Tuesday, May 24, 2022
7:00 PM
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
Council Chamber and Virtual Platform (Zoom)
City Council
Agenda
May 24, 2022City Council Agenda
CONCURRENT GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT BOARD AND
CITY COUNCIL MEETING
NOTICE: The City Council will hold a hybrid meeting in Council Chambers and virtually via Zoom.
How to observe the Meeting:
1. Comcast TV Channel 15
2. Live stream https://hayward.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx
3. YouTube Live stream: https://www.youtube.com/user/cityofhayward How to submit written Public Comment:
1. Use eComment on the City's Meeting & Agenda Center webpage at:
https://hayward.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx. eComments are directly sent to the iLegislate application used by City Council and City staff. Comments received before 3:00 p.m. the day of the meeting will be exported into a report, distributed to the City Council and staff, and published on the City's Meeting & Agenda Center under Documents Received After Published Agenda.
2. Send an email to [email protected] by 3:00 p.m. the day of the meeting. Please identify the Agenda Item Number in the subject line of your email. Emails will be compiled into one file, distributed to the City Council and staff, and published on the City's Meeting & Agenda Center under Documents Received After Published Agenda. Documents received after 3:00 p.m. through the adjournment of the meeting will be included as part of the meeting record and published the following day.
How to provide live Public Comment during the City Council Meeting:
Come to City Hall or click link below to join the meeting:
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HAYWARD GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT (GHAD)
BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING
CALL TO ORDER: Mayor/Chair Halliday
Pledge of Allegiance: Council/GHAD Member Lamnin
ROLL CALL
May 24, 2022City Council Agenda
PUBLIC COMMENTS
The Public Comment section provides an opportunity to address the GHAD Board on items not listed on the agenda. As the GHAD Board is prohibited by State law from discussing items not listed on the agenda, items will be taken under consideration and may be referred to GHAD staff.
CONSENT
Approve the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District
Board Minutes of the Special Meeting on March 15, 2022
MIN 22-0701.
Attachments: Attachment I Draft Minutes of 3/15/22
PUBLIC HEARING
GHAD Budget: Resolution Approving the Geologic Hazard
Abatement District (GHAD) Budget for the 2022/23 Fiscal Year (Report from GHAD Manager Harrell)
PH 22-0282.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
Attachment III Hayward GHAD Budget for FY22-23
GHAD Manager's Report
An oral report from the GHAD Manager on ongoing activities, events, or other items of general interest to the GHAD and the public, if any.
GHAD Boardmembers’ Reports, Referral, and Future Agenda Items Oral reports from GHAD Boardmembers on their activities, referrals to GHAD staff, and suggestions for future agenda items, if any.
Next Meeting: No future meetings are scheduled. All future meetings will be noticed.
The Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors Adjourns and Reconvenes into the Meeting of the City Council.
May 24, 2022City Council Agenda
CITY COUNCIL MEETING
CLOSED SESSION ANNOUNCEMENT
PRESENTATION
Asian and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander American Heritage Month Proclamation
PUBLIC COMMENTS
The Public Comment section provides an opportunity to address the City Council on items not listed on the agenda or Information Items. The Council welcomes your comments and requests that speakers present their remarks in a respectful manner, within established time limits, and focus on issues which directly affect the City or are within the jurisdiction of the City. As the Council is prohibited by State law from discussing items not listed on the agenda, your item will be taken under consideration and may be referred to staff.
CITY MANAGER’S COMMENTS
An oral report from the City Manager on upcoming activities, events, or other items of general interest to Council and the Public.
ACTION ITEMS
The Council will permit comment as each item is called for the Consent Calendar, Public Hearings, and Legislative Business. In the case of the Consent Calendar, a specific item will need to be pulled by a Council Member in order for the Council to discuss the item or to permit public comment on the item. Please notify the City Clerk any time before the Consent Calendar is voted on by Council if you wish to speak on a Consent Item.
CONSENT
Approve the City Council Minutes of the Special City Council Meeting on May 14, 2022
MIN 22-0711.
Attachments: Attachment I Draft Minutes of 5/14/2022
Adopt an Ordinance Adding Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code Regarding Traffic Impact Fees for Property Developers
CONS 22-3192.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Summary of Published Notice
May 24, 2022City Council Agenda
Adopt a Resolution Allowing the City Council and Appointed Commissions/Task Forces and Council Committees to Hold
Continued Teleconferenced Public Meetings Pursuant to AB 361
CONS 22-3213.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
Attachment III Exhibit A
Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to
Appropriate $8,394.29 in Asset Forfeiture Fund Balance and to Transfer the Appropriation from the Asset Forfeiture Fund (265) to the General Fund (100)
CONS 22-2964.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Execute Amendment No. 8 to the Professional Services Agreement with CSG Consultants, Inc., for Private Development Review Services in the Amount of $400,000 for a Total Not-To-Exceed Amount of $2.1 Million and Extending the Date of the Agreement to June 30, 2023
CONS 22-2975.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Execute Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services Agreement with EKI Environment & Water for As-Needed Technical Support Related to Implementation of a Groundwater Management Plan Increasing the Contract Amount by $35,000 for a Total
Not-to-Exceed Amount of $95,000
CONS 22-3136.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
Adopt a Resolution Adopting the Traffic Impact Fee, Setting Initial Fee Rates for FY23, and Amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule
CONS 22-3357.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
May 24, 2022City Council Agenda
WORK SESSION
Work Session items are non -action items. Although the Council may discuss or direct staff to follow up on these items, no formal action will be taken. Any formal action will be placed on the agenda at a subsequent meeting in the action sections of the agenda.
Presentation Regarding 2021 Explosion at Russell City Energy Center and Follow Up Investigation and Actions (Report from City Manager McAdoo and Fire Chief Contreras)
WS 22-0198.
Attachments: Attachment I April 26, 2022 CEC Staff Report and Order Attachment II Calpine Redacted Root Cause Analysis
Attachment III CEC Gap Analysis
Attachment IV Powerpoint Presentation
Climate Action Plan and Environmental Justice: Considerations for New General Plan Policies and Programs (Report from Public Works Director Ameri)
WS 22-0189.
Attachments: Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II CAP Mural Board Responses
Attachment III EJ Workshop 1 Mural Board Responses
Attachment IV Hayward EJ Draft Policy Framework
Attachment V EJ Workshop 2 Mural Board Responses
COUNCIL REPORTS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS
Council Members can provide oral reports on attendance at intergovernmental agency meetings, conferences, seminars, or other Council events to comply with AB 1234 requirements (reimbursable expenses for official activities).
COUNCIL REFERRALS
Council Members may bring forward a Council Referral Memorandum (Memo) on any topic to be considered by the entire Council. The intent of this Council Referrals section of the agenda is to provide an orderly means through which an individual Council Member can raise an issue for discussion and possible direction by the Council to the appropriate Council Appointed Officers for action by the applicable City staff.
ADJOURNMENT
NEXT MEETING, June 7, 2022, 7:00 PM
May 24, 2022City Council Agenda
PUBLIC COMMENT RULES
Any member of the public desiring to address the Council shall limit their remarks to three (3) minutes unless less or further time has been granted by the Presiding Officer or in accordance with the section under Public Hearings. The Presiding Officer has the discretion to shorten or lengthen the maximum time members may speak. Speakers will be asked for their name before speaking and are expected to honor the allotted time. Speaker Cards are available from the City Clerk at the meeting.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
That if you file a lawsuit challenging any final decision on any public hearing or legislative business item listed in this agenda, the issues in the lawsuit may be limited to the issues that were raised at the City's public hearing or presented in writing to the City Clerk at or before the public hearing.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE
That the City Council adopted Resolution No. 87-181 C.S., which imposes the 90-day deadline set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 for filing of any lawsuit challenging final action on an agenda item which is subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. ***Materials related to an item on the agenda submitted to the Council after distribution of the agenda packet are available for public inspection in the City Clerk ’s Office, City Hall, 777 B Street, 4th Floor, Hayward, during normal business hours. An online version of this agenda and staff reports are available on the City ’s website. Written comments submitted to the Council in connection with agenda items will be posted on the City ’s website. All Council Meetings are broadcast simultaneously on the City website, Cable Channel 15 - KHRT, and YouTube. ***
Assistance will be provided to those requiring accommodations for disabilities in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Interested persons must request the accommodation at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting by contacting the City Clerk at (510) 583-4400 or [email protected].
Assistance will be provided to those requiring language assistance. To ensure that interpreters are available at the meeting, interested persons must request the accommodation at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting by contacting the City Clerk at (510) 583-4400.
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: MIN 22-070
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board
FROM: GHAD Manager
SUBJECT
Approve the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board Minutes of the Special Meeting on March 15, 2022
RECOMMENDATION
That the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board approves the GHAD Board meeting minutes of March 15, 2022
SUMMARY
The Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board held a meeting on March 15, 2022.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Draft Minutes of March 15, 2022
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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020866.0004\6635259.2
MINUTES OF JOINT CITY COUNCIL/HAYWARD GEOLOGIC HAZARD
ABATEMENT DISTRICT BOARD MEETING OF THE CITY OF HAYWARD Council Chambers
777 B Street, Hayward, CA 94541
Tuesday, March 15, 2022
The Joint City Council/Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board meeting was called to order by Board Chair Halliday at 7:02 p.m.
ROLL CALL
Present: BOARD MEMBERS Andrews, Márquez, Lamnin, Salinas, Wahab, Zermeño and Chair Halliday
Absent: None
PUBLIC COMMENT
None.
CONSENT CALENDAR
1. Approve the GHAD Minutes of the Board Meeting of January 18, 2022. It was moved by Board member Márquez and seconded by Board member Andrews to approve the minutes; the motion carried unanimously (7-0-0).
PUBLIC HEARING
2. Approve a Resolution to Accept the Tabulation of Votes and if Allowed by the Votes, Confirm the Assessment and Order the Levy and Collection of the Assessment for the Hayward SoMi Development. Ms. Ralston provided a brief staff report, summarizing that the Board had previously approved the draft Engineer's Report for the Hayward SoMi Development to set an assessment limit of $567.00 per townhome unit and $454.00 per condominium unit. In order to impose the assessment, the property owner of the Hayward SoMi Development must approve the proposed assessments. Amara Morrison, acting as GHAD Clerk, opened the sealed ballot which had been submitted by the property owner; the ballot was certified as complete and was found to approve the proposed assessment.
It was moved by Board member Salinas and seconded by Board member Zermeño to approve Resolution No. 22-02 to accept the tabulation of the votes for the Hayward SoMi Development; the motion carried unanimously (7-0-0).
It was also moved by Board member Salinas and seconded by Board member Zermeño to approve Resolution No. 22-03 to confirm the assessment and to authorize the level and collection of the assessment for the Hayward SoMi Development; the motion carried unanimously (7-0-0).
020866.0004\6635259.2
GHAD MANAGER REPORT
3. The GHAD Manager reported that the assessment map for the Hayward SoMi Development will be recorded within the next 20 days. Ms. Ralston also reported that the GHAD Manager anticipates the Hideaway development will be eligible for transfer in 2023 and that other possible annexations may occur later this year.
Chair Halliday request a tally of the total confirmed number of residential units within the Hayward GHAD; Ms. Ralston responded there are 427 units which includes the addition of the Hayward SoMi units.
Board member Márquez asked how often the GHAD newsletter has been issued. After some discussion, the Board directed the GHAD Manager to send an updated newsletter to property owners in recently-annexed developments and to send a newsletter to all property owners within the GHAD on an annual basis thereafter.
Ms. Ralston also noted staff will return to the Board in mid-May to early June for budget approval.
GHAD BOARD MEMBERS’ REPORTS, REFERRAL, AND FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS
4. None.
ADJOURNMENT
GHAD Board Chair Halliday adjourned the meeting at 7:30 pm.
APPROVED:
Barbara Halliday, Board Chair,
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District
ATTEST:
Patricia E. Curtin, Clerk,
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: PH 22-028
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board
FROM: GHAD Manager
SUBJECT
GHAD Budget: Resolution Approving the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District (GHAD) Budget for the 2022/23 Fiscal Year.
RECOMMENDATION
Staff recommends that the Hayward GHAD Board of Directors adopt Resolution 22-04 approving the GHAD budget for the 2022/23 fiscal year.
SUMMARY
The Hayward GHAD Board of Directors accepted monitoring, maintenance, and/or ownership of selected parcels within The Reserve (formerly La Vista) development within the Hayward GHAD with the approval of Resolution 20-01 on February 25, 2020. The proposed budget allows funding of GHAD responsibilities for the 2022/23 fiscal year from July 1 to June 30. The proposed budget for the 2022/23 fiscal year is $145,570.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II GHAD Resolution 22-04
Attachment III Hayward GHAD Budget for Fiscal Year 2022-2023 CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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6671.002.021
May 24, 2022
HAYWARD
GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT
TO: Hayward GHAD Board of Directors
FROM: GHAD Manager
BOARD MEETING DATE: May 24, 2022
SUBJECT: Resolution Approving the Geologic Hazard Abatement District (GHAD) Budget for the 2022/23 Fiscal Year.
RECOMMENDATION(S):
Staff recommends that the Hayward GHAD Board of Directors adopt Resolution 22-04 approving the GHAD budget for the 2022/23 fiscal year.
SUMMARY:
The Hayward GHAD Board of Directors accepted monitoring, maintenance, and/or ownership of selected parcels within The Reserve (formerly La Vista) development within the Hayward GHAD with the approval of Resolution 20-01 on February 25, 2020. The proposed budget allows funding of GHAD responsibilities for the 2022/23 fiscal year from July 1 to June 30. The proposed budget for the 2022/23 fiscal year is $145,570.
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION:
Hayward City Council adopted Resolution 16-030 approving the formation of the Hayward GHAD and the Plan of Control for The Reserve (La Vista) development within the Hayward GHAD on March 1, 2016.
The Hayward GHAD Board of Directors accepted monitoring, maintenance, and/or ownership of selected parcels within The Reserve (La Vista) development within the Hayward GHAD with the approval of Resolution 20-01 on February 25, 2020. The adopted Plan of Control summarizes the GHAD’s responsibilities and the approved Engineer’s Report established a budget and assessment limit for residential properties within The Reserve development.
The following are improvements owned and/or maintained by the GHAD and activities funded through the proposed budget.
• General maintenance of the surface drainage improvements • General maintenance of storm drain inlets and outlets in open space, subdrain outlets, and risers
• Maintenance of concrete-lined drainage ditches
• Maintenance of existing property line/boundary fencing • Inspection and maintenance of surface water quality treatment, water quality pond, and detention basins
• Retaining wall east of Alquire Parkway at the northwest corner of the Moita property
6671.002.021
May 24, 2022
• Maintenance roads associated with the water quality pond and the detention basins • Maintenance roads/trails over public water mains on the GHAD-owned parcels • Debris benches and walls
• Subdrains
• Storm drain inlets, outfalls and pipelines within the GHAD-owned parcels • Maintenance including trails (other than City-owned public trails) within the GHAD- owned parcels
• Slopes including Hayward Concentrated Fault Zone
• Vegetation control for fire suppression
The Hideaway (formerly Ersted) development will be eligible for transfer of Plan of Control responsibilities in December of 2023 ; therefore, the GHAD does not have any ownership or maintenance responsibilities within the Hideaway development for fiscal year 2022/23. With the recent annexation of the Hayward SoMi development into the Hayward GHAD, the Hayward SoMi development will be eligible f or transfer of Plan of Control responsibilities in approximately summer of 2025.
The Hayward GHAD has been levying and collecting assessments since fiscal year (FY) 2017/18.
For the 20 22/23 FY, all 179 residential units with The Reserve development , all 59 residential units within the Hideaway development, and 37 of 189 residential units (21 condominiums and 16 townhomes) within the Hayward SoMi development, for a total of 275 units are subject to the levy of a GHAD assessment. Parcels are subject to the levy starting the first fiscal year following issuance of a building permit.
As the GHAD has exceeded its target reserve rate of accumulation forecast estimate in the approved 2016 Engineer’s Report for The Reserve Development, we have recommended suspension of the levy for residences within The Reserve development for FY 2022/23 . We provided this recommendation based on the following conditions.
• Unencumbered reserve funds collected from within The Reserve Development exceed the target reserve amount estimated in the approved Engineer’s Report • Reserve funds collected from within The Reserve Development exceed the dollar amount estimated for a large-scale repair
• Plan of Control responsibilities have been transferred from the developer to the GHAD
We are recommending the FY 2022/23 levies for the Hideaway and SoMi Hayward developments still be imposed at the assessment limit. The total assessment revenue for the Hayward GHAD for FY 2022/23 is estimated at $82,000.
As provided in the approved Engine ers’ Reports, the assessment limit s in each of the three developments (The Reserve, Hideaway, and Hayward SoMi) will continue to be adjusted for inflation annually. The proposed levy suspension for FY 202 2/23 for The Reserve Development does not preclude the GHAD Board in the future from increasing or decreasing the levy of the assessment up to the inflation adjusted assessment limit. This determination is made by the GHAD Board each year in approving the annual budget for the GHAD . As long as the GHAD Board levies future assessments in accordance with the Engineer's Report, a vote of property owners is not required; a vote is only required if the assessment limit is increased beyond that allowed in the Engineer's Report.
6671.002.021
May 24, 2022
The proposed program budget for fiscal year 2022/23 is $145,570. The budget expenses break down into the following amounts:
Major Repair ................................ ................................ ....... $0 Preventive Maintenance and Operations .................. $104,000 Special Projects ................................ ................................ .. $0 Administration ................................ ............................ $ 23,400 Additional - Outside Professional Services ................. $ 18,170 Total Expenses ................................ ........................ $ 145,570
FISCAL IMPACT:
The Hayward GHAD is proposing a budget of $145,570 for anticipated management and maintenance fees for the 2022/23 fiscal year. At the beginning of the 2022/23 fiscal year, the cumulative reserve is estimated at approximately $1,102,693 and approximately $1,074,123 at the end of the 2022/23 fiscal year.
The Hayward GHAD operates as a separate entity from the City of Hayward; therefore, there is no fiscal impact to the City of Hayward.
NEXT STEPS:
None.
Prepared by: The GHAD Manager, Eric Harrell
Recommended by: GHAD Manager, Eric Harrell
ATTACHMENTS:
A. Resolution No. 22-04
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HAYWARD GEOLOGIC HAZARD A B A T E M E N T
D I S T R I C T
RESOLUTION NO. 22-04
APPROVING THE BUDGET FOR THE 2022/23 FISCAL YEAR FOR THE HAYWARD
GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT AND SUSPENDING RESIDENTIAL LEVY
WITHIN THE RESERVE DEVELOPMENT
WHEREAS, on March 1, 2016, the City Council adopted Resolution 16- 030, approving and ordering formation of the Hayward Geologic Abatement District (GHAD) as described in the GHAD Plan of Control for the La Vista subdivision (Tract 7620) and appointed itself to act as the GHAD Board of Directors (the "Board"); and
WHEREAS, the GHAD Manager, ENGEO, has prepared a budget for Fiscal Year 2022/23 as attached as Attachment 1; the estimated budget amount for management, maintenance, and repair responsibilities is $145,570; and
WHEREAS, the GHAD Board of Directors desires to adopt the budget for the fiscal year 2022/23.
WHEREAS, based on the GHAD's current account balance and the anticipated expenditures in the proposed FY 2022/23 budget, the GHAD Board desires to suspend the residential parcel levy for Fiscal Year 2022/23 for residences within The Reserve Development;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Hayward GHAD Board of Directors hereby orders that:
1. The GHAD Board approves the GHAD Budget for the 2022/23 fiscal year attached as Attachment 1.
3. The recitals are incorporated herein by this reference.
4. This Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its passage and adoption.
IN COUNCIL, HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA May 24, 2022
ADOPTED BY THE FOLLOWING VOTE:
AYES:
NOES:
ABSTAIN:
ABSENT:
ATTEST:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Clerk of Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement
District Board of Directors
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
__________________________________________________
General Counsel of the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Attachment 1- Hayward GHAD Budget for Fiscal Year 2022-2023
HAYWARD GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23
ATTACHMENT III
2010 Crow Canyon Place, Suite 250 San Ramon, CA 94583 (925) 866-9000 Fax (888) 279-2698 www.engeo.com
May 3, 2021
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors Chair Barbara Halliday
Boardmember Aisha Wahab
Boardmember Angela Andrews
Boardmember Sara Lamnin
Boardmember Elisa Márquez
Boardmember Mark Salinas
Baordmember Francisco Zermeño
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
Subject: The Reserve (La Vista) Development
Hideaway (Ersted) Property Development
Hayward SoMi Development
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District
Hayward, California
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23
Dear Chair Halliday and Boardmembers:
Attached is the program budget for the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District (GHAD) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022/23. The proposed program budget is $145,570. The budget expenses break down into the following amounts.
Major Repair ................................ ................................ ....... $0 Preventive Maintenance and Operations .................. $104,000 Special Projects ................................ ................................ .. $0 Administration ................................ ............................. $23,400 Additional - Outside Professional Services .................. $18,170
The budget anticipates FY 2022/23 revenue of $117,000 with an estimated decrease of $28,570 in the reserve fund. A summary of the expenses is shown on Table 3 , followed by a brief description of each budget item on the following pages.
If you have any questions regarding the contents of this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District
ENGEO Incorporated, GHAD Manager
ENGEO Project No. 6671.002.021
Haley Ralston Eric Harrell
hjr/eh/cjn
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 1
HAYWARD GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT DISTRICT
PROPOSED PROGRAM BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR 2022/23
The following proposed program budget summarizes the anticipated revenues and expenditures for FY 2022/23 for the Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District (GHAD), which includes The Reserve ( formerly known as La Vista (Tract 7620)), Hideaway (formerly known as Ersted Property (Tract 8439)), and Hayward SoMi (Tracts 8605 and 8614) developments. The structure of the Hayward GHAD is shown below.
The GHAD has accepted maintenance and monitoring responsibilities for the following parcels within the District for only The Reserve (La Vista) development as listed on Table 1. In addition, those parcels that are owned by the GHAD are identified. Maintenance, monitoring responsibilities, and ownership for the listed parcels were acc epted by resolution on February 25, 2020.
TABLE 1: Accepted Parcels within The Reserve Development ASSESSOR’S PARCEL NUMBER DESCRIPTION (Tract 7620) GHAD OWNERSHIP 83-477-4 Parcel C Yes
83-480-1 Parcel D Yes
83-478-1 Parcel E No
83-478-2 Parcel F No
83-478-3 Parcel G No
83-478-4 Parcel H No
83-478-5 Parcel I No
83-479-1 Parcel J No
83-479-2 Parcel K No
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 2
ASSESSOR’S PARCEL NUMBER DESCRIPTION (Tract 7620) GHAD OWNERSHIP 83-479-3 Parcel L No
83-479-4 Parcel M No
83-480-2 Parcel N Yes
83-478-6 Parcel O Yes
83-477-6 Parcel Q No
83-477-7 Parcel R No
83-478-7 Parcel S No
83-477-8 Parcel T No
83-480-3 Parcel U Yes
83-480-4 Parcel V Yes
83-75-2-15 Unsurveyed Remainder Yes
83-75-2-9 La Vista LP 2006-301610 Yes
83-75-2-11 La Vista LP 2007-408664 Yes
83-75-2-13 La Vista LP 2007-408664 Yes
83-125-1-18 La Vista LP 2007-408664 Yes
83-125-1-21 La Vista LP 2007-408664 Yes
83-477-1 Public Roads No
Various Residential Lots 1 through 179 No
Maintenance and monitoring responsibilities for the remaining prope rties within The Reserve development not listed above are the responsibility of the individual property owners . The parcels listed on Table 2 within The Reserve development have been offered to the GHAD, but have not yet been accepted by the GHAD due to “punchlist” items that remain to be completed.
TABLE 2: Parcels not yet accepted within The Reserve Development ASSESSOR’S PARCEL NUMBER DESCRIPTION (Tract 7620) GHAD OWNERSHIP 83-477-2 Parcel A No
83-480-3 Parcel B Yes
83-477-5 Parcel P No
Within thi s budget, it is anticipated that during the 2022/23 fiscal year, Parcel B may be transferred to the Hayward GHAD and these expenses h ave been anticipated in the 202 2/23 budget estimates. Based on our discussions with the City of Hayward , construction on the Park site (Parcel “A”) will start in early 2023; therefore, the future GHAD-maintained improvements on Parcel A will not be offered for transfer in the 2022/23 fiscal year and GHAD expenses for monitoring and maintenance of these improvements are not included in this budget.
No parcels within the Hideaway (Ersted) development are yet eligible for transfer as eligibility occurs a minimum of 3 years after the issuance of the first residential building permit. The first residential permit was issued on Dece mber 18, 2020; therefore, transfer of responsibilities cannot occur earlier than December 2023. Additionally, no parcels within the Hayward SoMi development are yet eligible for transfer as eligibility occurs a minimum of 3 years after the issuance of the first residential building permit, which is estimated to be in summer of 2022.
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 3
The GHAD is funded through real property assessments. The initial assessment limit s were approved by the Board of Directors. The assessment limits are adjusted annually on Jun e 30 to reflect the percentage change in the San Francisco -Oakland-Hayward Consumers Price Index (CPI) for All Urban Consumers.
The annual assessment limits are shown on Table 3.
TABLE 3: Actual CPI Adjustments and Assessment Limit for Residential Properties FISCAL
YEAR
INDEX
DATE
SAN
FRANCISCO-
OAKLAND-
HAYWARD
CPI (JUNE
/JUNE)
THE
RESERVE
ANNUAL
ASSESSMENT
LIMIT AND
LEVY1
ERSTED
PROPERTY
ANNUAL
ASSESSMENT
LIMIT AND
LEVY1
HAYWARD
SOMI
TOWNHOMES
ANNUAL
ASSESSMENT
LIMIT AND
LEVY1
HAYWARD SOMI
CONDOMINIUMS
ANNUAL
ASSESSMENT
LIMIT AND
LEVY1
2016/2017 $1,502.00
2017/2018 6/30/2017 3.48% $1,554.30
2018/2019 6/30/2018 3.91% $1,615.03 $932.00
2019/2020 6/30/2019 3.22% $1,666.96 $961.96
2020/2021 6/30/2020 1.62% $1,693.90 $977.51
2021/2022 6/30/2021 3.16% $1,747.34 $1,008.35 $567.00 $454.00 1If assessment limit is an odd number the annual levy is rounded down to nearest even cent.
For the FY 2021/22, all 179 residential parcels with The Reserve development and 42 of 59 residential parcels were subject to the levy of a GHAD assessment . No parcels within the Hayward SoMi development were subject to the levy of a GHAD assessment. Parcels are subject to the levy starting the first fiscal year following issuance of a building permit. The final assessment roll prepared for the 202 1/22 fiscal year and submitted to the Alameda County Assessor’s Office identifies 221 properties subject to the levy of the GHAD assessment. T he total levy amount for the 2021/22 FY was $355,124.14.
Based on the San Francis co-Oakland-Hayward CPI data reported through April 2022 , for budgeting purposes, we hav e estimated a FY 202 2/23 annual inflation rate adjustment of 5 percent. We estimate that 2 75 residential units will be subject to asse ssment in FY 2022/23.
Parcels are s ubject to the levy starting the first fiscal year following issuance of a building permit.
As shown on Graph 1 below, the GHAD has exceeded the target reserve rate of accumulation forecast in the approved 2016 Engineer’s Report for the Reserve Development . The excess revenue is primarily due to lower expenses than anticipated as discussed below. In general, we have and may in the future recommend an annual levy amount less than the assessment limit if the following conditions are met.
Unencumbered reserve funds collected from within a development exceed the target reserve amount estimated in the approved Engineer’ s Report or unencumbered reserve funds collected from a development exceed the target reserve Reserve funds collected from within a development exceed the dollar amount estimated for a large scale repair
Plan of Control responsibilities have been transferred from the developer to the GHAD
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 4
As the above conditions have been met for T he Reserve development ; therefore, we are recommending and the budget prepared, provides that the residential parcel levy be suspended for fiscal year 202 2/23. F iscal Year 2022/23 levies for the Hideaway and SoMi Hayward Developments would still be imposed at the assessment limit.
The GHAD Treasurer has estimated that dividend and interest income for FY 2022/23 should be approximately 1½ to 2 percent above the rate of inflation. For budgeting purposes, we have assumed the lower estimate (1½ percent) when estimating dividend and interest income. The GHAD Treasurer maintains an estimate that the long -term inflation rate will average approximately 2 to 2.5 percent, but in FY 202 2/23 may be above this level. We have assumed an inflation rate of 5 percent for esti mating total revenues in Table 4 based on CPI published through April 2022.
TABLE 4: Estimated Revenue
FY 2022/23 LEVY/REVENUE
ESTIMATE
Residential Units (The Reserve) 0
Residential Units (Hideaway) 59
Residential Units (Hayward SoMi) 37
Assessment Revenue $82,000
Investment Income $35,000
Total Revenues $117,000
The budget is divided into four categories including Major Repair , Preventive Maintenance and Operations, Special Projects , and Administration and Accounting. As needed, the GHAD Manager, in its discretion, may reallocate funds within the budget. A description of each of the categories is provided below. In general, the budget amounts listed are based on the Engineer’s Report approved by the Hayward GHAD Board of Directors in 20 16. The budget amounts have been inflation adjusted to provide the estimates.
MAJOR REPAIR
Included within the major repair category are those repair or improvement projects that are intermittent and, by their nature, do not fit within a scheduled maintenance program. Minor slope repair and erosion control items are generally fu nded within the Preventive Maintenance and Operations category. For the purposes of this budget, we define major repairs as those estimated at over $50,000.
There are currently no major repair projects anticipated in the FY 2 022/23 budget within the GHAD-maintained areas of the Hayward GHAD. The reserve portion of the budget allows for funding toward these unpredictable events.
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS
Preventive maintenance and operations include slope stabilization services , erosion protection, and professional services within the District. Professional services include site -monitoring events as specified in the GHAD Plan of Control. Slope stabilization and erosion protection responsibilities include the open -space slopes and drainage swale s. GHAD-maintained improvements generally include detention and water -quality basins, maintenance roads,
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 5
concrete-lined drainage ditches, retaining walls, subsurface drainage facilities, storm drain facilities, trails, and debris benches.
SPECIAL PROJECTS
The Special Projects category allows the GHAD to budget for projects beneficial to the GHAD that do not fit into one of the other three categories. Although not proposed in the FY 2022/23 budget, special projects can include items such as global positioning system (GPS)/geographic information system (GIS) development for GH AD-maintained improvements; website development and maintenance; and reserve studies to reevaluate the financial condition of the GHAD.
There are currently no special projects anticipa ted in the FY 2022/23 budget within the GHAD-maintained areas of the Hayward GHAD.
ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTING
This category includes a dministrative expenses for tasks of the G HAD Manager, clerical and accounting staff related to the operation and admi nistration of the GHAD . The budget amounts listed are based on the Engineers’ Reports approved by the Hayward GHAD Board of Directors in 20 16 for The Reserve (La Vista) development. The budget amounts have been inflation adjusted to provide the listed budget estimates.
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 6
TABLE 5: Summary of Proposed Fiscal Year 2022/23 Budget
BUDGET ITEM
FY
2021/2022
BUDGET
FY 2021/2022
ESTIMATED1
FY
2022/23
FORECAST
PERCENT OF
TOTAL
EXPENDITURES
(FY 2022/23)
MAJOR REPAIRS
Total $0 0%
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS
Professional Services
Open Space Scheduled Monitoring Events $8,000 $8,000 $9,000 Heavy Rainfall Monitoring Events $1,000 $0 $1,000
Detention Basin Scheduled Monitoring Events $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 Detention Basin Heavy Rainfall Monitoring Event $1,000 $0 $1,000 Subtotal $12,000 $10,000 $13,000 9%
Maintenance and Operations
Sediment Removal - Concrete Structures $9,000 $7,876 $9,000 Water Quality/Detention Basin Facilities $10,000 $3,800 $10,000 Trail and Fence Maintenance $3,000 $0 $3,000
Slope, Erosion Repairs, and Minor Repairs $22,000 $2,200 $23,000 Vegetation Control $18,000 $14,100 $18,000
Subdrain Outlets $18,000 $0 $18,000
Conservation Easement Activities $10,000 $0 $10,000
Subtotal $90,000 $27,976 $91,000 63%
Preventive Maintenance and Operations Total $102,000 $37,976 $104,000
SPECIAL PROJECTS
Total $0 $0 $0 0%
ADMINISTRATION – GHAD MANAGER
Administration $20,400 $20,400 $21,000
Annual Report and Budget Preparation $2,300 $2,300 $2,400 Subtotal $22,700 $22,700 $23,400 16%
Professional Services - Nontechnical
Assessment Roll and Levy Update Preparation $1,750 $1,750 $1,750 GHAD Attorney $7,000 $7,000 $7,000
GHAD Treasurer $5,000 $2,500 $5,000
GHAD Clerk $1,500 $1,500 $1,500
Alameda County Assessor’s Fees $6,100 $6,037 $1,400
California Association of GHADs Membership $160 $155 $170 Insurance $1,350 $1,500 $1,350
Subtotal $22,860 $20,442 $18,170 12%
Administration and Accounting Total $45,560 $43,142 $41,570 TOTAL PROPOSED EXPENDITURES $147,560 $81,118 $145,570 100%
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 7
BUDGET ITEM
FY
2021/2022
BUDGET
FY 2021/2022
ESTIMATED1
FY
2022/23
FORECAST
PERCENT OF
TOTAL
EXPENDITURES
(FY 2022/23)
ESTIMATED REVENUE
Beginning Balance
Balance (June 30, 2021) $858,783
Estimated FY 2021/22 Revenue
Assessment Income $355,124
Investment Income $-30,096
Estimated Expenses 2021/22
Estimated Expenses
through 6/30/2022 $81,118
ESTIMATED RESERVE
ON JUNE 30, 2022 $1,102,693
Estimated 2022/23 Revenue
Estimated FY 2022/23
Assessment $82,000
Estimated FY 2022/23
Investment Income $35,000
Estimated 2022/23
Expenses
Estimated Expenses
through June 30, 2023 $145,570
ESTIMATED RESERVE
ON JUNE 30, 2023 $1,074,123
For FY 2022/23, the payment limit for the GHAD Manager, ENGEO, is set at $52,400. The tasks included withi n the payment limit may i nclude oversight of maintenance and repair projects, administration, and monitoring events as summarized in Table 6.
TABLE 6: Payment Limit
TASK AMOUNT
Scheduled and Heavy Rainfall Monitoring Events $13,000
Slope Stabilization and Erosion Repairs1 $4,400
Water Quality Detention Basin Maintenance1 $2,000
Trail and Fence Maintenance1 $600
Sediment Removal - Concrete Structures1 $1,800
Vegetation Control1 $3,600
Subdrain Outlets $3,600
Administration $21,000
Budget Preparation $2,400
TOTAL $52,400
1Dependent on maintenance and/or repair activities by the GHAD during FY 2022/23. The GHAD Manager, ENGEO, payment limit is 20% of the total budget item.
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 8
As shown on the graph below, the forecast cumulative reserve is above the amount estimated in the 20 16 Engineer’s Reports and is estimated to reach approximately $ 10,000,000 by 20 56.
The GHAD reserve is intended to fund unanticipated expenses that may occur.
GRAPH 1: Forecast and Actual Cumulative Reserve
MAJOR REPAIRS
There are currently no major repair projects anticipated in the FY 2022/23 budget within the GHAD-maintained areas of the Hayward GHAD. While no major repairs are ongoing at this time, by their nature, major repairs such as landslides are unpredictable and co uld occur during FY 2022/23. The reserve portion of the budget allows for the funding toward these unpredictable events.
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS
Professional Services
Open Space Scheduled Monitoring Events
As provided in the Plan of Contr ol, there are two scheduled monitoring events within the GHAD that will occur during each calendar year.
Estimated budget $9,000
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 9
Open Space Heavy Rainfall Events
We have budgeted for one heavy rainfall-monitoring event during the 2022/23 winter season. In the initial Engineer’s Report, we anticipated that a heavy rainfall-monitoring event would be needed on average once every two years.
Estimated budget $1,000
Water Quality/Detention Basin Scheduled Monitoring Events As provided in the Plan of Control, there are two scheduled monitoring events within the GHAD that will occur during each calendar year . The GHAD has not yet acquired detention basin monitoring or maintenance on Parcel A and does not expect to do so during the 2022/23 FY.
Estimated budget $2,000
Water Quality/Detention Basin Heavy Rainfall Events
We have budgeted for one heavy rainfall-monitoring event during the 2022/23 winter season. In the initial Engineer’s Report, we anticipated that a heavy rainfall-monitoring event would be needed, on average, once every two years.
Estimated budget $1,000
Maintenance and Operations
Sediment Removal - Concrete Structures
This budget item is to provide for the annual removal of vegetation, cleaning, sealing and minor repair of concrete-lined drainage ditches within The Reserve development.
Estimated budget $9,000
Water Quality/Detention Basin Facilities
The budget item allows for ongoing maintenance activities as described in the operations and maintenance manual.
Estimated budget $10,000
Trail and Fence Maintenance
This budget item includes gravel -surfaced road maintenance, trail maintenance, and fence repairs, which may occur during the 2022/23 fiscal year.
Estimated budget $3,000
Slope Stabilization, Erosion, and Minor Repairs
This is for unan ticipated minor repairs, including slope instability or erosion, which may occur during FY 2022/23.
Estimated budget $23,000
Vegetation Control – Open Space
This budget item includes annual firebreak mowing and litter removal, which will occur during FY 2022/23. This budget item has been increased to allow for a second cutting of fire breaks as needed.
Estimated budget $18,000
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 10
Subdrain Maintenance
This budget item allows for construction of subdrain markers and outfall structures to facilitate future monitoring and maintenance of the subdrain outlets , which are critical to slope stability within The Reserve development. This item was included in the Request for Proposals scope of services and is a one-time expense.
Estimated budget $18,000
Conservation Easement Activities
This budget item includes activities that may be needed in relation to the City of Hayward Conservation Easement or East Bay Regional Park District Conservation Easement in FY 2022/23.
Estimated budget $10,000
SPECIAL PROJECTS
There are currently no special projects anticipated in the FY 2022/23 budget within the GHAD-maintained areas of the Hayward GHAD.
ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTING
GHAD Manager
Administration
Administrative expenses include the G HAD Manager duties related to the operation and administration of the GHAD. The budget estimate for administrative services is derived from the original GHAD budget used to prepare the GHADs Engineer’s Report.
Estimated budget $21,000
Budget Preparation
This budget provides for the preparation of the annual report and budget.
Estimated budget $2,400
Outside Professional Services – Nontechnical
Legal Counsel
This budget item allows the GHAD to fund legal counsel for the District . The Board appointed Wendel Rosen to serve as the GHAD At torney on September 13, 2016 , with the approval of Resolution No. 16 -002. The duties of the legal counsel may include but not be limited to , transfer documentation, preparation or review of contrac ts, grant deeds, right of entry, and board resolutions.
Estimated budget $7,000
Treasurer
This budget item accounts for fees related the GHAD Treasurer and the investment manager functions. The Board appointed the GHAD Treasurer on September 13, 2016, with the approval of Resolution No. 16-002 and authorized a change in the GHAD Treasurer designation to GHAD Treasurer, Inc. on February 25, 2020, with the approval of Resolution 20-02.
Estimated cost $5,000
Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board of Directors 6671.002.021 Hayward Geologic Hazard Abatement District May 3, 2022
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022/23 Page 11
Clerk
This budget item allows the GHAD to fund clerk services for the District. The Board appointed Wendel Rosen to serve as the GHAD Clerk on September 13, 2016 , with the approval of Resolution No. 16-002.
Estimated cost $1,500
Assessment Roll and Levy Update
This budget item allows for preparation of the assessment roll for the District and the updated levy based on the Consumer Price Index adjustment.
Estimated budget $1,750
Alameda County Assessor’s Fees
This budget item accounts for fees from the Alameda County Assessor’s Office.
Estimated cost $1,400
California Association of GHADs Membership
The GHAD maintains membership in the California Association of GHADs.
Estimated cost $170
Insurance
The GHAD maintains general liability insurance for open space areas within the District.
Estimated cost $1,350
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: MIN 22-071
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Clerk
SUBJECT
Approve the City Council Minutes of the Special City Council Meeting on May 14, 2022
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council approves the special City Council meeting minutes of May 14, 2022.
SUMMARY
The City Council held a meeting on May 14, 2022.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Draft Minutes of May 14, 2022
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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SPECICITY COUNCIL MEETING
777 B Street, Hayward, CA 94541
Council Chamber and Virtual Platform (Zoom)
https://hayward.zoom.us/j/89967627550?pwd=MDFnbDNzK3FKenFGaXB2NURBQUh1Zz09 Saturday, May 14, 2022, 9:00 a.m.
The special City Council meeting was called to order by Mayor Halliday at 9:00 a.m. The City Council held a virtual meeting with participation via Zoom by members of the City Council, staff and public.
Pledge of Allegiance: Council Member Andrews
Present: COUNCIL MEMBERS Andrews, Lamnin, Márquez, Salinas, Wahab MAYOR Halliday
Absent: COUNCIL MEMBER Zermeño
PUBLIC COMMENT
TJ, Hayward Concerned Citizens ’ representative, referenced her email to Council and expressed she had budgeting concerns related to the FY 2023 Strategic Roadmap priorities specifically the restitution for survivors and descendants of Russell City.
WORK SESSION
1. Council Budget Work Session: Review Proposed Fiscal Year 2023 Operating Budget and Five-Year Plan and Receive and Discuss Department Budget Presentations (Report from City Manager McAdoo and Finance Director Claussen) CONS 22-245
Staff report submitted by City Manager McAdoo and Finance Director Claussen, dated May 14, 2022, was filed.
Finance Director Claussen and City Man ager McAdoo provided an ove rview of the General Fund (rev enue vs. expenses); General Fund five-year forecast update; key cost driver s impacting the General Fund; proposed FY 2023 G eneral Fund revenues and expenses; and proposed FY 2023 operating funds.
Discussion ensued among members of the City Council and City staff regard ing: American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funds; Redevelopment Agency dissolution and distribution; Real Property Transfer Tax; one-time funds; proposed FY 2023 Genera l Fun d revenues an d expenditures; reserve policy; vacancies throughout departments; Human Resou rces organizational study; and changes in technology.
Members of the City Council provided the following suggestions: as ARPA proje cts and programs are reported, provide information for the community and Council on how federal relief funds are allocated and sp ent; consider extra payment for future liability costs (Unfunded Actuarial Liability UAL) and economic development funds at Mid-Year; consider setting a reserve goal of no les s than six months of city operating costs as o pposed to two months in an effort to plan for an emergency or economic downturn. 2 | M a y 14 , 20 2 2
Members of the City Council thanked department heads for the ir service provided to the community and their efforts and accomplishments during FY 2022.
MAINTENANCE SERVICES
Maintenance Servic es Director Rullman gave an over view of the Maintenance Services Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Maintenance Services organizational chart; F Y 2022 highlights and accomplishments; and goals for FY 2023.
Members of the C ity Coun cil off ered the following comments : as staff continues implementation of the Illegal Dumping Pilot Program, consider a model like Eco Thrift for dropping items; work with property managers of multifamily complexes to address illegal dumping; consider Clean California funds to cl ean and beautify public spaces; seek opportunities to work with organizations that repurpose items; consider programs that address blight such as San Jose’s Cash for Trash model to incentivize unhoused residents to pick up trash in exchange for cash; be mindful of designing a program that empowers the community to be a part of the solution ; partner with the Ohlone indigenous community for collection efforts and creating opportunities for reusing; and continue to partner with e-waste providers to be present at future cleanup events.
HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
Human Resources Director Sangy gave an over view of the Human Resources Department budget comparison FY 2021 -FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Human Resources organizational chart; FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments; and goals for F Y 2023.
Members of the City Council offered the following comment: consider ways to track employee satisfaction.
FIRE DEPARTMENT
Fire Chief Contreras gave an overview of the Fire Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Fire Department organizational chart; FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments; and goals for FY 2023.
Members of the City Coun cil off ered the following comment: consider the feasibility of extending the hours for the Hayward Evaluation and Response Teams (HEART) program.
PUBLIC SAFETY WORKSHOP UPDATE
City Manager McAdoo provided an overview of Public Safety Projects with FY 2023 Budget Requests; Hayward Evaluation and Response Teams (HEART) Budget Request – (Strategic Roadmap); HEART FY 2023 Proposed Org Chart; and HEART Pilot Positions.
SPECICITY COUNCIL MEETING
777 B Street, Hayward, CA 94541
Council Chamber and Virtual Platform (Zoom)
https://hayward.zoom.us/j/89967627550?pwd=MDFnbDNzK3FKenFGaXB2NURBQUh1Zz09 Saturday, May 14, 2022, 9:00 a.m.
YFSB Administrator Young provided an overview of Mobile Evaluation Team (MET) and Fire Chief Contreras spoke about the Mobile Integrated Health ( MIHU) soft launch and referral system development and FY 2023 goals/focus areas.
Members of the City Coun cil off ered the following com ments: consider partnering with California State University, East Bay Master of Social Work program to provide internship that can help shape career trajec tory; note that proper staffing at the Dispatch Center is key; consider opioid funding to recruit and train menta l health pro fessionals; and continue to prioritize 9-8-8 as the mental health crisis and suicide prevention number in Alameda County.
The City Council took a break at 12:08 p.m.
POLICE
Police Chief Chaplin gave an overview of the Police Department budget comparison FY 2021- FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Police Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Coun cil offered the following comments: continue to evaluate whether the buyback program should include ghost guns in an effort to remove them from the streets; continue to recognize the importance of upholding quality of life and enforcing the noise ordinance related to loud mufflers an d tail pipes; c onsider a ctivating spaces that are problematic in a positive way with non-HPD resources; and consider the Eden Area Regional Occupational Program (ROP) and Chabot College Criminal Justice degree to build a workforce pipeline.
The City Council took a lunch break from 12:44 pm to 1:15 p.m.
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES
Assistant City Manager/Development Services Director Ott introduced Deputy Development Services Director B uizer who gave an over view of th e Development Services Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Development Services Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Coun cil off ered the following comments : continue to evaluate best approaches to organizing and supporting pop-up local entrepreneurs with a pathwa y to permitting and activating spaces and improving economic development; explore programs to help residents remain in compliance maintaining the ex terior o f their homes such as providing rebates for landscaping and message this information to the community.
4 | M a y 14 , 20 2 2
INFORMATION TECHNNOLOGY
Information Technology Director Kostrzak gave an overview of the Information Technology Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Information Techno logy Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highl ights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Council offered the following comments: continue efforts to upgrade the current infrastructure given the emergence of new laws; continue efforts to allow res idents and people to submit payments, plans and permits online allowing for large PDF files and full integration; remain cautious with threats to cyber security and privacy ; ensure water and utilities infrastructure remains protected and safeguarding the software managing the technology; and consider partners such as PilotCity for prospective internship opportunities.
LIBRARY
Library Director Addleman gave an over view of the Information Technology Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Information Technology Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Coun cil offered the following comments: prioritize infrastructure and needs assessment at the Weekes Library ; consider ways to get funds for the future Stack Center; consider possibilities for providing evening programs/events as alternatives working individuals can benefit from; consider unused spaces at the library for revenue generation opportunities such as workin g spaces; and showcase the activities provided through the library.
CITY MANAGER
City Manager McAdoo introduced Assistant City Manager Youngblood who gave an overview of the City Manager Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; and City Manager Department organizational chart. Assist ant City Manager Ott provided an overview of FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Coun cil offered the following comments: continue to partner with the Chamber of Commerce to organize Downtown Hayward Street Parties for its be nefit to the community and businesses; reimagine special events and consider the Tennyson Corridor to build community; exercise flexibility in how businesses conduct their activities such as more outdoor dining and activity options for sidewalk and outdoor retail; be prepared to respond to community members advising that a lack of staffing capacity may impact delivery of services; consider the YFSB Administrator position be restructured to report to the City Manager ; stabilize Human Resources to provide support to the rest of the organization, attract and retain workforce, and concentrate on succession planning; expand collaboration between Police and Fire for medical c linics throughout city; provide quarterly updates on City vacancies; consider expansion of the Economic Development Division at Mid-Year; get more life-science companies to Hayward; explore additional opportunities for revenue generation
SPECICITY COUNCIL MEETING
777 B Street, Hayward, CA 94541
Council Chamber and Virtual Platform (Zoom)
https://hayward.zoom.us/j/89967627550?pwd=MDFnbDNzK3FKenFGaXB2NURBQUh1Zz09 Saturday, May 14, 2022, 9:00 a.m.
as ballot measures approach expiration and be proactive and aggressive in expanding tax base and not be so reliant on Measure C or Utility Users Tax funds; consider an arts and cultural commission; and continue to keep the community informed.
FINANCE
Finance Director Claussen introduced Deputy Finance Directo r Gonzalez who gave an overview of the Library Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Library Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Council offered the following comment: consider social media campaign around the payment tool used by the City and consider having the service installed at different businesses in the city which may assist in boosting sales tax revenue.
The City Council took a break at 3:12 p.m.
CITY CLERK
City Clerk Lens gave an overview of the City Clerk Department budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; City Clerk Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Coun cil offered the following comment: engage Human Resources to explore creating additional job classifications to create career development within the department.
CITY ATTORNEY
City Attorney Lawson gave an overview of the City Attorney Department budget comparison FY 2021 -FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; City Attorney Department organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments.
Members of the City Council offered the following comment: continue to oversee the liability insurance premium and increase advocacy efforts through Cal Cities to control insurance cost and mitigate liability.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
City Manager McAdoo gave an overview of the Mayor and City Council budget comparison FY 2021-FY 2023; significant changes planned for FY 2023; Mayor and C ity Council organizational chart; and FY 2022 highlights and accomplishments. 6 | M a y 14 , 20 2 2
Members of the City Council offered the following comments: make sure negotiations with the Police and Fire Departments continue to be effective as it was under the direction of Human Resources Director Sangy; work with the City Attorney to e valuate a policy to erect other flags; and explore restoration for survivors and descendants of Russell City.
City Manager McAdoo noted that due to time con strains, the presentation for the Public Works Department would continue to the May 17th City Council meeting.
ADJOURNMENT
Mayor Halliday adjourned the special meeting at 4:10 p.m.
APPROVED
__________________________________________________________ Barbara Halliday
Mayor, City of Hayward
ATTEST:
__________________________________________________________ Miriam Lens
City Clerk, City of Hayward
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: CONS 22-319
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Clerk
SUBJECT
Adopt an Ordinance Adding Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code Regarding Traffic Impact Fees for Property Developers
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council adopts the Ordinance introduced on May 17, 2022.
SUMMARY
This item entails adoption of an Ordinance adding Article 30 Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code, introduced on May 17, 2022, by Council Member Márquez.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Summary of Ordinance Published
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Clerk
SUBJECT: Adopt an Ordinance Adding Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code Regarding Traffic Impact Fees for Property Developers
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council adopts the Ordinance introduced on May 17, 2022.
SUMMARY
This item entails adoption of an Ordinance adding Article 30 Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code, introduced on May 17, 2022, by Council Member Márquez.
BACKGROUND
The Ordinance was introduced by Council Member Márquez at the May 17, 2022, meeting of the City Council with the following vote:
AYES: COUNCIL MEMBERS: Andrews, Lamnin, Márquez, Salinas, Wahab, Zermeño
MAYOR Halliday
NOES: NONE
ABSENT: NONE
ABSTAIN: NONE
STRATEGIC ROADMAP
This agenda item is a routine operational item and does not relate to one of the priorities outlined in the Council’s Strategic Roadmap.
FISCAL IMPACT
There is no fiscal impact associated with this report.
PUBLIC CONTACT
The summary of the Ordinance was published in the Daily Review c/o Bay Area News Group- East Bay on Friday, May 20, 2022. Adoption, at this time, is therefore appropriate.
NEXT STEPS
The Hayward Municipal Code and other related documents will be updated accordingly.
Prepared and Recommended by: Miriam Lens, City Clerk
Approved by:
_________________________________
Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
ATTACHMENT II
PUBLIC NOTICE OF AN INTRODUCTION OF AN ORDINANCE BY THE CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HAYWARD
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF HAYWARD ADDING ARTICLE 30 TO CHAPTER 10 OF THE
HAYWARD MUNICIPAL CODE REGARDING TRAFFIC IMPACT FEES FOR PROPERTY
DEVELOPERS
THE CITY COUNCIL OF HAYWARD DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1. Article 30 is added to Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code to read in full as follows:
ARTICLE 30 – PROPERTY DEVELOPERS - TRAFFIC IMPACT FEES
SECTION 10-30.00 - AUTHORITY
SECTION 10-30.01 - FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SECTION 10-30.05 - DEFINITIONS
SECTION 10-30.10 - ESTABLISHMENT OF FEE AND APPLICABILITY SECTION 10-30.15 - EXEMPTION FROM REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 10-30.20 - AMOUNT OF FEE
SECTION 10-30.25 - COMPUTATION OF FEE
SECTION 10-30.30 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 10.-30.35 - APPEALS
SECTION 10-30.40 – EFFECTIVE DATE OF ARTICLE
The effective date of this Article shall be thirty (30) days after its adoption by the City Council.
SECTION 10-30.45 - EFFECTIVE DATE OF FEE
Pursuant to Government Code sections 66017 and 66019 the effective date of the fees established by this Article shall be no sooner than sixty (60) days following adoption of the fees by the City Council.
SECTION 10-30.50 – SEVERABILITY
If any section, subsection, paragraph, or sentence of this Ordinance, or any part thereof, is for any reason found to be unconstitutional, invalid, or beyond the authority of the City of Hayward by a court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of the remaining portions of this Ordinance.
Introduced at a meeting of the City Council of the City of Hayward, held the 17th day of May 2022, by Council Member Márquez.
ATTACHMENT II
This Ordinance will be considered for adoption at the regular meeting of the Hayward City Council, to be held on May 24, 2022, at 7:00 p.m. Please note the City Council will hold a hybrid meeting which will allow for participation in the Council Chamber and virtually via the Zoom platform. The full text of this Ordinance is available for examination by the public by contacting the City Clerk’s office at [email protected] or (510) 583-4400.
Dated: May 20, 2022
Miriam Lens, City Clerk
City of Hayward
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: CONS 22-321
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Manager
SUBJECT
Adopt a Resolution Allowing the City Council and Appointed Commissions/Task Forces and Council Committees to Hold Continued Teleconferenced Public Meetings Pursuant to AB 361
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) pursuant to AB 361 making specific findings to allow the Council and appointed commissions/task forces and Council committees (Exhibit A to Attachment II) to continue holding teleconferenced public meetings during the COVID 19 state of emergency.
SUMMARY
On September 16, 2021, the Governor signed AB 361 that amended provisions of the Brown Act to allow local governments to conduct virtual meetings during a state of emergency proclaimed by the Governor, subject to complying with specific requirements, including providing public access and participation via call-in or internet-based platforms. While AB 361 does not require legislative bodies to take any specific actions to hold an initial teleconferenced meeting during a state of emergency, a legislative body must act in order to continue holding subsequent teleconferenced meetings while the state of emergency remains in effect. Specifically, no later than 30 days after the initial AB 361 teleconferenced meeting, and every 30 days thereafter, a legislative body must make findings that the body has reconsidered the circumstances of the state of emergency and that either of the following conditions exist: the state of emergency continues to directly impact the ability of the members to meet safely in person; or, state or local officials continue to impose or recommend measures to promote social distancing.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
Attachment III Exhibit A
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Manager
City Clerk
SUBJECT: Adopt a Resolution Allowing the City Council and Appointed Commissions/Task Forces and Council Committees to Hold Continued Teleconferenced Public Meetings Pursuant to AB 361
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) pursuant to AB 361 making specific findings to allow the Council and appointed commissions/task forces and Council committees (Exhibit A to Attachment II) to continue holding teleconferenced public meetings during the COVID 19 state of emergency.
SUMMARY
On September 16, 2021, the Governor signed AB 361 that amended provisions of the Brown Act to allow local governments to conduct virtual meetings during a state of emergency proclaimed by the Governor, subject to complying with specific requirements, including providing public access and participation via call-in or internet-based platforms.
While AB 361 does not require legislative bodies to take any specific actions to hold an initial teleconferenced meeting during a state of emergency, a legislative body must act in order to continue holding subsequent teleconferenced meetings while the state of emergency remains in effect. Specifically, no later than 30 days after the initial AB 361 teleconferenced meeting, and every 30 days thereafter, a legislative body must make findings that the body has reconsidered the circumstances of the state of emergency and that either of the following conditions exist: the state of emergency continues to directly impact the ability of the members to meet safely in person; or, state or local officials continue to impose or recommend measures to promote social distancing.
BACKGROUND
In general, the Brown Act allows legislative bodies to use teleconferencing during a public meeting as long as certain requirements are met, such as:
Identification of any remote location from which a member of the legislative body is participating via teleconference;
Posting of agendas at all remote locations from which members of the legislative body are participating;
Public accessibility to the remote location and the technological means for allowing the public to participate in the meeting from the location; and A quorum of the members must be participating from a location within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
In response to the COVID 19 state of emergency, the Governor temporarily suspended the rules described above when he issued Executive Order N-29-20 on March 17, 2020 and authorized local legislative bodies to hold virtual public meetings subject to specific public accessibility and noticing requirements.
With the expiration of Executive Order N-29-20, AB 361 amends the Brown Act to allow virtual public meetings during a state of emergency proclaimed by the Governor. A local agency may hold a teleconferenced meeting during a state of emergency without complying with the normal teleconferencing requirements described above if it meets requirements related to providing notice of the meeting, public access and participation via call-in or internet-based service options, real-time public comments, and conduct of the meeting in a manner that protects statutory and constitutional rights of any parties and the public appearing before the legislative body.
AB 361 does not require legislative bodies to take any specific action prior to holding an initial teleconferenced meeting during a state of emergency. However, to hold a subsequent teleconferenced meeting a legislative body must act no later than 30 days after the initial teleconferenced meeting, and every 30 days thereafter, by making findings that the body has reconsidered the circumstances of the state of emergency and that either of the following conditions exist:
The state of emergency continues to directly impact the ability of the members to meet safely in person; or
State or local officials continue to impose or recommend measures to promote social distancing.
DISCUSSION
On February 25, 2022, the Governor issued Executive Order N-04-22 repealing many of his prior Executive Orders imposing various mandates intended to address the impact of COVID 19. However, the Governor did not lift the State of Emergency related to COVID 19 that he initially proclaimed on March 4, 2020. As of the date of this report, the State of Emergency proclaimed by the Governor remains in effect.
Current guidance and orders of the Alameda County Health Official satisfy both conditions necessary for the AB 361 findings described above:
Order No. 20-05g, originally issued April 3, 2020 and most recently amended on January 10, 2022, imposes a mandate that all individuals diagnosed or likely to have COVID 19 must isolate themselves and follow requirements further specified in the Order.
Order No. 20-06q, originally issued April 3, 2020 and most recently updated on May 9, 2022, requires individuals to comply with California Department of Public Health Guidance on Isolation and Quarantine of the General Public except in the specific circumstances described in the order, including, persons who are not fully vaccinated must quarantine for at least 5 days after close contact with an individual infected with COVID-19.
The Alameda County Public Health Department requires face coverings in the following situations:
o Indoors at busineses, government offices, youth-serving facilities, and workplace settings that choose to require everyone to mask. o On trains, buses, ferries, taxis and rideshare that choose to require everyone to mask.
o In transportation hubs like bus terminals, train stations, marines, seaports or other ports, subway stations, or any other area that provides transportation that choose to require everyone to mask. o Healthcare settings.
o State and local correctional facilities and detention centers. o Shelters and cooling centers.
The Alameda County Public Health Department strongly recommends everyone to wear a mask in indoor public settings, outdoor crowded settings, and in non-public indoor settings, like a private residence, when they are around people who may be unvaccinated, elderly, or immunocompromised.
Workplaces must comply with Cal/OSHA safety standards.
The following current guidance from the California Department of Public Health satisfies the AB 361 findings:
The Department strongly recommends that all persons, regardless of vaccination status, contintue to mask while in indoor public settings and businesses, on public transit, and in transportation hubs.
Face coverings are required for all individuals in the following indoor settings, regardless of vaccination status: homeless shelters, emergency shelters, cooling and heating centers, healthcare settings, state and local correctional facilities and detention centers, long term care settings and adult and senior care facilities. Fully vaccinated invidivuals are recommended to continue indoor masking when the risk may be high.
Persons with COVID-19 symptoms or who test positive for COVID-19 are required to isolate.
Persons working or housed in specified high-risk settings are required to isolate and quarantine in the event of an exposure to someone infected with COVID-19. Members of the general public, regardless of vaccination status, are not required to isolate if they are asymptomatic after exposure to a person infected with COVID-19.
Testing and masking are recommended and vaccination/boosting is strongly encouraged.
Alameda County Health Order No. 21- 04 (effective November 1, 2021), which allows a stable group of fully vaccinated individuals to remove masks in certain indoor situations, is not applicable to the City’s public meetings because they do not necessarily involve a stable group of vaccinated individuals.
