GLENDALE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
Proudly Representing the Men and Women of the Glendale Police Department 131 N. Isabel Street, Glendale, California 91206
December 31, 2025
Charter Review Committee
City of Glendale
613 E. Broadway
Glendale, California 91206
RE: Written Comments Rega rding Proposed Civil Service Amendments (Article IV, Section 4 and Article XXIV Civil Service Provisions) Dear Members of the Charter Review Committee:
On behalf of the Glendale Police Officers Association ("GPOA" or "Association") and our members—the sworn men and wo men who protect the residents and visitors of the City of Glendale—we submit these writte n comments in opposition to se veral proposed amendments to the City Charter concerning civil service protections and the appoi ntment authority over Department Heads, including the Chief of Police.
The GPOA has reviewed the Staff Re port dated December 11, 2025, the proposed redline amendments to Article XXIV, and the concerns raised by our fellow employee organization, the Glendale City Employees As sociation (“GCEA”). We share many of those concerns and write separately to address the unique implications these proposed changes have for law enforcement personnel and public safety operations.
I. THE POLICE CHIEF POSITION WARRANTS COUNCIL OVERSIGHT The Staff Report proposes eliminating the requi rement in Article IV, Section 4, that Department Head appointments and removals be "subject to the approval of the council." While this change would affect all Department Head s, its impact on the Police Chief position raises distinct concerns that warrant separate cons ideration. For the reasons outlined below, the Association urges the Committee to find that, on balance, the interests of the city and its employees are best served by exempting the police chief from this proposed change.
A. The Police Chief Exercises Unique Authority Over Civil Liberties The Chief of Police is not simply another Department Head. The Police Chief exercises extraordinary authority that directly affects the constitutional rights of every person in Glendale. The Chief sets use-of-force policies, determines deployment strategies, establishes community policing priorities, and makes decisions that implicate the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights of residents and visitors alike. No ot her Department Head position carries comparable authority over civ il liberties. For this reason, the California 222 of 238
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Constitution expressly identifie s "the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police force" as a municipal affair over which charter cities may exercise plenary authority.1 For this reason, even jurisdictions that grant City Managers broad authority over other executive positions frequently retain Council involvement for the Police Chief. The City of Los Angeles, for example, requires that the Ma yor's Police Chief appointee be "subject to confirmation by the Council" and permits the Council to remove the Police Chief by two-thirds vote after a public hearing.2 The Staff Report acknowledges this reality, noting that "some city councils of general law and charter cities retain the authority for approval over the Police Chief position." This common practice reflects sound judgment: Democratic oversight of police leadership is essential to maintaining public trust.
B. Federal Authorities Recognize the Importance of Civilian Oversight The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing—the most comprehensive federal examination of police practices in recent decades—emphasized that building trust and legitimacy is the foundational pr inciple of effective policing. 3 The Task Force specifically recommended that "[s]ome form of civilian oversight of law enforcement is important to strengthen trust with the community" and th at "[e]very community should define the appropriate form and structure of civilian oversight to meet the needs of that community."4 Council approval of the Police Chief provides precisely this kind of civilian oversight.
When residents know that thei r elected representatives approved the Police Chief—and can hold them accountable for that decision at the ballot box—it crea tes legitimacy that cannot be replicated by an unelected City Manager alone.
C. California Case Law Recogniz es Charter Authority Over Police Leadership
California courts have long recognized that charter provisions allocating authority over police leadership are fundamental to municipal governance. In Brown v. City of Berkeley, the Court of Appeal analyzed a charter that gr anted the city manager authority to "appoint, discipline or remove all heads or directors of departments, chief officials," and emphasized that charter provisions must be strictly followed—even when the electorate seeks to alter them by
1 Cal. Const. art. XI, § 5(b)(1) (expressly identifying "the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police force" as a municipal affair over which charter cities may exercise plenary authority). 2 See, e.g., Los Angeles City Charter § 575(a) (requiring Mayor's Police Chief appointee to be "subject to confirmation by the Council"); id. § 575(e) (permitting Council to remove Police Chief by two-thirds vote after public hearing).
3 President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing 1 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015), available at https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 4 Id. at Recommendation 2.8 ("Some form of civilian oversight of law enforcement is important in order to strengthen trust with the community. Every community should define the appropriate form and structure of civilian oversight to meet the needs of that community."). 223 of 238
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initiative.5 The court held that an initiative ordinance conflicting with charter provisions regarding police department governance was invalid to the extent of the conflict.6 The principle from Brown is instructive here: charter provisions regarding who appoints, supervises, and removes the Police Ch ief are not mere administrative details—they are fundamental allocations of governmental au thority that should not be lightly altered.
