Edwin C. Kisiel, Esq.
Kisiel Law
1205 Victory Walk
Laguna Beach, CA 92651
(949) 549-9076
[email protected]
25 May 2026
City of Laguna Beach
City Council
505 Forest Avenue
Laguna Beach, CA 92651
Re: 26 May 2026 Agenda Item # 14 – City Council Appeal & Draft Revised Resolution APN: 053-124-18
Application: CDP 2026-0148
Address: 238 Chiquita Street
Dear City Council Members:
In support of Mr. Lukoff’s appeal to request that the City Council set aside the Design Review Board’s (“DRB”) 12 March 2026 decision to deny Coastal Development Permit 2026-0148 for a proposed accessory dwelling unit (ADU) at 238 Chiquita Street in the City of Laguna Beach (the “property”), we submit this letter in advance of the 26 May 2026 public hearing for consent agenda item # 14. We note that May 26th will constitute the fifth public hearing for this project.1 We thank City Council for their time to listen to our point of view by reviewing all of the materials submitted in the file, and hearing from us in the 13 May 2026 public hearing. We also thank City Council for confirming that Mr. Lukoff has a right to an ADU on his property2 and that it is not fair for Mr. Lukoff to not have an ADU3 on his R-2 lot. However, it is still very apparent that there are fundamental differences between the City’s position and Mr. Lukoff’s position that are not resolved by City Council’s actions on the appeal.
Mr. Lukoff understands that the City of Laguna Beach is in a unique position as a coastal jurisdiction and that there are necessary coastal resource protection policies that apply to new development in order to ensure that we protect the coastal and marine environment under the Coastal Act that make Laguna Beach special. This is the basis of the Coastal Act Savings Clause at Gov.
Code § 66329. However, there is a major dispute between Appellant’s understanding of what constitutes “other development standards” and “coastal resources” under the City’s ADU Ordinance and the City’s position. Mr. Lukoff’s position is grounded in a plain language reading of the City’s ADU ordinance that applies to this project (which has been incorporated into the City’s Local Coastal Program (LCP)). Furthermore, even within the Coastal Act Savings Clause, Gov. Code § 66329(a) specifically mandates not only 60-day ministerial approval but explicitly that the City render a decision for a CDP for an ADU application within 60 days. This is a mandatory metric the City failed to meet, evidenced by the timeline shown in staff’s presentation. 1 See, Gov. Code § 65909.5. 2 City Council Hearing Video (13 May 2026), at 3:37:05. 3 Id., at 3:37:45. 2 Overall, the revised draft resolution does not address Mr. Lukoff’s contentions in the appeal.
Moreover, the revised draft resolution still does not address the interplay between the ADU Ordinance and the rest of the LCP, including the key provision from LBMC § 25.17.040(D) that “other development standards do not apply.” For example, the draft revised resolution continues to uphold the DRB’s decision regarding “the separate finding required to justify excess building site coverage”4 when that is a development standard that clearly does not apply (and not a coastal resource protection policy) based on a plain language reading of the City’s ADU ordinance.
Furthermore, the structure of the draft resolution makes clear that the neighborhood compatibility finding is being used as a backdoor to impose the very development standards that LMBC §
25.17.040(D) proscribes and not for coastal resource protection.
We submit this letter to discuss identified procedural irregularities at the 13 May 2026 public hearing and to comment on the resolution proposed on the consent agenda for the 26 May 2026 City Council hearing. We hope that City Council will re-open the matter to address the procedural and substantive deficiencies and overturn the DRB’s denial of Mr. Lukoff’s ADU.
Revised Draft Resolution Continues to Not Address the Contentions in the Appeal The revised draft resolution still does not address the contentions in the appeal based on the facts and law as they apply. As is indicated in the administrative record, the City has not successfully demonstrated how subjective standards of mass or view impairment apply, and even if they did, subjective standards are not being reasonably applied. For the “visual compatibility” finding, the DRB cherrypicked 2-3 homes on “middle and lower Chiquita” Street,5 out of the 21 properties total on the block and ignored the 2-story and 3-story properties on the block that did not suit the DRB’s pre-determined outcome. Applicable subjective standards are also not reasonably applied as compared to other historic properties such as 239 Viejo Street. City Council members did not conduct a site visit to understand the context for themselves. Mr. Lukoff’s property is an R-2 lot where a second unit is expected, and other neighbors on this block have developed their properties accordingly. This raises the specter of unconstitutional regulatory taking of property rights, as stated in the appeal.
