Del Mar City Council
September 22, 2025

43 September 22, 2025 Item 7
The City's October 2021 and October 2022 Draft Housing Elements, and HCD's Findings the City Had Not Attained Substantial Compliance with the Housing Element law Under the Housing Element Law, the City had a statutory deadl ne of October 15, 2021 to adopt a substantially compliant 6th cycle housing element. (AR 443.) The City submitted its draft housing element to HCD on that day. (AR 443.)
On December 3, 2021, HCD informed the City while the draft "addresses many statutory requirements," to comply with the Housing Element Law, signifcant revisions were required. (AR 443, 445-453.) HCD identified fourteen areas within the first version of the City's draft housing element that required specific programmatic revisions, organized into three broad categories-housing needs, resources, and constraints; housing programs; and public participation. (AR 445-453.) As examples, HCD found the draft rousing element lacked a sufficient site inventory analysis identifying potential sites for housing development distributed in a manner to affirmatively further fair housing, or an inadequate site Inventory of the City's vacant and underutilized sites to meet the City's RHNA determination. (AR 445-447.) Ten months later, on October 4, 2022, the City adopted its 2021-2029 housing element (October 2022 Housing Element). (AR 4504-4508, 4509 [Housing Element].) The City thereafter submitted its adopted Housing Element to HCD for review. (AR 5263.) On December 6, 2022, HCD informed the City "ft]he adopted hcusing element addresses most statutory requirements described in HCD's [prior] review; however, additional revisions are necessary to fully comply with State Housing Element law." (AR 5263 [referencing a May 26, 2021 review].) HCD's findings of non-compliance for the October 2022 Housing Element are discussed further in the Analysis section infra.
600 Foothill's Preliminary Application
On November 10, 2022-after the City's adoption of the October 2022 Housing Element but before HCD's December 6, 2022 review-600 Foothill submitted the Preliminary Application seeking the City's approval to construct a mixed-used project on a site located at 600 Foothill Boulevard, which is currently occupied by two vacant church buildings and a surface parking lot. (AR 5241.) 600 Foothill proposed to build 80 apartments on the 5ite, 16 of which (or 20 percent) would be reserved for persons earning less than sixty percent of the area median income (the Project). (AR 5243.) 600 Foothill's Preliminary Application explained "given that the City continues to have a Housing Element that is out of compliance with state law," 600 Foothill proposed the Project as a Builder's Remedy project pursuant to section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(S) meaning the Project was not required to account for the Oty's zoning ordinance or general plan land use designation. (AR 5235.)
Ill
Ill

44 September 22, 2025 Item 7
The City Staff Acknowledge Changes to the October 2022 Housing Element Are Necessary to Comply with HCD's Findings
The City's Director of Community Development, Susan Koleda, acknowledged on January 11, 2023 in an email communication that "[a]II additional changes to the Housing Element have yet to be determined but will likely require additional [Planning Commission/City Council] approval.'' (AR 12894.) At the City's January 12, 2023 Planning Commission meeting, City staff acknowledged revisions were required for "the Housing Elemert to be in conformance" with applicable law. (AR 5274-5275.) Director Koleda also stated in a February 9, 2023 email communication that "additional clarifications were required" tc the October 2022 Housing Element, and "[t]he additional information will be incorporated into a revised Housing Element, scheduled to be adopted by the City Council on February 21, 2023. It will then be submitted to HCD for review as a third submittal." (AR 13011.)
The City Adopts a February 2023 Housing Element, Fails to Rezone, and "Certifies" Its Substantial Compliance with the Housing Element Law
On February 21, 2023, the City adopted its third revised housin6 element which addressed the deficiencies to the October 2022 Housing Element identified by HCD. (AR 6274-6279.) In its resolution adopting the revised housing element, the City Council stated it "certifies that the City's Housing Element was in substantial compliance with State Housing Element law as of the October 4, 2022 Housing Element adopted by the City Council. ..." (AR 6274.) Despite use of the word "certifies" in the City's resolution, Director Koleda opined at the February 21, 2023 council meeting that the "consensus" from the City Attorney, the City's consultants, and HCD was that "self-certification" of the City' s housing element "is nm: an option." (AR 6207-6208; see also Opposition to lntervenors 19:18-21:7 ['1wrongly accuse ... of 'back-dating' and 'setfcertifying' "].) At the time the City adopted its t hird revised housing element 01 February 21, 2023, it had not completed the rezoning required by the Housing Element Law. Accordingly, on April 24, 2023, HCD found, although the February 2023 housing element addressed the previously identified deficiencies in the October 2022 Housing Element, and met "most of the statutory requirements of State Housing Law," the City was not in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law because the City adopted the February 2023 housing element more than one year past the statutory due date of October 15, 2021 and the City had not completed its statutorily required rezoning. (AR 6297-6300; see also AR 7170-7171.) As a result, HCD found the City could not be deemed in substantial compliance with sta:e law until it completed all required rezones. (AR 6297-6300; see§ 65588, subd. (e)(4)(C)(iii_1. ["A jurisdiction that adopts a housing element more than one year after the statutory deadlin~ ... shall not be found in substantial compliance with this article until it has completed the rezoning required by" the Housing Element Law].)
In its April 24, 2023 letter, HCD also opined that "a local jurisdict on cannot 'backdate' compliance to the date of adoption of a housing element," and t1e City was not in substantial

45 September 22, 2025 Item 7
compliance with the Housing Element Law as of October 4, 2022, notwithstanding its "certification" in the City's February 21, 2023 resolution. (AR 6297-6298.) The City Determines 600 Foothill's Preliminary Application Could Not Rely on the Builder's Remedy and the City Council Affirms the Decision
On February 10, 2023, in response to 600 Foothill's Preliminary Application, the City issued an incompleteness determination (the First Incompleteness Determination) requesting additional detail on several issues. The First Incompleteness Determination did not allege any inconsistencies between the Project and the City's zoning ordinance and general plan. (AR 5276-5279.) Petitioner supplemented its application materials in response to the First Incompleteness Determination on April 28, 2023. (See AR 6305, 7095-7096, 7152-7153, 7169, 7166, 8050-8060.)
On March 1, 2023, the City issued a second incompleteness determination (the Second Incompleteness Determination). The Second Incompleteness Determination advised 600 Foothill the Builder's Remedy did not apply to the Project making the Preliminary Application incomplete for its failure to comply with the City's general plan zoning laws and residential density limitations. (AR 6280-6281; see AR 7176.)
On March 9, 2023, 600 Foothill appealed the Second Incompleteness Determination. (See § 65943, subd. (c); AR 6282-6287, AR 12926.) In support of its appeal, 600 Foothill provided a letter from its attorney explaining 600 Foothill's position the City Council' s failure to grant the appeal would constitute a violation of the HAA. (AR 6304-6462, 6317 ["flouts the law"].) The City Council heard 600 Foothill's appeal on May 1, 2023. The City Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution No. 23-14, denying the appeal and upholding the Second Incompleteness Determination (the May 1, 2023 Decision). (AR 7151-7160, AR 7161-7168.) On June 8, 2023, HCD sent the City a Notice of Violation advising the City it violated the HAA and Housing Element Law by denying 600 Foothill's appeal. (AR 7170-7175.) HCD summarized the alleged violations:

The City cannot 'backdate' its housing element compliance date to an earlier date so as to avoid approving a Builder's Remedy application. In short, the October 4, 2022 Adopted Housing Element did not substantially comply with State Housing Element Law, regardless of any declaration by the City. Therefore, the Builder's Remedy applies, and the City's denial of the Project application based on inconsistency with zoning and land use designation is a violation of the HAA. !AR 7170.)

46 September 22, 2025 Item 7
The City Determines the Application is Complete and the Project is Inconsistent with City's Zoning Code and General Plan
On May 26, 2023, the City informed 600 Foothill that its Project application was complete. (AR 7169.) On June 24, 2023, the City advised 600 Foothill:
[l]t remains the City's position (as affirmed by City Council on May 1, 2023) that the 2021- 2029 Housing Element was in substantial compliance witn state law as of October 4, 2022.

Based on that, staff reviewed the project for consistency with the General Plan, applicable provisions of the Downtown Village Specific Plan (DVSP), the Zoning Code, and the density proposed within the 2021-2029 Housing Element. In accordance with[]§ 65589.S(j)(2)(A), t his letter serves as an explanation of the reasons that the City considers the proposed project to be inconsistent, not in compliance, or not in conformity with these aforementioned guiding documents. (AR 7176.)
The City Completes Rezoning and HCD Certifies the City's Substantial Compliance with the Housing Element Law
On September 12, 2023, the City adopted a resolution completing its rezoning commitments set forth in its housing element. HCD reviewed the materials anj, on November 17, 2023, sent a letter to the City finding the City had "completed actions to address requirements described in HCD's April 24, 2023 review letter." (Coy Deel. ,i 12, Exh. D.) Writ Proceedings
On July 21, 2023, 600 Foothill filed its verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Respondents. On July 25, 2023, CHDF filed its verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief. The court has related the two actions and coordinated them for trial and legal briefing. The court denied Respondents' motion to consolidate the two actions.

On December 20, 2023, pursuant to a stipulation, lntervenors filed their petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in the CHDF proceeding.

For this proceeding, the court has considered 600 Foothill's Opening Brief, CHDF's Opening Brief, lntervenors' Opening Brief, Respondents' three opposition briefs, 600 Foothill's Reply Brief, CHDF's Reply Brief, lntervenors' Reply Brief, the administrative record, the joint appendix, all requests for judicial notice, and all declarations (including exhibits).6 Ill
6 The court accounted for its evidentiary rulings as to the evidence.

47 September 22, 2025 Item 7

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Los Angeles County Court Rules (Local Rules), ''[t]he opening and opposition briefs must state the parties' respective positions on whether the petitioner is seeking traditional or administrative mandamus, or both." (Local Rules, Rule 3.231, subd. (i)(l).) The parties must also provide their position on the standard of revi:w in their briefing. (See Local Rule, Rule 3.231, subd. (i)(3).)
600 Foothill, CHDF and Respondents do not suggest the standard of review that applies to the causes of action. lntervenors argue Code of Civil Procedure sec:ion 1085, not Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, applies to their petition.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the relevant issues are whether (1) the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, (2) there was a fair trial, and (3) there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) In administrative mandate proceedings not affecting a fundamental vested right, the trial court reviews administrative findings for substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sJpport a conclusion (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 575, 584-85), or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable In nature, credible and of solid value. (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996} 51 Cal.App.4th 267, 305 n. 28.) Under the sub5tantial evidence test, "[c]ourts may reverse an [administrative] decision only if, based on the e·,idence . . . , a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency." (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. {1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.) The court does "not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it." (Doe v. Regents of University ofCalifornia (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073.)
To obtain a traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, there are two essential findings. First, there must be a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Second, a petitioner must have a clear, present. and beneficial right to the performance of that duty. (California Ass'n for Health Services a~ Home v. Department ofHealth Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) "Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency's performance or to correct an agency's abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial." (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. ofPublic Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.) An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official d;ties. (Evid. Code,§ 664.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the "trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings." (Fukuda v. City ofAngels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) A petitioner seeking administrative mandamus has the burden of proof and must cite

48 September 22, 2025 Item 7
the administrative record to support its contentions. (See,A/ford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.I Similarly, a petitioner "bears the burden of proof in a mandate proceeding brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.11 (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v.

State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.) A reviewing court "will not act as counsel for either party to a [challenge to an administrative decision) and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs." (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742 [context of civil appeal.)
" 'On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.' .... Interpretation of a statute or regulation is a question of law subject to independent review." (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)

ANALYSIS
Petition for Writ of Mandate - Violations of the HAA
600 Foothill, CHDF, and lntervenors seek a writ of mandate to enforce the requirements of the HAA against the City. Among other relief, they seek a writ directing Respondents to set aside the City Council's "decision, on May 1, 2023, to disapprove an application for a housing development project at 600 Foothill Boulevard, and compelling Respondent to approve the applicatioh or, in t he alternative, to process it in accordance with the law.'' (CHDF Pet. Prayer 11 1; see also 600 Foothill Pet. Prayer 1111 3-5 and lntervenors Pet. Prayer 1111 1-3.)7 Standard of Review
As noted, the HAA at section 65589.5, subdivision (m)(l) specifies "[a)ny action brought to enforce the provisions of this section shall be brought pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. , . .
11 Nonetheless, lntervenors argue Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, not Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, applies because Respondents have a "ministerial duty under the HAA to process the Foothill Owner's Builder's Remedy application." (lntervenors' Opening Brief 10:27; see Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 215, 221-222. ["A writ of mandate may be issued by a court to compel the performance of a duty imposed by law."])
While there is a colorable argument Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 applies to parts of the HAA claims involving the Housing Element Law, given the Legislature's clear instructions in section 65589.5, subdivision (m)(l), the court concludes Petitioners' writ petitions to enforce the HAA are all governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. 7 600 Foothill's writ claims under the HAA are alleged in itsthird through fifth causes of action while CHDF's and lntervenors' are alleged in their first causes of action.

49 September 22, 2025 Item 7
The court's task "is therefore to determine whether the City 'proceeded in the manner required by law,' with a decision supported by the findings, and findings supported by the evidence; if not, the City abused its discretion." (California Renters Legal Advocacy and Education Fund v.

City ofSan Mateo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820, 837.) The City "bear[s] the burden of proof that its decision has conformed to all of t he conditions specified in Section 65589.5." (§ 65589.6.) As noted, based on the circumstances, the court reaches the same result in its analysis even if the petitions, or parts thereof, are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. (See e.g., § 65587, subd. (d)(2) [action to compel compliance with Housing Element Law "shall" be brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085].) The HAA claims raise legal questions of statutory construction and concerns about Respondents' substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law. The court decides such issues independent ly, regardless of whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or 1085 governs. (See e.g. Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 237.)
The City "Disapproved" the Builder's Remedy Project
600 Foothill contends the City "disapproved" the Project, as the term is defined in the HAA, because the City 11determined that the Project could not proceed because it believed the Builder's Remedy was inapplicable." (600 Foothill Opening Brief 7:11-12.) CHDF and lntervenors make the same argument. (CHDF Opening Brief 21:25-28; lntervenors' Opening Brief 15:27- 16:3.)
The Builder's Remedy, at section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(S) provides in pertinent part:
(d) A local agency shall not disapprove a housing development project ... for very low, low-, or moderate-income households ... unless it makes written findings, based upon a preponderance of the evidence in the record, as to one of the following:
(S)The housing development project ... is inconsistent with both the jurisdiction's zoning ordinance and general plan land use designation as specified in any element of the general plan as it existed on the date the application was deemed complete, and the jurisdiction has adopted a revised housing element in accordance with Section 65588 that is in substantial compliance with this article. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, to prove their claim under the HAA and to proceed with the Project as a Builder's Remedy, Petitioners must show the City ''disapprove[d] a housing development project."

50 September 22, 2025 Item 7
(§ 65589.5, subd. (d).)8 Section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(6) provides to" 'disapprove the housing development project' includes any instance in which a local agency does any of the following:
(A) Votes on a proposed housing development project application and the application is disapproved, including any required land use approvals or entitlements necessary for the issuance of a building permit ...." (Emphasis added.)
Here, on May 1, 2023, the City Council denied Petitioner's appeal of the Second Incompleteness Determination stating:
(T]he City Council of the City of La Canada Flintridge hereby denies the appeal and upholds the Planning Division's March 1, 2023, incompleteness determination for the mixed use project at 600 Foothill Boulevard, on the basis that the 'builder's remedy' under the Housing Accountability Act does not apply and is not available for the project, and that the project did not 'vest' as a 'builder's remedy' project as alleged in the project's SB 330 Preliminary Application submission dated November 14, 2022, because the City's Housing Element was, as of October 4, 2022, in substantial compliance with the Housing Element law. (AR 7167.) Notably, Director Koleda informed the City Council, prior to its vote on the appeal, that "if the appeal is denied, the project will be processed accordingly as a standard, nonbuilder's remedy project." (AR 7103.) Thus, the City Council "voted" on a proposed housing development project application and determined the Project could not proceed as a Builder's Remedy project-that is, the Project would be subject to the City's discretionary approvals.

The Legislature has expressed its intent that the HAA "be interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision of, housing." (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L); California Renters Legal Advocacy & Education Fund. v.

City ofSan Mateo, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at 854.) In addition, "[a]s a basic principle of statutory construction, 'include' is generally used as a word of enlargement and not of limitation....

Thus, where the word 'include' is used to refer to specified items, it may be expanded to cover other items." (Rea v. Blue Shield ofCalifornia (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1227.) Applying these canons of statutory construction, the court finds section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(6) should be given a broad construction. Because the City Council made clear any required land use approvals or entitlements would not be issued for the Project, as a Builder's Remedy project, the City Council's May 1, 2023 decision falls within the HAA's broad definition of "disapprove."
8 It is undisputed the Project constitutes a "housing development project ... for very low, low-, or moderate-income households" within the meaning of the HAA. HCD advised the City on June 81 2023: "The Project is proposed as an 80-unit mixed-use project where 20 percent of the units (16 units) will be affordable to lower-income households. The residential portion equates to approximately 89 percent of the Project; therefore, the Project qualifies as a 'housing development project' under the HAA (Gov. Code,§ 65589.5, subd. {h)(2)(B))." (AR 7171.) Respondents develop no argument to the contrary.

51 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Respondents contend:
600 Foothill defined the "approvals" and "entitlements" it sought in its application - namely, a Conditional Use Permit (USE-2023-0016), Tentative Tract Map 83375 (LAN0-2023-0001), and Tree Removal Permit (DEV-2023-0003). (AR 5285.} There was no vote on May 1, 2023, on any of these "required land use approvals" or "entitlements" and, t hus, ... the "vote'' needed under the HAA has not occurred. (Opposition to 600 Foothill 19:22-26 [emphasis in original).) Respondents' narrow interpretation of the statute is unpersuasive. (See§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2}(L).) While the City Council may not have voted to deny the conditional use permit, tentative tract map, and tree removal permit, the City Council voted on May 1, 2023 and determined the Project could not proceed as the project proposed-a Builder's Remedy project. Because the Project was proposed as a Builder's Remedy, the City Council's May 1, 2023 vote on the project application was a "disapproval" within the meaning of the HAA.

Respondents also contend "[t]he City cannot as a matter of law approve or disapprove a development project, including a proj ect under the Builder's Remedy, prior to conducting environmental review under CEQA ...." 9 (Opposition to 600 Foothill 16:15-16.) Respondents argue the HAA does not authorize the court "to order the City to accommodate CEQA review after a possible finding by the Court of a violation of the HAA." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 16:25-26 [emphasis in original].)
Again, Respondents' arguments are unpersuasive-a city can disapprove a project without having undertaken CEQA review. Nothing requires a city to undertake CEQA review before deciding to disapprove a project. CEQA does not apply to "[p)rojects which a public agency rejects or disapproves." (Pub. Res. Code,§ 21080, subd. (b)(S).) "(l]f an agency at any time decides not to proceed with a project, CEQA is inapplicable from that time forward." (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City ofLos Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 850.) Respondents do not cite any language from the HAA that supports their position.10 9 CEQA refers to the California Environmental Quality Act at Public Resources Code section 21000, et seq.
10 During argument, the City emphasized its reliance on section 65589.5, subdivision (m)(l) its language concerning finality-an action cannot be brought to enforce the HAA's provisions until there is a "final action on a housing development project" and the City did not take final action on the Project-it merely determined the Project could not be built as a Builder's Remedy project and would be subject to discretionary approvals. As noted by 600 Foothill, an action to enforce the HAA may be initiated after a municipality imposes conditions upon, disapproves or takes final action on a housing project. The City made clear in its May 1, 2023 Decision that the Project could not proceed as proposed as a Builder's Remedy project.

52 September 22, 2025 Item 7
While CEQA review is preserved by the HAA11 nothing suggests a disapproval under the HAA can occur only after CEOA review or that a court lacks authority to issue a writ to compel compliance with the HAA, even if a Builder's Remedy project is subject to CEQA compliance.

Notably, a suit to enforce t he HAA must be filed "no later than 90 days from" project disapproval.(§ 65589.5, subd. (m)(l).) Further, the HAA must "be interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision of, housing.11 (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L).) Respondents' interpretation of the HAA, under which a disapproval cannot occur prior to CEQA review, would hinder the approval and provision of housing. Accordingly, an agency may 11disapprove" a project under the HAA before conducting any environmental review under CEQA, and a petitioner's claim to enforce the HAA may be ripe for consideration even if CEQA review has not been performed or completed.

Respondents' reliance on Schellinger Brothers v. City ofSebastopol (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1262 (Schellinger] is misplaced. Schellenger involved a request to compel the certification of an environmental impact report. Schellinger did not hold that all claims under the HAA or other housing laws are unripe or cannot be filed until CEOA review is completed. The case did not address CEQA in the context of a claim to enforce the Builder's Remedy provision in the HAA. The case also did not suggest a trial court lacks discretion to structure a writ issued pursuant to the HAA in a manner that allows for CEQA review to be completed. 11An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered." (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-

55.)
The court acknowledges Schellinger advised the HAA "specifically pegs its applicability to the approval, denial or conditional approval of a 'housing development project' . . . which, as previously noted, can occur only after the EIR is certified. (CEQA Guidelines,§ 15090(a).)" (Schellinger, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 1262.) Nonetheless, the court's statement must be interpreted in the context of the issues before that Court. Because the agency there had not disapproved the project at issue, the Court's reference to the "denial'' of a housing development project was a dictum. In any event, as discussed, Schellinger did not decide the legal question presented here-whether the City "disapproved" a Project when it determined, through a vote of its City Council, the Builder's Remedy Project did not qualify for the Builder's Remedy under the HAA.12
11 See section 65589.5, subdivisions (e) and (0)(6).
12 Respondents indicate the City took action to pay for CEQA review of the Project starting in September 2023. {Opposition to 600 Foothill 18:11-14 [citing Sheridan Deel. Exh. JJ].) By that time, however, the City Council had already determined the Project could not proceed as proposed pursuant to the Builder's Remedy. (AR 7167; see also AR 7176.) Respondents do not explain the purpose of CEQA review for a project the City Council has determined could not be approved consistent with the law. This evidence does not support Respondents' position the City Council's May 1, 2023 Decision did not constitute a "disapproval" under the HAA.

53 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Based on the foregoing, Petitioners have demonstrated the City Council "disapproved" the Project with its May 1, 2023 Decision within the meaning of the HAA. Respondents do not show the petitions are "unripe" because CEOA review has not been completed, or that CEQA review is a prerequisite to the "disapproval" of a Project under the HA.I\. In light of the court's conclusion, the court need not reach the parties' contentions regarding California Renters v.

City San Mateo (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 820 and appellate briefing from that case. (See Opposition to 600 Foothill 17:10-28 [citing Sheridan Deel. Exh. EE and FF).) "Vesting11 of the Builder's Remedy and the Date the Pro ect Application was Deemed Complete
Respondents assert the filing of a SB 330 preliminary applicatio1 does not "vest'' the Builder's Remedy because "when a city is determining whether it can m2ke the finding in subsection (d)(S), it considers the status of its Housing Element as ofthe date the finding is made." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 23:11-13 [emphasis in original].) The HAA defines "deemed complete" to mean that "the applicant has submitted a preliminary application pursuant to Section 65941.1." (§ 65589.5, subd. (h)(5) [emphasis added].) Section 65589.5, subdivision (o)(l) states "a housing development project shall be subject only to the ordinances, policies, and standards adopted and in effect when a preliminary application including all of the information required by subdivision (a) of Section 65941.1 was submitted." Construing these statutory provisions, along with section 65589.5, subdivision (d), the court concludes a Builder's Remedy "vests" if the local agency does not have a substantially compliant housing element at the time a complete preliminary application pursuant to section 65941.1 is submitted and "deemed complete."
Respondents have not developed any argument the Preliminary Application, submitted in November 2022, lacked the information required by section 65~41.l or was otherwise incomplete wit hin the meaning of the HAA. (See AR 5234-5246.;13 Thus, if the City's housing element did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law at that time (see analysis infra), the Builder's Remedy "vested" when 600 Foothill submitted its Preliminary Application in November 2022.14
Respondents' reliance on subdivision (o) of the HAA is misplacec. Section 65589.5, subdivision (o)(4) provides" 'ordinances, policies, and standards' includes general plan, community plan, specific plan, zoning, design review standards and criteria, subdi'Jision standards and criteria, and any other rules, regulations, requirements, and policies of a local agency." (Empasis added.) 13 600 Foothill's Preliminary Application used the form generated by the City. 600 Foothill completed the form and Included necessary attachments.
14 600 Foothill's Preliminary Application was "deemed complete," within the meaning of the HAA, when 600 Foothill submitted its application in November 2022. (See AR 5241-5246, 7171; see also Gov. Code§§ 65589.5, subdivision (h)(5) and 65941.1.) During argument, Respondents appeared to conflate the Preliminary Application with a formal project application.

54 September 22, 2025 Item 7
The housing element is a mandatory element of the general plan. (§ 65582, subd. (f).) Section 65589.5, subdivision (o)(l) precludes Respondents from retroactively applying a housing element to a Builder's Remedy project that "vested" before certification of the housing element.

Respondents' vesting argument is also inconsistent with the HAA's policy of promoting housing. (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L).) If Respondents' position was correct, as a practical matter "no housing developer would ever submit a builder's remedy application because of the uncertainty about whether the project would remain eligible long enough to be approved." (CHDF Reply 19:8-9.)
600 Foothill's Preliminary Application was "deemed complete," for purposes of the HAA, in November 2022 when 600 Foothill submitted its Preliminary Application. If the Builder's Remedy applies (see infra), it therefore "vested" in November 2022.15 The City Could Not Be in Substantial Compliance with the Housing Element Law until it Completed Rezoning
Petitioners contend the City's housing element was not in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law when 600 Foothill filed its Preliminary Application because the City had not completed the rezoning required by sections 65583, subdivision (c)(l)(A) and section 65583.2, subdivision (c). (See 600 Foothill Opening Brief 12:21-23.) Petitioners are correct.

Section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(i) states:

For the adoption of the sixth revision and each subsequent revision, a local government that does not adopt a housing element that the department has found to be in substantial compliance with this article within 120 days of the applicable deadline described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) shall comply with subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 65583 and subdivision (c) of Section 65583.2 within one year of the statutory deadline to revise the housing element.

Section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii) states:

A jurisdiction that adopts a housing element more than one year after the statutory deadline described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) shall not be found in substantial compliance with this article until it has completed the 15 However, the court reaches the same result in its analysis below even if the application was deemed complete or "vested" anytime up to May 1, 2023, the date of City Council's decision.

The City did not complete its required rezoning until September 12, 2023. (See § 65588, subd. (e)(4)(C)(iii).)

55 September 22, 2025 Item 7
rezoning required by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 65583 and subdivision (c) of Section 65583.2. (Emphasis added.) 16 Thus, the statute mandates the jurisdiction "shall not be found in substantial compliance" until completing the rezoning. (/bid.)17 The plain language of the statutory prohibition is not limited to HCD; the prohibition therefore applies to the courts.

As applied here, the City's statutory deadline to adopt a substantially compliant 6th cycle housing element was October 15, 2021. (AR 443.) The City submitted its draft housing element to HCD on October 15, 2021. (AR 443.) Because the City failed to secure certification of its 6th cycle housing element within 120 days of its statutory deadline of October 15, 2021 (see AR 443-447), October 15, 2022 served as the City's deadline to complete its required rezoning. (§ 65583, subd. (c)(l)(A).) It is undisputed the City did not complete the required rezoning until September through November 2023.

Pursuant to the plain language of section 65588, subdivision (e){4)(C)(iii), the City "shall not be found" in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law until the City completed its rezoning in September through November 2023. As a result, the City did not have a substantially compliant housing element when 600 Foothill submitted its Preliminary Application to the City in November 2022; the Builder's Remedy therefore applies to the Project.

