is in the Supplemental Reports.

2. Evulich Ct. was dedicated to the City in 1969 but was not improved as a proper city street to city standards and left as more of a driveway.

3. The Evulich Ct. ROW was mentioned as a reason for the need of the setback waiver in the AMMR. The City of Cupertino owns the ROW, however the dedication was for a different type of development.

4. What would be the process for the city to vacate Evulich Ct. ROW if a different roadway layout was proposed by the developer?

5. Parcel Ownership in the Supplemental Materials Map does not match the VTM.

6. Who is the engineer or surveyor of record for the parcel ownership map in the Supplemental Materials map, could they please sign off on it and/or explain why the mismatch with the VTM? It seems the VTM needs a correction regarding parcel ownership? Shouldn’t each parcel be labeled on the VTM and/or there be an ownership key of some sort?

7. Owner addresses need to be on the VTM and they are missing? Environmental Site Assessments: Auto Shop, AST/UST Hazardous Waste, and Onsite Landfill Dumps:

1. There are various ESAs which (please) need to be ordered chronologically and please clarify if the City’s 3rd party peer review had all of the information in the various Phase I and Phase II ESAs at the time of their review, because it seems like they may not have.

2. The site has had multiple ASTs (hazardous waste drums and various containers) including a 300- gallon diesel AST, four UST listings and an EDR HIST Auto listing for Vinculum International Auto Transmission Repair Shop at 10867 Linda Vista Dr.

3. Can you point to any ESA which describes Vinculum International Auto Transmission Repair Shop, what it did? Where exactly on the property it was located? This listing shows up in the EDR reports for the Target Property for 2002-2008. Auto repair shops often use degreasers such as PCE which can remain in the soil for an extremely long time.

4. The site has had above ground hazardous waste drums stored and an apparent 300 gallon diesel AST tank. The various hazardous waste drums, which looked to have been there for an extended period, may have been partially or fully removed in 2024/2025:
a. Do we have inspection reports from SCCFD/SCCDEH regarding the drums? Photographs of the area shows multiple containers with rust and what looks like paint with no labeling. b. What were their contents? How do we know?
c. What Certified Program Agency like SCCDEH/RWQCB provided oversight for their apparently fairly recent removal and inspection of the dirt area they were kept in? Has there been soil sampling?
d. The agenda record clipped off the date of some tank removals in the attachments, please provide a clean record copy.
e. Would these hazardous waste drums be accurately described as single wall, unsecured, above ground storage tanks, with unknown contents? Why did the site have multiple drums of hazardous waste on it? Was it for the Transmission Repair Shop? f. Where in the 3rd party peer review by the City’s consultant is the disposition and removal of the hazardous waste drums described?

5. A Phase I ESA shows an onsite transformer which may contain PCBs, where is this described and what are the recommendations for oversight of removal since electrical will be underground?

6. The site has had 4 Underground Storage Tanks
a. Were these single wall tanks?
b. When were each removed and what Certified oversight did each removal have, please provide a timeline and details.
c. Where on Geotracker are these tank removals listed, there does not appear to be a record there, please explain.
d. Did the City’s 3rd party peer review know that 2 tanks were fairly recently removed without SCCDEH, the CUPA, oversight and that no Geotracker reports exist?

7. The site has 2 buried dump locations with unknown contents a. Did the City’s 3rd party peer review evaluate these and provide recommendations regarding them?
b. Does the Geotechnical Report discuss how these will impact foundation design? c. What is the process for having these small landfill locations evaluated and cleaned up? Has there been soil testing?

8. Will SCCDEH be provided with a SMP? Will the owners be entering into a SCCDEH Regulatory Oversight Agreement for the site? The Resolution, unlike Mary Villas, has no paragraph regarding environmental mitigation with SCCDEH oversight and following CMC Chapter 17. Please explain.

Thank you.

Here are the screen shots of the two onsite buried dumps:

Kitty Moore
Mayor
City Council
[email protected]
(408) 777-1389
From: Jack Farrell
To: City Clerk
Subject: Public Comment Item 3
Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 5:21:00 AM
Attachments: Linda Vista Dr. Letter of Support.pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Good morning,
Please find attached letter of support from YIMBY Law for tonight's meeting of the Council.

Sincerely,
Jack Farrell he/him
Research Attorney
267-218-1147
Check out everything we achieved in 2024!
YIMBY Law
2261 Market Street STE 10416
San Francisco, CA 94114
[email protected]
April 1, 2026
City of Cupertino
City Council
10350 Torre Avenue
Cupertino, CA
Via email: [email protected]
Re: 10857, 10867, 10877 & 10887 Linda Vista Drive, Agenda Item 3 Dear City Council,
We are pleased to submit this letter of support of the proposed Summerhill Homes project at Linda Vista Drive. YIMBY Law is a 501(c)3 non-profit corporation, whose mission is to increase the accessibility and affordability of housing in California. The Summerhill Homes project will consist of a development of 51 townhomes, including 10 affordable units, to replace four single family homes on a 2.51-acre site, located close to the intersection of Linda Vista Dr and Columbus Ave.

We concur with the Planning Commission’s vote and the assessment of your staff that the project is exempt from CEQA and qualifies for final approval of all necessary entitlements. Failure to comply could subject Cupertino to the following penalties:
● Attorney’s fees to the prevailing applicant, with enhanced penalties if you receive notice from California’s Attorney General or Department of Housing and Community Development.
1 1 CA Gov Code § 65914.2(a)(2)(A)(II).

YIMBY Law
2261 Market Street STE 10416
San Francisco, CA 94114
[email protected]
● Decertification of the Cupertino Housing Element, which would subject the city to the Builder’s Remedy. This would attach the requirement to amend and recertify the Housing Element.
2 In compliance with AB130 local building code requirements, the project will include various resiliency upgrades such as hardened exteriors and roof eaves, ember resistant vents, and Zone 0 Landscape Buffers. These protections qualify it under the law as CEQA exempt, as attested to by your staff’s recommendation and the official opinion of the Santa Clara County Fire Department. We support staff’s assessment that this should receive a finding of exemption, and approval of all permits at issue in today’s hearing.

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (SB 330) and the City’s Housing Element Summerhill Homes submitted an SB 330 Preliminary Application on October 9, 2024, and a final application on December 13, 2024. Pursuant to Gov. Code § 65589.5, the application is only subject to the ordinances, policies, and standards adopted and in effect when the Preliminary Application was submitted.

The proposed project is consistent with the City’s General Plan and zoning ordinance and other applicable objective standards. In addition, the City’s approved 2023–2031 Housing Element identifies the project as a Housing Inventory Site. By designating the site as a Housing Inventory Site, the City selected the site for residential use and determined that residential development of the site would assist the City in meeting its Regional Housing Needs Allocation.

The State Density Bonus Law
SummerHill proposes to provide 10 of the 51 town home-styles at below market rate prices. By designating at least 10 percent of the units for Moderate Income households, the project qualifies for benefits under the State Density Bonus Law. Under the State Density Bonus Law, a developer may propose unlimited waivers of development standards that would have the effect of physically precluding construction of a qualifying project at the densities or with the concessions or incentives permitted by the 2 CA Gov Code § 65585(i)(1)(A).

YIMBY Law
2261 Market Street STE 10416
San Francisco, CA 94114
[email protected]
Density Bonus Law. SummerHill is entitled to the waivers it has requested, all of which will provide relief from development standards that would physically preclude construction of the project at the density proposed.

Once a project qualifies for a density bonus, State law provides that the City may deny a requested waiver only if it would have a specific, adverse impact upon health or safety, would have an adverse impact on a historic resource, or would be contrary to State or Federal law. In this context, specific adverse impact “means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the application was deemed complete.”
3 There is no substantial evidence in the record that any of SummerHill’s requested waivers would meet the criteria for City denial.

The Housing Accountability Act
The Housing Accountability Act, in Section 65589.5(j)(1)(A)-(B), limits a municipality’s ability to deny or condition on lower density a housing development project that complies with objective standards. The City may only disapprove the project or impose conditions on the project that would reduce density if necessary to avoid a “significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the application was deemed complete” and there is no feasible method to mitigate or avoid those impacts other than disapproval or development at a lower density.

We have reviewed the project plans, the CEQA document and the various expert reports that have been prepared for the project, and there is not a preponderance of evidence in the record that would justify the City’s disapproval of the project or conditioning the project in a manner that would reduce density.

Summary
The Legislature has made numerous amendments to California Housing Law in an effort to provide increased clarity and certainty for both municipalities and housing providers.

Based on these laws, the project is subject only to the objective standards that were in 3Gov. Code, §§ 65915, subd. (e)(1), 65589.5, subd. (d)(2).

YIMBY Law
2261 Market Street STE 10416
San Francisco, CA 94114
[email protected]
effect on the date of the Preliminary Application; the project is entitled to the requested waivers under Density Bonus law; with those waivers the project is consistent with applicable objective standards; and the evidence in the record would not justify the City’s denial of the project or imposition of approval that would reduce density. Disapproval of the project or approval with conditions that would render the project infeasible at the density proposed would contravene State law.

YIMBY Law closely monitors projects to ensure that all relevant state laws are properly applied, including the HAA. Should the City fail to follow these laws, YIMBY Law will not hesitate to file suit to ensure state housing policies are enforced. I am signing this letter both in my capacity as the Executive Director of YIMBY Law, and as a resident of California who is affected by the shortage of housing in our state. I look forward to seeing this project approved and brought to realization to help change the tides of the housing crisis in the Bay Area.

Sincerely,
Sonja Trauss
Executive Director
YIMBY Law
From: [email protected]
To: City Clerk
Cc: City Council; City Attorney"s Office; Public Comments Subject: Written Communications-SummerHill, LLC 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive Townhomes Date: Tuesday, March 31, 2026 11:00:03 PM
Attachments: City Council Letter_April_1_2026_v1.pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear City Clerk, Honorable Mayor, Councilmembers, and City Attorney, Please accept the attached updated letter sent earlier as written communication regarding:

Project: SummerHill - Evulich Ct. Townhomes;
Application Number: TM-2024-009, ASA-2024-015, TR-2024-044; Agenda Item: 12;
scheduled for consideration on April 1, 2026.

I respectfully request that this documents be:

1. Posted to the public agenda packet as written communication, and

2. Distributed to the full City Council for their review.

Please confirm receipt and posting at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your attention and for ensuring these materials are included in the public record.

Sincerely,
Mark W. Fantozzi, PE
Cupertino
[email protected]
March 30, 2026
City Clerk, Honorable Mayor, Council Members, City Attorney City of Cupertino
10300 Torre Ave.

Cupertino, CA 95014
Re: SummerHill-Homes Linda Vista Drive

VIA EMAIL
On August 11, 2024, I wrote a letter to the City Council expressing my concern over the upzoning of the Evulich property on Linda Vista Drive. My assessment was made based on my engineering background as a registered professional engineer in the State of California. Once I was able to review the Planning Staff report prior to the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission public hearing, I found that my concerns were well founded. A few of us in the neighborhood began analyzing the project in more detail in preparation of the March 17 Council meeting and we found numerous failures by Staff, Fire and SummerHill in the analysis of this project. Further research has shown that the project has serious issues over how the project was determined to be in conformance with standards and how Staff ignored public safety.

This Council did not create this situation. But it is being asked to ratify it. The Evulich property was quietly added to the Housing Element after a legal settlement, without meaningful notice to the neighborhood most affected. Planning then shepherded it through a process that systematically deferred, omitted, and concealed the analyses that would have exposed its deficiencies. The result is a project before this Council with an incomplete safety record, an unsupported CEQA exemption, and unresolved fire and evacuation risks in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. A yes vote does not just approve 51 townhomes. It ratifies every step that brought this project here.

I think it is important to understand how we got here. The Evulich property was put on the list of properties to be considered for the Housing Element back in 2022. However, the property was removed from the list prior to the city-wide notification that went out in 2022. I received that notice and the Evulich property was not shown. The Evulich property was zoned R1 Single Family with a minimum lot size of 7500 sq ft. The infrastructure in our neighborhood was built over 60 years ago and designed to support 11 houses on this property. The proposed development would put 5 times the demand on the infrastructure in place. The property simply could not support upzoning and the conditions for a CEQA review made it untenable.

On January 10, 2024, The City settled a law suit with YIMBY over the delay in the City submitting its Housing Element plan. As part of the settlement, the City agreed to waive CEQA for rezoning properties that are designated as part of the Housing Element. In February 2024, the Evulich property was put back on the Housing Element and rezoned to R3.

One of the many complaints I and my neighbors have about this project was the lack of notification of the zoning change on the property. We had several neighborhood meetings with Luke Connoly and staff from Planning. Each time they claimed the city did an extensive public outreach. However, from public records we determined

1. The Evulich property was added after the general notification of properties placed under the Housing Element.

2. The Evulich property notification was done by a posted notice at City Hall, a post card mailing that did not go to anyone in the neighborhood and the City website. Furthermore, only the APN was provided, no street address.

Do any of you know your APN number? Do any of you know your neighbor’s APN? This notification may have satisfied the process allowed under the current housing laws but it was not in any way extensive as described by Luke Connoly. An effective outreach would have insured those most affected by the rezoning were notified in writing similar to what we received for the public hearing on the project. As I research this incident, it is clear that there was a concerted effort by Planning to conceal from the neighborhood the addition of the Evulich property to the Housing Element and subsequent rezoning.

Understanding how we got here is important because it shows a pattern by Planning to conceal information that may jeopardize project approval. In addition, the exclusion of the property from the original Housing Element list and the subsequent addition of the property as a result of the YIMBY settlement made it clear that Planning was aware of the challenges this site has with respect to higher density.

It's also important to consider the timing of events.

1. Waiver of CEQA as part of the YIMBY settlement in January 2024,

2. Addition of the property to the Housing Element in February 2024

3. Approval of the upzoning by City Council in early summer 2024

4. SummerHill filing of the project in August 2024.

The sequence of events is not coincidental. It evidences outside influence put on the City to move on this property. It suggests a Planning Department that is more interested in pushing a project through instead of honoring a commitment to the community to ensure transparency, accountability, and fairness in the decision-making processes.

Based on my review of the project documents and Staff Report, it is clear the Council must deny the project or at a minimum require a full CEQA review and completion of all life-safety, environmental, and mobility analyses before any approval is considered. I have previously submitted detailed descriptions of the deficiencies found in Planning and Fire determinations as written communications and are summarized below.

1. This site is in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, and the safety record is incomplete
Your own record confirms the site sits in a VHFHSZ and that the project’s safety case is unfinished. The Fire Department’s conditional notes still require a Final Fire Protection Plan, acknowledge non-conforming setbacks, and call for a compliant turnaround—proof that key fire-safety issues remain outstanding today, not at some future building-permit stage. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]
Despite this, the applicant provided no wildfire evacuation analysis for a neighborhood with single-egress constraints and documented bottlenecks, which is directly contrary to the Fire Code, PRC 4290, and CEQA’s wildfire impact requirements. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] Bottom line: You cannot make current, defensible findings on fire safety or evacuation on this record. [Biological Errors | PDF]
2) Fire-flow and water-supply reliability were not demonstrated (modeling isn’t proof)
The submittals do not include:
 Hydrant flow tests or on-the-ground verification of residual pressure and duration,  Peak-demand, PSPS, or multi-structure fire scenarios, and  Hydrant spacing/placement and redundancy verification for a hillside VHFHSZ subdivision. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF]
Your integrated exhibits log documents 17 fire-flow, 9 fire-access, and 17 water-supply deficiencies— structural, not clerical. These are mandatory life-safety elements under CFC Appendix B/C/D and PRC 4290—not optional. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]
Hydraulic models are only as valid as their assumptions and boundary conditions; without physical flow tests and reliability checks, they can be easily skewed. In a VHFHSZ with a 50-year-old water main and no redundancy, that is unacceptable. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] I’ve done extensive computer modeling in my work. Computer models are only as good as the assumptions made and the boundary conditions used in the model. You can vary the results to achieve a desired result by simply changing the assumptions and/or boundary conditions. Testing is the only way to validate your model. Without field testing, there needs to be a thorough review of the safety factors used and system redundancies to account for inaccuracies in the computer model. As an example, in structural engineering, there are certain types of connections used in the lateral force resisting systems of a building that require testing to use the full capacity of the connection. Without testing, higher safety factors are required to in the design of the connection to account for defects and unforeseen conditions.

The project site is about 3.7 miles from the San Andreas earthquake fault, a source of major historical ground shaking. Beyond validating the computer model, the system needs to be analyzed for redundancy. In the event of a major earthquake, our neighborhood will be subject to strong ground shaking. This can result in pipe ruptures and failure of the fire water system. This occurred in the Marina District of San Francisco during the Loma Prieta Earthquake and the 1906 Earthquake where most of the damage was due to fires because pipes ruptured and there was limited water to fight the fires.

It’s not just about resiliency. Redundancy is required for system operation in a major event. In the Palisades Fire, there was a lack water at the fire hydrants because the City was doing maintenance at the water supply reservoir and there was no redundant system to effectively replace lost capacity to fight the fire.

Ask: Require field hydrant flow testing, reliability modeling for peak/PSPS, and a water-main capacity/ redundancy plan before any approvals. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]
3) Evacuation and access: no study, single egress, known bottlenecks The record shows no wildfire evacuation analysis—even though the corridor is single egress (Evulich → Linda Vista) with known choke points, and even though the Fire Code and PRC 4290 require safe ingress/egress. The City’s own policy framework and recent evacuation capacity work underscore these constraints. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] Planning staff’s reliance on a claim that the City lacks an “adopted evacuation plan” does not excuse the project’s duty to demonstrate safe evacuation now, particularly in a VHFHSZ. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF]
Ask: Require a CEQA-level evacuation analysis with clearance times, network performance under wildfire loading, and mitigation/secondary access feasibility before action. [Biological Errors | PDF] 4) CEQA exemption is legally unsupportable on this record CEQA exemptions fail where unusual circumstances raise a reasonable possibility of significant impact:

VHFHSZ location, discretionary PRC 4290 exception, missing wildfire/evacuation/water-reliability analyses, and conditional fire approval. All are present here. [Biological Errors | PDF] Moreover, because a PRC 4290 exception is discretionary, the project is not ministerial for CEQA purposes. CEQA does not allow approval premised on future mitigation such as a later Fire Protection Plan. [Biological Errors | PDF]
The reason this property was removed from the original Housing Element list was the challenges a CEQA review would uncover and the resulting mitigations would make the project infeasible. The timing of the reinstatement following the YIMBY settlement is not coincidental.

