STONER CARLSON LLP
Attorneys at Law
www.carlsonnicholas.com
Scott W. Carlson, Partner [email protected]
Richard A. McDonald, Of Counsel 301 E. Colorado Blvd. [email protected] Suite No. 320
Pasadena, California 91101
(626) 356-4801
Via Email
May 11, 2026
Mayor Mark Orgill
Mayor Pro Tem Hallie Jones
Hon. Council Members Sue Kempf, Alex Rounaghi, & Bob Whalen c/o Ann Marie McKay, City Clerk
City of Laguna Beach
505 Forest Avenue
Laguna Beach, CA. 92651
Re: 31526 Valido Road - Appeal
Dear Mayor Orgill, Mayor Pro Tem Jones, and Honorable City Councilmembers Kempf, Rounaghi, and Whalen:
Our firm represents the property owner whose architect applied for the Design Review Board's ("DRB") approval of the proposed residence at the above-referenced address ("Applicant"). The DRB approved the project by a vote of 4 - 1 on September 25, 2025.
Specifically, the DRB approved a categorical exemption under Section 15303 of the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), DR 24-0658, and Coastal Development Permit 24-0657 (CDP").
I. We Support Staff's Report and Recommendations.
The Staff report does an excellent job setting forth the extensive background of (1) the hearings before the DRB, (2) the DRB's efforts to balance the privacy concerns of certain neighbors with the property owners' rights to develop per the City's Municipal Code, (3) DRB's July 11, 2024 requests to the Applicant to reorient the house and decks to address the neighbors' privacy concerns (some of which were competing with one another), (4) the Applicants re- orienting and redesigning the house to address the neighbors privacy concerns, and the additional conditions of approval imposed by the DRB to further address them.
The Staff Report also does an excellent job explaining the late historical resources incern, ine competing historical resource evaluation reports, and how the Staff worke siduously to get them all peer reviewed by an obiective third-party professional (GP Consultants) that is not connected to either side of the debate.
As GPA Consultants determined, there is insufficient evidence to find the house is prime example of its time and thus is not eligible as a historical resource under either the State or Federal Criteria. Since the property owner objects to any such designation, it also does not qualify under the City's Local Ordinance.
Subsequently, ESA submitted its report coming to the same conclusion thus establishing that three out of four historical resource consultants have concluded that the house is not eligible for historic designation. Combined with the fact that the house was not on any historical tours nor appellants' website until recently, and that there is no prior request for designation, means there is substantial evidence supporting the DRB's decision and now on this appeal.
While we understand that members of the public have submitted letters in support of the appeal and the call to designate it over the objection of the property owner, as explained on page 6 below, 'Members of the public may ... provide opinion evidence where special expertise is not required... However, "[i]nterpretation of technical or scientific information requires an expert evaluation. Testimony by members of the public on such issues does not qualify as substantial evidence..." Joshua Tree Downtown Bus. All. v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 1 Cal.
App. 5th 677, 690-691 (2016)
Last, the Staff Report sets forth the testimony and record showing the extensive deliberations by the DRB that establishes that there was no abuse of discretion in how it conducted its hearings or otherwise reviewed, analyzed, and approved the Applicant's two applications. Specifically, Section 8 of the Staff Report from pages 18 - 21 shows extensively how deliberative the DRB acted. Nothing said or done was arbitrary or capricious in any manner, way, shape, or form.
Accordingly, under Subsection 25.05.070.E.2 of the Municipal Code, the City Council can and should easily conclude that the DRB as the approval authority proceeded in the manner required by law and its decision and determinations are supported by substantial evidence. As Subsection 25.05.070.E.2 of the Municipal Code states, "There shall be a presumption that the decision or determination made by the approval authority was reasonable, valid, and not an abuse of discretion. The appellant, if there is one, shall have the burden of proof of demonstrating otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence, including plans, presented." And as the Staff Report explained, given the 4-1 vote, it is not a de novo hearing. The only question is whether there was substantial evidence to support its decision. The record shows that there was more than enough evidence.
Indeed, a quick review of the appeals and later letters and emails submitted by the
Appellants in January and February 2026 shows that they have not presented a preponderance of evidence to overcome the Code's presumption, let alone any evidence that rebuts or otherwise disproves the substantial evidence that was the basis for the DRB's approvals. At best, they have submitted additional evidence to support their previous conclusions and arguments while continuing to ignore contrary evidence and GPA's conclusions.