Respondents do not challenge the plain language interpretation of section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii). 18 Thus, they concede where an agency has failed to adopt a substantially compliant housing element by more than a year after the statutory deadline to do so, the agency cannot be found in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law by HCD or a court until it 16 During argument, Respondents objected to the court's consideration of legislative history referenced in the court's tentative order distributed prior to the hearing. The court relied 600 Foothill's RJN, Exh. D at 82 and Exh. Eat 149. Respondents correctly argued resort to legislative history here is inappropriate given the plain language of the statute and lack of ambiguity. (See River Garden Retirement Home v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 922, 942.) While the parties later agreed the court could rely on all of the evidence that had been submitted by the parties, the court nonetheless revised its decision to eliminate the discussion of legislative history. Given Respondents' argument, there can be no claim the statute is unclear. "If there is no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what is said and the plain meaning of the language controls." (Ibid.)
17 In any event, as discussed infra, the court concludes the City did not adopt a substantially compliant housing element until after 600 Foothill submitted its complete Preliminary Application. Accordingly, even if the statutory bar of section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii) does not apply to the courts, the court still concludes the Builder's Remedy applies to the Project.
18 As noted supra in footnote 16, Respondents agree there is no ambiguity in the statute.

56 September 22, 2025 Item 7
completes its required rezoning. (Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is "equivalent to a concession"].) Respondents contend the "City could not rezone until it had a General Plan Housing Element under Section 65860{c), HCD did not promulgate draft [Affirmatively Further Fair Housing] requirements for the 6th Cycle housing element until April 23, 2020, and did not promulgate the final version until April 2021, only six months before the then-existing deadline (within SCAG) for submitting a 6th RHNA Cycle Housing Element." (Opposition to CHDF 8: 11-15.) Respondents' evidence does not demonstrate actions or omissions of HCO or the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) precluded the City from adopting a substantially compliant housing element or the required rezoning. Director Koleda advises the final affirmatively further fair housing requirements were available by April 2021, and the City's RHNA increased by only two dwelling units between March 22, 2021 and July 1, 2021. (Koleda Deel. ,i,i 20, 36.) As persuasively argued by lntervenors, the Cit~ "had sufficient time to accommodate its RHNA allocation, or at the very least, the two additional dwelling units added between March and July 2021." (lntervenors' Reply 16, fn. 8.) Respondents also do not show, with persuasive evidence, the timing of HCD's promulgation of affirmatively further fair housing requirements prevented the City from adopting a substantially compliant housing element.

Respondents also argue section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii)'s rezoning requirement "is illegal, unconstitutional, and unenforceable" because "[t]he Government Code specifically contemplates that rezoning will occur after adoption of an amendment to a General Plan, including Housing Elements, ...." (Opposition to lntervenors 12.:19, 14:26-27.) Respondents' statutory argument is not fully developed, lacks sufficient analysis of governing legal principles, and is unpersuasive.

Respondents wholly fail to explain how section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii) is "illegal" or "unconstitutional." At most, Respondents assert section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii} conflicts with other statutes requiring consistency between the zoning ordinances of a general law city and its general plan, and the requirement such zoning o'dinances be amended "within a reasonable time" to be consistent with a general plan that is amended. (Opposition to lntervenors 13:13-16 [citing§ 65860].)
Respondents do not show a conflict between section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii) and section 65860 or any other statute. Contrary to Respondents' assertion, a city could comply with both statutes. Thus, as argued by 600 Foothill, a city could Lpdate its zoning simultaneously with the adoption of its housing element. A city could also adopt a housing element that is provisionally certified by HCD and t hen subsequently complete the rezoning, which is what occurred here. While section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii) may subject a city to the Builder's Remedy it if does not complete its rezoning at the s3me time adopts its housing element, Respondents do not show such possibility conflicts witr section 65860 or that the

57 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Legislature lacked the authority to impose such measures to encourage the development of housing.19
Because the City had not completed its required rezoning, the City's housing element was not in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law when 600 Foothill filed the Preliminary Application in November 2022. As a result, the City Council prejudicially abused its discretion when it found the Builder's Remedy did not apply to the Project in its May 1, 2023 Decision.

Did the City's October 2022 Housing Element Substantially Comply with the Housing Element law Without Consideration of Rezoning?
In its May 1, 2023 Decision, the City Council found "the 'builder's remedy' under the Housing Accountability Act does not apply and is not available for the project ... because the City's Housing Element was, as of October 4, 20221 in substantial compliance with the Housing Element law." (AR 7167.) Petitioners contend the City Council's finding was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The court agrees. The October 4, 2022 Housing Element was not in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law.

Standard of Review-Substantial Compliance with Housing Element Law "In an action to determine whether a housing element complied with the requirements of the Housing Element l aw, the court's review 'shall extend to whether the housing element ... substantially complies with the requirements' of the law.(§ 65587, subd. (b), italics added.) Courts have defined substantial compliance as 'actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute,' as distinguished from 'mere technical imperfections of form.' [Citations.] Such a review is limited to whether the housing element satisfies the statutory requirements, 'not to reach the merits of the element or to interfere with the exercise of the locality1s discretion in making substantive determinations and conclusions about local housing issues, needs, and concerns.'" (Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 237.) HCD is mandated by statute to determine whether a housing element substantially complies with the Housing Element Law. (See e.g., § 65585, subds. (i)-(j); Health & Saf. Code § 50459, subds. (a), (b).) Given HCD's statutory mandate and its expertise, HCD's determination of substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law, or lack thereof, is entitled to deference from the courts. (See Hoffmaster v. City ofSan Diego (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1113, fn. 13 19 Further, even assuming a conflict existed, Respondents do not explain why section 65860 would take precedence over section 65588, subdivision (e)(4)(C)(iii) under the specific circumstances presented here (i.e., a statutory bar to attaining substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law until rezoning is complete). (See State Dept. ofPublic Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 960-961. ["If conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, later enactments supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific provisions take precedence over more general ones."])

58 September 22, 2025 Item 7
["We substantially rely on the Department of Housing and Community Development's interpretation ( ...] regarding compliance with the housing element law . . .."); accord Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 243 ["courts generally will not depart from the HCD's determination unless 'it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized'").) However, "HCD's housing element compliance determinations are not binding on courts." (See Intervenor Reply 10:2; see also 600 Foothill Opening Brief 15:8-9.) The trial and appellate courts "'independently ascertain as a question of law whether the housing element at issue substantially complies with the requirements of the Housing Element Law.' ...'' (Martinez~ supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 237.)20 Thus, to be clear (and as noted during the hearing) the court has not deferred to HCD concerning substantial compliance-the issue is properly subject to the court's independent review as a question of law.

Affirmatively Further Fair Housing
As background, HCD found the City's October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with the City's duties under the Housing Element Law to analyze how the housing element will affirmatively further fair housing. Specifically, HCD wrote:

While the element now analyzes census tracts and sites with a concentration of affordable units (p, D71-73), it should still discuss whether the distribution of sites improves or exacerbates conditions. This is critical as the sites to accommodate the lower-income households are only located along Foothill Boulevard near the 210 Freeway. If sites exacerbate conditions, the element should include programs to mitigate conditions (e.g., anti-displacement strategies) and promote inclusive communities. (AR 5263-5264.)
HCD also found "the element must include a complete assessment of fair housing. Based on the outcomes of that analysis, the element must add or modify programs." (AR 5264.) 20 While Martinez advises" '[t)he burden is on the challenger to demonstrate that the housing element ... is inadequate" (ibid.), the HAA provides the City "bear[s] the burden of proof that its decision has conformed to all of the conditions specified in Section 65589.5." (§ 65589.6; see also§ 655871 subd. (d)(2) [city has burden of proof in action to compel compliance with requirements of section 65583, subd. (c)(l}-(3)].) The parties do not address the language in Martinez or how it should be applied, if at all, in this proceeding. The court concludes based on sections 65589.6 and 65587, subdivision (d)(2) the burden is on Respondents to show the City Council's May 1, 2023 Decision complied with t he HAA. Such a showing requires the City to demonstrate it attained substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law before 600 Foothill's submitted its Preliminary Application and it was "deemed complete." The court notes and clarifies, however, it would reach the same result herein even if the initial burden of proof is with Petitioners.

59 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Housing elements must contain ''an inventory of land suitable and available for residential development, including vacant sites and sites having realistic a,d demonstrated potential for redevelopment during the planning period to meet the locality's housing need for a designated income level" -the "sites inventory." (§ 65583, subd. (a)(3).) The sites inventory must be accompanied by "an analysis of the relationship of the sites identified in the land inventory to the jurisdiction's duty to affirmatively further fair housing." (Ibid.) In addition, each updated housing element must include ''a statement of the community's goals, quantified objectives, and policies relative to affirmatively furthering fair housing"(§ 65583(b)(l)), and must commit to programs that will, among other things, "Affirmatively further fair housing in accordance with [Section 8899.50]." (§ 65583, subd. (c)(l0).)21
Here, the October 2022 Housing Element discloses t he sites identified by the City to accommodate affordable housing are all located near the Foothill Freeway. (AR 5130.) In this context, HCD found the October 2022 Housing Element lacked sufficient analysis of the relationship of the sites identified in the land inventory to the City's duty to affirmatively further fair housing, i.e. whether the site inventory would improve or exacerbate fair housing conditions. (AR 5263-5264.)
Respondents do not cite to any specific analysis in the October 2022 Housing Element addressing the concern raised by HCD. (See Opposition to 600 Foothill 9:14 [citing AR 1741, 5203].) In fact, neither AR 1741 nor 5203 demonstrate the October 2022 Housing Element analyzed how the clustering of affordable housing near the Foo:hill Freeway would promote or exacerbate fair housing. While Respondents now explain in the context of this proceeding why the City clustered all affordable housing near the freeway (See Koleda Deel. ,i,i 9-16), 21 Section 8899.50, subd. (b)(l) provides: "A public agency shall administer its programs and activities relating to housing and community development in a nanner to affirmatively further fair housing, and take no action that is materially inconsistent with its obligation to affirmatively further fair housing." Compliance with the obligation is mandatory. (Id. at subd. (b)(2).) The statute defines "affirmatively further fair housing'' as:
taking meaningful actions, in addition to combating discrimination, that overcome patterns of segregation and foster inclusive communities free from barriers that restrict access to opportunity based on protected characteristics. Specifically1 affirmatively furthering fair housing means taking meaningful actions that, taken together, address significant disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity, replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns, transforming racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of opportunity, and fostering and maintaining compliance with civil rights and fair housing laws. The duty to affirmatively further fair housing extends to all of a public agency's activities and programs relating to housing and community development. (Id. at subd. (a)(l).)

60 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Respondents were required to include that analysis in the October 2022 Housing Element. (See § 65583, subds. (a)(3), (b)(l), and (c)(l0).)22
Respondents contend the "City undertook numerous outreach efforts to reach a variety of economic groups, including via two housing workshops with 18 different stakeholder organizations." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 9:10-12 [citing Koleda Deel. 1111 38-50 and AR 3896- 3900, 4651].) Respondents do not cite any authority that outreach alone satisfies the City's statutory obligations to include in its housing element "an analysis of the relationship of the sites identified in the land inventory to the jurisdiction's duty to affirmatively further fair housing." (§ 65583, subd. (a)(3) [emphasis added].) Exercising its independent judgment on the statutory question, the court concludes outreach alone does not substantially comply with the requirement-outreach does not constitute analysis.

The deficiencies in the October 2022 Housing Element as to the affirmatively further fair housing analysis are demonstrated by changes made by the City in the February 2023 Housing Element.
23 Specifically, the February 2023 Housing Element added analysis-"the sites to accommodate the lower and moderate-income households are concentrated primarily in the western end of the City along the Foothill Boulevard Corridor, and near the 210 Freeway." (AR 6090.) The analysis recognized "adverse air quality conditions have the potential to be exacerbated" based on "close proximity to the freeway[.]" (AR 6090.) In addition, the revised February 2023 Housing Element committed to Program 24 to mitigate these impacts. (AR 6091; See also AR 5577-5578 [adding Program 24, "Mitigation for Housing in Proximity to Freeways" committing to building design measures for new residential development near the freeway].) ' Respondents contend "those air quality mitigation measures were adopted in 2013 and the 2023 Housing Element merely added a heading regarding these existing measures." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 9:7-8 [citing Koleda Deel. ,i 33 and AR 4515].) Respondents cite AQ Policy 1.1.6 from its General Plan Air Quality Element, which states the policy to "Ensure that new developments implement air quality mitigation measures, such as ventilation systems, adequate buffers, and other pollution reduction measures and carbon sequestration sinks, especially those that are located near existing sensitive receptors.11 (Koleda Deel. ,i 33.) 12 During argument, Respondents SL!ggested the material included in the February 23, 2023 housing element had previously been provided in the October 2022 Housing Element. While it is true Table D-12 can be found in both versions of the housing element (compare AR 6090 p. 02~ with AR 5158 p. 022), the February 23, 2023 revisions to the October 2022 Housing Element (AR 6090-6092) included additional narrative material beyond repeating information from Los Angeles County's Department of Public Health. Further, AR 5193-5204, identified by Respondents during the hearing as an analysis of how the clustering of affordable housing near the Foothill Freeway would promote or exacerbate fair housing within the October 2022 Housing Element, does not appear to address the issue. Finally, it does not appear Respondents cited any of this material in their briefs before the court in response to the claims raised by Petitioners. 600 Foothill objected to t he argument as new during the hearing. 23 See supra footnote 22.

61 September 22, 2025 Item 7
While Program 24 and AQ Policy 1.1.6 have simllarities, they are not the same. Program 24 identifies specific mitigation measures that apply to receptors near the freeways and is enforceable by HCD. (See § 65585, subd. (i) [requiring HCD to investigate a "failure to implement any program actions included in the housing element."].) In contrast, AQ Policy 1.1.6 is a shorter and more general policy t hat is not enforceable by HCD as a housing element program. Contrary to Respondents' assertion, the inclusion of Program 24 in the February 2023 Housing Element supports HCD's findings that the October 2022 Housing Element lacked sufficient analysis of the City's affirmatively further fair housing obligations.

Exercising its independent judgment on the issue, the court concludes the City's October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with the affirmatively further fair housing requirements in section 65583, subdivisions (a)(3), (b)(l), and (c)(l0). 24 Nonvacant Sites Analysis
HCD found the October 2022 Housing Element's analysis of nonvacant sites did not sufficiently analyze "redevelopment potential and evaluate the extent existing uses impede additional development." {AR 5264.) HCD also found "as the element relies on nonvacant sites to accommodate 50 percent or more of the housing needs for lower-income households, the adoption resolution must make findings based on substantial evidence in a complete analysis that existing uses are not an impediment and will likely discontinue in the planning period." (AR 5264.)
For nonvacant sites, the Housing Element law provides "the city or county shall specify the additional development potential for each site within the planning period and shall provide an explanation of the methodology used to determine the development potential. 11 (§ 65583.2, subd. (g)(l).) In addition, "when a city or county is relying on nonvacant sites ... to accommodate 50 percent or more of its housing need for lower income households, the methodology used to determine additional development potential shall demonstrate that the existing use ... does not constitute an impediment to additional residential development during the period covered by the housing element. An existing use shall be presumed to impede additional residential development, absent findings based on substantial evidence that the use is likely to be discontinued during the planning period." (§ 65583.21 subd. (g)(2).) 24 In reaching this conclusion, the court has considered Respondents' assertion the City undertookoutreach efforts "in the face of 'changing goal posts' and what appeared to be intentional obstructive behavior by HCD." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 9:16-21.) The court finds Respondents' evidence does not prove substantial compliance with the affirmatively further fair housing requirements in section 65583 or an excuse from substantial compliance. !See e.g.

Koleda Deel. ,i,i 49-50.) The court has also considered CHDF's arguments and evidence that the City discriminated on the basis of race and income when it selected sites for rezoning. The court further discusses CHDF's claims of discrimination and bad faith infra.

62 September 22, 2025 Item 7
The Court of Appear explains "there are many types of sites the Legislature has either deemed infeasible to support lower income housing or that require additional evidence of their feasibility or by-right development approvals before being deemed adequate to accommodate such housing (including] ... when a city relies on over 50 percent of the inventory to be accommodated on nonvacant sites .... The goal is not just to identify land, but to pinpoint sites that are adequate and realistically available for residential development targets for each income level." (Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 244 [emphasis added].) Here, more than 50 percent of the parcels included in the City's site inventory to accommodate the lower income RHNA are nonvacant. (AR 4506.) Accordingly, the City is required to comply with section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2). The site Inventory in the October 2022 Housing Element does not show substantial compliance with section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2). (See AR 5124-5129.) The criteria used to describe nearly all of the lower income nonvacant sites are some combination of "underutilized site," "buildings that are older than 30 years," "vacant lot or parking lot with minimal existing site improvements," "property has not been reassessed" in some time, "antiquated commercial uses," or "existing use retained and institution would add residential units.'' (AR 5124-5129; see also AR 4601-4603 [discussing methodology].) While these factors may be relevant to and inform on the analysis of "additional development potential" required by section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(l), they do not sufficiently address in any substantive way whether the sites are ''likely to be discontinued during the planning period," as required by section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2).

In the resolution adopting the October 2022 Housing Element, the City Council made the following finding:

Based on general development trends resulting from continuously rising land values, changes in desired land uses, the financial pressures placed on religious institutions that have been impacted by falling congregation numbers, aging structures, and underutilized properties, rising demand for housing, adjacency to public transportation and commercial services, and other factors/analysis as identified in the Section 9.4.1.3 Future Residential Development Potential and Section 9.4.1.4 Overview of Residential Development Potential and Realistic Capacity Assumptions by Zone of the Housing Element, the existing uses on the sites identified in the site inventory to accommodate the lower income RHNA are likely to be discontinued during the planning period, and therefore do not constitute an impediment to additional residential development during the period covered by the housing element. (AR 4506.)
The City Council's generalized statement does not reference any specific evidence to support a finding the existing uses of nonvacant sites, which were identified to accommodate housing need for lower income households, are "likely to be discontinued during the planning period." (§ 65583.2, subd. (g)(2).)

63 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Further, Petitioners cite record evidence that the owners of several of the nonvacant sites included in the October 2022 site inventory, including certain sites identified for lower income households, informed the City they did not intend to redevelop the site or discontinue the existing use during the planning period. (See AR 5114-5116, 2222, 2238, 2206, 5126, 12812, 5233, 5123-5129, 6054-6061.)25 Significantly, the City subsequently amended the housing element to disclose that some of the identified lower income category sites are "not currently available'' and were included in the site inventory "as a buffer site because it may become available further along in the 6th cycle HE planning period." (AR 6054-6061, 6098.) Such a change in characterization is a major substantive change in the site inventory and demonstrates the October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law.

The court has also reviewed Director Koleda's summary of changes to the October 2022 Housing Element. The court concludes, on the whole, Director Koleda's summary is consistent with Petitioners' arguments the October 2022 Housing Element was not substantially compliant and required significant changes. (See Koleda Deel. ,i 56 and Exh. A.) As lntervenors argue, the substantial changes to the October 2022 Housing Element show the City did not substantially comply with section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2) until afterit adopted the October 2022 Housing Element.

Respondents assert the City "adopted a Site Inventory using both a data-driven model endorsed by HCD . .. and along with that gathered 'substantial evidence' by sending TWO mailings to each commercial and religious property owner in the City to determine potential inclusion on the Site Inventory." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 11:9-12 [citing Koleda Deel. ,i,i 29, 54-56).) However, Respondents do not dispute it included multiple nonvacant sites in the October 2022 Site Inventory for which the City lacked substantial evidence, in October 2022, that the existing uses were "likely to be discontinued during the planning period.''(§ 65583.2, subd. (g)(2).) Notably, Respondents do not cite any written communications with the nonvacant site owners, prior to the adoption of the October 2022 Housing Element, as evidence the uses were "likely to be discontinued during the planning period." (§ 65583.2, subd. (g)(2).) Respondents assert their methodology should be sufficient. During the hearing, they followed HCD guidance and should not be penalized for doing so. Respondents also argue for purposes of section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2), they should not be required to knock on owners' doors and undertake an active investigation for its sites inventory.

The court cannot find on this record the City followed HCD guidance on the section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2) issue. While the City's reliance on methodology alone may be consistent with 25 For example, a representative of a restaurant {Panda Express) wrote "we have NO intention of discontinuing the current use of this property during the next eight-year housing planning period." (AR 5115.) The owner of sites 86-89 on the October 2022 site inventory {identified in the lower income category) similarly informed the City that the premises are leased to retail store (Big Lots) under a 20-year lease with two 10-year extension options, and it had no intention of discontinuing the current use during the planning period. (AR 5116.)

64 September 22, 2025 Item 7
HCD's section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(l) compliance guidance, that is not the case for section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2).

As discussed during the hearing, HCD guidance specifies at Step 3 how to prepare a nonvacant sites inventory when a municipality has relied on "nonvacant sit es to accommodate more than 50 percent of the RHNA for lower income households." (Koleda Deel., Exh. Q p. 26.) Consistent with section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2), the guidance makes clear:

If a housing element relies on nonvacant sites to accommodate 50 percent or more of its RHNA for lower income households, the nonvacant site's existing use is presumed to impede additional residential development, unless the housing element describes findings based on substantial evidence that the use will likely be discontinued during the planning period. (Id. at 27.) "The goal is not just to identify land, but to pinpoint sites that are adequate and realistically available for residential development targets . .. . " (Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 244 [emphasis added].) Accordingly, HCD guidance also explains the "housing element should describe the findings and include a description of the substantial evidence they are based on," and a housing element "should describe the findings and include a description of the substantial evidence they are based on." (Koleda Deel., Exh. Q at 27 .) (Ibid.)
HCD further advised substantial evidence "includes facts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts." (Ibid.) HCD provides specific examples of what constitutes substantial evidence "that an existing use will likely be discontinued in the current planning period .. . . " (Ibid.) Those examples include:
[1] The lease for the existing use expires early within the planning period, [21 The building is dilapidated, and the structure is likely to be removed, or a demolition permit has been issued for the existing uses, [3] There is a development agreement that exists to develop the site within the planning period,
[4] The entity operating the existing use has agreed to move to another location early enough within the planning period to allow residential development within the planning period.
[5] The property owner provides a letter stating its intention to develop the property with residences during the planning period. (Ibid.) Of the 21 nonvacant sites identified by the City as "sites that are adequate and realistically available for residential development targets" for lower income persons (Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 244), 19 percent or only four (sites 74, 91, 95 and 96) provide any site-specific evidence to support the City's inclusion of the site in its sites inventory. (AR 5124-5128.) For the four sites, the owner indicated some interest in redevelopment. (AR 5126, 5128.) The

65 September 22, 2025 Item 7
remaining sites rely on the City's generalized methodology to meet their obligations under section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2}.

Respondents argue 600 Foothill's principal "actively manipulated'' certain sites that were later deemed "buffer sites." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 10:22.) Respondents also blame deficiencies in their October 2022 site inventory on "dilatory guidance" of HCD and dilatory actions of SCAG. (Opposition to 600 Foothill 12:9-10.) Having considered the evidence cited by Respondents, the court finds Respondents' arguments unpersuasive. As discussed infra with Respondents' unclean hands defense, Respondents do not demonstrate 600 Foothill or its principals have engaged in any inequitable or wrongful conduct related to these proceedings, including the City's adoption of its housing element. Respondents also do not prove deficiencies in the site inventory of the October 2022 Housing Element resulted from actions or omissions of 600 Foothill, SCAG or HCD. Nor do Respondents cite any authority suggesting a city or county may be excused from substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law based on actions or omissions of SCAG, HCD or a project applicant.

Respondents contend t he City was permitted "to rely upon letters with site owners and between itself and HCD not included specifically in its Housing Element" and the City "made reasonable inferences" from the information it received from site owners. (Opposition to 600 Foothill 12:15-19.) Respondents rely on Martinez to support their claims. (See Martinez-, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 248.)
Martinez addressed the City of Clovis' nonvacant site analysis under section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(l); the Court did not analyze the heightened requirements of section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2). (See Martinez, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 248-250.) While Martinez held the substantive material required by section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(l), need not appear 1n the Housing Element itself, the Court did not suggest nonvacant sites may be included in a site inventory if the agency lacks substantial evidence, or has not sufficiently investigated or analyzed, whether the sites are "likely to be discontinued during the planning period." (§ 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2).)
Here, Respondents have not cited substantial evidence to support the City's position multiple nonvacant sites listed in the October 2022 inventory could realistically be developed in a manner to satisfy the City's RHNA obligations. In addition, that Respondents made substantive revisions to the site inventory after October 2022 also supports a reasonable inference the City did not complete the analysis and attain the evidence required by section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2), for many of the sites on its site inventory, before it adopted the October 2022 Housing Element. (Compare AR 5124-5129 with 6054-6061.)
Exercising Its independent judgment, the court concludes the City's October 2022 Housing Element did not include a nonvacant site analysis that substantially complied with the Housing Element Law, including section 65583.2, subdivision (g)(2).

Ill

66 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Realistic Assessment of Development Capacity
The Housing Element Law requires that municipalities "specify for each site [in its inventory] the number of units that can realistically be accommodated on that site." (§ 65583.21 subd. (c).) The law provides "the number of units calculated" for each site "shall be adjusted" to account for "the land use controls and site improvements requirement identified in paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 65583, t he realistic development capacity for the site, typical densities of existing or approved residential developments at a similar affordability level in that jurisdiction, and on the curreht or planned availability and accessibility of sufficient water, sewer, and dry utilities." (Id. at subd. (c)(2).)
CHDF contends the October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with these statutory provisions because it failed to apply a "downward adjustment on the number of units projected on each site to account for, among other constraints, the City's maximum floor-area ratio of 1.5 (AR 4607)1 its 80-percent maximum lot-coverage requirement (AR 4566), its 35-foot height limit (AR 4567), and significant parking requirements {AR 4572) for sites in mixed-use zones." (CHDF Opening Brief 20:4-7.)
Respondents did not address or rebut CHOF's argument. {Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v.

Traylor Brothers, Inc., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is "equivalent to a concession"].) The court concludes the City's October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with Housing Element Law because the City failed to adjust the development capacity for each site based on the factors set forth in section 65583.2, subdivision (c)(2).26
Government Code Section 65583.2, Subdivision (h)
CHDF argues fewer than 50 percent of the October 2022 Housing Element's low-income sites were zoned exclusively for residential use, and the City did not include analysis showing it would "accommodate all of the very low and low-income housing need on sites designated for mixed use [and} allow 100 percent residential use and require that residential use occupy SO percent ofthe total floor area of a mixed-use project.'' (CHDF Opening Brief 20:21-23 [citing § 65583.2, subd. (h)J.) CHDF supports its assertion with citations to the administrative record. (CHDF Opening Brief 21:1-4 [citing AR 5124-5129, 4607-4610); see also AR 4612.) Based on the 26 During argument, t he court engaged CHDF and Respondents at length on this issue. While Respondents provide an explanation that their rezoning included the required adjustments, t he court finds Respondents conceded the issue by not addressing it in their brief. (Compare CHDF Opening Brief 19:20-20:15 with Opposit ion to CHDF 10:10-11:20.) Respondents' analysis of development constraints is not entirely clear and undeveloped in their brief. (See AR 4565- 4570.)

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evidence, CHDF argues the October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with section 65583.2, subdivision (h).
27 Respondents do not squarely address CHDF's position, and they do not show, with citation to the administrative record, the October 2022 Housing Element substantially complied with section 65583.2, subdivision (h). (Opposition to CHDF 12:4-9.) Accordingly, the court concludes the October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law for this reason as well.