Ask: Direct staff to prepare a full CEQA analysis (wildfire behavior, evacuation, water reliability, biological, hazardous materials, and transportation updates). [Biological Errors | PDF] 5) General Plan consistency cannot be found Formatted: Font: 12 pt Under Government Code §§65300.5 and 65860, you must make General Plan consistency findings regardless of CEQA status. You cannot do so here: the project lacks verified evacuation capacity, fire-flow reliability, and present (not deferred) hazard mitigation—all core Safety Element requirements. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]
Ask: Until the safety record is complete and consistent, General Plan findings cannot be made. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]
6) Environmental & Biological E&O: data gaps that matter in the field  Phase II ESA tested only organochlorines (8081A); it did not test for organophosphates like parathion or dithiocarbamates like ziram—pesticide classes commonly present in legacy orchard soils. The corrective action is straightforward: run supplemental sampling/analysis (e.g., 8321B/validated OP/DTC suites), compare to SF Bay RWQCB ESLs, and issue a Phase II Addendum. Approving without this is a CEQA-level gap. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]  Biological report omissions: no species-level analysis for red-tailed hawk (a protected raptor), no acoustic bat surveys despite suitable structures, and no bird-safe design (glass/lighting/pets) or cumulative foraging assessment—each a standard expectation for CEQA biology in this setting. [Biological Errors | PDF] I grew up on a farm in Morgan Hill. As part of our farming operation, we farmed several hundred acres of fruit orchards much like what was here prior to development. I am familiar with the pesticides and fungicides used in orchards, and parathion and ziram were widely used up until the 70’s. Developers are required to test for all legacy chemicals used as part of the historical use of the property.

Ask: Require the ESA addendum and complete biological surveys/mitigation (raptor nesting, bat surveys, bird-safe measures) before hearing reconsideration. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF]
7) Transportation E&O: safety, code, and CEQA posture problems The Transportation Study contains numerous errors and omissions:
 Parking minimums mis-stated; bicycle parking obligations omitted; both are material to plan compliance.
 Missing intersections (e.g., Columbus/Terrace) even though the report itself says some trips will use them; skewing impact location.
 Invalid CEQA/VMT posture (mis-reliance on AB 130); must either meet the new PRC §21080.66 infill criteria or follow Cupertino’s 2025 Guidelines for VMT screening/analysis.  Sight-distance/school-area controls not translated into enforceable striping/signage exhibits (CA MUTCD). [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF]
Ask: Require a corrected LTA: add the missing intersections/assignments, fix parking/bike parking, provide the AB 130/PRC §21080.66 compliance memo or VMT analysis, and submit stamped sight-triangle/ school-area control sheets. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] 8) “Vesting” does not freeze public safety; PRC 4290 exception needs evidence—incl. financials
Staff suggested “vesting” insulates the project from updated safety rules. That is incorrect. SB 330 does not vest fire-safety, evacuation, water-supply, or VHFHSZ regulations—these are police-power standards that remain fully applicable. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] Further, a PRC 4290 exception is discretionary and requires findings of equivalent fire safety, no feasible alternative, General Plan consistency, and not deferring mitigation. Your record also explains when financial disclosure is warranted—if an exception confers a financial benefit, the City may require pro formas and cost comparisons to evaluate feasibility claims prior to granting any safety deviation. [Biological Errors | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] SummerHill intends to sell the market units for $2.2M to $2.6M. The construction costs are fixed regardless where the project is built in the Bay Area. Land costs may vary but the land cost is known up front and once known is considered fixed. The soft costs are variable. By providing exceptions to standards, the City is providing SummerHill a financial benefit by reducing their soft costs. This goes directly to profit. A profit made by sacrificing the health and safety of the public, and jeopardizing property is not acceptable. The City has the authority to require SummerHill to disclose the financials on the project.

Ask: Do not grant or rely on any PRC 4290 exception without a complete evidentiary record, including applicant financials if they assert compliance is infeasible. [Biological Errors | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF]
9) About “peer review” and why it doesn’t cure missing evidence At the Planning Commission, SummerHill argued that reports were vetted by staff and “peer reviewed.” But peer review is not a substitute for required data. The Millennium Tower was expert-designed and peer-reviewed—and still failed, with taxpayers paying tens of millions. The question is not whether a report exists—it’s whether the record contains the required analyses and verified data to support your findings today. Here, it does not. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] 10) The stakes: insurance, property values, and City liability Approving a 51-unit project in a VHFHSZ without verified evacuation, fire-flow reliability, ESA/biology completeness, and corrected transportation safety will drive insurance costs up and property values down while increasing the City’s exposure in foreseeable wildfire scenarios. The prudent course is to complete the analyses first. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF], [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] SummerHill is aware the project will not withstand a CEQA review. The reports they filed for this project are deeply flawed and we have demonstrated that the reports will not stand up to scrutiny. In an effort to get conciliatory approval by some of the neighbors, they offered concessions to two of my neighbors in advance of the March 17 Council meeting. SummerHill refused to consider these same concessions when asked by one of the Commissioners at the Planning Commission meeting, claiming they “could not make the project work.” This confirms why the Evulich property was removed from the Housing Element back in 2022 when CEQA was required for rezoning, and why it was added back only after the CEQA waiver was granted by the City. This property should never have been upzoned in the first place and the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone only makes it worse for upzoning.

As registered professional engineer, I am mandated by law to protect the health and safety of the public.

This applies to the work I design. However, when I see the failure of a government agency to fulfill its duty to protect public safety and verify compliance, I feel it is my duty to identify the problems and demand compliance. Planning has clearly demonstrated indifference to public safety to the benefit of developers to simply meet a quota. This Council should not. The risks documented in this letter are now part of the public record regardless of how this Council votes. Supporting housing is defensible.

Approving housing in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone without completing the required safety record is a different matter. If residents are trapped on Linda Vista Drive in a wildfire, the administrative record will show exactly what was known, who was told, and how each member voted. That record does not expire with a term.

Please deny the project, or continue the hearing and direct staff to:

1. Prepare a full CEQA review addressing wildfire/evacuation, water-supply reliability, ESA addendum, complete biological surveys/mitigation, and a corrected transportation analysis. [Biological Errors | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF], [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF]

2. Require a Final Fire Protection Plan now, not at building-permit stage; include verified hydrant flow tests, peak/PSPS reliability, and redundancy measures. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF]

3. Require PRC 4290 exception findings supported by substantial evidence, including financial disclosure if the applicant claims safety compliance is infeasible. [Biological Errors | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF]

4. Confirm General Plan consistency cannot be made until all safety and environmental requirements are satisfied on the record. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] Sincerely,
Mark W. Fantozzi, PE
From: Rhoda Fry
To: Public Comments
Cc: City Clerk; City Attorney"s Office; City Council; Cupertino City Manager"s Office Subject: 4/1/2026 Agenda #3 Linda Vista Project needs to be rejected Date: Tuesday, March 31, 2026 3:31:20 PM
Attachments: what the fire dept knew was expected of them.pdf David J Powers DJP ASKED for the 3 fire things.pdf
summerhill-evacuation.pdf
summerhill KNEW they needed extra fire info.pdf
april 1 deadline.pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear City Council,
Hopefully, this is the last of my emails to your regarding this topic, which has kept me awake at night for weeks on end, although I am not personally affected by it.

1. You are being asked to vote on a number of things. You CAN VOTE NO. If you didn’t have a choice, the project would have been rejected or accepted ministerially.

2. Consider delaying the hearing in order for further due diligence – per PRAs, the only reason that the developer wishes to have this hearing date is because of a contractual agreement that they have – the City had asked for May.

3. Please revoke the SB330 “vested rights.” At the time this project was initially approved, we did not know that the project was subject to major public health and safety issues, including:
a) increasing the fire hazard designation to the highest level – Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ).
b) impacted emergency evacuation routes at 2X to 4X over-capacity assessed in October 2025 and only revealed after the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission meeting that narrowly approved the project. Because this and other information was unknown at the Planning Commission, their advisory vote should not be considered.

A previously approved SB 330 project can be repealed or revoked due to severe health and safety risks. You can do this!
Without SB330, the conditions for AB130 (and SB131) are likely modified.

4. CEQA is required. The objective of AB130 (and SB131) is to streamline straightforward projects that don’t need CEQA.

This project is not simple and there are compelling reasons why CEQA is required and that the project is not subject to AB130/SB131:
a) Project is located in an earthquake zone
b) Project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) and does NOT meet the criteria for loopholes in the law. Specifically, the Planning Department communicated the three requirements (4290, 4291, 7a) to both the Fire Department and the Developer. The Developer asked Fire for only a subset of requirements. The Developer subsequently checked in with Fire to make sure that everything they needed was provided, but Fire is not familiar with AB130.
c) Project has a history of Underground Storage Tanks.

This project not only fails the AB130 test, it also fails the reasonable person test. i) We know that the pipes in the old Monta Vista Water Works are brittle and some have failed recently.
ii) We know that the project is in a very high fire zone. iii) We know that the project is in an active and dangerous thrust fault zone that is capable of a 7M earthquake
iv) We know that evacuation routes are extremely compromised.

If there is an earthquake and a fire, the proposed fire sprinklers on the exterior decks within 30 feet of the property line will fail. This is the type of thing that CEQA looks at.

You owe it to the residents to put public health and safety first.

5. Use of AMMR is improper on two counts.
a) The AB130 checklist mis-uses the AMMR as the only test for CEQA. Per above, this is false.
b) The purpose of the AMMR is used during exceptional circumstances. Otherwise code prevails. The Developer falsely claimed exceptional circumstances. Although the Housing Element granted them 51 units, there was no requirement that they be 4- bedroom mansions. Specifically, AMMRs are used when physical limitations, unique site conditions, or design constraints make it impossible to follow the standard, prescriptive code path. This was not the case and the use of the AMMR was improper.

6. Please vote on the park-fee waiver separately. It should not be bundled into your vote on other aspects of the project.

7. Please require the developer to select a more appropriate tree. The developer proposes Chinese Pistache. Although it is more fire-resistant than some trees, it is very susceptible to Verticillium wilt which kills trees. Verticillium is very common in old orchards and this property is in an old orchard.

8. Councilmember Shiela Mohan must recuse due to her proximity to the site. She should have recused during the Housing Element hearings – had she recused then, the zoning for this site would have been different. I have also put in an inquiry to the FPPC on this matter.

Please see enclosed attachments from PRAs. Additionally, through this email, all PRAs pertaining to this project, published and unpublished are included.

In Community,
Rhoda Fry, 40+ year Cupertino Resident

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From: Kitty Moore
To: City Clerk; Lauren Sapudar
Cc: Tina Kapoor
Subject: Written Communications Item 3 Summerhill Evulich Ct.

Date: Tuesday, March 31, 2026 1:28:06 PM
Attachments: evacuation_route_capacity_analysis_oct_2025.pdf Guenoc Case 2024-a165677.pdf
Dear City Clerk,
Please include this email and the attached documents as written communications for Item 3:

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Study
Center for Biological Diversity v. County of Lake (2022) / Bonta v. County of Lake (2024 Appellate Update).

Thank you,
Kitty Moore
Kitty Moore
Mayor
City Council
[email protected]
(408) 777-1389
Cupertino
Evacuation Route
Capacity Assessment
Submitted to:

City of Cupertino
Submitted in:

October 2025
Cupertino
Evacuation Route
Capacity
Assessment
Prepared for: Submitted in:

City of Cupertino October 2025
P
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Study Purpose......................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Study Context........................................................................................................................................................ 1

1.3 Natural Hazards ....................................................................................................................................................2

1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards ...............................................................................................................2

1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards ............................................................................................................3

1.3.3 Fire Hazards ...............................................................................................................................................4

1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials ..........................................................................................................5

2. Background................................................................................................................................ 6

2.1 Legislative Requirements ..................................................................................................................................6

2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino.................................................................................................................6

3. Approach and Methods............................................................................................................. 8

3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios ..................................................................................................................8

3.2 Define the Evacuation Area.............................................................................................................................11

3.3 Define Evacuation Routes................................................................................................................................11

3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips......................................................................................................................................11

3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips.........................................................................................................................................14

3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment ......................................................................................................................15

3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity ..............................................................................................15

3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway.......................................................................................................17

4. Evacuation Route Assessment................................................................................................18

4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips................................................................................................................18

4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population ....................................................................................................18

4.1.2 Student Population .................................................................................................................................19

4.1.3 Visitor Population.................................................................................................................................. 20

4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand.............................................................................................. 20

4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity.......................................................................................................21

4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis).....................................................................................................21

4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................23

4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis) .....................................................................................................27

4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways ...........................................................................................27

5. Recommendations................................................................................................................... 29

5.1 Supply-Side Strategies ....................................................................................................................................29

5.2 Demand-Side Strategies............................................................................................................................... 30 P

5.3 Information-Side Strategies......................................................................................................................... 30

5.4 Additional Considerations ............................................................................................................................ 30 Appendices
Appendix A: Socioeconomic Data
Appendix B: Trip Distribution
List of Figures
Figure 1: Fire Hazard Severity Zones ......................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 2: Evacuation Routes.........................................................................................................................................13 Figure 3: Trip Distribution for Scenario A............................................................................................................... 22 Figure 4: Trip Distribution for Scenario B............................................................................................................... 25 Figure 5: Distances to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................................ 28 Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations .........................................................................34 Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area)................................. 36 Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) ............... 38 List of Tables
Table 1: Scenario Definitions..........................................................................................................................................9 Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area......................................................................... 14 Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane ......................................................................... 15 Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity ..........................................................................................................................16 Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario .................................................................................................... 18 Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area .................19 Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ...............19 Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area................. 20 Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area ................................................ 20 Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area............................. 20 Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A)...................................................................... 23 Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) .................................................................... 26 Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1.................................................................................... 33 P
Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1.................................................................. 35 Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1....................37 Table A-4: School Enrollment Data .......................................................................................................................... 39 Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips................................................................................................... 39 Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips .....................................................................................................40 Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) ................................................42 Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B)...............................................43 Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) ..............................................44 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 1

1. Introduction
The City of Cupertino's comprehensive planning efforts make it appropriate to assess evacuation route capacity while simultaneously updating the General Plan and Emergency Operations Plan.

This assessment provides the City of Cupertino with emergency evacuation event information and is consistent with requirements outlined in Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021), which specifically require local agencies to evaluate evacuation routes capacity and identify evacuation locations. This supplements the analysis that was prepared for the Draft Health and Safety Element Update (March 2025) regarding residential street accessibility to identify parcels in hazard areas with limited egress routes as required by Senate Bill (SB) 99.

1.1 Study Purpose
The following is a summary of the purpose of this evacuation study:
• Identify major evacuation routes and shelter locations/gateways; • Inform development of evacuation strategies and conduct evacuation route capacity assessment of wildfire evacuation scenarios with other hazards that could limit evacuation route capacity;
• Identify bottlenecks on major evacuation routes based on the evacuation route capacity assessment results;
• Identify evacuation strategies to improve performance of the road network during evacuations; and
• Identify potential future/ongoing efforts for a detailed Evacuation Plan.

1.2 Study Context
This assessment evaluates roadway capacity under certain described scenarios and should not be considered an evacuation plan. Emergency evacuations can be triggered by a number of events, and natural and man-made disasters can be as unpredictable as individual behavior related to evacuation events. As such, this assessment is intended to provide the City of Cupertino with a broad “planning level” assessment of transportation system capacity during worst case evacuation scenarios; it does not provide system adequacy guarantees, nor does it guarantee the findings are applicable to all situations. This assessment will help the City develop policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the findings of this analysis.

Moreover, because emergency evacuation assessment is an emerging field, there is no established standard methodology. We have utilized existing methods in transportation planning that, in our knowledge and experience, we believe offer the most appropriate planning level understanding of roadway capacity for evacuation events. Nevertheless, such methods are limited by the budgetary and time constraints in our scope of work, by the current state of the practice, and of our knowledge.

The City of Cupertino has requested this study to aid in planning and implementing potential evacuation plans/scenarios. This assessment should help the city be better prepared for those events; however, in no way can Fehr & Peers guarantee the efficacy of the information used in this assessment, as such would be beyond our professional duty and capability.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 2

1.3 Natural Hazards
The Health and Safety Element Background Report (July 23, 2025) described the following potential natural hazards. For this assessment, we considered various natural hazards in the preparation of evacuation scenarios. The natural hazards are described

1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards
Flooding is the rising and overflowing of water onto normally dry land. Floods are one of the most frequent natural hazards impacting Santa Clara County and among the costliest natural disasters in terms of human hardship and economic loss nationwide, causing substantial damage to structures, landscapes, and utilities, as well as life-safety issues. Flooding can be extremely dangerous; even six inches of moving water can knock a person over. Floodwaters can transport large objects downstream, damaging or removing stationary structures, such as dam spillways. Ground saturation can result in instability, collapse, or other damage that breaks utility lines and interrupts services.

Objects can also be buried or destroyed through sediment deposition from heavy flooding. Standing water can cause damage to roads, foundations, and electrical circuits, as well as spread vector-borne illnesses. Other problems connected with flooding and stormwater runoff include erosion, degradation of water quality, and losses of environmental resources.

Floods are usually caused by large amounts of stormwater, either from a period of very intense rainfall or a long period of steady rain. Historically, Cupertino has been at risk of flooding primarily during the winter and spring when stream systems swell with heavy rain. This type of flood results from prolonged, heavy rainfall and typically occurs due to high peak flows of moderate duration and a large volume of runoff. Flooding is more severe when prior rainfall has saturated the ground. The watersheds in the Santa Cruz Mountains feed into four major streambeds that traverse the city, Permanente Creek, Stevens Creek, Regnart Creek, and Calabazas Creek. These creeks collect surface runoff and drain into channels leading to the San Francisco Bay. During heavy rainfall, these creeks create a potential flooding risk in the city as water levels may exceed the top of the creekbank.

Occasionally, flash flooding from short-duration, high-intensity precipitation events (often during atmospheric river events) may occur. Atmospheric rivers are a relatively common weather pattern that brings southwest winds and heavy rain to California. Atmospheric rivers are long, narrow regions in the atmosphere that transport water vapor carried away from the tropics. These columns of vapor move with the weather, carrying large amounts of water vapor and strong winds. When the atmospheric rivers make landfall, they often release this water vapor in the form of rain or snow, often causing heavy rains that can lead to flooding and mudslide events. Flash floods can occur even during a drought. Such events can tear out trees, undermine buildings and bridges, and scour creek channels. In urban areas, flash flooding is an increasingly serious problem due to removing vegetation and replacing groundcover with impermeable surfaces such as roads, driveways, and parking lots.

The greatest risk from flash floods is occurrence with little to no warning.

1.3.1.1 Dam and Pipeline Failure
A dam failure is an uncontrolled release of water from a reservoir through a dam because of structural failures or deficiencies in the dam, usually associated with intense rainfall or prolonged flooding.