Currently, the Council is holding hybrid Council meetings that allow for virtual participation via the Zoom platform as well as in-person participation. This format also allows for real-time public comments, in compliance with AB 361. In compliance with Alameda County public health orders, everyone who is unvaccinated inside the Council Chamber is required to wear a mask or other face-covering. All City commissions, task forces, and Council committees continue meeting entirely virtually over the Zoom platform.
Based on the above, staff recommends that the Council adopts the attached resolution making the necessary findings to allow the Council and the appointed boards and commissions identified in Exhibit A to the resolution to continue holding teleconferenced meetings pursuant to AB 361.
FISCAL IMPACT
There is no fiscal impact associated with this action.
STRATEGIC ROADMAP
This agenda item is a routine operational item and does not relate to any of the projects outlined in the Council’s Strategic Roadmap.
NEXT STEPS
Adoption of the resolution will allow the Council and specified appointed boards and commissions to hold a subsequent teleconferenced meeting pursuant to the provisions of AB 361. Additional resolutions must be adopted every thirty days during the existence of the state of emergency in order to continue holding teleconferenced meetings.
Prepared by: Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
Miriam Lens, City Clerk
Approved by:
___________________________________
Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
ATTACHMENT II
HAYWARD CITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION NO. 22-____
Introduced by Council Member __________
RESOLUTION MAKING THE REQUIRED FINDINGS PURSUANT TO AB 361 TO
CONTINUE TO HOLD TELECONFERENCED PUBLIC MEETINGS DURING THE COVID 19 STATE OF EMERGENCY
WHEREAS, the Brown Act (Government Code section 54950 et seq. ) allows for public meetings of a legislative body to occur via teleconferencing subject to certain requirements, particularly that the legislative body notice each teleconference location of each member that will be participating in the public meeting, that each teleconference location be accessible to the public, that members of the public be allowed to address the legislative body at each teleconference location, that the legislative body post an agenda at each teleconference location, and that at least a quorum of the legislative body participate from locations within the boundaries of the local agency’s jurisdiction; and
WHEREAS, in response to the COVID -19 state of emergency, the Governor temporarily suspended the rules described above when he issued Executive Order N -29-20 on March 17, 2020 and authorized local legislative bodies to hold virtual public meetings subject to specific public accessibility and noticing requirements; and WHEREAS, the Governor signed AB 361 prior to the expiration of Order N-29-20; and WHEREAS, AB 361 amends the Brown Act to the legislative body of a local agency to hold a teleconferenced meeting during a state of emergency without complying with the normal teleconferencing requirements described above if it meets requirements related to providing notice of the meeting, public access and participation via call-in or internet-based service options, real -time public comments, and conduct of the meeting in a manner that protects statutory and constitutional rights of any parties and the public appearing before the legislative body; and
WHEREAS, AB 361 does not require legislative bodies to take any specific action prior to holding an initial teleconferenced meeting during a state of emergency, however, to hold a subsequent teleconferenced meeting a legislative body must act no later than 30 days after the initial teleconferenced meeting, and every 30 days thereafter, by making findings specified in the statute justifying the continued use of teleconferenced public meetings; and WHEREAS, it shall be the policy of the City that the appointed boards and commissions of the City will hold teleconferenced public meetings in compliance with the provisions of AB 361 during the COVID-19 state of emergency; and
ATTACHMENT II
WHEREAS, the COVID -19 state of emergency declared by the Governor remains active; and
WHEREAS, public meetings involve many people in shared indoors spaces for hours, when the number of people present does not always allow for a minimum six foot distance between persons, and close contacts raise the risk of the spread of COVID-19; and
WHEREAS, the California Department of Public Health has mandated that everyone in California wear a mask in indoor public spaces and workplaces through February 15, 2022; and
WHEREAS, the Alameda County Health Officer has issued Order No. 20-05g (originally issued April 3, 2020 and most recently amended on J anuary 10, 2022) imposing a mandate that all individuals diagnosed or likely to have COVID-19 must isolate themselves and follow requirements further specified in the Order; and
WHEREAS, the Alameda County Health Officer has issued Order No. 20 -06q (originally issued April 3, 2020 and most recently amended on May 9 , 2022 )requires individuals to comply with California Department of Public Health Guidance on Isolation and Quarantine of the General Public except in the specific circumstances described in the order, including, persons who are not fully vaccinated must quarantine for at least 5 days after close contact with an individual infected with COVID-19. ; and
WHEREAS, the Alameda County Health Officer has issued Order No. 22-01 (effective on February 16, 2022 ), which rescinded Order No. 21 -06 (effective on December 8, 2021) which mandated face coverings be worn in indoor public spaces; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to a February 28, 2022 advisory from the California Department of Public Health, effective March 1, 2022 the requirement that unvaccinated individuals mask in indoor public settings will move to a strong recommendation that all persons, regardless of vaccina tion status, continue to mask while in indoor public settings and businesses; and
WHEREAS, the Alameda County Public Health Department requires face coverings in the following situations:
o Indoors at busine sses, government offices, youth -serving facilities, and workplace settings that choose to require everyone to mask. o On trains, buses, ferries, taxis and rideshare that choose to require everyone to mask.
o In transportation hubs like bus terminals, train stations, marines, seaports or other ports, subway stations, or any other area that provides transportation that choose to require everyone to mask.
o Healthcare settings.
o State and local correctional facilities and detention centers. o Shelters and cooling centers; and
ATTACHMENT II
WHEREAS, the Alameda County Pub lic Health Department strongly recommen ds everyone wear a mask in indoor public settings, outdoor crowded settings, and in non-public indoor settings, like a private residence, when they are around people who may be unvaccinated, elderly, or immunocompromised; and
WHEREAS, workplaces must comply with Cal/OSHA safety standards; and
WHEREAS, the California Department of Public Health has issued the following current guidance:
• The Department strongly recommends that all persons, regardless of vaccination status, continue to mask while in indoor public settings and businesses, on public transit, and in transportation hubs.
• Face coverings are required for all individuals in the following indoor settings, regardless of vaccination status: homeless shelters, emergency shelters, cooling and heating centers, healthcare settings, state and local correctional facilities and detention centers, long term care settings and adult and senior care facilities. • Fully vaccinated in dividuals are recommended to continue i ndoor masking when the risk may be high.
• Persons with COVID -19 symptoms or who test positive for COVID -19 are required to isolate.
• Persons working or housed in specified high -risk settings are required to isolate and quarantine in the event of an exposure to someone infected with COVID-19. • Members of the general public, regardless of vaccination status, are not required to isolate if they are asymptomatic after exposure to a person infected with COVID-
19. Testing and masking are recommended and vacci nation/boosting is strongly encouraged; and
WHEREAS, Alameda County Health Order No. 21 - 04 (effective November 1, 2021), which allows a stable group of fully vaccinated individuals to remove masks in certain indoor situations, is not applicable to the City’s public meetings because they do not necessarily involve a stable group of vaccinated individuals.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council of the City of Hayward makes the following findings pursuant to AB 361 to continue holding teleconferenced public meetings during the COVID-19 state of emergency:
The City Council has reconsidered the circumstances of the state of emergency.
The COVID 19 state of emergency declared by the Governor remains active and continues to directly impact the ability of Councilmembers to meet safely in-person.
State and local officials continue to recommend or impose measures to promote social distancing.
ATTACHMENT II
The Alameda County Health Officer has issued orders imposing measures to promote social distancing via isolation and quarantine of individuals infected or likely infected with COVID-19 and individuals with close contact to persons infected with COVID-19.
The Alameda County Health Officer strongly recommends that everyone wear a mask in indoor public settings, outdoor crowded settings, and in non-public indoor settings, like a private residence, when they are around people who may be unvaccinated, elderly, or immunocompromised.
The Alameda County Health Officer requires face coverings to be worn in the following settings:
o Indoors at busine sses, government offices, youth -serving facilities, and workplace settings that choose to require everyone to mask. o On trains, buses, ferries, taxis and rideshare that choose to require everyone to mask.
o In transportation hubs like bus terminals, train stations, marines, s eaports or other ports, subway stations, or any other area that provides transportation that choose to require everyone to mask.
o Healthcare settings.
o State and local correctional facilities and detention centers. o Shelters and cooling centers.
The California Department of Public Health strongly recommends that all persons, regardless of vaccination status, continue to mask while in indoor public settings and businesses, on public transit and in transportation hubs.
Workplaces must comply with Cal/OSHA safety standards.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that in the interest of public health and safety, based on the findings contained herein, the City Council of the City of Hayward and the appointed boards and commissions identified in Exhibit A of this Resolution shall continue to hold teleconferenced public meetings pursuant to AB 361.
ATTACHMENT II
IN COUNCIL, HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA ___________________, 2022
ADOPTED BY THE FOLLOWING VOTE:
AYES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
MAYOR:
NOES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSTAIN: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSENT: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ATTEST: _______________________________________
City Clerk of the City of Hayward
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
___________________________________________
City Attorney of the City of Hayward
ATTACHMENT III
EXHIBIT A
Community Services Commission
Keep Hayward Clean and Green Task Force
Library Commission
Personnel Commission
Planning Commission
Council Airport Committee
Council Budget and Finance Committee
Council Economic Development Committee
Council Infrastructure Committee
Council Homelessness-Housing Task Force
Council Sustainability Committee
Hayward Youth Commission
Hayward Police Department Community Advisory Panel
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: CONS 22-296
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Chief of Police
SUBJECT
Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Appropriate $8,394.29 in Asset Forfeiture Fund Balance and to Transfer the Appropriation from the Asset Forfeiture Fund (265) to the General Fund (100)
RECOMMENDATION
That the City Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) authorizing the City Manager to appropriate $8,394.29 in asset forfeiture fund balance and to transfer the appropriation from the Asset Forfeiture Fund (265) to the General Fund (100).
SUMMARY
The Hayward Police Department intends to utilize asset forfeiture funds currently in fund balance to offset the cost of sending two Crime Analysts to the 2021 Bay Area Crime and Intelligence Analyst Association Conference, and five members of the Special Duty Unit to the California Narcotics Officers Association conference.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II esolution
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Chief of Police
SUBJECT: Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Appropriate $8,394.29 in Asset Forfeiture Fund Balance and to Transfer the Appropriation from the Asset Forfeiture Fund (265) to the General Fund (100)
RECOMMENDATION
That the City Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) authorizing the City Manager to appropriate $8,394.29 in asset forfeiture fund balance and to transfer the appropriation from the Asset Forfeiture Fund (265) to the General Fund (100).
SUMMARY
The Hayward Police Department intends to utilize asset forfeiture funds currently in fund balance to offset the cost of sending two Crime Analysts to the 2021 Bay Area Crime and Intelligence Analyst Association Conference, and five members of the Special Duty Unit to the California Narcotics Officers Association conference.
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
The Hayward Police Department sent two Crime Analysts to the 2021 Bay Area Crime and Intelligence Analyst Association Conference, and five members of the Special Duty Unit to the California Narcotics Officers Association conference. The Personnel and Training Unit paid for the costs associated with these conferences and training courses and the Hayward Police Department requests reimbursement to the Personnel and Training Unit from the Asset Forfeiture Fund.
The Bay Area Crime and Intelligence Analyst Association conference is a four-day training course consisting of multiple breakout sessions covering various topics such as open-source and digital investigations, intelligence-led policing, cell phone and data analysis, and Microsoft Excel for law enforcement.
The California Narcotic Officers Association conference is a four-day training course consisting of multiple breakout sessions covering various topics such as human trafficking,
social media investigations, fentanyl investigations, informant management, and use of force/de-escalation.
Providing up-to-date training for analysts and officers is imperative for keeping the Hayward community safe and keeping Police Department staff up to date on the latest trends and best practices.
FISCAL IMPACT
Funding the cost of training through asset forfeiture funds will allow the Police Department to enhance officer safety and increase analyst and officer training without impacting the City’s general fund budget.
STRATEGIC ROADMAP
This agenda item is a routine operational item and does not relate to the any specific projects in the Strategic Roadmap.
NEXT STEPS
Upon City Council approval, the above-described funds would be appropriated and transferred from the Asset Forfeiture Fund to the Hayward Police Department’s Personnel and Training General Fund account.
Prepared by: David Dorn, Lieutenant
Recommended by: Toney Chaplin, Chief of Police
Approved by:
__________________________________________
Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
ATTACHMENT II
HAYWARD CITYCOUNCIL
RESOLUTION NO. 22-
Introduced by Council Member _
ADOPT A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE CITY MANAGER TO
APPROPRIATE $8,394.29 IN ASSET FORFEITURE FUND BALANCE AND
TRANSFER THE APPROPRIATION FROM THE ASSET FORFEITURE
FUND (265) TO THE GENERAL FUND (100)
WHEREAS, the Bay Area Crime and Intelligence Analyst Association conference is a four-day training course consisting of multiple breakout sessions covering various topics such as open-source and digital investigations, intelligence-led policing, cell phone and data analysis, and Microsoft Excel for law enforcement.
WHEREAS, t he California Narcotic Officers Association conference is a four -day training course consisting of multiple breakout sessions covering various topics such as human trafficking, social media investigations, fentanyl investigations, informant management, and use of force/de-escalation.
WHEREAS, the total amount being requested to cover the cost of both courses is $8,394.29.
WHEREAS, funding these two courses with Asset Forfeiture Funds will continue the training and development of both Crime Analysts and members of the Special Duty Unit.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council of the City of Hayward hereby authorizes the City Manager to transfe r and appropriate $8,394.29 from the Asset Forfeiture Fund to the General Fund.
ATTACHMENT II
IN COUNCIL, HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA , 2022
ADOPTED BY THE FOLLOWING VOTE:
AYES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
MAYOR:
NOES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSTAIN: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSENT: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
ATTEST:
City Clerk of the City of Hayward
City Attorney of the City of Hayward
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: CONS 22-297
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT
Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Execute Amendment No. 8 to the Professional Services Agreement with CSG Consultants, Inc., for Private Development Review Services in the Amount of $400,000 for a Total Not-To-Exceed Amount of $2.1 Million and Extending the Date of the Agreement to June 30, 2023
RECOMMENDATION
That Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) authorizing the City Manager to execute Amendment No. 8 to the Professional Services Agreement (PSA) with CSG Consultants, Inc., (CSG) for private development plan check review and related services, increasing the amount by $400,000 for a total not- to-exceed contract amount of $2.1 million and extending the date of the agreement to June 30, 2023.
SUMMARY
The City entered into a PSA with CSG on November 18, 2016 to assist with development review. CSG has extensive experience in providing professional services for private development projects in the Bay Area. CGS has provided these services for large scale projects in the City such as SoHay, Lincoln Landing, and Parcel Groups 3 and 5, specifically in the planning and entitlement stages of projects. Due to staff vacancies and continued significant private development workload, staff is requesting an additional amendment to continue receiving these services.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
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DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT: Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Execute Amendment No. 8 to the Professional Services Agreement with CSG Consultants, Inc., for Private Development Review Services in the Amount of $400,000 for a Total Not-To-Exceed Amount of $2.1 Million and Extending the Date of the Agreement to June 30, 2023
RECOMMENDATION
That Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) authorizing the City Manager to execute Amendment No. 8 to the Professional Services Agreement (PSA) with CSG Consultants, Inc., (CSG) for private development plan check review and related services, increasing the amount by $400,000 for a total not-to-exceed contract amount of $2.1 million and extending the date of the agreement to June 30, 2023.
SUMMARY
The City entered into a PSA with CSG on November 18, 2016 to assist with development review. CSG has extensive experience in providing professional services for private development projects in the Bay Area. CGS has provided these services for large scale projects in the City such as SoHay, Lincoln Landing, and Parcel Groups 3 and 5, specifically in the planning and entitlement stages of projects. Due to staff vacancies and continued significant private development workload, staff is requesting an additional amendment to continue receiving these services.
BACKGROUND
Public Works & Utilities staff is responsible for reviewing grading plans, subdivision maps, improvement plans, and soils and geological reports for private development projects. Due to staff vacancies and significant private development workload, the City entered into a PSA with CSG on November 18, 2016, to provide these plan review services. Council approved the following amendments:
Amendment No. Date Amendment Change
1 September 19, 2017 Increase total PSA to $500,000
Extend term to June 30, 2018
2 May 22, 2018 Increase total PSA to $680,000
Extend term to December 31, 2018
3 January 8, 2019 Extend term to June 30, 2019
4 June 25, 2019 Increase total PSA to $880,000
Extend term to June 30, 2020
5 September 22, 2020 Increase total PSA to $1,200,000
Extend term to June 30, 2021
6 July 6, 2021 Increase total PSA to $1,570,000
Extend term to June 30, 2022
7 February 1, 2022 Increase total PSA to $1,700,000
On September 19, 20171, Council approved Amendment No. 1, increasing the original PSA amount by an additional $425,000, for a total amount of $500,000, and extending the term to June 30, 2018. Amendment No. 2, approved on May 22, 20182, increased the total of the PSA to $680,000 and extended the PSA to December 31, 2018. Amendment No. 3, was approved on January 8, 2019, extended the PSA to June 30, 2019. On June 25, 20193, Council approved Amendment No. 4, for a total PSA amount of $880,000 and extended the PSA to June 30, 2020. On September 22, 20204, following Amendment No. 5 approval, the agreement was extended to June 30, 2021 for a total PSA amount of $1.2 million. On July 06, 20215, Council approved Amendment No. 6 for a total PSA amount of $1,570,000 and extended the PSA to June 30, 2022. On February 01, 20226, Council approved Amendment No. 7 for a total PSA amount of $1.7 million.
DISCUSSION
The current PSA with CSG for development plan check and review services expires on June 30, 2022 but because of the extended need for CSG services, the PSA amount of $400,000 will fund efforts through June 30, 2023. Due to staff vacancies in Public Works & Utilities and Development Services Departments, and significant private development workload, staff anticipates that these services will continue to be required through the end of FY23.
CSG’s advanced knowledge and experience in private development projects along with their familiarity with City Municipal Code and development requirements have assisted City staff in processing development projects.
1 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3155400&GUID=B285B522-BC04-49A5-BED3- E8F380898713&Options=&Search=
2 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3508589&GUID=F517F5A6-7470-4B64-BE2A- 26D7C5726EAC&Options=&Search=
3 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3993701&GUID=84297268-7A43-4F53-8674- B64A2D980093&Options=&Search=
4 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4646744&GUID=BEF0434E-91CC-40BB-8BBB- AE2E500B3CE1&Options=&Search=
5 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=5018122&GUID=65E9EA51-514A-43E0-A1E4- 3BF3177C01A2&Options=&Search=
6 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=5397458&GUID=3874735D-E3D4-4D72-8965- 49518BF8B439&Options=&Search=
As such, staff requests approval of Amendment No. 8 to increase the contract amount by $400,000 for a not-to-exceed amount of $2.1 million to fund the required services through the end of the fiscal year.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
This PSA facilitates timely development in the City, which impacts and improves the local economy.
FISCAL IMPACT
This item will have almost no impact to the General Fund. Given that the private consultant’s hourly rates are typically much higher than City staff’s rates in comparable positions, the consultant’s fees are not currently fully recovered through charges to projects. However, staff anticipates that most of these expenses will be offset by charges to developers, which replenish the General Fund.
Staff will be evaluating the approach taken in current charging practices for development review and will adjust accordingly in order to reduce the impact on the General Fund.
STRATEGIC ROADMAP
This agenda item supports the Strategic Priority to Grow the Economy by providing professional services to the Development Services and Public Works & Utilities Departments by assisting in finalizing planning on redevelopment of six remaining parcel groups. Specifically, this item relates to the implementation of the following:
Project 5, Part 5a: Finalize planning on redevelopment of six remaining parcel groups This agenda item also supports the Strategic Priority to Improve Infrastructure.
Specifically, this item relates to the implementation of the following:
Project 10: Investigate major municipal building upgrade needs
By receiving professional services from CSG, the City is taking steps to improve infrastructure within the City. This achievement is through reviewing and conditioning large developments projects to improve Hayward’s utilities and street improvements including but not limited to traffic calming initiatives.
PUBLIC CONTACT
No public contact has been made related to this amendment.
NEXT STEPS
If Council approves this request, the City Manager will execute Amendment No. 8 to the PSA with CSG to increase the PSA amount to $2.1 million and extending the agreement to June 30, 2023.
Prepared by: Kathy Garcia, Deputy Director of Public Works
Recommended by: Alex Ameri, Director of Public Works
Approved by:
____________________________________________________
Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
ATTACHMENT II
HAYWARD CITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION NO. 22-_____
Introduced by Council Member
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE CITY MANAGER TO EXECUTE
AMENDMENT N0. 8 TO THE PROFESSOIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH CSG CONSULTANTS, INC., FOR PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT REVIEW SERVICES IN THE AMOUNT OF $400,000 FOR A NOT -TO-EXCEED AMOUNT OF $2.1 MILLION AND EXTENDING THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT TO JUNE 30, 2023
WHEREAS, the aforesaid parties have entered into that certain Agreement dated the 18th day of November 2016, entitled “Agreement for Professional Services between the City of Hayward and CSG CONSULTANTS, INC.,", for temporary Development Review Services; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement on September 19, 2017 with Amendment No. 1 increasing that Agreement to $500,000 and extending the termination date to June 30, 2018; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement on May 22, 2018 with Amendment No. 2 increasing the Agreement to $680,000 and extend ing the termination date to December 31, 2018; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement on January 8, 2019 with Amendment No. 3 extending the termination date to June30, 2019; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement on June 25, 2019 with Amendment No. 4 increasing that Agreement to $8 80,000 and extend ing the termination date to June 30, 2020; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement with Amendment No. 5 on September 22, 2020 increasing the Agreement to $1 .2 million and extended it to June 30, 2021; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement with Amendment No. 6 on July 6, 2021 increasing the Agreement to $1,570,000 and extending the termination date to June 30, 2022; and
WHEREAS, the City and Consultant amended that certain Agreement with Amendment No. 7 on February 1, 2022 increasing the Agreement to $1.7 million; and
ATTACHMENT II
WHEREAS, the City and the Consultant desire to further amend the Agreement in certain respects.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City of Hayward that the City Manager is hereby authorized and directed to negotiate and execute, on behalf of the City of Hayward, an amendment to the agreement with CSG CONSULTANTS, INC., for additional services in the amount of $400,000, resulting in an increase of the total contract, inclusive of all prior amendments, to an amount not -to-exceed $2.1 million and extend it through June 30, 2023 associated with the City of Hayward temporary development plan check review services.
IN COUNCIL, HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA , 2022
ADOPTED BY THE FOLLOWING VOTE:
AYES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
MAYOR:
NOES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSTAIN: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSENT: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
ATTEST:
City Clerk of the City of Hayward
City Attorney of the City of Hayward
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: CONS 22-313
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT
Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Execute Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services Agreement with EKI Environment & Water for As-Needed Technical Support Related to Implementation of a Groundwater Management Plan Increasing the Contract Amount by $35,000 for a Total Not-to-Exceed Amount of $95,000
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) authorizing the City Manager to amend the Professional Services Agreement (PSA) with EKI Environment & Water (EKI) for as-needed technical support related to sustainable groundwater management at a cost of $35,000, increasing the total agreement not-to-exceed amount to $95,000.
SUMMARY
Independent groundwater review and technical expertise are needed to prepare the Groundwater Sustainability Plan (GSP) and to assist with implementation activities, as well as Sustainable Groundwater Management Act compliance. To assist with these activities, the City entered into a PSA with EKI in January 2021 to provide technical services related to sustainable groundwater management.
In July 2021, the agreement was amended to provide funds for additional work activities. A second amendment is recommended to allow for additional support for continuing GSP implementation and SGMA compliance. Staff recommends an increase in the agreement amount by $35,000. If approved, the additional will increase the total agreement amount to $95,000 for the period of May 2022 - April 2023.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
powered by Legistar™
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT: Adopt a Resolution Authorizing the City Manager to Execute Amendment No. 2 to the Professional Services Agreement with EKI Environment & Water for As- Needed Technical Support Related to Implementation of a Groundwater Management Plan Increasing the Contract Amount by $35,000 for a Total Not- to-Exceed Amount of $95,000
RECOMMENDATION
That the Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) authorizing the City Manager to amend the Professional Services Agreement (PSA) with EKI Environment & Water (EKI) for as-needed technical support related to sustainable groundwater management at a cost of $35,000, increasing the total agreement not-to-exceed amount to $95,000.
SUMMARY
Independent groundwater review and technical expertise are needed to prepare the Groundwater Sustainability Plan (GSP) and to assist with implementation activities, as well as Sustainable Groundwater Management Act compliance. To assist with these activities, the City entered into a PSA with EKI in January 2021 to provide technical services related to sustainable groundwater management. In July 2021, the agreement was amended to provide funds for additional work activities. A second amendment is recommended to allow for additional support for continuing GSP implementation and SGMA compliance. Staff recommends an increase in the agreement amount by $35,000. If approved, the additional will increase the total agreement amount to $95,000 for the period of May 2022 – April 2023.
BACKGROUND
SGMA was signed into law in 2014 to provide for comprehensive and sustainable management of groundwater resources within the State. The legislation provides a framework for groundwater management at the local level through formation of Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs).
As part of SGMA, local agencies in Medium and High-priority basins are required to form GSAs that have the authority and responsibility to develop, adopt, and implement a GSP. Under SGMA
guidelines, the City and East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) each formed GSAs for the portions of the East Bay Plain Groundwater Subbasin (Medium-priority basin) that underlay the City and EBMUD boundaries. As GSAs for the East Bay Plain Subbasin, the City and EBMUD are responsible for developing and implementing a GSP to sustainably manage and utilize groundwater within its management area without causing adverse results.
Upon approval from Council in June 2018, the City entered into an agreement with EBMUD to jointly prepare a single GSP for the entire East Bay Plain Subbasin. Working collaboratively with EBMUD reduced duplication of technical work and thus the cost of preparing a GSP for both agencies. The Cooperating Agreement anticipated the use of outside consultants to assist with the preparation of the GSP, and thus included a preliminary scope of work, project schedule, and budget. Subsequently, the City and EBMUD jointly selected Luhdorff & Scalmanini Consulting Engineers (LSCE) to provide technical consultant assistance. The initial agreement was dated June 25, 2018, and has been amended three times (March 29, 2019, December 22, 2020, and November 16, 2021).
Additionally, the City solely retained EKI to assist with technical groundwater support services to provide independent review and technical expertise to ensure its interests were being protected as the City currently does not have staff with extensive groundwater knowledge and experience.
As the GSAs for the East Bay Plain Subbasin, the City and EBMUD, with technical consulting assistance, completed the GSP. In accordance with SGMA guidelines, both GSAs held public hearings and adopted the GSP in December 2021. The GSAs jointly submitted the GSP to DWR by the required January 31, 2022 deadline. In addition, annual GSP reports are required to be submitted by April 30th of each year. The GSAs prepared and submitted the first GSP annual report in March 2022.
DISCUSSION
Under SGMA, GSAs have specific responsibilities and authorities, including development, implementation, and monitoring of sustainable management actions, and ensuring the management actions are commensurate with sustainability. EBMUD and Hayward retained the services of LSCE to prepare the GSP and to assist with some of the implementation activities, as well as SGMA compliance. Because the City does not have staff with extensive groundwater experience and knowledge, City staff had previously relied on EBMUD staff and the consulting team for assistance. City staff determined that independent review and technical expertise were needed to ensure the City’s interests were being protected.
In January 2021, the City entered into a PSA with EKI to provide as-needed groundwater technical support services. In July 20211, the City amended the PSA for an additional funds to continue technical support services. Because GSP- and SGMA-related activities are continuing, staff recommends the agreement with EKI be amended to include an additional $35,000 in funding for a total agreement not-to-exceed amount of $95,000 for ongoing sustainable groundwater management activities for the period of May 2022 – April 2023 to
1 https://hayward.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=5018122&GUID=65E9EA51-514A-43E0-A1E4-3BF3177C01A2&Options=&Search=
assist in Hayward’s compliance with SGMA. Implementation activities will continue over the upcoming years.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
Costs for implementing the GSP and other SGMA-related activities have been estimated and are not expected to significantly impact customer water rates. The community could benefit from groundwater management actions to achieve sustainability goals resulting in greater diversity and reliability of water supplies, especially during water emergency periods.
FISCAL IMPACT
The Water Improvement Fund in the Capital Improvement Program (CIP) includes funds for groundwater-related activities such as sustainable groundwater management. The amendment to the PSA with EKI will increase the contract amount by $35,000. Staff anticipates this amount will be sufficient for the period of May 2022 through June 2023. There is potential for additional costs as SGMA work progresses; however, none are anticipated at this time.
The following is the Scope for Work for Ongoing SGMA Support:
Attend Regular Meetings of East Bay Plain Subbasin GSAs Support Known GSP Implementation Activities
- Perform GSP-related Groundwater Monitoring (i.e., fall 2022 and spring 2023 events) - Support for responses to GSP-related inquiries/comments - Support for WY 2022 Annual Report preparation (report is due April 1, 2023) As-needed Technical Support (budget to be used only per specific direction from City, for specific technical issues)
Support monitoring network expansion efforts
Support analysis/review of new SGMA-related legislation/regulations/executive orders/etc. Support review of GSP materials prepared by other basins, relevant to City (e.g., Niles Cone or other)
Support Stakeholder Outreach efforts (e.g., prepare materials for and attend as-yet- unscheduled stakeholder meeting(s))
STRATEGIC ROADMAP
This agenda item is a routine operational item and does not relate to one of the Council’s six Strategic Priorities.
SUSTAINABILITY FEATURES
As a GSA, the City is responsible for the development of the GSP (approved in December 2022), ongoing GSP implementation activities, as well as preparation of an annual GSP update to ensure the groundwater beneath the City is protected and sustainably managed for the future. A long- term commitment to groundwater sustainability increases the City’s overall water supply reliability, maximizes local sources, and diversifies the City’s water supplies, which will help the
City to respond to future water supply uncertainties and the effects of climate change.
PUBLIC CONTACT
This item does not require public contact.
NEXT STEPS
If Council approves this item, the City Manager will execute an amendment to the Professional Services Agreement with EKI increasing the amount by $35,000 for a not-to- exceed amount of $95,000.