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes the October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law. Accordingly, the City Council prejudicially abused its discretion when it found in its May 1, 2023 Decision the Builder's Remedy did not apply to the Project.

Respondents' Defenses to the HAA Causes of Action
Respondents raise a defense of unclean hands to the HAA causes of action asserted by 600 Foothill. Respondents also raise defenses of ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and claim the petitions violate rules designed to prevent piecemeal litigation.

Unclean Hands
A party seeking equitable relief must have "clean hands" and inequitable conduct by the party seeking relief is a complete defense. (Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 446; Salas v. Sierra Chem. Co. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 407, 432.) The plaintiff must "come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean," or the plaintiff "will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim." (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978.) For the doctrine to apply, "there must be a direct relationship between the misconduct and the claimed injuries." (Matteo Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 846, citation omitted.)
Respondents contend "the only reasonable inference to draw [from the opposition evidence) is that on the eve of final review and approval of the Housing Element containing the Site Inventory, 600 Foothill's principal was running around town attempting to manipulate owners to 'decline' inclusion on the inventory and derail the process." (Opposition to 600 Foothill 14:2-

5.) The court has reviewed all of the evidence cited by Respondents. (Koleda Deel. ,i,i 46-51; Hernandez Deel. ,i,i 4, S; AR 7081-7085, 5233; Sheridan Deel. Exh. DD.) Respondents' assertion 27 Section 65583.2, subdivision (h) provides in pertinent part: "At least 50 percent of the very low and low-income housing need shall be accommodated on sites designated for residential use and for which nonresidential uses or mixed uses are not permitted, except that a city or county may accommodate all of the very low and low-income housing need on sites designated for mixed use if those sites allow 100 percent residential use and require that residential use occupy 50 percent of the total floor area of a mixed-use project.''

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that Garret Weyand, one of 600 Foothill's principals, engaged in "deliberate attemptsto manipulate the Site Inventory" is speculative and not supported by the evidence. (Opposition to 600 Foothill 10:22.) To the contrary, the court finds Weyand's public advocacy in support of the Project is' not evidence of inequitable conduct. (See Reply Weyand Deel.) Respondents have not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, 600 Foothill or any of its principals, including Weyand and Jon Curtis, engaged in inequitable conduct that has a direct relationship to any cause of action in 600 Foothill's petition. Respondents failed to meet their burden of demonstrating unclean hands and their entitlement to the defense.28 Ripeness, Exhaustion, and Piecemeal Litigation
" 'A decision attains the requisite administrative finality when the agency has exhausted its jurisdiction and possesses 'no further power to reconsider or rehear the claim.' . .. Until a public agency makes a 'final' decision, the matter is not ripe for judicial review." (California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1485.} Relatedly, "[t]he exhaustion doctrine precludes review of an intermediate or interlocutory action of an administrative agency. A party must proceed through the full administrative process 'to a final decision on the merits.' " (Id. at 1489.) There are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, including "when the aggrieved party can positively state what the administrative agency's decision in his particular case would be." (Edgren v. Regents of University ofCalifornia (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 515, 520.) Respondents do not show any lack of finality or any further administrative remedy to exhaust as to the May 1, 2023 Decision. The May 1, 2023 Decision of the City Council is final because there is no further avenue for administrative appeal. As discussed, the City disapproved (within the meaning of the HAA) the Project. Nothing in the HAA requires Petitioners to complete CEQA review before suing to enforce the HAA.

Respondents argue 600 Foothill did not sufficiently raise issues pursued in this proceeding, including that the City failed to rezone, the housing element does not meet its affirmatively further fair housing obligation, as well as the site inventory issues. The court concludes Petitioners sufficiently raised and preserved their contentions during the administrative proceedings. (See AR 6284-6286, 6307-6317 .) Many of the issues in these petitions were also raised by HCD in letters to the City at the administrative level, including a notice of violation. (AR 7170-7175.)
Respondents argue "[nlo express 'disapproval' of the entire project occurred here ...." (Opposition to CHDF 16:25.) While not entirely clear, Respondents seemingly suggest 600 Foothill should redesign the Project to avoid reliance on the Builder's Remedy. Respondents do not develop an argument 600 Foothill has any legal obligation, under the circumstances here, to redesign the Project "as a standard, nonbuilder's remedy project." (AR 7103.). Respondents 28 This defense only applies to 600 Foothill. Respondents do not develop any argument the HAA claims of CHDF or lntervenors are subject to the defense.

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also do not show that any further administrative action, including appeal of the City's June 24, 2023 letter describing inconsistency between the Project and the City's general plan and zoning ordinances (see AR 7176), could remedy the harm suffered by 600 Foothill when the City Council determined t he Builder's Remedy does not apply to the Project.

Moreover, Petitioners can positively state what the City's decision is with respect to 600 Foothill's application to develop the Builder's Remedy Project. In its May 1, 2023 Decision, the City Council made clear any required land use approvals or entitlements would not be issued for the Project as a Builder's Remedy project. Based on its review of the administrative record and the parties' declarations, the court finds no reasonable possibility Respondents, including the City Council, will change their position and process 600 Foothill's Project as a Builder's Remedy under the HAA. Accordingly, even if some additional appeal or administrative process were available, the futility exception to exhaustion applies under these facts. (See, e.g., Felkay v. City ofSanta Barbara (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 30, 40-41 [futility exception, which is a question of fact, applied where city 11made plain'' it would not permit the proposed development]; Ogo Associates v. City ofTorrance (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 830, 832-34 [futility exception applied where it was "inconceivable the city council would grant a variance for the very project whose prospective existence brought about the enactment of the rezoning" that necessitated the variance in the first place].)
Respondents do not demonstrate (1) the HAA claims In the petitions are unripe, (2) Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, or {3) Petitioners have violated rules designed to prevent piecemeal litigation. Further, even if Petitioners have additional administrative remedies (such as an appeal of the June 24, 2023 inconsistency letter), the court finds exhaustion of such remedies is futile under the circumstances presented here.

CHDF's Claims of Bad Faith and Discrimination Based on Race and Income CHDF contends:

La Canada Flintridge officials clearly acquiesced to the biases and prejudices ofcity residents when they revised the draft Housing Element's sites inventory and rezoning program to eliminate multiple 'low-income' sites south of Foothill Boulevard. This was a blatant violation of California and Federal fair housing laws alike. (See Gov. Code,§ 65008, subd. (b)(l)(C) ... ; Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2, § 12161, subd. (c) ... ; Mhany Management, Inc., supra, 819 F.3d 581 ....) (CHDF Opening Brief 17:13-21.)
As acknowledged in reply, CHDF did not plead a cause of action in its petition alleging the City violated the Fair Housing Act or state or federal discrimination laws. (CHDF Reply 10:15-20.) CHDF also did not move to amend its petition or request leave to amend its petition. (See Simmons v. Ware {2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1048. [''The pleadings are supposed to define the issues to be tried." ])

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In reply, CHDF argues the "City's discriminatory site-selection practices demonstrates the City did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law's requirements to affirmatively further fair housing." (CHDF Reply 10:18-19.) However, CHDF failed to plead that claim in its petition. (See CHDF Reply 10:20-21 [citing CHDF Pet. ,i,i 22, 26, 29-30 (generalized allegations the City "did not affirmatively further fair housing or provide an assessment of fair housing")].) On the merits of CHDF's claim, even if the affirmatively further fair housing allegations in the petition are interpreted to encompass CHDF's arguments about race and income discrimination (a difficult task), the court finds Respondents' opposition persuasive. (Opposition to CHDF 13:5- 15:21.) There is insufficient evidence the City Council "acquiesced" to or acted based on public comments at the August and September 2022 public hearings highlighted in CHDF's briefs. (See e.g., AR 2602-2603 ("different value system and much more high crime ... the value system is different than people that move here"], 3491-3494 [similar comments from same individual at AR 2602-2603), 3539-3541, 3543-3545 ["dust off my shotgun" "likelihood of being some bad apples"}, 3493 [additional similar comments from commenter at AR 2602-2603 and AR 3491- 3494], 5107-5110 [crime and will become dangerous community], 5112 ["fear poor or homeless people will move into La Canada and bring crime"].)
While some of the public comments were quite unfortunate, CHDF cites statements of councilmembers out of context and does not show those councilmembers "agreed" with the public comments highlighted by Petitioners. (CHDF Opening Brief 10:13-11:6.) Even if the councilmembers could have stated their disagreement with certain public comments, but did not, there is insufficient evidence to support an inference the City Council took any action on the housing element based on the unfortunate public comments and discrimination.29 Other Contentions Related to the HAA Causes of Action
Several other contentions are not necessary to the court's ruling on the HAA claims. For completeness, the court briefly addresses them.

The court agrees with lntervenors that the City did not have authority under the HAA or Housing Element Law to backdate its housing element and "self-certify" or declare its housing element to be in substantial compliance with state law as of October 2022. (lntervenors Opening Brief 14:3-15:24.) Respondents appear to concede the point. (See Opposition to lntervenors 19:18-21:7 [asserting City did not back date or self-certify].) 29 During argument, 600 Foothill provided a series of acts undertaken by Respondents that it believed demonstrated bad faith. Many of those acts, however, flowed from the City's belief it properly adopted the October 2022 Housing Element or the City's violation of the Permit Streamlining Act (PSA) discussed infra. Based on all of the evidence before the court, the evidence is insufficient to establish the City acted with bad faith and "will continue to use all means to obstruct'' as suggested by CDHF during argument.

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As argued by 600 Foothill, when HCD found the October 2022 Housing Element did not substantially comply with the law, section 65585, subdivision (f) required City to take "one" of the following actions: "(1) Change the draft element or draft amendment to substantially comply with this article; [or] (2) Adopt the draft element or draft amendment without changes [, but with] written findings which explain the reasons the legislative body believes that the draft ... substantially complies with this article despite the findings of the department." (600 Foothill Opening Brief 14:16-19.) The court agrees the "City unlawfully blended these approaches by making some changes in response to HCD's comments, adopting the February 2023 Housing Element with written findings explaining why the October 2022 Housing Element was sufficient, and then resubmitting its revised draft to HCD." (600 Foothill Opening Brief 14:19-22.)
If the City believed its October 2022 Housing Element substantially complied with the Housing Element Law, it should have taken the action set forth in section 65585, subdivision (f)(2).

Thereafter, the City could have sued for a judicial declaration that its October 2022 Housing Element substantially complied with state law. The City did not do so here.

The court finds 600 Foothill's arguments based on section 65589.5, subdivisions U) and (o) are not ripe at this time. Once ripe, the claims are subject to exhaustion. (See 600 Foothill Opening Brief 9:12-10:21; Pet. ,i,i 134-162.) Upon the remand ordered here, the City is required to process the application as a Builder's Remedy project and in accordance with the HAA, including sections 65589.5, subdivisions 0) and (o). Thus, it is premature to adjudicate today whether the City has complied with those provisions of the HAA.

Relatedly, since the court concludes the City is required by law to process the application pursuant to the Builder's Remedy provision of the HAA, the court need not address the financial infeasibility of a redesigned project. (600 Foothill Opening Brief 8:21-9:3 and 10, fn. 6.) Summary of HAA Causes of Action and Scope of Writ Relief The court finds the City Council prejudicially abused its discretion with its finding in its May 1, 2023 Decision that the Builder's Remedy does not apply to the Project. As a remedy, the court grants 600 Foothill's petition and will issue a writ directing Respondents to set aside the May 1, 2023 City Council decision finding 600 Foothill's Project does not qualify as Builder's Remedy and compelling the City to process the application in accordance with the HAA and state law.

That remedy is consistent with section 65589.5, subdivision (k)(l)(A)(ii) of the HAA (compliance required in 60 days) and Code ofCivil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (f).

CHDF argues the court should order the Project "approved" due to the City's alleged bad faith and unlawful discrimination. (CHDF Opening Brief 23:18-24:24.) For the reasons discussed, the court finds evidence the City Council "acquiesced" to or acted based on the public comments from the August and September 2022 public hearings highlighted in CHDF's briefs insufficient. (See e.g., AR 2602-2603, 3491-3494, 3539-3541, 3543-3545, 3493, 5107-5110, 5112.) CHDF has

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not met its burden of demonstrating Respondents acted in bad faith in connection with those public comments.

CHDF also argues "(w]hen 600 Foothill subsequently proposed a project under the HAA's builder's remedy, the City Council concocted a bizarre scheme to evade judicial review of their decision to disapprove that project, ...." (CHDF Opening Brief 24:15-18.) 600 Foothill contends the court should order Respondents to approve the Project on similar grounds. (600 Foothill Reply 18:13-19:8.) While the court finds the City prejudicially abused its discretion with Its May 1, 2023 Decision finding the Builder's Remedy inapplicable to the Project, the court does not find sufficient evidence to conclude the City Council acted in bad faith when it made its legally incorrect decision.

Further, even if it could be argued the City Council lacked a good faith reason to find the Project did not qualify as a Builder's Remedy, Petitioners do not show it would be equitable for the court to compel the City to approve the Project. Among other reasons, CEQA review is specifically preserved by the HAA. {See§ 65589.5, subds. (e) and (0)(6); Schellinger, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 1245.) In the exercise of the court's discretion, the court finds a writ compelling Respondents to approve the Project, without CEQA review, would not be an equitable or proportionate remedy for the violations of the HAA at issue. Respondents should be permitted on remand to process 600 Foothill's application, as a Builder's Remedy, in conformance with state law, including the HAA and CEQA.

Based on the foregoing, the HAA causes of action are GRANTED IN PART. 600 Foothill's First Cause of Action - Violation of Housing Element Law 600 Foothill prays for a writ of mandate "compelling Respondents to adopt a revised housing element pursuant to Government Code Section 65754. 2" and "to complete the required rezoning consistent with an HCD-approved housing element." (Pet. Prayer ,i,i 1-2.) 600 Foothill filed its petition on July 21, 2023. The petition alleged the City had not substantially complied with the Housing Element Law at that time. {Pet. ,i 91.) As discussed, the City completed the required rezoning in September through November 2023, after 600 Foothill filed its petition. On November 17, 2023, HCD sent a letter to the City finding the City had "completed actions to address requirements described in HCD's April 24, 2023 review letter" and was in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law. (See Coy Deel. ,i 12, Exh. D.)
600 Foothill has not pleaded in the petition, or argued in its briefing, there is any deficiency in the February 2023 Housing Element that HCD found to be substantially compliant with the Housing Element Law in November 2023, after the City completed its rezoning. Accordingly, the first cause of action is moot. ( Wilson & Wilson v. City Council ofRedwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573 ("A case is considered moot when 'the question addressed was at one time a live issue in the case,' but has been deprived of life 'because of events occurring after

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the judicial process was initiated,' .... 'The pivotal question in determining if a case Is moot is t herefore whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief."']) 600 Foothill's first cause of action is DENIED as moot. 600 Foothill's Second Cause of Action -Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 600 Foothill prays for a writ "compelling Respondents to comply with their statutory obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing." (Pet. Prayer ,i 9.) 600 Foothill's writ briefing, however, only challenges the City's compliance with affirmatively further fair housing obligations as to the October 2022 Housing Element and required rezoning. (See 600 Foothill Opening Brief 21:10-12; Pet. ,i,i 106-108.) 600 Foothill does not develop any argument the City's February 2023 housing element, after completion of the required rezoning, does not comply with the City's affirmatively further fair housing obligations. Accordingly, the second cause of action is moot. (Wilson & Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 1573.) Alternatively, to the extent 600 Foothill contends in the petition the City remains out of compliance with its affirmatively further fair housing obligations (see Pet. ,i 105), 600 Foothill has not sufficient ly supported its position with evidence and legal analysis.
600 Foothill's second cause of action is DENIED as moot. 600 Foothill's Sixth Cause of Action -Violation of the PSA 600 Foothill contends the City violated the PSA in several ways with its incompleteness determinations and the City Council's May 1, 2023 Decision. (600 Foothill Opening Brief 19:14- 20-25; Pet. ,i,i 163-175.) 600 Foothill prays for a writ "compelling Respondents review and process applications pursuant to the Permit Streamlining Act's provisions, including refraining from refusing to process development applications based on erroneous assertions of incompleteness." (Pet. Prayer ,i 4.)
600 Foothill has demonstrated Respondents violated the PSA in at least two respects.

Specifically, section 65943, subdivision (a) provides "[i]f the application is determined to be incomplete, the lead agency shall provide the applicant with an exhaustive list of items that were not complete." (Emphasis added.) In addition, the list "shall be limited to those items actually required on the lead agency's submittal requirement checklist." (Ibid. {Emphasis added].) ''In any subsequent review of the application determined to be incomplete, the local agency shall not request the applicant to provide any new information that was not stated in the initial list of items that were not complete." (Ibid. [Emphasis added].) While neither party has cited any published authority interpreting these provisions, the plain language of section 65943, subdivision (a) is clear. The PSA required the City to provide 600 Foothill with an "exhaustive list" of incomplete items in its First Incompleteness Determination; incomplete items are limited to items on the City's "submittal requirement checklist"; and the City could not later request new information it omitted from the initial list. Respondents

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provide no alternative interpretation of the statutory language. (Opposition to 600 Foothill 20:5-21:8.) Director Koleda reports "it is a common practice for the City to provide information to a developer in the early stages of the application review regarding ways that the development does not meet applicable development standards." (Koleda Deel. ,i 42 [emphasis added].) Even if true, the City's common practice does not supersede the statutory requirements of the PSA.

In violation of these provisions of the PSA, the Second Incompleteness Determination found the Project was inconsistent with City's zoning and general plan standards because the Project did not qualify as a Builder's Remedy. (AR 6280-6281.) However, t hat issue was not raised in the First Incomplete Determination and was also not included on the City' s submittal requirement checklist. (See AR 5276-5279, 6280-6281; see also Koleda Deel. ,i 42.) Accordingly, the City violated section 65943, subdivision (a).30
Respondents suggest 600 Foothill was not prejudiced by the violations of the PSA because the application was deemed complete on May 26, 2023. (Oppo. to 600 Foothill 22:19-21 [citing AR 7169].) Respondents do not cite any authority for the proposition that PSA violations are excused by a purported lack of prejudice. Moreover, 600 Foothill was prejudiced when Respondents made a legally unauthorized incompleteness determination. 600 Foothill does not cite a statute or published authority suggesting the appropriate remedy for these types of violations of the PSA is an order compelling the City to approve the project.

As discussed for the HAA causes of action, the court will grant a writ directing Respondents to set aside the City Council's May 1, 2023 Decision and process 600 Foothill's application in accordance with the HM. The violations of the PSA proven by 600 Foothill provide additional support for that remedy. 600 Foothill does not demonstrate any additional relief is justified under the PSA.

To the extent 600 Foothill prays for a writ directing the City to comply with the PSA in the future or with respect to development applications of non-parties (see Prayer ,i 4), 600 Foothill 30 600 Foothill also contends "Respondents' Second Incompleteness Determination was issued on March 1, 2023 (AR 6280-81) more than 30 days after Petit ioner submitted the Project application on January 13, 2023." (600 Foothill Opening Brief 20:22-24.) 600 Foothill did not pay the fees for the application until January 31, 2023, which was less 30 days before March 1, 2023. (AR 7161-7162.) When submitting its application, the City advised 600 Foothill "the 30- day time limit to determine completeness of a development application per Government Code Section 65943 does not begin until all invoiced fees have been paid." (AR 7161-7162) Section 65943 is ambiguous as to whether the 30-day period begins running when the application is submitted/received or when the fees are paid. While 600 Foothill has a colorable argument the 30-day period began when City "received" the application on January 13, 2023, Respondents' alternative interpretation is also reasonable. 600 Foothill has not submitted any legislative history to support its interpretation. Accordingly, the court is not persuaded 600 Foothill met its burden as to it complaint about timeliness under the PSA.

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does not sufficiently support such a prayer in its briefing. Specifically, 600 Foothill does not explain how it has standing to enforce the PSA on behalf of non-parties, or how any claim with respect to the City's future compliance with the PSA is ripe for judicial review. 600 Foothill's sixth cause of action is GRANTED IN PART. The court finds the City violated the PSA in the manner it processed 600 Foothill's application. As a remedy, the May 1, 2023 Decision finding t hat the application was incomplete because the Project does not qualify as a Builder's Remedy must be set aside. In all others respect, the sixth cause of action is DENIED. 600 Foothill's Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action - State Density Bonus Law and Subdivision Map Act
600 Foothill argues the City Council's May 1, 2023 Decision effectively denied 600 Foothill's requests for a density bonus and concessions or incentives under the State Density Bonus Law, and "necessarily constituted a disapproval" under the Subdivision Map Act. (600 Foothill Opening Brief 21:25-22:12; see Pet. ,i,i 176-197.)
The court's analysis of the seventh and eighth causes of action is similar to that set forth earlier with 600 Foothill's claims under section 65589.5, subdivisions U) and (o). Upon remand, the City will be required to process 600 Foothill's application as a Builder's Remedy and in accordance with the HAA and other state housing laws, including the State Density Bonus Law and the Subdivision Map Act. It is premature at this time to adjudicate whether the City has complied with those statutes. 600 Foothill has been informed that the City's review process under the State Density Bonus Law and the Subdivision Map Act is ongoing. (See AR 7176-7178, 7169.) Accordingly, 600 Foothill does not prove its seventh and eighth causes of action are ripe for judicial review or that the issues have been exhausted. Further, to the extent 600 Foothill seeks a writ directing the City to "approve" the Project in full, it does not demonstrate it is entitled to that remedy, as discussed earlier.
600 Foothill's seventh and eighth causes of action are DENIED. 600 Foothill's Ninth Cause of Action is Stayed
Respondents specially moved to strike 600 Foothill's ninth cause of action (right to fair hearing) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The court denied the motion, and Respondents appealed. Given the appeal, the ninth cause of action is stayed. (See Code Civ.

Proc.,§§ 425.16, subd. (i), 916, subd. (a); Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 195.)31
Ill
31 Respondents conceded at the time the court heard the special motion to strike that an appeal would stay only the ninth cause of action.

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Causes of Action for Declaratory Relief by All Petitioners Issuance of a declaratory judgment is discretionary. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 1060.) Further, ''it is settled that declaratory relief is not an appropriate method for judicial review of administrative decisions." (Selby Realty Co. v. City ofSan Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 127; accord Sheetz v. County ofEl Dorado (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 394, 414 {"administrative mandamus is 'the proper and sole remedy' to challenge a local agencis application of the law (e.g., application of a zoning ordinance to a particular property)"].)
Although the petitions include various requests for declaratory relief, all such requests pertain to the validity of City Council's May 1, 2023 Decision, including the City Council's determination the October 2022 Housing Element substantially complied with state law and t he Project did not qualify as a Builder's Remedy. None of the Petitioners have developed a legal argument that declaratory relief is an appropriate, or necessary, form ofjudicial review of the administrative decisions at issue. Accordingly, Petitioners have not demonstrated t hey are entitled to declaratory relief.
600 Foothill's eleventh cause of action for declaratory relief, CHDF's second cause of action for declaratory relief, and lntervenors' second cause of action for declaratory relief are DENIED as unnecessary given the court's decision on the HAA causes of action.

Retention of Jurisdiction
The court found Respondents, "in violation of subdivision (d), disapproved a housing development project ... without making findings supported by a preponderance of the evidence."32 (§ 65589.5, subd. (k)(l)(A)(i).) Accordingly, the court is required to "retain jurisdiction to ensure that its ,,. judgment is carried out , .. . " (Id. at subd. (k)(l)(A)(ii).)

CONCLUSION
The petitions of 600 Foothill, CHDF, and lntervenors to enforce the HAA are GRANTED IN PART.

The court finds the City Council prejudicially abused its discretion when it found in its May 1, 2023 Decision that the Builder's Remedy does not apply to the Project. The court will grant a writ directing Respondents to set aside the City Council's decision, dated May 1, 2023, finding 600 Foothill's application does not qualify as a Builder's Remedy and to process the application in accordance with the HAA and state law. The HAA claims are denied in all other respects. 600 Foothill's first, second, seventh, and eighth causes of action are DENIED. 32 The City's finding its October 2022 Housing Element was in substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law was not supported by substantial evidence. As discussed supra, HCD had advised the Ci~y why t he October 2022 Housing Element was not in substantial compliance.

Moreover, Director Koleda on January 11, 12 and February 9, 2023 appeared to accept HCD's evaluation that the City could not achieve substantial compliance with the Housing Element Law without "additional changes" and "clarifications." (AR 12894, 13011.)

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600 Foothill's sixth cause of action is GRANTED IN PART. The court finds the City violated the PSA in the manner it processed 600 Foothill's application and, as a remedy, the May 1, 2023 Decision finding the application was incomplete because the Project does not qualify as a Builder's Remedy must be set aside. In all others respect, the sixth cause of action is DENIED. 600 Foothill's ninth cause of action is stayed pending Respondents' appeal of denial of its antiSLAPP motion. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16, subd. (i), 916, subd. (a).) 600 Foothill's eleventh cause of action for declaratory relief, CHDF's second cause of action for declaratory relief, and lntervenors' second cause of action for declaratory relief are DENIED.

As to Case No. 23STCP02614 brought by CDHF, the court will enter judgment on the first cause of action in favor of CDHF and lntervenors on the first cause of action.

As to Case No. 23STPC02575 brought by 600 Foothill, the court does not enter judgment at this time given the pending appeal on 600 Foothill's ninth cause of action and Respondents' special motion to strike. The matter is continued to December 4, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. for a hearing on the status of Respondents' appeal.

The court will retain jurisdiction over this matter (in both cases) as required by section 65589.5, subd. (k)(l)(A)(ii).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March'{ 2024 Lu~c Hon. Mitchell Becklo
Judge of the Superior Court

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PROOF OF SERVICE
California Housing Defense Fund v. City of La Cañada Flintridge Case No. 23STCP02614

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 101 Mission Street, Sixth Floor, San Francisco, CA 94105-1738.

On March 6, 2024, along with an unsigned copy of this proof of service, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as:

NOTICE OF RULING ON PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDATE (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1019.5)
on the interested parties in this action as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address [email protected] to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 6, 2024, at San Francisco, California.

Sherry Zhu
[4450795.1]
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SERVICE LIST
California Housing Defense Fund v. City of La Cañada Flintridge Case No. 23STCP02614
Attorneys for Respondent City of La Cañada Flintridge
Adrian R. Guerra
City Attorney, City of La Cañada Flintridge
Michelle L. Villarreal
Erika D. Green

ALESHIRE & WYNDER, LLP
1 Park Plaza, Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92614-8507
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Peter C. Sheridan
Christopher L. Dacus

GLASER WEIL FINK HOWARD

JORDAN & SHAPIRO LLP
10250 Constellation Boulevard, 19th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067-6219
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest 600 Foothill Owner LP Ryan M. Leaderman
Kevin J. Ashe
William E. Sterling

HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP
400 South Hope Street, 8th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2809
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Petitioners-Intervenors People of the State of California ex rel. Rob Bonta and California Department of Housing and Community Development

ROB BONTA
Attorney General of California

CHRISTINA BULL ARNDT

DAVID PAI
Supervising Deputy Attorneys General
State Bar Nos. 175403, 227058

NINA LINCOFF
Deputy Attorney General
State Bar No. 348936
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor
P.O. Box 70550
Oakland, CA 94612-0550
[email protected]
[email protected]
[4450795.1]
80 September 22, 2025 Item 7

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA
Dated and Entered: 02/26/2025 Time: 10:00 AM
Judicial Officer: Thomas P Anderle
Deputy Clerk: Veronica Robles Dept: SB Dept 3
Deputy Sheriff:

Bailiff/Court Officer: Brandon Thillman Case No: 24CV00548 Court Reporter: Lindy DeBoer
Shelby Family Partnership LP vs City of Goleta et al
Parties Present:

Collins, Beth A Attorney for Plaintiff
Brand, Alex Attorney for Defendant
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Motion: Partial Judgment; Motion: Judgment on Pleadings Mr. Brand presented oral argument. After argument the Court adopted the tentative ruling as indicated below.