Water pipeline or aqueduct failures can create a similar sudden flood. Dam and pipeline failures can range from minor to catastrophic, potentially harming human life and property downstream from the failure. In addition, ecosystems and habitats can be destroyed by fast-moving floodwaters, debris, Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 3
and sedimentation from inundation. Although dam and pipeline failures are very rare, these events are not unprecedented. There are four major causes of failures:
• Overtopping: These failures occur when a reservoir fills too high with water, especially in times of heavy rainfall, leaving water to rush over the top of the dam. Other causes of this type of failure include settling of the crest of the dam or spillway blockage. • Foundation defects: These failures occur as a result of settling in the foundation of the dam, instability of slopes surrounding the dam, uplift pressures, and seepage around the foundation. All these failures result in structural instability and potential dam failure. • Piping and seepage failures: These failures occur as a result of internal erosion caused by seepage and erosion along hydraulic structures, such as the spillways of a dam, or failures in the walls of a water pipeline. Animal burrows and cracks in the dam structure may also cause erosion. • Conduit and valve failure: These failures occur as a result of problems with valves and conduits in a dam or pipeline’s systems.

Many dam and pipeline failures are also the secondary result of other natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, and extreme storms. Other causes include equipment malfunction, structural damage, and sabotage. Dams are constructed with safety features known as “spillways” that allow water to overtop the dam if the reservoir fills too quickly. Spillway overflow events, often referred to as “design failures”, result in increased discharges downstream and increased flooding potential. In a dam failure scenario, the greatest threat to life and property typically occurs in those areas immediately below the dam since flood depths and discharges generally decrease as the flood wave moves downstream. The primary danger associated with dam failure is the high-velocity flooding downstream of the dam and limited warning times for evacuation.

1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards
Seismic and geologic hazards are risks caused by the movement of different parts of the earth’s crust or surface. Seismic hazards include earthquakes and hazardous events caused by them. Geologic hazards are other hazards involving land movements that are not linked to seismic activity and can inflict harm to people or property. Additional information about seismic and geologic hazards in Cupertino, including development review coordination is in General Plan Appendix E, Geologic and Seismic Hazards.

1.3.2.1 Seismic Hazards
Seismic activity occurs along boundaries in the earth’s crust, called faults. Pressure along the faults builds over time and is ultimately released, resulting in ground shaking commonly referred to as an earthquake. Earthquakes can also trigger other hazards, including surface rupture (cracks in the ground surface), liquefaction (causing loose soil to lose its strength), landslides, and subsidence (sinking of the ground surface). Earthquakes and other seismic hazards often damage or destroy property and public infrastructure, including utility lines, and falling objects or structures pose a risk of injury or death.

1.3.2.1.1 EARTHQUAKES
While Cupertino is at risk from many natural and human-caused hazards, the event with the greatest potential for loss of life or property and economic damage is an earthquake. This risk is true for most of the San Francisco Bay Area region since damaging earthquakes affect widespread areas and trigger many secondary effects that can overwhelm the ability of local jurisdictions to respond.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 4
Earthquakes in the Bay Area result from strain energy constantly accumulating across the region because of the motion of the Pacific Plate, relative to the North American Plate.

Earthquake risk is very high in Santa Clara County, including the City of Cupertino, due to the presence of three major active faults1in the region, the Hayward Fault, Calaveras Fault, and San Andreas Fault. Both the San Andreas and the Hayward Faults have the potential for experiencing major to great events.

1.3.2.1.2 OTHER SEISMIC HAZARDS
In addition to the direct physical damage that can result from the motion of an earthquake, damage can result from liquefaction. Liquefaction occurs primarily in saturated, loose, fine- to mediumgrained soils in areas where the groundwater table is within approximately 50 feet of the surface.

Shaking causes the soils to lose strength and behave as a liquid. Excess water pressure is vented upward through fissures and soil cracks and can result in a water-soil slurry flowing onto the ground surface. This subsurface process can lead to near-surface or surface ground failure that can result in property damage and structural failure. Groundwater that is less than 10 feet to the surface can cause the highest liquefaction susceptibility, with lower groundwater levels causing lower liquefaction risks.

1.3.2.2 Geologic Hazards
Landslides and rock falls may occur in sloped areas, especially areas with steep slopes, and usually in loose and fragmented soil areas. Slope stability depends on many factors and interrelationships, including rock type, pore water pressure, slope steepness, and natural or human-made undercutting.

Landslides, rockfalls, and debris flows occur continuously on all slopes; some processes act very slowly, while others occur very suddenly, often with disastrous results.

Landslides are often triggered by other natural hazards, such as heavy rain, floods, or wildfires, so landslide frequency is often related to the frequency of these other hazards. In Santa Clara County, landslides typically occur during and after severe heavy rainfall, so the risk of landslides often rises during and after sequential severe storms that saturate steep, loose soils. Landslides and mudslides are a common occurrence and have caused damage to homes, public facilities, roads, parks, and sewer lines.

1.3.3 Fire Hazards
Fire hazards include both wildfires and urban fires. The combination of complex terrain, climate, vegetation and development patterns contribute to an elevated risk of wildfire. The Community Wildfire Protection Plan 2023 (CWPP) describes how each of these variables contributes to fire risk, and describes how fire risk varies throughout the city. Historically, the fire season extended from early summer through late fall of each year during the hotter, dryer months, although it is increasingly a hazard that can occur year-round. Fire conditions arise from a combination of high temperatures, low moisture content in the air and plant matter, an accumulation of vegetation, and high winds.

Three types of fires are of concern to Cupertino: (1) wildfires, (2) wildland-urban interface fires, and (3) structural fires.
1 Active faults are defined by their current movement and deformation and their potential to cause earthquakes or other types of ground deformation in the future.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 5

1.3.3.1 Wildfires
Wildfires occur on mountains, hillsides, and grasslands. Fuel, weather, and topography are primary factors that affect how wildland fires spread. In and around Cupertino, grassland and woodland habitat provide highly flammable fuel that is conducive to wildfires. These plant species are capable of regeneration after a fire, making periodic wildfires a natural part of the ecology of these areas.

The climate of Cupertino and the surrounding area keeps the grass dry and more readily combustible during fire season.

Wildfire potential for Santa Clara County is typically greatest in the months of August, September, and October, when dry vegetation coexists with hot, dry winds. During these times, controlling a fire becomes far more difficult. Areas adjacent to the city that are susceptible to wildfires are also of concern as these conditions could exacerbate vulnerabilities within the city. Grassland fires are easily ignited, particularly in dry seasons. These fires are relatively easily controlled if they can be reached by fire equipment, although after a fire, the burned slopes are highly subject to erosion and gullying. While brushlands are naturally adapted to frequent light fires, fire suppression in recent decades has resulted in heavy fuel accumulation on the ground. Wildland fires, particularly near the end of the dry season, tend to burn fast and very hot, threatening homes and leading to serious destruction of vegetative cover. In woodland and forested areas, a wildland fire can generate a destructive crown fire, which is a fire that burns materials at the top of trees, spreading from treetop to treetop. They can be very intense and difficult to contain.

Because areas of the city with natural vegetation are extremely flammable during late summer and fall, wildfire is a serious hazard in undeveloped hillside areas in the western portion of the city, as well as open space areas adjacent to the city. These areas include State Responsibility Area (SRA) lands west of the city, such as the Rancho San Antonio Open Space, Picchette Ranch Open Space, Stevens Creek County Park, Saratoga Creek County Park, Sanborn County Park, Fremont Older Open Space, as well as Local Responsibility Area (LRA) lands in the hillsides of Saratoga.

1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials
Hazardous materials are materials that pose a significant risk to public safety, or human and environmental health. These include toxic chemicals, flammable or corrosive materials, petroleum products, and unstable or dangerously reactive materials. They can be released through human error, malfunctioning or broken equipment, or as an indirect consequence of other emergencies (e.g., if a flood damages a hazardous material storage tank). Hazardous materials can also be released accidentally during transportation because of vehicle accidents.

The release or spill of bulk hazardous materials could result in fire, explosion, toxic cloud, or direct contamination of water, people, and property. The effects may involve a local site or many square miles. Health problems may be immediate, such as corrosive effects on the skin and lungs, or gradual, such as the development of cancer from a carcinogen. Property damage could range from immediate destruction by explosion to permanent contamination by a persistent hazardous material. Most hazardous materials in the region are transported on truck routes along major roadways, such as I280 and SR-85 that pass through Cupertino. The most vulnerable areas along this route are considered the on-/off-ramps and interchanges. Since 1970, one reported roadway hazardous materials incident occurred in Cupertino.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 6

2. Background

2.1 Legislative Requirements
Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021) both mandate local jurisdictions to update their safety elements to include comprehensive evacuation planning. • AB 747 (2019) adds California Government Code Section 65302.15, which requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated, upon the next update of a local hazard mitigation plan (LHMP) after January 1, 2022, to identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and viability under a range of emergency scenarios.2
• AB 1409 (2021) adds evacuation locations to Section 65302.15 of the California Government Code and requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated to identify evacuation locations.

Accordingly, this report considers:
• Identification of Evacuation Routes: The study identifies all evacuation routes and assesses their capacity, safety, and viability under various emergency scenarios. • Capacity Assessment: The study evaluates the capacity of evacuation routes to handle the expected volume of traffic and evacuees during an emergency. • Safety and Viability: The study considers the safety and viability of the identified routes and centers for use during emergencies.
• Mapping Evacuation Gateways: This involves mapping evacuation centers and shelters and/or shortest path to evacuation gateways to ensure they are accessible and adequately equipped.
• Policy Development: Policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the findings.
• Integration with Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMP): Updates to the Health and Safety Element should be coordinated with the existing LHMP or other relevant emergency planning documents to ensure consistency and alignment.

2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino
This City of Cupertino maintains and publishes several emergency planning documents:3 The Emergency Operations Plan (2019)4 provides guidance on the City's response to the most likely and demanding emergency conditions. It outlines the incident management structure, legal compliance, whole community engagement, continuity of government, and other critical components.
2 The City of Cupertino participated in the Santa Clara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan which was approved by FEMA in February 2024 which triggered compliance with this requirement. 3 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents 4 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/cupertino-emergency-operations-plan.pdf.

Accessed August 28, 2025.

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The Health and Safety Element (last amended in 2005, with minor edits in 2015) 5 , a Chapter in
the General Plan, describes local hazards and mitigation measures. It identifies that people in the foothills and mountains of Cupertino’s planning area, covering approximately 16 square miles, are most at risk from fire. The City is currently updating the Health and Safety Element. The Health and Safety Element Update lists the following policies to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies:
• Policy HS-2.1: Building And Fire Code Compliance
• Policy HS-2.2: Promote Emergency Preparedness
• Policy HS-2.3: Emergency Operations And Training
• Policy HS-2.4: Volunteer Groups
• Policy HS-2.5: Emergency Public Information
• Policy HS-2.6: Fire Prevention And Emergency Preparedness • Policy HS-2.7: Hazard Preparedness
• Policy HS-2.8: Educational And Outreach Materials
• Policy HS-2.9: Poor Air Quality Event Assistance
• Policy HS-2.10: Disaster Medical Response
• Policy HS-2.11: Evacuation Routes
• Policy HS-2.12: Evacuation Awareness
• Policy HS-2.13: Ingress And Egress
• Policy HS-2.14: Secondary Ingress And Egress.
• Policy HS-2.15: Emergency Access
The City’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) (February 21, 2024) 6 is an annex to the Santa
Clara County Multijurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan. It assesses potential hazard risks as well as mitigation measures to prevent loss of life, injury, and property damage. It identifies earthquake, severe weather, flood, landslide, and wildfire as hazards of greatest concern. In the LHMP, Table 17 lists the actions that comprise the City’s hazard mitigation action plan.

The Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) (2023)
7 describes projects from the Santa
Clara County CWPP (2023). These plans are required to be updated every five years to remain eligible for funding implementation projects through the Fire Safe Councils and CAL FIRE. 5 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/gp-chap-06-health.pdf. Accessed August 28, 2025.
6 https://oem.santaclaracounty.gov/multi-jurisdictional-hazard-mitigation-plan-mjhmp. Accessed October 24, 2025.
7 https://www.sccfd.org/santa-clara-county-community-wildfire-protection-plan/. Accessed October 24, 2025.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 8

3. Approach and Methods
This analysis focuses on the transportation system capacity during a wildfire evacuation event. The following flow chart illustrates the steps in the process.

3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios
Fehr & Peers, City of Cupertino staff, the Santa Clara County Fire Department, and the Santa Clara County Sherriff’s Office worked together to identify the hazard of highest concern for this assessment (wildfires in the Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ)) and three evacuation scenarios. In developing the evacuation scenarios, all hazards identified in Section 1.3 were considered. The defined evacuation scenarios represent hazards with the greatest potential to generate the largest number of vehicles requiring evacuation. Consideration was given to wildfire vulnerability, as well as access limitations that may occur due to compounding hazards such as a landslide or flood damage along an evacuation route.

Table 1 defines the evacuation scenarios. Scenarios A to C reflect Existing Conditions in year 2025.

This assessment conducted baseline analysis using existing socioeconomic conditions to establish current evacuation performance and identify potential constraints under present-day conditions. This provides a foundation for evaluating how future growth could affect evacuation route capacities.

When considering cumulative conditions with projected buildout, increased evacuation population would likely exacerbate bottlenecks identified in the baseline analysis.

These scenarios assume no evacuation population will “shelter in place” within the hazard area or evacuation area. Instead, these scenarios evaluate evacuation from the evacuation area using the shortest path.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 9
• Scenario A was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation within the evacuation area at 2 PM on a school day. All roadways are assumed to be accessible to evacuees, which include residents, employees, students, and visitors. • Scenario B was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course is assumed to be closed. Evacuees include residents and a small portion of employees.
• Scenario C was assessed qualitatively. It is based on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures on Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR85 and SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard because of an earthquake causing the wildfire.

Table 1: Scenario Definitions
Scenario A
(Quantitative)
Scenario B
(Quantitative)
Scenario C
(Qualitative)
Hazard Type(s) Wildfire Wildfire after
Earthquake
Wildfire after
Earthquake
Scale of Emergency Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Time of Event Fall 2 PM
(School in session)
Summer 6 AM
(School not in session)
Fall 2 PM
(School in session)
Road Closures
due to Hazard All roadways open
McClellan Road at Club
House Lane near the
Deep Cliff Golf Course
due to earthquake
• Stevens Creek
Boulevard at SR85
• SR-85 Southbound
Ramps at Stevens
Creek Boulevard
Type of Evacuees
Residents, employees,
students, visitors
Residents, small
portion of employees
Residents, employees,
students, visitors
Notes:

1. The boundary of evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect zones within the fire hazard severity zone (FHSZ) lands in the western portions of the City and homes within the foothills of the Santa Cruz Mountains, shown in Figure 1.

Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

Fire Hazard Severity Zones
FIGURE 1

Page 32 ends

Figure S-9 Fire Hazard Severity Zones
Data Source: Health and Safety Element Background Report, July 23, 2025 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 11

3.2 Define the Evacuation Area
According to the Cupertino Municipal Code Chapter 16.74.020, “Wildland‐Urban Interface (WUI) or Wildland‐Urban Interface Fire Area (WUIFA) mean a geographical area identified by the state as a Fire Hazard Severity Zone in accordance with the Public Resources Code Sections 4201 through 4204 and Government Code Sections 51175 through 51189, or other areas designated by the enforcing agency to be at a significant risk from wildfires”. The evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect8 zones within the WUI, or the moderate to very high FHSZ in Cupertino. Figure 1 illustrates the fire hazard severity zones included in the Health and Safety Element Background Report.

The safe area is established at SR-85 and I-280 and serves as the evacuation gateway, representing the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk.

3.3 Define Evacuation Routes
This analysis uses the evacuation routes provided by the City of Cupertino in August 2025, developed as part of the City’s ongoing effort to update its Health and Safety Element. The evacuation routes for the City of Cupertino and surrounding unincorporated areas are used to transport evacuees using their own vehicle and transit dependent evacuees to temporary shelter. This analysis assumes that routes that provide the most direct path to evacuate the community with the least exposure to risk will be used by evacuees. The major evacuation routes consider the location of critical facilities (i.e., safety and security, health and medical, and communications) as well as residential, employment, school, and recreational uses. Figure 2 shows the evacuation routes provided by the City.

3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips
The number of evacuation vehicle trips assigned to the roadway network are a combination of trips generated by residential households, employee trips, student trips, and visitor trips at the time of the evacuation. These trips include those generated by uses in the City as well as surrounding unincorporated areas including PG&E Trailhead, McClellan Ranch Preserve, Stevens Creek County Park, and Fremont Older Open Space Preserve.

Trips generated by residential households were informed by the most recent available data from the US Census Bureau and the California Department of Finance. This includes data on population, the number of households, persons per household, and vehicles per household. This data was crossreferenced with data in the Genasys Protect platform’s designated evacuation zones. The household data was then used to estimate evacuation vehicle trips based on the number of households, persons per household, auto-ownership information, population, and other factors that could affect the number of vehicles per household used during an evacuation event. 8 Genasys Protect is an evacuation management tool that helps communities and first responders plan, communicate, and conduct evacuations. It provides communications, situational awareness, and cross-agency coordination capabilities for emergency management. The platform delivers integrated hardware and software for proactive preparedness and multi-channel communication.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 12
Table 2 describes data sources and equations used to estimate vehicle evacuation demand for residents, employees, students, and visitors. Data sources reviewed for this assessment include the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates, Genasys Protect, Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool, and the adopted Housing Element. These sources provide population, household, and employment estimates that are within a similar range.

Evacuation Routes
FIGURE 2
280
280
280
85 85
yW ellivelleB
S Tantau Ave
evA thgirW
S Stelling Rd
Regnart Rd
evA hcniF
Prospect Rd
Saratoga Ave
dvlB aznA eD N
Doyle Rd
dR bbuB
S Blaney Ave
Moorpark Ave
Cox Ave
McClellan Rd
dR otiuQ
dvlB aznA eD S
S Mary Ave
evA relliM
N Tantau Ave
dvlB llihtooF S
Pruneridge Ave
W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd
Johnson Ave
N Stelling Rd Hollenbeck Ave
dR efloW S
dR elavynnuS-agotaraS S
Vallco Pkwy
Rainbow Dr
Bollinger Rd
Stevens Creek Blvd
W Campbell Ave
dvlB llihtooF N
N Blaney Ave
dR efloW
Stevens Canyon Rd
Phil Ln
evA liauQ
Mount Eden Rd
Basemap
FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Evacuation Route (outside of City Boundary)
Evacuation Route (in Cupertino)
Fire H azard Severity Zones
FIGURE 1
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Evacuation Routes (in Cupertino)
Evacuation Routes (outside of City Boundary)
Data Source: Draft Health and Safety Element, 2025
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
85 85
280
280
280
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 14
Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area Evacuation Demand Variable Data Source Equation

1. Employment Santa Clara Countywide
VMT Estimation Tool Data source provided value.

2. Residential Population Genasys Protect* Data source provided value.

3. Household Genasys Protect* Population / Household size

4. Household Vehicle
Ownership Distribution Census Tract Number of households with 0, 1, 2, or 3+ vehicles / Total household

5. Household Vehicle
Ownership Steps 4 & 5 Household vehicle ownership distribution * Household

6. Student Education Data
Partnership Data source provided value1

7. Visitor Parking Spaces Available
from Google Maps Portion of parking spaces occupied2

8. Estimated Vehicle
Evacuation Demand Steps 1 & 6
Residents:
1 * zero-vehicle household +
1 * one-vehicle household +
2 * two-vehicle household +

2.5 * three-or-more vehicle household
Employees:

0.99 * employment
Students:
1 * drive-alone student +

0.5 * carpooling student +
1 * student picked up/dropped off
Visitors:

0.5 * visitor
Notes: Raw data is presented in Appendix A.

