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• Stream or wave activity, which has caused erosion, undercut a bank or cut into a bank to cause the surrounding land to be unstable
• The presence or potential for snow avalanches
• The presence of an alluvial fan, indicating vulnerability to the flow of debris or sediments • The presence of impermeable soils, such as silt or clay, mixed with granular soils, such as sand or gravel.
The best predictor of where slides might occur is the location of past movements. Past landslides can be recognized by their distinctive topographic shapes, which can remain in place for thousands of years. Most landslides recognizable in this fashion range from a few acres to several square miles. Most show no evidence of recent movement and are not currently active. A small proportion of them may become active in any given year, with movements concentrated within all or part of the landslide masses or around their edges. The recognition of ancient dormant landslide sites is important in the identification of areas susceptible to flows and slides because they can be reactivated by earthquakes or by exceptionally wet weather. Also, because they consist of broken materials and frequently involve disruption of groundwater flow, these dormant sites are vulnerable to construction-triggered sliding.
12.1.3 Landslide Causes
Landslides are caused by a combination of geological and climate conditions and the influence of urbanization.
They can be initiated by storms, earthquakes, fires, volcanic eruptions, or human modification of the land.
Vulnerable natural conditions are affected by human development and the infrastructure that supports it. In some cases, irrigation increases the landslide potential. The following factors can contribute to slide formation:
• Change in slope of the terrain
• Increased load on the land
• Shocks and vibrations
• Change in water content
• Groundwater movement
• Frost action
• Weathering of rocks
• Removing or changing the vegetation covering slopes.
While small landslides are frequently a result of human activity, the largest landslides are often naturally occurring phenomena with little or no human contribution.
12.1.4 Landslide Management
Landslides can create immediate, critical threats to public safety. They can move rapidly down slopes or through channels, and can strike with little or no warning. Effective landslide management should include the following elements:
• Continuing investigation to identify natural landslides, understand their mechanics, assess their risk to public health and welfare, and understand their role in ecological systems • Regulation of development in or near existing landslides or areas of natural instability through the cities’ codes and ordinances and Alameda County code.
• Preparation for emergency response to landslides to facilitate rapid, coordinated action among Alameda County, the planning area, and state and federal agencies, and to provide emergency assistance to affected or at-risk citizens
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• Evaluation of options including landslide stabilization or structure relocation where landslides are identified as a threat to critical public structures or infrastructure
12.1.5 Secondary Hazards
Mass movements are not generally known to result in secondary hazards. A landslide that blocks a river or stream does have the potential to cause flooding.
12.2 HAZARD PROFILE
12.2.1 Past Events
Landslides in the Bay Area typically occur either as a result of an earthquake or during heavy and sustained rainfall events. Urbanized areas, like the Cities of Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton, and especially hilly areas of Alameda and Contra Costa County, have sustained damage from landslides caused by storms. Between January 1980 and May 2022, FEMA issued disaster (DR) declarations for the State of California for 11 landslide hazard- related events that affected Alameda or Contra Costa County, classified as one or a combination of the following events: severe winter storms, flooding, debris flow, mud flows, landslides and mudslides, as listed in Table 12-1.
Table 12-1. FEMA Landslide Disaster Declarations in Alameda County FEMA Declaration Event Date Event Type Location
DR-4308 February 1 – February 23,
2017 Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Mudslides 43 counties including Alameda and Contra Costa
DR-4305 January 18 – January 23,
2017 Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Mudslides 23 counties including Alameda and Contra Costa
DR-4301 January 3 – January 12,
2017 Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Mudslides 34 counties including Alameda and Contra Costa
DR-1646 March 29 – April 16, 2006 Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides 17 counties including Alameda
DR-1628 December 17 – January 3,
2006
Severe Storms, Flooding, Mudslides, and
Landslides
31 counties including Alameda and
Contra Costa
DR-1155 December 28, 1996 – April
1, 1997
Severe Storms, Flooding, Mud and
Landslides
48 counties including Alameda and
Contra Costa
DR-1046 February 13 – April 19,
1995
Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Landslides,
Mudslides
57 counties including Alameda and
Contra Costa
DR-1044 January 3 – February 10,
1995
Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Landslides,
Mudslides
42 counties including Alameda and
Contra Costa
DR-979 January 5 – March 20,
1993
Severe Storms, Flooding, Mud and
Landslides
27 counties including Contra
Costa
DR-677 January 21 – March 30,
1983 Coastal Storms, Floods, Slides & Tornadoes 40 counties including Alameda and Contra Costa
DR-651 December 19, 1981 –
January 8, 1983 Severe Storms, Flood, Mudslides & High Tide 10 counties including Alameda and Contra Costa
Source: (FEMA 2022)
Little recorded information is available regarding previous landslide occurrences in the Cities of Dublin, Livermore, and Pleasanton. Table 12-2 lists known landslide events that have impacted the planning area between January 1980 and May 2022.
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Table 12-2. Landslide Events in the Tri-Valley Planning Area Event Date Event Type
FEMA
Declaration Location Description
February 13,
2019
Flooding and
Debris Flows
N/A Livermore Widespread flooding and debris flows prompted evacuations.
March 8, 2017 Landslide N/A Pleasanton The backyards of three homes along Foothill Road slid/eroded into Arroyo De La Laguna Creek in Pleasanton.
February 20,
2017
Slide DR-4308 Livermore Slide blocked at least one land east bound 84 just west of Vallecitos and Tesla Road closed from mudslide in Livermore.
January 19,
2017
Mudslides DR-4305 Tri-Valley area/
unincorporated
county
Mudslide debris covered Palomares Road, Tesla Road, Mines Road, and Old Altamont Pass Road.
November 2,
2015
Mudslide N/A Livermore/
unincorporated
county
Heavy rain caused mudslide on Patterson Pass Road, Tesla Road and Corral Hollow Road, east of Livermore
April 6-20,
2006
Heavy Rain
and Debris
Flows
DR-1646 Alameda
County
Heavy rains caused landslides, eroding hillsides and cracked pavement. Landslide or erosion problems on private properties spilled over onto county rights-of-way. Overall, the County had approximately $10 million in damage to county roadways.
December 17,
2005 –
January 12,
2006
Winter Storms DR-1628 Alameda
County
Severe storms brought flooding, mudslides, and landslides to most of Alameda County.
February 1995 Late Winter
Storms
(Severe Winter
Storms, Flood,
Landslide,
Mudflows)
DR-1046 Statewide All California counties except Del Norte were included in this declaration. In total, the state recorded 17 deaths; $190.6 million in public property damage, $122.4 million in individual damage, $46.9 million in business damage, $79 million in highway damage, and $651.6 million in agricultural damage; with 1,322 homes recording major damage, 267 listed as destroyed, and 2,299 recording minor damage.
Sources: (National Climatic Data Center 2022); (FEMA 2022); (Alameda County 2021)
12.2.2 Location
The California Geological Survey developed statewide mapping of landslide susceptibility classes based on regional rock strength and slope. The mapping assumed that landslide susceptibility is low on very low slopes in all rock materials and increases with slope and in weak rocks. The analysis factored in locations of past landslides. Figure 12-1 shows the planning area susceptibility classes—low, moderate, high, and very high/existing landslide. Most of the planning area has low susceptibility, though portions of all the cities’ boundaries have moderate to high susceptibility. Western Pleasanton has very high susceptibility.
12.2.3 Frequency
Landslides are often triggered by events such as earthquakes, heavy rain, floods, or wildfires, so landslide frequency is often related to the frequency of these other hazards. In the planning area, landslides typically occur during and after major storms, so the potential for landslides largely coincides with the potential for sequential severe storms that saturate steep, vulnerable soils. The probability of a landslide event occurring in the planning area in any given year is high. Table 12-1 lists 10 federal disaster declarations for landslides in Alameda County between 1981 and May 2022, an average of once every four years. Table 12-2 lists eight landslide events in the Tri-Valley planning area between 1995 and May 2022, which averages about one event every three or four years.
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Figure 12-1
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12.2.4 Severity
Landslides destroy property and infrastructure and can take human lives. Slope failures in the United States result in about 25 to 50 deaths per year and damage costing over $1 billion (U.S. Geological Survey n.d.). Landslides can pose a serious hazard to properties on or below hillsides. When landslides occur—in response to such changes as increased water content, earthquake shaking, addition of load, or removal of downslope support—they deform and tilt the ground surface. The result can be destruction of foundations, offset of roads, breaking of underground pipes, or overriding of downslope property and structures. In the planning area, landslides and mudslides have caused damage to homes, public facilities, roads, parks, and sewer lines in particular. Landslides can vary widely in extent, from a single rock tumbling down a hillside, to a major landslide or mudflow that covers several acres.
12.2.5 Warning Time
Mass movements can occur suddenly or slowly. The velocity of movement may range from a slow creep of inches per year to many feet per second, depending on slope angle, material and water content. Generally accepted warning signs for landslide activity include the following:
• Springs, seeps, or saturated ground in areas that have not typically been wet before • New cracks or unusual bulges in the ground, street pavements or sidewalks • Soil moving away from foundations
• Ancillary structures such as decks and patios tilting and/or moving relative to the main house • Tilting or cracking of concrete floors and foundations • Broken water lines and other underground utilities
• Leaning telephone poles, trees, retaining walls or fences • Offset fence lines
• Sunken or down-dropped roadbeds
• Rapid increase in creek water levels, possibly accompanied by increased turbidity (soil content) • Sudden decrease in creek water levels though rain is still falling or just recently stopped • Sticking doors and windows, and visible open spaces indicating frames out of plumb • A faint rumbling sound that increases in volume as the landslide nears • Unusual sounds, such as trees cracking or boulders knocking together.
Some methods used to monitor mass movements can provide an idea of the type of movement and the amount of time prior to failure. Assessing the geology, vegetation, and amount of predicted precipitation for an area can help in predictions of what areas are at risk during general time periods. Currently, there is no practical warning system for individual landslides.
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12.3 EXPOSURE
12.3.1 Population
Population exposure was estimated by calculating the number of buildings in each landslide susceptibility zone withing the planning area as a percent of total planning area buildings, and then applying this percentage to the estimated planning area population. Figure 12-2 shows the estimated population for each planning area city living in the moderate, high, and very high landslide susceptibility zones, compared to total city population. Figure 12-3 shows results for the entire planning area.
Figure 12-2. Population Exposed to Landslide Hazard and Total Population, by Jurisdiction
Figure 12-3. Total Planning Area Population Exposed to Landslide Hazard 67,504
(35.0% of Total)
15,113
(20.7% of Total)
2,486
(2.9% of Total)
(6.7% of Total)
5,181
89,584
(46.4% of Total)
19,834
(27.2% of Total)
2,568
(3.0% of Total)
(12.2% of Total)
9,447
21,691
(11.2% of Total)
195
(0.3% of Total)
0 (0.0% of Total)
(1.6% of Total)
1,204
192,900
72,932
86,149
77,609
0 20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
220,000
DSRSD Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Population
Exposed Population, Moderate Landslide Susceptibility
Exposed Population, High Landslide Susceptibility
Exposed Population, Very High Landslide Susceptibility
Total Population
22,780
(9.6% of Total)
31,849
(13.5% of Total)
1,400
(0.6% of Total)
236,690
0 50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
Exposed Population, Moderate
Landslide Suscepitility
Exposed Population, High
Landslide Suscepitility
Exposed Population, Very High
Landslide Suscepitility
Total Planning Area Population
Population
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12.3.2 Property
The estimated value of planning area buildings within the moderate, high, and very high landslide susceptibility zones is shown in Figure 12-4 through Figure 12-6. Figure 12-7 shows the estimated exposed total value as a percentage of the total replacement value in each city and in the overall planning area. The numbers of structures in each susceptibility zone, by occupancy class, are shown in Figure 12-8 through Figure 12-10.