RULING
(1) For the reasons and to the extent set forth herein, the motion of petitioner Shelby Family Partnership, L.P., for judgment on its first and second causes of action for issuance of a writ of mandate is granted. The court will issue a writ of mandate as and when appropriate. (2) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of respondent and defendants City of Goleta and City of Goleta Council for judgment on the pleadings is denied in its entirety.

Background
(1) Project Submission
This proceeding involves a development project (the Shelby Project) on real property located at 7400 Cathedral Oaks Road in Goleta (the Property). (Administrative Record, vol. 1, at p. 20 [1 AR 20].) (Note:

The parties use different methods of citing to the administrative record. Herein, citations to the administrative record are as follows: [volume] AR [page number of the pdf document of that volume of the administrative record]. Citation to an electronic administrative record by the parties should not require the court to search an index to determine which volume (i.e., pdf document) of a multi-volume record contains the cited material nor require the court to go to a page number different from the page number of the pdf document. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.109, 3.1110(c) [documents must be consecutively paginated starting on the first page].)) The Property is surrounded by the Glen Annie Golf Course to the north and east, El Encanto Creek and Northgate Drive condominiums to the west, and Cathedral Oaks Road and single family residential development to the south. (First Amended Petition [FAP], ¶ 53; Answer, ¶ 53.) Petitioner Shelby Family Partnership, L.P. (Shelby LP or Petitioner) is the owner of the Property. (FAP, ¶ 1; 1 AR 114.)
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As of 2005, the Property was within the AG-II-40 zone district. (1 AR 114.) In 2005, Shelby LP submitted applications for a General Plan Amendment (05-154-GPA), a rezone (05-154-RZ), a Zoning Ordinance Text Amendment (05-154-OA), a Vesting Tentative Map (VTM) (05-154-VTM), a Development Plan (05-154-DP), and a Development Agreement (05-153-DA) (collectively, Entitlements) to return the Property to its prior General Plan and zoning designations for residential development. (FAP, ¶ 54; Answer, ¶ 54.) The applications for the Entitlements (individually or collectively, the 2011 Application) were determined to be complete by respondent City of Goleta (City) on or before March 10, 2011, after refinements to the Shelby Residential Project applications were submitted on February 1, 2011. (Ibid.)
In 2012, City voters approved Measure G (i.e., the Agricultural Land Protection Initiative) that, among other things, established a voter-approval requirement for changing Agricultural General Plan land use designations or zoning for parcels larger than ten acres until December 31, 2032, absent certain findings. (FAP, ¶ 55; Answer, ¶ 55.) The City Council recently approved adding a measure on the November 5, 2024, ballot to extend Measure G to 2052. (Ibid.)
In 2013, City’s then-City Attorney, Tim W. Giles, provided a memorandum to the Goleta City Council which provided an opinion that “The Goleta Agricultural Land Protection Initiative does not apply to the Shelby project because the rules for processing the Shelby project vested, or became fixed, under the Subdivision Map Act upon completion of the application in 2011, prior to the initiative being proposed in 2012. This fact was disclosed as part of the Impact Report prepared by the City Attorney at the request of the City Council, prior to the election, to help voters understand the impacts of the proposed initiative.” (FAP, ¶ 56 & exhibit D; Answer, ¶ 56.)
In 2016, Shelby LP put processing of the Entitlements on hold with the City in response to the Goleta Water District enacting a moratorium on new or additional water service connections. (FAP, ¶ 58; Answer, ¶ 58.) In early 2023, the Goleta Water District indicated the intent to rescind the moratorium on new or additional water service connections, and its Board of Directors officially rescinded the moratorium on December 12, 2023. (FAP, ¶ 59; Answer, ¶ 59.) On March 16, 2023, Shelby LP submitted an “SB 330 Preliminary Application” (the March 2023 Application). (FAP, ¶ 62; Answer, ¶ 62.) Shelby LP characterizes this application as a preliminary application revising the development plan for the Shelby Project to include at least 13 units affordable to lower-income households and not proposing any changes to the Vesting Tentative Tract Map (VTTM). (Motion, at p. 10; 1 AR 196-252.)
On March 21, 2023, the City Attorney sent a letter to Shelby LP’s counsel asserting, among other things, that the March 2023 Application was not a project subject to SB 330 or the Builder’s Remedy. (1 AR 298-305.) At this time, the City’s Housing Element remained substantially out of compliance with State Housing Element Law. (14 AR 20-24.)
On November 29, 2023, Shelby LP filed its second “SB 330 Preliminary Application” (SPA). (1 AR 310- 380; 2 AR 20; FAP, ¶ 69; Answer, ¶ 69.)
On December 5, 2023, City staff sent a series of emails stating that the SPA was returned and the check for the fees had been placed in the mail. (FAP, ¶ 70; Answer, ¶ 70.) On December 21, 2023, the City Planning & Environmental Review Director Peter Imhof rejected Shelby LP’s appeal. (FAP, ¶ 75; Answer, ¶ 75.)
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(2) Procedural History
On January 30, 2024, Shelby LP filed its original petition and complaint asserting seven causes of action:
(1) traditional writ of mandate—violation of SB 330 preliminary application law (Gov. Code, § 65941.1); (2) administrative writ of mandate—violation of Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, § 65589.5); (3) administrative writ of mandate—violation of Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, §§ 65589.5, subd. (o), 66474.2); (4) administrative writ of mandate—violation of Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, §§ 65589.5, subd. (o); (5) traditional writ of mandate—violation of State Housing Element Law (Gov.

Code, §§ 65580 et seq., 8899.50); (6) injunctive relief (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 525, 526); and (7) declaratory relief.

On June 26, 2024, with City’s demurrer to the original petition and complaint pending, Shelby LP filed its FAP asserting six causes of action: (1) traditional writ of mandate—violation of SB 330 preliminary application law (Gov. Code, § 65941.1); (2) administrative writ of mandate—violation of Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, § 65589.5); (3) administrative writ of mandate—violation of Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, §§ 65589.5, subd. (o), 66474.2); (4) administrative writ of mandate— violation of Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, §§ 65589.5, subd. (o); (5) traditional writ of mandate—violation of State Housing Element Law (Gov. Code, §§ 65580 et seq., 8899.50); and (6) declaratory relief.

On August 29, 2024, respondents filed their answer to the FAP, admitting and denying allegations thereof and asserting 15 affirmative defenses.

On September 12, 2024, Shelby LP filed its motion for judgment on the first and second causes of action of the FAP.

On October 7, 2024, respondents filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action of the FAP. Also on October 7, Shelby LP requested, and the court entered, dismissal as to the third and fourth causes of action of the FAP.

All motions are opposed by the respective responding parties.

On December 20, 2024, with leave of court, the California Attorney General filed an amicus brief supporting Shelby LP. On January 10, 2025, the respondents filed opposition to the amicus brief.

The court held a hearing on this matter on January 15, 2025. At that hearing the court adopted its tentative in which the court determined that Shelby LP is entitled to issuance of a writ of mandate under its first cause of action to compel the City to accept the SPA and to process the SPA as discussed therein. The court also determined that City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings would be denied as to the first cause of action for the same reason. The court observed that the consequences of these determinations were not clear as to the remaining matters before the court. The court requested further briefing, which the parties timely provided.

Analysis
(I) Previous Determinations Restated
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For completeness and convenience, this section I repeats the court’s analysis and determinations adopted at the January 15, 2025, hearing.
(1) Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment
(A) Procedural Matters
Respondents first argue in their opposition that this motion is procedurally improper because respondents have answered the FAP and denied, i.e., disputed factual assertions in the FAP, relying upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.
“If a petition for a writ of mandate filed pursuant to Section 1088.5 presents no triable issue of fact or is based solely on an administrative record, the matter may be determined by the court by noticed motion of any party for a judgment on the peremptory writ.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.) In this case, the petition is based on the administrative record and, where appropriate, upon judicially noticed materials. The matter may therefore be determined upon motion. The motion is therefore not inappropriate on that basis. The court has, by its scheduling orders, permitted this motion for judgment as to the first and second causes of action, effectively bifurcating trial on the merits as to these causes of action.

In support of the motion for judgment, Shelby LP requests that the court take judicial notice of:
(Petitioner’s Requests for Judicial Notice [PRJN], exhibit A) a memorandum dated January 15, 2013, authored by City Attorney Tim W. Giles and directed to the Goleta City Council; (exhibit B) a letter dated February 16, 2023, from Shannan West, Housing Accountability Unit Chief with the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Division of Housing Policy Development, to Jennifer Armer, Planning Manager for the Town of Los Gatos; (exhibit C) a letter dated July 23, 2024, from Shannan West, Housing Accountability Unit Chief with the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Division of Housing Policy Development, to Sharon Goei, Community Development Director for the City of Gilroy; (exhibit D) an email exchange, dated between May 18, 2023, and May 25, 2023, between John Buettner, Housing Accountability Manager for the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Housing Policy Division, staff and attorneys representing the City of Goleta, and counsel for Shelby LP; (exhibit E) an email exchange, dated between January 5, 2024, and January 29, 2024, between Grace Wu, Senior Housing Policy Specialist with the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Housing Policy Development Division, Housing Accountability Unit, and counsel for Shelby LP; (exhibit F) an email exchange, dated between April 3, 2023, and May 17, 2023, between various officials and staff from the California Department of Housing and Community Development and counsel for Shelby LP; (exhibit G) emails sent by staff at the City of Goleta to Shelby LP’s counsel on December 5, 2023, without attachments.

The court grants these unopposed requests for judicial notice. Judicial notice does not extend to the truth of facts set forth in judicially noticed documents. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117.)
(B) First Cause of Action for Traditional Mandamus
(i) Standards of Review
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The first cause of action is for traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “ ‘[A] court may issue a writ of mandate to compel a public agency or officer to perform a mandatory duty. [Citation.] “This type of writ petition ‘seeks to enforce a mandatory and ministerial duty to act on the part of an administrative agency or its officers.’ ” ’ [Citation.] To obtain relief on this basis, the petitioner must establish the existence of a public officer’s or a public entity’s ‘clear, present, and ministerial duty where the petitioner has a beneficial right to performance of that duty.’ [Citations.] Under this theory, ‘[m]andamus may issue ... to compel an official both to exercise his discretion (if he is required to do so) and to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law.’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “ ‘[t]he writ will not lie to control discretion conferred upon a public officer or agency.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1177.)
Here, Shelby LP seeks to compel City to accept its SPA as complete as of the date of its submission and payment of the applicable fee, and thereby to process the SPA according to applicable law. Shelby LP argues that the City is limited to determining completeness of the application to accept or to reject it and that the City has a ministerial duty to accept the application.

City argues that former Government Code section 65941.1 (see below re “former”) does not require the City to accept and process the SPA as an amended application because preliminary applications “are only for new development projects.” (Opposition, at p. 7.)
(ii) Submission
Former section 65941.1, subdivision (a) provides:
“An applicant for a housing development project, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 65905.5, shall be deemed to have submitted a preliminary application upon providing all of the following information about the proposed project to the city, county, or city and county from which approval for the project is being sought and upon payment of the permit processing fee:
“(1) The specific location, including parcel numbers, a legal description, and site address, if applicable.
“(2) The existing uses on the project site and identification of major physical alterations to the property on which the project is to be located.
“(3) A site plan showing the location on the property, elevations showing design, color, and material, and the massing, height, and approximate square footage, of each building that is to be occupied. “(4) The proposed land uses by number of units and square feet of residential and nonresidential development using the categories in the applicable zoning ordinance. “(5) The proposed number of parking spaces.
“(6) Any proposed point sources of air or water pollutants. “(7) Any species of special concern known to occur on the property. “(8) Whether a portion of the property is located within any of the following:

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“(A) A very high fire hazard severity zone, as determined by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection pursuant to Section 51178.
“(B) Wetlands, as defined in the United States Fish and Wildlife Service Manual, Part 660 FW 2 (June 21, 1993).
“(C) A hazardous waste site that is listed pursuant to Section 65962.5 or a hazardous waste site designated by the Department of Toxic Substances Control pursuant to Article 5 (commencing with Section 78760) of Chapter 4 of Part 2 of Division 45 of the Health and Safety Code. “(D) A special flood hazard area subject to inundation by the 1 percent annual chance flood (100-year flood) as determined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in any official maps published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
“(E) A delineated earthquake fault zone as determined by the State Geologist in any official maps published by the State Geologist, unless the development complies with applicable seismic protection building code standards adopted by the California Building Standards Commission under the California Building Standards Law (Part 2.5 (commencing with Section 18901) of Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code), and by any local building department under Chapter 12.2 (commencing with Section 8875) of Division 1 of Title 2.
“(F) A stream or other resource that may be subject to a streambed alteration agreement pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1600) of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code. “(9) Any historic or cultural resources known to exist on the property. “(10) The number of proposed below market rate units and their affordability levels. “(11) The number of bonus units and any incentives, concessions, waivers, or parking reductions requested pursuant to Section 65915.
“(12) Whether any approvals under the Subdivision Map Act, including, but not limited to, a parcel map, a tentative map, or a condominium map, are being requested. “(13) The applicant’s contact information and, if the applicant does not own the property, consent from the property owner to submit the application. “(14) For a housing development project proposed to be located within the coastal zone, whether any portion of the property contains any of the following:
“(A) Wetlands, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 13577 of Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations.
“(B) Environmentally sensitive habitat areas, as defined in Section 30240 of the Public Resources Code.
“(C) A tsunami run-up zone.
“(D) Use of the site for public access to or along the coast. “(15) The number of existing residential units on the project site that will be demolished and whether each existing unit is occupied or unoccupied.
“(16) A site map showing a stream or other resource that may be subject to a streambed alteration agreement pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1600) of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code and an aerial site photograph showing existing site conditions of environmental site features that would be subject to regulations by a public agency, including creeks and wetlands. “(17) The location of any recorded public easement, such as easements for storm drains, water lines, and other public rights of way.” (Gov. Code, § 65941.1, subd. (a).) (Note: At the time the SPA was submitted, a slightly different version of section 65941.1 was effective. (Stats. 2021, ch. 161, § 6.) This earlier version was amended in 2022, effective January 1, 2024, (Stats. 2022, ch. 258, § 27) and again in 2024, effective January 1, 2025 (Stats. 2024, ch. 358, § 2). The revisions do not substantively affect the arguments of the parties but, in some cases, the relevant subdivisions have been re-lettered. The parties’ papers were filed prior to the effective date of the most recent amendment SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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and reflect the former version of section 65941.1. All further statutory references herein to the Government Code, current or former, are to the version in effect in November 2023.) As noted above, former section 65941.1 applies to a “housing development project” as defined in section 65905.5, subdivision (b)(3):
“(A) ‘Housing development project’ has the same meaning as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (h) of Section 65589.5.
“(B) ‘Housing development project’ includes, but is not limited to, projects that involve no discretionary approvals and projects that involve both discretionary and nondiscretionary approvals. “(C) ‘Housing development project’ includes a proposal to construct a single dwelling unit. This subparagraph shall not affect the interpretation of the scope of paragraph (2) of subdivision (h) of Section 65589.5.” (Gov. Code, § 65905.5, subd. (b)(3).)
Section 65905.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A), in turn looks to the definition in former section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(2):
“ ‘Housing development project’ means a use consisting of any of the following:
‘(A) Residential units only.
“(B) Mixed-use developments consisting of residential and nonresidential uses with at least two-thirds of the square footage designated for residential use. ‘(C) Transitional housing or supportive housing.” (Former Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(2).) Starting at former section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(2), “housing development project” is defined as a use of land for housing purposes. This definition does not exclude prior proposed or partially completed projects. The fact, therefore, that Shelby LP had a prior development project pending with the City for the same real property, i.e., the 2011 Applications, does not exclude the SPA from the definition of “housing development project.” Accordingly, there is persuasive and substantial evidence presented that the Shelby Project as reflected in the SPA is a “housing development project” within the meaning of Government Code former section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(2)(A), section 65905.5, subdivision (b)(3)(A), and former section 65941.1, subdivision (a). (E.g., 1 AR 310-313, 332-339.) Shelby LP, as the party applying for development is for the same reason also an “applicant for a housing development project.” Moreover, Shelby LP has shown, and City has not disputed, that Shelby LP has provided the information about the proposed project to the City as required by former section 65941.1, subdivision (a)(1) through (17). (E.g., 1 AR 332-339.) There is also evidence presented that Shelby LP made the payment required for the SPA as an application. (2 AR 32.)
Shelby LP has provided all of the information and payment required by former section 65941.1, subdivision (a) so that under the plain meaning of the statute the “applicant for a housing development project … shall be deemed to have submitted a preliminary application ….” Thus, under former section 65941.1 the SPA is deemed submitted to the City. Because the SPA is deemed submitted to the City, it is correspondingly then received by the City under section 65943:
“Not later than 30 calendar days after any public agency has received an application for a development project, the agency shall determine in writing whether the application is complete and shall immediately transmit the determination to the applicant for the development project. If the application is determined to be incomplete, the lead agency shall provide the applicant with an exhaustive list of items that were not SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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complete. That list shall be limited to those items actually required on the lead agency’s submittal requirement checklist. In any subsequent review of the application determined to be incomplete, the local agency shall not request the applicant to provide any new information that was not stated in the initial list of items that were not complete. If the written determination is not made within 30 days after receipt of the application, and the application includes a statement that it is an application for a development permit, the application shall be deemed complete for purposes of this chapter. Upon receipt of any resubmittal of the application, a new 30-day period shall begin, during which the public agency shall determine the completeness of the application. If the application is determined not to be complete, the agency’s determination shall specify those parts of the application which are incomplete and shall indicate the manner in which they can be made complete, including a list and thorough description of the specific information needed to complete the application. The applicant shall submit materials to the public agency in response to the list and description.” (Gov. Code, § 65943, subd. (a).) The determination of completeness under section 65943, subdivision (a) is qualified and extended by former section 65941.1, subdivision (d):
“(1) Within 180 calendar days after submitting a preliminary application with all of the information required by subdivision (a) to a city, county, or city and county, the development proponent shall submit an application for a development project that includes all of the information required to process the development application consistent with Sections 65940, 65941, and 65941.5. “(2) If the public agency determines that the application for the development project is not complete pursuant to Section 65943, the development proponent shall submit the specific information needed to complete the application within 90 days of receiving the agency’s written identification of the necessary information. If the development proponent does not submit this information within the 90-day period, then the preliminary application shall expire and have no further force or effect. “(3) This section shall not require an affirmative determination by a city, county, or city and county regarding the completeness of a preliminary application or a development application for purposes of compliance with this section.” (Former Gov. Code, § 65941.1, subd. (d).) Former section 65941.1, subdivision (d)(3)’s use of the term “section” rather than “subdivision” as in subdivision (d)(1) indicates that subdivision (d)(3) is not limited to subdivision (d). (See Gov. Code, §

10.) Hence, the City is not required to make an affirmative determination regarding the completeness of the SPA to comply with section 65941.1. As this discussion demonstrates, there is a certain tension between section 65943 and former section 65941.1. Section 65943 requires the City to determine in writing whether the application is complete; former section 65941.1 does not require an affirmative determination of completeness. This tension is resolved by noting the provisions that deem a preliminary application to be complete without affirmative determination by the City:
“If the written determination is not made within 30 days after receipt of the application, and the application includes a statement that it is an application for a development permit, the application shall be deemed complete for purposes of this chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 65943, subd. (a).) Thus, if a City fails to make an affirmative determination of completeness, and correspondingly fails to make an affirmative determination of incompleteness, then the law makes the determination by deeming the application complete. “Notwithstanding any other law, until January 1, 2030, ‘deemed complete’ means that the applicant has submitted a preliminary application pursuant to Section 65941.1 or, if the applicant has not submitted a preliminary application, has submitted a complete application pursuant to Section 65943.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(5).) Here, a written determination of incompleteness SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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was not made within 30 days after receipt and the application is an application for a development permit.

The SPA is thus, by operation of law, a complete submitted preliminary application. (iii) Processing the Application
As the above discussion concludes, the SPA was, by operation of law, deemed submitted and received by the City, and then deemed complete. Further action by the City up to this point in the analysis is neither required nor needed. How the application must now be processed is a core dispute between the parties.

The City is not free to ignore a complete preliminary application for a housing development project. The City must act upon it. As discussed above, the City acted upon the SPA by rejecting it on the improper ground that a preliminary application cannot be made where a prior development application exists for the property. The City has a ministerial duty to process the SPA which may be compelled by writ of mandate.

What that means in this context, however, is not immediately obvious. The principle that creates the fundamental dispute between the parties is set forth in the Housing Accountability Act (HAA):
“Subject to paragraphs (2), (6), and (7), and subdivision (d) of Section 65941.1, a housing development project shall be subject only to the ordinances, policies, and standards adopted and in effect when a preliminary application including all of the information required by subdivision (a) of Section 65941.1 was submitted.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (o)(1).)
“For purposes of this subdivision, ‘ordinances, policies, and standards’ includes general plan, community plan, specific plan, zoning, design review standards and criteria, subdivision standards and criteria, and any other rules, regulations, requirements, and policies of a local agency, as defined in Section 66000, including those relating to development impact fees, capacity or connection fees or charges, permit or processing fees, and other exactions.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (o)(4).) Shelby LP argues that the “ordinances, policies, and standards” in effect at the time of the submission of the SPA include those matters vested as a result of the 2011 Applications. The City argues that Shelby LP’s approach improperly retroactively applies the HAA to the 2011 Application, that is, allows for retroactive vesting.

It is useful to consider the situation involving vesting tentative tract maps under the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.):
“The Subdivision Map Act (Act) permits a subdivider to file a ‘vesting tentative map’ whenever the Act requires a tentative map. This procedure is intended to provide greater statutory protection to subdividers than was afforded under the common law vested rights doctrine. [Citations.] “The intent of the Legislature in enacting the vesting tentative map statute (Gov. Code, §§ 66498.1– 66498.9) is spelled out in Government Code section 66498.9: ‘By the enactment of this article, the Legislature intends to accomplish all of the following objectives: [¶] (a) To establish a procedure for the approval of tentative maps that will provide certain statutorily vested rights to a subdivider. [¶] (b) To insure that local requirements governing the development of a proposed subdivision are established in accordance with Section 66498.1 when a local agency approves or conditionally approves a vesting tentative map. The private sector should be able to rely upon an approved vesting tentative map prior to expending resources and incurring liabilities without the risk of having the project frustrated by subsequent action by the approving local agency....’
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“Government Code sections 66498.1–66498.9 were enacted in response to the erosion of the common law doctrine of vested rights. [Citations.] The Legislature enacted these provisions to freeze in place those ‘ordinances, policies and standards in effect’ at the time the vesting tentative map application is deemed complete. [Citation.] These provisions enable the private sector to rely on vesting maps to plan and budget development projects. [Citation.] ‘The vesting tentative map statute now offers developers a degree of assurance, not previously available, against changes in regulations.’ [Citations.]” (Bright Development v.

City of Tracy (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 783, 792–793 (Bright Development).) The vesting tentative tract map statute includes language that is parallel to that in the HAA:
“When a local agency approves or conditionally approves a vesting tentative map, that approval shall confer a vested right to proceed with development in substantial compliance with the ordinances, policies, and standards described in Section 66474.2.” (Gov. Code, § 66498.1, subd. (b).) “Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b) or (c), in determining whether to approve or disapprove an application for a tentative map, the local agency shall apply only those ordinances, policies, and standards in effect at the date the local agency has determined that the application is complete pursuant to Section 65943 of the Government Code.” (Gov. Code, § 66474.2, subd. (a).)
With the use of nearly identical language found in section 65589.5, subdivision (o)(1), there is a strong reason to believe that the purpose behind the application of only those ordinances, policies, and standards in effect at the time of completion expressed in section 66474.2 and explained in Bright Development is the same purpose behind section 65589.5.

The case of North Murrieta Community, LLC v. City of Murrieta (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 31 (Murrieta), which was not cited by any party, is instructive. In Murrieta, the plaintiff was a developer of a project within the defendant city. (Id. at p. 34.) In July 1999, the plaintiff developer obtained approval for a vesting tentative map on the part of the project property. (Ibid.) The map locked in place fees the defendant city could charge the developer until the vesting tentative map expired two years later. (Ibid.) In March 2001, four months before the map would expire, the plaintiff developer and the defendant city entered into a development agreement covering the entire project property. (Ibid.) The development agreement extended the term of the vesting tentative map for 15 years and also locked in place regulations and fees on the project for the same time. (Ibid.) The development agreement explicitly allowed the defendant city to impose new mitigation fees to address the effects of development not fully mitigated by fees or exactions at the time of the development agreement. (Id. at p. 35.) The defendant city subsequently imposed new fees, which the plaintiff developer protested. (Ibid.) In the trial court in Murrieta, the plaintiff developer sought a writ of mandate to return the fees and sought judicial declarations that the defendant city could not impose those fees under the development agreement until it expired. (Murrieta, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 35.) The trial court determined that the defendant city was permitted to impose the fees. (Ibid.) The plaintiff developer appealed. (Ibid.) On appeal in Murrieta, the court framed this issue to be decided as “whether a subsequent development agreement can alter the builder’s vested rights under the vesting tentative map.” (Murrieta, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 35.) After explaining the common purpose of vesting tentative maps and development agreements, the court noted:

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“Thus, obtaining either a vesting tentative map or entering a development agreement allows a builder to rely on the regulations, conditions, and fees that exist at the planning stage when assessing the economics of completing a development that may take years or even decades to complete. ‘The purpose of [a] vesting tentative map and [a] development agreement is to allow a developer who needs additional discretionary approvals to complete a long-term development project as approved, regardless of any intervening changes in local regulations.’ [Citations.]” (Murrieta, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 41.) The Murrieta court observed:
“A vesting tentative map does not freeze regulations and fees indefinitely. The tentative map statute, which applies to vesting tentative maps, provides all tentative maps expire 24 months after their initial approval, though that period may be extended by ordinance up to 12 months. [Citation.] Here, the [defendant city] approved [plaintiff developer’s] vesting tentative map on July 28, 1999. That means the map—and [the plaintiff developer’s] rights—were set to expire on July 28, 2001. [Citation.] [¶] As it happens, the [defendant city] and [plaintiff developer] came to an agreement to extend the term of the vesting tentative map by nearly 15 years. They accomplished this by entering the development agreement.

The Legislature specifically allowed ‘a tentative map on property subject to a development agreement ... may be extended for the period of time provided for in the agreement, but not beyond the duration of the agreement.’ [Citation.] So, in March 2001, when [the plaintiff developer] was four months away from losing all the rights the vesting tentative map had conferred, they negotiated an extension of those rights with the [defendant city] as part of the development agreement concerning the entire [project].” (Murrieta, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 42.)
“However, the terms of the development agreement make clear the [defendant city] did not agree to extend all the rights conveyed by the vesting tentative map. [The plaintiff developer] made concessions.

For one, the parties agreed the date on which the [the defendant city] would be barred from imposing new fees and conditions was March 5, 2001, the effective date of the agreement, not the date the vesting tentative map was approved.” (Murrieta, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 42, italics omitted.) The plaintiff developer “also agreed to allow the [defendant city] to impose new mitigation fees under certain conditions.” (Ibid.)
The Murrieta court rejected the argument that the vesting tentative map provides a separate source of rights that was unaffected by the development agreement. (Murrieta, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) “[A]ltering the protections of the vesting tentative map was an explicit and critical part of the agreement.

