CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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CITY’S RESPONSE TO BRIEFS FILED BY EZZADIN ALI DBA THE GR8 SMOKE SHOP I. INTRODUCTION
The City of Hayward respectfully recommends that the City Council deny the appeal and affirm the Planning Commission’s June 25, 2026 decision to revoke the Tobacco Retail License for The Gr8 Smoke Shop.
The Planning Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence of a sustained pattern of noncompliance documented across four enforcement cases spanning more than three years. The record includes violations involving illegal flavored tobacco, e-cigarettes, out-of-state unstamped cigarettes, hemp and CBD products, and psilocybin-infused edibles, as well as, most recently, concealed compartments built into the sales counter and accessible only by radio frequency identification (RFID) card that were used to hide prohibited products from inspectors, evidencing the intent to continue violating. Appellant does not dispute that these violations occurred and never appealed them when the opportunity was provided; this Appeal instead challenges the process by which the Planning Commission reached its decision, a process which was proper and constitutional.
The City provided notice of the alleged violations and proposed revocation, the evidence upon which it intended to rely, a continuance from the original hearing date, and a meaningful opportunity to participate through counsel, documentary evidence, testimony, and argument. Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard but does not require a municipal administrative hearing to replicate a civil trial or provide every procedural protection available in judicial litigation. Horn v.
County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612; Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 267, 285–306.
As discussed below, the process afforded here satisfied those requirements.
The substantive issue before the Council is straightforward. Under the Hayward Municipal Code, three qualifying violations within a five-year period require referral to the Planning Commission and, upon a third violation, revocation unless the retailer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser penalty is warranted. Hayward Municipal Code §§ 10-1.2783, 10-1.2794. Here, the record establishes by a preponderance of the evidence—and without meaningful dispute—that Appellant committed at least three qualifying violations within the five-year period. Appellant has not presented CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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evidence or argument demonstrating that a lesser penalty is warranted.
The Planning Commission’s decision should be affirmed and the appeal denied.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The administrative record documents four separate code enforcement cases at the Premises within the relevant five-year period. None of the violations or enforcement actions described below were appealed.
• Case No. CE-TRLENF-2023-00001 (opened January 25, 2023): An inspection found flavored tobacco products, hemp products, and vapes/electronic smoking devices for sale in violation of HMC § 10-1.2783. A Notice of Violation was issued February 2, 2023 and was never appealed.
• Case No. CE-TRLENF-2024-00072 (opened February 6, 2024): An annual inspection on March 25, 2024 found the tobacco retail license expired or not posted, in violation of HMC §§ 10-1.2783/2785. A Notice of Violation was issued April 10, 2024 and was never appealed.
• Case No. CE-TRLENF-2025-00105 (opened November 7, 2025): An inspection on November 17, 2025 found flavored tobacco products, hemp wraps, mushroom gummies, and an expired or unposted tobacco retail license. An Administrative Penalty and Fee Notice issued November 26, 2025 assessed a $1,500 first-offense penalty and was never appealed.
• Case No. CE-TRLENF-2026-00006 (opened February 25, 2026): A joint inspection on January 28, 2026 with the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration and Hayward Police Department found flavored tobacco products, out-of-state unstamped menthol cigarettes, psilocybin-infused edibles, hemp products, vapes and vape liquid, pre-rolled cannabis joints, and an expired City and California tobacco retail license.
Inspectors also discovered hidden compartments beneath the sales counter, accessible only by RFID card, containing additional prohibited flavored tobacco products. An Administrative Penalty and Fee Notice was issued April 10, 2026 and was never appealed.
The violations are documented through dated photographs, inspector narratives, and, for the two most recent cases, co-agency inventories of prohibited items found at the Premises, including approximately 99 packages of suspected cannabis pre-rolls, 82 cannabis vape cartridges, and 39 packages of suspected psilocybin-infused food products. The 2026 inspection also documented concealed, RFIDaccessible storage containing additional prohibited tobacco products, evidencing a continued lack of intent to comply with local and state laws.