Glendale's current charter represents a deliberat e choice to retain C ouncil oversight, and that choice should be respected absent compelling justification for change.
II. AT-WILL STATUS FOR THE POLICE CHIEF POSITION THREATENS ITS ESSENTIAL PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE.
The Staff Report also proposes removing Department Heads, including the Police Chief, from the classified civil service and converting these positions to at-will employment.
Combined with the elimination of Council approval, this change would allow a single unelected official to terminate the Police Chief without cause, without a hearing, and without any public deliberation.
A. Professional Policin g Requires Independence from Political Pressure A central tenet of professional law enforcement is that policing decisions must be made based on law, policy, and professional judgment—not political considerations. When a Police Chief serves entirely at the pleasure of a City Manager, who in turn serves at the pleasure of the Council, there is pressure to make decisions that satisfy political interests rather than professional standards.
Civil service protection provides Police Chiefs with the independence to make difficult decisions—to investigate allega tions against politically connected individuals, to resist pressure to under-enforce or over-enforce in particular neighborhoods, to maintain professional standards even when those standards are inc onvenient. An at-will Police Chief who can be terminated without cause has diminished capacity to resist inappropriate pressure.
B. California Law Recognizes the Im portance of Stable Police Employment The California Legislature enacted the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act based on express findings that "effective law enforcement depends upon the maintenance of stable employer-employee relations between public safety employees and their employers."7 While POBRA's procedural protections apply to our members below the rank of Chief, the
5 Brown v. City of Berkeley (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 223, 231-232 [analyzing charter provisions granting city manager authority to "appoint, discipline or remove all heads or directors of departments, chief officials" and holding that charter provisions regarding police department governance must be strictly followed]. 6 Id. at 233.
7 Cal. Gov't Code § 3301 ("The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the rights and protections provided to peace officers under this chapter constitute a matter of statewide concern. The Legislature further finds and declares that effective law enforcement depends upon the maintenance of stable employer-employee relations, between public safety employees and their employers."). 224 of 238
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same principles—protection agains t arbitrary action and assurance of fair process—apply with equal force to police leadership.8
C. Police Leadership Affects Officer Safety and Morale
The selection of the Police Chief directly a ffects the safety and working conditions of every GPOA member. Chiefs determine staffing levels, equipment procurement, training priorities, and tactical protocols that impact whether officers return home safely at the end of each shift. Chiefs also set the tone for intern al discipline, promotional opportunities, and the department's overall culture.
Under the current system, Council approval provides a forum where the Association and its members can learn about candidates for Police Chief a nd provide input through their elected representatives. Eliminating Council appr oval would remove this avenue for officer voice in a decision that profoundly affects their professional lives and physical safety. At a minimum, if the Committee is inclined to reco mmend removal of Council approval for other Department Heads, it should retain the current approval requirement for the Chief of Police.
III. THE “ALIGNMENT WITH CITY PRIORITIES OR PHILOSOPHY"
STANDARD IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRMED
The Association understands that the propos ed amendments would permit the City Manager to remove Department Heads, including the Police Chief, based on a determination that the Department Head is not "in alignment with the city's priorities or philosophy." This standard is both unconstitutionally vague and violates the First Amendment protections afforded to public employees.
A. The First Amendment Prohibits Termination Based on Political or Philosophical Alignment
The United States Supreme Court has firmly established that public employees cannot be terminated solely because their political beliefs or affiliations differ from those of their supervisors. In Elrod v. Burns , the Court held that "[p]atronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association, which constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment, and government may not, w ithout seriously inhibiting First Amendment rights, force a public employee to relinquish his right to political association as the price of holding a public job."
9 The Court reinforced this principle in Branti v. Finkel , explaining that "conditioning continued public employment on an employee's having obtained support from a particular political party violates the First Amendment because of 'the coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a s ponsor in the dominant party to retain one's
8 Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3300-3313 (Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act). 9 Elrod v. Burns (1976) 427 U.S. 347, 359-360 (plurality opinion) ("Patronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association, which constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment, and government may not, without seriously inhibiting First Amendment rights, force a public employee to relinquish his right to political association as the price of holding a public job.").