Some provisions benefited the developer. They obtained the [defendant city’s] agreement to limit for a period of 15 years their ability to impose new regulations, conditions, and fees not provided for by the agreement. But some provisions benefited the [defendant city]. Most importantly, the provision giving it discretion to increase mitigation fees so long as they were generally applicable and aimed at mitigation not already provided for. [the plaintiff developer] can’t claim the benefit of the provisions that benefit them but disclaim the provisions that don’t.” (Ibid.)
The Murrieta court thus concluded that the development agreement gave the defendant city the authority to impose new, generally applicable mitigation fees. (Id. at p. 45.) Underlying the decision in Murrieta is that the rights attendant to vesting tentative tract maps are separate rights from rights under a development agreement so that rights in vesting tentative tract maps, like other property rights, may be compromised or conditioned by later contract—which give rise to separate contract rights. As Murrieta points out, had there been no development agreement in Murrieta, the SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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vesting tentative tract map rights would have been resolved according to the statutory law and expired.

But this point also demonstrates that the development agreement is a separate source of rights, duties, and conditions.

In construing section 65589.5, subdivision (o)(1), it is also important to consider the rules of construction provided in the HAA:
“It is the policy of the state that this section be interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision of, housing.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L).)
“This subdivision [(o)] shall not be construed in a manner that would lessen the restrictions imposed on a local agency, or lessen the protections afforded to a housing development project, that are established by any other law, including any other part of this section.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (o)(5).) Putting together these concepts, the Entitlements acquired under the 2011 Application were, at the time of the completeness of the SPA, rights vested in Shelby LP. Following the reasoning in Murietta, the amendments made to the Shelby Project by the SPA would affect the legal status of the Entitlements only to the extent that such amendments would have affected the legal status of the Entitlements without consideration of the HAA. This is so because the “ordinances, policies, and standards” at the time of the completeness of the SPA would include legal rules of how entitlements under other law would be altered by substantive amendment. To the extent that such amendments do not modify or extinguish an Entitlement by operation of law, the legal rights not so affected are part and parcel of the SPA.

An alternative interpretation of subdivision (o)(1) would run counter to the interpretive rule of subdivision (o)(5) by lessening the protections afforded to Shelby LP for the Shelby Project established by other law.

An alternative interpretation would also run counter to the policy established in subdivision (a)(2)(L) to give weight to the approval and provision of housing by forcing Shelby LP either to lose the benefits of the HAA by moving forward with the earlier version of the Shelby Project with its Entitlements or to lose the benefits of its Entitlements by moving forward with the SPA as if it were a wholly new project. The clear legislative intent of the HAA is to promote housing by providing additional opportunities for approval based upon the status quo ante of rights and conditions.

In this way, the HAA is not “retroactively” vesting anything. “Generally, a law has retroactive effect when it functions to change the legal consequences of a party’s past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities based upon such conduct. [Citation.] [¶] ‘[T]he critical question for determining retroactivity usually is whether the last act or event necessary to trigger application of the statute occurred before or after the statute’s effective date. [Citations.] A law is not retroactive “merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came into existence prior to its enactment.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association v. County of Ventura (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 585, 591.)
Here, the most reasonable interpretation of the HAA is that it takes the rights and conditions of development projects as they are under other law and provides additional rights going forward. This is a prospective application of the HAA, not an improper retroactive application.

Shelby LP is therefore entitled to issuance of a writ of mandate under the first cause of action to compel the City to accept the SPA and to process the SPA as discussed herein.

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(II) Matters Not Determined at January 15, 2025, Hearing (1) Issuing a Writ of Mandate
In supplemental briefing, Shelby LP argues that the next step as to the first cause of action is “preparation and issuance of a writ of mandate compelling the City to accept and process the SPA in accordance with the Ruling and with applicable law.” (Shelby LP Supp. Brief, at p. 4.) The City argues that the court’s ruling is incorrect, but if the court sticks with its ruling, then the City agrees that the writ should require only that City accept and process the application. (City Supp. Response Brief, at p. 2.) Both parties agree that it is premature and inappropriate for the court to make any determinations now as to how the SPA should be processed.

This ruling therefore disposes of the first cause of action substantively. However, the court is not in a position to issue the writ at this time because other causes of action remain pending. “Under California procedure there is ordinarily only one final judgment in an action.” (Evans v. Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 758, 760.) The one final judgment rule applies where a complaint includes both a petition for writ of mandate and other claims. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com’n (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697; Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743.) The issuance of the writ must therefore await determination of the remainder of Petitioner’s action. (2) Second Cause of Action for Administrative Mandate
The parties agree the second cause of action for administrative writ of mandate based upon a violation of the HAA is ripe for adjudication. The parties disagree as to whether the court’s disposition of the first cause of action has any impact upon the disposition of the second cause of action. Accordingly, the court will address the merits of the second cause of action.
(A) Standards of Review
“Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).)
“The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)
“Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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“On ‘ “purely legal” ’ questions, we exercise independent judgment and a decision ‘must “be reversed if based on erroneous conclusions of law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Family Health Centers of San Diego v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2023) 15 Cal.5th 1, 10.) “The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.” (MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 635, 643.)
(B) “Disapproved”
In the second cause of action, Shelby LP asserts that the City “disapproved” the Project without making required findings under the HAA. The City argues that it did not “disapprove” the Project under statutory definitions and the status of the SPA. The resolution of this dispute depends upon the scope of the City’s obligations under the HAA.
“A local agency shall not disapprove a housing development project, including farmworker housing as defined in subdivision (h) of Section 50199.7 of the Health and Safety Code, for very low, low-, or moderate-income households, or an emergency shelter, or condition approval in a manner that renders the housing development project infeasible for development for the use of very low, low-, or moderateincome households, or an emergency shelter, including through the use of design review standards, unless it makes written findings, based upon a preponderance of the evidence in the record, as to one of the following: ….” (Former Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (d).) “ ‘Disapprove the housing development project’ includes any instance in which a local agency does any of the following:
“(A) Votes on a proposed housing development project application and the application is disapproved, including any required land use approvals or entitlements necessary for the issuance of a building permit.
“(B) Fails to comply with the time periods specified in subdivision (a) of Section 65950. An extension of time pursuant to Article 5 (commencing with Section 65950) shall be deemed to be an extension of time pursuant to this paragraph.
“(C) Fails to meet the time limits specified in Section 65913.3.” (Former Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(6).)
Shelby LP argues that returning the SPA is effectively “disapproval” because by returning the SPA the City is necessarily refusing to act upon the SPA. The City argues that returning an amendment to an existing application is different from disapproving a project under the definition of section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(6). To resolve this conflict, it is first necessary to examine what is the “project” in the definition. The analysis of the first cause of action is helpful here. As discussed above, the court concludes that the “project” is the Shelby Project as modified in the SPA. Consequently, any disapproval of the SPA is a disapproval of a “project.” The record thus supports, and the court finds, that the Shelby Project as modified in the SPA is a “housing development project … for very low, low-, or moderateincome households ….” “Our primary task is to ‘determine and effectuate legislative intent’ by looking to the statute’s language. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision ... . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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nature and obvious purpose of the statute ... .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Further, ‘ “when a statute contains a list or catalogue of items, a court should determine the meaning of each by reference to the others, giving preference to an interpretation that uniformly treats items similar in nature and scope.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 470–471.) The word “disapprove” means, among other things, “[t]o pass unfavorable judgment on (something); to reject.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024); see also Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1986) [“to refuse approval to: decline to sanction: reject”].) The plain meaning of “disapprove” therefore starts with the concept of rejection. The statutory definition uses the word “includes” before its list of inclusions. “ ‘Includes’ is ‘ordinarily a term of enlargement rather than limitation.’ [Citation.] The ‘statutory definition of a thing as “including” certain things does not necessarily place thereon a meaning limited to the inclusions.’ [Citation.]” (Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 774.) The conduct of City clearly is one of rejection of the SPA. The City specifically identifies that it is returning the SPA, including returning the payment for the SPA. (2 AR 130.) The City clearly states the reason for the return is the proposition, rejected by this court for the reasons stated above, that “SB 330 preliminary applications cannot modify or amend existing applications ….” (Ibid.) This constitutes a clear statement from the City that it is finally rejecting, and will not further process, the SPA as the modified Shelby Project.

It is noteworthy that the statutorily defined term is “disapprove the housing development project” and not merely “disapprove.” Not all returns of proposed amendment paperwork would or should constitute a disapproval of “the … project.” When viewing the three items “included” within the statutory definition of “disapprove the housing development project,” each is based upon the failure of the City to proceed with the processing of the project as required by law, either by expressly rejecting the project by vote or by neglecting time obligations. The conduct of the City here falls within this statutory definition by demonstrating a clear intent to conclude the processing of the project as proposed by Shelby LP and not merely a rejection of an incidental amendment.

There is no dispute that the City has not made findings required by section 65589.5, subdivision (d).

Indeed, the City’s position, consistent with its arguments explained in the context of the first cause of action, has been that no findings were required.

The court concludes that the record shows that the City has “disapproved the housing development project” by its return of the SPA without making required findings. Consistent with the disposition of the first cause of action and based upon a review of the entire record, the court finds that Shelby LP is entitled to issuance of a writ of mandate compelling the City to set aside its disapproval of the Shelby Project and to further process the Shelby Project in accordance with law and consistent with this ruling. (C) Good or Bad Faith
The second cause of action raises the additional issue of bad faith. “The court may issue an order or judgment directing the local agency to approve the housing development project or emergency shelter if the court finds that the local agency acted in bad faith when it disapproved or conditionally approved the housing development or emergency shelter in violation of this section. The court shall retain jurisdiction to ensure that its order or judgment is carried out and shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit to the plaintiff or petitioner ….” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (k)(1)(A)(ii).) SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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“Bad faith” is defined in the HAA: “For purposes of this section, ‘bad faith’ includes, but is not limited to, an action that is frivolous or otherwise entirely without merit.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (l).) (Note:

By referring to “section,” this definition is expressly applicable to bad faith determinations beyond those cited in subdivision (l). (See Gov. Code, § 10.)) Under this standard, the court finds that the City’s actions in rejecting the SPA were not in bad faith. The record is clear in showing that the City consistently took the legal position that vested rights under a prior application could not be relied upon in making an application that invoked recently enacted provisions of the HAA with different rights and obligations. The court disagrees with the City’s conclusions for the reasons explained herein, but finds that the City’s arguments are not frivolous or made in bad faith. The HAA is a complex statute that has been the subject of continual amendments to address an increasing complex housing problem. As this lengthy discussion perhaps demonstrates, how these statutory provisions fit together is not, and has not been, a simple or obvious matter.

The court will not therefore issue orders under section 65589.5, subdivision (k)(1)(A)(ii) based upon the conduct of City asserted by Shelby LP in this proceeding as in “bad faith.” (III) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
As noted previously, the City has made a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to each of the causes of action of the FAP.
“A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).) “The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds: [¶] … [¶] “(B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist:
“(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
“(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).) “The motion provided for in this section may be made as to either of the following: [¶] (A) The entire complaint or cross-complaint or as to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(2)(A).) “The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings ‘is equivalent to a demurrer ….’ [Citation.]” (Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735.)
Because the court has found in favor of Shelby LP and against the City on the merits of the first and second causes of action to the extent set forth above, the motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied as to the first and second causes of action.

Shelby LP’s sixth cause of action is for declaratory relief. The sixth cause of action includes requests for declarations that are encompassed within the subject matter of the first and second causes of action. As with a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings does not lie as to part of a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 458, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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(2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) The motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied as to the sixth cause of action.

Shelby LP dismissed its third and fourth causes of action on October 7, 2024. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore moot as to these causes of action.

Shelby LP’s fifth cause of action is for traditional writ of mandate to find that the Housing Element adopted by the City on December 5, 2023, does not substantially comply with State law and to compel the City to adopt a revised Housing Element pursuant to Government Code section 65754. (FAP, prayer, ¶ 5.) (1) Requests for Judicial Notice
In support of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the City requests that the court take judicial notice of: (Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Request for Judicial Notice [RMJP RJN], exhibit 1) a copy of a communication from the Department of Housing and Community Development in response to Shelby LP’s request for technical assistance; and (exhibit 2) the City’s notice of certification of the administrative record in this matter. The request for judicial notice is granted as to exhibit 1. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) As to exhibit 2, the court grants the motion as to the filing and contents of the document entitled “Notice of Certification and Certification of the Administrative Record.” (See Evid.

Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) With respect to exhibit 1, exhibit 1 is merely a notice filed with the court and not a request for judicial notice as to the underlying administrative record. The court does not consider the underlying administrative record in determining this motion for judgment on the pleading. (See Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Department of Public Health (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 965, 974.) In opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Shelby LP requests judicial notice of:
(Petitioner’s Response to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Requests for Judicial Notice [PMJP RJN], exhibit A) a letter dated February 16, 2023, from Shannan West, Housing Accountability Unit Chief with the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Division of Housing Policy Development, to Jennifer Armer, Planning Manager for the Town of Los Gatos; (exhibit B) a letter dated July 23, 2024, from Shannan West, Housing Accountability Unit Chief with the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Division of Housing Policy Development, to Sharon Goei, Community Development Director for the City of Gilroy; (exhibit C) an email exchange, dated between May 18, 2023, and May 25, 2023, between John Buettner, Housing Accountability Manager for the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Housing Policy Division, staff and attorneys representing the City of Goleta, and counsel for Shelby LP; (exhibit D) an email exchange, dated between January 5, 2024, and January 29, 2024, between Grace Wu, Senior Housing Policy Specialist with the California Department of Housing and Community Development, Housing Policy Development Division, Housing Accountability Unit, and counsel for Shelby LP; (exhibit E) an email exchange, dated between April 3, 2023, and May 17, 2023, between various officials and staff from the California Department of Housing and Community Development and counsel for Shelby LP; (exhibit F) the request for dismissal of Shelby LP’s third and fourth causes of action, filed in this action on October 7, 2024.

The court grants these unopposed requests for judicial notice. Judicial notice does not extend to the truth of facts set forth in judicially noticed documents. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117.)
(2) Pleading Issues
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The City argues that there is a rebuttable presumption of validity of the validity of the housing element once the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) has found that the element substantially complies with the requirements of the HAA. “In any action filed on or after January 1, 1991, taken to challenge the validity of a housing element, both of the following shall apply, as applicable:
“(a) There shall be a rebuttable presumption of the validity of the element or amendment if, pursuant to Section 65585, the department has found that the element or amendment substantially complies with the requirements of this article.
“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption of the invalidity of the element or amendment if, pursuant to Section 65585, the department has found that the element or amendment does not substantially comply with the requirements of this article.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.3.) (Note: Subdivision (b) and the related text making two subdivisions were added to section 65589.3 in 2024. (Stats. 2024, ch. 269, § 6.))
Citing the administrative record, the City argues that Shelby LP’s allegations are insufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of validity the City’s Housing Element. “The housing element shall consist of an identification and analysis of existing and projected housing needs and a statement of goals, policies, quantified objectives, financial resources, and scheduled programs for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing. The housing element shall identify adequate sites for housing, including rental housing, factory-built housing, mobilehomes, and emergency shelters, and shall make adequate provision for the existing and projected needs of all economic segments of the community. The element shall contain all of the following:
“(a) An assessment of housing needs and an inventory of resources and constraints relevant to the meeting of these needs. The assessment and inventory shall include all of the following: [¶] … [¶] “(3) An inventory of land suitable and available for residential development, including vacant sites and sites having realistic and demonstrated potential for redevelopment during the planning period to meet the locality's housing need for a designated income level, and an analysis of the relationship of zoning and public facilities and services to these sites, and an analysis of the relationship of the sites identified in the land inventory to the jurisdiction's duty to affirmatively further fair housing. [¶] … [¶] “(5) An analysis of potential and actual governmental constraints upon the maintenance, improvement, or development of housing for all income levels, including the types of housing identified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), and for persons with disabilities as identified in the analysis pursuant to paragraph (7), including land use controls, building codes and their enforcement, site improvements, fees and other exactions required of developers, local processing and permit procedures, and any locally adopted ordinances that directly impact the cost and supply of residential development. The analysis shall also demonstrate local efforts to remove governmental constraints that hinder the locality from meeting its share of the regional housing need in accordance with Section 65584 and from meeting the need for housing for persons with disabilities, supportive housing, transitional housing, and emergency shelters identified pursuant to paragraph (7).” (Former Gov. Code, § 65583, subds. (a)(3), (5), added by Stats. 2022, ch. 654, § 1 [effective from Jan. 1, 2023, to March 24, 2024].) Shelby LP alleges that the City’s Housing Element fails to substantially comply with the requirements of subdivision (a)(3) and (5), among other things:

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“Respondents’ adopted Housing Element fails to substantially comply with State Housing Element Law because its site inventory is inadequate. … The inventory identified in Respondents’ adopted Housing Element fails to satisfy the statutory requirements. For example, as discussed above, the site inventory relies on non-vacant parcels but fails to show these sites have ‘realistic and demonstrated potential for redevelopment during the planning period’ based on a methodology that factors in existing uses, past experiences with redevelopment, current market trends, and existing leases or contracts, among other things, as required by Government Code sections 65583(a)(3) and 65583.2(g)(1).” (FAP, § 125.) “Respondents’ adopted Housing Element also fails to contain sufficient analysis of potential and actual governmental constraints on housing. … As explained above, Respondents failed to analyze the governmental constraints on housing for the Housing Element’s existing site inventory, and its candidate rezone sites, by relying on unproven, highdensity, in-fill developments to meet Respondents’ RHNA obligations despite no evidence that any such development is feasible. The Housing Element also fails to accurately characterize local processing and permit procedures.” (FAP, § 126.)
While under section 65589.3 a rebuttable evidentiary presumption arises where the preliminary fact exists that the HCD has made findings of substantial compliance, or not, an evidentiary presumption is only a matter of evidence. (Evid. Code, §§ 604, 606.) A party pleads ultimate facts, not evidentiary matter. (See, e.g., C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged”].) Here, Shelby LP has alleged that the City’s adopted Housing Element is deficient and has made specific allegations as to the manner in which the Housing Element is deficient. In order to resolve the dispute, it will be necessary for the court to consider the entire administrative record applying the appropriate standard of review. A motion for judgment on the pleadings (or a demurrer) is not a substitute for the careful review necessary for a resolution of the merits.

The allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate. The fifth cause of action is therefore sufficient for pleading purposes and the motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied. The court neither makes nor intends this ruling on the sufficiency of the pleadings to suggest any resolution on the merits of the cause of action.

DARREL E. PARKER, EXECUTIVE OFFICER Minutes Prepared by:

Veronica Robles , Deputy
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, California 92101-3598
619.338.6500 main
619.234.3815 fax
www.sheppardmullin.com

Exhibit 3
Summary of requests submitted under the State Density Bonus law [ATTACHED BEHIND THIS COVER PAGE]
100 September 22, 2025 Item 7
March 30, 2023
 Project includes the following requests under State Density Bonus law:
o Project requests a 50% density bonus by providing 24% of the base zone units for lower-income (42 units), resulting in 86 density bonus units. o Project qualifies for three concessions as summarized below. Concessions result in identifiable and actual cost reductions to a project that allow for the development of affordable housing.
1) Increase in maximum lot coverage from 20% to 37.4% [DMMC §30.10.070(C)(4)]. This concession allows the development to spread across the site with lower heights, while still maintaining sufficient bluff setbacks, in lieu of development with greater heights and added infrastructure costs. 2) Decrease in vehicle stall depth from 20 ft to 18 ft for parking stall layouts [DMMC §30.80.060(A)(1)-City Parking Lot Layout Standards]. This concession allows the development to provide a utilize adequate stall sizes in parking lots/garages and reduces the need to expand the subterranean parking garage laterally with added development costs.
3) Reduction in the minimum front yard setback from 20 feet to 0 feet [DMMC §30.10.070(C)(1)(a)] for an ADA accessible elevator and associated infrastructure and 20 feet to 10 feet for east building in compliance with the HEI-OZ [DMMC §30.92.040(B)(1)(a)]. This concession allows the development of a mandatory ADA accessway to the project site due to onsite grade and path of travel, thereby reducing the need to create an engineered system of ramps at maximum ADA slope, and allows the east building to spread into the setback by 50%, while still maintaining fire access requirements in the site, in lieu of having to develop another story on the building with added infrastructure costs to relocate the units.
o Project requests four waivers from City development standards. Waivers provide necessary relief from development standards that would otherwise physically preclude the development of affordable housing as part of an overall project. 1) Increase in maximum building height from 14 feet (BSC-OZ) to a maximum height of 56 feet (which includes shielding of mechanical units on rooftops) [DMMC §30.10.070(C)(2), §30.10.080, §30.52.080(A), §30.86.110(A)]. This waiver provides relief from a City development standard that would physically precludes the development of the project and associated affordable units.
2) Increase the maximum FAR from 0.125 (R1-40) to 1.32 (separated between a

0.78 FAR for residential development and 0.54 for parking garages) [DMMC §30.10.070(C)(3)]. This waiver provides relief from a City development standard that would physically precludes the development of the project and associated affordable units.
101 September 22, 2025 Item 7
3) Increase in maximum number of stories above grade from two (R1-40) to five (on average three or less) [DMMC §30.86.110(A)]. This waiver provides relief from a City development standard that would physically precludes the development of the project and associated affordable units. 4) Allowance for construction on steep slopes within the public right-of-way to facilitate required vehicle and pedestrian ingress/egress to the public street (Camino del Mar), as-needed utilities, and improvements for continued access to adjacent property. Steep slopes are not located onsite but immediately east of the Project site in the public right-of-way location. As such, the steep slopes are not located in the respective R1-40 zone, BSC-OZ, or HEI-OZ. However, in the event the City considers its restriction on steep slope development applies in the City’s right-of-way, there is no feasible alternative siting which eliminates or substantially reduces the need for such construction or grading. Construction on steep slopes is minimized to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with preserving the physical characteristics of the site [DMMC §30.52.060(A)(1-5), §30.92.040(B)(1)(c), §30.92.050(F)]. This waiver provides relief from a City development standard that would physically preclude the development from providing required vehicle and pedestrian access between the Project site and the public street (Camino del Mar), including ADA and emergency access, as-needed utilities, and improvements for continued access to the adjacent property at 101 Border Ave. The improvements would be constructed in a manner to minimize the improvements to the greatest extent feasible. 102 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, California 92101-3598
619.338.6500 main
619.234.3815 fax
www.sheppardmullin.com

Exhibit 4
Seaside Ridge Building Area Comparison, July 2023
[ATTACHED BEHIND THIS COVER PAGE
103 September 22, 2025 Item 7

SEASIDE RIDGE

BUILDING AREA COMPARISON
[BASED ON PLANS SUBMITTED TO CITY OF DEL MAR IN OCTOBER 2022 & MARCH 2023]

SUBMITTAL AREA SUMMARY
FIRST SUBMITTAL (PRELIMINARY APPLICATION OCT. 2022)
BUILDING AREA:

PARKING AREA:

BUILDING AREA + PARKING:
# OF UNITS:
“FIRST SUBMITTAL”: PRELIMINARY APPLICATION FILED WITH CITY OF DEL MAR ON OCTOBER 4, 2022. CITY “DEEMED SUBMITTED” VIA CITY REFERENCE FILE PDA22-001. “SECOND SUBMITTAL”: SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT APPLICATION FILED WITHIN 180 DAYS WITH CITY OF DEL MAR ON MARCH 30, 2023. CITY REFERENCE FILE CDP23-008.

HOUSING SUMMARY
SEASIDE RIDGE PROVIDES 42 LOWER INCOME UNITS (38 LOW, 2 VERY LOW, 2 EXTREMELY LOW), 43 MODERATE INCOME UNITS, AND 174 ABOVE MODERATE INCOME UNITS.

SECOND SUBMITTAL: (DEV APPLICATION MARCH 2023)
BUILDING AREA:

PARKING AREA:

BUILDING AREA + PARKING:
# OF UNITS:

NET CHANGE:
- 6,526 (SMALL REDUCTION IN BUILDING AREA)
+ 63,521 (INCREASE IN PARKING GARAGE AS PROJECT NO

LONGER PROPOSING PARKING REDUCTION UNDER

STATE DENSITY BONUS ALLOWANCES,
(GOVT. CODE 65915(P)(1))
BUILDING AREA + PARKING CHANGE : 17.14%
UNIT CHANGE : 0%
241,528 SF 235,002 SF
97,736 SF 161,257 SF
338,264 SF
259
396,259 SF
259
*BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION L
NO.

C-26744

ICENSED ARCHITECT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
REN. FEB. 2 8 2 01 9
J EFFREY B. CAU SEY
SA
2022-10.01
JBC

BUILDING AREA

COMPARISONS
JULY 2023

THIS STAMP IS CERTIFYING

THAT THE INFORMATION

HERE REPRESENTS WHAT

WAS SUBMITTED TO THE CITY

OF DEL MAR
104 September 22, 2025 Item 7
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5

SIDE SETCK
10' FRONT SETBACK
40'REAR SETBACK

RESIDENTIAL OVERLAY SIDE SETBACK

SIDE SETBACK
30 22
28 24
21 22
17 16
12 +79'
+72'
+68'
UP

SEASIDE RIDGE
929 Border Ave, Del Mar, CA, 92075
REVISIONS:

C
B
A

C C C C C
A
A
AM
AM
AM
AM
LOBBY
MECH

FIRE LANE

EXISTING ACCESS ROAD
*15' LANDSCAPE BUFFER +30' SETBACK FROM EXISTING RESIDENTIAL* LEVEL -1 FLOOR PLAN [68' - 70']
1" = 60"
C
E

STORAGE

STORAGE

STORAGE

STORAGE
E

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED
M M M
M
M M
E E E
C
E

STORAGE

STORAGE

STORAGE

STORAGE
E

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED

CLEAN AIR

DESIGNATED

RI A NAELC

DETANGI SED
M M M
M
M M
E E E
SEASIDE RIDGE929 Border Ave, Del Mar, CA, 92075
REVISIONS:

PROJECT NO:

DRAWN BY:

REVIEWED BY:

SHEET NAME:

DATE:

REV:
0 10 20 40
LEVEL -2
(AS SUBMITTED)

AREA SUMMARY
(AS SUBMITTED)
LEVEL -1
(AS SUBMITTED)
N/A
(L-2 FLOOR PLAN NOT SUBMITTED TO CITY)
BUILDING AREA: 60,488 SF
BUILDING AREA: 67,354 SF BUILDING AREA: 76,219 SF

FIRST SUBMITTAL
PRELIM APPLICATION OCT. 2022 DEV APPLICATION MAR. 2023

PLANS SUBMITTED

TO CITY

SECOND SUBMITTAL
*BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION L
NO.