Prepared by: Cheryl Muñoz, Water Resources Manager
Recommended by: Alex Ameri, Director of Public Works
Approved by:
Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
ATTACHMENT II
HAYWARD CITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION NO. 22-
Introduced by Council Member
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE CITY MANAGER TO EXECUTE AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE AGREEMENT WITH EKI ENVIRONMENT & WATER FOR AS -
NEEDED TECHNICAL SUPPORT RELATED TO GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENTAT A T A COST OF $35,000 FOR A TOTAL NOT-TO-EXCEED AMOUNT OF $95,000
WHEREAS, the City and EKI Environment & Water (EKI) and City of Hayward entered into an Agreement dated the 22nd day of January, 2021, entitled “Agreement for Professional Services Between the City of Hayward and EKI Environment & Water for As -Needed Technical Support Related to Sustainable Groundwater Management ” in the amount of $25,000; and
WHEREAS, the parties subsequently amended the contract on the 12 th day of July, 2021, entitled “Amendment No . 1 Agreement for Professional Services Between the City of Hayward and EKI Environment & Water” in the amount of $35,000; and
WHEREAS, the City and EKI Environment & Water desire to amend the Agreement to provide additional as-needed technical sustainable groundwater management support in the amount of $35,000.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City of Hayward that the City Manager is hereby authorized to execute, on behalf of the City of Hayward, Amendment No. 2 to the agreement with EKI Environment & Water, in a form approved by the City Attorney, for additional as-needed technical sustainable groundwater management support at a cost of $35,000, increasing the total agreement not-to-exceed amount to $95,000.
ATTACHMENT II
IN COUNCIL, HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA , 2022
ADOPTED BY THE FOLLOWING VOTE:
AYES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
MAYOR:
NOES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSTAIN: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSENT: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ATTEST:
City Clerk of the City of Hayward
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
City Attorney of the City of Hayward
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: CONS 22-335
DATE: June 7, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT
Adopt a Resolution Adopting the Traffic Impact Fee, Setting Initial Fee Rates for FY23, and Amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule
RECOMMENDATION
That Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) adopting the Traffic Impact Fee (TIF) at the maximum allowable amount, setting the initial FY23 TIF rates, and amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule to include the TIF and associated administrative appeal fee.
SUMMARY
On May 17, 2022, Council adopted the Multimodal Improvement Plan and TIF Nexus Study (Nexus Study) in support of the proposed TIF. Council also introduced an ordinance amending the Hayward Municipal Code to add Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Code. The ordinance would become effective 30 days after adoption by Council. The ordinance provides the implementing provisions for administration of the TIF program. This item involves formal action by Council to adopt the TIF at the maximum allowable amounts, setting the initial FY23 TIF rates, and amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule to include the initial TIF rates and the administrative appeal fee contained in the TIF ordinance.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II Resolution
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 1
powered by Legistar™
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT Adopt a Resolution Adopting the Traffic Impact Fee, Setting Initial Fee Rates for FY23, and Amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule
RECOMMENDATION
That Council adopts a resolution (Attachment II) adopting the Traffic Impact Fee (TIF) at the maximum allowable amount, setting the initial FY23 TIF rates, and amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule to include the TIF and associated administrative appeal fee.
SUMMARY
On May 17, 2022, Council adopted the Multimodal Improvement Plan and TIF Nexus Study (Nexus Study) in support of the proposed TIF. Council also introduced an ordinance amending the Hayward Municipal Code to add Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Code. The ordinance would become effective 30 days after adoption by Council. The ordinance provides the implementing provisions for administration of the TIF program. This item involves formal action by Council to adopt the TIF at the maximum allowable amounts, setting the initial FY23 TIF rates, and amending the FY23 Master Fee Schedule to include the initial TIF rates and the administrative appeal fee contained in the TIF ordinance.
BACKGROUND
The Mitigation Fee Act authorizes a local agency to establish, increase, or impose various fees as a condition of approval of a development project, if specified requirements are met. A TIF is a one- time fee imposed on new development projects to help mitigate the cumulative transportation impacts of development growth. As importantly, a TIF will bring much-needed certainty to the City’s development process at the onset of the application process.
In compliance with the Mitigation Fee Act, Council has adopted a Nexus Study supporting the TIF prior to adoption of the TIF and applicable TIF rates. Pursuant to the Mitigation Fee Act, an impact fee may be adopted by resolution or ordinance of a legislative body.
DISCUSSION
The TIF Nexus Study prepared by traffic consultants, TJKM, identifies locations of future traffic deficiencies generated by future development, develops mitigations to these deficiencies, calculates total cost of capital improvements required to implement the mitigations, and provides a calculated maximum allowable traffic fee that would be legally defensible based on
projected cumulative traffic impact from different development types. As a result of the feedback received during the outreach process and the May 17, 2022 Council meeting, staff recommends that Council adopts the TIF at the maximum allowable rates identified in the Nexus Study as shown in Table 1 below, but set the initial fee rates for FY23 according to Table 2 below.
Table 1
Maximum Allowable Traffic Impact Fees
Land Use Category Maximum
Allowable
Single Family Residence / Unit $11,584
Townhome / Unit $7,761
Multi-Family Residence / Unit $7,761
Office / KSF* $16,449
Retail/ KSF* $19,460
General Industrial / KSF* $4,633
Distribution or e-commerce /
KSF* $8,224
*ksf is one thousand square feet
Table 2
FY23 Traffic Impact Fees
Land Use Category FY23 Fees
Single Family Residence / Unit $3,475
Townhome / Unit $3,475
Multi-Family Residence / Unit $0
Retail/ KSF* $0
Office / KSF* $0
General Industrial / KSF* $3,243
Distribution or e-commerce /
KSF* $5,757
*ksf is one thousand square feet
The provisions of the TIF ordinance include an automatic annual construction inflation index adjustment, which will be referenced in the Master Fee Schedule. The cost of construction materials normally increases annually due to inflation – an issue that contractors faced even prior to the pandemic. Building material supply chains have been interrupted and labor has become scarce, increasing the magnitude of construction inflation costs due to the pandemic. It is typical practice for local jurisdictions to adjust fees annually based on the California Construction Cost Index for the San Francisco Bay Area published by the Engineering News Record.
Additionally, the Master Fee Schedule will be amended to include a $400 administrative appeal fee as specified in the TIF ordinance. The level of the appeal fee is consistent with other previously adopted administrative appeal fees by the City.
Staff will return to Council after three years to revisit the TIF program and evaluate whether the fee amounts set below the maximum allowable levels should be extended or modified. The reductions may be adjusted due to changes in proposed improvements and traffic patterns that are expected to change in the upcoming years from employers allowing employees to telecommute. In the event the Council decides to increase the TIF above the maximum adopted amounts, a new nexus study must be prepared, and the increased fee must be adopted pursuant to the noticing and public hearing requirements of the Mitigation Fee Act.
FISCAL IMPACT
A total budget of $700,000 from the Transportation System Improvement Fund (Fund 460) has been allocated for the traffic consultant TJKM for the nexus study of the City’s first TIF. The project breakdown is as follows:
Project No. Project Name Project Total
05705 Citywide Multi Modal Improvement Study $400,000 05711 Multi Modal Level of Service Study $100,000
05274 Traffic Impact Fee Study $200,000
Approximately $27,500 is remaining of the $700,000 contract.
A total budget of $36,000 has been allocated for economic consultant CAI for TIF policy recommendations that align with current economic and development activities within Hayward.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
A TIF will be valuable to the City in ensuring that future developers pay their fair share of needed mitigation measures to minimize future traffic impacts, such as addition of bicycle and pedestrian facilities, installation of traffic signals, efficient re-timing of signals, and the increase of traffic capacity.
Evaluations and studies have consistently shown that this type of funding mechanism increases job growth and revenues in the City. The fee acts as an investment in the community, by spurring economic growth through the timely provision of sustainable infrastructure and the expansion of buildable land. Developments bring more jobs, sales tax revenue, and/or property tax revenue.
Without a TIF, developers must hire a traffic engineering consultant to prepare a study which includes predicting future traffic impacts, developing mitigations, and estimating costs of constructing the mitigations. The City reviews, comments, and uses the study to determine which mitigation projects will be conditions of approval for the development. TIFs streamline the development process by saving time and effort for both developers and City staff.
As cities continue to grapple with the problems of traffic congestion and limited public resources, cities will continue to view impact fees as another source of funds for needed improvements and are commonly viewed in terms of their revenue potential. Because several of the mitigation projects identified in the Multimodal Improvement Plan and Traffic Impact Fee Nexus Study are additions or enhancements of bicycle and pedestrian facilities, the City will become a more pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly community, thus creating positive economic benefits.
STRATEGIC ROADMAP
This agenda item supports the Strategic Priority of Improving Infrastructure. Specifically, this item relates to the implementation of the following project(s):
Project 3. Develop and Submit a Traffic Impact Fee
SUSTAINABILITY FEATURES
The TIF will align improvements consistent with the City’s 2040 General Plan, Complete Streets Strategic Initiative, Pedestrian and Bicycle Master Plan, Neighborhood Traffic Calming Program, and major regional improvements.
PUBLIC CONTACT
Stakeholder Meeting #1. On February 9, 2022, Staff held Stakeholder Meeting #1 to introduce the proposed recommended TIF and solicit feedback from the public. An article publicizing the event was published in The Stack and distributed to its subscribers. Additionally, a targeted email with information on how to attend the event was sent to a distribution list of 420 recipients who are involved in some way to Hayward’s development process.
Council Infrastructure Committee
On February 23, 2022, staff presented the TIF recommendations to the CIC for review and feedback. The CIC expressed support for staff’s recommendation but suggested additional public outreach and coordination with transit agency partners. In response to CIC guidance, staff scheduled two outreach meetings with the Chamber of Commerce and conducted one additional stakeholder meeting, which was held on March 31, 2022. Staff also met with representatives from AC Transit to discuss the inclusion of transit projects to the list that could be funded by the TIF. Many of the projects identified by AC Transit and City staff have been included in the approved project list, which resulted in a nominal increase in the amount of the TIFs.
Stakeholder Meeting #2
On March 31, 2022, Staff held Stakeholder Meeting #2 to discuss the proposed recommended TIF and solicit feedback from the public. Feedback received from the Bay Area Building Industry Association (BIA) Director of Governmental Affairs – East Bay, Lisa Vorderbrueggen asked questions about whether the new fee will be imposed on the development applications currently in process and about grandfather provisions.
Planning Commission Review
On April 14, 2022, staff presented the TIF recommendations to the Planning Commission for review and feedback. The Commission expressed support for staff’s recommendation and asked questions about the proposed reduction of single-family residential TIF and whether it should be increased. Additionally, Planning Commission expressed interest in whether the TIF ordinance includes provisions regarding credits to developers for grandfathered changes or for developers who opt to pay to build improvements rather than paying the TIF.
City Council Work Session
On May 3, 2022, staff presented the TIF recommendations to Council in a Work Session for review and feedback. The Council expressed support for staff’s recommendation, discussed the single-family residential TIF, and the type of modifications to the TIF program that can be made after the initial three-year period. Council also inquired about the intended use of the TIF revenues and discussed the potential of subjecting large retail to TIF. Council appreciated the comprehensive multimodal project list, the thorough financial feasibility comparisons to other local jurisdictions, and the extensive outreach to the development community.
Although the presence of a development TIF is not uncommon for local jurisdictions, staff is prioritizing a seamless integration into the existing traffic requirements process for entitlement applications. With the goal of minimizing uncertainty, staff prepared a flow chart for determining which traffic analyses will be required, responses to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), and resources to traffic analysis guidelines to be posted on the transportation webpage for the public to access at any time. Developers seek to identify all expenses early as they develop a business pro forma for the development. Identifying TIFs and analysis requirements at the time of permit application will provide a baseline expectation and reduce administrative effort for both the City and developer, and establish a best practice where developers know what to expect up front rather than waiting after the entitlement process.
City Council Public Hearing
On May 17, 2022, two weeks after the Council Work Session, staff presented the TIF recommendations at a Council Public Hearing to recommend adoption of the Nexus Study in support of the TIF and to introduce an ordinance adding Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code regarding Traffic Impact Fees for Developers. Council had some clarifying remarks to verify that similar fees for single-family and townhome residential land uses are proposed to best reflect the traffic patterns experienced in Hayward. Additionally, Council praised staff for the extensive public outreach and the time and effort dedicated to preparing easily accessible resources for the development community to eliminate uncertainty in the development process. The following is summary of the meetings held related to the TIF:
1. February 9, 2022: Stakeholder Meeting #1 to introduce the proposed TIF and solicit feedback from the business/broker/development communities.
2. February 23, 2022: Council Infrastructure Committee review and comment.
3. March 3, 2022: Chamber of Commerce’s Government Relations Council
4. March 31, 2022: Stakeholder Meeting #2 to solicit feedback from the business/broker/development communities.
5. April 14, 2022: Planning Commission
6. May 3, 2022: City Council Work Session
7. May 17, 2022: City Council Public Hearing
8. May 24, 2022: City Council Second Reading/Establishment of Maximum Fees
NEXT STEPS
If Council adopts the attached resolution, pursuant to the Mitigation Fee Act the TIF will become effective sixty (60) days after adoption.
Prepared by: Charmine Solla, Senior Transportation Engineer
Recommended by: Alex Ameri, Director of Public Works
Approved by:
___________________________________
Kelly McAdoo, City Manager
ATTACHMENT II
HAYWARD CITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION NO. 22-____
Introduced by Council Member __________
RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HAYWARD
ADOPTING THE TRAFFIC IMPACT FEE , SETTING THE INTIAL FEE RATES, AND AMENDING THE FY23 MASTER FEE SCHEDULE
WHEREAS, California Government Code Section 660 00 et seq , known as the Mitigation Fee Act, authorizes local agencie s to imp ose fees in connection with approval of development projects fo r the purpose of defraying all or a portion of t he cost of pub lic facilities related to the development project; and
WHEREAS, the Mitigatio n Fee Act requires a nexus study to be adopted prior to establishment of an associated development fee; and
WHEREAS, TJKM prepared the Final Report Multimodal Intersection Imp rovement Plan and Nexus Study (Nexus Study) dated March 2022 in support of the proposed Traffic Impact Fee (TIF); and
WHEREAS, t he Nexus St udy identifies locatio ns of future traffic deficiencies as a result of future development, dev elops mitigations to these defic iencies, calculate s total cost of ca pital improvements required t o imple ment the mitigations, and provides a calculated maximum allowable traffic fee that would be l egally defensible based on projected cumulative traffic impact from different development types; and
WHEREAS, the C ity Counci l adopted the Nexus S tudy during the City Co uncil meeting of May 17, 2022, after conducting a public hearing pursuant to the Mitigation Fee Act; and
WHEREAS, the C ity Council intends to adopt the TIF a t t he maximum allo wable amounts identified in the Ne xus Study but set the in itial rates below the adopted maximum allowable amounts , as shown more specifically in Exhibit A, attach ed hereto; and
WHEREAS, concurrent with the adoption of the TIF, the City Council has adopted an ordinance adding Article 30 to Chapter 10 of the Hayward Municipal Code (TIF Ordinance) which provides the implementing provisions for administrat ion of the TIF program, including an administrative appeal process; and
WHEREAS, FY23 Master Fee Schedu le must be amended to includ e the TIF and the administrative appeal fee contained in the TIF Ordinance; and
WHEREAS, notice of the ado ption of the TIF was published in compliance with the Mitigation Fee Act.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the City Council of the City of Hayward that a TIF is hereby adopted at the maximum all owable amounts as shown in Exhibit A to th is Resolution.
BE IT FURTHER RESOVLED, tha t the in itial rates for FY23 shall be set below the adopted maximum allowable amounts, also as shown in Exhibit A to this Resolution.
BE IT FURTH ER RESOLVED, that the Fiscal Year 202 3 Master Fee Schedule is amended to include the TIF and the administrative appeal fee contained in the TIF Ordinance, as reflected in attached Exhibit B.
BE IT RESOLVED, that pursuant to the Mitigation Fe Act the T raffic Impact Fee adopted herein shall become effective sixty (60) days after adoption of this Resolution.
IN COUNCIL, HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA _______________________, 2022
ADOPTED BY THE FOLLOWING VOTE:
AYES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
MAYOR:
NOES: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSTAIN: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ABSENT: COUNCIL MEMBERS:
ATTEST: ______________________________________
City Clerk of the City of Hayward
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
_________________________________________
City Attorney of the City of Hayward
Exhibit A
Maximum Allowable Traffic Impact Fees
Land Use Category Maximum Allowable
Single Family Residence / Unit $11,584
Townhome / Unit $7,761
Multi-Family Residence / Unit $7,761
Office / KSF* $16,449
Retail/ KSF* $19,460
General Industrial / KSF* $4,633
Distribution or e-commerce / KSF* $8,224
*ksf is one thousand square feet
FY23 Traffic Impact Fees
Land Use Category FY23 Fees
Single Family Residence / Unit $3,475
Townhome / Unit $3,475
Multi-Family Residence / Unit $0
Office / KSF* $0
Retail/ KSF* $0
General Industrial / KSF* $3,243
Distribution or e-commerce / KSF* $5,757
*ksf is one thousand square feet
Exhibit B
Engineering and Transportation Services
B. ENGINEERING
11. Traffic Impact Fee
a. Residential
(1) Single-Family Residence/Unit $3,475/unit
(2) Townhome/Unit $3,492/unit
(3) Multi-Family/Unit $0/unit
b. Non-Residential
(1) Retail/KSF $0/KSF
(2) Office/KSF $0/KSF
(3) General Industrial/KSF $3,243/KSF
(4) Distribution or e-commerce/KSF $5,757/KSF
c. Appeal Fee $400
d. Annual Adjustment
The traffic impact fees listed above shall be automatically adjusted on the first of the fiscal year based on the preceding calendar year average California Construction Cost Index (CCCI) for the San Francisco Bay Area as produced by the Engineering News Record (ENR).
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: WS 22-019
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Manager
Fire Chief
SUBJECT
Presentation Regarding 2021 Explosion at Russell City Energy Center and Follow Up Investigation and Actions
RECOMMENDATION
That the City Council receives the presentation and provides comments.
SUMMARY
The Russell City Energy Center (RCEC) is a 600 megawatt powerplant located in the Hayward industrial area . The plant is owned and operated by the Calpine Corporation and began commercial operations in 2013. On May 27, 2021, RCEC experienced a mechanical failure of the steam turbine generator that resulted in an explosion and fire (incident). The steam turbine generator experienced extensive damage and debris from the explosion flew from the site to surrounding areas, including the City’s Water Pollution Control Facility (WPCF) and the City’s Homeless Navigation Center. No damage occurred at the WPCF but a large piece of debris fell through the roof of the Navigation Center trailer that serves as the common area and kitchen. Thankfully, the trailer was unoccupied at the time and there were no significant injuries resulting from the explosion.
On July 15, 2021, the California Energy Commission (CEC) voted to approve Calpine’s petition for modifications to allow the facility to temporarily operate in simple-cycle mode, subject to certain limitations in the CEC’s order. The CEC order found it was appropriate for the CEC to “exercise enhanced scrutiny over the facility” in light of the May 27, 2021 incident and that “it is reasonable for the public to have access to safety audits conducted pertaining to the operation of the facility, including the circumstances that gave rise to the petition.” Additionally, the order directed the project owner to meet with CEC staff and the Hayward City Fire Department within 30 days of the order “to discuss any needed modifications of [RCEC’s] standard operating procedures for first responders to implement when responding to incidents on site, including establishing a process for reimbursement of reasonable expenses.”
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 2
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File #:WS 22-019
CEC, California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and City staff have been meeting bi-weekly as part of a Joint Agency Working Group for the past year as the investigation and follow up actions have occurred.
After any major incident at a powerplant in the State, the operator must commission a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) report. Calpine commissioned this report and it is included as Attachment II to this report. Upon review of the RCA, CEC and CPUC staff determined there were deficiencies in the report and commissioned a secondary gap analysis and investigation. That report was recently completed and is included as Attachment III to this report. CEC and CPUC staff presented this report and corrective actions to the CEC Business Meeting on April 26, 2022 (staff report included as Attachment I). The City Manager and Fire Chief also participated in that meeting and presented the collaborative work that has been done with the Calpine team to enhance first responder training and response to the plant.
Staff from the CEC and the City will be sharing that presentation (Attachment IV) again this evening with the City Council and Hayward community so that information about the 2021 explosion and corrective actions can be shared and discussed.
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment I April 26, 2022 CEC Staff Report and Order
Attachment II Calpine Redacted Root Cause Analysis
Attachment III CEC Gap Analysis
Attachment IV PowerPoint Presentation
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 2 of 2
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DOCKETED
Docket Number: 01-AFC-07C
Project Title: 01-AFC-7C Russell City Energy Company
TN #: 242924
Document Title: Order Adopting Staff Recommended Corrective Actions and Delegating Authority to the Executive Director
Description: Order No: 22-0426-3
Filer: Liza Lopez
Organization: California Energy Commission
Submitter Role: Commission Staff
Submission Date: 5/4/2022 7:16:11 AM
Docketed Date: 5/4/2022
ATTACHMENT I
ORDER NO: 22-0426-3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STATE ENERGY RESOURCES
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF: Docket No. 01-AFC-07C
RUSSELL CITY ENERGY CENTER ORDER ADOPTING STAFF RECOMMEDED
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND DELEGATING
AUTHORITY TO THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
I. BACKGROUND
The Russell City Energy Center (RCEC) is a nominal 600 megawatt (MW) natural gas-fired, wet-cooled, combined-cycle electric generating facility that was initially certified by the California Energy Commission (CEC) in September 2002 and began commercial operation in August 2013.
On May 27, 2021, RCEC experienced a mechanical failure of the steam turbine generator that resulted in an explosion and fire (incident). The steam turbine generator experienced extensive damage. As a result, Russell City Energy Company, LLC (project owner) temporarily shut down RCEC and estimated that the time required for repairs necessary to resume combined-cycle mode operations would be approximately one year.
On June 3, 2021, the project owner filed a post-certification petition with the CEC to modify RCEC’s license to allow the facility to temporarily operate in simple-cycle mode.
On July 15, 2021, the CEC voted to approve the project owner’s petition for modifications to allow the facility to temporarily operate in simple-cycle mode, subject to certain limitations in the CEC’s order. The CEC order found it was appropriate for the CEC to “exercise enhanced scrutiny over the facility” in light of the May 27, 2021 incident and that “it is reasonable for the public to have access to safety audits conducted pertaining to the operation of the facility, including the circumstances that gave rise to the petition.”
Additionally, the order directed the project owner to meet with CEC staff and the Hayward City Fire Department within 30 days of the order “to discuss any needed modifications of [RCEC’s] standard operating procedures for first responders to implement when responding to incidents on site, including establishing a process for reimbursement of reasonable expenses.”
2 Finally, the CEC’s order found that RCEC will “return to combined cycle operations when repairs and testing are completed.” The order did not specify a schedule for completion of repairs and testing nor did it set a date by which modifications to the facility must be completed to resume combined-cycle operations. On June 7, 2021, the CEC staff conducted an initial inspection of the explosion and fire site and interviewed RCEC employees, first responders, and witnesses. In collaboration with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the CEC staff conducted an additional eleven site visits.
On November 24, 2021, the project owner submitted its Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of the May 27, 2021 turbine overspeed incident to the CEC staff and the CPUC. The project owner’s RCA, completed by Structural Integrity Associates, found that the systems’ inability to detect and drain excess water under pressure and at high temperature within the reheater system was the root cause of the Steam Turbine Generator (STG) drivetrain event at RCEC.
In January 2022, the CEC and the CPUC staff notified the project owner that they would be conducting a Joint Agency Investigation (JAI) and on-site inspection of RCEC on February 7 through 11, 2022. The purpose of the JAI was to investigate questions that were not answered in the project owner’s RCA and evaluate the need for additional corrective actions. The on-site inspection was performed as planned, and the project owner provided requested documents prior to the on-site inspection and made employees available to be interviewed by the CEC and the CPUC staff.
On February 18, 2022, the CEC and the CPUC staff transmitted to the project owner a list of preliminary corrective actions necessary for the facility to safely return to combined-cycle operations. The list of corrective actions prepared by the JAI was intended to supplement the corrective actions identified in the project owner’s RCA as necessary to resume combined-cycle operations. The project owner acknowledged receipt and provided responses indicating it would implement all of the CEC and the CPUC staffs’ preliminary corrective actions before resuming combined-cycle operations.
On April 22, 2022, the CEC staff filed its investigation report, titled Russell City Energy Center May 2021 Incident: Root Cause Gap Analysis (Staff’s Investigation Report), to the RCEC compliance docket. Staff’s Investigation Report lists the activities and safety audits undertaken as part of the JAI since May 27, 2021, presents their independent determination of the root cause of the turbine overspeed event, and presents the nine remaining corrective actions that the JAI team determined must be implemented at RCEC for the facility to safely return to combined-cycle operations with a minimal risk of future turbine overspeed events due to water induction.
3 II. STAFF RECOMMENDATION
The CEC staff has concluded that, with the CEC’s adoption of, and the project owner’s completion of, all corrective actions identified in Chapter 4 of Staff’s Investigation Report, the project owner can safely resume operating in combined-cycle mode while ensuring that the risk of a similar water induction incident occurring in the future is eliminated to the degree feasible by deploying robust redundant systems of prevention and detection.
Based on the foregoing, CEC staff recommends that the CEC specify that RCEC may return to combined-cycle operations only after all corrective actions identified in Chapter 4 of Staff’s Root Cause Gap Analysis Report are completed and verified by CEC staff.
Consistent with the CEC’s compliance verification regulations (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, § 1770), the CEC staff also recommends that the CEC delegate to the CEC’s Executive Director authority to verify completion of all corrective actions identified in Chapter 4 of the CEC staff’s Root Cause Gap Analysis Report prior to resuming combined-cycle operations. If this delegation is approved, the CEC’s Executive Director will verify that all required repairs, testing, and corrective actions are completed before notifying RCEC that they may return to combined-cycle operations.
At this time, the CEC staff is not recommending changes to any conditions of certification for RCEC, as the facility will be operating within its existing license.
III. ENERGY COMMISSION FINDINGS
Based on the record, including CEC staff’s Root Cause Gap Analysis Report and the April 21, 2022 Basis for CEQA Findings Memorandum, all required corrective actions, repairs, and testing must be completed by the project owner to ensure RCEC can safely return to combined-cycle operations. Upon verified completion of the stated corrections, repairs and testing, the temporary modifications to allow for operation in simple-cycle mode will no longer be necessary. As such, the CEC finds that:
• The corrective actions identified in Chapter 4 of Staff’s Root Cause Gap Analysis Report are sufficient to enable RCEC to safely return to operations in combined- cycle mode. Implementation of the corrective actions will eliminate risk of recurrence of a similar water induction incident to the degree feasible, by deploying robust redundant systems of prevention and detection.
• The project owner will file status reports documenting implementation of the corrective actions and will provide verification of completion to the Executive Director prior to RCEC restarting combined-cycle commercial operations.
• The facility’s operation in combined-cycle mode is within the existing license.
4 • A doption of the corrective actions and delegation to the Executive Director are not projects under CEQA because they will not result in a direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15060(c)(2)-(3) and 15378(a) & (b)(5).) In addition, the Class 1, Class 2, and Class 21 exemptions (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15301, 15302 and 15321; see also 15061(b)(2)), and the common-sense exemption also apply. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15061(b)(3).)
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The CEC hereby adopts the corrective actions identified in Chapter 4 of CEC Staff’s Root Cause Gap Analysis Report and orders their completion by RCEC’s project owner prior to returning to combined-cycle operations.
The CEC hereby orders the project owner to file via the CEC docket system, bi- weekly compliance reports outlining the progress made towards completion of the identified corrective actions. Compliance reports shall be filed by close of business starting on Friday, May 6, 2022, and continuing every two weeks thereafter until combined-cycle operations resume.
The CEC hereby delegates the authority and directs the CEC’s Executive Director to verify that the corrective actions have been completed at RCEC and to issue notice to RCEC when the facility may resume combined-cycle operations.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
The undersigned Secretariat to the CEC does hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and correct copy of an Order duly and regularly adopted at a meeting of the CEC held on April 26, 2022.
AYE: Hochschild, Gunda, McAllister, Monahan, Vaccaro
NAY:
ABSENT:
ABSTAIN:
__________________________
Liza Lopez
Secretariat
DOCKETED
Docket Number: 01-AFC-07C
Project Title: 01-AFC-7C Russell City Energy Company
TN #: 242911
Document Title: Calpine Russell City Steam Turbine Generator Event Investigation Report - Redacted
Description: N/A
Filer: Amanda Cooey
Organization: Ellison Schneider Harris & Donlan LLP
Submitter Role: Applicant Representative
Submission Date: 5/2/2022 2:22:10 PM
Docketed Date: 5/2/2022
ATTACHMENT II
SJ
Structural Integrity
Associates, Inc.
11515 Vanstory Drive #125 , Huntersville , NC 28078 1704-597-5554 Investigation Report
REPORT NO. 2100556.401
REVISION: 1
PROJECT NO. 2100556.00
November 2021
Calpine Russell City Steam Turbine/Generator
Event
Prepared by:
Reviewed by:
Reviewed by:
May 27, 2021
Calpine Corporation - Russell City Energy Center
Prepared For:
Calpine Corporation
Walnut Creek, CA
C1070-2000000013
Date: 11/16/21
Date: 11/16/21
Date: 11/16/21
© 2021 Structural Integrity Associates , Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential and Proprietary Business Information. Do not copy or distribute without the express written consent of Calpine Corporation. info structint.com ~ 1-877-451 -POWER e struct int com~
REVISION CONTROL SHEET
Report Number: 2100556.40 1
Title:
Client: Calpine Corporat ion
Investigation Report
Calpine Russell City Steam Turbine/Gene rator
Event
Mav 27, 2021
SI Project Number: 2100556.00
SECTION P AGES REVISION DATE COMMENT S
All All 0 11/5/2021 Initial Release
All All 1 11/16/21 Typographical corrections.
revision.
SJ
Disclaimer
Structural Integrity
Associa.tes, Inc info .structint.com m 1-877-4S1-POWER. struct int.com @) @2021 Structural Integrity Associates , Inc. All rights reseNed. Confidential and Proprietary Business Information. Do not copy or distribute without the express written consent of Calpine Corporation. 1 SUMMARY
The Russell City Energy Center steam turbine and generator (STG) experienced a mechanical failure as a result of an overspeed event late in the evening on May 27, 2021.
Calpine contracted with Structural Integrity Associates , Inc. (SI) to perform an independent investigation with a focus on determining the root cause of the event. SI performed an initial onsite investigation from May 30th to June 4th , which included reviewing the condition of the STG and its support auxiliaries , examining rotor train fracture surfaces and the reheat system piping, as well as performing an initial review of the unit's operating data. At the closure of the initial onsite investigation , SI indicated that an additional inspection would be planned to take place once the STG and valves were exposed. This second onsite investigation occurred on July 26th after the steam turbine and main steam system valves were exposed.
Through review of the STG operational data, it was determined that immediately prior to the mechanical failure , the STG reached speeds equal to or greater than 146% of its rated speed .
These rotor speeds are far in excess of the controller's overspeed protection settings and component mechanical failure would be expected . The radial vibration levels, as the unit accelerated from 1,950 RPM to near the rotor's ultimate speed of greater than 5,250 RPM, remained at acceptable operation levels. This lack of elevated vibration levels indicates that the rotor and bearings were in mechanicall y sound condition even under excessive speeds .