1. Educational Data Partnership shows school enrollment data for the following schools considered in the evacuation area: Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School.

2. Visitor presence considered at recreational attractions located within the evacuation area: PG&E Trailhead (50% of the Rancho San Antonio County Park parking spaces), Deep Cliff Golf Course (20% of the Linda Vista Park parking spaces), Rim Trail (45% of the Stevens Creek County Park Chestnut and Villa Maria parking lots), and Parker Ranch Trailhead (40% of the Fremont Older Open Space Preserve Prospect and Saratoga Country Club parking spaces).

Source: 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Educational Data Partnership; and Google Maps, Fehr & Peers, 2025.

3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips
The total resident, employee, student, and visitor evacuation trips are disaggregated into 14 different geographically designated evacuation zones in the Genasys Protect platform. Trips are routed from each zone to the nearest evacuation route. Once on a major evacuation route, trips are assigned to the most efficient path toward either SR-85 or I-280. The city limit is used as the evacuation Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 15
gateways because it represents the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the hazard area and the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk.

3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment
An evacuation route assessment can be completed in a variety of ways to determine the capacity and viability of key evacuation routes. An assessment, like this project, can use volume to capacity ratios under typical non-congested conditions. Under more constrained and congested conditions, higher effort studies may involve modeled analysis of evacuation scenarios using dynamic traffic assignment to simulate traffic flow and evacuation times when street and freeway networks are at capacity. This evacuation route capacity divides the vehicle demand volumes by the roadway evacuation capacity to estimate the volume to capacity ratio during an evacuation event. Furthermore, the evacuation route assessment measures the distance evacuees have to travel to reach evacuation gateways.

3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity
This analysis uses planning level roadway capacities based on the roadway cross section (e.g., two, four, or six travel lanes) with adjustments for the hilly nature of the evacuation routes in the evacuation area and anticipated lower visibility conditions present during an evacuation. These planning level roadway capacities are consistent with the level of planning for this AB 747/AB 1409 evacuation capacity analysis where the desired outcome is a list of policies and programs to integrate into the Health and Safety Element. Table 3 lists the peak one-hour planning capacity for each roadway type. These evacuation capacities do not incorporate contraflow, as the opposing direction is reserved for emergency responders.

Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane Roadway Type Planning Capacity1
(Typical Day)
Planning Capacity
(Low Visibility)
Freeway 2,020 1,780
Divided Arterial 940 830
Undivided Arterial 890 780
Collector/Local 650 570
Notes:

1. Roadway planning capacity from Highway Capacity Manual (2000).

Source: Highway Capacity Manual, 2000; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

Additionally, during a fire or other emergency event, roadways typically operate at lower capacities due to changes in driver behavior and the presence of hazards such as low visibility due to smoke.

Baseline capacities for all evacuation roadways were reduced by 12 percent to account for these hazards, based on recommended capacity reductions due to low visibility (due to weather) provided by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Road Weather Management Program.9 9 How weather events impact roadways?
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/q1_roadimpact.htm#:~:text=Speed%20variance%20can%20fall%20by,12 %20percent%20in%20low%20visibility, accessed April 2025.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 16
Table 4 presents the roadway types and total evacuation route capacity at designated screenlines and a few additional roadway segments. A screenline is an imaginary line on a map to evaluate the evacuation route capacity (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). This analysis uses a screenline east of the evacuation area, and another at SR-85 and I-280, which represent the defined evacuation gateways.

Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity
Roadway Name Roadway
Type1
Outbound
Lanes
Evacuation
Route
Capacity
Adjusted
Evacuation
Route
Capacity2

1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline
Cristo Rey Drive
west of Foothills Boulevard Collector 1 650 570
Foothill Boulevard
north of Alpine Drive Local 1 650 570
Stevens Creek Boulevard
east of Cupertino Road Collector 1 650 570
McClellan Road
east of Imperial Avenue Collector 1 650 570
Bubb Road
north of Hyannisport Drive Local 1 650 570
Rainbow Drive
west of Seven Springs Lane
Local 1 650 570
Prospect Road
east of Parker Ranch Trailhead Local 1 650 570

2. West of SR 85 Screenline
Foothill Boulevard
south of I-280
Undivided
Arterial 2 1,780 1,560
Stevens Creek Boulevard
west of SR-85
Undivided
Arterial 2 1,780 1,560
Bubb Road
south of Stevens Creek Boulevard Collector 1 650 570
McClellan Road
east of Bubb Road Collector 1 650 570
Stelling Road
north of Orion Lane Collector 1 650 570
South De Anza Boulevard
north of SR-85
Divided
Arterial 3 2,820 2,490
Prospect Road
east of S De Anza Boulevard Collector 2 1,300 1,140
Notes:

1. Roadway type determined by City of Cupertino Circulation Element (2025).

2. Vehicles per hour. Rounded to nearest 10.

Source: Circulation Element, 2025; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 17

3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway
For this analysis, evacuation population groups are considered to be evacuated when they have either accessed gateways to the east of SR-85 or north of I-280. To assist with identifying potentially vulnerable communities during an evacuation event it is also helpful to identify City neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event. This analysis measures the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways. Up to two best routes from each point to the gateways are included in this assessment.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 18

4. Evacuation Route Assessment
This chapter evaluates the evacuation route capacity during a wildfire evacuation event for the evacuation area and routes identified in Chapter 3. This section also analyzes the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways to help identify City neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event.

4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips
Based on the identified scenarios, the areas requiring evacuation include the FHSZ since these areas are most vulnerable to wildfire hazards. The trips assigned to the transportation system are estimated based on household and employer demographics along with student and visitor population and assist with estimating evacuation demand during an evacuation event.

Table 5 lists the composition of evacuees for each quantitative scenario. Note that Scenario C is a qualitative assessment, which builds on Scenario A and, therefore, has the same evacuation demand as Scenario A.

Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario
Type of Evacuees Scenario A
(Quantitative)
Scenario B
(Quantitative)
Scenario C
(Qualitative)
Residents 46% 100% 46%
Employees 100% 2% 100%
Students 100% 0% 100%
Visitors 100% 0% 100%
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population
A worst-case condition was estimated where all residents, and retail and restaurant (estimated to be half of all employees in the area) in the evacuation area would need to be evacuated. The number of residents, anticipated vehicle ownership per household, employees, students in schools, and visitors in the evacuation area were used to estimate the number of evacuee vehicles. Because the raw data for households, population, and employment cover geographic areas that differ from the evacuation area, the data were adjusted to estimate land use and evacuation demand. Table A-1 to Table A-3 provide raw socioeconomic data.

Table 6 to Table 10 present the resident, employee, student, and visitor land uses and estimated evacuation demand in the evacuation area. As shown in Table 6, approximately one percent of households does not have access to a vehicle and would potentially confront mobility constraints during an evacuation event.

This assessment uses zero-vehicle households as a proxy to provide an estimate of persons with mobility constraints that may need evacuation assistance. These zero-vehicle households would Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 19
require outside assistance. Although outside the scope of this assessment, the City may want to consider a program that ensures a more accurate accounting of households needing assistance and programs to facilitate their evacuation. This estimate also assumes employment centers would provide evacuation assistance to employees without access to a vehicle. Additionally, it was assumed that some households with more than two vehicles likely would not be able to utilize all of their vehicles during an evacuation event (e.g., homes with three or more vehicles but with only two licensed drivers).

Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area Population1 Households2
Household Vehicle
Ownership2 Estimated Evacuation Demand3,4,5
0 1 2 3+ Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
12,636 4,355
48 604 2,400 1,303
4,050 8,710 4,050
1% 14% 55% 30%
Notes:

1. The estimated population is obtained from Genasys Protect data provided by the City staff on July 25, 2025.

2. The estimated number of households and household vehicle ownership is derived from 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates and adjusted according to the estimated population.

3. Assumption of number of vehicles that will evacuate: zero-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; one-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; two-vehicle household: 2 vehicles; three-or-more vehicle household: 2.5 vehicles.

4. Assume that daytime population from Genasys Protect consists of residents, employees, students, and visitors. Calculated as (daytime population - employees - students - visitors) / residents * 100%, The residents present in the evacuation area were estimated to be 46% and 100% of the population for Scenarios A and B respectively.

5. It should be noted that this information does not constitute a specific analysis of households with mobility challenges as it does not specifically account for people who have mobility impairments that preclude them from using a vehicle; it also does not specifically account for households that own one or more vehicles, but where not all members of the household may necessarily have access to them at all times (for example, a household with one vehicle which a household member drives to work, leaving other members of the household at home with no vehicle available).

Source: 2023 ACS 5-Year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area
Employment (A)1
Estimated Evacuation Demand2
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
556 550 10 550
Notes:

1. The estimated employment is obtained from the Santa Clara Countywide VMT Evaluation Tool, using 2025 as the baseline year.

2. Assumes that all the employees will evacuate with 0.99 vehicles per employee (one percent of evacuation area households are zero-vehicle households).

Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

4.1.2 Student Population
Within the designated evacuation area, several schools serve a substantial student population that would require timely evacuation in the event of an emergency at working hours. Schools located Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 20
within the evacuation area include Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F. Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. Table 8 presents the estimated number of student evacuation trips during Scenario A. Table A-4 and Table A-5 show the school enrollment data and estimated student evacuation trips, categorized by mode of travel, including pick-up/drop-off by parents, carpooling, and individual student drivers.

Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area School Enrollment
Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
3,560 3,120 0 3,120
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

4.1.3 Visitor Population
Table 9 presents the estimated number of visitor trips generated by recreational land uses that would require evacuation during an emergency. Additional details on how these visitor trip estimates were developed can be found in Table A-6.

Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area Visitors
Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
355 180 0 180
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand
Considering the estimated trips generated in the evacuation area from all employees, residents, students and visitors, the total number of estimated trips during an evacuation event can be estimated. The total evacuation demand is 7,900 and 8,720 during Scenario A and Scenario B respectively, as shown in Table 10.

Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area Type of Evacuees Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Residents 4,050 8,710 4,050
Employees 550 10 550
Students 3,120 - 3,120
Visitors 180 - 180
Total 7,900 8,720 7,900
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 21
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the evacuation demand across two screenlines. These screenlines represent the edge of the hazard area (screenline 1) and the estimated evacuation edge (screenline 2).

4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity

4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis)
The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the roadway network in proportion to the combined resident, employee, student, and visitor population data for each Genasys Protect zone10 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in Table B-1. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees.

Traffic volume data for the roadway segments on the evacuation area were collected in July 2025.

These counts, combined with estimated demand, were used to calculate the total evacuation vehicle demand. StreetLight data from the same period in 2024 were collected and compared with data from October 2024 to evaluate the impact of school sessions versus non-school periods. For Scenario A, representing a typical Fall weekday at 2 PM, a factor of 1.2 was applied to account for the increased traffic associated with schools being in session.

Evacuation route capacity was assessed by dividing vehicle demand volumes by roadway evacuation capacity to calculate the volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio. As shown in Table 11, the results of the evacuation capacity assessment indicate that all evacuation routes have V/C ratios greater than 1 near the evacuation area except for Prospect Road. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the hillside, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation.

Foothill Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard and McClellan Road are the most critical bottlenecks with V/C ratio greater than 2. Prospect Road and Stelling Road have V/C ratios of 1, suggesting they are at capacity and should be prioritized for evacuation demand and supply strategies.

It is also important to note that emergency scenarios are often unpredictable (as well as driver behavior during the evacuation time period) and it is anticipated that evacuees would vacate at a rate that more closely resembles a bell curve from the time the evacuation order is issued. These are conditions which would affect the total estimated evacuation time in our assessment and are beyond the scope and budget of our assessment. There is also general unpredictability in operational issues, such as power issues that would trigger traffic signals to operate in “red flash mode” in which traffic would need to proceed through intersections in an all-way stop configuration. 10 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow.

Trip Distribution for Scenario A
FIGURE 3
280
280
280
85 85
yW ellivelleB
S Tantau Ave
evA thgirW
S Stelling Rd
Regnart Rd
evA hcniF
Prospect Rd
Saratoga Ave
dvlB aznA eD N
Doyle Rd
dR bbuB
S Blaney Ave
Moorpark Ave
Cox Ave
McClellan Rd
dR otiuQ
dvlB aznA eD S
S Mary Ave
evA relliM
N Tantau Ave
dvlB llihtooF S
Pruneridge Ave
W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd
Johnson Ave
N Stelling Rd Hollenbeck Ave
dR efloW S
dR elavynnuS-agotaraS S
Vallco Pkwy
Rainbow Dr
Bollinger Rd
Stevens Creek Blvd
W Campbell Ave
dvlB llihtooF N
N Blaney Ave
dR efloW
Stevens Canyon Rd
Phil Ln
evA liauQ
Mount Eden Rd
Basemap
FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Data Source: Fehr & Peers
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
West of SR-85 Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
Trip Distribution | Scenario A
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution %
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
5%
18%
21%
14%
14%
22%
6%
23%
21%
4%
24%
5%
17%
6%
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
West of SR-85 Screenline
Trip Distribution
Scenario A
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) %
0 1 2
M i l
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 23
Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A) Evacuation Route Link
Evacuation
Travel
Demand1
Existing
Hourly
Traffic
Total
Evacuation
Demand
Adjusted
Evacuation
Route
Capacity
V/C
Ratio2

1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline
Cristo Rey Drive
west of Foothills Boulevard 400 239 639 570 1.1
Foothill Boulevard
north of Alpine Drive 1,420 883 2,303 570 4.0
Stevens Creek Boulevard
east of Cupertino Road 1,660 417 2,077 570 3.6
McClellan Road
east of Imperial Avenue 1,110 100 1,210 570 2.1
Bubb Road
north of Hyannisport Drive 1,110 234 1,344 570 2.4
Rainbow Drive
west of Seven Springs Lane
1,740 20 1,760 570 3.1
Prospect Road
east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 470 116 586 570 1.0

2. West of SR 85 Screenline
Foothill Boulevard
south of I-280 1,820 883 2,703 1,560 1.7
Stevens Creek Boulevard
west of SR-85 1,660 719 2,379 1,560 1.5
Bubb Road
south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 320 550 870 570 1.5
McClellan Road
east of Bubb Road 1,900 506 2,406 570 4.2
Stelling Road
north of Orion Lane 400 196 596 570 1.0
South De Anza Boulevard
north of SR-85 1,340 1,578 2,918 2,490 1.2
Prospect Road
east of S De Anza Boulevard 470 912 1,382 1,140 1.2
Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity.

1. Rounded to nearest 10.

2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity.

Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis)
Scenario B assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 24
roadway network in proportion to the combined population, and employment population data for each Genasys Protect zone11 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in Table B-2. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees.

The results of the evacuation capacity assessment in Table 11 indicate that all the roadways near the evacuation area except for Cristo Rey Drive, McClellan Road and Prospect Road have V/C ratios greater than 2. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the evacuation area, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation.

This scenario is evaluated with a road closure on McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course, with schools not in session. When this segment of McClellan Road is closed, evacuees located east of Club House Lane can only travel eastbound along McClellan Road, while those west of the closure can only travel westbound. In other words, evacuees cannot cross the closed segment, which results in separate evacuation routes for areas on either side of the closure.

Under these conditions, evacuation demand on McClellan Road would decrease, with some trips shifted to Foothill Boulevard and Stevens Creek Boulevard. As a result, McClellan Road would experience a lower V/C ratio.

Under Scenario B, evacuation demand is higher than under Scenario A, as summarized in Table 10.

However, because existing hourly traffic is lower at 6 AM under Scenario B, the total evacuation demand (i.e., the sum of evacuation travel demand and existing hourly traffic) on some roadways is lower under Scenario B than under Scenario A. A morning evacuation (6:00 AM) reflects conditions when most residents are at home, resulting in higher residential evacuation demand but relatively low existing traffic volumes on the roadways. In contrast, an afternoon evacuation (2:00 PM) occurs when many residents are at work or school, leading to lower residential evacuation demand but higher levels of existing traffic associated with general daytime travel activity. Scenario B has higher evacuation travel demand but lower existing traffic, resulting in a lower total evacuation demand on some roadways than Scenario A. As a result, these roadways show lower V/C ratios under Scenario B despite the higher evacuation travel demand.
11 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow.

Trip Distribution for Scenario B
FIGURE 4
280
280
280
85 85
yW ellivelleB
S Tantau Ave
evA thgirW
S Stelling Rd
Regnart Rd
evA hcniF
Prospect Rd
Saratoga Ave
dvlB aznA eD N
Doyle Rd
dR bbuB
S Blaney Ave
Moorpark Ave
Cox Ave
McClellan Rd
dR otiuQ
dvlB aznA eD S
S Mary Ave
evA relliM
N Tantau Ave
dvlB llihtooF S
Pruneridge Ave
W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd
Johnson Ave
N Stelling Rd Hollenbeck Ave
dR efloW S
dR elavynnuS-agotaraS S
Vallco Pkwy
Rainbow Dr
Bollinger Rd
Stevens Creek Blvd
W Campbell Ave
dvlB llihtooF N
N Blaney Ave
dR efloW
Stevens Canyon Rd
Phil Ln
evA liauQ
Mount Eden Rd
Basemap
FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Data Source: Fehr & Peers
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
West of SR-85 Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
Trip Distribution | Scenario B
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution %
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
6%
25%
25%
6%
12%
19%
7%
31%
25%
2%
16%
6%
13%
7%
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
West of SR-85 Screenline
Trip Distribution
Scenario B
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) %
0 1 2
M i l
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 26
Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) Evacuation Route Link
Evacuation
Travel
Demand1
Existing
Hourly
Traffic
Total
Evacuation
Demand
Adjusted
Evacuation
Route
Capacity
V/C
Ratio2

1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline
Cristo Rey Drive
west of Foothills Boulevard 520 31 551 570 1.0
Foothill Boulevard
north of Alpine Drive 2,180 283 2,463 570 4.3
Stevens Creek Boulevard
east of Cupertino Road 2,180 31 2,211 570 3.9
McClellan Road
east of Imperial Avenue 520 13 533 570 0.9
Bubb Road
north of Hyannisport Drive 1,050 64 1,114 570 2.0
Rainbow Drive
west of Seven Springs Lane
1,660 85 1,745 570 3.1
Prospect Road
east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 610 23 633 570 1.1

2. West of SR 85 Screenline
Foothill Boulevard
south of I-280 2,700 283 2,983 1,560 1.9
Stevens Creek Boulevard
west of SR-85 2,180 142 2,322 1,560 1.5
Bubb Road
south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 170 86 256 570 0.4
McClellan Road
east of Bubb Road 1,400 31 1,431 570 2.5
Stelling Road
north of Orion Lane 520 28 548 570 1.0
South De Anza Boulevard
north of SR-85 1,130 362 1,492 2,490 0.6
Prospect Road
east of S De Anza Boulevard 610 144 754 1,140 0.7
Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity.