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job.'"10 The Court articulated the controlling test: "[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."11 In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois , the Court extended these protections beyond termination to all adverse employment acti ons, holding that "[e]mployees who do not compromise their beliefs stand to lose the considerable increases in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions... and even their jobs if they are not rehired after a 'temporary' layoff.
These are significant penalties and are imposed for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment."(“Rutan”)
12 Critically, the Rutan Court made clear that legitima te governmental interests can be served without resorting to ideological litmus tests: "A government's interest in securing effective employees can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring persons whose work is deficient, and its interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies can be adequately served by choosing or dismissi ng high-level employees based on their political views."
13 This distinction is crucial: the City may terminate employees for deficient performance, but not for philosophical disagreement.
B. "Philosophy" and "Priorities" Are Proxies for Protected Political Belief The proposed "alignment with c ity priorities or philosophy" standard is, in practical effect, a requirement of political and ideological conformity. What are "priorities" and "philosophy" if not political judgments about how government should operate? A Police Chief who believes community policing should take precedence over a ggressive enforcement has a different "philosophy" than a City Manager who prefers the opposite. A Police Chief who prioritizes officer safety equipment over admin istrative technology has different "priorities." These are precisely the kinds of policy disagreements that the First Amendment protects.
The proposed standard, however, invites ex actly this kind of impermissible inquiry.
When a City Manager determines that a Police Chief is not "aligned" with the city's "philosophy," that determinati on necessarily involves an asse ssment of the Chief's beliefs,
10 Branti v. Finkel (1980) 445 U.S. 507, 517 ("[C]onditioning continued public employment on an employee's having obtained support from a particular political party violates the First Amendment because of 'the coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a sponsor in the dominant party in order to retain one's job.'").
11 Id. at 518 ("[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."). 12 Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990) 497 U.S. 62, 74-75 ("Employees who do not compromise their beliefs stand to lose the considerable increases in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions... and even their jobs if they are not rehired after a 'temporary' layoff. These are significant penalties and are imposed for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment."). 13Id. at 76 ("A government's interest in securing effective employees can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring persons whose work is deficient, and its interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies can be adequately served by choosing or dismissing high-level employees on the basis of their political views.").
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values, and policy preferences. This is cons titutionally indistinguishable from the patronage practices condemned in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan.
C. The Standard Is Unconstitutionally Vague
Even setting aside First Amendment concerns, the "alignment with city priorities or philosophy" standard fails the void-for-vagueness test. In Grayned v. City of Rockfor d, the Supreme Court explained that "[v]ague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."14
"Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforc ement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."15 The Kolender v. Lawson Court reinforced that standards must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that or dinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
16 The Court struck down the challenged statute because it "vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police" and "entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to- moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."17
The "alignment" standard suffers from the same constitutional infirmity. What specific conduct demonstrates a lack of alignment? How does a Department Head know whether they are sufficiently aligned? The City's "priorities" and "philosophy" are not codified anywhere— they exist only in the subjective judgment of whoever happens to occupy the City Manager position. This is precisely the standardless, mo ment-to-moment discretion that the vagueness doctrine prohibits.
D. The Standard Undermines Merit System Principles
Civil service systems exist precisely to protect public employees from the arbitrary, politically-motivated terminations that the "alignment" standard would authorize. The foundational principle of merit-based employment is that personnel decisions should be based
14 Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 ("Vague laws offend several important values.
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.").
15 Id. at 109 ("Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.").
16 Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 (holding that standards must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"). 17 Id. at 360-361 (holding statute unconstitutional because it "vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police" and "entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat"). 227 of 238
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on job-related qualific ations and performance—not politi cal considerations. California's constitution enshrines the merit principle, providing that "[i]n the civil service, permanent appointments shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination."
Allowing termination based on "alignment" with "philosophy" eviscerates merit protection. A Department Head who has served competently for years could be terminated not because of any performance deficiency, but because a new City Manager has a different political outlook. This returns Glendale to the s poils system that civil service reform was designed to eliminate.
The Association strongly urges the Committee to reject any standard that permits termination based on "alignment," "philosophy," "priorities," or similar subjective, politically tinged criteria. If the City wishes to remove a Department Head, it should be required to identify specific, documented performance deficiencies—not ideological disagreements.