For example, the Chamberlains January 15, 2026 Addendum to their appeal raises several novel issues but cites no evidence or anything that was heard by the DRB. Similarly, like the Strombotne's January 6, 2026, email to you, the Chamberlains state their opinions on matters of expert evaluation. As explained below, that is not "substantial evidence" under California law.
And the Ann Christopher January 8, 2026, email is nothing more than the same rhetorical, results oriented reasoning that led her to write practically all of the HRG Report, thus calling into question the validity and viability of it. That ESA submitted another historical evaluation that concluded the same as GPA based upon its own site visit, and extensive records search further shows that substantial evidence supports the DRB's findings.
As the architect will explain, several modifications were made in response to the Chamberlains' privacy concerns that they seemed to ignore in their Appeal and January 2026 memo. For example, the layout has been adjusted to minimize direct views toward their property.
The overall structure, including both the first and second floors, also has been repositioned further away from the Chamberlain residence to increase separation and reduce potential privacy impacts. Bedroom 3 has been reoriented so that primary windows no longer have direct views into the Chamberlain property. Bedroom 3's main source of light, a sliding door, is now directed toward the deck and ocean views; and its window has been reoriented to avoid looking into their home, while the secondary window and large window have been removed. Similar changes have been made to the first floor, and the deck configuration has been modified and angled away from the Chamberlain residence to further reduce overlook. The small portion extending beyond the building line incorporates a 6-foot-high frosted glass panel, providing additional privacy.
Overall, these revisions reflect a comprehensive effort to protect the adjacent neighbors' 'privacy while maintaining the functional needs of the property owner's residence.
Last, the Staff Report sufficiently explains how the Applicant can further modify its design to address the neighbors' privacy concerns, how the City can impose a more restrictive condition of approval to achieve that end because the DRB condition is insufficient under recently adopted changes to the Fire Code (page 24), and how ESA's has offered several suggestions on noting the historical record that can be imposed as conditions of approval even though the site is not historic (page 34) nor a coastal resource as staff explains.
II. The Revised Project is Categorically Exempt Under CEQA as Explained in the Staff Report.
CEQA applies only to activities that meet the definition of a "project"' under the statute CEQA defines "project" to mean: "an activity which may cause either a direct physical
and its implementing administrative regulations. May v. City of Milpitas, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1319-20 (2013). Under CEQA, a project is any activity undertaken, assisted, or authorized by a public agency that may have a significant effect on the environment. May, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 1320. "Significant effect on the environment" means "a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment." Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21068.
The first step in CEQA analysis is a determination whether the activity in question amounts to a "project." May, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 1320. Once a lead agency determines that an activity falls within the statutory definition of a "project," it must then determine whether the project is nevertheless exempt from CEQA. Id. CEQA authorizes the adoption of regulatory exemptions for classes of projects. Id. at 1321. The CEQA Guidelines refer to them as categorical exemptions and they are set forth in the CEQA Guidelines. Id. (citing to CEQA Guidelines, § 15300 et seq.).
"An agency's determination that a project falls within a categorical exemption includes an implied finding that none of the exceptions identified in the Guidelines is applicable. The burden then shifts to the challenging party to produce evidence showing that one of the exceptions applies to taking the project out of the exempt category." San Francisco Beautiful, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1022-23. The CEQA Guidelines specify six exceptions to the categorical exemptions. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15300.2.
The Objecting Neighbors assert that three potential exceptions apply: (1) exemptions are inapplicable where the "cumulative impact of successive projects of the same type in the same place, over time is significant"; (2) categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a "significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances," and (3) categorical exemption shall not be used for a project which may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15300.2, subsections (b), (c) & (f).
For the reasons explained below, none of the exceptions apply, nor can the requisite showing for them be made.
A. There Is No Cumulative Impact of Successive Projects As explained in your Staff Report, the City considered and rejected the notion that there change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any of the following: (a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency. (b) An activity undertaken by a person that is supported, in whole or in part, through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public agencies. (c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies." Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21065.
are any cumulative impact of successive projects at the Property given that the area is already built-out with newer homes and the proposed project is a single family residence similar in use, size, and massing to the other homes in the area.
