1 CITY OF FAIRFIELD
CLOSED SESSION MEETING
MINUTES
March 10, 2026, 4:30 p.m.
Harry T. Price Memorial Council Chamber
1000 Webster Street, Fairfield, CA 94533 or Via Zoom
_____________________________________________________________________
A. CALL TO ORDER 4:30 PM
Mayor Catherine " Cat" Moy called the meeting to order at 4:30 p.m.
B. OPEN SESSION
C. ROLL CALL
On roll call were Councilmembers Doug Carr, Doriss Panduro, Manveer Sandhu, Scott Tonnesen, K. Patrice Williams, Vice Mayor Pam Bertani, and Mayor Moy.
D. PUBLIC COMMENTS
Joseph Joyce and Michael Jefferson spoke about the quo warranto process.
The public left the Council Chamber at 4:38 p.m.
E. CLOSED SESSION
F. PRESENTATIONS
F.1 Conference with Legal Counsel – Anticipated Litigation (Government Code section 54956.9(d)(2-4))
Present were Attorney Gary Winuk and City Manager David Gassaway. City Council directed outside legal counsel to conduct further investigation of mayor’s residency – the vote was 4-3 for that direction. The council directed the release of outside legal cou nsel’s initial report regarding the mayor’s residency (attached), the vote was 6-1 for that direction. The council placed a $25,000 cap on any further expenditures for outside legal counsel for further investigation of the mayor’s residency – the vote was 7-0 for that direction.
G. ADJOURN
Adjourned meeting at 7:10 p.m. to date/time Harry T. Price Memorial Council Chamber.
2 Mayor City Attorney
KAUFMAN LEGAL GROUP
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
777 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 4050 Los Angeles, CA 90017 ma in 213.452.6565 fax 213.452.6575 www.kaufmanlegalgroup.com
MEMORANDUM
To: Mayor and City Councilmembers
City of Fairfield
From: Gary S. Winuk, Outside Counsel
Kaufman Legal Group, APC
Re:
File No.:
Date:
Residency Status of Mayor Catherine Moy
COF6509.001
March 9, 2026
You have requested
advice regarding whether the evidence submitted to outside counsel about whether City of Fairfield (“City”) Mayor Catherine Moy meets the residency requirements articulated under State law to remain eligible to continue her term as Mayor and, if not, what remedies are available to the City Council.
Procedural Background
Outside counsel
was retained by the City of Fairfield in November 2025 to provide advice to the City Council and Mayor regarding the quo warranto process found in State law to potentially challenge the eligibility of Mayor Catherine Moy to continue to serve as Mayor of the City due to questions about her residency within the City limits. A closed session meeting of the City Council was scheduled and conducted on January 20, 2026, for outside counsel to provide a presentation on the residency requirements for elected officials contained in State law, and the quo warranto process for potential removal of a public official who no longer qualifies for their elected office.
At the conclusion of the closed session meeting, outside counsel was directed to gather relevant and verified information related to the residency of Mayor Moy. This information was to come from two sources. First, any member of the public, or any member of the Council, would be permitted to submit relevant and verified information to outside counsel via e-mail. To facilitate this process, a Proton e-mail account was set up by outside counsel to receive such information.
The date by which the public could send such information was February 4, 2026. To further solicit such information, an email was drafted for distribution by Councilmembers to anyone in the public with information, which included the Proton e-mail address and the February 4, 2026, deadline. No information was submitted to outside counsel’s Proton e-mail address either before or after (as of the date of this memorandum) the February 4 deadline.
Mayor Moy was also required to provide any relevant and verified information regarding her residency to outside counsel by February 4, 2026. Mayor Moy provided a packet of information, detailed below, by the February 4 deadline. Mayor Moy’s information was forwarded to outside counsel via overnight mail by the City staff.