IV. THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO ELIGIBLE LIST DURATION THREATEN
PROMOTIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND LACK ADEQUATE STANDARDS
The proposed amendments to Article XXIV, Section 2(4) would eliminate the Charter's current requirement that eligible lists remain in force "not longer than two years nor less than one year" and replace it with discretionary language that allows the Commission to set whatever duration it chooses. Critically, the proposed language would also allow cancellation of eligible lists "for good cause" without defining that term. The Association strongly opposes these changes for both substantive and constitutional reasons.
A. The "Good Cause" Standard Is Unconstitutionally Vague The Supreme Court has held that public em ployees who can be discharged only "for cause" possess a constitutionally protected property interest in their employment. 18 In
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill , the Court explained that "[t]he need for some form of pretermination hearing is evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake:
the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interests in expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination."
19 California courts have applied these same principles. In Skelly v. State Personnel Board, the California Supreme Court recognized that permanent public employees who may be discharged only for cause possess a constitutionally protected property interest in their
18 Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 538-539 (holding that public employees who can be discharged only "for cause" possess a constitutionally protected property interest in their employment).
19 Id. at 542 ("The need for some form of pretermination hearing is evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake: the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interests in expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination.").
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employment under both the United Stat es and California Constitutions. 20 The court held that due process requires, at a minimum, "notice of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the acti on is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline."21 Officers who have passed promotional exa minations and earned positions on eligible lists have a legitimate expectation—grounded in the Ch arter's current fixed-duration requirement—that their eligibility will persist for a defined period. Introducing an undefined "good cause" cancellation provision without objective criteria undermines this expectation and creates the same constitutional concerns identified in the vagueness cases discussed above.
B. "Good Cause" Must Be Define d to Prevent Arbitrary Application The proposed language requiring "good cause" for cancellation of eligible lists provides no guidance whatsoever. What constitutes good cause? Can a list be canceled because the department prefers different candidates? Because budget constraints de layed anticipated hiring? Because of organizational restructuring that changed position requirements? Because a new administration has other priorities? Without objective criteria, "good cause" becomes whatever administrators say it is—precisely the standardless discretion that the vagueness doctrine prohibits.
The Association requests that if any "good cause" cancellation provision is retained, the Charter must define "good cause" with specificity. At minimum, the Charter should enumerate the limited circumstances that qualify as good cause (such as elimination of the position, substantial change in minimum qualifications mandated by state law, or similar objective circumstances); require written findings docum enting the specific good cause basis; provide notice to affected employees before cancellation; afford affected employees the opportunity to be heard; and expressly prohibit cancellation based on the identity of candidates on the list or preferences regarding promotional outcomes.
C. Fixed Duration Prot ects Officers' Investment in Career Advancement Promotional examinations in law enfor cement are serious unde rtakings. Officers preparing for sergeant, lieutenant, or captai n examinations invest hundreds of hours studying department policies, legal updates, tactical procedures, leadership principles, and management practices. Many officers purchase expensive preparation materials, attend training courses, and sacrifice time with their fa milies—all in reliance on the understanding that passing the examination will provide meaningful eligibility for promotion.
The Charter's current guarantee of at least one year of eligibility is not arbitrary. It reflects the realistic time needed for promo tional vacancies to ar ise through retirements,
20 Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206 (recognizing that permanent public employees who may be discharged only for cause possess a constitutionally protected property interest in their employment under both the United States and California Constitutions). 21 Id. at 215 (holding that due process requires, at minimum, "notice of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline"). 229 of 238
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resignations, and organizational changes. Removing this minimum protection means an officer could pass an examination in January and have their eligibility terminated in March—before any vacancy occurs—effectively nullifying their demonstrated merit and wasting their substantial preparation effort.
The Association requests that if any modifications to eligible list provisions are considered, the Committee retain the one-year minimum duration and require that any cancellation be supported by documented, objective criteria with notice to affected employees and the opportunity to be heard.
V. THE "SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE" EXCEPTION TO PROMOTIONAL
EXAMINATIONS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL MERIT PRINCIPLE The proposed amendment to Article XXIV, Section 2(10) would create a new exception allowing the Chief Examiner to "suspend the promotional examination and authorize the appointment of a person who has attained specialized knowledge or experience unique to the promotional position." This provision directly conflicts with the California Constitution and decades of case law establishing that compe titive examination is the mandatory, exclusive method for civil service promotions.