C-26744

ICENSED ARCHITECT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
REN. FEB. 2 8 2 01 9
J EFFREY B. CAU SEY
SA
2022-10.01
JBC

BUILDING AREA

COMPARISONS
JULY 2023

THIS STAMP IS CERTIFYING

THAT THE INFORMATION

HERE REPRESENTS WHAT

WAS SUBMITTED TO THE CITY

OF DEL MAR

ZONING ANALYSIS

PROJECT DIRECTO
Owner:

Owner’s Representative:

Consulting Engineer:

Architect:

Geotechnical:

Landscape:

Civil:

Structural:

Mechanical/ Plumbing/
Electrical/ Fire Consultant

SHEET INDEX
Zoned: R1-40, BSC-OZ, CB-OZ, HEI-OZ (6th Cycle Candidate Site); small east portion in L-OZ & F-OZ (no development proposed) Desity Allowed: 1 unit/acre (R1-40); 20-25 units/acre (HEI-OZ); 50% State Density Bonus eligible with 24% designated lower-income
Site Area: 6.91 acres 300,921sf
Setback Requirements:

Required
Front: 20 feet (R1-40); 10 feet (HEI-OZ)
Rear: 40 feet (BSC-OZ)
Interior Side: 10 feet
*15 foot landscape buffer and 30 foot setback from property line adjacent to single family
Street Side: 10 feet
Height Limit: 14’ (BSC-OZ)
Parking Requirements:

Total:

Regular:

ADA:

Clean Air Designated:

Electric Charging Station :

Motorcycle:

Bicycle:

Parking Space Dimensions:

9’x18’ Standard Space (Concession for Stall Length)
8’x15’ Compact Space (Allowed)
9’x36’ Tandem (allowed)

4.5’x8’ Micro (Motorcycle)
5% of parking bicycle
8% of spaces clean air designated parking spaces
381
9 N/A
Required Proposed
Required: 381
Proposed: 449 (includes 25 public)
9 36 36
23 23
23 26
23 23

AREA SUMMARY
CS-1.0 - COVER SHEET AS-1.0 - SITE PLAN A-1.11 - TYPICAL CS-1.1 - COVER SHEET AS-1.1 - SITE ACCESS PLAN A-1.12 - TYPICAL CS-1.2 - COVER SHEET A-1.0 - LEVEL -1 FLOOR PLAN A-1.13 - TYPICAL A-0.0 - GENERAL NOTES A-1.1 - LEVEL +1 FLOOR PLAN A-1.14 - TYPICAL A-0.1 - PROJECT DATA SUMMARY SHEET A-1.2 - LEVEL +2 FLOOR PLAN A-2.0 - NORTH E A-0.2 - EXISTING PLANTING A-1.3 - LEVEL +3 FLOOR PLAN A-2.1 - SOUTH E A-0.3 - SITE PHOTOS A-1.4 - LEVEL +4 FLOOR PLAN A-2.2 - WEST & E EL-0.1 - LIGHTING FIXTURE SCHEDULE A-1.5 - ROOF PLAN A-2.3 - ELEVATIO EL-1.1 - LEVEL +1 LIGHTING PLAN A-1.6 - ENLARGED BASEMENT -2 PLAN A-2.4 - ELEVATIO EL-1.2 - LEVEL +2 LIGTHING PLAN A-1.7 - ENLARGED BASEMENT -1 PLAN A-2.5 - ELEVATIO EL-1.3 - LEVEL +3 LIGHTING PLAN A-1.8 - ENLARGED BASEMENT +1 PLAN A-3.0 - SITE SEC EL-1.4 - LEVEL +4 LIGHTING PLAN A-1.9 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS A-3.1 - SITE SEC EL-2.0 - SITE PHOTOMETRIC PLAN A-1.10 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS A-3.2 - SITE SEC Site Area 300,921 6.9 Acres
Site Coverage 112,546 37.4%
Building Area 235,002 (FAR 0.78)
Parking Garage 161,257 (FAR 0.54)
Level Residential Amenity Circulation Total Units Parking Garage L-2 0 0 0 0 0 60,488 (Underground Parking)
L-1 6,657 10,055 2,446 19,158 11 57,061 (Underground Parking) L+1 49,187 552 4,846 54,585 65 43,708 (Partial Underground Parking) L+2 64,367 3,285 6,169 73,821 82
L+3 50,679 0 7,250 57,929 65
L+4 27,073 0 2,437 29,510 36
Total 197,963 13,892 23,147 235,002 259 161,257
FAR Total 1.32 (Building 0.78 & Garage 0.54)
Parking
Standard Compact ADA Motorcycle Tandem Bicycle Clean Air Designated Charging Station (E) Total Outside 6 11 4 8 0 15 2 2 48
L-2 129 1 1 6 0 8 10 5 160
L-1 105 1 2 6 32 0 12 8 166
L+1 90 0 2 6 6 0 12 8 124
Total 330 13 9 26 38 23 36 23 498
Car Parking Spaces Total 449
*
**
* INCLUDES 2 VAN ACCESIBLE
** EXTERIOR CIRCULATION IS AREA/2

CAMINO DEL MAR

VIA DE LA VALLE
S. SIERRA AVE.

DEL MAR RACING

SITE SITE

PROJECT DIRECTORTY
Owner:

Owner’s Representative:

Consulting Engineer:

Architect:

Geotechnical:

Landscape:

Civil:

Structural:

Mechanical/ Plumbing/
Electrical/ Fire Consultant:

Stensrud Lazier Holding
2717 Via De La Valle, Del Mar, CA 92104
Pudgil and Company
Contact: Darren Pudgil
[email protected]
Nieto Consulting Engineers
Contact: Manuel Nieto
[email protected]
Wolden Design + RDC
Contact: Frank Wolden
[email protected]
Geocon Inc.

Contact: Dave Evans
[email protected]
McCullough Landscape Architects
Contact: David McCullough
[email protected]
Project Design Consultants
Contact: Greg Shields
KPFF Engineers
Contact: Eric Luehmkil
[email protected]
Coffman Engineers
Contact: Casey Whitsett

SHEET INDEX
Zoned: R1-40, BSC-OZ, CB-OZ, HEI-OZ (6th Cycle Candidate Site); small east portion in L-OZ & F-OZ (no development proposed) Desity Allowed: 1 unit/acre (R1-40); 20-25 units/acre (HEI-OZ); 50% State Density Bonus eligible with 24% designated lower-income
Site Area: 6.91 acres 300,921sf
Setback Requirements:

Required
Front: 20 feet (R1-40); 10 feet (HEI-OZ)
Rear: 40 feet (BSC-OZ)
Interior Side: 10 feet
*15 foot landscape buffer and 30 foot setback from property line adjacent to single family
Street Side: 10 feet
Height Limit: 14’ (BSC-OZ)
Parking Requirements:

Total:

Regular:

ADA:

Clean Air Designated:

Electric Charging Station :

Motorcycle:

Bicycle:

Parking Space Dimensions:

9’x18’ Standard Space (Concession for Stall Length)
8’x15’ Compact Space (Allowed)
9’x36’ Tandem (allowed)

4.5’x8’ Micro (Motorcycle)
5% of parking bicycle
8% of spaces clean air designated parking spaces
381
9 N/A
Required Proposed
Required: 381
Proposed: 449 (includes 25 public)
9 36 36
23 23
23 26
23 23

AREA SUMMARY
CS-1.0 - COVER SHEET AS-1.0 - SITE PLAN A-1.11 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS CS-1.1 - COVER SHEET AS-1.1 - SITE ACCESS PLAN A-1.12 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS CS-1.2 - COVER SHEET A-1.0 - LEVEL -1 FLOOR PLAN A-1.13 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS A-0.0 - GENERAL NOTES A-1.1 - LEVEL +1 FLOOR PLAN A-1.14 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS A-0.1 - PROJECT DATA SUMMARY SHEET A-1.2 - LEVEL +2 FLOOR PLAN A-2.0 - NORTH ELEVATIONS A-0.2 - EXISTING PLANTING A-1.3 - LEVEL +3 FLOOR PLAN A-2.1 - SOUTH ELEVATIONS A-0.3 - SITE PHOTOS A-1.4 - LEVEL +4 FLOOR PLAN A-2.2 - WEST & EAST ELEVATIONS EL-0.1 - LIGHTING FIXTURE SCHEDULE A-1.5 - ROOF PLAN A-2.3 - ELEVATIONS BLDG. A & B EL-1.1 - LEVEL +1 LIGHTING PLAN A-1.6 - ENLARGED BASEMENT -2 PLAN A-2.4 - ELEVATIONS BLDG. C & D EL-1.2 - LEVEL +2 LIGTHING PLAN A-1.7 - ENLARGED BASEMENT -1 PLAN A-2.5 - ELEVATIONS BLDG. E & F EL-1.3 - LEVEL +3 LIGHTING PLAN A-1.8 - ENLARGED BASEMENT +1 PLAN A-3.0 - SITE SECTIONS EL-1.4 - LEVEL +4 LIGHTING PLAN A-1.9 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS A-3.1 - SITE SECTIONS EL-2.0 - SITE PHOTOMETRIC PLAN A-1.10 - TYPICAL UNIT PLANS A-3.2 - SITE SECTION BLOW-UPS SA
2022-10.01
JBC
MARCH 2023
Site Area 300,921 6.9 Acres
Site Coverage 112,546 37.4%
Building Area 235,002 (FAR 0.78)
Parking Garage 161,257 (FAR 0.54)
Level Residential Amenity Circulation Total Units Parking Garage L-2 0 0 0 0 0 60,488 (Underground Parking)
L-1 6,657 10,055 2,446 19,158 11 57,061 (Underground Parking) L+1 49,187 552 4,846 54,585 65 43,708 (Partial Underground Parking) L+2 64,367 3,285 6,169 73,821 82
L+3 50,679 0 7,250 57,929 65
L+4 27,073 0 2,437 29,510 36
Total 197,963 13,892 23,147 235,002 259 161,257
FAR Total 1.32 (Building 0.78 & Garage 0.54)
Parking
Standard Compact ADA Motorcycle Tandem Bicycle Clean Air Designated Charging Station (E) Total Outside 6 11 4 8 0 15 2 2 48
L-2 129 1 1 6 0 8 10 5 160
L-1 105 1 2 6 32 0 12 8 166
L+1 90 0 2 6 6 0 12 8 124
Total 330 13 9 26 38 23 36 23 498
Car Parking Spaces Total 449
*
**
* INCLUDES 2 VAN ACCESIBLE
** EXTERIOR CIRCULATION IS AREA/2

SEASIDE RIDGE
929 Border Ave, Del Mar, CA, 92075
REVISIONS:

PROJECT NO.

DRAWN BY:

REVIEWED BY:

SHEET NAME:

CAMINO DEL MAR

TRAIN TRACKS

SAN DIEGUITO RIVER

PACIFIC OCEAN

VIA DE LA VALLE
I-5
S. SIERRA AVE.

DEL MAR RACING
JIMMY DURANTE BLV.

SITE SITE

PROJECT DATA

STATEMENT
A-0.0

AREA SUMMARY
SITE AREA:

SITE COVERAGE:

BUILDING AREA:

LEVEL RESIDENTIAL AMENITY CIRCULATION TOTAL UNITS COMMENTS L(-1) 5,565
53,170

UNDERGROUND

PARKING

PARTIAL

UNDERGROUND

PARKING
7,729
1,124 2,807 57,101 67
--- 13,294 8
L(+1)
L(+2) 74,7785
56,000
22,712
22,232 SF
.7
8,853 SF 20,443 SF 241,528 SF
---
---
---
7453
7453
2,730
82,238
63,453
25,442
88 70
26 259
L(+3)
L(+4)
TOTAL
FAR
54,060 SF
42,676 SF
---
---
---
96,736
300,921 SF
69,212

6.9 ACRES
+/- 23%

SHEET INDEX
A-0.0 - PROJECT DATA STATEMENT
A-0.2 - ALTA SURVEY
A-0.3 - EXISTING PLANTING PLAN
A-0.4 - COASTAL ACCESS (REGION)
A-0.5 - COASTAL ACCESS(SITE)
A-0.6 - PROJECT SUMMARY
A-0.7 - DESIGN CONCEPTS
A1.0 - ILLUSTRATIVE SITE PLAN
A1.1 - FLOOR PLANS
A1.2 - FLOOR PLANS
A1.3 - FLOOR PLANS
A2.0 - ELEVATIONS
A2.1 - MASSING STUDY
A2.2 - MASSING STUDY
A3.0 - SITE SECTIONS
A3.1 - SITE SECTIONS
C1.0 - CIVIL ROAD DRAWINGS

PROJECT DIRECTORTY
Owner:

Owner
Representative:

Designer:

Stensrud Lazier Holding Trust
Carole Anne Lazier (Trustee)
Darren Pudgil
Frank Wolden
Main Contact
waiver
BUILDING AREA + PARKING TOTAL: 338,264 SF BUILDING AREA + PARKING TOTAL: 396,259 SF 105 September 22, 2025 Item 7
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5

THE TIDES
929 Border Ave, Del Mar, CA, 92075
REVISIONS:

PROJECT NO.

DRAWN BY:

REVIEWED BY:

SHEET NAME: ALONG THE COASTAL TRAILS
D
D
D
DD
D
A
A
A
AAA
AAA
A
F
B
A
C
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
A
C
A
A
F
A
CC
A
A
AC
C
C
C
A
C
C
C
A
B

COMMUNITY ROOM CC
A
AAAA
FAACC
C
C
A
F
F
A
AA
A
A
AA
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
F
AAA
AA
A
D
D
DDD
D
D
D
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
A
C
A
A
F
A
CC
A
A
AC
C
C
C
A
C
C
C
A
B
C
C
A
AAAA
FAACC
C
C
A
B
C
A

HGABFCD
UNITS
1 BED (AVG: 850 SF)
VARIES (AVG: 1,196 SF)
STUDIO (AVG: 489 SF)
VARIES (AVG: 1,200 SF)
3 BED (AVG: 1,176 SF)
1 BED (AVG: 960 SF)
2 BED (AVG: 960 SF)
+92'

GREEN ROOF
POOL
+102'
A
0 60 120
LEVEL +2 FLOOR PLAN [92']
1" = 60"
LEVEL +3 FLOOR PLAN [102']
1" = 60"
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5

THE TIDES
929 Border Ave, Del Mar, CA, 92075
REVISIONS:

PROJECT NO.

DRAWN BY:

REVIEWED BY:

SHEET NAME: ALONG THE COASTAL TRAILS
D
D
D
DD
D
A
A
A
AAA
AAA
A
F
B
A
C
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
A
C
A
A
F
A
CC
A
A
AC
C
C
C
A
C
C
C
A
B

COMMUNITY ROOM CC
A
AAAA
FAACC
C
C
A
F
F
A
AA
A
A
AA
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
F
AAA
AA
A
D
D
DDD
D
D
D
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
A
C
A
A
F
A
CC
A
A
AC
C
C
C
A
C
C
C
A
B
C
C
A
AAAA
FAACC
C
C
A
B
C
A

HGABFCD
UNITS
1 BED (AVG: 850 SF)
VARIES (AVG: 1,196 SF)
STUDIO (AVG: 489 SF)
VARIES (AVG: 1,200 SF)
3 BED (AVG: 1,176 SF)
1 BED (AVG: 960 SF)
2 BED (AVG: 960 SF)
+92'

GREEN ROOF
POOL
+102'
A
0 60 120
LEVEL +2 FLOOR PLAN [92']
1" = 60"
LEVEL +3 FLOOR PLAN [102']
1" = 60"
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5

SEASIDE RIDGE
929 Border Ave, Del Mar, CA, 92075
REVISIONS:

PROJECT NO.

DRAWN BY:

REVIEWED BY:

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
C
C
A
B
+112'
C
A
C
A
AAAA
CCAAF
LEVEL +4 FLOOR PLAN [112']
1" = 60"
BUILDING AREA: 82,238 SF BUILDING AREA: 73,821 SF
BUILDING AREA: 63,453 SF BUILDING AREA: 57,929 SF
BUILDING AREA: 25,442 SF BUILDING AREA: 29,510 SF
F.S. 1.5 +50
F.S. 1.5
Total -1 Parking= 117
UP
SEASID
929 Border Ave
REVISIONS:

PROJECT NO.

DRAWN BY:

REVIEWED BY:

SHEET NAME:
+80'
20 8
13 15
15171614
+79'
+78'
+76'
+74'
+72'
H
G
H
H
G
H
H
H
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AAA
B
A
C
A
F
A
A
A
C
A
C
A
F
A
A
B
AAAA
FAA
CC
A
C
C
B
F
AAA
A
AA
A

FITNESS
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
POOL
DOWN

HGABFCD
UNITS
1 BED (AVG: 850 SF)
VARIES (AVG: 1,196 SF)
STUDIO (AVG: 489 SF)
VARIES (AVG: 1,200 SF)
3 BED (AVG: 1,176 SF)
1 BED (AVG: 960 SF)
2 BED (AVG: 960 SF)
0 60 120
LEVEL 1 FLOOR PLAN [68 70]
1" = 60"
LEVEL +1 FLOOR PLAN [80']
1" = 60"
LEVEL +2
(AS SUBMITTED)
LEVEL +3
(AS SUBMITTED)
LEVEL +1
(AS SUBMITTED)
LEVEL +4
(AS SUBMITTED)
BUILDING AREA: 99,777 SF BUILDING AREA: 98,293 SF

FIRST SUBMITTAL
PRELIM APPLICATION OCT. 2022 DEV APPLICATION MAR. 2023

PLANS SUBMITTED

TO CITY

SECOND SUBMITTAL
*BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION *BUILDING AREA IN DIAGRAMS INCLUDES UNITS, AMENITY, PARKING, AND CIRCULATION L
NO.

C-26744
ICENSE
D
A

RCHITECT
STATE
OF
C

ALIFORNIA
REN. FEB
.
2 8
2 01 9
J EFFREY B.

CAU SEY
SA
2022-10.01
JBC

BUILDING AREA

COMPARISONS
JULY 2023

THIS STAMP IS CERTIFYING

THAT THE INFORMATION

HERE REPRESENTS WHAT

WAS SUBMITTED TO THE CITY

OF DEL MAR
106 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, California 92101-3598
619.338.6500 main
619.234.3815 fax
www.sheppardmullin.com

Exhibit 5
Location of the Project site in relation to the Special Flood Hazard Areas identified in the City pursuant to the most recent FEMA FIRM Panel 1307 dated December 2019 Source: FEMA FIRM Panel 1307 dated December 2019
107 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, California 92101-3598
619.338.6500 main
619.234.3815 fax
www.sheppardmullin.com

Exhibit 6
Resolution of the City of Del Mar in Support of “Our Neighborhood Voices” Ballot Initiative [ATTACHED BEHIND THIS COVER PAGE]
108 September 22, 2025 Item 7
RESOLUTION NO. 2025-XX

A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF DEL MAR, CALIFORNIA, IN SUPPORT OF THE “OUR NEIGHBORHOOD VOICES”

BALLOT INITIATIVE TO AMEND ARTICLE IX OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO MAKE ZONING, DEVELOPMENT,

AND LAND USE MATTERS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY
WHEREAS, the Legislature of the State of California in recent years has proposed, and passed, and Governors have signed into law more than 400 bills addressing a range of local land use, development, and planning issues; and
WHEREAS, the majority of these new laws usurp the authority of local jurisdictions, including city councils, county boards of supervisors, planning departments, and mayoral offices, among others, to determine for themselves the land use, development, and planning policies that best suit their communities and residents, and instead impose “one-size-fits-all” mandates that fail to account for the unique needs and differences of local jurisdictions throughout the State; and WHEREAS, the majority of these new laws do not provide any incentives or requirements for low-income, affordable, or moderate income workforce housing, but instead impose mandates that incentivize real estate speculation and the construction of unneeded market rate, above market rate, and luxury housing on a theory of “trickle down” economics, thereby eliminating the authority and ability of local jurisdictions to implement effective policies to create more affordable housing and affirmatively further fair housing practices; and WHEREAS, this “trickle down” approach to housing has demonstrably failed to produce the needed stock of low-income, affordable, and moderate-income housing for working Californians, instead pushing millions of working individuals and families into housing insecurity, defined as individuals and families who spend 50% or more of their monthly income on housing; and
WHEREAS, the ability of local jurisdictions to determine for themselves, based on their constituents’ and residents’ needs, which projects require review beyond ministerial approval; what off-street parking requirements are appropriate for different neighborhoods; what housing plans are appropriate for those neighborhoods; what zoning should be applied to those neighborhoods; what restrictions to place in high fire danger severity zones and other sensitive areas; and what types of housing are needed and appropriate, is a matter of critical importance to the City of Del Mar; and
WHEREAS the sixth cycle Regional Housing Needs Allocation (“RHNA”) allocation of 175 new units imposed on the City of Del Mar bears no rational relationship to the City of Del Mar’s or San Diego County’s actual housing needs, and amounts to an arbitrary and capricious state mandate; and
WHEREAS, the state mandated sixth cycle RHNA units would force the City of Del Mar to approve development in open spaces, environmentally sensitive areas, high fire danger severity zones, and other areas inappropriate and/or dangerous for housing; and WHEREAS, the state mandated new construction of unneeded and inappropriate market rate, above market rate, and luxury housing via RHNA, most of which will be in dense, 4 July 7, 2025 Item 18 109 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Resolution No. 2025-XX

unaffordable new multifamily buildings, would place untenable and unsustainable stresses on local infrastructure, including but not limited to schools, police, sheriff, and fire resources, sanitation, roads, public transit, and water and power; and WHEREAS, by failing to appropriate funds for necessary infrastructure upgrades, including but not limited to new schools and increased resources for police, sheriff, fire, sanitation, roads, public transit, and water and power, the state mandated sixth cycle RHNA units are an unfunded state mandate that violates Article XIIIB, section 6 of the Constitution of the State of California; and
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Del Mar hereby determines and declares that local governmental entities are best able to assess and respond to the unique needs of our communities and neighborhoods, and hereby objects to the proliferation of State legislation and sixth cycle RHNA mandates that deprives us of that ability.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City of Del Mar, California that:

1. That the City Council of the City of Del Mar is opposed to the legislature of the State of California continually proposing and adopting legislation that overrides the zoning, development, and land use authority of local government and inhibits the ability of local government to effectively plan for and implement policies to stimulate the efficient production of affordable and workforce housing.

2. That the City Council of the City of Del Mar hereby finds and declares that the sixth cycle RHNA mandate of 175 units by 2029 bears no rational relationship to the City’s actual housing needs, is arbitrary and, in the case of Del Mar’s allocation is flawed in the calculation formula and input data, and would be a physical impossibility to meet.

3. That the City Council of the City of Del Mar hereby finds and declares that the state mandated sixth cycle RHNA requirements are an illegal unfunded mandate in violation of Article XIIIB, section 6 of the Constitution of the State of California.

4. That the City Council of the City of Del Mar supports and endorses the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State of California put forth by the grassroots nonprofit Our Neighborhood Voices attached to this Resolution as “Exhibit A” to ensure that zoning and land use authority rests with the local government entities that represent the communities in which the residents reside, and to allow local government to participate in solving our affordable housing crisis through solutions that effectively address the unique needs and conditions of each local community.

5. That the City Council of the City of Del Mar incorporates each recital set forth herein above.

PASSED, APPROVED, AND ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Del Mar, California at the Regular Meeting held this 7th day of July, 2025. _____________________________
Terry Gaasterland, Mayor
City of Del Mar
5 July 7, 2025 Item 18 110 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Resolution No. 2025-XX

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
____________________________
Leslie E. Devaney, City Attorney
City of Del Mar
ATTEST AND CERTIFICATION:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CITY OF DEL MAR
I, SARAH KRIETOR, Administrative Services Manager/City Clerk of the City of Del Mar, California, DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of Resolution No. 2025-XX, adopted by the City Council of the City of Del Mar, California, at a Regular Meeting held the 7th day of July, 2025, by the following vote:

AYES:

NOES:

RECUSE:

ABSENT:

ABSTAIN:
__________________________________
Sarah Krietor, Administrative Services
Manager/City Clerk
City of Del Mar
6 July 7, 2025 Item 18 111 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Exhibit A to Attachment A
Our Neighborhood Voices- Ballot Initiative
The proposed constitutional amendments read as follows:
(from https://www.ourneighborhoodvoices.com/draft-initiative/) We, the undersigned, registered, qualified voters of California, residents of _____ County , hereby propose amendments to the Constitution of California, and petition the Secretary of State to submit the same to the voters of California for their adoption or rejection at the next succeeding general election or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election or as otherwise provided by law. The proposed constitutional amendments read as follows:

SECTION 1. The people of the State of California find and declare all of the following:
(a) California’s housing crisis is primarily due to a failure to provide enough housing (to own or rent) that is affordable for working class and lower income Californians, and this crisis has worsened due to massive reductions in available funding to help local governments encourage more affordable housing production. The involvement of large financial institutions and speculators in our housing markets and recent state laws that usurp the power of local government to exercise its constitutional authority to make local land use planning and zoning decisions have combined to further restrict affordable housing options and displace many working-class families and people of color from their own historic communities. (b) Local government is best able to consider all the requisite factors and make the difficult land use planning and zoning decisions to ensure that new development is supported by the infrastructure and utilities required to maintain appropriate levels of public services, including police and fire services, parklands and public open spaces, transportation, parking, and schools.

The specific needs and challenges facing every California community vary greatly and therefore require significant input and leadership from local government to achieve best outcomes on land use planning and zoning issues, including the provision of affordable housing and protecting the environment.
(c) The State Legislature cannot adequately consider or address the unique impacts of land use planning and zoning laws on every local community, and recent state laws designed to require local governments to increase housing density and encourage the production of more market rate housing by minimizing public input and eliminating environmental review will not solve our affordable housing crisis. In fact, these state laws will harm communities by escalating housing costs and increasing property tax burdens instead of encouraging collaboration with local government to produce more affordable housing.
(d) The purpose of this measure is to protect the ability of local communities to make local land use planning and zoning decisions, and to clarify the process to resolve conflicts between current or future state and local land use planning and zoning laws. One size does not fit all, and recent statewide land use and zoning laws will do great harm without significant input and participation from local communities. The “home rule” doctrine is enshrined in Sections 4 and 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution, and local land use planning or zoning initiatives approved by voters shall not be nullified or superseded by state law.
(e) This constitutional amendment is expressly intended to authorize local land use planning and zoning law to override conflicting state law while ensuring that specified laws remain in full force and effect.
7 July 7, 2025 Item 18 112 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Exhibit A to Attachment A
SEC. 2. Section 3.5 is added to Article XI of the California Constitution, to read:

SEC. 3.5. For purposes of this article:
(a) “Land use planning and zoning law” means any law, whether adopted or put into effect by charter, ordinance, regulation, local initiative, or other action that accomplishes any of the following:
(1) Eliminates or restricts a city or county’s discretion to establish or change the zoning designation of any parcel within its jurisdiction.
(2) Requires a city or county to review, approve, or deny a development application on a streamlined, ministerial, or expedited basis if the project meets a specified criteria. (3) Approves or denies a development or subdivision of a parcel. (4) Imposes any restriction on the ability of a city or county to deny a development project or subdivision of a parcel.
(5) Establishes the procedure for establishing or changing the zoning designation of any parcel within its jurisdiction.
(6) Establishes the procedure or timing for reviewing and approving development applications.
(b) “Covered state statute” means a state law that addresses a matter of statewide concern rather than a municipal affair, as that term is used in Section 5 of this article, and relates to any of the following:
(1) The protection of the environment or natural resources, including, but not limited to any of the following:
(A) The California Environmental Quality Act (Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code) and California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines (Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 15000) of Division 6 of Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations).
(B) The California Endangered Species Act (Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 2050) of Division 3 of the Fish and Game Code). (C) The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Division 20 (commencing with Section 30000) of the Public Resources Code).
(D) The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act (Division 7 (commencing with Section 13000) of the Water Code).
(E) The Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 2710) of Division 2 of the Public Resources Code). (F) Pollution control or environmental justice laws, rules, or regulations. (2) The protection of health and safety, including but not limited to, the development of contaminated sites and regulation of hazardous material storage sites. (3) Emergency response to natural disasters and disaster planning and recovery. (4) The regulation of the physical structure and the construction of buildings. (5) The regulation of residential or commercial rents and landlord-tenant relations, including the Ellis Act (Chapter 12.75 (commencing with Section 7060) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code) and Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Chapter 2.7 (commencing with Section 1954.50) of Title 5 of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code). (6) The siting of a power generating facility capable of generating more than 50 megawatts of electricity and the California Public Utilities Commission has determined that a need exists at that location and that the facility addresses a matter of statewide concern. (7)
(A) The development or construction of a water, communication, or transportation infrastructure project for which the Legislature lists the specific reasons explaining 8 July 7, 2025 Item 18 113 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Exhibit A to Attachment A
how the project addresses the statewide concern and declares that the development is in the best interests of the state.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, a transportation infrastructure project does not include a transit-oriented development project, whether residential, commercial, or mixed-use.
(8) Fair housing matters, including, but not limited to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code), prohibitions against discrimination, or affirmatively furthering fair housing.
(9) Reporting and planning requirements, provided that the requirement does not otherwise impact the ability of a city or county to adopt, or put into effect, a land use planning and zoning law described in paragraph (1). Reporting and planning requirements imposed pursuant to this paragraph shall apply uniformly to all cities and counties and shall not discriminate amongst cities or counties based on voluntary compliance with any land use planning and zoning law adopted by the state.