Memorandum to City of Fairfield March 9, 2026 Page 2 Outside counsel was required to provide a draft of this memorandum to Mayor Moy by February 16, 2026. Outside counsel provided the draft memorandum on that date. Mayor Moy was then required to provide any comments or responses to the draft memorandum by February 27, 2026. Mayor Moy provided her comments on the draft memorandum by that date, On March 1, 2026, Council Member Williams sent an e-mail to City Attorney David Lim requesting that outside counsel review the candidate papers filed by Mayor Moy to run for County Supervisor in the 2026 election cycle. Mr. Lim sent this message to outside counsel the same day. This request for additional information was outside the February 4, 2026, deadline established by the City Council for the receipt of information. However, outside counsel requested Mayor Moy’s permission to access these records, in order to provide a more complete factual record. Mayor Moy granted her permission to the Registrar to provide the requested information, which greatly sped up the ability for outside counsel to obtain it. Outside counsel then spoke with the Registrar, who provided the relevant information via telephone. All relevant, verified information was included in the preparation of this memorandum. Relevant Legal Standard to Determine Residency The City of Fairfield is a General Law City. General Law Cities, as opposed to Charter Cities, are required to follow State statues, and may not adopt ordinances that are in conflict with the provisions of State law. Therefore, State law regarding the residency requirements of City elected officials, including the Mayor and City Councilmembers, must be followed, along with any Municipal ordinances that are not in conflict with State law. The City’s Municipal Code provides that Members of the City Council shall be elected “by District” as defined in California Government Code Section 34871. It also states that the Mayor shall be elected by a city-wide election of eligible voters residing in the City of Fairfield. Further, it states that “(a) person shall not be eligible to be elected to be a Member of the City Council unless he or she is otherwise qualified as required by law, resides in the geographical area making up the district from which he or she is nominated to be elected and is a registered voter of the City of Fairfield at the time nomination papers are issued to the candidate.” (Municipal Code Section 2A.03.) Government Code Section 34871 provides that “(t)he term “by districts” shall mean election of members of the legislative body by voters of the district alone. “Geographical area making up the district” is defined to mean the district, and in the case of elections from districts shall mean the entire city except with respect to the residence requirements imposed by Government Code Section 34882. Section 34882 states that “(a) person is not eligible to hold office as a member of a municipal legislative body unless he or she is otherwise qualified, resides in the district and both resided in the geographical area making up the district from which he or she is elected and was a registered voter of the city at the time nomination papers are issued to the candidate.” Memorandum to City of Fairfield March 9, 2026 Page 3 Residency is also referred to in Government Code Section 36502. This Section, which identifies when a vacancy occurs in a local elected City office, provides that a person is not eligible to hold office as councilmember unless she is at the time of assuming the office an elector of the city, and was a registered voter of the city at the time nomination papers were issued to the candidate. It also states that “(i)f, during his or her term of office, he or she moves his or her place of residence outside of the city limits or ceases to be an elector of the city, his or her office shall immediately become vacant.” The Government Code provides certain “rules” for residency, as follows: (a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. (b) There can only be one residence. (c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. (d) The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child maintains his or her place of abode is the residence of such unmarried minor child. (e) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be changed by his or her own act. (f) The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent. (g) A married person shall have the right to retain his or her legal residence in the State of California notwithstanding the legal residence or domicile of his or her spouse. (Government Code Section 244.) Residency is further defined for voter registration purposes under Elections Code Section 349, which states that: “a) “Residence” for voting purposes means a person's domicile. (b) The domicile of a person is that place in which his or her habitation is fixed, wherein the person has the intention of remaining, and to which, whenever he or she is absent, the person has the intention of returning. At a given time, a person may have only one domicile.” (c) The residence of a person is that place in which the person's habitation is fixed for some period of time, but wherein he or she does not have the intention of remaining. At a given time, a person may have more than one residence. (Elections Code Section 349.) Both sections require the union of act and intent to determine residence. California courts and the Attorney General’s office have applied this basic principle when considering the residence of public officials. For example, courts have held that “[d]espite the fact that the terms residence and domicile are often used synonymously, residence is not a synonym for domicile, and its meaning in particular statutes is subject to differing construction, depending on the context and Memorandum to City of Fairfield March 9, 2026 Page 4 purpose of the statute in which it is used. (Kirk v. Board of Regents (1969) 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 434-435.) In Brown v. Happy Valley Fruit Growers, Inc., 206 Cal. 515, 520, the Court ruled that “The question of residence is largely dependent upon the intent of the person whose residence