Consistent with this conclusion , the shaft fractures lacked indications of pre-existing flaws or fractures. Therefore, no additional effort was expended to detennine the exact nature of how the rotor fractures occurred as this was not required to carry out the causal analysis of the overspeed event.
The overspeed was the final event in a cascade of events that led to the mechanical overload of the STG rotor. Prior to the overspeed , a water induction event resulted in thermal seizure of the intermediate pressure steam turbine #2 intercept and stop valves, preventing their closure. The water induction event also caused an increase in the rotor axial load and position , tripping the steam turbine . Leading up to the water induction event, heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) #1 was shut down (but available) for approximately two days while the plant operated in 1x1 configuration . During this time , HSRG #1 condensed an excessive volume of water at saturation temperature and was pressurized to near operating levels. This was an undetected , abnormal condition for an out-of-service HRSG.
As combustion turbine #2 was reducing load through its normal shutdown procedure , the two HRSGs equalized in pressure , initiating the induction of water from the out-of-service HRSG #1 .
As water passed through the #2 intercept and stop valves, the valve components were thennall y distorted preventing their closure. The valve seizure was thermally induced and was not associated with a lack of periodic maintenance. Further , the valves operated as expected in the days preceding this event. The STG's primary and emergency overspeed protection triggered properl y, however, were unable to prevent the overspeed due to the thennal seizure of the valves. Additionall y, the water induction resulted in the trip command that led to the automated opening of the STG line breakers. With the line breakers no longer maintaining rotor speed, the continued flow through the seized valves provided the energy source to accelerate the STG into the overspeed event.
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
Report No. 2100556 .401 R1 Page 13
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In the hours prior to the event, a small number of alarms re-occurred 1, all during operating load transition periods. These alarms provided no new event-related information to the operator and would not have prompted operator action based on the common occurrence of these alarms during transient conditions within normal operation . The first non-recurrent alarms related to the event were triggered starting at 29 seconds prior to the trip, documenting the rapid fall of the HRH steam temperature. Operator intervention at this point would not have prevented the event from occurring as the intercept valve seizure had occurred.
Based on the operation data, the accumulation of excessive quantities of water at near operating pressure within the out-of-service HRSG was primarily driven by flow and pressure supplied by the cold reheat piping across the HRSG #1 Cold Reheat stop valve. Investigation of this valve at a valve service center identified degradation of the gearbox that was observed once the gearbox was disconnected, fully disassembled , and cleaned . Testing at the service center revealed that the degradation reduced the valve stroke, which would not have been apparent during operation as the actuator attained its full stroke. With the actuator 's full stroke, both open and closed actuator limit switch positions were met such that no alarms were triggered.
Since some steam valve leakage should be expected during the operation of a combined cycle plant, limited amounts of condensation within an out-of-serve HRSG are not uncommon. This water does not specifically put a unit at risk for a water induction event as HRSG heating and drain operation during a normal startup will boil off or purge a reasonable quantity of water.
Prior to the event on May 27th, the out-of-service HRSG #1 reheat system maintained elevated pressure levels and condensed excessive quantities of high temperature water within its harps.
The reheat systems were not equipped by design to reliably detect the presence of water in all circumstances. Additionally , the distributed control system was not configured by design to mitigate the presence of excessive water under near operating pressure and elevated temperatures within an out-of-service HRSG . The systems' inability to detect and drain excess water under pressure and at high temperature within the reheater system is the root cause of the STG drivetrain event at Russell City Energy Center.
1 The site recorded alarms during turning gear operation (07:30:00 5/23/21) up to the trip (23:45:03 5/27/21 ). The vast majority of these alarms occurred while on turning gear up through the shutdown (22:40:15 5/25/21) of block 1 (combustion turbine, generator and HRSG). The alarms that entered during this time period all occurred during normal, transient operating conditions and prior to the accumulation of water in the offline HRSG.
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
Report No. 2100556 .401 R1 Page 14
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© 2021 Structural Integrity Associates , Inc. All rights reseNed. Confidential and Proprietary Business Information. Do not copy or distribute without the express written consent of Calpine Corporation. 2 INTRODUCTION
The Calpine Russell City Energy Center is a natural gas-fired combined-cycle electric generating facility with two blocks, each comprised of one combustion turbine (CT) (nominally 200 MW each) , one generator manufactured by Siemens Westinghouse , and one heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) manufactured by Nooter Eriksen, as well as a single condensing steam turbine and hydrogen cooled generator (combined drivetrain referred to as STG) manufactured by General Electric (nominally 235 MW). The net baseload rating for the facility is 572 MW and the nameplate capacity is 635 MW. The facility treats effluent water from the local sanitation district for use as cooling water and operates as a zero liquid discharge plant. The combined cycle site began commercial operation in August 2013.
At 11 :47 pm PDT on May 27, 2021, a STG event occurred during a shutdown at the Russell City facility. At the time of the failure, the steam turbine had operating hours and- starts.
As a result of the event, extensive damage was incurred by the steam turbine (including both stationary and rotating members) , bearings, seals, sensors , and casing components . Damage was also incurred by the generator , collector , hydrogen cooling system, and other peripheral and auxiliary systems . The common rotor between the steam turbine and generator was also fractured into multiple sections , at least two of which were found at ground level subsequent to the event.
Immediately following the event on May 27th, operators at the plant confirmed there were no injuries to on-site personnel and called emergency personnel to the site to extinguish the ensuing fire. After the fire was extinguished, and over the course of the next several days, the extent of damage was assessed by Calpine personnel. Structural Integrity Associates (SI) was contracted by Calpine to conduct an independent failure investigation and to perform a root cause assessment. SI initiated site work on May 30, 2021, and substantially completed site work on June 4, 2021 . A follow-up site visit was completed on July 26, 2021 . On-site personnel included:
Additional (remote) support for the investigation was provided by:
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
Report No. 2 100556 .401 R1 Page 15
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3.1 Steam Turbine Generator Description
An overall view of the Russell City Energ y Center is provided in Figure 3-1; the STG is located to the west side of the two blocks . The General Electric (GE) model 011 steam turbine (ST) includes a high pressure (HP) section, an intermediate pressure (IP) section, and a low pressure (LP) section ; the generator is a hydrogen-cooled, two-pole , 60 Hz machine that operates at 3,600 rpm. A schematic of the steam turbine is provided in Figure 3-2. The HP and IP sections share a common rotor arranged in a double-flow configuration in which the steam enters each section near the center of the rotor and flows outward towards each end ( one flowing away from the generator end through the HP section and the other flowing towards the generator end through the IP section). The dual flow LP section of the steam turbine is similarly arranged, on a common shaft with steam flow from the center towards each end.
The overall design is such that main steam from the HRSGs flows into the north end of the HP turbine section and flows south , away from the generator (steam flows are shown as red arrows in Figure 3-2). Main steam design (nameplate) pressure and temperature are-psi and F, respectively. The cold reheat (CRH) steam from the HP turbine exhaust flows back to the HRSGs' reheater (RH) systems, and hot reheat (HRH) steam flows back to the IP turbine section, where it flows towards the generator. Steam from the IP turbine casing (exhaust) flows through the crossover pipe and into the center of the LP turbine, where it is joined by LP steam from the HRSGs and flows in opposite directions through each set of LP blade rows, then down to the condenser (located beneath the LP turbine). When looking from the HP front standard towards the hydrogen-cooled generator, rotation of the turbine and generator rotors is counter clockwise (also indicated in Figure 3-2).
3.2 May 27th Event Timeline
On the night of the event , the STG had been running in- at the time of the
failure , block 2 was in operation and block 1 was offline. At approximately , the operator in the control room received a communication from PG&E Dispatch to . At- pm, he initiated the process to shut down power production. Three additional personnel were on-site but were not in the control room at the time of the event. The operator in the control room reported spending several minutes going through a number of procedural steps that included reducing the combustion gas turbine load to MW, changing the setpoints of the LP, HRH, and HP steam bypass systems, and verifying that the bypass valves were opening and beginning to control pressure. During the shutdown process and concurrent with the STG trip, the operator reportedl y noticed that some settings and valve positions were already in the appropriate positions for shutting down. The operator stated that at this point he looked out of the ■■■■■■■■I I ■■■■■ where he saw a fire emerging from the turbine deck .
2 The facility has two combustion turbines blocks. Either or both blocks can provide steam to the STG.
Based on this layout, 1x1 operating mode corresponds to one block providing steam to the STG, and 2x1 operating mode corresponds to generation with both blocks providing steam to the STG. ~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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A separate operator was working on shutting down auxiliary systems and was located in the area of the plant ■■■■■■ of the control room, and ■■■■of the turbine deck) . This operator reported hearing a loud, persistent sound that resembled a small airplane. He stated that he heard two loud sounds that occurred close together , and for an instant thought that a small plane had struck the turbine deck .
Emergency personnel reportedly responded to the scene in a timely manner and executed fire suppression activities in areas near the generator. The operator located northwest of the turbine deck at the time of the event reported seeing what he believed was steam continue to emit from the turbine area for an extended period of time subsequent to suppression of the fire, but was not entirely sure whether he was observing steam or residual smoke. During and after the emergency response , other (offsite ) Calpine personnel were contacted and notified of the event in order to initiate an investigation of the event as well as an assessment of the extent of damage.
3.3 Calpine's Initial Review of Operating Data
Following the event, Calpine personnel reportedly began to review operating data for the steam turbine and generator. When SI was retained, Calpine reported that their initial review of the operating data had found that a combined reheat valve (CRV) 3, which controls steam flow to the IP turbine inlet, appeared to have failed to close, and that during the attempted shutdown event, the STG rotational speed had initially decreased from
immediately prior to the failure . Calpine also reported that abnormal drops in HRH steam temperature(s) were identified in steam feeding the IP turbine . Based on Calpine's preliminary review of operating data, an important aspect of Si's failure investigation was to fully review a broader set of operating data in order to identify and evaluate potential causes of the event.
3 The CRVs are located
These are used to
control HRH steam flow to the IP turbine. When standing at the the CRV #1 is located on the and
the CRV #2 is located on the . Note that the CRV #'s do not correspond to the reheat piping lines feeding the valves from the HRSGs #1 and #2. Within this document, CRV # will be used to refer to both valves and the common body and RSV# or IV# will be used to refer to specific valves.
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
Report No. 2100556.401 R1 Page 17
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Figure 3-1. Satellite Image Showing the General Layout of the Russell City Generating Station
Report No. 2 100556 .401 R1 Page 18
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Cold Reheat
Main Steam
South .......,. North
Generator
Coup ling
Figure 3-2. Schematic of the General Electric D11 Steam Turbine (Steam Flow Indicated in Red, Rotation in Blue)
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
Report No. 2 100556.401 R1 Page 19
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Si's investigation of the event was initiated at the plant site, and during the on-site effort , a number of preliminary tasks were accomplished. As discussed in the following sections , the onsite activities were partially directed by preliminary reviews of operating data and observations of visible damage and components in the initial days of the investigation.
4.1 Visual Examinations and Documentation of Damage
During the course of the event, extensive damage was incurred by the steam turbine stationary and rotating components , bearings, seals , sensors, couplings, etc. Damage also occurred to the hydrogen cooling system, the generator, the condenser , localized regions of the turbine support footing and bolting, and other peripheral and auxiliary systems. Photographs of the turbine , generator, and surrounding areas are provided in Attachment A. The turbine and generator rotor assembly fractured into multiple pieces, and several pieces, including the collector shaft, were found at ground level at various locations within the plant. Visual examination of exposed fracture surfaces on rotor sections revealed no indications of pre existing cracks . Initial disassembly and removal of turbine components occurred while SI was on-site , but most of the deconstruction process was undertaken after SI had departed the plant site.
4.2 Preliminary Review of Operating Data
Concomitant with examinations performed prior to initiating the steam turbine and generator disassembly process , a review of operating data and the trip log from the shutdown and event was initiated. Data related to turbine rotational speed, valve positions , bearing conditions, lube oil conditions , vibration levels, hydrogen cooling , and numerous other variables were reviewed . Collectively, the available operating data showed that during initial shutdown steps , after decreasing load on the operating CT 2 and while the plant shutdown checklist was being implemented by the control room operator , the steam turbine tripped due to the failure of the axial thrust bearing probes. This steam turbine trip initiated an automatic response of the control system that was taking place as the operator was following the standard shutdown process.
During the steam turbine trip , the IV #2 and RSV #2 failed to fully close, and as a result , the IP turbine continued to receive high pressure steam thru the partially open valves . During the initial stages of the event , the generator breaker stayed in a closed position , maintaining synchronization between the STG and the power grid
... ).
However, approximately•••• after the steam turbine trip was initiated, and with the IV #2 and RSV #2 in a partially open position , the STG line breakers opened . When the line breakers 4 When the STG is synchronized to the power grid, the steam turbine rotor must continue to rotate at 3,600 rpm. If there is insufficient torque from the steam turbine to drive the generator and produce power, power from the grid will be consumed by the generator (reverse power or "motoring") in order to maintain the synchronized rotational speed. Note that this is an undesirable operating condition for more than a relatively short period of time.
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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STG mechanical failure occurred .
4.2.1 Indications of Water Induction into the Steam Turbine Prelimina ry review of the operation data identified multiple indicators that a water induction event, wherein water entered through one or both CRVs at the IP turbine inlet, had occurred.
The first indicator , rapid reduction in HRH steam temperature below the normal operating temperature of approximately ■■■■■■■■■■, indicated the presence of water in the HRH piping as it entered the IP steam turbine. Accompan ying this, the second key indicator , the rapid reduction in rotor speed upon opening of the STG line breakers, provided a consistent indication that water had been inducted into the HRH steam flow path resulting in rotor deceleration much faster than during a typical shutdown . Additional indications of water in the flow path in conjunction with a step
change in the rotor axial position . Failure of the IV #2 and RSV #2 to close upon command and later closing as HRH steam temperature returned to near normal operating temperatures indicated that temporary valve thermal seizure resulted from the water induction. Review of alarm logs also indicated alarms 6 were present indicating water detection in the RH bowl feeding the IP steam turbine based on bowl thermocouple temperature spreads.
4.2.2 Nature of Steam Turbine Overspeed
Steam turbine overspeed events occur for a variety of reasons and require specific investigations to determine the nature of the event. Many of these events such as a load rejection , failure of steam stop valves to close, or steam over pressure events have specific precursors visible in the operating data prior to the overspeed of the turbine. Review of the operating data in this case showed key observations that directed the nature of the forensic inspection on site:
• HRH IV #2 and RSV #2 remained partially open following the steam turbine trip while HRSG #1 and #2 RH sections were supplying pressure to the IP steam turbine after the generator breaker was opened.
• Radial vibrations remained low, even as the rotor speed exceeded overspeed (110% speed) condition. This indicated that the rotor had not experienced any significant losses of material.
As a result of these key observations , the event investigation was focused on IV #2 and RSV #2 failure to close, the source of water inducted into the IP turbine , and control logic leading to the STG line breakers opening while pressurized HRH steam was accessible to the turbine . The 5 At the time which the rotor speed began accelerating and passed the overspeed trip setting, the unit was already in a tripped condition.
6 The i nitial ■•■ alarm indirectly indicating the presence of water, based on differential temperatures, within the ST occurred approximately prior to the trip command. The corresponds approximately to as the••■ clock is approximately off in synchronization to site local time.
~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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4.3 Onsite Examination of Hot Reheat Piping
Based on the initial reviews of control system alarms and associated operating data that suggested water induction into the IP steam turbine, the HRH piping providing steam to the IP turbine (through the CRVs located on each side of the IP turbine inlet) was examined during multiple walkdowns. A schematic of the HRH piping near the STG is provided in Figure 4-1. Each of the two HRSGs has a HRH pipe that carries steam from the RH section of each HRSG to the IP steam turbine. For discussion purposes, the HRH piping from HRSG #1 is referred to as the HRH #1, and the HRH piping from HRSG #2 is the HRH #2.
Because HRSG #2 was online and operating normally prior to the shutdown and failure event, HRH #1 was of interest as a potential source of water.
As the two HRH pipes approach the IP steam turbine, the pipes run essentially . Near the downstream end of each HRH
pipe there is a manually operated combined stop valve/check valve with a drain located just upstream of each stop/check valve. The outlet from each stop/check valve flows to a HRH header ( or balancing pipe) that connects both HRH pipes, and from the header are parallel pipes that flow to the two CRVs.
While at the plant site, SI personnel requested that the drains on each HRH pipe upstream of the stop/check valves be opened to check for residual water in the system. The drain valve on HRH #2 was opened and a few drops of water emitted from the drain . The drain valve on HRH #1 was opened and flowed water steadily for approximately minutes. Based on this observation , an additional drain located at a low point in HRH #1 pipe (situated in a of HRSG #1 and HRSG #2) was opened ; this drain
emitted a strong flow of water (through a 1 inch opening) for approximate! minutes. ~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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IP
Turbine
CRV#1 0•
Turbine
Left
Side
Schematic :
Notto Scale
t
....
l
HP
Turbine
®
Drain
"\J Manual
~ Stop/Check
Valve
®
Drain
+(Z) CRV#2
Turbine
Right
Side
"\J Manual
6. Stop/Check
Valve
Drain HRH#1
® +-
+-
HRH#2
Figure 4-1. Arrangement of HRH Piping and Valves Upstream from the IP Turbine Report No. 2100556.401 R1 Page 113
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These drain valve tests confirmed that a significant amount of water remained in the HRH #1 piping after the event. The possibility of checking for water in the HRSG #1 RH harps was discussed with plant personnel , but an appropriate drain was not present and testing was not feasible without destructively cutting into the system.
Further evaluation of water in HRH #1 was performed based on a detailed review of additional operating data obtained subsequent to the site visit. The analysis of this data is discussed later in this report .
4.4 Onsite Investigation of Steam Turbine CRVs
Operation data indicated that IV #2 and RSV #2 failed to fully close prior to the STG line breakers opening, thus allowing steam to continue to flow and resulting in the overspeed event. The CRVs were not readily accessible while the investigation team was onsite in early June. However , limited inspections were performed to support the overall investigation .
According to operation data, the IV #2 initially began throttling steam flow in coordination with IV #1 . Both valves were commanded by the controller to re-open to_, IV #1 responded where IV #2 held at- open . The IVs were signaled to throttle flow a second time; IV #1 followed the command , however , IV #2 held at- open. Approximately later the ST trip command (Axial Probe Failure) was issued from the controller and all steam inlet valves (HP, IP and LP) closed with the exception of IV #2, which remained at-open, and RSV #2 which responded but failed to fully close, only reaching- open and remaining at that position through the event. RSV #2 and IV #2 closed on their own approximately , respectively, after the overspeed event.
While SI was at the plant site , an independent vendor performed a borescope inspection of the horizontal HRH pipe sections below the CRVs and the inlet of the CRVs , to the extent possible, via the upstream piping. The goal was to determine if foreign material was present that could have prevented IV #2 and RSV #2 from closing. No notable findings were made with the exception that the CRV #2 valve body showed indication of a greater degree of interior surface oxide exfoliation than CRV #1.
Multiple factors previously discussed suggest quenching of CRV #2's components during the water induction led to transient thermal distortion and resulted in the failure of both valves to close upon command. Therefore, further valve inspection was planned when the internal components could be exposed.
~ Structural Integrity
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4.5 Onsite Investigation of Exposed Valves
SI completed a walk-down inspection of the exposed steam valves listed below on a return trip to site on July 26, 2021.
• Combined Reheat Valves:
o CRV #1 (CRV-1)
o CRV #2 (CRV-2)
• Cold Reheat Stop Valve:
o HRSG #1 )
• Cold Reheat Balance Valves:
o HRSG #1 )
o HRSG #2 )
Additionally, inspect ion reports were reviewed for the following valves:
• Combined Reheat Valves:
o CRV #2 (CRV-2)
• HRH Manual Stop/Check Valves
o HRSG #1 1!!1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1)
o HRSG #2 )
Inspection pictures are included in Appendix A.
4.5.1 CRV Inspection
Visual inspection of RSV #2 stem documented scoring and the vendor inspection report documented excessive runout values in the IV #2 and RSV #2 stems. Run out check markings on the RSV #1 shaft were noted on the shaft as shown in Table 5-1 and were not excessive .
The RSV #2 disk and pressure seal head , as well as the IV body and basket showed signs of surface oxide exfoliation greater than that of CRV #1.
Table 5-1: Com risen of CRV Stem Runout Values
Maximum Identified CRV Stem Runout Values
Intercept Valve
Stop Valve
CRV#1 CRV#2
Findings from the inspection of both CRVs are consistent with those anticipated from operational data review where IV #2 began throttling after ■■■■■■■■ steam temperature drop as measured in the upstream right steam pipe and the RSV action occurring after a greater than - steam temperature drop. All IV #1 and RSV #1 operation occurred while exposed to temperature drops , respectively , as measured in the upstream steam pipe. Temperature measurements downstream of CRV #1 and CRV #2 indicate operation of the valves occurred with up to temperature reductions respectively .
The scoring on RSV #2 stem, exfoliation of multiple components , as well as the stem plastic deformation (measured as runout) in both portions of CRV #2 are consistent with a steam valve ~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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4.5.2 CRH Stop Valve Inspection
Visual inspection of the HRSG #1 CRH stop valve was performed with the valve removed from the CRH pipe , in the closed position, and with the actuator removed. Visual inspection was performed as best as possible with the valve in the closed position. No significant deficiencies were observed. It appeared to be seated and no visual signs of seat or butterfly-disc damage could be observed in the as-examined position. The only item of potential significance was the appearance of a horizontal (in the installed orientation) line possibly indicating there had been an accumulation of liquid on the discharge side of the valve disk.
4.5.3 CRH Balance Valve Inspection
No notable findings were observed during visual inspection of the CRH balance valve. ~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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Subsequent to the on-site work activities, the ongoing investigation involved requesting and review ing more detailed operational data related to the failure event and prior shutdown events, and analysis of HRSG #1 operating data associated with the potential for water condensation during 1x1 operations . These are discussed in detail in the following sections.
Section 5.1 through Section 5.8 include detailed evaluation of the site's operating data to characterize the events through documentation of their predecessors and causes . Each figure identifies points of interest within the operating data as a O and corresponding discussion for that item is identified with a corresponding(#) within the section .
5.1 Shutdown and Event Characterization
A review of basic operating parameters was performed to characterize the type and nature of the event and better direct further investigation efforts. Figure 5-1 characterizes basic operation data prior to and during the failure event.
Event Characte rizat ion • Basic Operat ion Data
... ~ -0
A
~
-CTGJGAt> !.S II.M
·J
- STGGll::OS& WW
Event ttmc linr-
Figure 5-1 - Event Characterization - Basic Operation Data Prior to the event and as part of the shutdown procedure, the operator initiated a (1 ) load reduction for CT 2 load to-M W at approximately-. As the reduction in CT output occurred, the (2) output of the STG began to decline accordingly. Both the CT and STG load reductions were smooth until approximate! when the (3) STG load began to fluctuate in an inconsistent manner with respect to the CT load reduction . At ~ Structural Integrity
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At approximately , the (5) STG line breakers ) opened , de- synchronizing the STG from the grid (indicated by the vertical orange line in this and future figures). The rotor speed immediately responded to the loss of synchronization by (6) dropping at a very high rate. The speed fell from - RPM to slightly below as compared to a normal
shutdown deceleration of approximately per minute . After this rapid deceleration , the rotor began (7) accelerating rapidly, crossing the (8) overspeed limit of (indicated by the vertical red line in this and future figures). The rotational speed registered a maximum of . This acceleration of
, which greatly
exceeds typical controlled rotor acceleration of less than per minute. The rotor speed (9) dropped to and shortly after this , the control room operator (10) tripped CT 2 from load.
The (3) STG load fluctuation and subsequent (5) rapid rotor deceleration is indicative of a substantial change within the STG, and based on the steady load of CT 2, suggests the cause was not related to the running CT.
. This is also evident in the
(6) rapid deceleration of the rotor upon (5) breaker opening. Based on this operating data, there is no indication of the cause or nature of the event , but it would indicate a significant driving force change associated with the rotating hardware within the STG. ~ Structural Integrity
Associates. Inc
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Figure 5-2 overlays additional operating data to that presented in Figure 5-1. Further analysis of basic operating data adds vibration sensors to the trend to further characterize the nature of the event. It is common to review both radial and axial vibrations in the diagnosis of a turbine event as trends in this data provide primary indicators of physical changes to the rotating components.
Some signals in Figure 5-2 were multiplied as noted in the legend to enhance the visibility of changes .
4lcqlf'o1J(UIXI
- \~t,,110~ tJ(-l!iUP'C lllOtJ
- \~or.:,tio tvt1ui1ns1
- \~~.tt1r,t12JC'-&t;,,i "t12110CI
- Y:.bt-<1V11112r--h.,;.,g2
- Y:btid~ 3X·Bf-~ 3
- \':)('1CIC1'13Vlle~~S
- \,bffMt14l<kor~ 4
\J<!)l'"<'ltlon4V-&Mns.t
\<;bn,t1<111!JIC•e.e~~'C:t
Event Characteri zation - Basic Operat ion Data
Figure 5-2 - Event Characterization - Basic Operation Data (Continued) Minor trends (1) are visible beginning at in Figure 5-2 with the axial position probes and radial bearing 1 X and 2X appearing inconsistent with prior operation , although these would likely not raise concern until a more significant (2) step change occurs at ■■■I within the axial position probes. The second (2) step change is consistent with STG load fluctuations identified in Figure 5-1.
Consistent with the load swing to reverse power, the most significant (3) axial position change occurs. At this point, a trip was initiated (indicated by the vertical y Uo-..-, line in this and future figures) by the controller. While there were minor trends within the radial vibration at this time, the magnitude of the axial change far exceeded the radial fluctuations. Pairing this axial position change with the load swing provides a strong indication that water was present within the flow path. The axial thrust of the rotor increased substantially due to the dramatic increase in the density of the ST operating fluid ,
. The minimal changes in radial vibrations indicate that mass loss within the rotor train did not contribute to the event.
The first significant ( 4) radial vibration step change occurred after the STG exceeded 110% overspeed and (5) bearing 1X peaked approximately•••• after the rotor speed fell tol ~ Structural Integrity
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Review of STG basic operating data provided conclusive evidence that mechanical failures within the steam turbine and generator drivetra in are a result of and not contributors to the overspeed event. Further investigation of the sources and causes of the water induction and the rotor overspeed are discussed in subsequent sections.
5.2 Event Investigation - Vibration Predecessors
Figure 5-3 overlays key steam turbine temperature data to that presented in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2.
Event Investigation• Vibration Predecessors (Sources)
r\lf'nt Tlmt'l+ne
Figure 5-3 - Event Investigation - Vibration Predecessors Based on the operational data review of STG speed, power output and vibrations, it has been identified that the overspeed event was substantially initiated by a water induction event.
Review of HP, IP and LP inlet temperatures was utilized to isolate the turbine section that initially experienced this water induction. The IP section showed a significant reduction in temperature prior to the event and corresponding with the initial minor vibration trends identified in Figure 5-2. As shown in Figure 5-3, HP steam (2) inlet temperature and (3) LP admission steam temperature remained steady throughout the event, however, the (1) HRH steam entering through the right of the IP turbine showed a rapid reduction in temperature consistent with the induction of liquid water vs. steam.
~ Structural Integrity
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5.3 Event lnvestigation-Overspeed Investigation
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 identified that the steam turbine trip, followed by reverse power and rapid rotor deceleration , was initiated by rotor axial position change due to a water induction event within the IP turbine section. This water induction event resulted in the rapid speed reduction of the rotor once the STG line breakers opened, however, cannot explain the following rapid acceleration and eventual overspeed of the rotor. Figure 5.4 presents additional IP steam turbine temperatures prior to and during the failure event.
Event Investigation • Overspeed Investigation
Figure 5-4 - Event Investigation - Overspeed Investigation Figure 5-4 shows that (1) both the right HRH pipe beneath the STG and the right IP lower bowl temperatures were rapidly reduced from operating temperatures of approximately to less than ■■■■■■■ when (2) both CRV IVs began to throttle in response to shutdown activities as described in Section 4.4. At this time, the right HRH pipe and IP lower bowl showed the presence of water versus the left HRH pipe and IP lower bowl, providing explanation as to why the IV #2 was (3) unable to close in response to flow throttling and RSV #2 in response to the trip command to (4) close all stop valves. At the time of the steam turbine trip , the left IP lower bowl temperature had begun to drop below ■■I indicating a much smaller volume of water had entered through the left HRH pipe, allowing (5) IV #1 and RSV #1 to throttle and close as commanded .
As the unit ove r sped, the (6) steam flowing through CRV #2 returned to approximately allowing the IV #2 and RSV #2 to close.
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5.4 Event Investigation- HRH Investigation
Data from HRH thermocouples downstream of the pair of HRH stop/check valves is presented in Figure 5-5 .
Event Investigatio n• HRH Steam Temperatures
Figure 5-5 - Event Investigation- HRH Steam Temperatures An (1) initial temperature disturbance occurred in the right HRH pipe beneath the STG prior to the initial vibration changes as previously highlighted in Figure 5-2. This disturbance was followed by a (2) significant drop in temperature in the same HRH pipe . Next, (3) the right , lower IP reheat bowl thermocouple , followed by the upper IP reheat bowl thermocouple , showed a sharp reduction in temperature , indicating that water was churning in the ST flow path. These significant temperature disturbances precede the axial vibration shift and the reverse power occurrence by less than one minute .
As of approximately , all noticeable activity occurred in the right side of the STG feeding up through the vertical piping leg and through CRV #2 into the IP steam bowls . The next indication of water within the steam piping is in the (4) HRH header drain between the right and left vertical CRV inlet piping. The drain temperature drop is followed quickly by a rapid temperature reduction in the (5) left vertical pipe leading to CRV #1. After there is an indication in both vertical pipes, (6) the left lower IP bowl thermocouple at CRV #1 sees a drop in temperature, indicating water mixing with steam at this location .
The HRH steam temperatures in Figure 5-5 and the schematic in Figure 4-1 indicate that initially water entered the right side of the HRH header and the IP turbine through the right vertical pipe and passed through CRV #2. As the right steam temperature dropped to saturation temperature (based on the HRH pressure) , the header drain data showed that water spread from the right HRH pipe across the header and into the left HRH pipe. The schematic shows that HRH pipe ~ Structural Integrity
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Further investigation of the HRH pipe #1 and #2 and HRSG #1 and #2 temperatures follow in subsequent sections to document the source of water involved in the induction event.