DSRSD does not have any exposure for this zone
Figure 12-4. Number and Exposed Value of Buildings in the Moderate Landslide Susceptibility Zone
Figure 12-5. Number and Exposed Value of Buildings in the High Landslide Susceptibility Zone $1,571,676,713
$364,550,892
$651,480,256
$850,402,975
$212,773,376 $338,675,881
Total Exposed Value
$2,422,079,687
(3,085 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$577,324,268
(856 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$990,156,138
(1,466 Buildings)
$0
$500,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$1,500,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000
Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Exposed Value
Exposed Structure Value
Exposed Contents Value
$52,820,650
$2,489,713,410
$530,530,964
$1,631,778,279
0 $1,329,842,434
$378,884,651
$942,001,580 Total Exposed Value
$52,820,650
(25 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$3,819,555,843
(4,040 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$909,415,615
(929 Buildings)
(2,776 Buildings), Total
Exposed Value,
$2,573,779,859
$0
$500,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$1,500,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000
$3,000,000,000
$3,500,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$4,500,000,000
DSRSD Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Exposed Value
Exposed Structure Value
Exposed Contents Value
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DSRSD does not have any exposure for this zone
Figure 12-6. Number and Exposed Value of Buildings in the Very High Landslide Susceptibility Zone
Figure 12-7. Total Value in Landslide Susceptibility Zones as % of Total Replacement Value, by City
$53,000,424 $0
$249,510,481 $31,751,112 $0 $130,888,166
Total Exposed Value
$84,751,536
(41 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$0
( Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$380,398,647
(349 Buildings)
$0
$1,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$3,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Exposed Value
Exposed Structure Value
Exposed Contents Value
0%
24.30%
0 11.8%
18.7%
0.4%
1.9%
3.1%
0.0%
3.4%
8.8%
1.3%
5.0%
9.2%
0.6%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Moderate Landslide
Susceptibility
High Landslide
Susceptibility
Very High Landslide
Susceptibility
Exposed Value as % of Total City or Area Replacement Value DSRSD
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
Planning Area Total
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Figure 12-8. Structures in the Moderate Landslide Susceptibility Zone, by Jurisdiction and Occupancy Class
Figure 12-9. Structures in the High Landslide Susceptibility Zone, by Jurisdiction and Occupancy Class Residential, 3,015
Residential, 814
Residential, 1,454
Commercial, 10
Commercial, 14
Commercial, 5
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 4
Religion, 1
Religion, 5
Government, 17
Government, 4
Government, 0
Education, 39
Education, 23
Education, 2
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
Number of Structures in the Landslide Hazard Zone
CITIES
Residential, 5,283
Commercial, 29
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 10
Government, 21
Education, 64
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
Number of Structures in the Landslide Hazard Zone
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
Residential, 3,957
Residential, 841
Residential, 2,651
Commercial, 16
Commercial, 24
Commercial, 79
Industrial, 4
Industrial, 20
Industrial, 17
Agriculture, 5
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 4
Religion, 0
Religion, 3
Government, 37
Government, 10
Government, 0
Education, 17
Education, 34
Education, 26
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
Number of Structures in the Landslide Hazard Zone
CITIES
Residential, 7,449
Commercial, 119
Industrial, 41
Agriculture, 5
Religion, 7
Government, 47
Education, 77
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
Number of Structures in the Landslide Hazard Zone
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
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Figure 12-10. Structures in Very High Landslide Susceptibility Zone, by Jurisdiction and Occupancy Class
12.3.3 Critical Facilities
Estimates of critical facilities in the mapped landslide susceptibility zones are summarized in Figure 12-11. The total count of critical facilities in high or very high landslide susceptibility zones (98) represents 8 percent of the planning area total of 1,161.
12.3.4 Environment
All natural areas within the high susceptibility zones for landslide are considered to be exposed to the hazard.
Residential, 39
Residential, 0
Residential, 338
Commercial, 0
Commercial, 0
Commercial, 9
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 2
Agriculture, 2
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Government, 0
Government, 0
Government, 0
Education, 0
Education, 0
Education, 0
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
0 100 200 300 400
Number of Structures in the Landslide Hazard Zone
CITIES
Residential, 377
Commercial, 9
Industrial, 2
Agriculture, 2
Religion, 0
Government, 0
Education, 0
0 100 200 300 400
Number of Structures in the Landslide Hazard Zone
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
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Figure 12-11. Critical Facilities in the High or Very High Landslide Susceptibility Zone
12.4 VULNERABILITY
Vulnerability estimates for the landslide hazard are described qualitatively. No loss estimation of these facilities was performed because damage functions have not been established for the landslide hazard.
12.4.1 Population
According to the CDC, health threats from landslides include the following (CDC 2018):
• Trauma caused by rapidly moving water and debris
• Broken electrical, water, gas and sewage lines that can lead to injury or illness • Disrupted roadways that can endanger motorists and disrupt transport and access to health care Communications, 0
Communications, 0
Communications, 1
Communications, 0
Energy, 0
Energy, 0
Energy, 1
Energy, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 26
Food, Water, Shelter, 25
Hazardous Material, 0
Hazardous Material, 1
Hazardous Material, 13
Hazardous Material, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Health & Medical, 3
Health & Medical, 0
Safety & Security, 2
Safety & Security, 1
Safety & Security, 2
Safety & Security, 0
Transportation, 11
Transportation, 4
Transportation, 8
Transportation, 0
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
DSRSD
0 10 20 30 40
Number of Critical Facilities in the Flood Zone
PLANNING PARTNERS
Communications, 1
Energy, 1
Food, Water, Shelter, 51
Hazardous Material, 14
Health & Medical, 3
Safety & Security, 5
Transportation, 23
0 20 40 60 80
Number of Critical Facilities in the Flood Zone
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
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Landslide events can hinder evacuation routes, prevent the delivery of necessary goods to vulnerable populations in the Tri-Valley planning area, and delay emergency and medical responses to the area. Local vulnerable populations, such as the senior community, schools, individuals without vehicles, and individuals with disabilities within the cities of Dublin, Livermore, and Pleasanton and those served by DSRSD, may also have a difficult time evacuating the affected area in time due to their circumstances. A landslide might also impact access to senior centers, the veteran center in Livermore, schools, and disadvantaged community centers.
12.4.2 Property
Figure 12-12 shows estimates of potential loss representing 10 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent of the assessed value of structures exposed to the landslide hazard (for the moderate, high, and very high susceptibility zones combined). These estimates allow emergency managers to assess a range of economic impacts based on an estimate of the percent of damage to the general building stock. Damage in excess of 50 percent is considered to be substantial by most building codes and typically requires total reconstruction of the structure.
Figure 12-12. Loss Estimates for Landslide
12.4.3 Critical Facilities
There are 98 critical facilities exposed to the high or very high landslide susceptibility zone. No loss estimates were developed as a result of the lack of established damage functions for the landslide hazard.
DSRSD, $5,282,065
DSRSD, $15,846,195
DSRSD, $26,410,325
DSRSD, $52,820,650
Dublin, $632,638,707
Dublin, $1,897,916,120
Dublin, $3,163,193,533
Dublin, $6,326,387,067
Livermore, $148,673,988
Livermore, $446,021,965
Livermore, $743,369,941
Livermore, $1,486,739,883
Pleasanton, $394,433,464
Pleasanton, $1,183,300,393
Pleasanton, $1,972,167,322
Pleasanton, $3,944,334,644
$0 $2,000,000,000 $4,000,000,000 $6,000,000,000 $8,000,000,000 $10,000,000,000 $12,000,000,000 Loss = 10% of
Exposed Value
Loss = 30% of
Exposed Value
Loss = 50% of
Exposed Value
Exposed Value
Loss Value
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12.4.4 Environment
Environmental problems as a result of landslides can be numerous. Vegetation and wildlife habitats may be damaged or destroyed. Soil and sediment runoff accumulate downslope, potentially blocking waterways and roadways and impairing the quality of streams and other water bodies. Landslides that fall into streams may significantly impact fish and wildlife habitat, as well as affecting water quality. Hillsides that provide wildlife habitat can be lost for prolonged periods of time due to landslides.
12.5 FUTURE TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT
The planning partners are equipped to handle future growth within landslide hazard areas. Landslide risk areas are addressed in the safety elements of local general plans. All three cities have committed to linking their general plans to this hazard mitigation plan. This will create an opportunity for wise land use decisions as future growth impacts landslide hazard areas.
Additionally, the State of California has adopted the International Building Code by reference in its California Building Standards Code. The Code includes provisions for geotechnical analyses in steep slope areas that have soil types considered susceptible to landslide hazards. These provisions assure that new construction is built to standards that reduce the vulnerability to landslide risk.
12.6 SCENARIO
Major landslides in the planning area occur as a result of soil conditions that have been affected by severe storms, groundwater or human development. The worst-case scenario for landslide hazards in the planning area would generally correspond to a severe storm that had heavy rain and caused flooding. Landslides are most likely during late winter when the water table is high. After heavy rains from November to December, soils become saturated with water. As water seeps downward through upper soils that may consist of permeable sands and gravels and accumulates on impermeable silt, it will cause weakness and destabilization in the slope. A short intense storm could cause saturated soil to move, resulting in landslides. As rains continue, the groundwater table rises, adding to the weakening of the slope. Gravity, poor drainage, a rising groundwater table and poor soil exacerbate hazardous conditions.
Landslides are becoming more of a concern as development moves outside of city centers into less-developed areas. It is probable that private and public property, including infrastructure, will be affected. Mass movements could affect bridges that pass over landslide-prone ravines and knock out rail service through the planning area.
Road obstructions caused by mass movements would create isolation problems for residents and businesses in sparsely developed areas. Property owners exposed to steep slopes may suffer damage to property or structures.
Landslides carrying vegetation such as shrubs and trees may cause a break in utility lines, cutting off power and communication access to residents.
12.7 ISSUES
Important issues associated with landslides in the planning area include the following:
• There are existing homes in landslide risk areas throughout the planning area. The degree of vulnerability of these structures depends on the codes and standards the structures were constructed to. Information to this level of detail is not currently available.
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12-15
• Future development could lead to more homes in landslide risk areas. • Mapping and assessment of landslide hazards are constantly evolving. As new data and science become available, assessments of landslide risk should be reevaluated. • The impact of climate change on landslides is uncertain. If climate change impacts atmospheric conditions, then exposure to landslide risks is likely to increase. • The risk associated with the landslide hazard overlaps the risk associated with other hazards such as earthquake, flood and wildfire. This provides an opportunity to seek mitigation alternatives with multiple objectives that can reduce risk for multiple hazards.
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13-1
13. SEVERE WEATHER
13.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND
Severe weather refers to any dangerous meteorological phenomena with the potential to cause damage, serious social disruption, or loss of human life. Severe weather conditions with the greatest potential to impact the planning area are described in the following sections. Flooding and landslides associated with severe weather are discussed as separate hazards in Chapters 11 and 12. In this risk assessment, the “severe weather” hazard refers in aggregate to the various weather conditions profiled—severe storms, extreme heat, damaging winds and space weather. These conditions are treated as a single hazard for the following reasons:
• Each condition has impacted the planning area, with similar frequencies of occurrence, based on weather records.
• Each condition impacts the entire planning area, with no clearly mapped or defined extent. Without a mapped or defined extent, quantitative, geospatial analysis to assess exposure or vulnerability is not available.
Therefore, the risk assessment for severe weather is qualitative and is based on the aggregate exposure and vulnerability to all weather conditions.
13.1.1 Severe Storms
Severe storm conditions in the planning area include heavy rain (atmospheric rivers and thunderstorms), lightning and hail. Heavy rain refers to events where the amount of rain exceeds normal levels. The amount of precipitation needed to qualify as heavy rain varies with location and season. Heavy rain is distinct from climate change analyses on increasing precipitation. It does not mean that the total amount of precipitation at a location has increased, just that the rain is occurring in a more intense event. More frequent heavy rain events, however, can serve as indicators of changing precipitation levels. Heavy rain is most frequently measured by tracking the frequency of events, analyzing the mean return period, and measuring the amount of precipitation in a certain period (most typically inches of rain within a 24-hour period) (Environmental Protection Agency 2021).
Thunderstorms
NOAA classifies a thunderstorm as a storm with lightning and thunder produced by cumulonimbus clouds, usually producing gusty winds, heavy rain, and sometimes hail. Thunderstorms are usually short in duration (seldom more than two hours). They have three stages:
• The developing stage is marked by a cumulus cloud that is being pushed upward by a rising column of air (updraft). The cumulus cloud soon looks like a tower. There is little to no rain during this stage but occasional lightning. The developing stage lasts about 10 minutes.
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• In the mature stage, the updraft continues to feed the storm, precipitation begins to fall, and a downdraft begins (a column of air pushing downward). When the downdraft and rain-cooled air spread out along the ground, they form a line of gusty winds. The mature stage is the most likely time for hail, heavy rain, frequent lightning, strong winds, and tornadoes.
• Eventually, a large amount of precipitation is produced and the updraft is overcome by the downdraft, beginning the dissipating stage. At the ground, the gusty winds move out a long distance from the storm and cut off the warm moist air that was feeding the thunderstorm.
According to the American Meteorological Society Glossary of Meteorology, thunderstorms are reported as light, medium, or heavy according to the following characteristics:
• Nature of the lightning and thunder
• Type and intensity of the precipitation
• Speed and gustiness of the wind
• Appearance of the clouds
• Effect on surface temperature.
A thunderstorm is classified as “severe” when it contains one or more of the following: hail with a diameter of three-quarter inch or greater, winds gusting in excess of 50 knots (57.5 mph), or tornado.
Atmospheric Rivers
An atmospheric river is a common weather pattern that brings southwest winds and heavy rain to California.