A Notice of Revocation was issued May 14, 2026, setting a hearing for June 11, 2026. Upon Appellant's counsel's appearance and request for a 30-day continuance based on a stated travel conflict, CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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the City — as a courtesy, and with no obligation to do so — continued the hearing to June 25, 2026, a date specifically selected to fall after counsel's stated period of unavailability (June 9 through June 15, 2026). On June 5, 2026, twenty days before the hearing, the City produced the complete evidentiary package it intended to rely upon, consisting of the Summary of Evidence, the Case and Inspection Details for all four cases, all four Notices of Violation/Penalty, and the Hayward Police Department's inventory of seized items. The City declined Appellant's renewed requests for a second continuance, explaining that the June 25 date had been selected to accommodate counsel's own stated unavailability and that no further delay was warranted.
On June 17, 2026, a Second Notice of Revocation was served, identical in substance to the original notice except that it also identified the January 2023 violation. The hearing proceeded as scheduled on June 25, 2026. Appellant's counsel appeared in person with a court reporter and addressed the Commission; the Commission deliberated and voted to revoke the License. This appeal followed.
III.ARGUMENT
A. The License Is a Limited, Conditional Privilege, and the City Provided the Process That Was Due
Appellant characterizes its Tobacco Retail License (TRL) as a “vested property interest” and relies on that label to demand trial-like procedures. The Municipal Code defines the interest differently.
A TRL grants no status or right other than the “limited conditional privilege” to operate at the licensed location, HMC § 10-1.2785(e), it does not vest the holder with any right to act as a Tobacco Retailer in contravention of law, HMC § 10-1.2785(a)(1), and the privilege is conditioned on continued compliance with the ordinance, HMC § 10-1.2794.
Nor does Government Code section 11503 apply. That section is part of the California Administrative Procedure Act's formal adjudication provisions, which govern only the agencies and proceedings subject to them. Gov. Code §§ 11500–11501. This proceeding is governed by the Hayward Municipal Code, which does not incorporate the Act's accusation requirements.
The City does not dispute that procedural due process applies to administrative proceedings. See Horn, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 612; Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 81, 90. But the standard is notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, not the full CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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panoply of civil litigation procedures. In Mohilef v. Janovici, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 267, a municipal administrative proceeding involving a protected property interest, the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the argument that due process requires cross-examination, subpoenas, and discovery. The same principle applies here, and here, there is no protected property interest.
Appellant received that process. It received notice of the violations and the proposed revocation, the City's evidence twenty days before the hearing, and a continuance. Under the Order of Proceedings it was permitted to appear in person or remotely, to be represented by counsel, to challenge the accuracy and sufficiency of the City's evidence, to offer mitigating circumstances, documents, and testimony, and to answer Commissioners' questions, and its written materials became part of the record.
It then had this appeal. The Constitution did not require the City to convert the hearing into a judicial trial.
B. Appellant Received Adequate Notice of the Violations and of the Revocation Hearings The violations. Appellant contends that the revocation notices listed the dates the violation notices issued rather than the dates the violations were observed. Each listed date corresponds to a single, numbered enforcement case, and the inspector's notes for each case state the date the violations were observed: January 25, 2023; March 25, 2024; November 17, 2025; and January 28, 2026. (Staff Report, Attachment VI, Exhibits II–V, pp. 16, 20, 23, 27.) Those records were produced to counsel on June 5, 2026 and attached to the staff report, and they also identify the violations, the Code sections, and the photographs. Appellant thus had every observation date twenty days before the hearing, which answers its claim that it could not identify witnesses or review surveillance footage. Due process does not require that every factual detail appear in a single document, and none of the cases Appellant cites holds otherwise. Appellant's counsel submitted detailed written argument on each violation and argued them at the hearing.
The hearing date, time, and place. Appellant contends the notices omitted the time and location of the hearing required by HMC § 10-1.2820(c). The May 14, 2026 Notice of Revocation identified the Planning Commission hearing date and included instructions for appearing in person or remotely. On CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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May 29, 2026, the City advised counsel in writing that the matter would be heard at “the June 25, 2026 Planning Commission meeting held in person and remotely at 7:00 p.m.,” 27 days before the hearing, and repeated the date and time on June 8. The caption of Appellant's own brief lists the date, time, and location. Procedural errors in an administrative proceeding, even where shown, warrant relief only if prejudicial. See Thornbrough v. Western Placer Unified School Dist. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 169, 200.