A. The California Constitution Mandates Competitive Examination for All Promotions
Article VII, Section 1(b) of the California Constitution provides unequivocally: "In the civil service, permanent appointment and prom otion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination." 22 This constitutional mandate,
adopted by California voters in 1934, was explicitly designed to eliminate the "spoils system" of political patronage and ensure that promotions are based solely on merit demonstrated through competition—not administra tive discretion or subjective assessment of "specialized knowledge."
The California Supreme Court has confirmed that "the 'sole aim' of the amendment was to establish, as a constitutiona l mandate, the principle that a ppointments and promotions in state service be made solely based on merit." 23 A provision that permits a Chief Examiner to "suspend" the promotional examination and au thorize promotion without competitive testing directly contradicts this constitutional command.
B. California Courts Have Consistently Held That Bypassing Competitive Examination Violates the Merit Principle
In Kidd v. State of California, the Court of Appeal declared that "[t]he merit principle is sacrosanct; however free the hand of the Legislature, neither that hand nor the hand of any other branch or agency of government can ma nipulate the merit principle to serve ends
22 Cal. Const. art. VII, § 1(b) ("In the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination."). 23 State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, 439 (quoting ballot pamphlet for 1934 constitutional initiative establishing merit principle). 230 of 238
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inconsistent with article V II of the state Constitution." 24 The court further held that "[t]he notion that defendants can hire any applicant who passes an examination without consideration of that applicant's standing in relation to ot hers who passed the examination reads the word 'competitive' out of the state Constitution."25
In Professional Engineers in California Government v. State Personnel Board , the court reaffirmed that competitive examination is "the cornerstone of the constitutional merit principle.” It held that "[c]ompetition denotes a rivalry: 'It encompasses a comparison of relative merit.' Such comparison requires rankings."
26 The court invalidated regulations that
permitted the selection of candidates without ranking them ag ainst competitors, holding that such procedures violate the constitutional requirement of competitive examination.
Most directly on point, in Ligon v. State Personnel Board, the court addressed attempts to circumvent competitive examin ations through alternative pa thways. The court held that permitting promotions based on out-of-class experience rather than examination "would permit different appointing powers to short-cut the me rit system" and allow certain employees to "swiftly bypass other candidates who are dutifully performing their tasks according to their job classifications. Unfairness and acrimony could result."27 The Ligon court quoted with approval the f oundational principle: "If the appointing power could, by assigning duties... to a higher cl ass than that of the employee's original position, give to an employee a permanent civil se rvice status, the entire fabric of the civil service system would fail. Prom otion and appointments in civil service would then no longer be made 'exclusive under a general system based on merit, efficiency and fitness as ascertained by competitive examinations.'"28
C. The Proposed Excep tion Would Destroy the Competitive Examination System
24 Kidd v. State of California (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 386, 401-402 ("The merit principle is sacrosanct; however free the hand of the Legislature, neither that hand nor the hand of any other branch or agency of government can manipulate the merit principle to serve ends inconsistent with article VII of the state Constitution."). 25 Id. at 402 ("The notion that defendants can hire any applicant who passes an examination without consideration of that applicant's standing in relation to others who passed the examination reads the word 'competitive' out of the state Constitution.").
26 Professional Engineers in Cal. Government v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 678, 689-690 (referring to competitive examination as "the cornerstone of the constitutional merit principle" and holding that "competition denotes a rivalry: 'It encompasses a comparison of relative merit.' Such comparison requires rankings.").
27 Ligon v. State Personnel Bd. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 583, 590 ("To permit out-of-class experience to be substituted for the minimum time 'in the chairs' experience would permit different appointing powers to short- cut the merit system by assigning higher class duties to employees.... Those who attain out-of-class status could swiftly bypass other candidates who are dutifully performing their tasks according to their job classifications.
Unfairness and acrimony could result.").
28 Id. at 589 (quoting Pinion v. State Personnel Board (1940) 29 Cal.App.2d 314, 319) ("If the appointing power could, by assigning duties... to a higher class than that of the employee's original position, give to an employee a permanent civil service status, the entire fabric of the civil service system would fail. Promotion and appointments in civil service would then no longer be made 'exclusive under a general system based on merit, efficiency and fitness as ascertained by competitive examinations.'"). 231 of 238
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The proposed "specialized knowledge" exce ption is not a narrow accommodation for extraordinary circumstances—it is a broad au thorization to bypass competitive examination whenever an administrator concludes that a particular candidate possesses desirable experience. Under this standard, the Chief Examiner could suspe nd examination for any position by simply determining that a favored candidate has "speci alized knowledge or experience unique to the promotional position."