B. There Are No Unusual Circumstances
One of the exceptions to the categorical exemptions arises "where there is a reasonable possibility the activity will have a significant environmental effect 'due to unusual circumstances.' (Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (c).)" San Francisco Beautiful, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1023. The CEQA Guidelines do not define the term "unusual circumstances," nor what is required to prove it. See, e.g., id. In Berkeley Hillside, therefore, the California Supreme Court first clarified that a party must show an unusual circumstance by demonstrating that the project has some characteristic or feature that distinguishes it from others in the exempt class. Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1105 (2015).2 In so doing, the Supreme Court held that the "unusual circumstances" exception can only be used to preclude the use of a categorical exemption if an "unusual circumstance" differentiates the project from the general class of similarly situated projects, and, if so, when that unusual circumstance creates a "reasonable possibility" that the project may result in a "significant environmental impact." Id. at 1105 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court expressly rejected the appellate court's interpretation of the "unusual circumstances" test, finding that "the Court of Appeal erred by holding that a potentially significant environmental effect itself constitutes unusual circumstances." Id. at 1104.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, the First District Court of Appeal filed its opinion affirming the trial court's judgment and later ordered its opinion to be published.
Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley, 241 Cal. App. 4th 943 (2015).3 The later Court of Appeal opinion states that a party challenging a categorical exemption decision by seeking to establish the unusual circumstances exception cannot prevail merely by providing substantial evidence that the project may have a significant environmental effect. Id. at 952.
Rather, such a party must first establish an unusual circumstance by distinguishing the project
2. In Berkeley Hillside, the applicant sought a hillside permit for a 6,478-square-foot house with an attached 3,394-square-foot 10-car garage, covering 16% of a steeply sloped (about 50% grade) lot in a heavily wooded area on Rose Street in Berkeley. Berkeley Hillside, 60 Cal. 4th at 1093. The trial court denied the petition for a writ of mandate by the neighborhood group holding there were no unusual circumstances, but the Court of Appeal reversed and granted it. Id. at 1096. The Supreme Court then considered the issue of how the unusual circumstances exception to categorical exemptions should be analyzed and applied by lead agencies such as the City. Id. at 1097.
On February 3, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied further review of the case, thus letting the Court of Appeal's decision stand, i.e., there were no unusual circumstances that precluded the use of the categorical exemption for the proposed residence in Berkeley Hillside.
from others in the exempt class. Id.
Indeed, "a challenger must prove both unusual circumstances and a significant environmental effect that is due to those circumstances. In this method of proof, the unusual circumstances relate to some feature of the project that distinguishes the project from other features in the exempt class." Citizens for Envtl. Responsibility v. State ex rel. 14'h Dist. Agric.
Ass'n., 242 Cal. App. 4th 555, 574 (2015) (citing to Berkeley Hillside, 60 Cal. 4th at 1105) (emphasis added). "Once an unusual circumstance is proved under this method, then the "party need only show a reasonable possibility of a significant effect due to that unusual circumstance."" Id. (emphasis added). Anyone who claims the proposed project is not entitled to a categorical exemption, therefore, must prove both parts of this two-pronged test and cannot prevail simply by claiming that the project may have a significant environmental effect. Whether a project presents unusual circumstances is thus a factual inquiry subject to the traditional substantial evidence standard of review. Berkeley Hillside, 60 Cal. 4th at 1114.
Under CEQA, "[substantial evidence includes facts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts. [Citations]. It does not include '[a]rgument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, [or] evidence which is clearly inaccurate or erroneous. . ' [Citations.]" Joshua Tree Downtown Bus. All. v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 1 Cal.
App. 5th 677, 690 (2016) (emphasis added). "Complaints, fears, and suspicions about a project's potential environmental impact likewise do not constitute substantial evidence." Id. "Members of the public may ... provide opinion evidence where special expertise is not required. ...
However, "[i]nterpretation of technical or scientific information requires an expert evaluation.
Testimony by members of the public on such issues does not qualify as substantial evidence..."|I]n the absence of a specific factual foundation in the record, dire predictions by nonexperts regarding the consequences of a project do not constitute substantial evidence." Id. at 690-91 (citations omitted).