There was none here: counsel appeared at the hearing in person, on time, with a court reporter arranged in advance, and argued Appellant's case to the Commission. The Code adopts the same rule: “[d]efects in information on a notice or the failure of any or all of the addressees to receive the notice given pursuant to this Ordinance shall not invalidate the proceedings, provided that such defect or failure has not occurred in bad faith.” HMC § 10-1.2820(d). Appellant identifies no bad faith or actual prejudice.
The second notice. Appellant characterizes the June 17, 2026 notice as adding a new violation eight days before the hearing, in violation of the ten-day requirement of HMC § 10-1.2820(c). But section 10-1.2820(c) governs notice of the hearing, not the content of the City's evidence, and it expressly provides that “[i]f a hearing is continued to a specified date and time, no further notice need be given.” The original notice issued May 14, 2026, 28 days before the June 11 hearing, and the hearing was continued to June 25 at Appellant's own request. The City's May 29 email to counsel granting that request specified the new date and time: “the June 25, 2026 Planning Commission meeting held in person and remotely at 7:00 p.m.” No further notice was required, and Appellant cannot complain of the timing of a notice occasioned by a continuance it asked for. And the 2023 violation was not new: the Summary of Evidence produced on June 5 listed it, stated that the establishment “committed its first violation on January 25, 2023,” and attached the 2023 case details, Notice of Violation, and photographs. Appellant had that evidence for twenty days and briefed the 2023 violation at length. Adding an earlier violation to the five-year history did not create a new enforcement action, and there was no trial by ambush.
Appellant's remaining objections to the second notice are equally unavailing. The second notice was a reissued version of the May 14 notice, updated to reflect the continued hearing date and the CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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complete violation history, and it retained the original letter date. Neither that date nor an officer's remark to a store employee that it was the same letter changed the content of the notice or the evidence Appellant already held. Nor was it improper to deliver the notice to the Premises (the licensee) after Appellant retained counsel. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct governs communications by lawyers, not service of a required notice by code enforcement staff. Counsel was not bypassed: the City emailed the continued hearing date to counsel on May 29, June 5, and June 8, sent its evidence to counsel on June 5, and counsel's brief quotes and analyzes the second notice.
The underlying notices. Appellant asserts that the earlier Notices of Violation and Administrative Penalty and Fee Notices were mailed to Bhupinder Bhandari and that it had “no notice” of them. The property owner received notice because the Code makes the owner responsible for the violation. Operating a tobacco retailer in violation of the regulations is a public nuisance (HMC § 10-
1.2792), subject to abatement under Chapter 5, Article 7 (HMC § 10-1.2793). Under that Article, a violation of any provision of Chapter 10 is a public nuisance, and “[t]he property owner shall be responsible for violations thereof, regardless of any contract or agreement with any third party regarding the property.” (HMC § 5-7.20 & subd. (l).) Notifying the owner also serves the Code's purpose. Every owner “shall manage that property in such a manner to avoid violation of this code” (HMC § 5-7.20), and it is the responsibility of property owners “to maintain, secure, and prevent these properties from becoming a burden to the neighborhood and community or a threat to public health, safety and welfare” (HMC § 5-7.00(b)). An owner cannot meet that duty, or abate a tenant's violation, without knowing of it. Notices of penalties and fees “may be issued to the responsible party or property owner” (HMC § 5-7.30(d)(1)); abatement notices are mailed to the owner's address on the last equalized assessment roll (HMC § 5-7.35); and although penalties and enforcement costs are charged to the business in the first instance, the City may recover any unpaid amounts from the property owner, and they may become a lien or special assessment on the property (HMC §§ 10-1.2790, 5-7.140(a)).
Nonetheless, the City’s records show that Appellant had actual notice of each violation. Each inspection was conducted at the Premises with Appellant's staff, and Appellant acted on every notice.
CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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In 2023, the inspector instructed the owner and clerk in person, emailed the clerk the ordinance and the Notice of Violation, and the business passed reinspection on February 9, 2023. In 2024, the business paid its fees by April 22, and the owner told the inspector at the May 2 reinspection that he had paid for the state license. In 2025, the inspector reviewed the violations with the storekeeper, and the business removed the products, renewed its license, and passed reinspection on December 10. In 2026, the owner came to the City's counter on April 22, within the fifteen-day period to request a hearing, “regarding the tobacco 1st offense,” and the hidden compartments had been cleared by that day's reinspection. Appellant's own brief states that the 2025 and 2026 penalties were paid. A retailer (licensee) does not correct violations, renew lapsed licenses, and pay penalties without knowing it was cited. Actual notice satisfies due process. (See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa (2010) 559 U.S. 260, 272.) The Code is to the same effect: “the failure of any or all of the addressees to receive the notice given pursuant to this Ordinance shall not invalidate the proceedings, provided that such defect or failure has not occurred in bad faith.” (HMC § 10-1.2820(d).) In any event, the point does not affect the outcome. Appellant received the Notice of Revocation, as Mr. Ali's declaration acknowledges, and all of the City's evidence, and the Order of Proceedings allowed it to contest whether each violation occurred. It offered no evidence that any did not; Mr. Ali's declaration does not deny a single violation. Nor does the outcome depend on the 2023 case. Independent of it, the record documents three fully noticed violations within five years: the 2024 licensing violation, the 2025 flavored-tobacco and licensing violation, and the 2026 violation involving flavored tobacco, unstamped cigarettes, cannabis, psilocybin edibles, vapes, and concealed compartments.
C. The Hearing Procedures Were Fair
Continuance. The hearing was originally set for June 11, 2026. At counsel's request, the City granted a courtesy continuance to June 25, a date selected to fall after counsel's stated unavailability of June 9 through June 15 and fixed by the Planning Commission's meeting schedule, and produced its evidence on June 5, twenty days before the hearing. Due process does not give a represented party an CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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unlimited right to continuances based on counsel's calendar. Denton v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779 is not to the contrary; it involved a self-represented litigant denied a meaningful opportunity to oppose summary judgment in a lawsuit. Here, counsel accepted the engagement knowing the administrative hearing date, could have appeared remotely or sent an associate, and in fact appeared in person with a court reporter arranged in advance. Nor was the City's June 22 offer to agree to a further continuance if Appellant refrained from tobacco sales in the interim a “summary suspension.” The City imposed nothing. It offered an accommodation on a condition that protected the public given the serious violations at the Property, which endangered both citizens and youth. Appellant declined and has continued to sell through the hearing and, by operation of the stay in HMC § 10-1.2845(c), through this appeal.
Disclosure of evidence and deadlines. There is no constitutional right to prehearing discovery in a municipal administrative proceeding. Mohilef, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 302. The City nonetheless produced the evidence it relied upon directly to counsel on June 5, which moots Appellant's complaint about an initial reference to the Public Records Act. Appellant's demand for the “complete administrative record” identifies no document the Commission relied upon that Appellant did not receive. Appellant also complains that it had to submit materials fourteen days before the hearing while the staff report was published five working days before. But the staff report, which counsel received June 18, presented the same evidence produced June 5, and Appellant identifies nothing in it that was new. Nor was the fourteen-day deadline enforced: Appellant filed a 29-page brief with two declarations and more than 120 pages of exhibits dated June 24, the City Attorney confirmed in writing that Appellant was “free to submit any additional written materials which become part of the administrative record,” and the submission was made part of the record. Miller v. Department of Real Estate (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 141 requires a meaningful opportunity to respond. Appellant had one and used it.
Time limit and cross-examination. The eight-minute limit applied to the retailer's oral presentation only. It did not restrict written materials, documentary evidence, witness statements, or responses to Commissioners' questions, and the Chair had discretion to extend the time and did so.
CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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Reasonable time limits are a routine and necessary part of administrative hearings, particularly where multiple revocation matters are heard together; the Constitution requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard, not unlimited time. Likewise, the Order of Proceedings provided that there would be no crossexamination, a rule that applied to every retailer. Mohilef holds that due process does not require crossexamination in a municipal administrative proceeding. 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 285–306. Appellant was permitted to challenge the City's evidence, submit contrary evidence, present witnesses and argument, and respond directly to the allegations.