1. Rounded to nearest 10.

2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity.

Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 27

4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis)
Scenario C assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 2 PM on a school day.

Scenario C demonstrates the worst-case evacuation condition in which an earthquake initiates wildfire. Scenario C builds on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures at the following roadways because of an earthquake causing wildfire:
• Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85
• SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard
Due to the results of the baseline scenario, no further quantification was conducted for Scenario C.

However, in addition to the capacity constraints identified in Scenario A, the following evacuation route capacity issues have been noted:
• The closure on Stevens Creek Boulevard and SR-85 Southbound Ramps would divert 2,378 evacuees assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard (refer to Table 11) to the adjacent routes. The updated trip distribution is shown in Table B-3. These alternative routes include Foothill Boulevard, McClellan Road, and De Anza Boulevard. Since these routes are already bottlenecks in Scenario A, the added volume would result in further congestion and increase the severity of the bottleneck causing more delay and queuing.
• Stevens Creek Boulevard also serves the evacuees from the entire corridor east and west of the FHSZ. A portion of the rerouted evacuation demand from Stevens Creek Boulevard is expected to shift towards Rainbow Drive and to Stelling Road or De Anza Boulevard, which serve as one of the key evacuation corridors to SR-85.
• Foothill Boulevard is already identified as a critical bottleneck with a V/C ratio exceeding 4 in both the scenarios. The rerouted evacuation demand due to the roadway closures would further exacerbate congestion and significantly affect evacuation efficiency.

4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways
Distance to evacuation gateways is mapped in Figure 5. The map illustrates the primary evacuation routes likely to be used by evacuees. The distance for all the evacuation routes ranges from 0.9 to 2.5 miles with most falling between 1.5 to 2 miles. From each start point, there is one or two best routes to reach the gateways with similar distances.

Routes A, B, E, and F (via Cristo Rey Drive, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Rainbow Drive, and Prospect Road, respectively) are within two miles of the nearest evacuation gateways. According to Table 11 and Table 12, Cristo Rey Drive and Prospect Road are not expected to experience capacity constraints under Scenarios A and B. As a result, evacuees using these routes are expected to have relatively short evacuation times.

In contrast, Route D (via Bubb Road) is located 2 miles to the nearest evacuation gateway (Gateway 3), while Route C (via Foothills Boulevard) exceeds 2 miles in distance to the nearest gateway (Gateway 3). Given that Foothills Boulevard is projected to be over capacity (V/C > 4) under Scenarios A and B, and Bubb Road is over capacity (V/C > 2) under both scenarios, evacuees using these routes are likely to encounter significant traffic congestion and longer evacuation times.

Distances to Evacuation Gateways
FIGURE 5
280
280
280
85 85
yW ellivelleB
S Tantau Ave
evA thgirW
S Stelling Rd
Regnart Rd
evA hcniF
Prospect Rd
Saratoga Ave
dvlB aznA eD N
Doyle Rd
dR bbuB
S Blaney Ave
Moorpark Ave
Cox Ave
McClellan Rd
dR otiuQ
dvlB aznA eD S
S Mary Ave
evA relliM
N Tantau Ave
dvlB llihtooF S
Pruneridge Ave
W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd
Johnson Ave
N Stelling Rd Hollenbeck Ave
dR efloW S
dR elavynnuS-agotaraS S
Vallco Pkwy
Rainbow Dr
Bollinger Rd
Stevens Creek Blvd
W Campbell Ave
dvlB llihtooF N
N Blaney Ave
dR efloW
Stevens Canyon Rd
Phil Ln
evA liauQ
Mount Eden Rd
Basemap
FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Distance to Evacuation Gateway
0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles Gateway
Start
A
B
C
D
E
F
1 2
3 4
5 6

0.9 miles
from Point F
to Gateway 6

1.1 miles
from Point F
to Gateway 5

1.3 miles
from Point B
to Gateway 1

1.4 miles
from Point E
to Gateway 4

1.6 miles
from Point E
to Gateway 5

1.6 miles
from Point B
to Gateway 2

1.9 miles
from Point A
to Gateway 1
2 miles
from Point D
to Gateway 3

2.2 miles
from Point D
to Gateway 4

2.4 miles
from Point C
to Gateway 3

2.5 miles
from Point C
to Gateway 1
Gateway
Start
Distance to Evacuation Gateway
0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles 0 1 2
M il
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
Data Source: Fehr & Peers
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 29

5. Recommendations
The City of Cupertino has already implemented several key strategies that support evacuation readiness and enhance emergency response capabilities. These existing measures provide a strong foundation for coordinated and effective action during wildfire or other disaster events:
• Established multi-jurisdictional plans that enable Fire and Sheriff departments to operate seamlessly under a unified command structure. This coordination ensures faster decisionmaking, effective resource deployment, and a cohesive response across different agencies and jurisdictions.
• Traffic signals within the evacuation network are equipped with battery backup systems, allowing them to remain operational during power outages for up to eight hours. This functionality helps maintain orderly traffic flow, reduces confusion at intersections, and supports safer, more efficient evacuations.
• Strong coordination and communication among key agencies including Fire, Sheriff, and Public Works—facilitate real-time updates and operational alignment. These communication protocols enable swift sharing of situational information, ensuring a collaborative response during rapidly evolving emergency situations.

In addition to the recommended policies (Policy HS-2.1 to Policy HS-2.15) included in the Safety Element Update, the following recommendations are listed as potential measures that can enhance the evacuation process through the supply side (increasing evacuation capacity), demand side (managing evacuation volumes), and information side (improving awareness and communication).

These recommendations will be incorporated into future updates of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP), and Health and Safety Element Update to ensure consistency and alignment. Some recommendations can be implemented more readily through the EOP. Others may require additional coordination and formal adoption as part of the Safety Element Update or LHMP.

5.1 Supply-Side Strategies
Supply-side strategies aim to temporarily increase evacuation capacity at key bottleneck locations while balancing the everyday safety and function of the roadway system. • Increasing capacity through the use of contraflow lanes or dual purpose shoulder evacuation/protected bike lane widening by changing future roadway design, especially in areas with less accessibility and located on key evacuation routes. These areas are primarily located on I-280, Foothills Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Bubb Road, and SR-85 corridors. These routes should consider incorporating design treatments such as painted medians (instead of raised medians) or other treatments that could assist in creating reversible lanes, or a dual-purpose shoulder to facilitate additional capacity in an evacuation event scenario.
• Extending water service into evacuation corridors strengthens firefighting capacity and longterm water investment ensures reliable resources that sustain evacuation operations under emergency conditions.
• Managed traffic control during evacuation, including turn restrictions and route or ramp closures, to maximize outflows from evacuation areas.
• Faster clearing of fire-induced road closures.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 30
• Plan for street parking management on high hazard days.

5.2 Demand-Side Strategies
• The City of Cupertino can support vehicle volume reduction during an evacuation by encouraging carpooling and use of public transit;
• Encouraging a one car per household evacuation pledge (for households that must have second vehicles, an alternative could involve early off-site placement of a second car when advance wildfire warnings or other hazard requiring evacuation are available); • Identifying shelter locations within the City limits and outside the FHSZ to reduce demand on evacuation routes outside the FHSZ and plan/implement shelter facilities; and

5.3 Information-Side Strategies
The City of Cupertino can further support evacuation through the following measures:
• Enhance community evacuation programs to improve resident, employee, student, and visitor preparedness and familiarity with evacuation routes and processes. • Strengthen coordination of emergency response equipment and resources between neighboring jurisdictions, allowing for shared use based on operational needs rather than ownership.
• Enhance communication protocols between cities and elected officials to support unified decision-making, real-time information sharing, and coordinated emergency response across jurisdictional boundaries.
• Explore and deploy wildfire early detection systems (i.e., wildfire video surveillance cameras, drones, etc.) especially for constrained access parcels. • Use real-time traffic management tools to implement dynamic route guidance and monitoring to guide evacuees away from congested routes and encourage the use of secondary or tertiary routes to distribute traffic more evenly. • Study a phased evacuation process where different groups or areas evacuate at different times to prevent congestion on main evacuation routes. This can be based on factors like proximity to danger, traffic volume, or priority of evacuation. • Study and install vehicle monitoring devices and variable message signs to monitor evacuation programs and provide notification of any changes in evacuation routes or plans due to a change in the wildfire or incidents to motorists along the road.

5.4 Additional Considerations
This evacuation assessment includes trips generated by both employees and residents from the evacuation area and assumes all residents and employees will be evacuated using vehicles. A critical consideration for emergency personnel is to assist individual residents and employees who either do not have access to a vehicle or cannot drive, to ensure that compete evacuation is provided. The EOP includes provisions to coordinate with the VTA, Silicon Valley (SV) Hopper, and emergency services. Further research into strategies for evacuating people who do not have access to a vehicle is recommended. Options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following:
• Neighborhood “buddy” program to link people needing assistance with people willing to assist.

Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 31
• Partnership with transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft.

For individual students and visitors who do not have access to a vehicle, options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following:
• Designated pick-up zones for TNCs or buses to ensure orderly evacuation. • Provide dedicated shuttle, school vans, or charter bus service, if available.

P
Appendix A:

Socioeconomic Data
P
Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1
Geographic Area Households Population Employment
Household Vehicle Ownership
0 1 2 3+
Census Tract 5077.01 1,216 4,092 1,526 90 217 515 394
Block Group 1; Census
Tract 5077.01 N/A 878 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.01 N/A 1,927 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Census Tract 5077.02 2,163 6,107 3,310 24 300 1,192 647 Block Group 1;
Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,052 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 1,704 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 3;
Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,351 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Census Tract 5077.04 1,214 3,466 1,453 150 299 457 308
Block Group 1;
Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 1,060 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 2,406 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Census Tract 5077.05 1,385 4,560 1,753 19 255 671 440
Block Group 1;
Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,952 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,373 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 3;
Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,235 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total 5,978 35,613 8,042 283 1,071 2,835 1,789
Notes:

1. Census block group and census tract locations are illustrated in Figure A-1.

Source: 2023 ACS 5-year Estimates; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

P
Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations P
Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1 Geographic Area Total Population Total Daytime
Population Total Households
SCC-005 0 0 0
SCC-006 0 3 0
SCC-008 198 270 82
SCC-010 12 52 2
SCC-011 13 41 4
SCC-020 67 37 21
CUP-007 784 1,057 376
CUP-008 1,294 931 418
CUP-016 10 124 3
CUP-017 3,188 2,523 1,042
CUP-018 1,339 1,245 461
CUP-029 2,841 2,046 953
CUP-032 654 470 248
CUP-033 2,236 1,546 745
Total 12,636 10,345 4,355
Notes:

1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.

Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

P
Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area) P
Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1 Geographic Area Households Population Employment
TAZ 132 955 2,702 94
TAZ 130 0 0 0
TAZ 127 204 614 14
TAZ 128 231 693 25
TAZ 126 647 2,038 647
TAZ 103 193 530 77
TAZ 133 325 920 66
TAZ 102 278 749 55
TAZ 116 305 910 64
TAZ 115 1 3 1,448
TAZ 129 996 2,995 150
TAZ 105 413 1,240 5
TAZ 136 22 62 135
TAZ 122 328 1,033 0
TAZ 125 238 751 2
TAZ 131 273 822 5
TAZ 1334 661 1,880 55
TAZ 135 640 1,825 31
TAZ 134 677 1,916 7
TAZ 117 582 1,741 1,448
TAZ 123 466 1,472 0
Total 8,435 24,896 4,328
Notes:

1. TAZ locations are illustrated in Figure A-3.

Source: Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

P
Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) P
Table A-4: School Enrollment Data
School Name School Enrollment
Abraham Lincoln Elementary 700
John F Kennedy Middle 930
Tessellations Elementary School 270
Total (non-driving students) 1,9001
Monta Vista High School (can drive) 1,6602
Total Students 3,560
Notes:

1. Elementary and middle school students are assumed to evacuate either by carpooling with another student (20%) or by being picked up/dropped off individually (80%).

2. High school students are assumed to be able to drive and are therefore assigned the following evacuation mode shares: drive alone (20%), carpool (30%), and pick-up/drop-off (50%).

Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips
Driving Condition
Percent Estimates
Number of
Students Factor1 Estimated Student Evacuation Trips 1,900 Students (Non- Driving)
1,660
Students
(Can Drive)
Drive Alone 0% 20% 330 1.0 330
Carpool 20% 30% 880 0.5 440
Drop-Off 80% 50% 2,350 1.0 2,350
Total 3,560 3,120
Notes:

1. Drive Alone trips assume one person per vehicle; Carpool trips assume two passengers per vehicle, excluding the driver; and Drop-Off trips assume one passenger per vehicle, with the driver not counted.

P
Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips
Recreational Attractions Location Number of Visitors1
PG&E Trailhead East of Rancho San
Antonio County Park 200
Deep Cliff Golf Course North of Linda Vista Park 20
Rim Trail North of Stevens Creek
County Park 100
Parker Ranch Trailhead East of Fremont Older
Open Space Preserve 35
Total Visitors 355
Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips2180
Notes:

1. The number of visitors is based on the percentage of parking spaces assumed during the study period. (Refer to Table 2 notes for the percentages assumed).

2. Visitors are assumed to carpool (two or more passengers per vehicle).

P
Appendix B: Trip
Distribution
P
Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) Genasys Protect
Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution SCC-0052 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1%
SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0%
SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0%
CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5%
CUP-008 1,294 8%
Foothills Boulevard 5%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0%
CUP-017 3,188 20%
Foothills Boulevard 9%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 10%
McClellan Road 1%
CUP-008 1,339 8%
Foothills Boulevard 5%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-029 2,841 38%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 4%
McClellan Road 24%
Rainbow Drive 10%
CUP-032 654 4%
McClellan Road 2%
Rainbow Drive 2%
CUP-033 2,236 16%
Stelling Road 5%
Rainbow Drive 5%
Prospect Road 6%
Notes:

1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.

2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ.

Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

P
Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B) Genasys Protect
Zones1 Population Population Distribution
Connected
Roadways
Evacuation Trip
Distribution
SCC-005 0 0% Foothills
Boulevard 0%
SCC-006 0 0% Foothills
Boulevard 0%
SCC-008 198 2% Foothills
Boulevard 2%
SCC-010 12 0% Foothills
Boulevard 0%
SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0%
SCC-020 67 1% Prospect Road 1%
CUP-007 784 6% Cristo Rey Drive 6%
CUP-008 1,294 10%
Foothills
Boulevard 7%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0%
CUP-017 3,188 25%
Foothills
Boulevard 10%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 13%
McClellan Road 2%
CUP-008 1,339 11%
Foothills
Boulevard 8%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-029 2,841 22%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 2%
McClellan Road 15%
Rainbow Drive 5%
CUP-032 654 5%
McClellan Road 3%
Rainbow Drive 2%
CUP-033 2,236 18%
Stelling Road 6%
Rainbow Drive 6%
Prospect Road 6%
Notes:

1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.

2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ.

Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.

P
Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) Genasys Protect
Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution2 SCC-0053 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1%
SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0%
SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0%
CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5%
CUP-008 1,294 8%
Foothills Boulevard 8%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0%
CUP-017 3,188 20%
Foothills Boulevard 15%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
McClellan Road 5%
CUP-008 1,339 8%
Foothills Boulevard 8%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
CUP-029 2,841 38%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
McClellan Road 26%
Rainbow Drive 12%
CUP-032 654 4%
McClellan Road 2%
Rainbow Drive 2%
CUP-033 2,236 16%
Stelling Road 5%
Rainbow Drive 5%
Prospect Road 6%
Notes:

1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.

2. For Scenario C, due to road closure at Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85, trips assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard under Scenario A were shifted to alternative roadways.

3. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ.

Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
1 Filed 10/23/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA EX REL. ROB
BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et
al.,
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.

COUNTY OF LAKE,
Respondent;

LOTUSLAND INVESTMENT
HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

A165677
(Lake County Super. Ct.

Nos. CV421152, CV421193)
Petitioners Center for Biological Diversity and California Native Plant Society challenged Respondents County of Lake and the Lake County Board of Supervisors’ (collectively, the County) approval of the Guenoc Valley Mixed-Use Planned Development Project (project) proposed by Real Party in Interest Lotusland I6nvestment Holdings, Inc. (Lotusland) and certification of a final environmental impact report (FEIR) for the project adopting its findings. Petitioners argued the FEIR did not properly analyze and/or mitigate the project’s impacts on evacuation routes, wildfire risk, greenhouse * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, sections IV, V, and VII of this opinion are certified for publication. 2 gases, and water use. They further argued that the County failed to properly consider project alternatives and failed to recirculate the FEIR for public review after adding significant new information.

The trial court held that the County’s findings regarding the impacts on the existing community’s emergency evacuation routes were not supported by substantial evidence, and thus the FEIR did not comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). It otherwise rejected Petitioners’ other challenges, which they appealed. We too reject these other challenges to the FEIR, but we agree that its conclusory discussion of the project’s potential impact of exacerbating wildfire ignitions fails to provide meaningful information for the environmental assessment required by CEQA. Because the FEIR is invalid in part, a new environmental impact report (EIR) must be prepared, mooting Petitioners’ request that the FEIR be recirculated.

BACKGROUND
Lotusland proposed the project, a luxury resort consisting of residential estate villas, hotel units, and related infrastructure, on 16,000 acres in an unincorporated and largely undeveloped area of Lake County known as the Guenoc Valley Ranch.

Having been designated the “lead agency” for purposes of approving the project under Public Resources Code, section 21067,
1 the County first
published a draft environmental impact report (DEIR). The DEIR offered the public insight into the County’s evaluation of the project’s environmental impacts, the County’s proffered mitigation measures, and alternatives to the proposed project.
1 All further statutory references are to CEQA provisions as codified in Public Resources Code sections 21000–21177 unless otherwise indicated.

Where applicable, the CEQA guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15000– 15387) are denoted as “Guidelines.”
3 Public comment letters alleged several deficiencies in the DEIR’s analysis. The County published its responses to the public comments along with the FEIR in June 2020.