Every promotional position involves sp ecialized knowledge. A sergeant position requires specialized knowledge of supervis ion. A lieutenant position requires specialized knowledge of watch command and program management. A captain position requires specialized knowledge of divisi on management. Under the propos ed language, virtually any promotion could be exempted from competitive examination if the appointing authority prefers a particular candidate.
This is precisely the outcome the constitutional merit principle was designed to prevent.
As the Kidd court observed, the civil service system ex ists to ensure that "appointments and promotions in state service be made solely on the basis of merit"—not administrative preference, political favor, or subjective asse ssment of which candidate the appointing power believes is best. The competitive examination requirement removes that discretion and replaces it with objective, measurable criteria.
D. Promotional Competition is Fu ndamental to Police Professionalism Competitive promotional examinations are not mere administrative hurdles—they are fundamental to professional law enforcement. Su ch examinations ensure that supervisors and commanders not only possess the knowledge necessary to lead officers safely and effectively, but also to ensure the City is protected agai nst preventable civil claims against the police department. They provide objectiv e, defensible criteria for adva ncement that protect against favoritism and discrimination. Such fundamentals motivate officers to develop professionally throughout their careers.
Creating broad exceptions to competitive ex amination undermines these benefits. An officer promoted through the "specialized knowledge" pathway has not demonstrated the comprehensive competency that examination va lidates. Other officers who prepared for and passed examinations are bypassed by someone who avoided the competitive process entirely.
E. The Proposed Criteria Ar e Unconstitutionally Vague The proposed language requires "specialized knowledge or experience unique to the promotional position" and is demonstrated by "documented evidence of the employee's demonstrated proficiency, technical competence, and familiarity with the promotional reallocation position's specific functions." This language is circular and provides no objective standard.
What specialized knowledge is sufficiently "unique" to justify bypassing examination? Who determines whether documentation is adequate? Every posit ion has "specific functions" with which some candidates are more familiar than others —does this justify bypassing 232 of 238
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competition for any promotion? The vagueness of these criteria virtually guarantees inconsistent application and invites challenge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine discussed in Section III above.
F. The Proposed Exception Should Be Rejected Entirely
Unlike other provisions where the Asso ciation has proposed safeguards and modifications, the "specialized knowledge" exception to promotional examination cannot be saved through drafting improvement s. The fundamental concept—that an administrator can suspend competitive examination and authorize promotion based on subjective assessment— is incompatible with the constitutional mandate that promotions be "based on merit ascertained by competitive examination."
The Association strongly urges the Committee to reject this proposed exception in its entirety. If the City believes current examination procedures are inadequate to identify candidates with specialized skills, the appropriate remedy is to modify examination content— not to abandon competitive examination altogether.
VI. PROBATION EXTENSION LANGUAGE REQUIRES CLARIFICATION The proposed amendment to Article XXIV, Se ction 2(7) would allow probation to be extended in "extraordinary circumstances" without defining that term. For police officers, the end of probation marks the point at which PO BRA's full procedural protections attach. 29 Extended probation means extended vulnerability to termination without the due process rights afforded to permanent officers.
The Association does not oppose reasonabl e probation extension in genuinely extraordinary circumstances—for example, when an officer is called to extended military duty or experiences a serious medical situation that prevents evaluation. However, the proposed language must be narrowed in order to avoid abuse. We re quest that "extraordinary circumstances" be defined to include only extended leave (military, medical, or other protected leave) that prevents meaningful evaluation, that written justification be required documenting why evaluation could not be completed, that notice to the employee and Association be mandatory, and that total probation, including extensions, not exceed 18 months except in cases of military deployment.
VII. REDUCTION-IN-FORCE PROVISIONS MUST PROTECT SENIORITY Article XXIV, Section 9b currently requires that reductions in force be made on the basis of seniority "as closely as practicable." The Association is concerned that this language, combined with discretion granted elsewhere in the proposed amendments, may be interpreted to permit departures from seniority-based layoffs.
29 Cal. Gov't Code § 3304(b) ("No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency against any public safety officer who has successfully completed the probationary period that may be required by his or her employing agency without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal."). 233 of 238
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For police officers, seniority-based layoff protection is not merely a preference—it is essential to fair treatment of officers who have dedicated their careers to the Department.
Officers accept lower starting wages and endure the challenges of early-career assignments in reliance on the understanding that seniority w ill be respected if difficult times require reductions.