Moreover, Appellant had an earlier opportunity to contest the merits of each violation. Each of the four Notices of Violation and Administrative Penalty and Fee Notices advised that the recipient could request an administrative hearing "to dispute the facts of the violations(s) under the Hayward Municipal Code." (Staff Report, Attachment VI, pp. 36, 40, 44, 48.) Had Appellant requested a hearing on any of them, it could have disputed the merits of that violation at the time, including by crossexamining the City's witnesses. Appellant requested none. Having passed up four opportunities to test the City's evidence when each violation was fresh, Appellant cannot now complain that the revocation hearing, which addresses the cumulative consequence of those violations, did not include crossexamination.
Burdens of proof. The City did not apply inconsistent burdens. Because a TRL is a nonprofessional, location-specific regulatory license, the City's burden to establish the violations is the ordinary preponderance standard. See Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 856 (clear-and-convincing standard applies to revocation of professional licenses; ordinary civil standard governs otherwise); Brown v. Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531 (preponderance standard governs DMV license proceedings). The Code separately requires the retailer to show by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser penalty is warranted. HMC § 10-1.2794. These standards govern two different determinations: whether three qualifying violations occurred, and whether, if they did, something less than revocation is justified. The City never required Appellant to disprove the violations by clear and convincing evidence, and it met its own burden.
CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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Neutral decision-maker. Appellant cites Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731 but identifies no fact suggesting that any Commissioner was biased or had an interest in the outcome. The City Attorney's Office maintained a separation between the attorney presenting the City's case and the attorney advising the Commission, and so informed counsel before the hearing.
D. The “First Offense” Penalty Designation Does Not Bar Revocation Appellant argues that because the penalty invoices were labeled “first offense” and the cases were marked “Closed – Resolved,” the violations cannot count toward revocation. That conflates two separate provisions. The Master Fee Schedule sets the monetary penalty for an individual enforcement event. The ordinance separately establishes the consequence of three violations within five years. A $1,500 penalty is not a representation that the violation will never count toward the cumulative history, and “Closed – Resolved” means only that the cited conditions were corrected at reinspection, which the Code requires of every retailer, it does not mean the violations did not occur and the retailer has never challenged the fact that the violations did occur. The City's notices also warned of escalating consequences: the 2023 Notice of Violation stated that continued violations would result in additional penalties and other legal remedies, and the November 26, 2025 notice advised that compliance was necessary “[t]o avoid penalty fees and potentially the revocation of the business license.” (Staff Report, Attachment VI, Exhibit VIII, p. 44.)
E. There Was No Selective, Bad-Faith, or Delayed Enforcement Appellant's assertion that the City began enforcing because it received a California Department of Justice tobacco grant is false and unsupported by the record. The ordinance itself directs compliance and follow-up inspections. HMC § 10-1.2783(f). Appellant was cited in January 2023 and again in 2024, before the grant cycle it identifies. Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229 does not hold that grant funding, standing alone, supports an inference of selective enforcement, and Appellant identifies no similarly situated retailer that was treated differently.
CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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Nor did the City “wait years” to act. It cited each violation within days or weeks of the inspection, reinspected, and closed each case when Appellant failed to appeal and complied.
Revocation was not available until a third violation within five years, and the Notice of Revocation issued about five weeks after the April 10, 2026 penalty notice. Appellant identifies no witness, document, or recording lost to the passage of time. The record also refutes the allegation that the business never received education or outreach: inspectors explained the prohibited products to Appellant's staff in person in January 2023, May 2024, and November 2025, and ten weeks after the last of those visits found the same categories of products at the Premises, some in concealed compartments.
F. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding, and Revocation Is the Appropriate Penalty The Planning Commission had before it documentary evidence of four violations within five years, none of which was appealed: (1) January 25, 2023: flavored tobacco, hemp products, and electronic smoking devices; (2) March 25, 2024: licensing deficiencies; (3) November 17, 2025:
flavored tobacco, hemp wraps, mushroom gummies, and licensing deficiencies; and (4) January 28, 2026: flavored tobacco, out-of-state menthol cigarettes, psilocybin products, hemp products, vapes, cannabis pre-rolls, expired licenses, and prohibited products hidden in RFID-locked compartments beneath the counter.