Atmospheric rivers are long, narrow regions in the atmosphere that transport water vapor carried away from the tropics. These columns of vapor move with the weather, carrying large amounts of water vapor and strong winds.
When they make landfall, they often release the water vapor in the form of heavy rain or snow.
Lightning
Lightning is an electrical discharge that results from the buildup of positive and negative charges within a thunderstorm. When the buildup becomes strong enough, lightning appears as a “bolt.” This flash of light usually occurs within the clouds or between the clouds and the ground. A bolt of lightning reaches temperatures approaching 50,000ºF instantaneously. The rapid heating and cooling of air near the lightning causes thunder.
Lightning is a major threat during a thunderstorm. In the United States, between 1989 and 2018, lightning killed an average of 43 people per year (National Weather Service 2019).
Hail
Hail occurs when updrafts in thunderstorms carry raindrops upward into extremely cold areas of the atmosphere where they freeze into ice. Super-cooled water may accumulate on frozen particles near the back-side of a storm as they are pushed forward across and above the updraft by the prevailing winds near the top of the storm.
Eventually, the hailstones encounter downdraft air and fall to the ground. Hailstones can begin to melt and then re-freeze together, forming large and very irregularly shaped hail.
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13.1.2 Extreme Heat
Extreme heat is defined as temperatures that hover 10 ºF or more above the average high temperatures for a region for several days or weeks. Extreme heat events can lead to an increase in heat-related illnesses and deaths, cause drought, and impact water supplies. Heat waves do not strike victims immediately, but their cumulative effects slowly cause harm to vulnerable populations. Older adults, children, and sick or overweight individuals are at greater risk from extreme heat. Such events do not typically impact buildings; however, losses may be associated with the urban heat island effect and overheating of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems.
Extreme heat is the primary weather-related cause of death in the United States. Excessive heat claims over 100 lives each year in this country. In a 30-year record of weather fatalities across the nation (1990-2019), excessive heat claimed more lives each year than floods, lightning, tornadoes, and hurricanes (Erdman 2022).
According to the California Climate Adaptation Strategy, heat waves have claimed more lives in California than all other declared disaster events combined. Despite this history, in a span of 60 years, only four heat emergencies (August 14, 2020; September 2, 2020; June 16, 2021; July 9, 2021) were proclaimed in California at the state level and none were proclaimed at a federal level.
The heat index is what the temperature feels like to the human body when relative humidity is combined with the air temperature. When the body gets too hot, it begins to perspire or sweat to cool itself off. If the perspiration is not able to evaporate, the body cannot regulate its temperature. When atmospheric moisture content (humidity) is high, the rate of evaporation from the body decreases, and the body feels warmer. Figure 13-1 shows the heat index used by the National Weather Service (National Weather Service n.d.).
Figure 13-1. National Weather Service Heat Index
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13.1.3 Damaging Winds
Straight-Line Winds
Straight-line wind is a general term used to describe winds that have no rotation (i.e., are not tornadoes).
Damaging straight-line winds are those that exceed 50 to 60 mph. The Beaufort wind chart (Table 13-1) provides terminology and a description of potential impacts at different levels.
Table 13-1. Beaufort Wind Chart
Beaufort
Number
Range
(mph) Terminology Description
0 0 Calm Calm. Smoke rises vertically.
1 1-3 Light air Wind motion visible in smoke.
2 4-7 Light breeze Wind felt on exposed skin. Leaves rustle. 3 8-12 Gentle breeze Leaves and smaller twigs in constant motion. 4 13-18 Moderate breeze Dust and loose paper are raised. Small branches begin to move. 5 19-24 Fresh breeze Smaller trees sway
6 25-31 Strong breeze Large branches in motion. Whistling heard in overhead wires. Umbrella use is difficult. 7 32-38 Near gale Whole trees in motion. Some difficulty when walking into the wind. 8 39-46 Gale Twigs broken from trees. Cars veer on road. 9 47-54 Sever gale Light structure damage.
10 55-63 Storm Trees uprooted. Considerable structural damage. 11 64-73 Violent storm Widespread structural damage.
12 74-95 Hurricane Considerable and widespread damage to structures.
Source: (NWS n.d.)
Public Safety Power Shutoff Events
High winds can uproot trees, blow branches onto power lines or create sparks if power lines contact one another.
When this occurs in combination with extreme heat and low humidity that dry out vegetation, it poses increased risks of wildfire. In 2012, the California Public Utilities Commission ruled that California Public Utilities Code gives electric utilities authority to shut off electric power to protect public safety by reducing the potential to ignite wildfires (California Public Utilities Commission 2021). Such shutoffs are referred to as public safety power shutoff events. Given the long, connected nature of power supply systems, a shutoff event targeted to a small at-risk area can affect a larger area outside the risk zone. The duration of a shutoff is tied directly to the severe weather that triggers it; the shutoff typically ends within 24 hours after the severe weather has passed (Pacific Gas & Electric 2022).
13.1.4 Space Weather
Space weather refers to variations in the space environment between the sun and earth. It includes phenomena that impact systems and technologies in orbit and on earth. Space weather can occur anywhere from the surface of the sun to the surface of the earth. As a space weather storm leaves the sun, it passes through the sun’s corona and into the solar wind. When it reaches earth, it energizes earth’s magnetosphere and accelerates electrons and protons down to earth’s magnetic field lines where they collide with the atmosphere and ionosphere, particularly at high latitudes. Each component of space weather impacts a different technology. Figure 13-2 illustrates several types of space weather phenomena.
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Figure 13-2. Space Weather Phenomena
A solar flare occurs when magnetic energy that has built up in the solar atmosphere is suddenly released. The flare ejects clouds of electrons, ions, and atoms through the corona of the sun into space. These clouds typically reach earth a day or two after the event. Solar flares last from minutes to hours. Radiation is emitted across virtually the entire electromagnetic spectrum, from radio waves at the long wavelength end, through optical emission to X-rays and gamma rays at the short wavelength end ( (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2016)). Solar flares only impact the earth when they occur on the side of the sun that faces the earth (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2016a). If the energy from a solar flare reaches the earth, it has the potential to affect global positioning system (GPS) signals, television and radio transmissions, and telecommunications.
13.1.5 Secondary Hazards
The most significant secondary hazards associated with severe weather are floods and landslides. Heavy rain can overwhelm natural and man-made drainage systems, causing overflow and property destruction. Landslides occur when the soil on slopes becomes oversaturated and fails.
13.2 HAZARD PROFILE
13.2.1 Past Events
Sources that provide historical information regarding previous occurrences and losses associated with severe weather events in Alameda County and the planning area include FEMA, NWS, and NOAA NCEI. Between 1970 and March 2022, Alameda County was included in 12 FEMA disaster declarations for severe storms, severe
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winter storms, mudslides, landslides and flooding. Impacts on the planning area were not identified in the sources reviewed.
According to NOAA NCEI, between 1996 and March 2022, no extreme heat nor tornado events were recorded in Alameda County. Three hail events occurred in the county, but not in the Tri-Valley planning area. Alameda County recorded 30 high wind events in this timeframe with wind magnitude ranging between 44 knots and 96 knots, 39 strong wind events with wind magnitude between 30 knots and 48 knots, and five thunderstorm wind events. Table 13-2 lists known severe weather events that impacted the planning area between 1970 and April 2017, along with solar flare events that occurred in North America.
Table 13-2. Severe Weather Events in the Tri-Valley Planning Area Event Date Event Type
FEMA
Declaration Location Description
October 24,
2021
Atmospheric
River, Flood,
Heavy Rain
N/A Alameda County An atmospheric river system brought heavy rain, urban and small stream flooding, strong winds, and high surf to the region. Area streams rose rapidly. Multiple flood advisories and warnings were issued. Several downed trees were reported, along with wind gusts of 40 to 50 mph at lower elevations and 60 to 80 mph in the hills.
One station in Alameda County reported a wind gust of 92 mph.
February 20,
2017
Atmospheric
River, Heavy
Rain, Flash Flood
N/A Alameda County An atmospheric river brought heavy rain, causing widespread flooding, debris flows, accidents, and overtopping of reservoir spillways. SR 84 completely closed in both directions due to Alameda Creek flooding between Mission in Fremont to Main Street in Sunol
February 7,
2017
Atmospheric
River
DR- 4308 Alameda
County, planning
area, Bay Area
An atmospheric river produced widespread roadway flooding, debris flows, strong winds, and overtopping of reservoir spillways in the Bay Area. Pleasanton recorded 2.45 inches of rain on Feb. 20.
January 20,
2017
Atmospheric
River
DR- 4305 Alameda
County, planning
area, Bay Area
January 10,
2017
Atmospheric
River
DR- 4301 Alameda
County, planning
area, Bay Area
An atmospheric river produced widespread roadway flooding, debris flows, and strong winds in the Bay Area. Pleasanton recorded
2.15 inches of rain on Jan 10.
December 10
– 11, 2014
Heavy Rains and
High Winds
N/A Alameda
County, planning
area, and Bay
Area
An atmospheric river brought heavy rains and gusty winds to the Bay Area for several days. Rainfall of 1.5 to 2 inches an hour was reported. A flash flood warning was issued for Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton. Wind gusts were recorded up to 83 mph. Rainfall totals ranged from 5.78 to 7.24 inches. Power outages occurred across the Bay Area. Total rainfall in Pleasanton was 3.27 inches.
December
2006
Geomagnetic
Storms and Solar
Flares
N/A United States This event disabled GPS signal acquisition over the United States.
April 6-20,
2006
Heavy Rain and
Debris Flows
DR-1646 Alameda County
and planning
area
Storms brought heavy rain causing landslides, eroding hillsides and cracked pavement. Landslides or erosion on private properties spilled over onto county rights-of-way. Overall, the County had approximately $10 million in damage to county roadways.
December 17,
2005 –
January 12,
2006
Winter Storms
(Severe Storms,
Flood, Mudslides,
Landslides)
DR-1628 Alameda
County, planning
area, Bay Area
Damage estimates for the region were over $100 million. Storms were blamed for two deaths from falling trees, around 50 businesses declared damage, and three homes were nearly wiped out by mudslides.
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Event Date Event Type
FEMA
Declaration Location Description
October 2003 Space Weather
(“Halloween
Storms of 2003”)
N/A Parts of the
Europe and the
United States
Solar flares impacted satellite-based systems and communications.
A one-hour-long power outage resulted in Sweden. Aurorae were observed as far south as Texas.
December 28,
1996 – April 1,
1997
Severe Storms,
Flooding, Mud
and Landslides
DR-1155 48 counties
including
Alameda County
Over 12,000 people were evacuated in northern California. Levee breaks were reported across the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. Over 23,000 homes and business, agricultural lands, bridges, and roads were damaged. The event caused eight deaths and $1.8 billion in damage.
March 13,
1989
Space Weather
Storm
N/A Quebec, Canada A space weather storm disrupted the hydroelectric power grid in Quebec, Canada. This system-wide outage lasted for 9 hours and left 6 million people without power.
February 12 –
March 10,
1986
Severe Storms &
Flooding
DR-758 Bay Area
including
Alameda County
This event damaged over 12,000 homes, destroyed over 1,300 homes, and caused 13 deaths and 67 injuries in California. Damage totaled over $407.5 million.
January 3 – 5,
1982
Landslides,
Floods, and
Marine Effects
DR-651 Bay Area
including
Alameda County
A major storm caused widespread and catastrophic landslide damage throughout the Bay Area, resulting in numerous deaths and over $60 million in direct costs. In Alameda County, damage was concentrated in Oakland, Piedmont, and Berkeley. The County had approximately $3.5 million in damage.
February 10,
1970
Severe Storms &
Flooding
DR-283 Bay Area
including
Alameda County
Heavy winds, storms and flooding impacted the Bay Area, including Alameda County. Impacted areas had over $27 million in damage.
Source: FEMA, 2017b; NOAA NCEI, 2022
13.2.2 Location
All severe weather conditions profiled in this chapter have the potential to happen anywhere in the planning area.
No location mapping is currently available.
13.2.3 Frequency
The planning area can expect to experience exposure to and adverse impacts from severe weather events almost annually.
13.2.4 Severity
The most common problems associated with the severe weather conditions profiled in this assessment are immobility and loss of utilities. Fatalities are uncommon, but can occur. Roads may become impassable due to flooding, downed trees, or a landslide. Power lines may be downed due to high winds, and services such as water or phone may not be able to operate without power. Lightning can cause severe damage and injury. Physical damage to homes and facilities can be caused by wind or flooding.