5.5 Event Investigation-Water Source Investigation
Figure 5-6 compares the HRSG outlet temperatures to thermocouples downstream of the pair of HRH stop/check valves shown in Figure 5-5.
eotilowlC)Wl"l'•~IW'rMet.1
q;;ttlQll.t()'.a....!!'lf'llr~
t.t80'4 IJllrRrlnW"MeUI
H:lAOll:tPltG'fEMP
Hl>.JTTfMP
UIOUlTLMP
1u\ t.eerf'ITn:pl
Event Investigation - Wate r Source Investigation
Figure 5-6 - Event Investigation - Water Source Investigation During the initial shutdown of CT 2, (1) all left and right HRH pipe and reheat bowl thermocouple temperatures are aligned with the (3) output temperature of HRSG #2 RH, which was in service at the time. As the temperatures of the HRH pipe and IP bowls dropped , those temperatures became consistent with the (2) output temperature of HRSG #1 RH, which was out of service at the time . The HRSG #2 HRH outlet temperature remained at a (3) relatively consistent temperature throughout the event and only began to fall once CT 2 was tripped by the control room operator. This data gives a clear indication of the source of water in the water induction event is HRSG #1 RH and associated piping.
Since HRSG #1 was out of service at the time of the event, additional investigation into why water was present in HRSG #1, and what caused the induction of water into the active steam path, is detailed in the following sections .
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5.6 Event Investigation-Water Induction Investigation
Figure 5-7 compares the inlet and outlet pressures HRSG #1 and #2 operating data as block 1 was reducing load.
Event Investigat ion - Water Induction Investigat ion
Figure 5-7 - Event Investigation - Water Induction Investigation During normal operation prior to the event , (1) the inlet and exit pressures of HRSG #2 RH were greater than the (2) corresponding pressures of HRSG #1 which was out of service. As CT 2 load was reduced as part of the normal shutdown sequence, both (3) HRSG #2 RH inlet and outlet pressures declined with reduced CT output I exhaust temperatures , as expected. Later in the shutdown, the (4) outlet pressure of HRSG #2 RH drops below the outlet pressure of HRSG #1 RH, and the timing of this is consistent with the HRH # 1 pipe showing the rapid temperature reduction. Immediatel y prior to the steam turbine trip , (5) both the inlet and outlet pressures of HRSG #2 RH drop below the corresponding pressures from HRSG #1 and remain below for approximately 1 minute.
As the HRSG RH outlet pressures close in (3) on each other and equalize (4), water is inducted into the IP ST. As the pressure of HRSG #1 is maintained above that of HRSG #2, flow from the out-of-service HRSG was permitted into the IP ST.
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5.7 Event Investigation-Water Accumulation Investigation To understand how water accumulated in HRSG #1 prior to the event, historical data for the plant was reviewed. Operating data is presented in Figure 5-8 representing the 5 days prior to the event.
Event Invest igation
Figure 5-8 - Event Investigation - Water Accumulation Investigation . During this time, block 1 provided
ranged between approximately Also, during
this time, HRSG #1 RH inlet pressure followed CRH outlet pressure with typical losses through piping and valves. HRSG #1 RH outlet pressure shows an average differential relative to inlet pressure of approximately_ , consistent with pressure losses through the reheat cycle.
Notable to the investigation , at the start of the 1 x1 operation with block 1, (1 ) HRSG #2 RH inlet and outlet pressures increase upon startup of the STG to approximately , but this pressure decays off over the ■•••• Both HRSG #2 RH inlet and outlet pressures were equivalent throughout this time period, indicating that the RH circuit was pressurized and free of obstructions from inlet to exit.
The plant then operated a short time in 2x1 configuration with both block 1 and 2 in service for approximately . At approximately , block 1 shut down
while block 2 remained in operation until the event.
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Unlike how HRSG #2 RH pressure levels decayed as HRSG #1 came online on 5/23/21, (2) HRSG #1 RH held pressure throughout the remaining operation of block 2. Initially, with block 1 offline, the differential pressure across HRSG #1 RH inlet and outlet locations remained very low , which indicates unobstructed flow of steam through the reheater circuit. However , at approximately , the (3) HRSG #1 RH inlet pressure began to rise, holding an increased level of pressure over the HRSG #1 RH exit. The (4) HRSG #1 RH inlet pressure continued to increase, driving towards the CRH pipe pressure through the remaining operation, with the exception of CT 2 load reductions, which also dropped the CRH pressure.
The RH sections of the HRSGs are comprised of 3 harps as depicted in the Nooter Eriksen P&ID drawing excerpt provided in Figure 5-9. While not in service, meaning no heat input to the HRSG, the inlet and outlet of the RH circuit should have no obstructions that could cause a differential pressure to develop across the circuit. When in operation , the temperature of steam flowing through the RH circuit increases from the inlet to the outlet as depicted in Figure 5-9, with the inlet pressure corresponding to the CRH pressure (HP turbine exhaust) and outlet pressure set by the CRV and IP turbine load. For a differential pressure to exist across the HRSG #1 RH circuit with block 1 out of service , there would have to be a source of pressure and a flow obstruction to prevent free flow through the harps. ~ Structural Integrity
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Figure 5-9 - Nooter/Eriksen RH P&ID (Ref:
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Review of the same timeline with HRSG #1 RH temperatures, Figure 5-10 provides the necessary details to identify how obstructions within the RH harps were created .
Event Investigation • Water Accumulation Investigation Continued ~·i...-1:.
___ ,
- ~-"' .... ~- 1 .. ~~I
~ §::-'·- -:.:.-~.
Figure 5-10- Water Accumulation Investigation Temperature Plot Temperature traces (1) show representative temperatures through the RH circuit including the inlet, 3 harps, and outlet; these traces show that the RH steam was steadily increasing in temperature when HRSG #1 was in service. These temperatures (2) decline after HRSG #1 is taken out of service . RH harp 1 drain - ) temperatures, followed by harp 3 drain ■••■) temperatures, decline first, followed by drops in temperature at the upper region thermocouples.
To aid in the investigation (3) the steam saturation temperature was calculated based on the HRSG #1 RH inlet and outlet pressures and trended through the operation period. The 3 drains identified above quickly dropped in temperature to the saturation temperature after the unit shut down. Approximately after block 1 shut down , (4) RH harp 1 drain temperature dropped below the steam saturation temperature, quickly followed by the (5) RH harp 3 drains .
This indicates that steam condensed within the HRSG. Approximately••■ later , the HRSG #1 RH inlet and outlet pressures began to separate , indicating that a sufficient amount of wate r had accumulated in the lower turns of the harps to form loop seals, as depicted in Figure 5-11, and was preventing free flow through the circuit.
The presence of small amounts of water within an offline HRSG is not necessarily intended , but on its own, is not capable of resulting in a significant wate r induction event. The warming through CT startup and startup drain will typically boil off and purge small levels of residual water within the HRSG. The HRSG #1 RH condensed water within the harps for greater than ■ prior to the event, as shown in Figure 5-10. The RH also maintained approximately of its typical operating pressure prior to the formation of the loop seals, and the inlet pressure ~ Structural Integrity
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Free flowing pipe system
• No fl ow restric t ions prevent ing
flow through pip ing loops
• Equal inlet and outlet pressures
Restricted flow pipe system
• Accumulation of liquid in the
bottom loops partia lly restrict s
flo w through piping loops
• Flow restriction may result in a
small pressure reduction through
the piping system
Obstructed flow pipe system
• Accumulat ion of liquid in the
bottom loops obst ruct s flo w
through piping loops
• Inlet pressure is able to increase
substantia lly over t he out let
pressure
Outlet
-
Outlet
Figure 5-11 - Loop Seal Depiction
lnlel
-
Intel
-
Inlet
-
Along with this maintained pressure, the temperatures within the RH system were at or near saturation temperature . The maintained pressure acted as one force driving accumulated water into the IP ST via the HRH pipe when the exit pressure of HRSG #2 dropped . The second driving force was the additional pressure created as portions of the high temperature water boiled off (flashed) and expanded as the HRH header pressure dropped .
A significant source of steam was required to condense enough water within the RH harps to form loop seals. Additionally , this source maintained near operating levels of pressure within the out-of-service HRSG and near boiling temperatures at that eleveted pressure. Potential sources of steam are discussed in the next section .
5.8 Event Investigation - Water Accumulation Steam Source Investigation Review of Russell City Energy Center Main Steam P&ID drawings through and the HRSG P&ID drawing through
~
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• F low from the CRH piping through HRSG #1 CRH SV
• F low into CRH piping from the HP Bypass
o CRH Flow Balance Flowmeter
• Flow from the HRSG #1 CRH Slowdown Tank7
• F low into HRSG #1 RH from the IP Superheater
o IP Superheate r to CRH Flowmete r
• Drain piping and vents within HRSG #17
• Reverse flow into HRH pipe from HRSG #1 Bypass to Condense r7 • Reverse flow into HRH pipe from HRSG #1 Vent Stack 7
• Reverse flow into HRH pipe from HRSG #1 Slowdown Tank7 • Reverse flow from the HRH heade r through the HRH stop/check valve
5.8.1 Forward flow into HRSG #1 RH
Figure 5-12 provides a view of flow into both HRS Gs during the operation time period prior to the event.
Oper.ttion Timelioe
Figure 5-12- Event Investigation Flow into HRSGs
The CRH Flow Balance Flowmeter is in-line downst ream of the HRSG CRH SV, CRH flow balance valve and HP bypass piping. As shown in Figure 5-12, (1) both HRSG #1 and HRSG 7 Vent stacks, drains, condenser and blowdown tanks were reviewed and excluded due to an inability to support pressure and temperature documented in Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-10. ~ Structural Integrity
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© 2021 Structural Integrity Associates , Inc. All rights reseNed. Confidential and Proprietary Business Information. Do not copy or distribute without the express written consent of Calpine Corporation. #2 recorded approximately of steam flow during steady , full load operation. While low levels of flow through the flowmeters are unlikely to provide accurate readings , a relative comparison can be drawn between the offline CRH flow into the HRSGs. While offline, (2) HRSG #2 showed approximately where (3) HRSG #1 recorded Plotted in Figure 5-13 , the pressures upstream of HRSG #1 are shown for the (1) CRH pipe upstream of the CRH SV, (2) HP bypass system (plotted on the secondary Y scale), (3) CRH flow meter , (4) IP superheater, and both the (5) RH inlet and outlet. Initially, after the shutdown of block 1, the HP bypass system remained at approximately . However, after approximately••• • the (6) pressure bleeds off to less than . Throughout the majority of block 2's operation , both CRH pipes remain at approximately-sig with the exception of the••■ prior to the event where the pressure (7) increases to approximately without a load increase on CT 2.
Figure 5-13- HRSG #1 HR Upstream Pressure Plot
Flow into HRSG #1 RH from the CRH pipe was documented to remain at approximately greater than flow into HRSG #2 when similarly offline. The 3 potential sources were assessed as follows:
• Flow from the CRH piping through HRSG #1 CRH SV
o The (1) CRH pipe upstream of the CRH SV remains at a higher pressure than the (3) CRH pipe leading to the RH system throughout the duration of operation. o The CRH upstream pressure fluctuates with operation of block 2 and pressures downstream of the CRH SV follow these fluctuations. This pressure association appears to indicate flow across the CRH SV.
~ Structural Integrity
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• Flow from the CRH piping from the HP Bypass
o Initial equalization of the (2) HP bypass system is likely to have provided flow into the CRH piping upstream of the CRH valve for up to approximatel y 16 hours through the HP bypass control valve or its warming line.
o After this timeframe , however, the system (6) pressure dropped below the CRH pipe pressure , at which point the direction of flow would have reversed back into the HP bypass system.
o The HP bypass flow enters downstream of the CRH SV but upstream of the CRH balance flow meter. The temperatures of the HP bypass {Figure 5-14 (4)} are cooler than both of these temperature readings for the majority of the block 2 operation . This indicates the HP bypass is not contributing significant flow for the duration HRSG #1 is out of service , otherwise, the CRH balance flow meter would have recorded a temperature at or below the HP bypass temperature.
o While the HP bypass initially provides steam flow and pressure to the CRH pipe, that flow reverses backwards into the HP bypass system early in the HRSG #1 offline period. o It should be noted that the bypass warmup lines are expected to be similar for both units, and operation of HRSG #1 with HRSG #2 offline did not result in a significant pressurization of the HRSG #2 RH.
• Flow into the HRSG #1 RH from the IP Superheater
o The IP superheater feeds into the CRH pipe downstream of the CRH flowmeter and has a flowmeter of its own.
o The (4) pressure within the IP superheater (measured upstream of the flow meter) remains slightly above the CRH pipe pressure , however, the pressure of the IP superheater itself is approximatel y 150 psig lower than CRH pressure. o Based on the low supply pressure from the IP superheater and the {Figure 5-14 (3)} temperatures within the IP superheater piping , it is unlikel y that this contributes any significant steam flow or pressurization of the HRSG #1 RH. ~ Structural Integrity
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Event Instigation - HRSG #1 HR Upstream Temperature Plot Oper.ition.tl Timetine
Figure 5-14- HRSG #1 HR Upstream Temperature Plot
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5.8.2 Reverse flow into HRSG #1 RH
Pressures within the HRH and CRH piping, as presented in Figure 5-15, further document steam flow direction within these systems.
Event Invest igation - HRH and CRH Pressure Plot
Figure 5-15- CHR and HRH Pressure
The (1) CRH pipes to HRSG #1 and #2 remain the highest pressure within the CRH and HRH piping systems throughout the approximately of operation prior to the event. Due to flow losses in the piping and valves, (2) the inlet pressure of the IP ST downstream of the CRVs is the lowest pressure. The (3) outlet pressure of HRSG #2 RH, which is in service , is initially greater than both the (4) inlet and outlet pressure of HRSG #1 RH. However, as the loop seals form within HRSG #1, (5) the inlet pressure of the HRSG #1 RH begins to exceed the outlet pressure of the HRSG #2 RH.
Both HRSGs meet at the HRH header downstream of the HRH stop/check valves. In the event that HRH #1 stop/check valve was providing significant reverse steam flow to HRSG #1, the outlet pressure of the RH would exceed in the inlet pressure. Additionally , the inlet temperature of HRSG #1 exceeds the outlet temperature, which indicates the source of steam flow to the out of-service HRSG is on the inlet side of the RH. This is consistent with flow recorded through the HRSG #1 CRH flowmeter as well. For these reasons , reverse flow through the HRH #1 stop/check valve was not considered as a substantial source of steam for the water accumulation within the HRSG #1 RH.
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5.9 Cold Reheat Stop Valve Investigation
The HRSG #1 CRH stop valve ■■■■■■ was removed for investigation based on continued supply of steam to the offline HRSG #1 . The valve, gearbox and actuator were tested, disassembled, and inspected at a local valve service center.
5.9.1 Cold Reheat Stop Valve Shop Investigation
The HRSG #1 CRH stop valve ) was removed from the CRH piping for investigation and the actuator was separated while on site. Initially, the valve and gearbox were sent to Bay Valve Service center; subsequently the actuator was shipped to the service center for a complete system evaluation. Bay Valve performed inspection and testing under Si's direction.
Initial observations from the shop confirmed that the valve was capable of manual actuation from the fully opened to fully closed position. Additionally, the valve was noted to hold water in an atmospheric pressure , static water test. Externally , the valve and gearbox had no significant findings .
Upon arrival of the actuator to the shop, a visual inspection was completed with no notable findings . The actuator's controller was configured to open and close based on limit switch positions. The actuator was stroked in the stand alone configuration. During this test, the electrical current draw slightly exceeded the typical operating range .
The actuator , gear box and valve were reassembled for testing purposes. When attempting to align the three components, it was identified that the configuration prior to removal cou ld not be recreated. When assembled, only-of stroke was achieved by the valve through the full stroke of the actuator. Due to this limited valve stroke, the assembly could be internally aligned such that the valve either fully closed, fully opened or partially stroked achieving neither full opening nor closure . Depiction of an ideal alignment as well as the former two potential alignments are shown in Figure 5-16.
Both the actuator and valve were disassembled with no notable findings impacting the stroke of the valve. The valve stem and yoke bearing were identified with galling damage which was noted to potentially increase actuator load but would not significantly impact the range of stroke.
Disassembly of the gearbox identified a heavily damaged gear box shaft roller bearing . The bearing components had been trapped within the worm and quarter gear further damaging the gearbox. This damage increased the gearbox backlash and resulted in reduced valve stroke. ~ Structural Integrity
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A. As Intend ed Stroke
contieuration
At (Ui lOf' ~i4------~►
Valve rll' t------_,.
Ael'l~CI ; ..__ ___ _ _ ..,.
Strob ;
Closed Open
8. Potential Site Configuration
Aliened Fully dosed
Actuator ◄; i------- ...
Valve '41 i-------•
Aehl~yj!,d L ------ --· Sttolce- ;
Closed Open
I
C. Potential Site Configuration
Aligned Fully Open
Acl Ui\Of ◄; t-------+
Valve i ,..., t------ ...
AChih<M ! i
Slroke i ◄; ..... - ----•
Closed Open
Figure 5-16 - CRH Stop Valve Component Stroke Depiction Had the gearbox been able to efficiently translate the full actuator motion to the valve, both positions in Figure 5-16A. could have been achieved . The fully opened position is depicted in blue and the fully closed position is shown in orange . Intermediate positions are shown as grey in depictions B and C.
As the gearbox was unable to efficiently translate the actuator motion to the valve, Figure 5-15 depictions B and C represent possible alignments of the valve while in service . If the three components were aligned based off a fully closed position , the resulting partially opened position would have been as depicted in Figure 5-168 . If the three components were aligned based off a fully open position , the resulting partially closed position would have been as depicted in Figure 5-16C. More likely, the valve was unable to reach either the fully opened or fully closed position through the full stroke of the actuator.
The assemb ly actuation was tested both at shop temperatures and heated to to simulate operating conditions . The valve was found to move smoothly throughout the actuator stroke in both tests . When configured to fully close, as shown in Figure 5-16B, the valve passed a graphite seat contact test and feeler gage inspection.
To perform a static pressure test, the valve was manually actuated to the closed position and tested at 250 PSI. The valve experienced significant leakage (8 oz./ minute) at 250 PSI and was unable to achieve pressurization to 500 PSI due to the leakage level. Per American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 598 - Valve Inspection and Testing , the maximum allowable leakage for this size valve is 28 drops per minute (0.06 oz. per min) at 1,625 PSI. The test leakage equates to approximately 135 times the acceptable leakage at 15% of the API Standard test pressure.
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5.9.2 Cold Reheat Stop Valve Operation Investigation
The HRSG CRH SV is positioned upstream of the CRH balance valve ), the HP bypass tie-in , and the CRH Flow Balan ce flowmeter , all of whi ch feed the HRSG RH. The CRH SV is intended to isolate the offline HRSG from the common CRH piping , which is active when either block is operational.
The CRH SV is configured to operate either fully opened or fully closed. The valve is configured to report to the distributed control system (DCS) when in the open limit position , closed limit position , in-motion , or when the actuator fails to actuate properl y. As identified in the shop inspection , the actuator was able to stroke throughout its entire range and reach both limit positions. Therefore , prior to the event, the actuator reported to the DCS that it successfull y reached both the fully opened and fully closed positions during operation . Based on the degradation of the gearbox , while the actuator reached both positions it was commanded to reach , the valve likely never full y reached either position. Since the actuator reached its limit position , no valve alarms were triggered .
5.10 Controller Alarm Log Review
SI completed a review of the complete, historical process alarm log from the controller including turning gear operation 8 prior to the startup on 5/23/21 through the event on the evening of 5/27/21. From the time the STG began turning gear operation to the event trip, the controller registered 5,391 alarms . Review of operational data indicated that 39 of these alarms were raised after the accumulation of water within the offline HRSG. Relevant alarms are discussed relative to the plant operation and plotted on the operation timeline within Figure 5-17.
Of the 5,391 alarms experienced from turning gear operation (beginning ) up to the trip ), the first non-recurrent alarms relevant to the event entered 29 seconds prior to the trip documenting the rapid fall of the HRH steam temperature . Operator intervention at this point would not have prevented the event from occurring .
Based on the configuration of the STG HRH #1 and #2 pipes feeding the HRH header , shown in Figure 4-1, flow , temperature, and pressure changes from either HRSG will affect both CRVs and the STG . However , since the individual HRH pipes are closel y aligned to the right and left vertical pipe legs , temperature and pressure differences downstream of the header would be expected during transient9 conditions as flow balances through the header. During review of the alarm log, it was not uncommon for transient conditions to result in temperature differences that triggered alarms.
8 STG are put on turning gear operation when offline to aid in cooling the turbine after shutdown, prevent rotor bowing when offline or on standby, and to evenly heat the rotor during startup warming. It is common for STGs with cyclic or peaker operating profiles to operate on turning gear to reduce the start time unless the unit is not planned to start for longer durations of time (typically weeks or longer). Turning gear is an electric motor rotating the STG rotor at low RPMs typically in the 4-20 RPM range, and RCEC operates at 6-7 RPM.
9 Transient conditions are conditions where parameters (pressure, temperature and flow) within the STG, HRSG and steam piping are changing. These conditions typically occur during start-up or shutdown and load changes.
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Plant Operation Time line
C'I' l lxl Operation
426
T,..ns.ient
Alarms
39 Tr,mient
Alarms
Figure 5-17 - Plant Operation Timeline )with Alarm
Overlay
Of the 5,391 alarms , 5,352 occurred from the start of turning gear operation up to prior ) to the event. The 5,352 alarms occurred prior to water accumulation in offline and transient conditions and do not present abnormal operating conditions. Of these alarms , 5,308 occurred on turning gear or with HRSG 1 online in conditions that would not condense or accumulate water within the HRSG. The remaining 44 alarms occurred in 1x1 operation as block 1 was shutting down with HRSG 1 still at operating temperature. Based on the CT and HRSG operation time periods, these alarms would not have been associated with large amounts of water accumulating within the offline HRSG. These alarms are not related to the event or its precursors .
The remaining 39 alarms of the 5,391 occurred later in the 1x1 block 2 operation and after water was forensically determined as part of this investigation to have accumulated in HRSG 1. 13 of these occurred during transient operation between hours prior to the trip . These "REHEAT STEAM TC PROBLEM " alarms indicate a temperature spread was identified in the HRH pipes downstream of the HRH header . This alarm had been experienced 304 times previousl y while on turning gear and in both 2x1 and 1x1 transient operation. Providing no new information to the operator on the afternoon of 5/25/21 , these alarms would not have prompted operator action.
After the operator initiated the load reduction of CT 2, the same alarm repeated 12 times between ••■ minutes prior to the trip. 3 additional alarms (1 - REHEAT BOWL LOWER TC ~ Structural Integrity
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PROBL EM, 2-WATER DETECT RH BOWL TEMP SPREAD EXCEED ED10) entered between minutes prior to the trip . Combined , these three alarms occurred 969 times since the unit was on turning gear, and when triggered withi'III minutes of the event, did not present new information to the operator. Based on the transient operation and the repetitive nature of the alarms, they would not have prompted operator action.
A total of 11 non-recurrent alarms triggered with in 29 seconds of the trip, including the HRH steam temperature downward trend , IV failure to respond, and axial position alarms. The HRH steam temperature alarms entered at ■■■■documenting the rapid HRH temperature fall.
The next relevant alarms occurred at approximately ••• and were related to failure of the IV #2 to respond appropriately and the axial position trip command from the ■■■· The axial probes failed trip alarm occurred at ■■■I Operato r intervention was no longer possible to impact the event during this timeframe. IV #2 and SV #2 were seized , allowing continued flow into the IP ST, the manual HRH #1 stop / check could not have been closed, and no operator interaction could have maintained the STG line breakers in a closed position. 10 "Water detect" alarms are based off differential temperature measurements between thermocouple pairs verses a physical detection of the presence of water. These alarms typically trigger based off differential temperature between thermocouples in the upper and lower halves of the turbine shell. ~ Structural Integrity
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5.11 Root Cause and Contributing Factors
The Russell City Energy Center STG experienced an overspeed event including liberation of portions of the drivetrain shaft, on the evening of May 27, 2021. This mechanical failure of the STG has been determined to be a result of a rotor overspeed event where the rotor exceeded or- of rated speed, when the speed sensors were destroyed. Review of the rotor fracture surfaces and operation data indicate , as noted in Sections 4.1 and 5.1, that the failure occurred as a result of the overspeed event with no indication of pre-existing flaws or mass loss prior to the overspeed event. Therefore, no additional effort was expended to determine the exact nature of how the rotor fractures occurred as understanding this failure sequence was not required to carry out the causal analysis of the overspeed event.
The rotor overspeed event occurred due to the continued flow of pressurized operating fluid to the IP ST and subsequentl y the LP from both the in- and out-of-se rvice HRSGs after the control system initiated a trip and commanded all steam valves to close. The IP ST continued to receive flow due to the failure of the IV #2 and RSV #2 to close , which has been attributed to the binding of the valves' components.
Contributing to
the overspeed event, the STG line breakers opened prior to the closure of IV #2 and RSV #2 based on delay logic within the protection system . With the generator no longer maintaining rotor speed of 3,600 RPM, the fluid pressure from both HRSGs could freel y accelerate the rotor beyond its intended operating speed and into the uncontrolled overspeed condition. Based on feedback from Calpine, there is no indication that the STG control system failed to execute commands per the existing protection logic .
The IV #2 and RSV #2 binding occurred as a result of thermal distortion due to a water induction event from pressurized , high temperature water condensed in the out-of-service HRSG #1.
HRSG #1 RH was charged to near operation pressures and maintained elevated temperatures while out of service for approximatel y . Water was inducted from HRSG #1 as the RH outlet pressure of HRSG #2 decreased to a level below that of HRSG #1 RH during the normal shutdown of CT 2. Identified as a secondary factor impacting this RCA, Russell City Energy Center 's main steam system was not designed with an effective means of isolating the out-of service HRSG during routine operation 11.
The RH circuit within HRSG #1 maintained an elevated pressure and condensed high temperature water within RH harps as a result of continued flow of steam into the circuit when offline. Initially, HRSG #1 RH was supplied with steam from both the HP Bypass and the CRH SV as verified by the CRH Bypass flow meter. After the decay of the HP bypass pressure below the HRSG #1 RH inlet pressure, the CRH SV continued to supply steam to the HRSG #1 RH and maintain its pressurization. The pressures and temperatures of the CRH pipe downstream of the CRH SV remained above corresponding values at the inlet to the first RH harp. HRSG #1 condensed and accumulated water within the RH harps for approximately ■■I while offline .
Typical 1x1 operation prior to the event was less than , which is less than the duration in which the harp loop seals formed prior to the event. 11 Manual operation of the HRH stop/check valve to isolate either out-of-service HRSG is not practical for a plant that operates in cyclic and peaking operation. Manual operation of the HRH stop/check valve could not be performed in timely manner to prevent the event from occurring upon ••■ alarms identifying the presence of water within the IP ST.
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Investigation of the HRSG #1 CRH SV at a valve service center identified degradation of the gearbox, which resulted in increased gear backlash . This increased backlash reduced the valve's effective stroke to approximately., where a- stroke is required to move from the fully opened to fully closed position. It is likely that the increased backlash within the gearbox resulted in the valve failing to meet either position while the actuator 's stroke met its programmed range indicating to the DCS the limits were met.
Due to the potential for steam valves to leak, this causal analysis focused primarily on detecting and mitigating the consequences of valve leaks that increased the site's risk of a water induction event. The HRSGs are equipped to monitor temperatures and pressures within the RH system but are not equipped by design to reliably detect the presence of water within the RH harps in all circumstances. The presence of water was forensically determined through the evaluation of historian data from multiple sensors, however there is no direct indication of the presence of water (e.g. via liquid level switch) within the DCS. In addition to the lack of capability to detect water, the DCS was not configured to mitigate , through actuation of the RH drains , the presence of excessive water under near operating pressure and elevated temperatures within an out-of service HRSG . Respectively , the design and configuration of the HRSG and DCS failed to adequately detect and mitigate the presence of excess water under pressure and temperature within the RH system; this is the root cause of the STG drivetrain event at Russell City Energy Center.
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DOCKETED
Docket Number: 01-AFC-07C
Project Title: 01-AFC-7C Russell City Energy Company
TN #: 242769
Document Title: CEC Staff Report - Russell City Energy Center May 2021 Incident Root Cause Gap Analysis
Description: ***This document supersedes TN 242757***
Filer: susan fleming
Organization: California Energy Commission
Submitter Role: Commission Staff
Submission Date: 4/25/2022 10:16:38 AM
Docketed Date: 4/25/2022
ATTACHMENT III
California Energy Commission
STAFF REPORT
Russell City Energy Center
May 2021 Incident: Root
Cause Gap Analysis
April 2022 | CEC-700-2022-004
California Energy Commission
Geoff Lesh
Brett Fooks
Elizabeth Huber
Timothy Smith
Paul Trygstad
Ivan Clark
Primary Author(s)
John Heiser
Project Manager
Elizabeth Huber
Office Manager
SAFETY AND RELABILITY OFFICE
Geoffrey Lesh
Office Manager
ENGINEERING OFFICE
Shawn Pittard
Deputy Director
SITING, TRANSMISSION, & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIVISION Drew Bohan
Executive Director
DISCLAIMER
Staff members of the California Energy Commission (CEC) prepared this report. As such, it does not necessarily
represent the views of the CEC, its employees, or the State of California. The CEC, the State of California, its employees, contractors, and subcontractors make no warrant, express or implied, and assume no legal liability for the information in this report; nor does any party represent that the uses of this information will not infringe upon privately owned rights. This report has not been approved or disapproved by the CEC nor has the Commission passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of the information in this report.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Acknowledgements
California Energy Commission
Jared Babula
Tom Chesy
John Heiser
Caryn Holmes
Shahab Khoshmashrab
Kenneth Salyphone
Sandy Ito
Kirk Oliver
Nicolas Oliver
Hung Pham
James Qaqundah
Dian Vorters
California Public Utilities Commission
James Cheng
Nika Kjensli
Chris Lee
Stephen Lee
Leslie L. Palmer
Naveed Paydar
City of Hayward
Alex Ameri
Garrett Contreras
Kelly McAdoo
i
West Peak Energy
Paul Trygstad
Ivan Clark
Kenny Smith
ii
GLOSSARY
AIR CONTAMINENTS — Dust, fumes, mist, smoke, other particulate matter, vapor, gas, odorous substances, or any combination thereof.
BLACK START — The process of restoring an electric power station or part of an electric grid to operation without relying on the external electric transmission network to recover from a total or partial shutdown.
BUSHING — A metal lining for a round hole, especially one in which an axle revolves.
CENTRIFUGAL — Moving or tending to move away from a center.
COMBUSTION TURBINE (CT) — A turbine driven by expanding hot gases produced by burning fuel, such as natural gas.
DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEM — A computerized control system for a process or plant usually with many control loops, in which autonomous controllers are distributed throughout the system, but there is no central operator supervisory control.