Appellant's attacks on the reliability of this evidence do not withstand review. Appellant points to the “created on” dates of entries in the City's case management system to argue that reports were written months after the inspections. The contemporaneous notices show otherwise: the 2023 Notice of Violation issued eight days after the inspection, the 2025 penalty notice issued nine days after the inspection and lists the same products, and the January 28, 2026 inspection is documented by dated photographs and by the Hayward Police Department's separate inventory of that date. As to 2024, the City relies on the violation actually cited, that the required licenses were not all posted or current, which is corroborated by the business then paying its fees and receiving a current license certificate on April 22–23, 2024. The finding does not depend on any hemp product in 2024. And the photographs of CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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unstamped cigarettes are not a new charge; both revocation notices identified “out of state menthol cigarettes” among the 2026 violations.
Appellant's argument that revocation is disproportionate because failure to post a license is a “technical” violation addresses, at most, one of the four violations, and misstates it. The licenses were not merely unposted; they were not current in 2024, in November 2025, when the case was placed on hold for “unpaid fees and no current TRL Certificate,” or in 2026. Holding a current license is the foundation of the regulatory scheme. HMC §§ 10-1.2785, 10-1.2794. More importantly, setting 2024 aside entirely, the record establishes three violations within five years involving the sale of prohibited products, in 2023, 2025, and 2026. To prevail, Appellant would have to eliminate two of the four violations. It has not eliminated any and has not even alleged that the violations did not occur.
Upon a third violation, the Code calls for revocation unless the retailer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser penalty is warranted. HMC § 10-1.2794. Appellant offered no evidence of mitigation. The record shows the opposite: prohibited products reappeared after every corrective notice, the range of unlawful products expanded to include cannabis and psilocybin, and by 2026 the business had installed RFID-locked compartments to keep prohibited inventory out of inspectors' view, evidencing an intent to continue to violate. The Commission acted well within its discretion and made the right decision.
G. Appellant's Remaining Arguments Do Not Bear on the Revocation Appellant argues at length that it faces irreparable harm and that the balance of equities favors it. Those are the elements of a request for injunctive relief, not the standard governing revocation under the Municipal Code, and they are not a ground for reversal. The economic consequences of revocation are the ones the ordinance prescribes for repeated violations, and the public's interest in enforcing laws restricting the sale of flavored tobacco, electronic smoking devices, and controlled substances weighs at least as heavily as Appellant's interest in continuing to sell tobacco.
Appellant's arguments that its appeal is timely, that the appeal fee should not affect timeliness, and that the appeal stays the revocation under HMC § 10-1.2845(c) are not in dispute. The appeal is CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLATE BRIEF
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before the Council on its merits and the revocation has been stayed. These points describe the procedural posture of the appeal; they do not challenge the revocation and present nothing for the Council to resolve.
IV.CONCLUSION
The appeal largely seeks to transform a municipal administrative licensing proceeding into a judicial trial governed by the California Administrative Procedure Act and civil discovery concepts.
Neither the Hayward Municipal Code nor the Constitution requires that result.
The City provided notice of the allegations, disclosed the evidence upon which it intended to rely, granted a continuance, afforded Appellant representation by counsel and an opportunity to present evidence and argument, and conducted the revocation hearing before the Planning Commission pursuant to established procedures.
The Planning Commission then considered the evidence and determined that the applicable conditions for revocation had been established.
The City's procedures were lawful, consistent with the Hayward Municipal Code, and sufficient to satisfy due process. Appellant has identified no procedural defect that deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to defend its Tobacco Retail License and does not dispute that the violations occur.
Moreover, the violations here were egregious and the evidence shows that the retailer intended to circumvent inspection to continue to violate. No lesser penalty is deserved.
Accordingly, the City Council should deny the appeal and affirm the Planning Commission's June 25, 2026 decision revoking the Tobacco Retail License for The Gr8 Smoke Shop.