As was discussed at the City Council hearing, it is apparent in the administrative record and does not appear to be in dispute by the City, the proposed ADU meets all applicable objective standards under the State ADU Law and the City’s ADU Ordinance (and LCP). The ADU maintains 4’ or greater side and rear setbacks and is 16’ total height and is even sunk 1’ into the ground. The ADU also maintains the minimum separation required from other structures. Furthermore, the applicable standard is height, not stories. No provision in the ADU Ordinance precludes a two-story ADU that meets the objective design standards. This objective compliance is confirmed by this email screenshot from the City planner to designer Bill Dickey:
4 Draft Revised Resolution 8.
5 Id. at 7.
3 Procedural Irregularity Regarding Applicable Standard of Review There is a key discrepancy regarding the standard of review for the appeal that affects the legal legitimacy of City Council’s action, materially prejudiced Mr. Lukoff’s case, fatally flawed the appeal proceedings, and raises new matters of denial of due process. In the City Attorney-reviewed staff report prepared for the hearing, the applicable standard of review is characterized as LBMC §
25.05.070(E)(1). Please see the excerpt from the Staff Report6:
On the other hand, during the May 13, 2026 staff presentation, Mr. Viera briefed the City Council members that the applicable standard of review came from LBMC § 25.05.070(E)(3),7 as shown on City staff’s slide presentation:
6 Staff Report 3 (13 May 2026).
7 City Council Hearing Video (13 May 2026), at 2:50:59. 4 This discrepancy is a fatal flaw because it goes to the legal framework under which the appeal was evaluated. Under the LBMC § 25.05.070(E)(1) standard of review stated in the Staff Report, the City Council is not limited to the grounds specifically stated in the notice of appeal and is not confined to the evidence presented to the DRB (emphasis added). However, under the LBMC §
25.05.070(E)(2)(b) standard of review briefed to City Council by Mr. Viera at the public hearing, the City Council is limited to the grounds specifically stated in the notice of appeal and is confined to the evidence presented to the DRB (emphasis added). This is a direct contradiction.
While the Design Review Board rendered the decision subject to appeal, the decision was not a “design review application” that would trigger LBMC § 25.05.070(E)(2) but was rather solely a Coastal Development Permit application (for which appellant continues to object to having been heard by Design Review Board in the first instance). An ADU application, standing alone, is not a “design review application” for purposes of fee assessment but is its own category. Since the standard of review was misstated to the decision-makers, and the City Council was provided with two inconsistent standards of review by City Staff, the entire analytical framework underlying the City Council’s deliberation is compromised. Moreover, it appears that City staff understood that they could submit new evidence, to include the slide presentation of 72 other historic homes in the North Laguna neighborhood.
It appears that City Council was influenced by Mr. Viera’s statement of the standard of review during the presentation. There was no discussion by City Council regarding concerns raised and evidence provided by the appellant’s team questioning the reliability of the HRG consultant’s report, including historic consultant Carrie Chasteen’s 8 May 2026 memorandum and testimony at the public hearing. Additionally, the appellant’s team prepared its pre-hearing materials and its hearing presentation on the basis that the applicable standard of review, as expressed prior to the meeting in the Staff Report (reviewed by the City Attorney’s office) was LBMC § 25.05.070(E)(1), which materially prejudiced appellant’s ability to make its case. This ambiguity in the applied 5 standard of review not only further demonstrates the City’s lack of good faith and fair dealing under the Mills Act contract but also constitutes a Constitutional due process violation.
Cited Coastal Commission Decisions Do Not Support Claim of Historic Structures as Coastal Resources
There is still no support for the City’s position that historic preservation is a coastal resource protection policy. It is the Appellant’s position that the provisions of LBMC Chapter 25.45 on historic preservation fall into the category of proscribed “other development standards” that do not apply to this project instead of the “coastal resource protection policies” that continue to apply under LBMC § 25.17.040(D). At the 13 May 2026 public hearing, City Staff indicated, without further discussion, that the Coastal Commission cases of Appeal A-5-LGB-12-091 and Appeal A-3-SCO-08- 036 supported the City’s claimed position that historic structures are coastal resources. However, neither of these cases come to this conclusion, nor does the recent Appeal A-3-PGR-27-0007.