Petitioners and the Attorney General, on behalf of the People, submitted further comment letters maintaining that the FEIR fails to resolve many of the DEIR’s issues. Most relevant here, public comment letters challenged the adequacy of disclosure and mitigation regarding Impacts 3.16- 2 (exacerbating wildfire risks), 3.7-1 (generating greenhouse gas emissions),

3.9-2 (decreasing groundwater supplies), as well as the rejection of an environmentally superior alternative.

Of note, Petitioners averred the “FEIR remains deficient because it fails to acknowledge or adequately analyze the increased risk of wildfire that results from development and increasing the intensity of use in undeveloped areas subject to wildfire.” While acknowledging the FEIR’s wildfire prevention plan (Wildfire Plan) may reduce Impact 3.16-2, Petitioners criticized the FEIR for failing to disclose “the Project’s potential to increase wildfire ignitions as compared to existing conditions on the Project site,” particularly “ ‘how adding new residents will affect the potential for wildfires to start.’ ”
Petitioners also argued the FEIR’s analysis of the project’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions failed to correct deficiencies identified in comments to the DEIR. They applauded the inclusion “for the first time in the FEIR an administrative draft Transportation Demand Management plan” but nonetheless argued it fell short of CEQA’s standards for mitigation measures and was improperly deferred. Petitioners also urged the County to “consider the use of legally adequate carbon offset program to offset the Project’s unmitigated GHG emissions.”
4 Beyond addressing their complaints in a revised FEIR, Petitioners requested that the County recirculate it.

At Lotusland’s request, the Board continued its hearing. The County then published an errata to the FEIR and a supplemental report addressing the latest public comments. The errata acknowledges that “[d]evelopment of the Guenoc Valley Site would introduce additional wildfire risk factors as compared to existing conditions,” including by an “increase in vehicular traffic” and an “increase [in] the number of inhabitants . . . thereby increasing the risk of wildfire due to human-caused ignitions.” It also explains that the Wildfire Plan is a project commitment and “would ensure that features are incorporated into the [project] such that wildfire risks are not exacerbated.” But the errata does not purport to amend the Wildfire Plan, which was last edited on June 1, 2020. However, certain fire prevention design features are included in the FEIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan, and the errata states the Wildfire Plan is “a component of the Proposed Project.”2
This did not, however, assuage Petitioners’ or the Attorney General’s concerns. Regarding the increased wildfire risk, for example, the Attorney General noted the errata “fails to provide the required Project-specific 2 On July 17, 2020, Lotusland’s attorney sent the County a letter (Philippakis Letter) addressing several of the comment letters’ concerns. The Philippakis Letter explained that, because Lotusland “voluntarily offered at the outset to mitigate any risks of wildfire it had identified,” the FEIR’s “analysis largely analyzed the voluntary design features” instead of “identifying risks that need to be mitigated.” Although it conceded that “humans are the main cause of fire ignitions,” the letter claimed the “[p]roject design features make the risks . . . inapplicable.” But due to concerns raised by the Attorney General that the Wildfire Plan’s “measures were discretionary,” the letter assured the County that it could enforce the commitments incorporated into the Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan.
5 analysis of increased wildfire risk” as opposed to a “general summary of wildfire research on the effects of new development on wildfires.” Accordingly, the Attorney General and Petitioners sought further revisions to the FEIR and “sufficient time . . . to review and understand the wildfire risks associated with the Project.”
The County did not further revise the FEIR or recirculate it after releasing the errata. Instead, on July 21, 2020 — less than a week after publishing the errata — the Board held its hearing as scheduled, at which it certified the FEIR, approved the project, and adopted the County’s Findings and Facts in Support of Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations (Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations).

Petitioners filed writ petitions alleging the project’s approval violated CEQA.3 The petitions allege that the FEIR fails to properly disclose, analyze, or mitigate the project’s wildfire and community safety impacts, greenhouse gas emissions, offsite water use, and alternatives to the project.

The trial court ruled that the FEIR violates CEQA by failing to consider the project’s impact on the community’s ability to evacuate from a wildfire. But it rejected Petitioners’ other contentions. The court entered final judgment and issued a writ directing the County to set aside the project approvals, vacate the associated findings, and de-certify the FEIR.

Petitioners appealed.4
3 The People, represented by the Attorney General’s Office, successfully moved to intervene in the action filed by the Center for Biological Diversity.

The People’s petition raised substantially similar issues. Months later, the trial court ordered the Petitioners’ actions consolidated. 4 The Attorney General filed a notice of appeal before reaching a settlement with Lotusland, and the appeal was dismissed. It is unclear from the briefing and the materials submitted why the AG voluntarily had its appeal dismissed.
6 DISCUSSION
I. CEQA
The Legislature has declared that it is the policy of the state that the procedures required by CEQA “are intended to assist public agencies in systematically identifying both the significant effects of proposed projects and the feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures which will avoid or substantially lessen such significant effects.” (§ 21002.) In an effort to achieve these goals, CEQA requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIR), the purpose of which “is to identify the significant effects on the environment of a project, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate the manner in which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.” (§ 21002.1.)
The EIR should include, among other things, a detailed statement setting forth “[a]ll significant effects on the environment of the proposed project” and “[m]itigation measures proposed to minimize significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21100, subd. (b)(1); see also Guidelines, § 15126 [“Significant Environmental Effects of the Proposed Project” and “The Mitigation Measures Proposed to Minimize the Significant Effects” shall be discussed “preferably in separate sections or paragraphs of the EIR”].) “For each significant effect, the EIR must identify specific mitigation measures; where several potential mitigation measures are available, each should be discussed separately, and the reasons for choosing one over the others should be stated.” (Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 (Sacramento Old City Assn.).) If the EIR identifies significant environmental effects, the public agency may approve the project only if it makes one or more of the following findings:
“(a) . . . [¶] (1) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated 7 into, the project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment . . . . [¶] (3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological or other considerations . . . make infeasible the mitigation measures or [project] alternatives identified in the environmental impact report.” (§ 21081; see also Sacramento Old City Assn., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1034.) These findings must be made for each identified significant effect “accompanied by a brief explanation of the rationale for each finding.” (Guidelines, § 15091.) However, “in the event specific economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible such project alternatives or such mitigation measures, individual projects may be approved in spite of one or more significant effects thereof.” (§ 21002.)
II. Mandamus Standard of Review
As in other mandamus cases, we review the “agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.” (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 427 (Vineyard).) In reviewing an agency’s compliance with CEQA, we review the administrative record for prejudicial abuse of discretion. (§ 21168.5.) Such abuse occurs “if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.; Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 426.)
We approach procedural and factual issues under two different standards of review. (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 512 (Sierra Club).) “[W]e determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements,’ ” but “we accord greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions.” (Ibid.) Mixed questions of law and 8 fact are “generally subject to independent review,” but a more deferential standard may be warranted in circumstances where factual questions predominate. (Id., at p. 516.)
“Substantial evidence shall include facts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts.” (§ 21082.2, subd. (c); Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a) [“substantial evidence” is “enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached”].) “In determining whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court may not reconsider or reevaluate the evidence presented to the administrative agency. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.) All conflicts in the evidence and any reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the agency’s findings and decision.” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1177.) III. Substantial Evidence Shows Wildfire Plan and Biological Resources Analyses Are Reconcilable
We first address Petitioners’ contention that the FEIR fails to reconcile its Wildfire Plan and its protection for biological resources. We reject the argument.
5 The Wildfire Plan includes animal grazing and manual vegetation removal. It provides a map showing where “grazing and manual vegetation removal” will occur. Studies also located all special status plants observed across approximately 11,550 acres — about half of the total project 5 We observe that Petitioners bore their burden of showing this specific issue was raised by the Attorney General and thus exhausted the administrative remedies on this issue. (§ 21177, subd. (a); Maintain Our Desert Environment v. Town of Apple Valley (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 430, 439.)
9 site — and estimated the protected species’ total acreage territory and number of individuals.

Based on this information, the FEIR concludes that “[g]iven the scattered distribution of special-status plants on the [project] Site, and the existing and ongoing grazing activities, inclusion of grazing activities for the use of vegetative fuel reduction to reduce fire hazard would not result in longterm adverse impacts to special-status plants. This impact is therefore considered less than significant.” Given the extensive studies and evidence supporting the County’s conclusion, we do not reconsider it. (Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 207, 216.)
Petitioners’ reliance on San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 655, in which the challenged EIR disclosed an increase in mining production that was “entirely inconsistent with the assurances elsewhere that there would be no increase in production” is unavailing. The County’s mitigation measure to counter the impacts of vegetation clearing (MM 3.4-18) is not incompatible with the Wildfire Plan.

As the FEIR explains, most sensitive habitats do not require any vegetation removal under the Wildfire Plan. Where that is not the case, MM 3.4-18 manages, and in some cases bars, the use of heavier equipment and grazing to clear vegetation. There is no irreconcilable inconsistency undermining the FEIR as an information document. (Cf. San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, at pp. 654–657.)
IV. FEIR Did Not Adequately Analyze Wildfire Risk
While we do not pass upon the correctness of the FEIR’s determination that the project’s purported design features sufficiently alleviate the potential impact of human-caused wildfires, the FEIR fails to sufficiently inform the 10 public of this risk. (See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (Laurel Heights).) Specifically, the errata’s belated mention of the project’s potential to increase wildfire risks does not adequately disclose the increased risks relative to the baseline existing conditions.

A. Governing Standards
An EIR is “ ‘an informational document’ ” central to “CEQA’s fundamental goal that the public be fully informed as to the environmental consequences of action by their public officials.” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 391, 404.) Consequently, an EIR “shall” set forth “[a]ll significant effects on the environment of the proposed project” and “[m]itigation measures proposed to minimize significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21100, subd. (b).)6 “[S]ignificant effect” is defined as “a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment.” (§§ 21100, subd. (d), 21068.) CEQA requires these analyses to be distinct. (§ 21100, subd. (b); see also Sacramento Old City Assn., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1027.) “ ‘To facilitate CEQA’s informational role, the EIR must contain facts and analysis, not just the agency’s bare conclusions or opinions.’ ” (Laurel Heights, at p. 404.) In short, “there must be a disclosure of the ‘analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.’ ” 6 Mitigation measures are “feasible changes in any or all activities involved in the project in order to substantially lessen or avoid significant effects on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15041, subd. (a).) The Guidelines define “mitigation” to include “avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action,” “[m]inimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action,” “[r]ectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the impacted environment,” “[r]educing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations,” and “[c]ompensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources.” (Guidelines, § 15370, subds. (a)–(e).)
11 (Ibid.)
An agency’s inadequate or conclusory discussion of a potentially substantial adverse change in the environment deprives the public of information necessary for informed self-government and constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 512–514; § 21168.5.) On review, we defer to the agency’s factual finding, including which methodologies best identify and analyze significant environmental impacts. (Sierra Club, at p. 516.) But we independently review “whether the EIR includes enough detail ‘ “ ‘to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
B. FEIR Insufficiently Disclosed Project’s Potential Adverse Effects of Increased Wildfire Risks
The errata to the FEIR discloses, under Impact 3.16-2 regarding exacerbating wildfire risks, that “[d]evelopment of the [project site] would introduce additional wildfire risk factors as compared to existing conditions.” Specifically, the errata outlines — in a single paragraph — that increased human habitation in a wildlife-urban interface increases the fire risk from “arson, children playing with fire, and debris-burning”; that increased vehicular traffic increases fire risk from “sparks, catalytic converters, and discarding of cigarettes”; and that “[t]he introduction of residences within the site would create a wildland-urban interface” that increases the general potential for human-ignited wildfires. These factors, it explains, “expose project occupants to pollutant concentrations from wildfire or the uncontrolled spread of wildfire.” The errata further states that “wildfires tend to cause more damage” to low density developments. And the County’s staff report, released following the errata’s publication, states “[t]he Final EIR acknowledges that wildfire risk from development of the Proposed 12 Project would be potentially significant” and “would result in impacts associated with increased risk of wildfire ignition.”
The need for the FEIR’s disclosure of the potentially substantial adverse risk of human-caused wildfire is uncontroversial given the context. (See League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 136 [“Developing new homes and stores in a very high fire hazard area risks exacerbating the hazard . . . .”]; California Building Industry Assoc. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 385 [“EIR should evaluate any potentially significant impacts of locating development in other areas susceptible to hazardous conditions (e.g., . . . , wildfire risk areas)”]; see Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a).)7 Initially, the errata’s information came too late. (Sierra Watch v.

County of Placer (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 103 (Sierra Watch).) “CEQA requires agencies to discuss a project’s potentially significant impacts in the draft EIR and final EIR. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15120, subd. (c); see also id., §§ 15125, 15126.2.)” (Ibid.) And an agency cannot “make up for the lack of analysis in the EIR” through post-EIR analysis. (Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 131 (Save Our Peninsula Committee) [errata not “subjected to the same ‘ “critical evaluation that occurs in the draft stage” ’ ”].) Otherwise, the public would be denied the “ ‘ opportunity to test, assess, and evaluate the [newly revealed information] and make an informed judgment as to the validity of 7 We note that disclosures in the County’s initial study — which promises “[p]otential impacts related to wildfire will be addressed in the Wildfire section of the EIR” — does not suffice. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 520 [“The relevant informational document here is the EIR”].) Moreover, in tension with the errata, the revised FEIR still asserts that “the prospect of growth, by itself, does not create an adverse effect on the environment.”
13 the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. ’ ” (Id., at p. 131.) The same holds true for the letter from Lotusland’s attorney, Katherine Philippakis, presented to the public the day before the Board hearing to approve the Project, and her oral testimony at the hearing in support of the Project.

Neither the letter nor the testimony was made part of the FEIR, and therefore, cannot be said to have remedied the FEIR’s insufficiencies. (See Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 88 (Communities) ([rejecting project proponent’s postEIR expert letter as “too little, and certainly too late, to satisfy CEQA’s requirements” because “[i]t is the adequacy of the EIR with which [courts] are concerned, not the propriety of the subsequent decision to approve the Project”].)
It is fundamental to the purpose of CEQA that the public obtain a full understanding of the environmental impacts of a project from a single source relevant informational document — that being the EIR. (Cf. Guidelines § 15150, subd. (b) [“Where part of another document is incorporated by reference, such other document shall be made available to the public for inspection”]; Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 520 [“The relevant informational document here is the EIR”].) This allows for easy access to the relevant information and direct accountability for the agency when dealing with large volumes of documents and material. Material not contained in the EIR cannot be expected to be considered; and therefore, cannot be relied upon to support an adequate EIR. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 405 [“ ‘ “Whatever is required to be considered in an EIR must be in that formal report; what any official might have known from other writings or oral presentations cannot supply what is lacking in the report” ’ ”].) This also 14 ensures the public is fully informed of the environmental risks posed by the proposed project.

The FEIR in this case did not contain the information in the errata nor the Philippakis letter or Board presentation, as such, it came too late and may not be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of the FEIR.

Moreover, even if its discussion of the project’s potentially significant impacts on wildfire risks did not come too late, the errata’s passing disclosure is insufficient to comply with CEQA. “[T]he adequacy of an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts is an issue distinct from the extent to which the agency is correct in its determination whether the impacts are significant.” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 514; cf. Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 403–404 [“Even if the Regents are correct in their conclusion that there are no feasible alternatives . . . , the EIR is nonetheless defective” because the “treatment of alternatives was cursory at best”].) An EIR’s analysis must “provide decisionmakers with information which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of environmental consequences.” (Guidelines, § 15151.) The instant FEIR does not perform this function.

Specifically, the FEIR fails to reasonably describe the “additional wildfire risk factors as compared to existing conditions” that the project would “introduce” to the area. Instead, the errata points to several sources of “human-caused ignitions” — i.e., arson, debris-burning, vehicle sparks, and discarding of cigarettes — and then cites a general study finding that “increased fire education, a decline in smoking, and modern vehicles . . . have reduced the impacts of anthropogenic causes of wildfire ignitions [other than by powerlines] in recent times.” It concerns us that the County did not appear to “use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can” about the project’s impact on these risk factors. (Guidelines, § 15144.) 15 The errata in no way explains the extent to which bringing in over 4,000 new residents to the largely undeveloped project site increases the risk of human-caused wildfire over the existing baseline risk. For example, given the general decline in human-caused wildfires, how many such ignitions occur per 1,000 people in a wildland-urban interface, and how much has that rate reduced as wildfire safety and education has increased? And how many wildfires ignite per 1,000,000 miles driven by vehicles with and by vehicles without catalytic converters, and how has the mix of vehicles on public roads affected those statistics over time?8
The current discussion prevents decision-making and the public from adequately evaluating the merits of the Wildfire Plan. (Guidelines, § 15151; Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 514 [“adequate description of adverse environmental effects is necessary to inform the critical discussion of mitigation measures and project alternatives”].) Despite imposing no revisions to the Wildfire Plan, the errata affirms the FEIR’s original conclusion that the project “would not exacerbate the risk of wildfire from existing levels with implementation of the Wildfire Prevention Plan.” As the FEIR currently stands, there is no way to connect the dots between the “additional wildfire risk factors,” which the errata concedes exist, and the Wildfire Plan’s prevention strategies, which the errata does not update. 8 Of course, we do not require that these specific questions be answered in the FEIR. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515 [“agency has considerable discretion to decide the manner of the discussion of potentially significant effects in an EIR”].) Nor must the risk be quantified if that is not possible. (Id., at p. 520 [“if it is not scientifically possible to do more than has already been done to connect air quality effects with potential human health impacts, the EIR itself must explain why, in a manner reasonably calculated to inform the public of the scope of what is and is not yet known about the Project’s impacts”].) But an EIR cannot give a mere cursory mention of potential significant impacts as the FEIR does here.
16 The errata contains a single sentence of such analysis, asserting that the Wildfire Plan’s requirement of fire breaks will “reduce the risk of wildfire ignition from sparks or discarded cigarettes along project roadways.” It vaguely points to the Wildfire Plan and a general decline in human-caused wildfire ignitions as support for its conclusion that the project does not exacerbate the risk of wildfire. While the Wildfire Plan comprehensively analyzes the project site’s current wildfire risk, it does not expound on the anthropogenic risks that the errata admits development at the project site will “introduce.” No component of the FEIR, therefore, discusses this aspect of the project in detail sufficient to enable the public to discern “the ‘analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.’ ” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 404.)
The County counters that there is no need to separately discuss the project’s potential adverse effects on increased wildfire risks because the Wildfire Plan’s “design features” are a “central part of the [p]roject” — not mitigation measures — that reduce Impact 3.16-2 to “less than significant.” But even if the Wildfire Plan’s prevention strategies are properly characterized as part of the project, the FEIR still violates CEQA.9 The dispositive issue is whether the FEIR “obfuscates required disclosure of the 9 Certainly, aspects of the Wildfire Plan — such as undergrounding power lines — reflect design choices. (E.g., Lotus v. Department of Transportation (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 645, 656, fn. 8 (Lotus) [“composition of paving” plausibly part of design].) But we observe that other components of the Wildfire Plan, such as animal grazing, “[p]running tree limbs,” and “remov[ing] vegetation debris that accumulates on [rooves],” are more naturally understood as “maintenance operations” aimed at “[r]educing . . . impacts” of a project introducing people to undeveloped, fire-prone areas. (See Guidelines, § 15370, subd. (d).) We are not persuaded that making it a project objective to be a “ ‘ “model project” of wildfire mitigation’ ” converts such measures into project design features.
17 project’s environmental impacts and analysis of potential mitigation measures.” (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 185 (Mission Bay); cf. Save Our Peninsula Committee, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 130 [finding information regarding mitigation measure disclosed in errata “does not make up for the lack of analysis in the EIR”].) It plainly does.