GALLING — A form of wear caused by adhesion between sliding surfaces.
GENERATOR — A dynamo or similar machine for converting mechanical energy into electricity.
HEAT RECOVERY STEAM GENERATOR (HRSG) — An energy recovery heat exchanger that recovers heat from a hot gas stream, such as combustion turbine or other waste gas stream.
It produces steam that can be used to drive a steam turbine.
ISOLATION VALVE — Stops the flow of process media to a given location, usually for maintenance or safety purposes.
LOCKOUT TAGOUT (LOTO) — A safety procedure used in industry to ensure that dangerous machines are properly shut off and not able to be started up again prior to the completion of maintenance or repair work.
MOTORING — A process when the steam turbine generator (STG) is connected to the electric grid but instead of outputting power to the grid, it is taking power from the electric grid.
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT — A tank, vessel, pipe, transport vessel or equipment intended to serve as the main container for or used for the transfer of a material.
REHEAT — The process by which additional energy is added to steam to increase the efficiency of the steam cycle.
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT — A control measure placed or built around a storage vessel to prevent its contents from corroding or polluting the adjacent environment. iii
STEAM ATTEMPERATOR — Located in the steam pipe work upstream of the steam turbine that allows very fine control of the final steam temperature by spraying precise amounts of water into the steam flow.
STEAM TURBINE (ST) — A machine that extracts thermal energy from pressurized steam and uses it to do mechanical work on a rotating output shaft.
STEAM TURBINE GENERATOR (STG) — A device that uses steam, produced from a heat recovery steam generator, to drive the blades of a turbine to produce mechanical energy that can then be used to produce electricity by causing rotation of the central shaft of a mechanically connected generator.
STOP/CHECK VALVE — A valve with override control to stop flow regardless of flow direction or pressure.
THRUST BEARING — A bearing designed to absorb thrusts parallel to the axis of rotation.
WATER INDUCTION — The process by which water finds itself entering the steam turbine.
WORM GEAR — A gear consisting of a shaft with a spiral thread that engages and drives a toothed wheel and changes the rotational movement by 90 degrees.
ZERO LIQUID DISCHARGE (ZLD) — A strategic wastewater management system that ensures that there will be no discharge of industrial wastewater into the environment. iv
ABSTRACT
On Friday, May 28, 2021, at 2:27 p.m., the California Energy Commission (CEC) was informed by Russell City Energy Center that it was in a forced outage because of a serious steam turbine generator incident at 11:47 p.m. on May 27, 2021. During Russell City Energy Center night shift’s normal shutdown procedures for taking the power plant offline, an incident in the steam turbine generator occurred causing an onsite explosion and fire.
The CEC’s Siting, Transmission and Environmental Protection Division maintains a comprehensive compliance monitoring and enforcement program to ensure that permitted thermal power plants are constructed, operated, and decommissioned in accordance with their conditions of certification and all applicable laws, ordinances, regulations, and standards. The CEC’s post-certification compliance monitoring and enforcement authority can be found in Public Resources Code sections 25532 to 25534.2 and Title 20, California Code of Regulations, sections 1751 to 1770, as well as in conditions of certification within facility licenses.
Under this authority, the Russell City Energy Center May 2021 Incident: Root Cause Gap Analysis was developed to summarize the CEC’s investigation into the factors that contributed to the May 27, 2021, incident and to determine what corrective actions would be required for the Russell City Energy Center to safely restart operations. In addition to determining the causal factors of the May 27, 2021, events, the CEC focused its investigation on worker safety, fire safety, hazardous materials, onsite physical security, and other conditions of certification as warranted.
v
Keywords: combined cycle, combustion turbine, control valve, explosion, fire, forced outage, incident, steam turbine generator, water induction, heat recovery steam generator, steam, lube oil, Hayward, Russell City Energy Center
Please use the following citation for this report:
California Energy Commission Staff, Russell City Energy Center May 2021 Incident: Root Cause Gap Analysis. California Energy Commission. Publication Number: CEC-700-2022-004. vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Russell City Energy Center May 2021 Incident: Root Cause Gap Analysis.................................i Acknowledgements (Optional) ..............................................................................................i Glossary ............................................................................................................................ iii Abstract .............................................................................................................................v Table of Contents.............................................................................................................. vii List of Figures.................................................................................................................. viii List of Tables ................................................................................................................... viii Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1: Russell City Energy Center................................................................................4 Introduction.................................................................................................4 Combined-Cycle Configuration ......................................................................4 Russell City Energy Center ............................................................................5 Background............................................................................................................................................................ 5 Incident ................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Investigation .......................................................................................................................................................... 6 CHAPTER 2: Incident Investigation ......................................................................................8 Introduction.................................................................................................8 Initial Site Inspection....................................................................................9 Follow-Up Site Inspection ...........................................................................11 Fire Department Response..........................................................................13 Compliance Inspection................................................................................14 Root Cause Analysis ...................................................................................14 CHAPTER 3: Technical Analysis..........................................................................................16 Incident Causation .....................................................................................16 Gap Audit Conclusions ................................................................................18 Equipment Maintenance and Monitoring Program.........................................18 Control Room Operator Interface and Training.............................................19 Inadequate Water Induction Protection .......................................................20 Public Safety..............................................................................................23 CHAPTER 4: Conclusions ...................................................................................................24 Corrective Actions ......................................................................................24 APPENDIX A: Joint State Agency Investigation Team Document Requests ..............................1 vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1.1: Combined-Cycle Configuration ............................................................................5 Figure 1.2: Russell City Energy Center HRSG ........................................................................6 Figure 2.1: Steam Turbine Generator .................................................................................10 Figure 2.2: Debris Field .....................................................................................................12 Figure 2.3: RCEC Metal Piece.............................................................................................13 Figure 3.1: Russell City HRSG Reheater Schematic..............................................................17
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1: RCEC Investigation Timeline ................................................................................8 Table A.1: Document Request Timeline ................................................................................1 viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On May 27, 2021, around 11:47 p.m., the Russell City Energy Center experienced a mechanical failure of the steam turbine generator that resulted in an explosion that threw dozens of metal pieces off the project site and resulted in an onsite fire requiring response by the Hayward, Alameda County, and Fremont Fire Departments. The steam turbine generator was severely damaged. In addition to the immediate public health and safety threat, this incident resulted in a loss of 600 megawatts (MW) of generating capacity from the grid.
Fortunately, there were no injuries and the lube oil mixed with fire suppression water was contained with no adverse impact to nearby waterways.
Structural Integrity Associates, an independent consultant retained by the project owner, Russell City Energy Center, LLC, a subsidiary of Calpine Corporation, performed a root cause analysis of the incident. The consultant’s root cause analysis was released to CEC staff on November 24, 2021. The root cause analysis concluded that there was only one cause of the incident: “The systems' inability to detect and drain excess water under pressure and at high temperature within the reheater system is the root cause of the STG drivetrain event at RCEC.”
To independently investigate the incident, both the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the California Energy Commission (CEC) inspection units established a Joint State Agency Investigation Team (JAIT). The investigation team conducted an examination and review of the power plant and associated documents, independently assessed the findings from the root cause analysis, and investigated gaps identified in that report.
The investigation team found that Structural Integrity Associates’ root cause analysis was limited in the scope of its analysis and restoration recommendations. Both the CPUC and the CEC concluded that further investigation to more broadly capture the causal factors to the incident was needed. The investigation team focused its site inspections not only on the power train involved in the incident, the steam turbine and electrical generator and associated heat recovery steam generator, but also examined facility operations, maintenance, and management practices that may have contributed to the causation of this incident.
The investigation team determined that there were three causal factors to the incident. The factors included: deficiencies in maintenance for some critical equipment, deficiencies in control room operator interface and training, and inadequate protection from water induction.
These factors led the investigation team to develop corrective actions to address the deficiencies that contributed to the incident, which are contained in Chapter 4 of this report.
Successful completion of the required corrective actions would directly address the causes of the May 27, 2021, incident and provide protective measures to further reduce the likelihood of future steam turbine overspeed due to water induction.
The activities of the JAIT were strengthened through collaboration between the agencies’ complementary approaches to execution of their respective regulatory authorities which added 1 both depth and breadth of technical knowledge and investigative expertise. This allowed the team to quickly uncover the causal factors that contributed to the incident and to provide the required corrective actions needed to reduce the possibility of a reoccurrence of this type of incident. Successful completion of the corrective actions will enable the Russell City Energy Center to return to operation safely.
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3 CHAPTER 1:
Russell City Energy Center
Introduction
The California Energy Commission (CEC) has jurisdiction and permitting authority for thermal power plants 50 megawatts (MW) and greater in California. This jurisdiction also includes infrastructure associated with thermal power plants, including electric transmission lines, natural gas lines, and water pipelines. The CEC’s permitting process ensures that proposed thermal power plants are designed, constructed, and operated in a manner that protects public health and safety, promotes the general welfare, and preserves environmental quality.
As a certified regulatory program, the licensing process is the functional equivalent of a California Environmental Quality Act review and includes coordination with local, state, and federal agencies to ensure that these agencies’ permit requirements are incorporated. There are 76 power plants operating under CEC licenses, totaling roughly 26,600 MW. Of these, 41 operate in gas-fired combined-cycle configuration.
Combined-Cycle Configuration
A combined-cycle power plant generates electrical power by the combination of a combustion turbine generator (CTG) burning fuel to operate its own electrical generator, and a steam turbine generator (STG) using the high temperature waste heat from the CTG exhaust to generate additional electrical power. Thermodynamically, the CTG operates on what is called a Brayton energy cycle, and the waste heat in its exhaust is captured by a heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) to make steam. The steam is then sent through pipes to the STG which operates on what is called a Rankine cycle. When both cycles operate simultaneously, the operation is called a combined-cycle configuration. Because the Rankine cycle makes electrical power from what would have been wasted heat in the CTG exhaust gas, the combined-cycle configuration is more efficient. It makes more electrical power from the same amount of fuel.
The overall efficiency of a combined-cycle power plant can be up to 60 percent more efficient than other fossil-fueled generating sources. The high efficiency of a combined-cycle configuration also reduces the overall air emissions per megawatt-hour.
In the combined-cycle process, the CTG compresses air and mixes it with fuel that is heated to a very high temperature. The hot air-fuel mixture moves through the CTG blades, making them spin. The spinning CTG drives a generator that converts a portion of the spinning energy into electricity. The HRSG captures waste heat exhaust from the CTG that would otherwise escape through the exhaust stack. The HRSG creates steam from the CTG exhaust heat and delivers it to the STG. The STG turns the generator drive shaft, where it is converted into additional electricity.
There are many different configurations for combined-cycle power plants, but typically each combustion turbine has an associated HRSG, and one or more HRSGs supply steam to a single 4 Combustion Turbine
Generator
Combustion Turbine
Generator
< < < <
< < <
<
HRSG
L
HRSG
L
I 2x1 Combined Cycle I
T
Steam
Turbine
Generator
Steam Condenser
.. ..... 1 Coo ling System I
steam turbine. For example, at a power plant in a 2x1 configuration, two combustion turbines/HRSGs supply steam to one STG; likewise, there can be 1x1 or 3x1 configurations.
The STG is custom-made to match the number and capacity for any combustion turbine/HRSG configuration (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Combined-Cycle Configuration
Combined-cycle configuration showing a 2x1 operation
Credit: California Energy Commission
Russell City Energy Center
Background
The Russell City Energy Center (RCEC) is a 600 megawatt (MW) natural gas-fired, 2x1 design, combined-cycle power plant located in Hayward (Alameda County). The project was certified in September 2002 and began commercial operation in August 2013. In February 2019, the CEC approved a project amendment allowing RCEC to install a 10 MW battery energy storage 5 system in response to the California Independent System Operator’s selection of the facility to provide black start battery energy storage capability should the grid go down and need a “jump start” to come back online.
The RCEC consists of two Siemens Westinghouse F-class CTGs; two HRSG’s; a single condensing GE D11 STG; a de-aerating surface condenser; a mechanical draft hybrid wet/dry plume-abated cooling tower. To control emissions of air pollutants, RCEC has gas turbines with dry, low nitrogen oxide (NOx) burners. The units use the best available control technology including selective catalytic reduction for control of NOx.
Figure 1.2: Russell City Energy Center HRSG
View of heat recovery steam generator from ground level Credit: California Energy Commission
Incident
Around 11:47 p.m. on May 27, 2021, RCEC experienced a mechanical failure of a STG that resulted in an explosion that threw dozens of metal pieces off the project site and resulted in an onsite fire requiring responses by the Hayward, Alameda County, and Fremont Fire Departments. The STG was severely damaged. In addition to the immediate public health and safety threat, this incident resulted in a loss of 600 MW of generating capacity from the grid.
Investigation
To investigate the RCEC incident, both the CEC and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) inspection units established a Joint State Agency Investigation Team (JAIT). Along with the JAIT’s engineering and subject matter experts, third-party independent consultants, 6 Aspen Environmental Group, and West Peak Energy, were hired to support the JAIT’s 10- month investigation. The JAIT conducted:
Comprehensive inspections of the site on 12 different occasions including a three-day onsite gap-audit.
Weekly JAIT meetings.
Site tours for the five CEC commissioners, the CEC executive director, and the CPUC President.
Independent review and analysis of Structural Integrity Associates’ (SIA) root cause analysis report commissioned by the project owner.
Formal requests for information for more than 100 documents including maintenance reports, operation records, and other agency site visit reports such as from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
In-depth assessment of the documents and reports.
Interviews of several onsite witnesses and first responders.
The JAIT and the independent consultants conducted examinations and independent reviews of the facility and assessed the findings of the root cause analysis and supplemented gaps in the RCA Report. The JAIT’s focus included the equipment involved in the incident, the HRSG system, and any facility operations, maintenance, and management practices that may have contributed to the potential for this incident to occur. 7 CHAPTER 2:
Incident Investigation
Introduction
Under Public Resources Code section 25532 and Title 20, California Code of Regulations, section 1770, and the conditions of certification of CEC-issued facility licenses, CEC staff oversees a compliance monitoring and enforcement program. This includes inspection and enforcement activities to ensure that all CEC-jurisdictional electric generating facilities are operating in compliance with air and water quality, public health and safety, and other applicable regulations, guidelines, and conditions adopted or established by the CEC or specified in the license’s conditions of certification. Because of the seriousness of the RCEC incident, the CEC inspection team and multi-agency leadership visited the facility on several occasions, as summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: RCEC Investigation Timeline
Visit Date Agencies Represented Event
June 7, 2021 CEC and CPUC inspections
team
Initial inspection of the explosion and
fire site and interviewing employees,
first responders, and witnesses
August 3, 2021 CEC and CPUC inspections
teams
Establishing coordination with City of
Hayward. Met with Hayward Fire
Chief onsite to discuss the incident
and future coordination
August 5, 2021 CEC, CPUC, Hayward Fire
Department (they are the
local Certified Unified
Program Agency), and City
of Hayward’s City
Manager’s Office (COH)
Meeting to present the results of the
CPUC’s 2019 Audit, corrective actions
identified and implemented, discuss
RCA process and timeline, and site
inspection
August 16, 2021 CEC Chair David Hochschild
and former STEP Lead
Commissioner Karen
Douglas, Hayward Mayor
and Fire Chief, and CEC,
CPUC and COH staff
Overview of the CPUC 2019 Audit,
tour of explosion and fire site. Also
toured the Hayward’s Navigation
Center (transitional facility for the
unhoused) where a metal piece of
the STG penetrated the roof
August 19, 2021 CEC Commissioners
Andrew McAllister and
Overview of the CPUC 2019 Audit,
tour of explosion and fire site. Also
8 Patricia Monahan, Hayward
Mayor and Fire Chief, and
CEC, CPUC and COH staff
toured the Hayward’s Navigation
Center (transitional facility for the
unhoused) where a metal piece of
the STG penetrated the roof
August 27, 2021 CEC Vice Chair Siva Gunda
and former CPUC President
Marybel Batjer, Hayward
Mayor and Fire Chief, and
CEC, CPUC and COH staff
Overview of the CPUC 2019 Audit,
tour of explosion and fire site. Also
toured the Hayward’s Navigation
Center (transitional facility for the
unhoused) where a metal piece of
the STG penetrated the roof
October 19,
2021
CEC inspection team A compliance inspection of plant to review whether RCEC was in
conformance with the Conditions of
Certification
November 30,
2021
CEC, CPUC, CUPA, and
COH staff
Presentation from Structural Integrity
Associates on the Root Cause
Analysis Report and recommended
corrective actions, Q&A, and site
inspection
January 3, 2022 CEC and CPUC leadership
and staff, CUPA and COH
staff
Briefing on Structural Integrity
Associate’s Root Cause Analysis
Report and Corrective Actions, and
site tour and inspection
February 7 – 9,
2022
CEC and CPUC inspections
teams and expert
consultants from Aspen
Environmental Group and
West Peak Energy
Comprehensive onsite investigation
and gap-audit of the explosion and
fire site
March 21, 2022 CEC and CPUC inspection
teams
Corrective actions and timeline
presentation to Calpine’s RCEC
management
Source: California Energy Commission
Initial Site Inspection
In response to the May 2021 incident, the CEC staff initiated its investigation with an onsite inspection on June 7, 2021, to assess the damage from the STG failure and subsequent fire. 9 The CEC staff started at the STG structure deck and observed that the thrust bearings for the STG were exposed, and lube oil released.
Figure 2.1: Steam Turbine Generator
General Electric Model D11 Steam Turbine Generator Graphic Credit: Technical Training Professionals
During the initial onsite inspection, the CEC staff observed that the STG shaft was fractured at the exit point of the intermediate pressure (IP) section to the low-pressure section, and the shaft was ejected from the STG. The CEC staff examined the turbine shaft that entered the low-pressure (LP) section and found that the shaft was twisted. The metal casing of the LP section had separated, breaking bolts in the process.
The black charring and soot in the area around the casing were clear evidence that there was a fire at the exit of the LP section to the steam turbine’s generator. The LP section casing was severely damaged from the overspeed event. The drive shaft connecting the LP section to the generator was fractured at each end and had been thrown from the enclosure.
The various equipment on the STG structure deck also had extensive fire damage. The lube oil feed and return lines were severed and an estimated 4,000 gallons of lube oil was released which was contained by the secondary containment. The secondary containment was a concrete berm that surrounded the lube oil reservoir and the area beneath the STG. However, the water used by the Hayward Fire Department (HFD) to extinguish the STG fire collected in the secondary containment. Eventually the volume of water caused the secondary containment to overflow. The lube oil mixed with water made its way out to the stormwater retention pond of the site.
10 On the night of the incident, the HFD’s initial response was to contain the lube oil on site. They deployed booms in the stormwater retention pond and in one of the drainage canals from where the lube oil mixed with water was coming. The day after the initial release of the lube oil mixed with water the RCEC hired Environmental Logistics to do the required remediation work. The RCEC also hired a third-party biologist to survey the stormwater retention pond and the channel that feeds out to the San Francisco Bay. The biologist confirmed that no lube oil had made it off site.
The CEC staff surveyed the extent of the lube oil spill by starting at the outflow of the stormwater retention pond. The CEC was able to conclude that there was no immediate danger of lube oil leaving the site since the retention pond had sufficient capacity. The CEC staff inspected the surrounding area rocks, plants, and water and found no evidence of a lube oil spill in the outflow. However, there was evidence that lube oil entered the retention pond from the drainage canal behind the cooling tower of the power plant. The CEC staff also inspected the remediation work that was being conducted by Environmental Logistics.
Follow-Up Site Inspection
Staff returned to the RCEC site August 3, 2021, to examine the locations where metal pieces from the STG had landed after the incident. Representatives from the CPUC and the HFD also accompanied the CEC staff on this inspection. The CEC staff visited the Hayward Pollution Water Control Facility (HPWCF) and the Hayward Navigation Center to investigate where metal pieces from the STG had landed.
The CEC staff met with the HPWCF plant manager to examine the metal pieces thrown onto the site and to inspect any damage to the HPWCF facility. CEC staff learned from the plant manager that:
Some large metal pieces, weighing between 10 to 50 lbs., were found in the HPWCF drying beds southwest of RCEC. The pieces consisted of LP turbine blade parts and a large part of the LP turbine casing (Figure 2.2).
Some smaller metal pieces were found within the HPWCF facility to the east of RCEC that consisted mostly of copper (Figure 2.2).
Water treatment plant personnel sheltered in place during the fire with no injuries reported.
No structural damage occurred to the HPWCF facility.
11 Figure 2.2: Debris Field
Steam turbine generator debris field
Credit: California Energy Commission
The CEC staff then inspected the Hayward Navigation Center complex and met with the Housing Care Coordinator for Bay Area Community Services, the organization that operates the Hayward Navigation Center. Using data from the inspections at the HPWCF facility and the Hayward Navigation Center complex, the CEC staff created a map of the metal pieces found (Figure 2.2). Most of the metal pieces were found to the west of RCEC. These steel metal pieces ranged up to 50 lbs. Most of the small copper pieces of metal were found toward the east side of the power plant. The locations of the metal pieces released during the overspeed event are consistent with having been thrown from a rotating shaft.
The outlier of the debris field is the 12-pound piece of the LP turbine blade root. The blade root was discovered in the Hayward Navigation Center complex (Figure 2.2). The Hayward Navigation Center complex has multiple trailers on site serving people experiencing homelessness. The trailer used for meal preparation and eating was damaged when the 12- 12 pound metal piece traveled 1,200 feet, penetrated through the trailer’s roof, and landed on the floor (Figure 2.3). No individuals were in the trailer at the time since it was after operating hours. There was no damage to the floor of the trailer.
Figure 2.3: RCEC Metal Piece
The metal piece traveled approximately 1,200 feet and weighed 12 lbs.
Credit: Hayward Navigation Center Staff
Fire Department Response
The HFD was the first responder to the RCEC STG incident and requested back-up from the Alameda County Fire Department and the Fremont Fire Department. The CEC staff interviewed the HFD battalion chief who was the incident commander on the night of the STG incident. At the gate, RCEC personnel informed the battalion chief that 45 hydrogen cylinders could be exposed to the onsite fire. The battalion chief established fire engine teams in various locations around the site. The main emphasis was to contain the fire at the STG deck structure. Some of the fire engine teams were dispatched to help contain the lube oil/fire water that had escaped from secondary containment. CEC staff corroborated these events by reviewing the incident reports and radio recordings from the three responding fire departments.
During the fire department’s response, four fire fighters suffered injuries. There was concern from the HFD that the fire fighters could have been exposed to toxic air contaminants.
Because of this concern, the JAIT required that the RCEC conduct a separate analysis to determine if there was toxic exposure to the fire fighters. Jensen Hughes, a third-party consultant, analyzed the combustion byproducts from the incident fire. Their analysis determined that the fire did not produce environmental toxins that are untypical of an 13 industrial fire. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the fire fighters were exposed to any unexpected environmental toxins by responding to the incident.
During one of the interviews with the HFD battalion chief, the CEC staff learned that there was a possible accident involving a vehicle hitting debris in the roadway on State Highway 92 near the toll plaza the night of the incident. The CEC staff reached out to the local California Highway Patrol (CHP) office for more information on the possible accident. The Hayward CHP office had no record of an accident that night matching that description in its jurisdiction.
However, the Hayward CHP office mentioned that it could have occurred in the Redwood City CHP’s jurisdiction. The CEC staff followed up in person October 19, 2021, at the Redwood City CHP office to ask if they had any records of a possible accident on the night of the RCEC incident. Redwood City CHP personnel reviewed the records and confirmed that there were no accidents matching the description the night of the incident. Therefore, the CEC staff concluded that there is no evidence of an accident on State Highway 92 from the STG debris from RCEC.
Compliance Inspection
The CEC maintains a compliance monitoring and enforcement program to ensure that permitted thermal power plants are constructed, operated, and decommissioned in accordance with the associated conditions of certification and all applicable laws, ordinances, regulations, and standards. The CEC’s post-certification compliance monitoring and enforcement authority can be found in Public Resources Code sections 25532 to 25534.2 and Title 20, California Code of Regulations, sections 1751 to 1770, as well as in conditions of certification within facility licenses. Physical compliance inspections are one tool that the CEC uses to maintain the compliance monitoring and enforcement program. The RCEC compliance inspection conducted October 19, 2021, focused on the areas of security, worker safety, hazardous materials management, and fire protection systems and maintenance. The CEC staff requested and reviewed documentation from RCEC related to worker safety, hazardous materials management, and fire protection systems and maintenance.
The compliance inspection included visual observation of the fire protection systems, site security, hazardous materials management, chemical storage, STG, water treatment area and associated bulk chemicals, and the zero-liquid-discharge (ZLD) system of the facility. The ZLD system had several lock-out tag-out (LOTO) tags on the electrical supply and control panels to prevent the ZLD system from activating. The CEC staff witnessed LOTO’s on several major systems throughout the plant. Material and equipment were also stored in various locations around the facility to prepare for the repair of the STG. The CEC staff observed that the plant appeared to be acceptably maintained.
Root Cause Analysis
The JAIT requested additional information regarding operations prior to the STG incident (Appendix A). Documentation related to the control system for the facility was reviewed along with piping and instrumentation diagrams for the STG and HRSG. 14 The root cause analysis was released to the CEC and the CPUC on November 24, 2021. The JAIT reviewed the root cause analysis and confirmed it by reviewing various reports, data, and documentation that the JAIT requested throughout the investigation. The JAIT determined that the root cause analysis was silent or did not go far enough in some areas, including maintenance, control room operator interface and training, and inadequate water induction protection. This determination required the JAIT to conduct a “gap” analysis to fill in the areas where the root cause analysis was lacking and address several unanswered “why” questions.
RCEC was informed of the upcoming audit on January 13, 2022. The JAIT conducted the audit of RCEC from February 7 to February 9, 2022, in support of the gap analysis. 15 CHAPTER 3:
Technical Analysis
Incident Causation
As RCEC’s night shift operating crew was going through its scheduled shutdown process on the evening of May 27, 2021, the facility suffered a serious incident that resulted in an explosion of the STG and subsequent fire involving released lubrication oil. Before the incident, the RCEC had been operating in a 1x1 configuration, with Combustion Turbine 2 (CT-2) and the associated HRSG-2 in operation. CT-2 was producing electricity, and HRSG-2 was producing steam to drive the STG. While the RCEC was operating in this 1x1 configuration, Combustion Turbine 1 (CT-1) and the associated HRSG-1 were offline and not operating. The RCEC had been in this operational configuration for about two days. Unknown to the power plant’s control room operator and onsite crew, the on-line HRSG-1 cold reheat isolation valve (CRH-1), designed to prevent steam being produced by the operating HRSG-2 from entering the reheat section of the offline HRSG-1, failed to close completely and allowed steam to leak past it. The CRH-1 valve’s actuator erroneously signaled to the control room operator that the valve had closed completely.
Over the two days operating in that 1x1 configuration, the steam produced in HRSG-2 continued to leak past the CRH-1 valve into the offline and much cooler HRSG-1 causing the steam to condense into water. Enough water condensed in the offline HRSG-1 to collect a substantial quantity of water in the section of the offline HRSG-1 known as the reheater (Figure 3.1). Because of the large quantity and high temperature of the condensing superheated steam, the condensed water remained near its boiling point and at an elevated pressure.
16 FAILED TO
COMPLETELY
CLOSE
"Cold Reheat"
Steam Lines CRH
(Return from
HP turb ine)
HRSG #1
"Hot Reheat "
Steam Lines HRH
SEIZED IN
OPEN POSITION
! "Closed D rains" !
J Hea der I
i CRV-2 ►
One -way
Stop/C heck
Valves
IP Turbine
Figure 3.1: Russell City HRSG Reheater Schematic
Schematic of RCEC’s HRSG reheater path to the IP section of the steam turbine Credit: California Energy Commission
As is normal during a shutdown, the steam pressure being supplied by HRSG-2 began a gradual, but steady, decline. At a point during the shutdown, the pressure being supplied by the HRSG-2 to the STG, dropped to a lower level than the pressure in HRSG-1, which was being maintained at its saturation (i.e., boiling) temperature. This situation allowed the accumulated water in the HRSG-1 to enter the IP section of the STG supply piping and flow past the hot reheat stop/check valve (HRH-1) and control valve (CRV-2) of the STG. The introduction of the cooler condensed water to the CRV-2 valve, located at the entrance to the IP section of the STG, caused it to seize in the open position.
As water flowed into the IP section of the STG, the power output of the STG began to fluctuate, then dropped suddenly to below zero output. At this instant, the STG control system initiated “motoring” of the generator, which is a term used when the STG is connected to the grid but is absorbing rather than putting out power to the grid. When motoring, the STG uses grid power to maintain the required 3600-rpm rotational speed. After about 30 seconds of motoring, the STG had yet to recover outputting electrical power, the automatic controls ceased the motoring, and the controls opened the breakers to disconnect the STG’s generator from the grid. Over the next few seconds, as the water cleared from the STG, with the CRV-2 valve of the STG still seized in the open position allowing steam to continue flowing, and with 17 no generator load to slow the rotation, the STG began to spin freely. From this point on, the STG increased rotational speed until it was torn apart by centrifugal forces.
Gap Audit Conclusions
A review of SIA’s root cause analysis provided an understanding of how the conclusions in the root cause analysis were determined. The JAIT determined that a broader scope of investigation was needed. The JAIT conducted interviews and technical discussions with RCEC staff and reviewed technical documents and operational logs onsite at the RCEC for three days from February 7 through February 9, 2022.
Following the onsite investigations and review of collected data, the JAIT concluded that the root cause of the event included three essential causal factors:
1. Steam leakage past the not-completely closed CRH-1 steam isolation valve allowed water to condense and accumulate in the out-of-service HRSG-1 reheater section.
2. Accumulated water was not detected and drained from the HRSG-1.
3. The HRH-1 stop/check valve in the steam line between the HRSG-1 reheat section and the STG had not been closed into a blocked position which allowed the water to be drawn into the IP section of the STG as described above in “Incident Causation.” The JAIT also determined that the key contributing conditions associated with the factors were:
1. Maintenance failures were associated with critical components.
2. Critical control system alarm points at RCEC are not “aggregated” into one alarm point system (annunciator), and operators are expected to monitor several systems during critical events, leading to a loss of situational awareness so that they could not react to the fact that a substantial amount of water had accumulated in HRSG-1.
3. The operations staff failed to identify the manually operated stop/check valve as a potentially critical blocking valve should water collection occur in the offline reheat steam piping.
To address the identified causal factors and key contributing conditions, the JAIT identified a set of corrective actions for implementation at the RCEC that the JAIT determined were necessary to ensure that the risk of a similar water induction incident occurring in the future is eliminated to the degree feasible by deploying redundant systems of prevention and detection.