It is clear from Appeal A-3-SCO-08-036 that historic resource protection is not a mandatory coastal resource protection policy for a certified LCP. An LCP can be certified without historic resource protections (as Santa Cruz County’s LCP was) and in the absence of historic resource protections, the Coastal Commission will not apply the historic preservation portion of the code in its analysis. This demonstrates that historic preservation in and of itself is not coastal resource protection. Instead, the Coastal Commission considered whether a historic oceanfront inn on a bluff in a state of disrepair was integral to community character under Pub. Res. Code § 30253 and concluded it was not. Appeal A-5-LGB-12-091 stands for the proposition that if a historic preservation ordinance is incorporated in an LCP, the Coastal Commission will enforce it. However, this case does not equate historic preservation with coastal resource protection, and it did involve an ADU where the ordinance proscribes application of other development standards. Appeal A-3-PGR27-0007 found that alteration to a historic structure for an attached ADU complied with Secretary of the Interior standards. This distinction appears to be understood in the draft revised resolution, discussing “historic and coastal resources” as two different categories.8 A further distinguishing factor is that all of these cases involve demolition or physical alteration to a historic structure and not a detached accessory structure. Also tellingly, the Coastal Act’s resource protection provisions (Chapter 3) do not list historic buildings. The Coastal Act’s resource protection provisions address marine resources (Pub. Res. Code § 30230, et. seq.), environmentally sensitive habitat (Pub. Res.
Code § 30240), agricultural lands (Pub. Res. Code § 30241), and archaeological/paleontological resources (Pub. Res. Code § 30244). Historic structures are not listed. Mr. Lukoff’s design meets the intent of Pub. Res. Code § 30250 and § 30251 since it is infill development, does not substantially impact public ocean views, and is a visually compatible design.
The plain language interpretation of LBMC Chapter 25.45 is as a development standard and not a coastal resource protection policy. LMBC § 25.45.010 construes it as “Procedures for alteration of a historic resource” and provides for staff review of proposed changes to determine consistency with “the design review criteria, the Secretary of the Interior's Standards (SOIS) or the City's Local Design Guidelines.” Design review criteria, design guidelines, and SOIS are quintessential development standards, not coastal resource protection policies. Furthermore, the City’s current position would render the language at LBMC § 25.17.050(E) as meaningless surplusage (since it would have been captured under LBMC Chapter 25.45), which is contrary to canons of statutory interpretation. Additionally, Appellant’s position is in line with proposed 8 Draft Revised Resolution 48.
6 guidance from the Coastal Commission, which expresses an understanding that coastal resource protection standards in an LCP are those “related to protecting habitat, ensuring that new development will minimize risks from flooding or other coastal hazards, or height limits that protect public coastal views.”9 Historical resources are absent from the Coastal Commission’s understanding of coastal resources.
Furthermore, the ADU ordinance must be interpreted based on the plain meaning of its terms in light of the original intent of the City Council at that time. With regards to historic preservation, the ADU ordinance at LBMC § 25.17.050(E) provides that “ADUs and/or JADUs within or proposed to be within a structure listed on the California Register of Historic Resources or the City's Register shall meet all Secretary of the Interior Standards, as applicable” (emphasis added). This provision applies SOIS only to ADUs within a historic structure—i.e., conversions of or additions to the historic building itself. Mr. Lukoff's proposed ADU is a detached structure that does not physically alter the historic residence. Thus, under the applicable ADU ordinance, the SOIS would clearly apply to City Council’s suggested approach of a garage conversion JADU but no such application to a detached ADU that does not alter the existing residence. LBMC § 25.17.040(E)(3)(e) identifies what constitutes a “resource” for imposing greater setbacks on non-guaranteed allowance ADUs “as necessary to protect the resources, consistent with the requirements of the certified Local Coastal Program. Resources may include, but are not limited to, hazardous areas, environmentally sensitive areas, wetlands, public views, and public trails and accessways.” Again, historic structures are not listed. This reflects the intent of the City Council at the time that historic resources were not considered coastal resources. The plain language reading of the City’s own ordinance therefore does not require SOIS compliance for a detached ADU on the same lot as a historic resource.
Additionally, the record of adoption of the ADU Ordinance and the LCP Amendment does not establish support for the City’s now-claimed position that historic structures are coastal resources.