The Association requests that the Charter be amended to provide that layoffs shall follow strict seniority within classification, that any departure from seniority requires Commission approval after public hearing, that bumping rights within the department be expressly preserved, and that recall rights of at least two years be guaranteed for laid-off officers.
VIII. THE PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENTS IMPLICATE MANDATORY
SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING AND REQUIRE EFFECTS BARGAINING
As a preliminary matter, the proposed charte r amendments would fundamentally alter the terms and conditions of employment fo r sworn personnel. Many of the proposed amendments affect terms and conditions of employment for our members and therefore implicate the City's duty to meet and confer under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (“MMBA”). 30 Under the MMBA, these changes implicate mandat ory subjects of bargaining and trigger the City's duty to meet and confer—both over the s ubstance of the proposals and their foreseeable effects on represented employees.
A. The MMBA Requires Meet and Confer Over Terms and Conditions of Employment
Government Code section 3504 defines the scope of representation to include "all matters relating to employment conditions a nd employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and othe r terms and conditions of employment." 31 Section 3505 requires the governing body of a public agency to "meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of such recognized employee organizations."32
The California Supreme Court has interpre ted this language br oadly to protect employee interests. In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, the Court held that the phrase "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" in the MMBA was taken directly from the National Labor Relations Act, and that federal precedents interpreting that phrase "furnish reliable authority" for construing the MMBA. 33 The Court cautioned against
30 Cal. Gov't Code § 3504 et seq. (Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, requiring public agencies to "meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of such recognized employee organizations").
31 Cal. Gov't Code § 3504 ("The scope of representation shall include all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.").
32 Cal. Gov't Code § 3505.
33 Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 616-617 (holding that "the phrase 'wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment' in the MMBA was taken directly from the National Labor 234 of 238
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restricting the scope of bargaining through "an overbroad definiti on" of management prerogatives.
Here, while the Charter Review Committee process has provided an opportunity for comment, the Association requests that before any proposed amendments are placed on the ballot, the City engage in formal meet and c onfer with the Association regarding provisions that affect promotional procedures and eligible lists, probationary periods and their extension, reduction-in-force procedures and seniority rights, and any other matters within the scope of representation.
B. The Proposed Amendments Address Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining Several of the proposed charter amendments directly implicate mandatory subjects of bargaining:
1. Promotional Procedures and Eligible Lists
The proposed changes to eligible list duration, the "specialized knowledge" exception, and probation extension authority all affect promotional opportunities—a core term and condition of employment. In Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that "[r]ules delineating how layoffs will be made clearly fall within the 'conditions of employment' phrase" of the MMBA. 34 By the same reasoning, rules governing promotions, eligib le lists, and competitive examin ations fall squarely within the scope of representation.
2. Disciplinary Procedures and Job Security
The proposed at-will status for the Police Chief and the vague "alignment with philosophy" termination standard affect job security—another mandatory subject. PERB has held that disciplinary procedures and criteria "lie at the core of traditional labor relations" and are "particularly amenable to collective bargaining."35 Changes that affect employee tenure and conditions of discipline require a meet-and-confer.
3. Reduction-in-Force Procedures
The proposed RIF provisions directly affect seniority rights and job security. The Supreme Court has held explicitly that "though an employer has the right unilaterally to decide that a layoff is necessary, he must bargain a bout such matters as the timing of the layoffs and
Relations Act" and that federal precedents "furnish reliable authority" for construing the scope of representation).
34 Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 63-64 ("Rules delineating how layoffs will be made clearly fall within the 'conditions of employment' phrase of the section."). 35 County of Sonoma (2023) PERB Decision No. 2772a-M, p. 24 ("[I]nvestigatory and disciplinary procedures 'lie at the core of traditional labor relations' and are 'particularly amenable to collective bargaining.'"). 235 of 238
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the number and identity of employees affected."36 The procedures for implementing reductions in force are mandatory subjects of bargaining.