SEC. 3. Section 5.5 is added to Article XI of the California Constitution, to read:

SEC. 5.5.
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), in the event of a conflict with a state statute, a land use planning and zoning law within the boundaries of the city shall be deemed a municipal affair within the meaning of Section 5 and shall prevail over a conflicting state statute. (b) A covered state statute shall prevail over conflicting land use planning and zoning laws, provided that for a covered state statute enacted on or after January 1, 2016, the Legislature makes a finding that the covered state statute addresses a matter of statewide concern. A finding of statewide concern made pursuant to this subdivision shall list the specific goals, purposes, and objectives of the statute.
(c)
(1) State funding appropriated before the effective date of this section shall not be modified due to a city preempting any state law pursuant to this section. (2) State funding appropriated after the effective date of this section shall not discriminate in favor of, or give any preference to, a city that voluntarily complies with state-adopted land use planning and zoning laws.
(d) The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

SEC. 4. Section 7 of Article XI of the California Constitution is amended to read:

SEC. 7.
(a)
(1) A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws. that are not, except as provided in subdivision (b), in conflict with general laws. (2) A county or city shall not supersede or otherwise interfere with any voter approved local initiative.
(b)
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a land use planning and zoning law within the boundaries of the county or city shall prevail over conflicting general laws. 9 July 7, 2025 Item 18 114 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Exhibit A to Attachment A
(2) A covered state statute shall prevail over conflicting land use planning and zoning laws, provided that for a covered state statute enacted on or after January 1, 2016, the Legislature makes a finding that the covered state statute addresses a matter of statewide concern. A finding of statewide concern made pursuant to this paragraph shall list the specific goals, purposes, and objectives of the statute. (c)
(1) State funding appropriated before the effective date of this section shall not be modified due to a city or county preempting any state law pursuant to this section. (2) State funding appropriated after the effective date of this section shall not discriminate in favor of, or give any preference to, a city or county that voluntarily complies with stateadopted land use planning and zoning laws. (d) The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

SEC. 5. Article XXXIV of the California Constitution is repealed. 10 July 7, 2025 Item 18 115 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, California 92101-3598
619.338.6500 main
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www.sheppardmullin.com

Exhibit 7
“Fair board wants Del Mar to explain ‘contradicting’ stance of affordable housing”, San Diego Union Tribune, July 24, 2025
[ATTACHED BEHIND THIS COVER PAGE]
116 September 22, 2025 Item 7
By LUKE HAROLD LUKE HAROLD | [email protected] | The San Diego | The San Diego Union-Tribune
John Gibbins/San Diego Union-Tribune
An aerial view of the Del Mar Fairgrounds property, as pictured on Jan. 14, 2020. (John Gibbins / U-T file)
DEL MAR TIMES DEL MAR TIMES  DEL MAR TIMES NEWS DEL MAR TIMES NEWS Fair board wants Del Mar to Fair board wants Del Mar to explain ‘contradicting’ stance on explain ‘contradicting’ stance on affordable housing affordable housing
Board members said city support for local Board members said city support for local control ballot measure undermines control ballot measure undermines negotiations for housing on fairgrounds negotiations for housing on fairgrounds 117 September 22, 2025 Item 7
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118 September 22, 2025 Item 7
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IIffiittiiss aapppprroovveedd bbyy vvootteerrss,, sshhee ssaaiidd sshhee eexxppeeccttss lleeggaall cchhaalllleennggeess bbeettwweeeenn cciittiieess aanndd tthhee ssttaattee tthhaatt wwoouulldd eessttaabblliisshh tthhee nneeww eexxppaannssiioonnss ooffllooccaall ccoonnttrrooll,, wwhhiicchh cciittiieess ccoouulldd aappppllyy iinn tthhee nneexxtt RRHHNNAA ccyyccllee.. 119 September 22, 2025 Item 7
““IItt’’ss aa lloonngg,, hhaarrdd sslloogg aanndd iinn tthhee mmeeaannttiimmee wwee ccaannnnoott aaffffoorrdd ttoo hhaavvee oouurr hhoouussiinngg eelleemmeenntt bbee ddeecceerrttiiffiieedd oorr aa ffuuttuurree hhoouussiinngg eelleemmeenntt nnoott bbee cceerrttiiffiieedd,,”” GGaaaasstteerrllaanndd ssaaiidd..

OOnn ffaaiirrggrroouunnddss hhoouussiinngg,, sshhee aaddddeedd,,““TThhiiss iiss ssttaattee llaanndd,, aanndd wwee hhaavvee ssttaattee-- mmaannddaatteedd hhoouussiinngg tthhaatt wwee mmuusstt ddoo,, aanndd tthheerree iiss nnoowwhheerree iinn DDeell MMaarr ttoo ppuuttiitt wwiitthhoouutt mmaassssiivveellyy bbeennddiinngg llooccaall ccoonnttrrooll.. AAnndd llooccaall ccoonnttrroollffoorr tthhee ffaaiirr bbooaarrdd aass wweellll iiss wwhhaatttthhaatt bbaalllloott mmeeaassuurree wwoouulldd rreessttoorree..”” IIfftthhee ffaaiirrggrroouunnddss hhoouussiinngg ppllaann ffaaiillss,,tthhee cciittyy’’ss hhoouussiinngg eelleemmeenntt rreeqquuiirreess aa bbaacckkuupp ppllaann ooff rreezzoonniinngg nnoorrtthh aanndd ssoouutthh bblluuffff pprrooppeerrttiieess.. TThhee nnoorrtthh bblluuffff pprrooppeerrttyy iiss tthhee pprrooppoosseedd ssiittee ooff SSeeaassiiddee RRiiddggee,, aa 225599--uunniitt pprroojjeecctttthhaatt hhaass rreeppeeaatteeddllyy bbeeeenn rreejjeecctteedd aass ““iinnccoommpplleettee”” bbyy cciittyy ppllaannnneerrss bbeeccaauussee tthhee aapppplliiccaattiioonnss ddiiddnn’’ttiinncclluuddee tthhee nneecceessssaarryy ddooccuummeennttss ttoo rreezzoonnee tthhee pprrooppeerrttyy..

PPrrooppeerrttyy oowwnneerr CCaarrooll LLaazziieerr ffiilleedd aa ccoouurrtt ppeettiittiioonn llaasstt yyeeaarr,, aarrgguuiinngg tthhaatttthhee pprroojjeeccttiiss eelliiggiibbllee ffoorr ssttrreeaammlliinneedd aapppprroovvaall bbeeccaauussee tthhee iinniittiiaall aapppplliiccaattiioonn wwaass ssuubbmmiitttteedd bbeeffoorree tthhee cciittyy rreecceeiivveedd ssttaattee cceerrttiiffiiccaattiioonn ooffiittss hhoouussiinngg eelleemmeenntt.. AA jjuuddggee ddiissmmiisssseedd tthhee ppeettiittiioonn llaasstt mmoonntthh bbeeccaauussee LLaazziieerr hhaadd nnoott eexxhhaauusstteedd hheerr ““aaddmmiinniissttrraattiivvee rreemmeeddiieess”” wwiitthh tthhee cciittyy,, uupp ttoo aanndd iinncclluuddiinngg aann aappppeeaallttoo tthhee CCiittyy CCoouunncciill.. PPeennddiinngg tthhaatt oouuttccoommee,, sshhee ccoouulldd ttaakkee tthhee ppeettiittiioonn bbaacckk ttoo ccoouurrtt..

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““TThhee CCiittyy llooookkss ffoorrwwaarrdd ttoo tthhee ooppppoorrttuunniittyy ttoo pprreesseenntt aaccccuurraattee,,ffaacctt--bbaasseedd iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn ttoo tthhee FFaaiirr BBooaarrdd rreeggaarrddiinngg tthhee CCiittyy’’ss hhoouussiinngg eelleemmeenntt rreeqquuiirreemmeennttss,, ddeevveellooppmmeenntt ssttuuddiieess ccuurrrreennttllyy bbeeiinngg uunnddeerrttaakkeenn uussiinngg SSttaattee hhoouussiinngg ggrraannttffuunnddss iinn ccoonnjjuunnccttiioonn wwiitthh FFaaiirrggrroouunnddss ssttaaffff rreellaatteedd ttoo aaffffoorrddaabbllee hhoouussiinngg oonn tthhee FFaaiirrggrroouunnddss,, aanndd ttoo bbee aabbllee ttoo pprroovviiddee iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn aabboouutttthhee ssttaattee bbaalllloottiinniittiiaattiivvee bbeeiinngg ssuuppppoorrtteedd bbyy mmuunniicciippaalliittiieess aallll oovveerr tthhee ssttaattee,, nnoottjjuusstt DDeell MMaarr,,ttoo pprreesseerrvvee llooccaall ccoonnttrrooll,,””JJoonneess ssaaiidd..

FFaaiirr bbooaarrdd mmeemmbbeerrss,, wwhhoo aarree uunnddeerrttaakkiinngg aa mmaasstteerr ppllaannnniinngg pprroocceessss ffoorr tthhee ffuuttuurree oofftthhee ffaaiirrggrroouunnddss,, hhaavvee nnoott yyeett ddeecciiddeedd wwhheetthheerr tthheeyy wwaanntt hhoouussiinngg oonn tthhee pprrooppeerrttyy..

DDeell MMaarr TTiimmeess:: GGeettttoopp hheeaaddlliinneess oonn tthhee llooccaall nneewwss tthhaatt mmaatttteerrss mmoosstt ttoo CCaarrmmeell VVaalllleeyy,, DDeell MMaarr aanndd SSoollaannaa BBeeaacchh.. 120 September 22, 2025 Item 7
OOrriiggiinnaallllyyPPuubblliisshheedd:: JJuullyy 2244,, 22002255 aatt 44::1199PPMMPPDDTT Email address SIGN UP
BByy ssiiggnniinngguupp,, yyoouu aaggrreeee ttoo oouurr TTeerrmmss ooff UUssee,, PPrriivvaaccyy PPoolliiccyy,, aannddttoo rreecceeiivvee eemmaaiillss ffrroommTThhee SSaann DDiieeggoo UUnniioonn--TTrriibbuunnee..

MMiicchhaaeell GGeellffaanndd,,ffiirrsstt vviiccee pprreessiiddeenntt oofftthhee ffaaiirr bbooaarrdd,, ssaaiidd hhee wwaannttss tthhee cciittyy ttoo ““aatttteemmppttttoo jjuussttiiffyy wwhhyy wwee wwoouulldd ppuutt hhoouussiinngg iinn tthhee mmiiddddllee ooff CCeennttrraall PPaarrkk iinn NNeeww YYoorrkk,, wwhhiicchh iiss wwhhaattIItthhiinnkk tthheeyy’’rree ttrryyiinngg ttoo ddoo hheerree..”” Around the Web
If You're Over 65, Try This Instead of Gutter Cleaning (It's Genius)
LLeeaaffFFiilltteerr PPaarrttnneerr
121 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101-3598
619.338.6500 main
619.234.3815 fax
www.sheppardmullin.com
619.338.6530 direct
[email protected]
July 10, 2025
File Number: 47WF-354402
Matt Bator, AICP
Principal Planner
City of Del Mar
1050 Camino Del Mar
Del Mar, California 92014-2698
Via U.S. Mail and Electronic Mail to:
[email protected]
Re: Applicant Response to Fourth Review of Application CDP23-008 and Determination of Incompleteness
Dear Mr. Bator:

On behalf of the Applicant for the Seaside Ridge housing development project (“Seaside Ridge” or “Project”), this response is in follow up to the City’s correspondence dated December 20, 2023, which represents the City’s fourth refusal to process the Seaside Ridge application filed as CDP23-008. Three prior refusals from the City are dated April 27, 2023, June 30, 2023, and September 26, 2023 (collectively, “Reviews”). As set forth in our previous responses to the City’s Reviews, the City cannot require the Project to apply for discretionary approvals, cannot relegate its responsibility to rezone housing sites to the Project Applicant, and cannot refuse to process the Project application as “incomplete” for failure to apply for discretionary approvals. The City’s continued failure to process the application is a violation of applicable state law, inter alia, Government Code §§ 65583(g)(1), 65589.5 subds. (d)(5), (f)(6), (h)(6)(D)-(I). We therefore request City staff to rescind its prior incompleteness determination and find the application complete.

If City staff remains unwilling to determine the application as complete, the City must immediately identify, within no more than ten (10) days of the date of this letter, the applicable process to appeal City staff’s incomplete determination to the City Council at its next available meeting within no more than sixty (60) days thereafter. None of the City’s Reviews referenced above advised the Applicant of any right, duty or procedure for any such appeal. The City has suggested in its filings in Lazier v. City of Del Mar, San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2024-00009804-CUWM-CTL, that the appeal process under Del Mar Municipal Code (DMMC) § 1.12.020 applies. 1 On its face, DMMC § 1.12.020 only applies to a determination made at an administrative or public hearing. This procedure does not apply to the Seaside Ridge application as no hearings were held on the Project’s application.
1 Lazier v. City of Del Mar, San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2024-00009804-CU-WMCTL, ROA No. 40, at 1-4.

Attachment B
122 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Matt Bator, AICP
July 10, 2025

In the event the City Council hears such an appeal and upholds the determination that the application is incomplete, the City will bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that the determination is not a “disapproval of the housing development project” as proscribed by state law. As set forth in our previous responses to the City’s First (April 27, 2023), Second (June 30, 2023), and Third (September 26, 2023) Reviews, we have repeatedly disputed the City’s determination that the Project application is incomplete. In support of this position, we incorporate herein the Applicant’s responses dated June 15, 2023, August 25, 2023, and November 22, 2023, attached hereto as Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and Exhibit C, respectively, where the Applicant fully and timely responded to the City’s requests for information and provided all information necessary for the City to process the application. As set forth in exhaustive detail therein, pursuant to State Housing Element Law, if a site is required to be rezoned to accommodate the City’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA), the City (and not a project applicant) shall rezone it within one year of the statutory deadline for the 6th Cycle Housing Element Update to allow residential use by right for development in which at least 20% of the units are affordable. (Gov. Code § 65583.2(h)-(i).)
Because the City failed to complete the required rezoning of the Project site by the one-year deadline, the City may not disapprove, or require locally imposed discretionary permits for, a housing development project proposed on the site that includes at least 49% affordable units and complies with applicable, objective general plan and zoning standards and criteria described in the rezoning program action. (Gov. Code § 65583(g)(1).) The only exception is if the City makes written findings supported by substantial evidence that the housing development would have a “specific, adverse impact upon the public health and safety” and there is no feasible method to mitigate or avoid the impact other than disapproval or approval on the condition that it be developed at a lower density. (Gov. Code § 65583(g)(2).) As further explained in the Applicant’s prior responses, the City cannot make these findings. Moreso, the City shall not relegate its responsibility to rezone its housing sites to the Project Applicant.

Based on the correspondence received, City staff believes that rezoning the Project site is not required unless adequate progress had not been made by April 2024 as described in Program 3A (Agreement with State to Build Affordable Housing Units on State Fairgrounds property).

Although the City entered into an Exclusive Negotiating Rights Agreement (ENRA) with the Fairgrounds in April 2024, the ENRA or Program 3A does not absolve the City’s responsibility to comply with state law requiring the rezoning of sites within the 6th Housing Element Cycle. The City may already be aware of two recent budget trailer bills that were signed into law by Governor Newsom on June 30, 2025 (Assembly Bill 130 and Senate Bill 131). The bills are already in effect and include a provision where a city’s rezoning of its candidate housing sites to meet RHNA requirements are now exempt from CEQA (i.e., no longer rely on the environmental impact report prepared for a housing element). These bills will aid the City to expeditiously process its required amendments for rezoning without further delay. 123 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Matt Bator, AICP
July 10, 2025

Additionally, in a December 2024 letter to the City, the State Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) has required2 the City to detail further milestones including approval of a ground lease by both parties by October 2025 and further advised the City that both shall occur:
a. That “regardless of sites identified in any contingency program, it must continue to process housing development applications submitted during the time the City’s housing element was out of compliance, pursuant to Government Code section 6558[9.]5, subdivision (d)(5).” [Seaside Ridge is a housing development application wherein both the SB 330 application and formal development application were submitted during the time the City’s housing element was out of compliance.]
b. That the City shall ensure that its housing element inventory or program to make sites available pursuant to Gov. Code § 65583(c)(1) can accommodate “at all times throughout the planning period” its remaining RHNA and “[a]t no time” shall the City “permit or cause its inventory of sites identified in the housing element to be insufficient to meet its remaining unmet share” of the RHNA (Gov. Code § 65863(a)).

On June 5, 2025, the State Attorney General issued a Legal Alert to local governments reminding cities and counties of their responsibility to timely process Builder’s Remedy applications. The Attorney General states, “The legal alert today is intended to ensure local governments understand their responsibility to facilitate affordable housing: California expects nothing less and is committed to ensuring that all cities and counties are part of the solution — no exceptions.” The Legal Alert further explains the consequences for a city failing to properly implement the Builder’s Remedy. These include referral to and intervention by the Attorney General and penalties under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), including a minimum fine of $10,000 per unit of the proposed project. Seaside Ridge is a Builder’s Remedy application with 259 units, and initially submitted for processing over 2.5 years ago on October 14, 2022. The Legal Alert reminds a city that if it appeals a court order finding that a city violated the HAA, the local government must post an appeal bond or dismiss its appeal. As evidenced in the case Cal.

Housing Defense Fund v. City of La Cañada Flintridge, the court required the city to post an appeal bond of $14 million or dismiss its appeal – the city dismissed its appeal. The Legal Alert is provided here as Exhibit E.

Pursuant to Gov. Code § 65589.5(d)(5), the City of Del Mar may not “disapprove the housing development project” (as defined) unless, on the date the application was “deemed complete”, both: (a) the jurisdiction had adopted a substantially compliant housing element and (b) the housing development project was inconsistent with both the zoning ordinance and general plan land use designation. This paragraph shall not be used to disapprove a housing development project proposed on a site “identified as suitable or available for very low, low- or moderate-income households in the jurisdiction’s housing element”, “including a candidate site for rezoning”, even 2 By letter dated December 11, 2024, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 124 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Matt Bator, AICP
July 10, 2025

Additionally, in a December 2024 letter to the City, the State Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) has required2 the City to detail further milestones including approval of a ground lease by both parties by October 2025 and further advised the City that both shall occur:
a. That “regardless of sites identified in any contingency program, it must continue to process housing development applications submitted during the time the City’s housing element was out of compliance, pursuant to Government Code section 6558[9.]5, subdivision (d)(5).” [Seaside Ridge is a housing development application wherein both the SB 330 application and formal development application were submitted during the time the City’s housing element was out of compliance.]
b. That the City shall ensure that its housing element inventory or program to make sites available pursuant to Gov. Code § 65583(c)(1) can accommodate “at all times throughout the planning period” its remaining RHNA and “[a]t no time” shall the City “permit or cause its inventory of sites identified in the housing element to be insufficient to meet its remaining unmet share” of the RHNA (Gov. Code § 65863(a)).

On June 5, 2025, the State Attorney General issued a Legal Alert to local governments reminding cities and counties of their responsibility to timely process Builder’s Remedy applications. The Attorney General states, “The legal alert today is intended to ensure local governments understand their responsibility to facilitate affordable housing: California expects nothing less and is committed to ensuring that all cities and counties are part of the solution — no exceptions.” The Legal Alert further explains the consequences for a city failing to properly implement the Builder’s Remedy. These include referral to and intervention by the Attorney General and penalties under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), including a minimum fine of $10,000 per unit of the proposed project. Seaside Ridge is a Builder’s Remedy application with 259 units, and initially submitted for processing over 2.5 years ago on October 14, 2022. The Legal Alert reminds a city that if it appeals a court order finding that a city violated the HAA, the local government must post an appeal bond or dismiss its appeal. As evidenced in the case Cal.

Housing Defense Fund v. City of La Cañada Flintridge, the court required the city to post an appeal bond of $14 million or dismiss its appeal – the city dismissed its appeal. The Legal Alert is provided here as Exhibit E.

Pursuant to Gov. Code § 65589.5(d)(5), the City of Del Mar may not “disapprove the housing development project” (as defined) unless, on the date the application was “deemed complete”, both: (a) the jurisdiction had adopted a substantially compliant housing element and (b) the housing development project was inconsistent with both the zoning ordinance and general plan land use designation. This paragraph shall not be used to disapprove a housing development project proposed on a site “identified as suitable or available for very low, low- or moderate-income households in the jurisdiction’s housing element”, “including a candidate site for rezoning”, even 2 By letter dated December 11, 2024, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 125 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Matt Bator, AICP
July 10, 2025

though the housing development project was inconsistent with the zoning and general plan designation on the date the application was deemed complete. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(d)(5)(A).) For purposes of Gov. Code § 65589.5(d)(5), notwithstanding any other law, “deemed complete” means only that an applicant has submitted a Preliminary Application pursuant to Gov. Code § 65941.1; a complete application pursuant to Gov. Code § 65943 is only required if an applicant has not submitted a Preliminary Application. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(h)(5)3 .) Here, the Applicant
submitted the required information to be deemed to have submitted a Preliminary Application, including a site plan showing approximate square footage of each building to be occupied and the proposed land uses by number of units and square feet of residential and nonresidential development. (Gov. Code § 65941.1(a).) Revisions in the Project between the October 2022 Preliminary Application and the full application in March 2023 increased the total construction square footage by 17.1% in order to provide more subterranean parking onsite. As was also represented on the plans, the residential area of the project actually decreased between the two applications. Due to a clerical error on the checklist submitted with the October 2022 Preliminary Application, the City claims the increase is 28% despite the fact that the plans represent a 17.1% increase, and that therefore the project “shall not be deemed to have submitted a preliminary application.” However, the City’s response relies entirely on the optional checklist and ignores the actual application materials which evidence only a 17.1% increase in the overall building square footage. (Gov. Code § 65941.1(c).) As such the City’s claim that the Project increased by 28% is not supported by substantial evidence.

AB 1893 (2024) provides additional protections to “Builder’s Remedy” projects, defined to include projects that provide affordable housing, where the jurisdiction did not have a substantially compliant Housing Element on or after the date an application for the project was deemed complete (Gov. Code § 65589.5(h)(11)), and expressly provides that “The project shall not be required to apply for, or receive approval of, a general plan amendment, specific plan amendment, rezoning, or other legislative approval.” (Gov. Code § 65589.5(f)(6)(D)(i).) Under these laws, the City cannot require the Project to apply for a rezoning, GPA or any other legislative approval. As stated previously, the City shall not relegate its responsibility to rezone its housing sites to the Project Applicant.

Moreover, the City’s refusal to process a valid Builder’s Remedy application is a violation of State Housing Law.4 Pursuant to Gov. Code § 65589.5(i), the City bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that its repeated determination that the project application is incomplete is not an unlawful “disapproval of the housing project”. Further, the City must prove that applications for discretionary approvals are required to process the Project, rather than the result of the City’s 3 See also, Californians for Homeownership v. City of La Cañada/Flintridge (LASC, Case No. 23STCP00699); Californians for Homeownership v. City of Hawaiian Gardens (LASC, Case No. 23STCP00624); Californians for Homeownership v. City of Beverly Hills (LASC, Case No. 23STCP00143); Shelby Family Partnership, L.P. v. City of Goleta, et al. (Super. Ct. S.B. County, Case No. 24CV00548) and related Attorney General Legal Alert dated June 5, 2025, attached hereto as Exhibit E [“preliminary Builder’s Remedy applications vest at the time of submission.”]. 4 See Exhibit E, inclusive of “Possible Consequences for the Failure to Process a Builder’s Remedy Application Pursuant to State Law.”
126 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Matt Bator, AICP
July 10, 2025

own failure to complete mandatory rezoning of the site in violation of its obligations under state law, including its requirement pursuant to Gov. Code §§ 65583(c)(1)(A)(i) and 65863(a) to “accommodate, at all times throughout the planning period, its remaining unmet share of the regional housing need allocated pursuant to Section 65584[.]”5 In short, the City cannot require the Project to apply for discretionary approvals and cannot refuse to process the project application as “incomplete” for failure to do so. The City’s continued failure to process the application is a violation of applicable state law, inter alia, Gov. Code §§ 65583(g)(1), 65589.5 subds. (d)(5), (f)(6), (h)(6)(D)-(I). We therefore request the City rescind its prior incompleteness determinations and find the application complete. We look forward to your response within 10 days.

Sincerely,
Brooke Miller
for SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
SMRH:4897-5142-3313.7
cc: Carol Lazier
Joseph Smith
Manuel Nieto
Exhibits:

A: Applicant’s response dated June 15, 2023
B: Applicant’s response dated August 25, 2023
C: Applicant’s response dated November 22, 2023
D: Letter from HCD to City of Del Mar dated December 11, 2024 E: Attorney General Legal Alert dated June 5, 2025
5 We note further that, according to HCD, as of the 50% benchmark for the 6th Housing Element Cycle in June 2025, the City has completed 0% of its Very Low Income and 0% of its Low Income RHNA, https://www.hcd.ca.gov/planning-and-community-development/streamlinedministerial-approval-process-dashboard 127 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Ralph T. Hicks, Esq.
[email protected]
Direct: (951) 949-4498
41955 Fourth Street, Suite 210, Temecula, CA 92590 T: (951) 262-4491 F: (951) 262-4495 DPMClaw.com

July 18, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
501 West Broadway, 18th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101-3598
Re: City of Del Mar Response to July 10, 2025 Seaside Ridge Legal Representations Dear Ms. Miller,
This letter is in response to the demands set forth in your July 10, 2025 letter. Your letter is the fifth legal treatise that the City has received and does nothing to advance the application process for the reasons stated below.

The City has repeatedly requested these missing application materials from April 27, 2023 to December 2023, however, in lieu of submitting these materials, noted in Section V of this letter, Counsel continues their on-going misinformation media campaign in an attempt to relitigate the Court’s decision to dismiss the Lazier Petition for Writ of Mandate. The Applicant continues to falsely state that the Builder’s Remedy applies to the Project and that the City was obligated to amend its Local Coastal Program, the Community Plan, and Zoning designation to accommodate a project that is wholly inconsistent with the City’s Community Plan, LCP, and the California Coastal Act. Moreover, counsel continues to falsely claim that the Seaside Ridge project site is eligible for a mandatory rezone when it is only listed as a contingency site in the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element. This legalistic approach by the Applicant is the only reason the Seaside Ridge project is not moving forward. And despite the City’s offer to engage in a joint planning effort to move the project forward, Counsel continues to misinform the press by stating that the City and the California Coastal Commission have no authority under state housing laws to protect coastal resources.

Counsel assumes that providing false and misleading information to the press will somehow force the City in approving the Seaside Ridge project without needing to comply with state housing law and the California Coastal Act. An example of these bulling attempts occurred on July 1, 2025 and July 16, 2025, where Counsel told the media that “the project is in a stalemate” and once again blamed the City for the project not moving forward when in fact the responsibility to complete the application process rests solely on the Applicant. It is important to note, however, that the only party stalling this project is the Applicant by not submitting the required application materials.

In their steadfast refusal to complete the application process, Applicant continues to ignore the mandates of state housing law and the California Coastal Act. Under Section V of this letter, we note that there are 6 critical application materials that have not yet been submitted, and we again urge the Applicant to meet its obligations to complete the application process. As you are aware, the City has previously requested these materials in four separate incomplete application letters from April 2023 to December 2023. Accordingly, the only “stalemate” is the in-action on the part of the Applicant.