is the subject of inquiry.” Similarly, in Chambers v. Hathaway, (1921) 187 Cal. 104, 105, the Court found that “Where a person has two dwellings in different places and resides a part of his time in one place and a part of the time in another alternatively, the question which of the two places is his legal residence is almost altogether a question of his intent. If a party has two residences, that will be esteemed his domicile which he himself selects or deems to be his home, or which appears to be the center of his affairs, or where he votes or exercises the rights and duties of a citizen." In interpreting the term “residency” found in Government Code Section 244, the California State Supreme Court has ruled that the term "residence" as used in section 244 means "legal residence" or "domicile." (Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 7; Smith v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 235, 239; see also Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113.) The test for determining a person's domicile is physical presence coupled with an intention to make that place his or her permanent home. (Fenton v. Board of Directors, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at 116.) A domicile, once acquired, continues until it is shown that a new domicile has been acquired. (DiMiglio v. Machore (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268.) The Attorney General’s office has opined on this issue as well. In 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 8, (1989), the Attorney General’s office stated that: ". . . While the question of domicile is a mixed question of law and fact, many factors enter into the equation, including where an individual is registered to vote and his or her address for mail, where tax returns are filed, where an automobile is registered, and where a homeowner's exemption or renter's credit is taken. However, the critical element is that of intent. While declarations of intent are significant, they are not determinative. The acts must be examined as well." (Id., at p. 14.) In short, the determination of residency is a very fact specific question. It must be undertaken with an eye towards determining the public official’s intent, when matched with the factual scenario presented. Relevant factors in other cases that have either been pursued criminally or civilly, have included: voter registration; address for mail; where tax returns are filed; where an automobile is registered; where children go to school; where the public official spends their time; and where a homeowner's exemption or renter's credit is taken. Again, however, this is not an exhaustive list, and other facts may help to determine intent.
Memorandum to City of Fairfield March 9, 2026 Page 5 Residency Facts As mentioned previously, the only facts that were provided to outside counsel were those provided by Mayor Moy, and those provided by the County Registrar. Thus, these are the only facts that were considered in making the outside counsel’s finding. No outside research was conducted by the outside counsel, with two exceptions. First, the residency addresses provided by the Mayor was searched online to: (1) confirm that they were within the boundaries of the City of Fairfield and (2) view an online picture of the Mayor’s stated current residence on Google to confirm that it was an apartment building and appeared to be currently occupied and not an abandoned property. Second, in response to Councilmember Williams’ request for outside counsel to review the relevant information contained in Mayor Moy’s County Supervisor candidate paperwork, outside counsel obtained the residence disclosed by Mayor Moy in those documents. The Mayor provided outside counsel several documents and a cover letter that were related to three properties. All properties are located within the City boundaries of the City of Fairfield. In the Mayor’s response to outside counsel’s draft report, the only comment provided by the Mayor requested outside counsel to protect the confidentiality of her property addresses to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, the properties are referred to in this memorandum as “Property One,” “Property Two,” and “Property Three.” Further discussion regarding the specific location of these properties can be had, at the Council’s discretion, during the closed session meeting on March 10, 2026. However, the Council should exercise caution with this information, given the Brown Act’s restrictions on the release of information obtained during a Council’s closed session meeting. For Property One, the Mayor states that this she and her husband owned this property and it was her residence at the time she became a candidate for Mayor. She states that this property was vacated by her and her husband in 2025. In support of this contention, the Mayor provided three utility bills (two with her name and one with Ken Moy’s name) from November and December 2022 that reflect the address she provided for Property One. Property One is located within the City of Fairfield. Property Two has been owned by the Mayor since 2001 and is described by her as an investment property. She states that she rents this property to tenants and does not and has not resided there during the relevant period of 2022 through present. However, the property has a walnut farm which she and her family maintain. She has also spent some nights there in an office space she and her husband built for her husband’s business and have held family functions and parties there through the present day. The Mayor states that she does much of her business there, but it is not her residence. In support of this the Mayor provided tax documents from 2023 and 2024, including Supplemental Income and Loss statements reflecting the status of the property as not being her residence. The Mayor states that she pays insurance rates and loan rates consistent with the property being used as a commercial space. Further, the Mayor provided a copy of her 2024 Statement of Economic Interests (“SEI”), which discloses the property on Schedule B, along with the required tenant and rental income disclosures. Primary residences are not