Material Misrepresentations of Fact Within the Draft Revised Resolution The draft revised resolution contains several misrepresentations of fact that compromise the integrity of the proceedings and raise additional due process violations. The three most egregious include (1) misrepresentation of the alternative design revision discussed during the hearing;10 (2) misleading facts regarding other historic homes in the North Laguna area;11 and (3) mischaracterization of the Bill Dickey-designed ADU as “unsightly.”12 The draft revised resolution misrepresents the alternative design revisions that were “offered” to the Appellant during the hearing. The draft revised resolution states that “possible alternative designs and locations include adding a second-story ADU above the existing garage and/or expanding the ADU into the driveway to ensure sufficient square footage” which is misrepresented as an “offer” the Appellant is characterized as having “explicitly declined”13 The testimony reveals that there was no such offer made by the City Staff or City Council. Even if this was what had been 9 California Coastal Commission, Draft SB 1077 Guidance 4 (13 April 2026); see also, id. at 5 (stating that “Some LCPs may contain side or front yard setback requirements or other design standards that conflict with State ADU Law and that are not necessary to protect coastal resources (e.g., they are not needed to protect public access, wetlands, or public view corridors),” excluding discussion of historic resources from this category). 10 Draft Revised Resolution 48, 61. 11 Id. at 9, 67. 12 Id. at 12-13. 13 Id. at 48, 67. 7 offered, it would not be possible to construct even a 150 square foot minimum size ADU in this location due to the imposition of the mandatory 4’ side yard setback as the existing garage has zero setback from the side property line.14
Instead, Mr. Lukoff was offered a LBMC § 25.17.040(D)(2) “garage conversion” at the hearing by City Staff.15 No City Council members performed a site visit of the property prior to the 13 May 2026 hearing. If they had conducted a site visit, they would have seen that Mr. Lukoff has a single-car garage with zero setback from the side property line with interior dimensions of 10’ width and 16’ 8” long. This 166 square foot space is barely more than the minimum allowable size for an efficiency ADU under the ADU Ordinance and State ADU Law and would not be functional to provide the required facilities for a full ADU, much less a Junior ADU (which is not allowed for a garage conversion under the ADU Ordinance). Moreover, this “offer” constitutes 20% of the living space sought under the proposed 799 square foot detached ADU and is 19% of the permitted 850 square foot “guaranteed allowance” under LBMC § 25.17.040(D)(1). Furthermore, the “offer” on the record under LBMC § 25.17.040(D)(2) would be denying Mr. Lukoff of a “guaranteed allowance” detached ADU under LBMC 25.17.040(D)(1) and would explicitly require compliance with SOIS, which likely constitutes another bait-and-switch operation by the City and further compounds the due process violations. Instead, Mr. Lukoff offered an alternative during the hearing, which went ignored by City Staff and City Council, that would have disregarded the illegally imposed 21-foot front yard setback and create greater spatial distance between the historic home and the proposed detached ADU, likely satisfying HRG’s expressed concerns.
City Staff used a misleading statistic during the staff presentation and in the draft revised resolution that claims there are 72 historic homes in North Laguna with zero detached ADUs in the front yard.16 However, this fails to account for the number of historic homes that actually have sufficient front yard setback to accommodate a detached ADU. As Carrie Chasteen’s presentation and memorandum makes clear, and a site visit would have made clear as well, other properties do not have the 50-foot setback that Mr. Lukoff’s property has. Thus, this is an unreliable statistic and should City Council rely on this for a basis of denial, would further demonstrate abuse of discretion.
Finally, the draft revised resolution misconstrues the Bill Dickey-designed detached ADU as “unsightly” and thus a violation of the Mills Act17 when there is no evidence in the record to support such a finding. All of the involved historic consultants, including the City’s preferred consultant HRG, found that the design of the ADU would be a compatible design and differentiated from the existing historic residence.
Furthermore, even if the City’s position regarding compliance with SOIS (which contradicts the plain language meaning of LBMC Chapter 25.17) were valid (which Appellant contends it is not), the HRG report fails to provide substantial evidence for the City’s denial of the project. The Heritage Committee proceedings disregarded HRG’s basis of contention under SOIS #4 that the 1960s modifications to the front façade of the home constituted character-defining features. That analysis 14 South Coast Remodels, Plans 3 (existing and proposed site plan). 15 City Council Hearing (13 May 2026), at 2:52:10 (“garage conversion” or “single story for additional square footage in front of garage” by Anthony Viera); City Council Hearing Video (13 May 2026), at 3:39:10 (“use of the garage” by Megan Garibaldi); City Council Hearing (13 May 2026), at 3:43:37 (“garage conversion” by Matt Schneider).