Atmospheric rivers or heavy precipitation can have significant impacts, including crop damage, soil erosion, and increased risk of flood. These events can drop up to 12 inches of rain over a few days and cause widespread flooding and disruption to road and air travel. Stormwater runoff from heavy rains can also impair water quality by washing pollutants into water bodies. Thunderstorms carry the same risks as heavy precipitation events, and depending on the type of storm, they can also result in tornados, lightning, and heavy winds, increasing risk of injury and property damage (Keller and Blodgett 2008).
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Lightning severity is typically associated with both property damage and life safety (injuries and fatalities). The number of reported injuries from lightning is likely to be low, but planning area infrastructure losses can be up to thousands of dollars each year. Lightning also is associated with wildfire ignitions in the planning area.
An indicator of the potential severity of extreme heat is the number of heat advisories issued for the planning area by the National Weather Service. Figure 13-3 shows the annual number of heat advisories in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties since 2006.
Source: (Times Record News 2023)
Figure 13-3. Annual Number of Heat Advisories in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties Since 2006 Windstorms can be a frequent problem in the planning area and have been known to cause damage to utilities.
Strong, hot, dry offshore winds locally known as “diablo winds” can be particularly dangerous. These winds can occur at any time of year, but are especially dangerous in summer and fall when vegetation is at its driest. The wind speed given in wind warnings issued by the NWS is for a one-minute average; gusts may be 25 to 30 percent higher. The FEMA Winds Zones of the United States map (Figure 13-4) indicates the strength of windstorms in the United States and the general location of the most wind activity, based on 40 years of tornado data and 100 years of hurricane data collected by FEMA. The planning area, along with most of the Western United States, is in Wind Zone I, where wind speeds can reach up to 130 mph.
Solar flares can lead to long-term power grid outages. Moderate solar storms have affected transformers as they are not very resilient to long electromagnetic pulses (Global Resilience Network 2016). Recent events impacting the United States have disrupted the power grid, shut down satellites and air traffic precision navigation, and disabled GPS signals. Power outages induced by space weather can be life-threatening to those dependent on electricity for life support.
0 5
10 15
20 25
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
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Source: (National Institutes of Standards and Technology 2011)
Figure 13-4. Wind Zones in the United States
13.2.5 Warning Time
Meteorologists can often predict the likelihood of a severe weather event. This can give several days of warning time. However, meteorologists cannot predict the exact time of onset or severity of the storm. Some storms may come on more quickly and have only a few hours of warning time. The San Francisco Bay Area Weather Forecast Office of the NWS monitors weather stations and issues watches and warnings when appropriate to alert government agencies and the public of possible or impending weather events. The watches and warnings are broadcast over NOAA weather radio and are forwarded to the local media for retransmission using the Emergency Alert System.
Space weather prediction in the United States is provided primarily by the Space Weather Prediction Center and the U.S. Air Force’s Weather Agency. The Space Weather Prediction Center draws on a variety of data sources, both space- and ground-based, to provide forecasts, watches, warnings, alerts, and summaries to civilian and commercial users.
13.3 EXPOSURE AND VULNERABILITY
A lack of clearly defined extent mapping for the severe weather conditions profiled in this chapter prevents a detailed analysis of exposure and vulnerability. However, it can be assumed that the entire planning area is exposed to some extent to all severe weather conditions profiled. Certain areas are more exposed due to geographic location and local weather patterns.
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13.3.1 Population
All people in the planning area are exposed to some degree to the severe weather hazard. The most common problems associated with severe weather events are immobility and loss of utilities. Vulnerable populations are the elderly, low income or linguistically isolated populations, people with life-threatening illnesses, and residents living in areas that are isolated from major roads. Power outages can be life threatening to those dependent on electricity for life support, making the local at-risk senior community and individuals with disabilities in the cities of Dublin, Livermore, and Pleasanton and those served by DSRSD especially vulnerable. These populations face isolation and exposure during severe weather events and could suffer more secondary effects of the hazard. Those experiencing homelessness who lack adequate shelter may be directly exposed to severe weather, leading to the destruction of temporary shelter, heat stroke, hypothermia, or illness from this exposure.
Populations living at higher elevations with large stands of trees or power lines may be more susceptible to wind damage and black out. The most common impacts of specific weather event types on people are as follows:
• Severe Storms—Nationally, lightning is one of the leading causes of weather-related fatalities, though lightning strikes are less common in the west than in other areas of the country. The majority of injuries and deaths associated with lightning occur when people are outdoors; however, almost one-third of lightning-related injuries occur indoors. Males are five times more likely than females to be struck by lightning and people between the ages of 15 and 34 account for 41 percent of all lightning strike victims. • Damaging Winds—Debris carried by extreme winds and trees felled by gusty conditions can contribute directly to loss of life as well as increase the vulnerability of people by damaging buildings where people take shelter. Utility lines brought down by winds have been known to cause fires and create the possibility of lethal electric shock.
• Extreme Heat—Individuals with physical or mobility constraints, cognitive impairments, economic constraints, or social isolation are typically at greater risk to the adverse effects of extreme heat. Some medical conditions, such as heat stroke, are directly attributable to extreme heat, while others may be exacerbated by it, resulting in medical emergencies.
• Space Weather —The sun’s activities cause extreme space weather events that can affect the City’s population, mainly by power black-out events
13.3.2 Property
Most of the buildings within the census tracts that define the planning area are residential. Older structures were built without the influence of a structural building code that would mitigate the severe weather conditions profiled in this assessment. All of these buildings are considered to be exposed to the severe weather hazard, but structures in poor condition or in particularly vulnerable locations (located on hilltops or exposed open areas) may risk the most damage. The frequency and degree of damage will depend on specific locations.
Loss estimations for the severe weather hazard are not based on damage functions, because no such damage functions have been generated. Instead, loss estimates were developed representing 10 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent of the assessed value of exposed structures. Figure 13-5 lists the loss estimates. These estimates allow emergency managers to select a range of potential economic impact based on an assessment of the percent of damage to the general building stock. Damage in excess of 50 percent is considered to be substantial by most building codes and typically requires total reconstruction of the structure.
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Figure 13-5. Loss Estimates for Severe Weather
13.3.3 Critical Facilities
All critical facilities are vulnerable during severe weather events, especially those that lack backup power generation capabilities. When facilities supplying power to planning area land line telephone systems are frequently disrupted, significant issues arise with communication in the planning area. In addition, some facilities are particularly vulnerable to specific types of severe weather events:
• Thunderstorms—Facilities and transportation systems are vulnerable to disruption from secondary hazards such as flooding or landslides.
• Damaging Winds—Facilities near trees or power lines that are likely to fall are vulnerable. Roads and other transportation infrastructure could be blocked by downed trees or other debris. • Extreme Heat— Extreme heat is generally not a threat to damage critical facilities or infrastructure. • Space Weather— Extreme space weather events can degrade or damage critical infrastructures, which may result in direct or cascading failures across key services such as electric power, communications, water supply, healthcare, and transportation (National Science & Technology Council 2019).
13.3.4 Environment
The environment is highly exposed to severe weather events. Natural habitats such as streams and trees are exposed to the elements during a severe storm and risk major damage and destruction. Prolonged rains can saturate soils and lead to slope failure. Flooding events caused by severe weather can produce river channel migration or damage riparian habitat.
DSRSD, $1,462,900
DSRSD, $4,388,700
DSRSD, $7,314,500
DSRSD, $14,629,000
Dublin, $2,045,467,529
Dublin, $6,136,402,587
Dublin, $10,227,337,644
Dublin, $20,454,675,289
Livermore, $2,979,889,648
Livermore, $8,939,668,945
Livermore, $14,899,448,241
Livermore, $29,798,896,482
Pleasanton, $2,934,923,624
Pleasanton, $8,804,770,872
Pleasanton, $14,674,618,120
Pleasanton, $29,349,236,239
$0 $10,000,000,000 $20,000,000,000 $30,000,000,000 $40,000,000,000 Loss = 10% of
Total
Replacement
Value
Loss = 30% of
Total
Replacement
Value
Loss = 50% of
Total
Replacement
Value
Total
Replacement
Value
Loss Value
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13.4 FUTURE TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT
All future development will be affected by severe storms. The ability to withstand impacts lies in sound land use practices and consistent enforcement of codes and regulations for new construction. The planning partners have adopted the International Building Code in response to California mandates. This code is equipped to deal with the impacts of severe weather events. Land use policies identified in general plans within the planning area also address many of the secondary impacts (flood and landslide) of the severe weather hazard. With these tools, the planning partners are well equipped to deal with future growth and the associated impacts of severe weather.
13.5 SCENARIO
Severe weather impacts can be significant, particularly when secondary hazards occur. A worst-case event would involve prolonged high winds during a winter storm caused by an atmospheric river event. Such an event would have both short-term and longer-term effects. Initially, schools and roads would be closed due to power outages caused by high winds and downed tree obstructions. Prolonged rain could produce flooding, overtopped culverts with ponded water on roads. Flooding and debris could further obstruct roads and bridges, further isolating residents.
13.6 ISSUES
Important issues associated with a severe weather in the planning area include the following:
• Older building stock in the planning area is built to low code standards. These structures could be highly vulnerable to severe weather events such as windstorms. • The cities may need to open cooling centers during extreme heat events. • Redundancy of power supply and communications equipment must be evaluated. • The capacity for backup power generation is limited.
• Dead or dying trees as a result of drought conditions are more susceptible to falling during severe storm events.
• Public education on dealing with the impacts of severe weather needs to continue to be provided so that citizens can be better informed and prepared for severe weather events. • Debris management (downed trees, etc.) must be addressed, because debris can impact the severity of severe weather events, requires coordination efforts, and may require additional funding. • The effects of climate change may result in an increase of heavy rain or more atmospheric storm events, and will likely lead to increased temperatures and changes in overall precipitation amounts.
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14. WILDFIRE
14.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND
A wildfire is any uncontrolled fire occurring on undeveloped land that requires fire suppression. Wildfires can be ignited by lightning or by human activity such as smoking, campfires, equipment use, and arson. The potential for such fires is primarily influenced by the following factors:
• Fuel—Fuel may include living and dead vegetation on the ground, along the surface as brush and small trees, and above the ground in tree canopies. Lighter fuels such as grasses, leaves, and needles quickly expel moisture and burn rapidly, while heavier fuels such as tree branches, logs and trunks take longer to warm and ignite. Trees killed or defoliated by forest insects and diseases are more susceptible to wildfire. • Weather—Relevant weather conditions include temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, cloud cover, precipitation amount and duration, and the stability of the atmosphere. Conditions are favorable for severe wildfires when the temperature is high, relative humidity is low, wind speed is increasing and coming from the east (inland), and there has been little or no precipitation. These conditions occur more frequently inland where temperatures are higher and fog is less prevalent. • Terrain—Topography includes slope and elevation. The topography of a region influences the amount and moisture of fuel; the impact of weather conditions such as temperature and wind; potential barriers to fire spread, such as highways and lakes; and elevation and slope of landforms (fire spreads more easily uphill than downhill).
14.1.1 Wildfire Hazard Mapping
Fire Hazard Severity Zones
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has modeled and mapped wildfire hazard zones using a computer model that designates moderate, high or very high fire hazard severity zones (FHSZ).
CAL FIRE classifies these zones based on how a fire would behave in a given area and the probability of flames and embers threatening buildings. Each area gets a score for flame length, embers, and the likelihood of the area burning. Scores of smaller areas are then averaged over larger zones that encompass them.
CAL FIRE’s maps these zones using a model that derives fire frequency from 50 years of fire data. The model considers the frequency of fire weather, ignition patterns, and expected rate-of spread. It accounts for flying ember production, which is the principal driver of the wildfire hazard in densely developed areas. A related concern in built-out areas is the relative density of vegetative fuels that can serve as sites for new spot fires and spread fire between structures. The model refines the zones to characterize fire exposure mechanisms that cause ignitions to structures.
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14.1.2 Wildfire Protection Responsibility in California Hundreds of local, state, and federal agencies have responsibility for wildfire protection in California. Often, two organizations share responsibility on the same parcel of land— one for wildfire protection, and the other for structural or “improvement” fire protection. To address wildfire jurisdictional responsibilities, the California state legislature adopted legislation establishing the following responsibility areas:
• Federal Responsibility Areas (FRAs)—FRAs are fire-prone wildland areas owned or managed by a federal agency (e.g., Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Defense). Primary financial and rule-making jurisdictional authority rests with the federal land agency. In many instances, FRAs are interspersed with private land ownership or leases. Fire protection for developed private property is usually not the responsibility of the federal land management agency; structural protection responsibility is that of a local government agency. • State Responsibility Areas (SRAs)—SRAs are lands where CAL FIRE has legal and financial responsibility for wildfire protection and administers fire hazard classifications and building standard regulations. SRAs are defined as lands that meet the following criteria:
➢ Are county unincorporated areas
➢ Are not federally owned
➢ Have wildland vegetation cover rather than agricultural or ornamental plants ➢ Have watershed or range/forage value
➢ Have housing densities not exceeding three units per acre.