C. Even Non-Negotiable Decisi ons Require Effects Bargaining Even if the City contends that certain charter amendments involve fundamental policy decisions outside the scope of mandatory barg aining, the City remains obligated to bargain over the effects of those decisions. PERB has c onsistently held that "the MMBA's duty to bargain extends to the implementation and effects of a decision that has a foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of representation, even where the decision itself is not negotiable."37 The California Supreme Court confirmed this principle in International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 188 v. Pub lic Employment Relations Board , holding that "even where a decision involves a non-mandatory bargaining topic, if the decision has reasonably foreseeable effects on exclusively represen ted employees' terms and conditions of employment, then the employer has a bargaining obligation regarding the decision's effects and implementation."38 The employer's duty includes providing "reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to engage in effects nego tiations, before imple mentation begins." 39 A failure or refusal to bargain over effects "is equally as ha rmful as a failure to bargain over a negotiable change, as it disrupts and destabilizes employer-employee relations."40 D. The Proposed Amendments Have Foreseeable Effects Requiring Bargaining
The proposed charter amendments will have numerous foreseeable effects on terms and conditions of employment that require bargaining, including but not limited to: changes to promotional opportunity and career advancement fo r officers currently on eligible lists or preparing for promotional examinations; impact on officers who have invested time and resources preparing for competitive examinations that may be suspended under the "specialized knowledge" exception; effects on probationary employees whose status may be extended under the new probation authority; impact on senior ity rights and bumping procedures under the revised RIF provisions; and effects on workin g conditions and depa rtmental operations resulting from at-will status for executive leadership.
36 Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 64 (citing Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 621-622).
37 County of Sonoma (2023) PERB Decision No. 2772-M ("[T]he MMBA's duty to bargain extends to the implementation and effects of a decision that has a foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of representation, even where the decision itself is not negotiable."). 38 International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 265, 276.
39 California State University (2024) PERB Decision No. 2915-H, pp. 25-26 ("[I]f an employer reaches a firm decision on a matter outside the scope of representation and the decision has reasonably foreseeable effects on represented employees, then the employer typically must afford the exclusive representative notice and a meaningful opportunity to engage in effects negotiations, before implementation begins."). 40 County of Sonoma (2023) PERB Decision No. 2772-M ("A failure or refusal to bargain over the effects of a non-negotiable change is equally as harmful as a failure to bargain over a negotiable change, as it disrupts and destabilizes employer-employee relations.").
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PERB has emphasized that "[e]ffects bargaini ng contemplates that negotiations may ultimately cause the employer to change its mind about the non-negotiable decision in some way." The Association is entitled to present alternatives, propose mitig ating measures, and negotiate over implementation timelines and procedures before any amendments take effect.
E. The City Must Provide Notice and Opportunity to Bargain Before Implementation
Under the County of Santa Clara decision, the employer has "a duty to provide reasonable notice and an opportunity to bargai n before it implements a decision within its managerial prerogative that has foreseeable effects on negotiable terms and conditions of employment."41 "Reasonable" notice must be "clear and unequivocal" and must "clearly inform[] the employee organization of the nature and scope of the proposed change." Placing proposed amendments on a ballot for voter approval does not satisfy the City's meet-and-confer obligations. The City must engage in good faith bargaining over both the substance of proposals within the scope of representation and the effects of all proposals before implementation. The Association requests that the City fulfill its statutory obligations by engaging in meaningful meet-and-confer on th ese proposals before any charter amendments are finalized for submission to voters.
IX. CONCLUSION
The GPOA recognizes that periodic review of the City Charte r is appropriate and that some modernization may be warranted. Howe ver, the proposed amendments go far beyond modernization. They would fundamentally restructure civil service protections that have served Glendale and its employees well for nearly a century.
We urge the Committee to retain Council approval authority over the appointment and removal of the Police Chief, reject any standard permitting termination based on "alignment" with "philosophy" or "priorities," preserve ci vil service status for the Police Chief position, maintain fixed minimum and max imum durations for eligible lis ts, define "good cause" with specificity if any cancellation provision is retained, substantially narrow or eliminate the "specialized knowledge" exception to promo tional examination, define and limit probation extension authority, strengthen seniority prot ections in reduction-in-force procedures, and engage in meaningful meet and confer before finalizing recommendations.
The men and women of the Glendale Police Officers Association are proud to serve this community. We ask only that the Charter continue to provide the fair, merit-based employment system that allows us to focus on our mission of protecting Glendale's residents and visitors. Thank you for your consideration of these comments. Representatives of the Association are available to address any questions the Committee may have.
41 County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M (holding that employer has a duty to provide reasonable advance notice and opportunity to bargain over foreseeable effects of decisions within managerial prerogative).
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Respectfully submitted,
GLENDALE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
_________________________________
Michael Wenz
President
cc: Glendale City Council
Roubik Golanian, City Manager
Michael Garcia, City Attorney
GPOA Board of Directors
Stone Busailah, LLP, GPOA Legal Counsel
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