Attachment C
128 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

Finally, at the conclusion of this letter, the City once again extends an offer to enter into a collaborative planning process to resolve the many issues associated with the Seaside Ridge project.

We would like the Applicant to reflect on how successful the campaign of misinformation and combative tactics has served the interest of the Applicant. Submission of the application materials would be a welcome start to resolving what you have called a stalemate.

I. The Applicant Is Acting In Bad Faith
Your letter continues to recast the City’s regulatory housing obligations in such a manner which misrepresents the resource protection provisions of the 1976 California Coastal Act and misinterprets the City’s housing obligations under state housing laws. Counsel continues to refuse to submit the necessary application materials for the application to be deemed complete. This refusal results in unnecessary delays and consumes valuable City resources.

Moreover, your letter is disappointing. Immediately following the Court’s dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Mandate, counsel for the City and counsel for Mrs. Lazier discussed an alternative path forward; namely entering into a joint planning exercise between City staff and the applicant’s technical consultants. Mrs. Hodges likened this approach to the successful joint planning effort that resolved the Winston School project issues, and she responded very positively and later confirmed, by phone call, that such an approach was acceptable to Mrs. Lazier and the Seaside Ridge team. As a result, the City Attorney’s office explored this approach with City Council and received input on how best to approach this effort. Apparently, this good faith outreach on the part of the City is not being reciprocated. Your letter restates an argument that relies on misapplied housing laws and lists new demands that have no basis or support in law.

As stated in our Motion to Dismiss, Counsel for the Applicant has repeatedly tried to undermine the City’s efforts to secure low-income housing on the State Fairgrounds site by stating that the Seaside Ridge housing project is “shovel ready” and can “meet all of the City’s housing demands.” Neither is true. The Seaside Ridge project is not “shovel ready”; the development application is not complete.

Further, the submitted plans do not set forth a clear affordable housing development proposal, the Applicant team does not include affordable housing development experience, and the proposed Seaside Ridge project does not meet the City’s inclusionary housing requirements or lower-income housing needs as identified in the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element. The Applicant has invested more time misinforming the press than delivering the requested application materials necessary to complete the Seaside Ridge application.

Counsel for the Seaside Ridge project has the mistaken belief that if they provide enough misinformation to the press, state untrue information to other regulatory agencies, and bully the City they somehow will be successful. This approach is not a formula for success. If the Seaside Ridge team had a qualified developer leading the project, it is highly likely that the project developer would have submitted the application materials necessary to amend the City’s Local Coastal Program. Seaside Ridge’s legal strategy is clearly directed at misinforming the press, HCD, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Fairgrounds Board of Directors. While this may garner legal counsel significant legal fees, it is not how affordable housing projects become successful.
129 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

II. The Seaside Ridge Project Is A Contingency Housing Site Not A By-Right Project The fundamental flaw in the Applicant’s legal posture is that the “Builder’s Remedy” applies and the Coastal Act does not. Neither is the case. Instead of recognizing this fact, counsel has now submitted five legal treatises on housing laws which only serve to delay the application process. We can only assume that these law review type letters are a substitution for the Applicant’s obligation to respond to the deficient areas identified in the City’s four (4) incomplete application determinations.

Counsel has continuously misrepresented the history and content of the City’s Housing Element. Below we provide the true history and content of the City’s 6th Housing Element:
• The City adopted its 6th Cycle Housing Element March 25, 2021, prior to the April 15, 2021 deadline; and re-adopted the Housing Element on December 13, 2021 and April 3, 2023 to incorporate modifications required by HCD.
• None of the subsequent deficiencies identified by HCD for certification required any changes to the sites relied upon to meet RHNA. They were focused on compliance with new “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” standards where the State guidance was not even published until after the April 2021 deadline for the San Diego region to adopt Housing Elements.
• The City’s Housing Element was formally certified on May 31, 2023, when HCD determined the City’s Housing Element to be in substantial compliance with State Housing Element Law.
• The City has consistently demonstrated it has adequate sites to meet its 6th Cycle RHNA. HCD has inquired and confirmed this on multiple occasions. The HE Program 1E contingency rezone continues to be not applicable and not required. • The City and District timely satisfied the agreement milestone in HE Program 3A through execution of an Exclusive Negotiating Rights Agreement in March 2024 that took effect on April 15, 2024.
• Implementation of the ENRA remains in process and has involved substantial investment by the City and the State, including 1) $121,500 Cycle 1 HAP grant funds spent in 2022 to 2023 to produce architectural/site design concepts and economic feasibility studies to demonstrate the feasibility of lower income housing on the State Fairgrounds; and 2) $1.5 million in Cycle 2 HAP Grant funds to conduct due diligence and feasibility studies to develop at least 61 lower income units on the State Fairgrounds in Del Mar.
• As discussed below, a contingency rezone (i.e., HE Program 1E) will not be necessary unless the State Fairgrounds Affordable Housing Plan is determined to be infeasible.

Yet, Counsel falsely believes this was a mandatory requirement.

In sum, legal memorandums do not relieve the Seaside Ridge Applicant from submitting materials that City staff have requested in their previous incomplete determinations. Counsel’s legal treatise letter of July 10, 2025, is not an application amendment nor can it be construed as being responsive to any areas of deficiency identified by the City, nor could it be construed as a supplement to the Seaside Ridge application.
130 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

The Applicant’s counsel relies on Ca Gov Code Sec 65583.2 in asserting that the City had an obligation to rezone the Seaside Ridge site. However, this assumes that the Seaside Ridge site was needed to meet the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment (“RHNA”) which is not the case, and Section 65583.2 clearly states what is required and what is not required:
“If a local government fails to complete the rezoning by the deadline provided in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), as it may be extended pursuant to subdivision (f), except as provided in paragraph (2), a local government may not disapprove a housing development project, nor require a conditional use permit, planned unit development permit, or other locally imposed discretionary permit, or impose a condition that would render the project infeasible, if the housing development project, (A) is proposed to be located on a site required to be rezoned pursuant to the program action required by that subparagraph and, (B) complies with applicable, objective general plan and zoning standards and criteria, including design review standards, described in the program action required by that subparagraph. Any subdivision of sites shall be subject to the Subdivision Map Act (Division 2 (commencing with Section 66410)). Design review shall not constitute a “project” for purposes of Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code.( Emphasis added). (CA Gov. Code Sec 65583.2 (g)(1)).

The Applicant’s reliance on this provision is misplaced because the Seaside Ridge site is only a “contingency” site should an affordable housing development on the State Fairgrounds site not materialize. The City and State Fairgroundsin Del Mar have an Exclusive Negotiating Rights Agreement in place (effective April 15, 2024) that remains in full force and effect.

Moreover, the Seaside Ridge project does not comply with the City’s objective design guidelines or zoning standards found in the City’s Community Plan and LCP because the height limitations for this coastal blufftop site are significantly exceeded, the density of the project far exceeds the R1-40 zone designation for very low density residential, and the project does not demonstrate protection of the coastal bluff and public safety as required by the applicable overlay zones.

Furthermore, the bluff setbacks are inadequate, and the new access road will have significant environmental impacts due to the road traversing a protected canyon and its proposed 18’ retaining wall design only makes the impacts more significant.

Because the Seaside Ridge site was only identified in the City’s 6th Housing Element as a “contingency site” no rezone was required. This fact is identified in Chapter 3 and Appendix B of the City’s 6th Housing Element which explicitly identifiesthe specific sites that the City is relying on to meet the RHNA. Seaside Ridge site is not one of the sites being relied upon to meet RHNA. Refer to Housing Element Chapter 3 “Sites Suitable for Lower Income Housing” analysis on pages 3-66 to 3-68 and Appendix B Candidate Sites Analysis page B-1 “City’s Plan to Accommodate Units for the 6th Cycle”, Section B “Lower Income Sites Analysis by Location” on pages B-4 to B-28, and Table B-2 “Summary of 131 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

RHNA Status and Sites Inventory (Dwelling Units)” on page B-30. The listed sites relied upon to meet lower income RHNA in all adopted versions of the Housing Element, including the final certified 6th Housing Element are as follows:

Professional Commercial (PC) – 3 lower income units, two sites North Commercial (NC) (without Watermark) –22 lower income units, six sites Rezoned Watermark Lots (NC) – 6 low, 2 very low, 2 extremely low-income units Public Facilities (PF) – City Owned Properties – 4 lower income 10th Street site 941 Camino Del Mar Specific Plan – 2 low income units
Existing Residentially Zoned Properties – 3 lower income units 28th Street site Accessory Dwelling Unit Production – 15 low income units State Fairgrounds Property – 54 lower income units
The determination that the Seaside Ridge site is only listed as a “contingency site” is found in the City’s 6th Housing Element Chapter 3 “Sites Suitable for Lower Income Housing” analysis on pages 3-66 to 3-68 and Appendix B Vacant Sites Analysis in the Section C.1 Analysis of State Fairgrounds Sites and Contingency Rezone and Table B-3 on page B-31 where it references sites to be considered if necessary to implement the Program 1E contingency rezone.

HCD continues to monitor the City’s Housing Element implementation progress, including City and District coordination to implement the Housing Plan to build lower income affordable units on the State Fairgrounds property in Del Mar, and continues to confirm the City has adequate sites in place.

The 22nd District Agricultural Association and City of Del Mar timely entered into an Exclusive Negotiating Rights Agreement (ENRA) in March 2024, which took effect April 15, 2024, and remains in effect. The California Housing and Community Development Department (HCD) recognizes that lower income housing development in this context involves a complex process due to the respective roles and responsibilities of the City, District, California General Services Department, HCD, and Coastal Commission. The State, by a SANDAG formal action, awarded $1.5 million in Cycle 2 Housing Acceleration Program (HAP) Grant funds to the City specifically for the Fairgrounds Affordable Housing Project. The Cycle 2 funding is in addition to the $121,500 Cycle 1 HAP grant funds spent 2022 to 2023 to produce architectural/site design concepts and economic feasibility studies to demonstrate the feasibility of lower income housing on the State Fairgrounds. Currently, Cycle 2 grant funds have been allocated to cover the following five task orders in process with the District’s Consultant, Harris Associates:
• Updated State Fairgrounds Housing Site Conditions and Constraints Assessment • State Fairgrounds Supplemental Financial Feasibility Analysis • State Fairgrounds CEQA Opportunities and Constraints Analysis • State Fairgrounds Vulnerability Assessment
• State Fairgrounds Transportation Demand Management/Mobility Analysis • State Fairgrounds Water/Sewer, CIP plan, and Financial Analysis 132 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

The fact that the Seaside Ridge project site is merely a contingency site supports and helps explain the motives of counsel in making false and misleading public statements to the 22nd District Agricultural Association Board of Directors where counsel stated that the Seaside Ridge project is “shovel ready” and can meet all the City’s housing needs without the need of the State Fairground property in Del Mar. The City’s adopted affordable housing strategy for the State Fairgrounds property was supported by a Resolution adopted by the County Board of Supervisors and has received other widespread support from SANDAG, State representatives, and others. Yet, Counsel has taken upon herself to try to undermine these legislative acts of elected representatives.

The misleading public statements made to the media and 22nd District Agricultural Association Board of Directors by Seaside Ridge project proponents have clearly been directed at subversion of the City’s good faith efforts to secure lower-income housing on the State Fairgrounds property in Del Mar. This is clear because the only way that the City will be required to identify a replacement lowerincome housing site is if the State Fairground housing strategy is rendered infeasible and thereby creates a need for additional adequate sites. Therefore, these statements and activities clearly demonstrate bad faith by the Applicant and her counsel.

III. The Seaside Ridge Project Site is Environmentally Sensitive and is Protected Under the Coastal Bluff and Bluff, Slope and Canyon Overlay Zones As Part of the City’s Certified LCP

The Seaside Ridge Project site is environmentally sensitive and is protected under the Coastal Bluff Overlay Zone (DMMC Chapter 30.55) and Bluff, Slope and Canyon Overlay Zone (DMMC Chapter

30.52) as Part of the City’s Certified LCP. The application calls for an access road to traverse through this protected area which will cause extensive environmental damage. This road is so steep that it requires an 18’ retaining wall which is entirely inconsistent with the environmental protection set forth in DMMC 30.52.

The City of Del Mar is a coastal jurisdiction located entirely within the coastal zone where proposed development is subject to compliance with the California Coastal Act and the City’s certified Local Coastal Program. The City’s 6th Housing Element recognized that the City may have to process a contingency rezone of vacant sites (that could include the Applicant’s property) and that additional environmental review would need to occur at the project level. Housing Element Appendix B page B31 states in its analysis of the vacant sites that were identified as “contingency sites” that “environmental conditions were evaluated at a program level in the Housing Element Program EIR and will need to be further evaluated and factored in at the project level (e.g., four of the nine contingency sites are in the Coastal Bluff Overlay Zone, which prohibits development within 40 feet of the edge of a coastal bluff).”
The Seaside Ridge project site is located on an environmentally sensitive coastal bluff location, and the proposed development is of a scale that is in substantial conflict with the existing very low density and low-density development standards that apply to the subject property and adjacent properties. The proposed high density project’s land use and zoning inconsistencies and potential to

133 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

result in significant environmental impacts, including impacts to similarly situated adjacent properties, have not been sufficiently analyzed, addressed, or disclosed in the application. All CEQA documentation will have to be provided (as addressed below) in addition to the documentation requirements of the City’s LCP. Until such time the application will remain incomplete.

IV. The Project is Not Exempt Under CEQA by the Passage of New CEQA Legislation

Under the new CEQA legislation the Seaside Ridge project would not be exempt because the Applicant is seeking approval under Cal.Gov. Code 65589.5 and the site is more than 5 acres and is not consistent with the City’s LCP.

The new Government Code section reads:
(a) Without limiting any other statutory or categorical exemption, this division does not apply to any aspect of a housing development project, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 65905.5 of the Government Code, including any permits, approvals, or public improvements required for the housing development project, as may be required by this division, if the housing development project meets all of the following conditions:
(1) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the project site is not more than 20 acres.
(B) The project site or the parcel size for a builder’s remedy project, as defined in paragraph (11) of subdivision (h) of Section 65589.5 of the Government Code, or the project site or the parcel size for a project that applied pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (d) of Section 65589.5 of the Government Code as it read before January 1, 2025, is not more than five acres.(CA Pub. Res. Code Sec. 21080.66 (a)(1)(B).

The Project is inconsistent with the 14’ height limitation contained in the City’s Community (General) Plan, certified LCP and the density far exceeds the Very Low Density Residential land use and R1-40 zone standards. As such it is not exempt under 4(A) of the new CEQA legislation and no reasonable person could reasonably conclude that the 259-unit high density project with heights that range up to 56’ is consistent with the LCP. The new legislation reads:
(4) (A) The project is consistent with the applicable general plan and zoning ordinance, as well as any applicable local coastal program as defined in Section 30108.6. For purposes of this section, a housing development project shall be deemed consistent with the applicable general plan and zoning ordinance, and any applicable local coastal program, if there is substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that the housing development project is consistent. (CA Pub Res. Code Sec. 21080.66 (a)(4)(A)).
134 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

V. How To Complete the Seaside Development Application-Submit the LCP Amendment Forms and the Pay Fees

The City in four (4) letters from April 2023 to December 2023 has informed the Seaside Ridge Applicant to provide the documents outlined below and pay the City’s standard processing fees. These requests have been ignored by the Applicant to date. Given the project’s lack of conformity to the City’s Community Plan, Zoning Designations, and certified Local Coastal Program (LCP) the documents listed below are required along with the deposit of the correct fees associated with those actions.

1. Rezone Application Has Not Been Submitted
As stated in previous reviews, a rezone is a legislative action that cannot be processed administratively and the subject project parcels are not eligible for “by right” housing development. Therefore, your prior application request for an “Administrative Rezone” is rejected. Use and applicability of the HEI-OZ for implementation of the Housing Element is at the discretion of the Del Mar City Council. If the Applicant would like to apply for a legislative action to rezone the subject site parcels (APN 298-241-06, 298-241-07, & 299-030-14), then please prepare a separate letter of request to accompany the Uniform Development Application that clearly states the request, justifications for the rezone, and proposed findings for approval as are required in accordance with DMMC Section 30.86.220 (C). Exhibits identifying the existing zoning designations and proposed zoning designations shall also be prepared and submitted.

Required Deposit: $10,925 (This is an initial working deposit; additional funds may be required in accordance with the City’s adopted Fee Schedule).

2. Local Coastal Program Amendment (LCPA) Has Not Been Submitted

Rezoning and modifying the land use designation of the subject site would require an LCPA, adopted by the City Council and Certified by the California Coastal Commission.

Proposed/revised text revisions and map exhibits of the City’s LCP are required with an LCPA application submittal.

Required Deposit: Included with the above-required Rezone deposit.

3. General Plan (Community Plan) Amendment Has Not Been Submitted An Amendment of the City’s General Plan (Community Plan) is required for any changes to the Very Low Residential Density Land Use Designation (located in the North Bluff District) to allow - multi-unit development on lots identified with the Assessor’s Parcel Numbers 298-241-06, 298-241-07, and 299-030-14. Proposed/revised land use maps and Community Plan text revisions are required with the application submittal.

Required Deposit: Included with the above-required Rezone deposit. 135 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

4. Environmental Assessment Application Has Not Been Submitted The proposed project is subject to compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The recent changes to CEQA as pointed out in your July letter do not apply because the project is inconsistent with the City’s Community Plan, LCP, Overlay zones, and is not needed to meet the City’s obligations under its RHNA. Therefore, a discretionary Local Coastal Program Amendment is required in order for the Project to be found consistent with the existing LCP. Accordingly, an Environmental Assessment (EA) application is required for the City to determine the appropriate level environmental review that would be required for the project.

Required Deposit: $1,090 (Additional funds will be required once a consultant from the City’s on-call environmental consultant list has been contracted to perform the Initial Study). To facilitate the processing of the re-submitted application additional technical information/reports will be required regarding the following areas of environmental concern:
• Public Coastal View Impact Analysis
• Air Quality Impacts
• Energy Conservation and Impact Analysis
• Greenhouse Gas Emissions Impacts Including during construction • Hazards and Hazardous Materials Usage and Impacts
• Noise Impact Analysis
• Full Paleontological Report
• Tribal/Cultural Resources Impact
• Climate Change Impacts to the North Bluff
• Environmental Justice Analysis
• Proposed Roadway Impact Analysis
• Public Coastal Access Impact Analysis
• Conformity with LCP Impact Analysis
Upon completion of the required Initial Study, and in order to address significant environmental impacts, additional technical reports and/or information may be required.

5. Design Review Permit Application
A discretionary Design Review Permit approval is required for all development in the City of Del Mar, not otherwise exempted. As it is the City’s determination that the subject Housing Development Project is not subject to the provisions of AB 1398, discretionary development applications and approvals are required in accordance with Del Mar Municipal Code (DMMC) Chapter 23.08. The Applicant must submit an unaltered City of Del Mar Design Review Permit Application and Submittal Checklist.

Required Application Fee: $11,380 General Plan/Zoning Code Update Charge (10%): $1,138.

DRB Public Notice Fee: To be determined and required at the time of public notice distribution.
136 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

6. LCP Environmentally Protective Overlay Zones Apply to the Project Site Because the project site is located in the Coastal Commission approved Coastal Bluff Overlay Zone, the Bluff, Slope and Canyon Overlay Zone, and Lagoon Overlay Zone, as well as the proposed grading that would be required to adequately access the housing units, the following discretionary permit applications are required under the provisions of the certified LCP:
i. Conditional Use Permit Application (Has Not Been Submitted) Required Application Fee: $2,595
Planning Commission Public Notice Fee: To be determined and required at the time of the public notice distribution.
ii. Coastal Development Application – A CDP Supplemental questionnaire was submitted on March 30, 2023. However, as previously indicated in the City’s incomplete letter dated April 27, 2023, the Coastal Development Permit required for this project is a discretionary permit, not administrative permit.

A new CDP Supplemental Questionnaire without reference to the HEI-OZ.

Required Application Fee is: $3,185.
iii. Land Conservation Permit Application (Has Not Been Submitted) Required Application Fee: $3,185

Total Fees Owed: $33,498.

In accordance with the City’s Adopted Planning and Engineering Fee Schedules, payment of these fees is required for the City to process the proposed Seaside Ridge project application.

Items 1-6 that have been missing from the Application since April 2023 and these requested materials are consistent with state housing law. Even if the Builder’s Remedy applied they would be required.
(2), a local government may not disapprove a housing development project, nor require a conditional use permit, planned unit development permit, or other locally imposed discretionary permit, or impose a condition that would render the project infeasible, if the housing development project, (A) is proposed to be located on a site required to be rezoned pursuant to the program action required by that subparagraph and, (B) complies with applicable, objective general plan and zoning standards and criteria, including design review standards, described in the program action required by that subparagraph. Any subdivision of sites shall be subject to the Subdivision Map Act (Division 2 (commencing with Section 66410)). Design review shall not constitute a “project” for purposes of Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code.( Emphasis added). (CA Gov. Code Sec 65583.2 (g)(1)).
137 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

VI. The Preliminary Application is Void and Not Because of a Clerical Error

The Applicant continues to falsely assert that their project did not grow more than 20% from the submission of the preliminary application to the completed application. City staff calculations of project growth were based on the fact the Applicant added an additional parking level to the project.

The Preliminary Development Application proposed a Housing Development Project consisting of 308,968 “square-feet of construction.” Now, the subject Coastal Development Permit (CDP) application materials propose a Housing Development Project consisting of 396,259 square-feet of construction. The additional square footage is almost entirely the result of adding a new level to the parking structure.

State housing laws recognize the consequences of a project growing beyond the preliminary application with the result being to void the preliminary application:
“After submittal of all of the information required by subdivision (a), if the development proponent revises the project such that the number of residential units or square footage of construction changes by 20 percent or more, exclusive of any increase resulting from the receipt of a density bonus, incentive, concession, waiver, or similar provision, the housing development project shall not be deemed to have submitted a preliminary application that satisfies this section until the development proponent resubmits the information required by subdivision (a) so that it reflects the revisions.

For purposes of this subdivision, “square footage of construction” means the building area, as defined by the California Building Standards Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations).” (CA Gov. Code Sec. 65941.1(c)).

Both the preliminary and development entitlement proposals for the Seaside Ridge Housing Project calculated the square footage inclusive of density bonus units/construction areas. Therefore, thisincrease represents a change to the “building area,” as defined by the California Building Standards Code. This change, therefore represented a net increase of 28 percent, which exceeds the allowance provided by the Government Code cited above. Accordingly, pursuant to the cited Code, the PDA22- 001 application must be resubmitted to reflect the revisions to the project’s “building area.” This substantial increase in building area results in the preliminary application being void until such time that Applicant resubmits the information required by CA Gov. Code Sec. 65941.1 (a) which is consistent with the Coastal Act and in this case the City’s LCP.

VII. The California Coastal Act Was Not Superseded By State Housing Laws

As stated above, the City of Del Mar is a coastal jurisdiction located entirely within the coastal zone where proposed development is subject to compliance with the California Coastal Act and the City’s certified Local Coastal Program. The California Coastal Act’s relationship to state housing laws has been well articulated by the courts, which the Applicant all but ignores. For example, in Pacific 138 September 22, 2025 Item 7
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Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles [(2012) 55 Cal.4th 783 at 721] the Court summarized the key components of the California Coastal Act and its role harmonizing the mandate of housing legislation with coastal resource protections. There the Court noted that:

The Coastal Act “was enacted by the Legislature as a comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California. The Legislature found that ‘the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource of vital and enduring interest to all the people’; that ‘the permanent protection of the state's natural and scenic resources is a paramount concern’; that ‘it is necessary to protect the ecological balance of the coastal zone’ and that ‘existing developed uses, and future developments that are carefully planned and developed consistent with the policies of this division, are essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of this state....’ (Id., § 30600, subd. (a).)
The Coastal Act expressly recognizes the need to “rely heavily” on local government “[t]o achieve maximum responsiveness to local conditions, accountability, and public accessibility....” (Pub.

Resources Code, § 30004, subd. (a).) As relevant here, it requires local governments to develop local coastal programs, comprised of a land use plan and a set of implementing ordinances designed to promote the act's objectives of protecting the coastline and its resources and of maximizing public access. (Id., §§ 30001.5, 30500–30526; Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1011, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 953 P.2d 1188.) Once the California Coastal Commission certifies a local government's program, and all implementing actions become effective, the commission delegates authority over coastal development permits to the local government. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30519,subd. (a), 30600.5,subds. (a), (b), (c).) Thus, “[u]nder the Coastal Act's legislative scheme, ... the [local coastal program] and the development permits issued by local agencies pursuant to the Coastal Act are not solely a matter of local law but embody in state policy.” (Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 466.)
Here, the Applicant relies on the Density Bonus Law to achieve a higher density project based on the percentage of affordable homes that are integrated into the overall project. (Cal.Gov.Code Sec. 65915). While the Density Bonus Law is designed to address the shortage of affordable housing in the State, it does not require a city to rezone a property for alternative housing sites or disregard the resource protective provisions of the Coastal Act.

The Applicant attempts to rely on the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”) the so called “builder’s remedy” to secure by-right approvals when a city has non-compliant housing element. But both statutory schemes recognize the importance of the coastal resource protection safeguards provided in the California Coastal Act. (Cal.Pub.Res.Sec. 30000, et seq.).

Under the Bonus Density Law, the Coastal Act is clearly not “superseded” under the CA Gov.

Code Sec. 65915 (m):
“This section does not supersede or in any way alter or lessen the effect or application of the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Division 20 139 September 22, 2025 Item 7
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Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025

(commencing with Section 30000) of the Public Resources Code). Any density bonus, concessions, incentives, waivers or reductions of development standards, and parking ratios to which the applicant is entitled under this section shall be permitted in a manner that is consistent with this section and Division 20 (commencing with Section 30000) of the Public Resources Code.” (CA Gov. Code Sec. 65915(m)).

And under the Housing Accountability Act, the City of Del Mar, like all coastal cities, are to follow the mandates of the Coastal Act. This is clearly stated in CA Gov. Code Sec. 65589.5 (e):
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve the local agency from complying with the *** California Coastal Act of 1976 (Division 20 (commencing with Section 30000) of the Public Resources Code).

Neither shall anything in this section be construed to relieve the local agency from making one or more of the findings required pursuant to Section 21081 of the Public Resources Code or otherwise complying with the California Environmental Quality Act (Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code.” (Cal.Gov.Code Sec. 65589.5 (e).

These two provisions of state housing lawsrequire the City of Del Mar to continue to follow the processing and resource protection mandates of the Coastal Act and not abandon the Coastal Act protection principles that the voters first placed into law under Prop. 20 in 1972. (Kalnel Gardens, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 927, 939).

As the Kalnel Court noted:
“Once the California Coastal Commission certifies a local government's program, the Coastal Commission delegates authority over coastal development permits to the local government. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30519, subd. (a); 30600.5, subds. (a), (b) & (c).) Under the Coastal Act, the local coastal program and development permits issued by local agencies are not just matters of local law. Instead, they embody state policy. A fundamental purpose of the Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies prevail over local government concerns.” (Kalnel Gardens, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 927, 940).

When the Court considered the legislative attempts in housing laws to balance the interest of the Coastal Act it held that “the Coastal Act’s statement that protecting coastal resources is a “paramount concern” because those resources are of “vital and enduring interest.” Id. (See also: Pub.

Resources Code, § 30001, subds. (a), (d).).

In sum the Kalnel Court held: “We therefore hold that section 65915 (Density Bonus Law) is subordinate to the Coastal Act and that a project that violates the Coastal Act as the result of a density bonus may be denied on that basis. (Emphasis added), (Kalnel Gardens, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 927, 945).
140 September 22, 2025 Item 7
Brooke Miller Esq.

Sheppard Mullin
July 18, 2025