Where SRAs contain built environment or development, the responsibility for fire protection of those improvements (non-wildland) is that of a local government agency. • Local Responsibility Areas (LRAs)—LRAs include land in cities, cultivated agriculture lands, non- flammable areas in unincorporated areas, and lands that do not meet the criteria for SRA or FRA. LRA fire protection is typically provided by city fire departments, fire protection districts, and counties, or by CAL FIRE under contract to local governments. The Cities of Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton are located in incorporated LRAs. LRAs may include flammable vegetation and areas where the financial and jurisdictional responsibility for improvement and wildfire protection is that of a local government agency.
State law requires local governments to update their general plan safety elements to recognize SRAs and “Very High” FHSZs. The safety element must include information and policies on unreasonable risk from fire. The state encourages integration among jurisdictions to enhance mitigation and prevention efforts.
14.1.3 Secondary Hazards
Secondary effects of wildfires can in some cases cause more damage than the fire itself. Wildfires strip slopes of vegetation, exposing them to greater amounts of runoff. This in turn can weaken soils and cause failures on slopes. Major landslides can occur several years after a wildfire. Most wildfires burn hot and for long durations that can bake soils, especially those high in clay content, thus increasing the imperviousness of the ground. This increases the runoff generated by storm events, thus increasing the chance of flooding.
14.2 HAZARD PROFILE
14.2.1 Local Climate Conditions Related to Wildfire
The planning area has a Mediterranean-like climate with no summer rains and potential high winds. Non-native and invasive weedy vegetation has replaced more fire resistant and ecologically stable native species in many
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places. In addition, highly flammable homes are located in high fire hazard zones. “Red flag” weather in the planning area features strong, hot, dry offshore winds known as “diablo winds.” These winds carry extremely dry air at high velocity and can push a fire down or up a slope quickly. They can occur at any time of year but are especially dangerous in the driest months of summer and fall.
14.2.2 Past Events
Between 1954 and May 2022, Alameda County was included in two FEMA major disaster (DR) fire management assistance declarations (DR-919 Oakland Hills Fire in 1991 and DR-295 Buckingham Norfolk Fire in 1970) but neither of these affected the planning area. With drought conditions in recent years, wildfires have occurred near the planning area, though none have caused sufficient damage to trigger a state or federal disaster declaration.
Table 14-1 lists wildfires of over 10 acres recorded near the planning area in recent years (CAL FIRE 2023).
Table 14-1. Recent Fires Affecting Planning Area (Burning More Than 10 Acres) Start Date
Date
Contained
Acres
Burned Location
07/16/20 07/19/20 253 Near Tesla Road and McLaughlin Road, southeast of Livermore. 07/04/20 07/05/20 108 Near Sheridan Road, south of Sunol (which is just south of Pleasanton). 10/24/19 10/27/19 35 Near Mines Rd and Del Valle Rd, southeast of Livermore. 10/08/19 10/08/19 12 Near SR 84 and Little Valley Road in Sunol, south of Pleasanton. 09/02/19 09/02/19 11 Near Mines Road in Livermore.
08/31/19 08/31/19 19 Near eastbound 580 and North Flynn Road, east of Livermore. 08/21/19 08/21/19 139 Near Patterson Pass and Midway Road, east of Livermore. 08/09/19 08/12/19 240 Near Central Pkwy and Croak Rd, 4 miles east of Dublin. 06/21/19 06/24/19 30 Near Grant Line Rd and Mountain House Rd, east of Livermore. 11/14/18 01/04/19 20 Near Vallecitos Road and Little Valley, south of Livermore. 07/08/18 01/04/19 640 Near I-580 and Grantline Rd, east of Livermore. 07/25/18 01/04/19 34 Near Patterson Pass Road and Midway Rd, east of Livermore. 05/14/18 01/04/19 12 Near Grant Line Road and I-580, east of Livermore. 10/17/17 01/09/18 116 Near Fallon Road 3 miles East of Dublin. 08/22/17 01/09/18 200 Near Range Road and Cromwell Avenue, Camp Parks Dublin, National Guard Reserve Forces Training Center.
06/25/16 06/26/16 211 In the Altamont Pass, 10 miles east of Livermore. 08/19/15 08/22/15 2,700 Off Tesla Road near Corral Hollow between Livermore and Tracy. This fire took four days to contain with 18 fire personnel and five fire engines.
06/25/15 06/25/15 53 Near Tesla Road, southeast of Livermore. 10/04/13 10/04/13 150 Along Highland Road near Livermore. 07/06/13 07/06/13 38 Near Fallon Road and Camino Tassajara near Dublin. 06/08/13 06/08/13 240 Near Vasco Road and North Vasco Road, north of Livermore.
14.2.3 Location
Figure 14-1 shows the FHSZ mapping for the planning area.
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Figure 14-1
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14.2.1 Frequency
Wildfire frequency can be assessed through review of the percent of a given area that has been burned in previous wildfire events. Based on CAL FIRE records of fires, about 3 percent of the mapped wildfire risk zones in Alameda County burned in the 138-year period from 1878 to 2016 (see Table 14-2).
Table 14-2. Record of Fire in Alameda County
Area Burned, 1878 – 2016
FHSZ Category Total Area in Zone (acres) Acres Percent of Total Area Moderate 10,564 115 1.09%
High 9,455 498 5.26%
Very High 472 0 0.00%
Source: CAL FIRE, 2016
14.2.2 Severity
The largest wildfire in the Bay Area, and one of the worst wildfires in the United States, occurred in 1991 in the Oakland Hills of Alameda County. The fire resulted in $1.7 billion in losses and received a FEMA disaster declaration. The fire spread across 1,520 acres, destroyed 3,354 homes and 456 apartments, injured 150 people and took the lives of 25 people (Alameda County 2021). There are no recorded incidents of loss of life from wildfires in the planning area.
Potential losses from wildfire include human life, structures and other improvements, and natural resources. There are no recorded incidents of loss of life from wildfires within the planning area. Given the immediate response times to reported fires, the likelihood of injuries and casualties is minimal.
Smoke and air pollution from wildfires can be a health hazard, especially for children, the elderly and those with respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. First responders are exposed to dangers from the initial incident and after- effects from smoke inhalation and heat stroke. Public health impacts associated with wildfire include difficulty in breathing, odor, and reduction in visibility.
14.2.3 Warning Time
Wildfires are often caused by humans, intentionally or accidentally. There is no way to predict when one might break out. Since fireworks often cause brush fires, extra diligence is warranted around the Fourth of July when the use of fireworks is highest. Dry seasons and droughts are factors that greatly increase fire likelihood. Dry lightning may trigger wildfires. Severe weather can be predicted, so special attention can be paid during weather events that may include lightning. Reliable National Weather Service lightning warnings are available on average 24 to 48 hours prior to a significant electrical storm
If a fire does break out and spread rapidly, residents may need to evacuate within days or hours. Once a fire has started, fire alerting is reasonably rapid in most cases. The rapid spread of cellular and two-way radio communications in recent years has further contributed to a significant improvement in warning time. .
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14.3 EXPOSURE
14.3.1 Population
Population exposed to the wildfire hazard was estimated using the structure count of buildings in each mapped FHSZ and multiplying by the estimated average population per household. Figure 14-2 shows the estimated population for each planning area city living in the moderate, high, and very high FHSZs, compared to total city population. Figure 14-3 shows results for the entire planning area.
Figure 14-2. Population Exposed to Wildfire Hazard and Total Population, by Jurisdiction
Figure 14-3. Total Planning Area Population Exposed to Wildfire Hazard 37,303
(19.3% of Total)
14,692
(20.1% of Total) 843
(1.0% of Total)
(0.3% of Total)
242
4,185
(2.2% of Total)
30 (0.0% of Total) 3
(0.0% of Total)
(0.3% of Total)
2390
(0.0% of Total) 0
(0.0% of Total) 0
(0.0% of Total)
(2.9% of Total)
2,216
192,900
72,932
86,149
77,609
0 20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
220,000
DSRSD Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Population
Exposed Population, Moderate FHSZ
Exposed Population, High FHSZ
Exposed Population, Very High FHSZ
Total Population
15,777
(6.7% of Total) 272
(0.1% of Total)
2,216
(0.9% of Total)
236,690
0 50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
Exposed Population, Moderate
FHSZ
Exposed Population, High
FHSZ
Exposed Population, Very High
FHSZ
Total Planning Area Population
Population
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14.3.2 Property
The estimated value of planning area buildings within the moderate, high, and very high FHSZs is shown in Figure 14-4 through Figure 14-6. Figure 14-7 shows the estimated exposed total value as a percentage of the total replacement value in each city and in the overall planning area. The numbers of structures in each FHSZ, by occupancy class, are shown in Figure 14-8 through Figure 14-10.
Figure 14-4. Number and Exposed Value of Buildings in the Moderate FHSZ
Figure 14-5. Number and Exposed Value of Buildings in the High FHSZ $0
$1,435,470,257
$164,887,580 $56,268,823
$0
$745,075,606
$121,540,389 $36,298,468
Total Exposed Value
$0
(0 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$2,180,545,864
(2,961 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$286,427,970
(305 Buildings)
(77 Buildings), Total
Exposed Value,
$92,567,291
$0
$1,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$3,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
DSRSD Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Exposed Value
Exposed Structure Value
Exposed Contents Value
$5,994,000
$3,010,029
$12,094,330
$41,633,433
0 $1,505,014
$17,835,563
$21,623,464 Total Exposed Value
$599,400
(1 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$4,515,043
(6 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$29,929,893
(4 Buildings)
(69 Buildings), Total
Exposed Value,
$63,256,897
$0
$10,000,000
$20,000,000
$30,000,000
$40,000,000
$50,000,000
$60,000,000
$70,000,000
DSRSD Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Exposed Value
Exposed Structure Value
Exposed Contents Value
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Figure 14-6. Number and Exposed Value of Buildings in the Very High FHSZ
Figure 14-7. Total Value in FHSZs as Percent of Total Replacement Value, by Jurisdiction
$0 $0 $0
$362,400,688
$0 $0 $0
$181,896,098 Total Exposed Value
$0
(0 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$0
(0 Buildings)
Total Exposed Value
$0
(0 Buildings)
(626 Buildings), Total
Exposed Value,
$544,296,786
$0
$200,000,000
$400,000,000
$600,000,000
$800,000,000
$1,000,000,000
DSRSD Dublin Livermore Pleasanton
Exposed Value
Exposed Structure Value
Exposed Contents Value
DSRSD, 0%
DSRSD, 3%
DSRSD, 0%
Dublin, 10.7%
Dublin, 0.0%
Dublin, 0.0%
Livermore, 1.0%
Livermore, 0.1%
Livermore, 0.0%
Pleasanton, 0.3%
Pleasanton, 0.2%
Pleasanton, 1.9%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Moderate FHSZ
High FHSZ
Very High FHSZ
Exposed Value as % of Total City or Area Replacement Value
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Figure 14-8. Structures in the Moderate FHSZ, by Jurisdiction and Occupancy Class
Figure 14-9. Structures in the High FHSZ, by Jurisdiction and Occupancy Class Residential, 2,931
Residential, 276
Residential, 68
Commercial, 1
Commercial, 5
Commercial, 9
Industrial, 8
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 6
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Government, 1
Government, 0
Government, 0
Education, 14
Education, 24
Education, 0
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500
Number of Structures in the FHSZ
CITIES
Residential, 3,275
Commercial, 15
Industrial, 8
Agriculture, 6
Religion, 0
Government, 1
Education, 38
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500
Number of Structures in the FHSZ
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
Residential, 6
Residential, 1
Residential, 67
Commercial, 0
Commercial, 0
Commercial, 2
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Government, 0
Government, 0
Government, 0
Education, 0
Education, 3
Education, 0
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
0 20 40 60 80
Number of Structures in the FHSZ
CITIES
Residential, 74
Commercial, 2
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 0
Government, 0
Education, 3
0 20 40 60 80
Number of Structures in the FHSZ
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
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Figure 14-10. Structures in the Very High FHSZ, by Jurisdiction and Occupancy Class
14.3.3 Critical Facilities
Estimates of critical facilities in each FHSZ are summarized in Figure 14-11. The total count of critical facilities in high or very high fire hazard severity zones (11) represents 1 percent of the planning area total of 1,161.
14.3.4 Environment
All natural resources and habitats in mapped FHSZs are exposed to the risk of wildfire.
14.4 VULNERABILITY
Structures, above-ground infrastructure, critical facilities and natural environments are all vulnerable to the wildfire hazard. There is currently no validated damage function available to support wildfire mitigation planning.