Mission Bay is an instructive contrast. There, a construction project was defined to include a transportation management plan, which in turn incorporated a special event transit service plan (Muni TSP). (Mission Bay, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 179–180.) The court determined the EIR was adequate because it analyzed the project’s environmental impacts on vehicle traffic and transit “both with and without implementation of the Muni TSP and applie[d] the same threshold standards to determine the significance of those impacts.” (Id., at p. 185.) Thus, “the environmental impacts of the project on vehicle traffic and transit [were] fully disclosed in the FSEIR.” (Ibid.) That is not so here, where the County admits that no similar analysis occurred with and without the Wildfire Plan because the project as proposed is “the only one that Lotusland seeks to build.”
Again, we do not prescribe the appropriate manner of discussing the project’s potentially significant effects. We do not hold that the County must analyze the project’s environmental impacts on wildfire ignitions with and without the Wildfire Plan. The County retains discretion in choosing the methodologies employed for analyzing environmental impacts and mitigation measures. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 516, 521.) But the FEIR must sufficiently discuss the project’s potential adverse effect of human-cause ignitions and analyze in some detail how the project’s design (or mitigation measures) alleviates such risks. It is not sufficient to cite a scientific study 18 unrelated to the project and summarily state that “increased fire education, a decline in smoking, and modern vehicles . . . have reduced the impacts of anthropogenic causes of wildfire ignitions.” That may be true, but it does not inform the public how this evidence led the County to conclude that the Wildfire Plan eliminates those otherwise reduced — but still present — risks. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.) Such a discussion is critical to the public’s understanding of the efficaciousness of the Wildfire Plan. 10 Here,
the County presents no industry standard modeling tools, no methodology or analysis for its conclusory findings, nor any other discussion of how the Wildfire Plan proposes to address the existing baseline conditions other than the Project design proposal itself. This is insufficient. Failure to separately identify and analyze the significant impacts of the fire risk to the Project area and its baseline existing conditions before proposing mitigation measures violates CEQA. (Lotus, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–658.) Because the FEIR must be revised to provide critical information about the increased risk of wildfire ignitions, Petitioners’ claim that the County erred by refusing to recirculate the FEIR in light of the errata’s “ ‘significant new information’ ” is undeniably moot. (See § 21092.1; see also Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(1).)” (Communities, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) “Because the EIR is invalid in part, a new EIR must be prepared, submitted for public review and comment, and certified in accord with CEQA procedures.” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 391, 404.) 10 Given the FEIR’s failure to identify or describe with any particularity the project’s potential to increase wildfire ignitions, we do not resolve whether the FEIR’s mitigation of the project’s wildfire impacts is deficient. 19 V. FEIR’s Inclusion of Carbon Credit Program Does Not Violate CEQA
Petitioners challenge the FEIR’s inclusion of a carbon credit program to mitigate the project’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on the grounds that it is ineffective, improperly deferred, and unenforceable. We find their position meritless.

An EIR must discuss and adopt “feasible” mitigation measures that alleviate significant adverse impacts. (§ 21002; Guidelines, § 15126.4.) A mitigation measure is feasible if it is “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.” (§ 21061.1.) Whether a measure is feasible is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence. (Cherry Valley Pass Acres & Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 316, 350). Infeasible measures need not be analyzed “in any detail.” (Ibid.)
In reaction to the FEIR’s conclusion that the project’s impact due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would be significant even after adopting feasible mitigation measures,
11 Petitioners’ comment letter urged the County
to “consider the use of a legally adequate carbon offset program.” But as a memorandum detailing the County’s responses to public comments explains, carbon offset credits “cannot be considered feasible” as a mitigation measure because “there is a limited supply of verifiable, reliable, real carbon offsets,” 11 The FEIR evaluates and adopts several measures to mitigate the project’s significant impact on the direct and indirect generation of GHG emissions. These include using energy efficient technology, net zero energy buildings, and renewable energy (MM 3.7-1); implementing a transportation demand management plan (MM 3.13-4 incorporated through MM 3.7-1); utilizing less polluting engines during construction (MM 3.3-1 incorporated through MM 3.7-2); and conserving oak woodland habitat and replanting oak trees (MM 3.4-16).
20 and “no way to sure that adequate offset credits will be available” at the time that Lotusland would need to purchase them.

Nonetheless, the errata adds a condition to the FEIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan requiring Lotusland to “purchase [14,865] GHG emissions credits from a [California Air Resources Board] approved registry source or project to offset the difference between the mitigated project emissions and the [relevant significance] thresholds.” Meanwhile, the County’s Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations restates that “[s]pecific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations make infeasible additional mitigation measures or project alternatives identified in the Final EIR [regarding GHG emissions].”
Petitioners do not challenge the County’s infeasibility finding. Rather, they argue that, by virtue of being in the FEIR, the carbon credit program must meet CEQA’s standards for feasible mitigation measures. Indeed, Petitioners suggest that the County would have avoided any alleged defect by simply rejecting the program from the FEIR altogether.

But Petitioners cite no authority for the contention that CEQA bars considering potentially beneficial measures that agencies deem too uncertain to be feasible. (Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 456, 204 [arguments unsupported by legal authority or cogent analysis are forfeited].) And, contrary to Petitioners’ contention, the program was not relied upon to eliminate the project’s impacts. At the July 21, 2020 Board hearing, it was explained that the carbon credit program’s addition would not avert the project’s significant and unavoidable impact from GHG emissions “given the limited supply of carbon offsets and the uncertainty regarding the availability of offset credits throughout the life of the project.” The errata does not state otherwise; it merely explains the 21 amount of carbon credits Lotusland would seek to purchase is the “difference between the total project emissions and the [state recognized 2030 service population] thresholds.” Petitioners’ reliance on Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 485 for the proposition that mitigation measures for GHG emissions must ensure that carbon credits are “ ‘real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable’ ” is therefore inapposite.

Moreover, Petitioners do not contend the carbon credit program will impose any adverse impacts. Thus, to the extent the addition of this program to the FEIR did not comply with CEQA, we find it does not constitute prejudicial error because its inclusion did not “deprive[] the public and decision makers of substantial relevant information about the Project’s likely adverse impacts.” (Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 463.)
VI. Transportation Demand Management Plan Not Improperly Deferred
We reject Petitioners’ arguments that proposed mitigation measure

3.13-4 — implementing a Transportation Demand Management (TDM) — is improperly deferred and inadequate.

An EIR cannot put off formulating mitigation measures (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B)), but it need not be exhaustive. (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 696.) A measure’s specific details “ ‘may be developed after project approval when it is impractical or infeasible to include those details during the project’s environmental review’ provided that the agency” “ ‘(1) commits itself to the mitigation, (2) adopts specific performance standards the mitigation will achieve, and (3) identifies the type(s) of potential action(s) that can feasibly achieve that performance standard and 22 that will [be] considered, analyzed, and potentially incorporated in the mitigation measure.’ ” (East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1254–1255; Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) We “ ‘scrupulously enforc[e]’ ” these legislatively mandated CEQA requirements and determine de novo whether they have been followed. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512.)
There was no impermissible deferral here because the TDM satisfies all three requirements. We first observe the reasonable rationale for deferring the details for mitigating the project’s impact as measured by vehicle miles traveled (VMT). While the County accepted the State recommended significance threshold for VMT, the FEIR notes that a “limitation of VMT measurements is the inability to easily observe or measure them” requiring that they be estimated based on the number of vehicles observed multiplied by a probabilistic average of the distances traveled.
12 VMT is not static or
even stable over time; this inherently limits the specificity of a plan to reduce VMT. (Cf. Guidelines, § 15146 [“The degree of specificity required in an EIR will correspond to the degree of specificity involved in the underlying activity which is described”].) Thus, it is “readily apparent” why specifying the TDM’s details was “impractical or infeasible at the time the [F]EIR was certified.” (Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 281.)
The County then met the necessary conditions for deferring a mitigation measure’s minutiae. First, the FEIR commits the County and 12 Nonetheless, based on such estimations, the FEIR does not mask the project’s significant and unavoidable impact on VMT “due to the rural nature of the project setting and associated longer distances required for travel.” For this reason, the County adopted a statement of overriding considerations with respect to this impact. And it devised the TDM with VMT-reducing strategies that may be revised or augmented based on their performance. 23 Lotusland to the TDM. The FEIR provides that Lotusland “shall develop and submit to the County a final Transportation Demand Management Program” for the project “[p]rior to issuance of occupancy permits for Phase 1 . . . .” Second, the FEIR adopts a specific performance standard that the TDM must achieve. It specifies the TDM’s goal “shall be” reducing the project’s expected VMT by 15 percent, which the TDM restates as its “minimum reduction goal.” This is sufficiently concrete. (City of Hayward v. Trustees of California State University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 855 (City of Hayward) [“The Master Plan goal to reduce drive alone vehicle trips is the performance standard that the TDM plan will strive to meet”].) Third, the TDM identifies nearly a dozen strategies that can feasibly achieve that goal because they are “expected to collectively reduce vehicle trips by 3 to 20 percent.” One, for example, includes public and private shuttle services, the latter of which is “expected to accommodate approximately 40 [percent] of resort patrons,” and which together, along with a “dial-a-ride” service, are expected to reduce the project’s VMT by 2–10 percent.

The TDM further requires the post-implementation efficaciousness of the strategies to be analyzed. Specifically, it requires a coordinator to “monitor daily one-way vehicle trips” and “compare these vehicle trips to the aggregate daily one-way vehicle trips anticipated based on the trip generation rates contained within the Project’s DEIR.” If the results reveal the TDM’s measures “are not achieving the reduction goal” then Lotusland “shall adjust the TDM plan . . . in consultation with County staff.” This requirement is also enshrined in the FEIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan. This satisfies CEQA. (See City of Hayward, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 [“The monitoring program which is an integral part 24 of the plan ensures that the public will have access to the information necessary to evaluate compliance . . . .”].)
Petitioners’ related charge that there is no evidence of the enumerated strategies’ effectiveness is a factual inquiry we review for substantial evidence. (Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1114.) Here, “[t]he estimated trip reductions associated with the TDM strategies are based on research compiled” by the California Air Pollution Control Officers Association and reflect the County’s expert’s conclusions based on that report’s trip reduction methodology. This is enough, “even though other conclusions might also be reached.” (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a); see also South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 339.) Accordingly, we conclude that the FEIR does not improperly defer or inadequately analyze mitigation of VMT impacts.

VII. FEIR Adequately Discloses Potential Impact of Off-Site Well The project devises two separate water systems. Potable water would be supplied through on-site groundwater supply wells, and non-potable water “would be supplied by a combination of surface water from the on-site reservoirs, recycled from the on-site water recycling plants, and groundwater supply wells.” While the FEIR anticipates on-site water supplies would adequately supply the project’s non-potable water demands, it also identifies an off-site well that “may be developed” to provide a supplemental nonpotable water supply “if required.” Because the well’s potential use is contingent on an unanticipated shortfall and because the aquifer it draws from is ill-defined, the County concluded the well would have a “potentially significant impact.” Petitioners argue the County erred by “omit[ting]” disclosure of the project’s potential use of the off-site well and for “mak[ing] 25 no effort to quantify the amount of groundwater the Project will draw” from that source. We disagree.

While an EIR “necessarily involves some degree of forecasting” that requires an agency to “use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can” (Guidelines, § 15144), “the sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible” (Guidelines, § 15151), and an agency may “terminate discussion of [an] impact” if its investigation “finds that [it] is too speculative for evaluation.” (Guidelines, § 15145.) Thus, rather than speculate about project impacts, the agency “may discuss potential project impacts at a ‘level of specificity . . . determined by the nature of the project and the rule of reason.’ ” (Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105; see Guidelines, § 15146.) Whether further disclosure and analysis by an EIR is reasonably feasible “presents a mixed question of law and fact, which usually is subject to independent review and is subject to substantial evidence review only when questions of fact predominate.” (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, 843 (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC).)
As discussed below, disclosure and analysis of the well’s potential environmental impacts turn on the foreseeability of the well’s actual use and the water source from which it draws. We find these factual questions predominate the inquiries, and therefore review for substantial evidence. (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 843–844.) Here, the FEIR discloses that non-potable water would be supplied by onsite reservoirs, onsite recycled wastewater, and groundwater wells. Those groundwater wells would consist of existing onsite irrigation wells and “[i]f necessary, an off-site high production well . . . .” Based on these supplies, the FEIR determines “availability of water supplies [even] during dry water 26 years is projected to exceed projected water demands.” Moreover, given “current groundwater and surface water supplies” — which does not include the undeveloped offsite well — the non-potable water supply would exceed demand during a “critical dry year” by thousands of acre feet. And during normal water years, the water supply from surface water entitlements (e.g., onsite reservoirs) and recycled water exceed projected water demands without any groundwater from any source.

Nonetheless, the County evaluated the potential offsite well’s production capacity and the underlying groundwater basin. The FEIR explains that “[p]ump test results indicate that the existing well has a high production capacity measured at 1,100” gallons per minute. Because of the existing well’s “marginal” condition, a new well would need to be constructed that would “yield high flows over 1,000” gallons per minute. Use of the offsite “well has the potential to draw down the Collayomi Valley Groundwater Basin,” but the County’s investigation into “regional studies and local well data” reveals that “the nature and extent of the aquifer that would be utilized is not well defined.” This is because it is not “a uniform alluvium aquifer” but “a series of layers and lenses of permeable or semi-permeable materials that are partially interconnected (Wagner and Bonsignore, 2019).” Accordingly, “the amount of water that could be withdrawn without substantially decreasing groundwater supplies has not been determined.” Petitioners do not challenge these findings, nor can they given the substantial evidence supporting them. Rather, they fault the County for “mak[ing] no effort to quantify the amount of groundwater the Project will draw from offsite.”
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. The County unambiguously explains that the well would only be used “[i]f necessary,” which it cannot 27 reasonably forecast given its uncontested finding that the well’s use is contingent on extreme circumstances that would not arise under the County’s most conservative model of water supplies during “critical dry years.” (See Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105 [“EIR was not required to supply speculative estimates” of construction’s duration].) Petitioners point to language in the FEIR stating the offsite well would “be used as a primary source of non-potable water” but fail to emphasize that sentence concludes with the caveat “if required,” which the record reveals is exceedingly unlikely.

For this reason, Petitioners’ reliance on Santiago County Water Dist. v.

County of Orange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818, 829–830, where the EIR failed to evaluate the impact of supplying 12,000 to 15,000 gallons of water per day that “[t]he EIR disclose[d] . . . will be consumed,” is unavailing. We therefore find the FEIR was “prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis” and specificity under the rule of reason regarding the amount of water the offsite well would draw. (Guidelines, §§ 15151, 15146.)
We are also unpersuaded that the County should be reasonably expected to disclose more information regarding the well’s potential impact on the underlying aqueduct or Middletown’s water supply. The County relies on sufficient evidence in support of its finding that the ill-defined nature of the aqueduct precluded a conclusive evaluation of the well’s impacts on the aquifer. Coupled with the unlikely and uncertain use of the offsite well, the FEIR’s limited discussion of the off-site well’s potential impact is reasonable.
13 (Guidelines, §§ 15145, 15146; see also Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105.)
13 These same circumstances justify the deferred nature of Mitigation Measure 3.9-3, which imposes “safe yield analysis and monitoring” of the offsite well. (See Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); see also Section VI, 28 VIII. FEIR Properly Rejected Alternative C
Petitioners contend the FEIR rejected a less environmentally impactful alternative — Alternative C — as infeasible without the properly supported findings that CEQA requires. We are unpersuaded.

As our Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘[o]ne of [an EIR’s] major functions . . . is to ensure that all reasonable alternatives to proposed projects are thoroughly assessed.’ ” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 565, italics omitted.) This assessment is critical because “agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives . . . available which would substantially lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects.” (§ 21002.) Thus, an EIR must “describe a range of reasonable alternatives” that “would feasibly attain most of the basic objectives of the project but would avoid or substantially lessen any of the significant effects of the project.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a); Citizens of Goleta Valley, at p. 566; Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 400.)
Once such alternatives are identified, however, the agency has discretion to reject them if the agency “make[s] one or more of the findings required by section 21081.” (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California ante, p. 21.) The FEIR commits itself to the measure, adopts specific performance criteria for a safe yield — i.e., “avoid drawdown of groundwater beyond 300 feet of the well” — and identifies actions to achieve this — i.e., “incorporate[ing] pump testing,” identifying monitoring wells, limiting pumping rates and durations based on hydraulic analysis, “submit[ting] annual monitoring reports” on quarterly groundwater pumping and groundwater level data, and requiring the analysis to be “certified by a Registered Professional Engineer or Registered Geologist.” This is sufficient. (See Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); see also East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1254–1255; Section IV, ante, p. 9.)
29 State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 350; see § 21002 [“in the event specific economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible such project alternatives . . . , individual projects may be approved in spite of one or more significant effects thereof”]; § 21002.1, subd. (c) [similar].)
Pursuant to paragraph (3) of that provision, an agency may reject an alternative after finding it is infeasible. (§ 21081, subd. (a)(3).) Specifically, the agency may determine that “[s]pecific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations, including considerations for the provision of employment opportunities for highly trained workers, make infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified in the environmental impact report.” (Ibid.) And if the agency makes such an infeasibility finding, then it must also “find[] that specific overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the project outweigh the significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21081, subd. (b); Preservation Action Council v. City of San Jose (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1353 (Preservation Action Council).)
Notably, an agency does not abuse its discretion by rejecting alternatives as “infeasible” based on “policy considerations” or project objectives. (E.g., California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 1001 (California Native Plant) [“an alternative ‘may be found infeasible on the ground it is inconsistent with the project objectives as long as the finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record’ ”]; Planning and Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 892, 918 [alternatives must be evaluated “in relation to the objectives of the project”]; City of Del Mar v. City of San Diego (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 401, 417 [alternative “reasonably rejected . . . in view of the social and economic realities”].) Moreover, a reasonable reading of a project’s 30 “ ‘fundamental purpose’ ” in light of its listed objectives may defeat a proposed alternative’s feasibility. (Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC v. Regents of University of California (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 779, 798 (Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC); In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1165.) An agency’s findings are presumed correct, and the burden is on the party seeking mandamus to prove otherwise. (California Native Plant, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) Thus, we review the County’s finding that Alternative C would be infeasible for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
The instant FEIR explains the project was designed “to align with the objectives of the Middletown Area Plan Special Study Area, and existing County planning documents.” Those plans “identif[y] the need to develop more tourist destinations” and “encourage development of resorts with more commercial uses than residential.” The FEIR then sets forth the project’s specific development and economic objectives. Relevant here, these objectives include: (1) “Develop a luxury international destination resort that generates financial profits for the investor”; (2) “Meet Middletown Area Plan objectives by incorporating smart growth principles and low density development strategies while providing high end luxury accommodations and services”; (3) “Propose a mix of resort, agriculture, and residential uses consistent with the Lake County General Plan policies, Zoning regulations, Middletown Area Plan, and economic development goals and policies”; (4) “Plan for long term growth of the County with a significant fiscal contribution toward the County’s community goals of new economic, employment, and housing opportunities.”
After briefly discussing alternatives eliminated from consideration, the FEIR evaluated three potentially feasible alternatives to the project: no 31 project; a reduced density, similar development footprint; and a high density, compact development footprint (Alternative C). Under Alternative C, all 400 hotel units envisioned by the project would be combined into one large hotel, average lot size for the 1400 residential estates and 450 resort residential units would drop from 4.8 acres to 0.8 acres, and many of the resort amenities would be reduced. The FEIR concludes Alternative C would be environmentally superior to the project because it would result in fewer impacts.