Equipment Maintenance and Monitoring Program
The failure of the CRH-1 valve to close properly was identified as one of the causal factors of the incident by both SIA and the JAIT. SIA’s root cause analysis found that its actuator/gearbox assembly was degraded with severely worn internals of the gearbox. SIA’s root cause analysis concluded that the damage to the gearbox was caused by a heavily damaged gear box worm shaft roller bearing. The bearing components had been trapped within the worm and quarter gear further damaging the gearbox. This damage increased the gearbox backlash and resulted in reduced valve stroke.
18 The JAIT also observed evidence of inadequate lubrication and water intrusion into the gearbox. The CRH-1 valve stem packing showed lack of lubrication and extreme wear of its bushings. The resulting surface galling (pitting wear) would have required higher-than-normal actuation forces. Broken and chipped quarter-gear teeth in the gearbox were evidence of the gearbox operating under higher than designed-for loads, consistent with higher-than-normal valve torque required to compensate for the worn valve stem bushings. Maintenance records for the valve actuator reviewed by the JAIT showed that the actuation torque had been increased multiple times, and the actuator required replacement during the previous period, spanning more than a year.
Regular service inspections and lubrication would have likely detected or prevented the extreme wear that contributed to the failure of the valve to close. The JAIT recommends that the RCEC implement a regular preventative maintenance plan for this critical component. The preventative maintenance program will include the valve, gearbox, and actuator assemblies including the frequency of inspections, scope of services, and lubrication requirements. The JAIT will review the new preventative maintenance program to be developed by the RCEC.
Control Room Operator Interface and Training
The Mark VI control system of the STG was not fully integrated into the overall distributed control system (DCS) for the power plant. Therefore, the RCEC control room operators were responsible for monitoring the outputs from both the Mark VI control system and the DCS.
With multiple control systems operating in parallel, there is potential for operator confusion from nuisance alarms when the DCS system does not have all the power plant alarm points in a single system with levels of priority established for all of them. When alarm points are consolidated into one system, such as the DCS at the RCEC, the alarms can be organized into priority levels depending on importance and urgency.
The JAIT recommends that the Mark VI high priority alarm points be integrated into the DCS.
The reasoning is that the RCEC operators “can only see one thing at a time,” and in critical events the operator should have to view only one area for high-priority alarms which can be acted upon without confusion or delay. Furthermore, the integration of the Mark VI into the DCS allows for the application of a smart alarm logic system which can assist operators with nuisance alarms. Alarms in a repair state or nuisance depending on the order of importance can be suppressed so operators do not miss critical alarm notifications.
An additional complication for the control room operators identified from the gap audit was the lack of a unified clock for the control systems. The RCEC uses a DCS that controls the power plant that has a clock that stamps alarm times for various errors and conditions. The Mark VI also has its own clock that stamps STG alarms with times, but the times were not in agreement with there being a one-hour and 56-minute difference between the two control systems’ clocks. With alarms and alerts being sent to the operator simultaneously by the two control systems, but having discrepant timestamps almost two hours apart, it is difficult to confirm their order of arrival and timeliness, both during and after critical events. The JAIT recommends that the RCEC consolidate the time and date stamp for the DCS and Mark VI control systems so that they remain synchronized.
19 The JAIT also identified a need for additional training for the control room operators and developed a corrective action to require that the RCEC implement new training procedures for water induction events. Over the two days of 1x1 operation preceding the event, the control room operator was unable to identify the accumulation of water or the higher-than-expected pressure in the offline HRSG-1. This lack of knowledge demonstrated a lack of operator training for water induction events. Therefore, the procedure will be targeted toward assuring that operators have the proper authority and are trained to immediately act when certain indications suggest the possibility of water induction either before or during an event. The damage to the STG could have been avoided had the operators been provided situational awareness and adequate training enabling them to take appropriate and timely action.
For completeness, the JAIT reviewed the trip alarm sequencing that occurred during the incident to confirm that the STG was motoring for almost 30 seconds before the steam turbine’s generator primary protective relay device tripped the STG from the electrical grid. No evidence of noncompliance was found. Known as the “86-relay systems,” their design, installation, and operations are governed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) regulations and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) design codes. The JAIT reviewed and verified that these advanced diagnostic systems were configured, calibrated, and operated as designed per the relevant industry codes and standard guidelines.
Inadequate Water Induction Protection
At the time that the RCEC submitted construction design plans to the CEC’s Chief Building Official for approval, which established the applicable editions of building and engineering codes,1 RCEC was required to comply with all applicable California Building Codes and engineering laws, ordinances, regulations, and standards. The primary standard that addressed water induction at the time of the RCEC’s construction was the 2006 version of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) TDP-1 titled TDP-1-2006, Recommended Practices for the Prevention of Water Damage to Steam Turbines Used for Electric Power Generation: Fossil-Fueled Plants. This standard was considered voluntary guidance containing suggestions for steam power plant design features that “should” be considered and addressed.
However, Calpine’s Application for Certification for RCEC indicated that the ASME TDP-1 was “applicable to the mechanical aspects of the power facility” and represented that ASME TDP-1 1 RCEC Condition of Certification GEN-1 states:
The project owner shall design, construct and inspect the project in accordance with the 2001 California Building Code (CBC) and all other applicable engineering LORS in effect at the time initial design plans are submitted to the CBO for review and approval. (The CBC in effect is that edition that has been adopted by the California Building Standards Commission and published at least 180 days previously.) All transmission facilities (lines, switchyards, switching stations, and substations) are handled in Conditions of Certification in the Transmission System Engineering section of this document.
In the event that the initial engineering designs are submitted to the CBO when a successor to the 2001 CBC is in effect, the 2001 CBC provisions identified herein shall be replaced with the applicable successor provisions. Where, in any specific case, different sections of the code specify different materials, methods of construction, or other requirements, the most restrictive shall govern.
Where there is a conflict between a general requirement and a specific requirement, the specific requirement shall govern. (Emphasis added.) 20 was among the codes and standards that would be “used in the design and construction of mechanical engineering systems for the Russell City Energy Center (RCEC).”2 The basic philosophy of ASME TDP-1 is to prevent water damage to steam turbines by providing three layers of protection wherever practical. The first layer of protection would be to prevent the intrusion of steam condensate into piping locations where it could be reasonably expected for the steam condensate to be driven into the operating steam turbine’s inlets. Should the first layer fail, the second layer would be to detect and drain any substantial collections of water as they occur so that the steam condensate would not pose any subsequent risk to the STG. If the first and second layers fail, the third layer would prevent the release of any collected steam condensate to the STG by providing positive isolation via a blocking valve. Thus, by requiring three critical layers of protection, the possibility of a water induction event of this kind is reduced to a level of being extremely unlikely.
Typically, power plants’ design elements are selected through contract negotiations between the owner and the major construction company and suppliers. Hence, the level of adoption of the recommended practices, in this case ASME TDP-1, was left to the owner’s discretion. In the case of RCEC’s design, there was not complete adoption of ASME TDP-1 into the design and construction with respect to its protection against steam turbine water induction events.
Some practices that are recommended to be automated under ASME TDP-1 were left at the discretion of the operators to fulfill through manual procedures.
At the time of the incident, RCEC did not have adequate protection from all three ASME TDP-1 intended layers of protection. Interviews with Calpine staff verified that they did not trust the reliability of the temperature and pressure sensor network of the HRSGs to detect water accumulation when they were offline. Hence, the alarms coming from the offline HRSG (and reheater section) were not acted upon. SIA’s root cause analysis also considered the water detection to be unreliable in the offline HRSG. Thus, there was no effective water detection (second layer of protection) that would have enabled the operators to open HRSG drains to dispose of accumulated condensed water.
Also, the manually operated stop/check valve (HRH-1) at the end of the offline reheater section of HRSG-1 was left in an “unblocked” configuration. This meant the HRH-1 valve operated as a one-way “check” valve, capable only of preventing steam from entering the reheater section from the STG direction. It was not capable of preventing the exiting of condensed water from the reheater to the STG. Therefore, the HRH-1 valve did not act as a blocking valve, meaning there was no effective capture of condensed water (third layer of protection).
With no functioning second or third layers of water induction prevention, RCEC was dependent solely on the CRH-1 valve (first layer of protection) to prevent any water accumulation from occurring in the first place. This allowed for a potential single point failure for a water induction event. In the operational period leading up to the incident, the valve leaked steam 2 Russell City Energy Center AFC, Vol. II, at p. 10C-1. 21 past it, allowing substantial water accumulation in the HRSG-1 reheater. Without the functional protection from the second and third layers of protection, the accumulated water went undetected, undrained, and uncaptured, making its way into the steam turbine. A design goal of TDP-1’s recommendations is to avoid potential “single point failures” that can lead to water induction. Each of the three causal factors identified in Gap Audit Conclusions, can be associated with one of the three critical layers of protection described above.
The JAIT proposes as a corrective action that the RCEC perform a conformance analysis of the existing power plant against ASME TDP-1-2013 to determine what additional modifications should be made to reduce the possibility of a future water induction event. The JAIT review of the conformance analysis will ensure that practical modifications would be identified and implemented. In addition, the CEC’s Delegate Chief Building Official (DCBO) would ensure that these required modifications are implemented to required industry codes and standards.
Therefore, the identified changes from the conformance analysis will bring the practices of the RCEC in alignment, to the extent feasible, with the current version of ASME TDP-1-2013, Prevention of Water Damage to Steam Turbines Used for Electric Power Generation: Fossil- Fuel Plants.
SIA’s RCA provided a list of restoration recommendations based on their analysis of the incident. Their restoration recommendations included:
Implement controls logic to utilize existing HRSG reheated system drains to discharge water from the HRSG harps when offline.
Implement controls logic to utilize existing HRSG reheated system drains to alleviate undesirable pressure within the HRSG reheater system when offline. Re-configure the CRH stop valve to close based on its actuator torque value. Convert the HRH stop/check valve from manually operated to electrically actuated including the implementation of controls logic to positively isolate the offline HRH piping and HRSG Reheat.
In addition to the JAIT’s corrective actions, the JAIT agrees that SIA’s restoration recommendations are appropriate and should be implemented as corrective actions prior to RCEC resuming commercial operations. The first restoration recommendation would allow any accumulated water in the offline HRSG to be detected and drained in a timely manner. The second restoration recommendation would prevent the buildup of excess pressure while the HRSG is offline. The third restoration recommendation would improve the reliability of the CRH-1 valve in providing positive isolation and would reduce the likelihood of damage to its actuator and gearbox by preventing excess closing forces. The fourth restoration recommendation would prevent the HRH stop/check valves from remaining unblocked when the HRSG is offline, thus preventing any collected water from being drawn to the operating steam turbine. All these changes are consistent with assuring the three levels of protection discussed earlier as necessary for conformance with ASME TDP-1.
The SIA restoration recommendations will also require changes to the maintenance and operating procedures of the RCEC. Therefore, the JAIT has developed a corrective action to require that Calpine develop the necessary revised procedures needed for the implementation 22 of the SIA restoration recommendations and provide them for CEC review. This will ensure that the RCEC has correctly implemented the appropriate procedural updates based on the SIA restoration recommendations and that the CEC provides oversight appropriate to its licensing authority.
The JAIT examined other potential paths for water to get to the STG. One area of concern was the steam attemperators, devices that control the steam temperature. Steam attemperators and mixers spray high pressure feedwater or steam mixed with the feedwater into the main steam line and control final steam temperature to the turbine. Malfunctioning or leaking attemperators and mixers are known to be a potential source for water induction and are addressed in the 2013 version of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standard: ASME TDP-1, Prevention of Water Damage to Steam Turbines Used for Electric Power Generation: Fossil-Fuel Plants. Annual inspection procedures are recommended. The JAIT recommends that RCEC create an annual preventative maintenance program for the steam attemperators that will be reviewed and approved by the JAIT. This maintenance program would ensure that the steam attemperators are operating correctly and will further reduce the probability of water induction in the future.
Public Safety
The JAIT concluded that the STG overspeed and subsequent explosion was due to a water induction event. Water induction events are considered by the industry to be a low probability event with a potential high impact, including to the surrounding community, as confirmed by this STG failure. The JAIT recommends that the RCEC look at other systems on their facility that could present a similar low probability/high risk of impact on the surrounding community.
Candidate systems for review include ammonia storage, fuel gas systems, hydrogen storage, and battery energy storage systems. The CEC has tasked the DCBO to review these systems for code compliance and produce a report detailing its findings. Any deficiencies would be corrected by the RCEC. This will ensure that the four identified systems do not present significant risks.
23 ■
CHAPTER 4:
Conclusions
Corrective Actions
In response to the RCEC’s May 2021 incident, the focus of this report has been to highlight the JAIT’s investigative activities, provide an understanding of what occurred, and determine the appropriate corrective actions necessary to allow RCEC to return to operation safely.
After reviewing SIA’s root cause analysis, the JAIT conducted an audit to address some perceived gaps. This gap audit was necessary to determine whether there were contributing factors to the event that were outside the scope of, or not addressed in, SIA’s root cause analysis. After completing the gap audit, the JAIT determined that there were three overall casual factors to the water induction event: (1) deficiencies in maintenance for some critical equipment, such as the CRH-1 valve assembly, (2) deficiencies in control room operator interface and training, such as the inability to detect and respond to water accumulation in the offline HRSG, and (3) inadequate protection from water induction, such as reliance on a single valve to prevent accumulation in the offline HRSG. Corrective actions were developed to address these three casual factors.
The corrective actions for the equipment maintenance and monitoring program at the RCEC include:
For each HRSG, implement a preventative maintenance and monitoring program for the cold reheat (CRH-1) valve, gearbox and actuator assemblies that includes frequency of inspections, services, and lubrication for review and approval. For each HRSG, implement an annual preventative maintenance program for the steam attemperators and mixers for review and approval.
Revise operations procedures needed to accommodate implementation of SIA’s restoration recommendations for review and approval.
The corrective actions for the control room operator interface and training include:
Synchronize the internal clocks that generate the time and date stamps for alerts and alarms for both the Mark VI and the distributed control system. Review and evaluate the alarm and trip points of RCEC’s programmable logic controllers making them more sensitive to alarm settings, where appropriate.
Consolidate the alarms generated by the DCS and Mark VI control systems into a single control system to reduce the need for operations staff to monitor multiple systems simultaneously.
Reduce the occurrence of nuisance/false alarms by providing “smart alarm” logic in the consolidated DCS and Mark VI control systems and provide an updated operator training that includes water induction events along with evidence of its completion.
The corrective actions for inadequate water induction protection include:
24 Provide an ASME TDP-1-2013 conformance analysis for the RCEC. Provide the list of design modifications that are being implemented at RCEC based on the ASME TDP-1-2013 conformance analysis along with evidence of their completion. Implement the SIA restoration recommendations along with evidence of their completion.
These corrective actions contain a mix of operations and maintenance changes, improvements to operator notification systems to improve situational awareness, and upgrades to hardware and control system integration. These corrective actions would not expand the facility, change the performance of the facility, or require any changes to existing conditions of certification.
These corrective actions are required to be implemented prior to the facility restarting combined-cycle operations. Verification that the corrective actions have been completed will be achieved through review of documentation provided by RCEC and by onsite inspection by the DCBO and JAIT staff or retained consultants.
In addition to the required corrective actions for the water induction event, the JAIT also conducted an audit of other aspects of the power plant. This included tasking the CEC’s DCBO with reviewing several systems on site that could have potential for offsite consequences to the surrounding community and providing a report that will specify whether the systems are code compliant and will detail any deficiencies needing correction. Such inspections are periodically conducted to help ensure that the normal operation of the plant remains in compliance with applicable regulations and industry standards. Collectively, these nine corrective actions will address the three causal factors that were identified by the JAIT during the investigation. Completion of the above corrective actions by the RCEC would prevent, to the degree feasible, any future turbine overspeed events due to water induction by deploying redundant systems of prevention and detection.
25 APPENDIX A:
Joint State Agency Investigation Team Document Requests Table A.1 details the requested additional information for the events surrounding the STG incident.
Table A.1: Document Request Timeline
Document
Request Title Due Date Documents requested
DR-
RC20210528-01
Monday,
June 7, 2021
Operator Logbooks from May 25, 2021 through May 30, 2021 Steam Turbine (ST) OEM Manuals for Lube Oil Bearing Seals Lube Oil Analysis Past Three (3) Years
Work Orders for all ST Bearing Seals Past Three (3) Years Failure and Root Cause Analysis of Failure and Fire (When available) DR-
RC20210617-02
Wednesday,
July 7, 2021
Digital Control System (DCS) Logs from 05/26/2021 at 00:01 hrs. to 05/28/2021 at 24:00 hrs.
DCS Instrument Calibration Records; most recent.
Overspeed Trip Tests; past three (3) years.
Plant Operators Training Records; past two (2) years.
Plant Organization Chart.
OSHA 300 Reports; past five (5) years.
Current Air Permits.
RATA Testing; past five (5) Years.
Shutdown Checklist.
DR-
RC20210617-03
Friday,
July 30, 2021
Steam Turbine rotational speed records of any type from 05/26/2021: 00:01 hrs. through 05/27/2021: 24:00 hrs.
Work Orders for all DCS Alarms from 05/25/2021: 00:01 hrs. through 05/27/2021: 21:47 hrs.
Status
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
A-1
DR-
RC20210617-04
Wednesday,
August 11,
2021
Steam Turbine rotational speed records of any type from 05/26/2021: 00:01 hrs. through 05/28/2021: 24:00 hrs.
Received
Steam Turbine P&ID’s with all current and intended modifications to the steam system.
Received
Operator Training Procedures Received
Operator Training Curriculum Received
Operator Qualifications Received
Operator Job Description Received
Calpine Technical Training Information Received
DR-
RC20210617-05
Friday,
August 27,
2021
Completed Responses to the attached “Russell City Operator Questionnaire” Received
DR-
RC20210617-06
Friday,
September 17,
2021
An unredacted copy of the full and final Root Cause Analysis of the incident DR-
RC20211019-07
Tuesday,
October 26,
2021
An unredacted copy of the full and final Root Cause Analysis of the incident The Department of Toxic Substance Control hazardous waste compliance report approved by the Certified Unified Program Agency (CUPA) involved and corrective Delayed
Received
DR-
RC20211026-08
Tuesday,
November 2,
2021
actions taken this year for all hazardous materials (Hazmat) accumulation storage areas (seven violations were indicated), fire suppression water clean-up, and other Hazmat waste at the Russell City Energy Center (RCEC).
Referred to
City of
Hayward
All RCEC Hazmat Manifests for the current year. Received Any photo evidence to substantiate EPA compliance.
Referred to
City of
Hayward
DR-
RC20211112-09
City of Hayward
Completed April
14, 2022
The Department of Toxic Substance Control hazardous waste compliance approved by the Certified Unified Program Agency (CUPA) involved and corrective actions taken this year (2021) for all hazardous materials (Hazmat) accumulation storage areas.
Open
A-2
Any photo evidence to substantiate EPA compliance.
DR-
RC20211026-10
Tuesday,
December 7,
2021
OEM Manuals for the HRSG Cold Reheat Stop Valve (CRHSV#1) All recent Preventative Maintenance Work Orders for the CRHSV#1prior to the overspeed event.
DR-
RC20211026-11
Friday,
December 17,
2021
OEM Gear/Actuator Installation, Operating and Maintenance Instructions for the HRSG Cold Reheat Stop Valve (CRHSV#1).
Received
Any post event Toxic Substance and Human Exposure evaluations performed All attachments to and appendices and referenced photos in the RCA. Received Power plant reconfiguration/startup checklist (starting in 1X1 mode, for changing from 2X1 operation to 1X1 operation, or from 1X1 to 2X1 operation) Received
Item 2 above, (completed) for the final configuration change prior to the incident Received Shut down checklist (completed) for the incident Received All manuals, presentations, and other documents regarding operator/employee trainings in effect at the time of the incident.
Received
Training status of personnel performing the startup/operation/shutdown leading to the incident
Received
"Additional operating data" referenced on pg. 14 of the RCA Received Extended operating data of startups and shutdowns of HRSG#1 and HRSG#2 (extending 2 hours or more after startups, and beginning 2 hours or more before shutdowns)
Received
A simplified schematic representation (similar to the figures shown in the presentation on November 30, 2021) of reheat loop/IP turbine including piping, drains, valves, sensors with labels as used in the RCA
Received
The presentation that was given on November 30, 2021 . Received Glossary of acronyms used in RCA Received
All earlier versions of RCA, or any portion thereof, including but not limited to the first version of the RCA summary.
Received
Prior risk assessment done for the 1x1 operation configuration (e.g. FMEA, fault- tree, or other).
Received
DR-
RC20211026-12
Open
Received
Received
Received
Tuesday,
January 12,
2021
A-3
Report of evaluation and test results of the valve (HRSG #1 CRH stop valve); Please provide the maintenance records for the last two years for HRSG #1 and HRSG #2 CRH stop valves.
Received
Manufacturer’s HRSG #1 CRH stop valve specs and assembly drawings. Received Report of investigation and test results of the IP-stop valve (IV#2 & RSV #2) Received IP-stop valve (IV#2 & RSV #2) manufacturer’s specs and assembly drawings. Received The assessment report that determined the viability of reusing or repairing the HP/IP turbine post incident.
Received
SIA and Calpine operator interviews for the personnel on site during the incident, including any transcripts, notes, or other recordings, including audio or video, of the interviews.
Received
The borescope inspection report of the horizontal HRH pipe sections of the CRVs and the inlet of the CRVs.
Received
A clarification of the statement in Section 5.11 of the RCA, “STG line breakers opening prior to the closure of IV #2 and RSV #2 based on delay logic within the protection system.”
Received
Any other reports generated by SIA concerning the facility or the incident, including but not limited to the recommendations made by SIA or any report regarding recommendations.
Received
Contracts between Calpine and SIA relevant to the RCA, including but not limited to the second contract for recommendations.
Received
All documents and information regarding the facility’s alarm design and/or protocols, including documents and information regarding the alarm priority levels.
Received
Agreements with PG&E (including power purchase agreements) that govern operation of the facility.
Received
Any communications from or with PG&E (written or emailed) regarding this facility, including notes from calls or oral communications with PG&E, on May 27, 2021, or during the 10 days prior and after May 27, 2021.
Received
A list of all documents SIA reviewed during preparation of the RCA and recommendation report.
Received
A-4
DR-
RC20210527-13
Monday,
January 17,
2022
All CAL-OSHA 300 reports for the current year (2021)
An Analysis or Testing of the Toxins released (airborne or otherwise) from the Incident
Evaluation of the Health and Physical Impact of the Toxins Released Received
Received
Proof of Notification of all exposed or affected people and personnel DR-
RC20220121-14
Friday,
January 28,
2022
P&ID Symbol Legend sheet
P&ID 25483-000-V1A-MBPR-00011
P&ID’s 103200-PID-002 through 103200-PID-012
P&ID 25483-000-M6-AB-00002
P&ID 25483-000-M6-AB-00005
P&ID 25483-000-M6-AB-00006
P&ID M6-BM-00001
P&ID M6-AE-00001
All post incident reports or debriefs from all operators that who were onsite during the incident.
Nooter-Eriksen HRSG drawings showing sectionals and side views with all drains and Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
sizes.
OEM cold start procedure from Bechtel or others.
Operating procedures for total plant shutdown.
Operating history for changing from 2x1 to 1x1 operation for the past 3 years.
OEM recommendations operations changes from 2x1 to 1x1 operation.
Schematic of HRSG drainage valves on the steam pendant.
ALL DCS Alarms from 05/22/2021; 00:01 hrs. through 05/28/2021; 24:00 hrs.
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
Received
DR-RC20220201- Monday,
15 February 7, 2022
Pursuant to section 11.2 of General Order 167-B, the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) Electric Safety and Reliability Branch (ESRB), in cooperation with the California Energy Commission’s (CEC) Siting, Transmission and Environmental Protection Division, requests that Calpine have all staff that were onsite during the May 27, 2021, incident be available for interviews one day during the joint agencies’ on-site investigation taking place on February 7-11, 2022. Each staff member should be available at least one day during the on-site investigation including but not limited to Mr.
Warren Mushatt and the control room operator who was on the shift just prior Mr.
Supervisor
and Operator
are no longer
employed /
available
A-5
Warren Mushatt. Please confirm the availability of each staff member on or before February 4, 2022.
DR-RC20220103-
16 Sunday,
February 13,
2022
SUPERCEEDED BY DR-RC20220802-17
Logic Scope for SIA Corrective Action Recommendations Received Logic for Generator Lockout Protective Relays Received
Received
Received
Received
Daily Rounds Sheets from 05/22/21: 00:01 through 05/28/22: 23:59 Received DCS Logs for a similar change in operation, 2X1 to HRSG 2: 1X1 Operation Received DR-RC202200223-
18 Tuesday, March
1, 2022
Russell Energy Center Steam Turbine Generator (STG) Generator Protection Relay 86 (A&B) device alarm and trip history for the May 27, 2021, incident. There are two redundant devices, a Beckwith M-3425 86 Relay and an SEL Model 300G. Therefore, information from both devices should be included.
Open
Bechtel logic drawings and instrumentation calibration history for the Beckwith and SEL relays previously noted showing how these devices were designed to work and what options were selected when they were installed.
Open
Provide photographs or material inventory logs of the type of oil/grease used as lubrication for the CRH stop valve actuator assembly. Open DR-RC20220802-
17 Friday,
February 11,
2022
Larger and Clearer Graphs of graph 5.2 & 5.10 from the SIA RCA Unit Trip criteria for Vibration Parameters (i.e. graph 5-2) List of Procedural Changes as a result of all Corrective Actions Source: California Energy Commission
A-6
Russell City Energy Center May 2021
Incident: Gap Analysis Report
Hayward City Council - May 24, 2022
Presenting: Elizabeth Huber, Manager, Safety and Reliability Office and Geoff Lesh, Manager, Engineering Office
Siting, Transmission and Environmental Protection Division California Energy Commission
ATTACHMENT IV
Restarting Russell City Energy
Center
2 Russell City Energy Center
Investigation
3 Steam Turbine Generator
4 Steam Turbine Debris Field
5 Heat Recovery Steam Generator
6 Russell City Energy Center’s HRSG
Reheater Schematic
7 Causal Factor 1 – Equipment
Maintenance and Monitoring
8 Causal Factor 2 – Deficiencies in
Operator Interface and Training
9 Causal Factor 3 – Inadequate
Water Induction Protection
10 • Modify preventative maintenance
and monitoring programs
• Re-configure the CRH stop valve
to close based on actuator torque
value
• Implement an annual
preventative maintenance
program for the steam
attemperators and mixers for
review and approval.
• Synchronize control system
clocks
• Consolidate the alarms generated
by the control systems
• Implement control logic to
alleviate pressure within offline
HRSG
• Implement control logic to
discharge water from offline
HRSG
• Provide an ASME TDP-1-2013
conformance analysis
• Convert the HRH stop/check
valve from manual to electrical
actuation
• Revise operations procedures
• Reduce the occurrence of
nuisance/false alarms
11 JAIT Corrective Actions
Commission Decision and Next
Steps
• Revise operations CEC Commissioners adopted the corrective actions and delegated to the CEC Executive Director to verify that the corrective actions have been completed.
• The JAIT spent the third week of May at Russell City Energy Center verifying the implementation of each of the corrective actions. • Russell City Energy Center begins testing and commissioning the last week of May and will be available for CAISO to dispatch on June 1, 2022.
12 13
City of Hayward
• City staff have been participating on Joint Agency Working Group with CEC and CPUC staff
• Consistent with the CEC Order to allow Calpine to restart operations at RCEC, City staff and Calpine staff have meeting “to discuss any needed modifications of [RCEC’s] standard operating procedures for first responders to implement when responding to incidents on site, including establishing a process for reimbursement of reasonable expenses.” • Finalizing joint City/Calpine hazardous resiliency and action plan – this includes partial funding for a hazardous materials response vehicle • Insurance claims for Homeless Navigation Center being processed • Conversations with Russell City descendants/community action group underway – additional monetary contribution from Calpine proposed
• Notified City of Hayward of Plant
Management Changes on March 10.
• Schedule Annual HFD/City
Manager/RCEC Meeting -TBD
• Knox Box Updated 12/14/2021
o Updated MSDS’s
o Updated Plot Plan with Location
of oil filled equipment and
hazardous materials
• Met with Hayward Fire Department
Training Battalion Chief on March 14,
2022
• Hazmat Table TopDrill – TBD
• Schedule Plant Tour for new Fire
Company Officers – TBD
o Identifying Hazardous Material
locations
o Review Emergency Action Plan
o Identify possible Fire/Explosive
areas
o Identify areas of static Electricity
potential for Aerial Ladder Trucks
o Identify water supply locations
and access points
• Rope Rescue Scenario Drill
(incapacitated victim on platform or
scaffolding) – TBD
14 Hayward First Responder
Training Plan Enhancements
Thank you
CITY OF HAYWARD
Hayward City Hall
777 B Street
Hayward, CA 94541
www.Hayward-CA.gov
File #: WS 22-018
DATE: May 24, 2022
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: Director of Public Works
SUBJECT
Climate Action Plan and Environmental Justice: Considerations for New General Plan Policies and Programs
RECOMMENDATION
That Council reviews and comments on this report and provides direction to staff.
SUMMARY
The City is in the process of updating its Climate Action Plan (CAP) to establish policies and programs needed to meet greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets adopted by Council. The CAP, part of the Hayward 2040 General Plan, is being updated along with revisions to the Housing and Safety Elements of the General Plan. This report also presents a draft policy framework for a new Environmental Justice Element of the General Plan. This report provides an update on the project, community engagement strategies, and next steps. The City is working with Rincon Consultants to forecast GHG emissions and develop policies and programs that will help reduce community-wide emissions. Staff will continue engaging with community stakeholders to ensure that all policies in the CAP are equitable and align with community needs.
Council Sustainability Committee Review - On May 9, 2022, the Council Sustainability Committee (CSC) considered a report about the Climate Action Plan and Environmental Justice updates and outreach efforts. Committee members requested that staff:
· Engage with local organizations and nonprofits, including, Save the Bay, Hayward Promise Neighborhood, Hayward Unified School District, StopWaste, Green the Church, and Indigenous groups;
· Partner with the City’s Library to reach different audiences through already existing programs like Storytime; and
· Ensure that Strategic Roadmap initiatives align with proposed CAP and EJ initiatives.
ATTACHMENTS
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 1 of 2
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File #:WS 22-018
Attachment I Staff Report
Attachment II CAP Mural Board Responses
Attachment III EJ Workshop 1 Mural Board Responses
Attachment IV Hayward EJ Draft Policy Framework
Attachment V EJ Workshop 2 Mural Board Responses
CITY OF HAYWARD Printed on 5/20/2022Page 2 of 2
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