Except as discussed in this section, vulnerable populations, property, infrastructure and environment are assumed to be the same as described in the section on exposure.
Residential, 0
Residential, 0
Residential, 622
Commercial, 0
Commercial, 0
Commercial, 3
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Religion, 0
Government, 0
Government, 0
Government, 1
Education, 0
Education, 0
Education, 0
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
0 200 400 600 800
Number of Structures in the FHSZ
CITIES
Residential, 622
Commercial, 3
Industrial, 0
Agriculture, 0
Religion, 0
Government, 1
Education, 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Number of Structures in the FHSZ
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
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Figure 14-11. Critical Facilities in the High or Very High FHSZ
14.4.1 Population
Many communities and populations are especially vulnerable to wildfires, including low-income communities, migrant populations, populations whose primary language is not English, indigenous populations, communities of older adults, and those with respiratory and other health concerns. The local senior community and individuals within the cities of Dublin, Livermore, and Pleasanton and those served by DSRSD are especially vulnerable to respiratory issues in the event of reduced air quality following wildfire. Members of immigrant communities may be concerned about impacts to their immigration status and not seek help. The homeless population may also be affected with their exposure to smoke or airborne particulates, especially if no shelter or evacuation center has been open.
When a wildfire impacts an area with high rents where multiple families live in one structure, it may be difficult for those not listed on the lease to prove that they were affected by the fire; this could result in a lack of access to services. Additionally, fires quickly increase housing prices and rent prices, further displacing people already affected by the fire. Homelessness may increase as a result of wildfire events.
Communications, 0
Communications, 0
Communications, 0
Communications, 0
Energy, 0
Energy, 0
Energy, 0
Energy, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 10
Food, Water, Shelter, 1
Hazardous Material, 0
Hazardous Material, 0
Hazardous Material, 0
Hazardous Material, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Safety & Security, 0
Safety & Security, 0
Safety & Security, 0
Safety & Security, 0
Transportation, 0
Transportation, 0
Transportation, 0
Transportation, 0
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
DSRSD
0 5 10 15 20
Number of Critical Facilities in the Hazard Zone
PLANNING PARTNERS
Communications, 0
Energy, 0
Food, Water, Shelter, 11
Hazardous Material, 0
Health & Medical, 0
Safety & Security, 0
Transportation, 0
0 5 10 15 20
Number of Critical Facilities in the Hazard Zone
PLANNING AREA TOTAL
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All people exposed to the wildfire hazard are potentially vulnerable to wildfire impacts. Populations with access and functional needs as well as elderly populations and the very young are more vulnerable as they may not be able to evacuate quickly enough to avoid the impacts of a wildfire. Persons with existing health issues may be more vulnerable to the health impacts associated with wildfire smoke. Wildfires also threaten the health and safety of those fighting the fires.
14.4.2 Property
All property exposed to the wildfire hazard is vulnerable. As of 2008, California State Building code requires minimum standards be met for new buildings in relative fire hazard zones. Older structures that were not constructed to these standards may be especially vulnerable.
Figure 14-12 shows estimates of potential loss representing 10 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent of the assessed value of structures exposed to the wildfire hazard (for the moderate, high, and very high FHSZs combined). These estimates allow emergency managers to assess a range of economic impacts based on an estimate of the percent of damage to the general building stock. Damage in excess of 50 percent is considered to be substantial by most building codes and typically requires total reconstruction of the structure.
Figure 14-12. Loss Estimates for Wildfire
14.4.3 Critical Facilities
Critical facilities of wood frame construction are especially vulnerable to wildfire. In the event of wildfire, there would likely be little damage to most infrastructure. Most roads and railroads would be without damage except in the worst scenarios. Power lines are the most at risk from wildfire because most poles are made of wood and DSRSD, $599,400
DSRSD, $1,798,200
DSRSD, $2,997,000
DSRSD, $5,994,000
Dublin, $218,506,091
Dublin, $655,518,272
Dublin, $1,092,530,454
Dublin, $2,185,060,907
Livermore, $31,635,786
Livermore, $94,907,359
Livermore, $158,178,932
Livermore, $316,357,863
$70,012,097
$210,036,292
$350,060,487
$700,120,974
$0 $500,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $1,500,000,000 $2,000,000,000 $2,500,000,000 Loss = 10% of
Exposed Value
Loss = 30% of
Exposed Value
Loss = 50% of
Exposed Value
Exposed Value
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susceptible to burning. Fires can create conditions that block or prevent access and can isolate residents and emergency service providers. Wildfire typically does not have a major direct impact on bridges, but it can create conditions in which bridges are obstructed. Many bridges in areas of high to moderate fire risk are important because they provide the only ingress and egress to large areas and in some cases to isolated neighborhoods.
During a wildfire event, containers storing hazardous materials at sites in wildfire risk zones could rupture due to excessive heat and act as fuel for the fire, causing rapid spreading and escalating the fire to unmanageable levels.
In addition, they could leak into surrounding areas, saturating soils and seeping into surface waters, and have a disastrous effect on the environment.
14.4.4 Environment
Fire is a natural and critical ecosystem process in most terrestrial ecosystems, dictating in part the types, structure, and spatial extent of native vegetation. However, wildfires can cause severe environmental impacts:
• Damaged Cultural and Historical Resources—The destruction of cultural and historic resources may occur, scenic vistas can be damaged, and access to recreational areas can be reduced. • Damaged Fisheries—Fisheries can suffer from increased water temperatures, sedimentation, and changes in water quality.
• Destroyed Endangered Species Habitat—Wildfire can have negative consequences for endangered species by degrading their habitat.
• Disease and Insect Infestations—Unless diseased or insect-infested trees are swiftly removed, infestations and disease can spread to healthy forests and private lands. Timely active management actions are needed to remove diseased or infested trees. • Reduced Agricultural Resources—Wildfire can have disastrous consequences on agricultural resources, removing them from production and necessitating lengthy restoration programs. • Soil Erosion—The protective covering provided by foliage and dead organic matter is removed, leaving the soil fully exposed to wind and water erosion. Accelerated soil erosion occurs, causing landslides and threatening aquatic habitats.
• Soil Sterilization—Some wildfires burn so hot that they can sterilize the soil. Topsoil exposed to extreme heat can become water repellant, and soil nutrients may be lost. • Spread of Invasive Plant Species—Non-native woody plant species frequently invade burned areas.
When weeds become established, they can dominate the plant cover over broad landscapes, and become difficult and costly to control.
14.5 FUTURE TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT
The highly urbanized portions of the planning area have little or no wildfire risk exposure. Urbanization tends to alter the natural fire regime, and can create the potential for the expansion of urbanized areas into wildland areas.
The expansion of the wildland urban interface can be managed with strong land use and building codes. The planning area is well equipped with these tools and this planning process has assessed capabilities with regards to the tools. As the planning area experiences future growth, it is anticipated that the exposure to this hazard will remain as assessed or even decrease over time due to these capabilities.
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14.6 SCENARIO
A major wildfire in the planning area might begin with a wet spring, adding to fuels already present on the forest floor. Flashy fuels would build throughout the spring. A dry summer could follow the wet spring, exacerbated by diablo winds. Carelessness with combustible materials or a tossed lit cigarette, or a sudden lightning storm could trigger a multitude of small, isolated fires.
The embers from these smaller fires could be carried miles by hot, dry winds. The deposition zone for these embers would be deep in the forests and interface zones. Fires that start in flat areas move slower, but wind still pushes them. It is not unusual for a wildfire pushed by wind to burn the ground fuel and later climb into the crown and reverse its track. This is one of many ways that fires can escape containment, typically during periods when response capabilities are overwhelmed. These small new fires would most likely merge. Suppression resources would be redirected from protecting the natural resources to saving more remote subdivisions.
While local fire districts would be extremely useful in the urban interface areas, they have limited wildfire capabilities or experience, and they would have a difficult time responding to the ignition zones. Even though the existence and spread of the fire is known, it may not be possible to respond to it adequately, so an initially manageable fire can become out of control before resources are dispatched.
14.7 ISSUES
The major issues for wildfire are the following:
• Public education and outreach to people living in or near the fire hazard zones should include information about and assistance with mitigation activities such as defensible space, and advance identification of evacuation routes and safe zones.
• Wildfires could cause multiple secondary natural hazards. • Climate change could affect the wildfire hazard.
• Future growth into interface areas should continue to be managed, particularly in the western hillside area of Pleasanton.
• Area fire districts need to continue to train on wildland-urban interface events. • Vegetation management activities. This would include enhancement through expansion of the target areas as well as additional resources.
• Regional consistency of higher building code standards such as residential sprinkler requirements and prohibitive combustible roof standards.
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15-1
15. CLIMATE CHANGE
15.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND
“Climate change” refers to alterations in the long-term patterns of temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind, and seasons that play a fundamental role in shaping natural ecosystems and the human economies and cultures that depend on them. These shifts may result from natural processes (e.g., cyclical ocean patterns like El Niño or La Niña, volcanic activity, changes in the sun’s energy output, variations in Earth’s orbit), but they can also be driven by human activity. The worldwide warming trend of recent decades has been attributed to human activity resulting in rising concentrations of “greenhouse gases” in the earth’s atmosphere.
Greenhouse gases are gases that trap heat in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is the most commonly known greenhouse gas; however, methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases also contribute to warming. Emissions of these gases come from sources such as the combustion of fossil fuels, agricultural production, and changes in land use. According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), carbon dioxide concentrations measured about 280 parts per million before the industrial era began in the late 1700s and have risen dramatically since then, surpassing 400 parts per million in 2013 for the first time in recorded history (see Figure 15-1).
Source: NASA 2021
Figure 15-1. Global Carbon Dioxide Concentrations Over Time
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15.1.1 How Climate Change Affects Hazard Mitigation
Climate change will affect the people, property, economy, and ecosystems of the planning area in a variety of ways. Consequences of climate change include increased periods of prolonged drought, potential for heat-related illnesses, detrimental impacts on agricultural productivity, and increased flood vulnerability. The most important effect for the development of this hazard mitigation plan is that climate change will have a measurable impact on the occurrence and severity of many natural hazards.
An essential aspect of hazard mitigation is predicting the likelihood of future hazard events. Typically, predictions are based on statistical projections from records of past events. This approach assumes that the likelihood of hazard events remains essentially unchanged over time. Thus, averages based on the past frequencies of, for example, floods are used to estimate future frequencies: if a river has flooded an average of once every 5 years for the past 100 years, then it can be expected to continue to flood an average of once every 5 years.
For hazards that are affected by climate conditions though, the assumption that future behavior will be equivalent to past behavior is not valid. For example, flooding is generally associated with precipitation frequency and quantity. However, the frequency of flooding will not remain constant if broad precipitation patterns change over time. Specifically, as hydrology changes, storms currently considered to be the 100-year flood might strike more often, leaving many communities at greater risk.
The risks of landslide, severe storms, severe weather, and wildfire are all affected by climate patterns as well. For this reason, an understanding of climate change is pertinent to efforts to mitigate natural hazards. Information about how climate patterns are changing provides insight on the reliability of future hazard projections used in mitigation analysis.
15.1.2 Current Indicators of Climate Change
Global Indicators
The major scientific agencies of the United States—including NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—have presented evidence that climate change is occurring. NASA summarizes key evidence as follows (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2023):
• Global Temperature Rise—The planet’s average surface temperature has risen about 2.12 ºF since the late 19th century, a change driven largely by increased carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere and other human activities. Most of the warming occurred in the past 40 years. The years 2016 and 2020 are tied for the warmest year on record. The ocean has absorbed much of this increased heat, with the top 100 meters (about 328 feet) of ocean showing warming of more than 0.6 ºF since 1969. Earth stores 90 percent of its extra energy in the ocean.
• Shrinking Ice Sheets—The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have decreased in mass. Data from NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment show Greenland lost an average of 279 billion tons of ice per year between 1993 and 2019, while Antarctica lost about 148 billion tons of ice per year. • Glacial Retreat—Glaciers are retreating almost everywhere around the world—including in the Alps, Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, Alaska and Africa.
• Decreased Snow Cover—Satellite observations reveal that the amount of spring snow cover in the Northern Hemisphere has decreased over the past five decades and that the snow is melting earlier
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• Sea-Level Rise—Global sea levels rose about 8 inches in the last century. The rate in the last two decades is nearly double that of the last century and is accelerating slightly every year. • Declining Arctic Sea Ice—Both the extent and thickness of Arctic sea ice has declined rapidly over the last several decades
• Extreme Events—The number of record high temperature events in the United States has been increasing, while the number of record low temperature events has been decreasing, since 1950. The U.S. has also witnessed an increasing number of intense rainfall events. • Ocean Acidification—Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the acidity of surface ocean waters has increased by about 30 percent. The amount of carbon dioxide absorbed by the upper layer of the oceans is increasing to about 7 to 10 billion metric tons per year.