But due to the FEIR’s finding that “this alternative would not fully meet objectives related to the development of a luxury destination resort with sufficient amenities to attract a diverse range of guests and residents,” the County concluded in its Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations that Alternative C was infeasible. This was based, in part, on information submitted by Lotusland “indicating that they would expect price reductions for residential lots of at least 35 [percent] if they are unable to offer larger estate lots, and resort amenities, which are in turn supported by the scale of homes and resort units within the community.” Petitioners argue that the FEIR “contained no substantial analysis as to Alternative C’s economic infeasibility.” Moreover, they contend the evidence submitted by Lotusland is too unreliable to constitute substantial evidence supporting the County’s conclusion that Alternative C would reduce the price of residential lots and threaten the “financial feasibility of this alternative.”14
14 This information came in the form of two letters from the founding partner of luxury real estate firm IMI Worldwide Partners that attest to selfreinforcing market forces behind luxury development — i.e., “larger estatesized homesites” with luxury amenities command “luxury prices” which in turn “is critical to support the luxury amenities.” One letter claims 32 Even if we agreed, however, this flaw is not dispositive. (See Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 503, 523 [where an agency cites several independent reasons why an alternative is infeasible, the agency’s determination will be upheld if one reason is supported by substantial evidence].) Citing California Native Plant, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1336, the County’s Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations expressly states “Alternative [C] is overall less capable of achieving the full scope of project objectives.” The County’s finding therefore goes beyond the alternative’s economic feasibility. Indeed, the foremost justification the County states in rejecting Alternative C is that it “is less capable of achieving the full array of project objectives” and “would not meet the objective of achieving a balance in housing densities consistent with a luxury resort.” We find this carries significant weight because the project’s objectives make plain that creating a “luxury” resort defined by low density residences is fundamental to the project’s purpose. (Cf. Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.) The County’s conclusion reflects the FEIR’s evaluation of Alternative C’s inability to satisfy several of the project’s objectives. That Alternative C would cut the average lot sizes from 4.8 acres to 0.8 acres — an 83 percent reduction — and reduce the total number of luxury amenities is uncontested.

The FEIR states the goal of “meet[ing] Middletown Area Plan objectives by incorporating smart growth principles and low-density development strategies” would not be met because the density of Alternative C “would not experience with “similar developments,” but the letters differ without explanation on Alternative C’s impact on revenues. The letters do not discuss costs, profits, or contain facts evaluating the project’s particular circumstances. (See Preservation Action Council, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 [fact showing an alternative is merely less profitable is insufficient to demonstrate it is financially infeasible].)
33 provide as many luxury accommodations.” The FEIR also determines Alternative C would only partially meet the project objective regarding “the County’s community goals of new economic, employment, and housing opportunities” due to Alternative C’s “reduced resort amenities.” And it would only partially meet the objective for “[p]ropos[ing] a mix of resort, agriculture, and residential uses consistent with the Lake County General Plan policies, Zoning regulations, Middletown Area Plan, and economic development goals and policies” because “density would be higher than encouraged under current policies.”15
The FEIR’s analysis that smaller and denser accommodations and reduced amenities would not meet these objectives is reasonable. (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 569; see also § 21082.2, subd. (c) [“reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts” constitutes substantial evidence].) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the County’s discretionary judgment that the alternative would not meet key project objectives.

Petitioners’ other allegation that the FEIR and the County’s findings are contradictory is meritless. It is true that the County’s Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations states Alternative C “only marginally lessens the Proposed Project’s potentially significant and unavoidable impacts,” while the FEIR states that “future phases under Alternative C” would eliminate the potential for significant and unavoidable 15 Another objective that the FEIR claims Alternative C will not meet is “develop[ing] a luxury international destination resort that generates financial profit” because “Alternative C would not provide enough resort amenities or large enough lots . . . .” This argument relies, at least in part, on an argument about financial feasibility, which we do not address. But it also reinforces our view that the fundamental purpose of the project is to build a luxury resort.
34 impacts to scenic vistas.” Petitioners ignore, however, that the FEIR also concludes that Alternative C would still result in “significant and unavoidable aesthetic impacts in Phase 1 due to construction,” and “[a]ll significant and unavoidable impacts related to Important Farmlands, greenhouse gas emissions, noise, and traffic and transportation would still occur.” This is consistent with the County’s finding that Alternative C would only “marginally” reduce impacts compared to the project. Petitioners’ authority, California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 205, where the lead agency made an “unexplained switch from a rationale of economic infeasibility to environmental inferiority as the basis for rejecting” an alternative, is therefore inapposite. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the FEIR’s conclusion to reject Alternative C.

DISPOSITION
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the trial court’s decision that the FEIR adequately disclosed the project’s impact on increasing the area’s existing wildfire risks. Because the FEIR must be revised, Petitioners request that the FEIR be recirculated is moot. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

The cause is remanded to the trial court, which shall issue an order granting the Petitioners’ petition for a writ of mandate vacating the County’s certification of the EIR and approval of the project. (§ 21168.9, subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 21168.9, subdivision (b), the trial court shall retain jurisdiction over this action to ensure compliance with the peremptory writ issued. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.278(a)(3), (5).)
35 HITE, J.*
We concur:

STREETER, Acting P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.

People ex rel. Rob Bonta v. County of Lake (A165677)
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
36 Trial Judge: Hon. J. David Markham
Trial Court: Lake County Superior Court
Attorneys: Peter J. Broderick and Aruna M. Prabhala for Center for Biological Diversity, for Petitioner and Appellant.

Lozeau Drury LLP, Rebecca L. Davis and Brian B. Flynn,
for Petitioner and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Andrew R. Contreiras, Aarti S. Kewalramani, and Nicole U. Rinke, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Petitioner and Appellant.

Anita L. Grant and Nicole Danielle Johnson, County
Counsels, for Defendant and Respondent.

Miller Starr Regalia, Arthur F. Coon and Matthew C.

Henderson, for Defendant and Respondent.

Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass LLP, Jonathan R. Bass,
Charmaine G. Yu, and Sarah E. Peterson, for Real Party in Interest.

Farella Braun & Martel, Katherine Philippakis and Linda Sobczynski, for Real Party in Interest.

From: David Yan
To: City Council
Cc: Public Comments
Subject: Evulich Court -AB 130 Exemption: Fire Authority Signed Off on PRC 4290. Not PRC 4291.

Date: Monday, March 30, 2026 7:16:16 PM
Attachments: PRC 4291_Not Complied With_03.30.2026.pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Please include this email and the attached letter to the public record for the April 1, 2026 City Council meeting - Agenda Item 3 re. 10857 - 10887 Linda Vista Dr City Councilmembers,
AB 130’s CEQA exemption applies in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone only if a project complies with all three required fire hazard mitigation standards: PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Chapter 7A.

The Santa Clara County Fire Department’s signoff is scoped only to an AMMR under PRC 4290.

It does not address PRC 4291, and no other Fire Authority document in the record does either.

The Applicant asserts PRC 4291 compliance, but the record contains no analysis, no findings, and no documentation supporting that assertion. Without evidence in the record demonstrating PRC 4291 compliance, the City cannot make the eligibility finding AB 130 requires.

The attached letter provides the details.

Regards,
David Yan
March 30, 2026
Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, City Councilmembers:

The CEQA exemption under AB130 requires compliance with PRC 4291. The Santa Clara County Fire Authority signed off on PRC 4290. Not 4291. This letter addresses a separate and independent issue from the threshold eligibility argument I submitted on March 21 2026 10:51am PST. Each stands on its own.

AB130 Existing Standards Framework
AB 130's fire hazard mitigation criteria are conjunctive. Government Code Section 65913.4(6)(D) requires compliance with all of the following: PRC 4291, PRC 4290, and Chapter 7A. The statute uses the word "all."
The Conflation Problem
The applicant has treated PRC 4290 setback and PRC 4291 defensible space as the same requirement. They are not.

PRC 4290 governs setback, the distance between structures or property lines. PRC 4291 governs defensible space, the clearance of vegetation around structures. They address different risks.

In plain terms: setback is about how close buildings sit to each other. Defensible space is about whether there is enough cleared vegetation around those buildings for occupants to survive a wildfire.

The David J. Powers AB 130 Qualification Memo, dated February 18, 2026 which is the City’s own qualifying document makes this conflation explicit. On page 12, under Condition 7, their entire fire hazard mitigation showing consists of: Chapter 7A compliance, noncombustible landscaping, fire sprinklers within 30 feet of the property line, enhanced exterior materials, and the AMMR reducing the required 30 foot setback. PRC 4291 is not mentioned once.

Why the Setback Reduction Makes This More Urgent
The AMMR reduced the required setback from 30 feet to 10 feet. PRC 4291 independently requires 100 feet of defensible space clearance around structures. These are not the same measurement addressing the same concern. The setback reduction compressed buildings together. Whether the resulting site configuration of buildings 10 feet apart on a 2.5 acre parcel in a VHFHSZ can support the required defensible space clearance is precisely the analysis that was required before the exemption was granted. A site with buildings separated by 10 feet must still provide up to 100 feet of defensible space around each structure. The record contains no analysis demonstrating that this is physically achievable on a 2.5 acre site. Without that showing, compliance with PRC 4291 is speculative.

What the Record Actually Shows
The David J. Powers memo states that the Santa Clara County Fire Department "has determined that appropriate fire hazard mitigation measures have been incorporated by the project." That determination was scoped to PRC 4290. Footnote 5 cites only the Fire Prevention Plan Review Comments dated January 27, 2026. Those comments do not mention PRC 4291.

The Fire Authority reviewed setback. It did not review defensible space.

Meanwhile, Jensen Hughes, the Applicant’s consultant scoped their review to structural hardening and defensible space requirements "as required by Public Resources Code 4290," alongside Chapter 7A. The Fire Authority's scope mirrors Jensen Hughes exactly. Both reviewed 4290. Neither reviewed 4291. This is not an oversight in the paperwork. It is the boundary of what was actually evaluated.

Chapter 7A: Reviewed by Jensen Hughes.

PRC 4290: Reviewed by Jensen Hughes via the AMMR.

PRC 4291: No analysis by any party. Absent from the record entirely.

There is therefore no document in the record that supports a finding that the project complies with PRC 4291.

See below from Jensen Hughes own memo:

Distinguishing Conceptual Landscape Zoning From PRC 4291 Compliance PRC 4291 compliance is not a landscaping question. It is a feasibility question: can each proposed structure independently maintain the required clearance distances given the actual site configuration? A zone diagram showing Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2 on a site plan does not answer that question. The record contains no analysis demonstrating that the required clearance conditions can be met for each building without overlap or conflict from adjacent structures placed 10 feet apart on a 2.5 acre parcel. That feasibility showing was required before the exemption was granted. It is absent.

Absence of PRC 4291 Analysis Renders the "All" Requirement Unmet The anticipated response is that PRC 4291 carries an ongoing maintenance obligation rather than a preapproval signoff, and therefore its absence from the record is unremarkable. That argument misses the point.

PRC 4291 does impose an ongoing maintenance obligation on property owners. But that obligation presupposes a site configuration capable of supporting compliance. An ongoing maintenance requirement does not fix a feasibility or geometry problem. This is precisely why PRC 4291 is signed off at both pre-approval as well as post build. AB 130 requires that fire hazard mitigation measures, including PRC 4291 be adopted as a condition of eligibility, not deferred to the permit stage.

If the record contains no evidence addressing whether the configuration can meet those conditions, the Council has no basis to conclude that PRC 4291 is satisfied. The Council must be able to make a finding, based on the record before it, that the proposed site configuration can satisfy PRC 4291. No document in the record shows how the proposed layout satisfies PRC 4291 for each structure.

Because the applicant may point to various diagrams as “defensible space,” Appendix 2 includes those exhibits and demonstrates why none of them satisfy PRC 4291 or establish the required feasibility finding.

The Ask
The record before this Council contains no PRC 4291 analysis. That is not a resident's interpretation. It is confirmed by the applicant's own consultant in their own words. The AB 130 exemption the City has allowed to stand was granted without the analysis the statute requires.

Because AB 130 requires compliance with PRC 4291, the Council must be able to support that finding with evidence in the record. The record contains none. Any after the fact letter or conclusory signoff does not substitute for evidence already in the record supporting that finding.

If the record does not contain such evidence, the Council cannot make the required eligibility determination and the exemption must be withdrawn.

The two independent grounds for withdrawing the AB 130 exemption are in this letter and in my March 21st submission. Both stand on their own and either is sufficient. The City of Cupertino is better protected by getting this right before April 1 than by defending it afterward.

Regards,
David Yan
Linda Vista Neighborhood Resident
Appendix 1
Government Code Section 65913.4(6)(D)
Conjunctive Fire Hazard Criteria
The statute requires compliance with all of the following as a conjunctive set: Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code, Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code, and Chapter 7A of the California Building Code. The word "all" is in the statute itself. These are not alternative pathways. A project in a VHFHSZ must satisfy each one.

Appendix 2 - Why the Applicant’s Exhibits Do Not Constitute PRC 4291 Compliance (from Fire PRA)
The applicant may point to various diagrams and plan sheets as evidence of PRC 4291. For clarity and completeness, each of the four relevant exhibits is reproduced below, followed by a brief explanation of why none of them individually or collectively satisfy PRC 4291 or the AB 130 eligibility requirement to demonstrate defensible space feasibility before granting an exemption.

Additionally, none of the applicant’s fire-related exhibits reference PRC 4291 or perform the defensible space feasibility analysis the statute requires.

Continued on next page
Exhibit 1 - Setback Site Plan (PRC 4290)
Why Exhibit 1 is not PRC 4291: This sheet is a setback diagram, which falls under PRC 4290, not PRC 4291.

Continued on next page
Exhibit 2 - Conceptual Landscape Zoning – NOT SIGNED OFF BY FIRE This exhibit shows defensible space zones around the proposed buildings. PRC 4291 applies at the structure level, requiring clearance outward from each building. For interior buildings, that clearance is constrained by adjacent structures. The plan does not show how those buildings achieve the Zone 2 requirement under those conditions.

Why this is not PRC 4291:

This is a conceptual landscape architect zoning diagram, not a statutory feasibility analysis.

It shows:
• Zone 0 / Zone 1 / Zone 2 coloring
• tree canopy spacing
• generic CAL FIRE “guidelines and recommendations”
PRC 4291 applies at the structure level and requires clearance outward from each building. For interior buildings, that clearance is constrained by adjacent structures.

The exhibit shows Zone 2 generally across the site, but does not show how interior buildings achieve the required clearance where surrounding buildings limit outward space. In these areas, defensible space is effectively shared and is effectively restricted to Zones 0 and 1. The Zone 2 areas shown are primarily at the site edges. For example, between buildings 3 and 4, and along the interior areas north of buildings 1-5 and south of buildings 6-10, Zone 2 appears only in limited and fragmented areas. The plan does not show a clear Zone 2 area for each building in those locations.

Lastly, this is a design intent exhibit, not evidence supporting a finding that the project complies with PRC 4291 or one that shows the Fire performed a detailed review or measurements.

Continued on next page
Exhibit 3 — Landscape Materials and Planting Guidance Sheet Why this is not PRC 4291:

This sheet provides general materials and spacing guidance for vegetation. It defines Zone 2 as an area extending outward from each structure.

Zone 2 is defined as an outward area from each structure. For interior buildings, that outward area is cut off by adjacent buildings and circulation space. The plan does not show where the Zone 2 area described in this sheet exists for those buildings.

Continued on next page
Exhibit 4 — Wildfire Construction Requirements (Chapter 7A / CRC R337) Why this is not PRC 4291:

This sheet addresses structural hardening:
• ember resistant vents
• tempered glazing
• noncombustible siding
• ignition-resistant materials
PRC 4291 is not about building materials.

Aggregate Conclusion
These exhibits show the site layout, defensible space zones, vegetation standards, and construction requirements.

Exhibit 1 shows where the buildings are placed. This is a 4290 not 4291 requirement.

Exhibit 2 shows defensible space zones across the site.

Exhibit 3 defines how those zones are intended to function.

Exhibit 4 addresses building materials. This is a 7A not 4291, requirement Exhibit 3 defines Zone 2 as an outward area from each structure. In the layout shown that outward area is limited for interior buildings by adjacent structures and circulation space. The plan does not show where the Zone 2 area exists for those. Based on the spacing between interior buildings, the outward area required by Zone 2 is not present for those structures.

The plan does not show that PRC 4291 is satisfied. No document in the record shows that the Fire Authority evaluated or approved compliance with PRC 4291.

From: Kitty Moore
To: Lauren Sapudar; Kirsten Squarcia; Tina Kapoor; City Clerk Cc: Liang Chao
Subject: Written Communications Item 3
Date: Monday, March 30, 2026 6:29:05 PM
Attachments: evacuation_route_capacity_analysis_oct_2025.pdf Dear City Clerk,
Please provide the attached Evacuation Study performed under the direction and expense of the City of Cupertino into the record for Item 3, Summerhill proposed project. I do not know if it has been included in the public record for the hearing yet.