To preclude the use of the categorical exemptions, any opponent of a project must show that the "unusual circumstances exception" to the exemption somehow applies, which Objecting Neighbor cannot do under California law. As the record reflects, there is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, of any unusual circumstance because there are no features that distinguish the Project from the general class of similarly situated projects. Specifically, the proposed project complies with all the development standards set forth in the City's Zoning Code and the proposed Resolution imposes certain conditions of approval to mitigate against any potential concerns the neighbors or public may have.
Last, the surrounding neighborhoods have been developed over time with similar single- family homes of comparable size and dimensions. As such, there is no evidence of any unusual circumstance based on the features of the project, let alone substantial evidence, the City Council does need not to address the second prong of the test, i.e., whether there is a reasonable possibility of a significant environmental impact as a result of unusual circumstances. Citizens, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 588, n.24. ("A negative answer as to the question of whether there are unusual circumstances means the exception does not apply" and the use of the categorical
exemption is affirmed). Even if the City Council chose to address it, there is no showing that any purported unusual circumstances create a "reasonable possibility" that the Project may result in a "significant environmental impact."
C. There Is No Historical Resource on the Property
There is no debate that the existing home on the property was substantially altered over time as explained in all the historical evaluation reports. There also can be no debate that the house and property have lost their integrity over time, and do not currently represent the best example of any historical trend such as the Homestead Act and era. In fact, as the ESA reports shows, the dates for the site simply do not correspond enough to conclude that is a prime example of homes from that era. As a result, no historical resource is at issue that would make a categorical exemption inapplicable under CEQA.
D. Designating the Property Constitutes a Regulatory Taking However, designating the site as historical resource over the owner's objections either will constitute a direct taking or a regulatory taking. Specifically, as the United States Supreme Court has stated:
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), ... the Court established the proposition that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, y regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." [citation omitted] This framework now applies to use restrictions as varied as zoning ordinances.... To determine whether a use restriction effects a taking, this Court has generally applied the flexible test developed in Penn Central, balancing factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [citation omitted]
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, _ _ U.S. _ 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071-72 (2021) (emphasis added).
The "Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). A "use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, [citation omitted], or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
Further, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. ... this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. [citation omitted]
Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2072 (emphasis added). But where a regulatory decision permanently or temporarily deprives a plaintiff of all economically viable use of the property, such a decision violation is not merely a normal part of the development process for which compensation is not required but is arbitrary and unreasonable. Ali v. City of Los Angeles, 77 Cal.
App. 4th 246, 253-55 (1999) (affirming trial court's inverse condemnation judgment in favor of the property owner based on the city's delay in issuing a demolition permit based on its enforcement of a single room occupancy ordinance that violated the Ellis Act).
As explained in Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal.4th 1 (1994), the landowner is entitled to damages for any loss of use of the property beyond that to be expected as part of the normal permit process. Moreover, the expense of a meritorious claim will not be borne by the owner.
Not only are damages for a temporary taking available, but the owner's reasonable costs and attorney fees must be reimbursed by the local entity if the owner establishes that the restriction on land use is a compensable taking." Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 14-15.
Similarly, to "state a due process cause of action under section 1983, a party must, as a threshold matter, allege a liberty or property interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation] A property interest is defined as 'a legitimate claim of entitlement to [a benefit].' Thus, to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.' " Blank v.
Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 319 (1985). "I]n the context of land use and zoning decisions, a person cannot state a section 1983 claim absent a foundational showing that the government's action deprived him of a land use to which he was entitled." Breneric Assocs. v. City of Del Mar, 69 Cal. App. 4th 166, 181 (1998).
Here, the is no debate that designating the property as a historical resource for the public's benefit over the objections of the property owner deprive the property owner of his right to build his house and/or any other residential use on the property. As the historical resources report noted, no prior owner ever applied or sought to have the site declared a historical resource and the City has never imposed it on any prior owner. To do so now, therefore, will constitute such a taking.
In sum, all the requisite findings can be made as set-forth in the proposed Resolution, and none of the issues raised on appeal prove otherwise. The Categorical Exemption under the CEQA Guidelines applies and there are no cumulative impact, unusual circumstances, or historical resource exceptions to it. Accordingly, the Project is exempt from environmental review and the Applicant requests that the City Council deny the appeals and approve the project with the additional condition of approval recommended by Staff.
Sincerely,
Richard A. . McDonald, Esq.
Of Counsel, Stoner Carlson LLP