California Indicators
Monitoring and research efforts across California have generated data that describe changes already underway in the state. Notable examples across the state include the following (California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 2018):
• Dissolved oxygen in coastal waters is declining throughout the south coast survey region • Since 1950, the northern Sierra Nevada showed an overall snowpack decline of 7.4 inches. • Unusually warm waters occurred in the Pacific Ocean in 2014-2015, leading to widespread impacts on marine life. This marine heat wave first appeared as a large area of exceptionally high sea surface temperatures in the Gulf of Alaska in November 2013 and later extended along the entire west coast of North America.
• The surface area of seven Sierra Nevada glaciers has decreased dramatically since the beginning of the 20th century. In 2014, the size of these glaciers ranged from 14 to 52 percent of their 1903 area. • Sea level has risen by about 7 inches since 1900 at San Francisco and by about 6 inches since 1924 at La Jolla.
• Since 1906, the fraction of annual snowmelt runoff that flows into the Sacramento River between April and July has decreased by about 9 percent.
• Compared to the 1930s, forests across much of California today have lower densities of large trees, and higher densities of small trees. Water stress, which increases in a warming climate, poses a greater risk to large trees than to small trees.
• Annual tree mortality in California forests increased in 2014, and steep increases in mortality followed in subsequent years; the highest number, 62 million tree deaths, was recorded in 2016. • Future droughts may be hotter, as warm temperatures coincide with periodic dry years; 2016 and 2020 were the warmest years on record.
• Heat-related deaths and illnesses in California increased dramatically in 2006 following a record-breaking heat wave. At least 140 deaths occurred between July 15 and August 1. Deaths related to this heat wave were largely attributed to elevated nighttime temperatures. • The number of acres burned by wildfires statewide has been increasing since 1950. Large fires affecting 1,000 acres or more account for most of the area burned each year.
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15.1.3 Projected Future Impacts
Climate change projections contain inherent uncertainty, largely derived from the fact that they depend on future greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Generally, the uncertainty in greenhouse gas emissions is addressed by the presentation of differing scenarios: low-emissions or high-emissions scenarios. In low-emissions scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions are reduced substantially from current levels. In high-emissions scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions generally increase or continue at current levels. Uncertainty in outcomes is generally addressed by averaging a variety of model outcomes. Despite this uncertainty, climate change projections present valuable information to help guide decision-making for possible future conditions.
Global Projections
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which includes more than 1,300 scientists from the United States and other countries, project that Earth’s average temperatures will raise 2.5 to 10 ºF over the next century (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2023). The Third and Fourth National Climate Assessment Reports indicate that climate change will continue through this century and beyond, with the following specific changes:
• Rising temperatures
• Increased droughts and heat waves
• Lengthening frost-free seasons and growing seasons
• Stronger hurricanes
• Changed patterns of precipitation
• Ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean
• Sea level rise of 1 to 8 feet by 2100
Projections for the Bay Area and Alameda County
The California Climate Adaptation Planning Guide outlines the following climate change impact concerns for Bay Area communities (California Emergency Management Agency 2012):
• Increased temperature
• Reduced precipitation
• Sea level rise—coastal inundation and erosion
• Public health—heat and air pollution
• Reduced agricultural productivity
• Inland flooding
• Reduced tourism.
Some of these changes are direct or primary climatic changes, such as increased temperature, while others are indirect climatic changes or secondary impacts, such as heat wave frequency, resulting from these direct changes.
Some direct changes may interact with one another to create unique secondary impacts. These primary and secondary impacts may then result in impacts on human and natural systems. The primary and secondary impacts likely to affect the planning area are summarized in Table 15-1.
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Table 15-1. Summary of Likely Primary and Secondary Climate Change Impacts on the Planning Area Primary Impact Secondary Impact Example Human and Natural System Impacts Increased temperature Heat wave • Increased frequency of illness and death • Increased stress on mechanical systems, such as HVAC systems Increased temperature and
changes in precipitation
Changed seasonal patterns • Reduced agricultural productivity • Reduced tourism
Increased temperature
and/or reduced precipitation
Drought • Reduced agricultural productivity
• Decreased water supply
Reduced Snowpack • Decreased water supply
• Reduced tourism
Wildfire • Increased incidence of landslide or mudslide • Reduced tourism
• Increase in air pollution and related health impacts
Sea level rise Permanent inundation of
previously dry land
• Loss of assets and tax base
• Loss of coastal habitat
Larger area impacted by extreme
high tide
• More people and structures impacted by storms
• Increased incidence of loss of utilities and lifeline systems Increased coastal erosion • Loss of assets and tax base Saltwater intrusion into freshwater
systems
• Decreased water supply
• Ecosystem disruption Sea level rise
Changes in wind patterns Increased extreme events,
including severe storms and fires
• More frequent disruption to systems resulting from severe storms Ocean acidification • Decreased biodiversity in marine ecosystems Source: Adapted and expanded from California Adaptation Planning Guide: Planning for Adaptive Communities Climate change projections contain inherent uncertainty, largely derived from the fact that they depend on future greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Generally, the uncertainty in greenhouse gas emissions is addressed by the presentation of differing scenarios: low-emissions or high-emissions scenarios. In low-emissions scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions are reduced substantially from current levels. In high-emissions scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions generally increase or continue at current levels. Uncertainty in outcomes is generally addressed by averaging a variety of model outcomes.
Despite this uncertainty, climate change projections present valuable information to help guide decision-making for possible future conditions. The following sections summarize information developed for the planning area by Cal-Adapt, a resource for public information on how climate change might impact local communities, based on the most current data available. The projections are averaged across Alameda County and include information from two emissions scenarios, which were developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Cal-Adapt 2023):
• Low Emissions Scenario—Emissions peak around 2040 and then decline (this was designated Scenario B1 in previous IPCC analyses but is Scenario RCP 4.5 under more recent IPCC analyses) • High Emissions Scenario—Emissions continue to rise strongly through 2050 and plateau around 2100 (this was designated Scenario A2 in previous IPCC analyses but is Scenario RCP 8.5 under more recent IPCC analyses).
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Temperature
The historical (1961-1990) average maximum temperature in Tri-Valley planning area was 69.9 ºF and the average minimum temperature was 44.6 ºF. While average temperatures may fluctuate from year-to-year, and may differ from one municipality to the next, the trend for the planning area indicates that average temperatures are increasing (see Figure 15-2). The annual average maximum temperature increased by 7.7 ºF when comparing 1961 to 1990 and 2070 to 2099 records. Average temperatures are expected to continue to rise. Table 15-2 shows the estimated average temperatures for 2050 and 2099 under the low and high emission scenario.
Source: Cal-Adapt, 2017
Figure 15-2. Observed and Projected Average Temperatures in Tri-Valley Planning Area
Table 15-2. Average Temperature Projections in Tri-Valley Planning Area 2050 Projection (°F) 2099 Projection (°F)
Average Temperature
Difference from
Historical Average Average Temperature
Difference from
Historical Average
Emission Scenario Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min.
Low Emissions (RCP 4.5) 73.9 50.1 +4.0 +5.5 76.23 49.3 +6.3 +4.7 High Emissions (RCP 8.5) 74.8 51.0 +4.9 +6.4 80.6 56.4 +10.7 +11.8 Extreme Heat
The extreme heat day temperature threshold for the planning area is 98.3 °F. The historical average (1961-1990) number of extreme heat days is 4.3 days. In the low emissions scenario, there are projected to be an annual average of 13 days with temperatures over the extreme heat day threshold between 2017 and 2050 and between
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2051 and 2099. In the high emissions scenario, there are projected to be an annual average of 20 days with temperatures over the extreme heat day threshold between 2017 and 2050 and an average of 19 days per year between 2051 and 2099 (see Figure 15-3).
Source: Cal-Adapt, 2017
Figure 15-3. Projected Number of Extreme Heat Days by Year Precipitation
Cal-Adapt shows that the historical annual mean precipitation (1961-1990) for the Tri-Valley planning area was
21.1 inches. Under the low and high emission scenario, annual precipitation is expected to average 22.75 inches from 2017 to 2050 and 29.22 inches from 2051 to 2099. In general, most precipitation is expected to continue to fall during the winter. Small changes in precipitation patterns in the state will have the potential to cause significant disruption to built and natural systems.
Snowpack
While there are no snow-water equivalency measurements for the planning area, Cal-Adapt indicates that changes in precipitation patterns may result in a reduction in snowpack. For example, Sierra Nevada snowpack may be reduced by as much as 70 to 90 percent.
Wildfire
Wildfire risk is expected to change in the coming decades (see Figure 15-4). Under both high- and low-emissions scenarios, the change in area burned in planning area decreases by 10 to 20 percent by 2050.
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Source: Cal-Adapt, 2017
Figure 15-4. Projected Changes in Fire Risk, Relative to 2010 Levels
15.1.4 Responses to Climate Change
Communities and governments worldwide are working to address, evaluate and prepare for climate changes that are likely to impact communities in coming decades. Generally, climate change discussions encompass two separate but inter-related considerations—mitigation and adaptation:
• Mitigation in climate change discussions is defined as human intervention to reduce the impact on the climate system. It includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhance greenhouse gas sinks.
• The IPCC defines adaption as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.” Mitigation and adaptation are related, as the world’s ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will affect the degree of adaptation that will be necessary. Some actions can both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and support adaptation to likely future conditions. Some adaptation actions also help communities reach other community goals (referred to as co-benefits). The ability to adapt to changing conditions is often referred to as adaptive capacity, which is “the ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014).
Societies across the world are facing the need to adapt to changing conditions and to identify ways to increase their adaptive capacity. Some efforts are already underway. Farmers are altering crops and agricultural methods to
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deal with changing rainfall and rising temperature; architects and engineers are redesigning buildings; planners are looking at managing water supplies to deal with droughts or flooding.
Adaptive capacity goes beyond human systems, as some ecosystems show a remarkable ability to adapt to change and to buffer surrounding areas from the impacts of change. Forests can bind soils and hold large volumes of water during times of plenty, releasing it through the year; floodplains can absorb vast volumes of water during peak flows; coastal ecosystems can hold out against storms, attenuating waves and reducing erosion. Other ecosystem services—such as food provision, timber, materials, medicines and recreation—can provide a buffer to societies in the face of changing conditions. Ecosystem-based adaptation is the use of biodiversity and ecosystem services as part of an overall strategy to help people adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. This includes the sustainable management, conservation and restoration of specific ecosystems that provide key services.
Assessment of the current efforts and adaptive capacity of the planning partners participating in this hazard mitigation plan are included in the jurisdiction-specific annexes in Volume 2.
15.2 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The following sections provide information on how each natural hazard of concern for this planning process may be impacted by climate change and how these impacts may alter current exposure and vulnerability for the people, property, critical facilities and the environment in the planning area.
15.2.1 Dam Failure
On average, changes in California’s annual precipitation levels are not expected to be dramatic; however, small changes may have significant impacts for water resource systems, including dams. Dams are designed partly based on assumptions about a river’s flow behavior, expressed as hydrographs. Changes in weather patterns can have significant effects on the hydrograph used for the design of a dam. If the hygrograph changes, it is conceivable that the dam can lose some or all of its designed margin of safety, also known as freeboard.
If freeboard is reduced, dam operators may be forced to release increased volumes earlier in a storm cycle in order to maintain the required margins of safety. Such early releases of increased volumes can increase flood potential downstream. According to the California Department of Water Resources, flood flows on many California rivers have been record-setting since the 1950s. This means that water infrastructure, such as dams, have been forced to manage flows for which they were not designed. The California Division of Dam Safety has indicated that climate change may result in the need for increased safety precautions to address higher winter runoff, frequent fluctuations of water levels, and increased potential for sedimentation and debris accumulation from changing erosion patterns and increases in wildfires. According to the Division, climate change also will impact the ability of dam operators to estimate extreme flood events (California Department of Water Resources 2021b).
A strategy called Forecast Informed Reservoir Operations is being developed and tested in California as a way to inform decisions to retain or release water by allowing flexibility in operation policies and rules with enhanced monitoring and improved weather and water forecasts (Center for Western Weather and Water Extremes 2021).
Dams are constructed with safety features known as “spillways.” Spillways are put in place on dams as a safety measure in the event of the reservoir filling too quickly. Spillway overflow events, often referred to as “design failures,” result in increased discharges downstream and increased flooding potential. Although climate change will not increase the probability of catastrophic dam failure, it may increase the probability of design failures.
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The following summarizes changes in exposure and vulnerability to the dam failure hazard resulting from climate change:
• Population—Population exposure and vulnerability to the dam failure hazard are unlikely to change as a result of climate change.