16 Draft Revised Resolution 9, 67. 17 Id. at 12-13.
8 appears to have carried forward to the DRB in that the discussion only focused on SOIS #2 and SOIS #9. However, HRG’s findings regarding SOIS #4 are integral to and inseparable from its findings regarding SOIS #2 and SOIS #9 based on the later, non-character defining alterations to the first level of the property. The City’s disregard of HRG’s findings regarding SOIS #4 as a basis for denial also brings into question the reliability of HRG’s analysis by infecting all of the other findings, rendering HRG’s documentation unreliable and lacking substantial evidence. Even though HRG’s representative was available at the City Council public hearing and had the benefit of Ms. Chasteen’s memorandum and public testimony, HRG remained silent. The only reliable and substantial evidence regarding the proposed ADU’s compliance with SOIS is the 2023 Sapphos report, the 8 May 2026 memorandum from Ms. Chasteen, and Ms. Chasteen’s testimony at the 26 May 2026 public hearing. This issue was not discussed or resolved by City Council or the draft revised resolution.
Failure to Discuss How the Application Can Be Remedied
The draft revised resolution continues the same failure to tell the Appellant how the application can be remedied to secure approval. LBMC § 25.17.030(C)(4) provides: “If the city denies an application for an ADU or JADU, it shall provide a full set of comments with the denial listing the items that are defective or deficient and shall describe how the application can be remedied by the applicant” (emphasis added). The Resolution provides a blanket denial with no description of how the application can be remedied. This violates the City's own ordinance — which is part of the certified LCP.
The draft revised resolution’s response to this contention asserts that § 25.17.030(C)(4) (which mirrors Gov. Code § 66317(b)) “applies to ministerial ADU applications” and that the Project is not subject to ministerial approval due to the CDP requirement. This argument fails for several reasons. First, LBMC § 25.17.030(C)(4) contains no limitation to ministerial applications. It says “if the city denies an application for an ADU or JADU” then it is required to provide a pathway to remedy—there is no qualifier based on ministerial approval. Second, the LBMC § 25.17.030(B)(1) acknowledges that ADUs in the coastal zone require CDPs but does not exempt CDP-track ADUs from the remedy requirement. The ordinance was drafted with full knowledge that most Laguna Beach ADUs would require CDPs. The remedy requirement serves the same purpose regardless of the review track. It ensures that applicants know what they need to do to obtain approval, rather than receiving a blanket denial with no path forward. Here, even City Council’s guidance in deliberation to submit a SOIS-compliant application does not meet the requirement because multiple historic consultants from Sapphos and Alta concluded that this project does meet SOIS.
It is clear that from the City’s perspective, the only way to remedy the application is to obtain the subjective approval of HRG (which is not the same as SOIS compliance), which is being used to prevent development of a guaranteed allowance ADU. HRG did not submit materials present at the 13 May hearing, even though City staff noted an HRG representative was present for deliberations.
HRG also ignored outreach efforts from Appellant’s counsel on 22 April seeking resolution.
Throughout the process, Mr. Lukoff and designer Bill Dickey recurrently met with City staff, successfully addressed all of the City’s requested revisions and each time met the additionally imposed requirements by new planners. However, this is an exercise in futility, as the City has never provided the legally required pathway to approval. The draft revised resolution and silence from HRG perpetuates the guessing game, wasting more time and money, which provides more evidence of the City’s bad faith under the Mills Act is what the state legislature sought to prevent with Gov.
Code § 66317(b), adopted into the City’s LCP.
9 City staff concurred on 30 October 2025 the submitted plan meets all requirements for allowable location of an ADU. Furthermore, Mr. Lukoff’s proposed alternative raised on multiple occasions, including at the City Council hearing, to move the ADU towards the street would improves public views of the front façade, as HRG requests to meet its subjective, unreasonable interpretations SOIS standards, yet the City has refused to consider this solution. Some City Council members appear to have understood Mr. Lukoff’s fundamental fairness concern, yet the draft revised resolution still fails to provide the concrete required discussion of how the application can be remedied.
Conclusion
Thank you for your consideration of this letter in support of Mr. Lukoff’s appeal of Resolution 2026-0148 and concerns regarding the draft revised resolution. We hope that City Council will set things right and grant Mr. Lukoff’s appeal. If you would like to schedule a site visit in advance of the May 26th hearing, please contact me by phone at (949) 549-9076 or by email at [email protected].
Kind regards,
Edwin C. Kisiel, Esq.
Counsel for Mr. Jonathan Lukoff
Cc: David Barboza, ADU Team, California HCD