disclosable on Memorandum to City of Fairfield March 9, 2026 Page 6 SEIs, only other properties such as investment properties located within the City’s boundaries, or two miles outside the City’s boundaries. No other properties were disclosed on her 2024 SEI. Property Three is where the Mayor states that she resides and is her domicile. It is located within the City of Fairfield. Mayor Moy states that, when vacating Property One, her family had intended to purchase a condominium within the City of Fairfield. However, economic conditions were not favorable to a purchase, so she and her family moved in with a family member at Property Three. She states that many of the family’s possessions are in a storage container that they rent that is currently located on Property Two. A receipt for the cost of this rental was provided by the Mayor in support of this contention. The Mayor states that she intends to purchase another property in Fairfield as her next residence and intends to remain a resident of Fairfield. She further states that she purposely chose to stay with the family member on Property Three because that family member resides in Fairfield, which reflect her intent to remain in the City and continue to be eligible for the office of Mayor. She also provided confirmation of her voter registration at Property Three, and a document from the City of Fairfield that indicates she receives correspondence from the City at that address and has notified the City that this is her residence. The County Registrar also confirmed that this was the address that Mayor Moy declared as her residence in her candidate paperwork for County Supervisor. Last, the Mayor states her unequivocal intent to remain a resident of the City of Fairfield. Outside Counsel’s Determination of Residency Outside counsel makes this determination based solely on the facts presented. While there may or may not be other relevant facts that exist, counsel can only consider the relevant and verified information presented, per the instructions of the City Council at the January 20, 2026, closed session meeting. Note that Counsel is not aware of any other relevant facts related to the topic. Consideration of the potential removal from office of a public official is a serious topic that should be handled with care. The California Supreme Court has recognized this. In Carter v. Com. on Qualifications etc., (1939) 14 Cal.2d 179, 182, the court held that: “[T]he right to hold public office, either by election or appointment, is one of the valuable rights of citizenship . . . The exercise of this right should not be declared prohibited or curtailed except by plain provisions of law. Ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of eligibility to office. . . ." Here the facts presented weigh clearly in favor of determining that Mayor Moy is a resident of the City of Fairfield and has been so continuously since her election in 2022. She has provided unrefuted evidence to support that her residence was at Property One in Fairfield from 2022 through 2025. She further provided unrefuted evidence that her current residence is at Property Three, and that she has resided there from the time she left Property One through the present.
Memorandum to City of Fairfield March 9, 2026 Page 7 As noted previously, the confluence of fact and intent must be used to determine residency. Here, the Mayor has stated her unequivocal intent to remain a resident of the City of Fairfield. This intent is matched with all the available facts to make the determination. The Mayor is registered to vote at Property Three, has provided the City that address as her residence, and receives her City correspondence there. Further, there is no evidence in the record to support the contention that she lives anywhere else. Absent any evidence whatsoever that she maintains her residence outside the City of Fairfield, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the record presented is that the Mayor resides in Fairfield, has done so for many years, and permanently intends to remain as a resident of the City, where she is domiciled. Options for City Council Outside counsel does not believe there currently is evidence to support a finding that the Mayor is not a resident of the City of Fairfield. However, the ultimate decision of how to proceed lies with the City Council. Therefore, the City has the following options available to it: 1. Close the matter. The Council may deem the outside counsel’s report and findings sufficient to resolve the issue and take no further action. 2. Direct further investigation of the issue by outside counsel or another party to gather additional relevant information. The City has the authority to investigate the residency of one of its members and take action consistent with the factual findings. 3. Seek a quo warranto action from the Attorney General. As described at the January 20, 2026, closed session meeting, the Council has the authority to vote to request the Attorney General to give the City the ability to file a civil lawsuit to challenge Mayor Moy’s residency status and eligibility for office. It is outside counsel’s recommendation that further investigation be undertaken before such a submission, as it is likely to be rejected by the Attorney General’s office based on the current factual record. 4. Declare a vacancy in the Mayor’s elected office. Government Code Section 36502 states that, if, during her term of office, a public official moves her place of residence outside of the city limits or ceases to be an elector of the city, her office shall immediately become vacant. The City Council could vote to declare a vacancy and could then fill the vacant seat with a special election or appointment. There is some legal question as to whether this can be used to remove a public official where the residency issue occurs during the public official’s term (rather than at the time of nomination) (See 79 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 21.). It is outside counsel’s recommendation that further investigation be undertaken before such an action is taken, as the current factual record does not support declaring a vacancy based on the residency issue.