• Property—Property exposure and vulnerability to the dam failure hazard are unlikely to change as a result of climate change.
• Critical facilities—The exposure and vulnerability of critical facilities are unlikely to change as result of climate change. Dam owners and operators are sensitive to the risk and may need to alter maintenance and operations to account for changes in the hydrograph and increased sedimentation. • Environment—The exposure and vulnerability of the environment to dam and levee failure are unlikely to change as a result of climate change. Ecosystem services may be used to mitigate some factors that could increase the risk of design failures, such as increasing the natural water storage capacity in watersheds above dams.
15.2.2 Drought
The long-term effects of climate change on regional water resources are unknown, but global water resources are already experiencing the following stresses without climate change:
• Growing populations
• Increased competition for available water
• Poor water quality
• Environmental claims
• Uncertain reserved water rights
• Groundwater overdraft
• Aging urban water infrastructure.
With a warmer climate, droughts could become more frequent, more severe, and longer-lasting. According to the National Climate Assessment, “higher surface temperatures brought about by global warming increase the potential for drought. Evaporation and the higher rate at which plants lose moisture through their leaves both increase with temperature. Unless higher evapotranspiration rates are matched by increases in precipitation, environments will tend to dry, promoting drought conditions” (U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit 2021).
Because changes in precipitation patterns are still uncertain, the potential impacts and likelihood of drought are uncertain. DWR has noted impacts of climate change on statewide water resources by charting changes in snowpack, sea level, and river flow. As temperatures rise and more precipitation comes in the form of rain instead of snow, these changes will likely continue or grow even more significant. DWR estimates that the Sierra Nevada snowpack, which provides a large amount of the water supply for other parts of the state, will experience a 48- to 65-percent loss by the end of the century compared to the historical April 1 average (California Department of Water Resources 2021a). Projections for the planning area show a significant decline in projected snow water equivalent in April snowpack. Increasing temperatures may also increase net evaporation from reservoirs, which would reduce water availability for ecosystems and human use (Mount, Escriva-Bou and Sencan 2021).
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By addressing current stresses on water supplies and by building a flexible, robust program, the County will be able to more adeptly respond to changing conditions and to survive dry years.
The following summarizes changes in exposure and vulnerability to the drought hazard resulting from climate change:
• Population—Population exposure and vulnerability to drought are unlikely to increase as a result of climate change. While greater numbers of people may need to engage in behavior change, such as water saving efforts, significant life or health impacts are unlikely. • Property—Property exposure and vulnerability may increase as a result of increased drought resulting from climate change, although this would most likely occur in non-structural property such as crops and landscaping. It is unlikely that structure exposure and vulnerability would increase as a direct result of drought, although secondary impacts of drought, such as wildfire, may increase and threaten structures. • Critical facilities—Critical facility exposure and vulnerability are unlikely to increase as a result of increased drought resulting from climate change; however, critical facility operators may be sensitive to changes and need to alter standard management practices and actively manage resources, particularly in water-related service sectors
• Environment—The vulnerability of the environment may increase as a result of increased drought resulting from climate change. Prolonged or more frequent drought resulting from climate change may stress ecosystems in the region, which include many special-status species.
15.2.3 Earthquake
The impacts of global climate change on earthquake probability are unknown, although scientists have identified tiny earthquakes triggered by the change of fault stress loads from rain and snow. Similarly, long-term drought can result in a significant change in the stress load on earth’s crust.
Pumping of groundwater from underground aquifers by humans, which is exacerbated during times of drought, has also been shown to impact patterns of stress loads by “unweighting” Earth’s crust. A 2014 study looked at the effects of groundwater extraction in California’s Central Valley on seismicity on the adjacent San Andreas Fault.
The researchers found that such extractions can promote lateral changes in stress to the two sides of the San Andreas, which move horizontally against each other along the boundary of two major tectonic plates. This could potentially cause them to unclamp and slip, resulting in an earthquake (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2019).
Because impacts on the earthquake hazard are not well understood, increases in exposure and vulnerability of local resources are not able to be determined.
15.2.4 Flood
Use of historical hydrologic data has long been the standard of practice for designing and operating water supply and flood protection projects. For example, historical data are used for flood forecasting models and to forecast snowmelt runoff for water supply. This method of forecasting assumes that the climate of the future will be similar to that of the period of historical record. However, the hydrologic record cannot be used to predict changes in frequency and severity of extreme climate events such as floods. Scientists project greater storm intensity with climate change, resulting in more direct runoff and flooding. High frequency flood events in particular will likely increase with a changing climate. What is currently considered a 1-percent-annual-chance also may strike more
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often, leaving many communities at greater risk. Going forward, model calibration must happen more frequently, new forecast-based tools must be developed, and a standard of practice that explicitly considers climate change must be adopted.
Climate change is already impacting water resources, and resource managers have observed the following:
• Historical hydrologic patterns can no longer be solely relied upon to forecast the water future. • Precipitation and runoff patterns are changing, increasing the uncertainty for water supply and quality, flood management and ecosystem functions.
• Extreme climatic events will become more frequent, necessitating improvement in flood protection, drought preparedness and emergency response.
The amount of snow is critical for water supply and environmental needs, but so is the timing of snowmelt runoff into rivers and streams. Rising snowlines caused by climate change will allow more mountain areas to contribute to peak storm runoff. Changes in watershed vegetation and soil moisture conditions will likewise change runoff and recharge patterns. As stream flows and velocities change, erosion patterns will also change, altering channel shapes and depths, possibly increasing sedimentation behind dams, and affecting habitat and water quality. With potential increases in the frequency and intensity of wildfires due to climate change, there is potential for more floods following fire, which increase sediment loads and water quality impacts.
The following summarizes changes in exposure and vulnerability to the flood hazard resulting from climate change:
• Population and Property—Population and property exposure and vulnerability may increase as a result of climate change impacts on the flood hazard. Runoff patterns may change, resulting in flooding in areas where it has not previously occurred.
• Critical facilities—Critical facility exposure and vulnerability may increase as a result of climate change impacts on the flood hazard. Runoff patterns may change, resulting in risk to facilities that have not historically been at risk from flooding. Changes in the management and design of flood protection critical facilities may be needed as additional stress is placed on these systems. Planners will need to factor a new level of safety into the design, operation, and regulation of flood protection facilities such as dams, bypass channels and levees, as well as the design of local sewers and storm drains. • Environment—The exposure and vulnerability of the environment may increase as a result of climate change impacts on the flood hazard. Changes in the timing and frequency of flood events may have broader ecosystem impacts that alter the ability of already stressed species to survive.
15.2.5 Landslide
Climate change may impact storm patterns, increasing the probability of more frequent, intense storms with varying duration. Increase in global temperature is likely to affect the snowpack and its ability to hold and store water. Warming temperatures also could increase the occurrence and duration of droughts, which would increase the probability of wildfire, reducing the vegetation that helps to support steep slopes. Each these factors would increase the probability of landslides.
The following summarizes changes in exposure and vulnerability to the landslide hazard resulting from climate change:
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• Population and Property—Population and property exposure and vulnerability would be unlikely to increase because of climate change impacts on the landslide hazard. These events may occur more frequently, but the extent and location should be contained within mapped hazard areas or recently burned areas.
• Critical facilities—Critical facility exposure and vulnerability would be unlikely to increase due to climate change impacts on the landslide hazard; however, critical facility owners and operators may experience more frequent disruption to service provision resulting from landslide hazards. For example, transportation systems may experience more frequent delays if movements blocking these systems occur more frequently.
• Environment—Exposure and vulnerability of the environment would be unlikely to increase because of climate change, but more frequent movements in river systems may impact water quality and have negative impacts on stressed species.
15.2.6 Severe Weather
Climate change presents a challenge for risk management associated with severe weather. The number of weather-related disasters during the 1990s was four times that of the 1950s, and cost 14 times as much in economic losses. The science for linking the severity of specific severe weather events to climate change is still evolving; however, a number of trends have been recorded that indicate how climate change may be impacting these events. According to the U.S. National Climate Change Assessment (U.S. Global Change Research Program 2014), there were more than twice as many high temperature records as low temperatures records broken between 2001 and 2012, and heavy rainfall events are becoming more frequent and more severe.
The increase in average surface temperatures can also lead to more intense heat waves that can be exacerbated in urbanized areas by what is known as urban heat island effect. The evidence suggests that heat waves are already increasing, especially in western states. According to information on Cal-Adapt provided above, extreme heat days are likely to increase in the planning area.
Climate change impacts on other severe weather events such as thunderstorms and high winds are still not well understood.
The following summarizes changes in exposure and vulnerability to the severe weather hazard resulting from climate change:
• Population and Property—Population and property exposure and vulnerability are likely to increase as a direct result of climate change impacts on the severe weather hazard in term of summer extreme heat events and potentially winter storm events. Secondary impacts, such as the risk of fire or extent of localized flooding, may increase, impacting greater numbers of people and structures. • Critical facilities—Critical facility exposure and vulnerability may increase as a result of climate change impacts on the severe weather hazard. Critical facility owners and operators may experience more frequent disruption to service provision. For example, more frequent and intense heat waves or storms may cause more frequent disruptions in power service.
• Environment—More frequent storms and heat events and more intense rainfall may place additional stress on already stressed ecosystems.
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15.2.7 Wildfire
Climate change has the potential to affect multiple elements of the wildfire system: fire behavior, ignitions, fire management, and vegetation fuels. Hot dry spells create the highest fire risk. Increased temperatures may intensify wildfire danger by warming and drying out vegetation.
Changes in climate patterns may impact the distribution and perseverance of insect outbreaks that create dead trees (increase fuel). When climate alters fuel loads and fuel moisture, forest susceptibility to wildfires changes.
Climate change also may increase winds that spread fires. Faster fires are harder to contain, and thus are more likely to expand into residential neighborhoods.
The following summarizes changes in exposure and vulnerability to the wildfire hazard resulting from climate change:
• Population—California’s Fourth Climate Change Assessment - Bay Regional Report states that “wildfires will continue to be a major disturbance in the region. Future wildfire projections suggest a longer fire season, an increase in wildfire frequency, and an expansion of the area susceptible to fire.” • Property and Critical facilities—The exposure and vulnerability of property and infrastructure is anticipated to increase based on projections from California’s Fourth Climate Change Assessment. The application and enforcement of codes and standards to mitigate the risk from wildfire hazards could help to decrease this risk as development moves into wildfire hazard areas. • Environment— It is possible that the exposure and vulnerability of the environment will be impacted by changes in wildfire risk due to climate change. Natural fire regimes may change, resulting in more or less frequent or higher intensity burns. These impacts may alter the composition of the ecosystems in areas in and surrounding planning area. If more acres are burned every year, wildlife may be more stressed as the suitable habitat is lost.
15.3 ISSUES
The major issues for climate change are the following:
• Planning for climate change related impacts can be difficult due to the inherent uncertainty in projected future impacts.
• Average temperatures are expected to continue to increase in the planning area, which may lead to a host of primary and secondary impacts, such as an increased incidence of heat waves. • Expected changes in precipitation patterns are poorly understood and could have significant impacts on the water supply and flooding in the planning area.
• Some impacts of climate change are poorly understood, such as potential impacts on the frequency and severity of earthquakes and thunderstorms.
• Atmospheric river events may result in stormwater flooding after stormwater management systems are overwhelmed.
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16. PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
16.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND
16.1.1 Definitions
According to the Centers for Disease Control, a pandemic involves the international spread of a new disease (CDC 2016). While an epidemic remains limited to one city, region, or country, a pandemic spreads beyond national borders and possibly worldwide. Authorities consider a disease to be an epidemic when the number of people with the infection is higher than the forecast number within a specific region. A pandemic is an epidemic that becomes widespread in several countries at the same time. A pandemic affects a higher number of people and can be more deadly than an epidemic.
16.1.2 General Causes
A new virus strain or subtype that easily transmits between humans can cause a pandemic. Bacteria that become resistant to antibiotic treatment may also be behind the rapid spread. Sometimes, pandemics occur when new diseases develop the ability to spread rapidly, such as COVID-19. Humans may have little or no immunity against a new virus. Often, a new virus cannot spread between animals and people. However, if the disease changes or mutates, it may start to spread easily, and a pandemic may result. Seasonal flu epidemics generally occur because of a viral subtype that is already circulating among people. Novel subtypes, such as COVID-19, generally cause pandemics. These subtypes will not previously have circulated among humans.
16.1.3 Pandemic Response
A pandemic can lead to social disruption, economic loss, and general hardship on a wide scale. The severity is dependent upon the hazard and the population exposed to it. As the population increases, so does the risk of exposure to hazards. The key to reducing the disease hazard is isolation so that the exposed population does not continue to spread the hazard to the uninfected population. For disease and weather-related human health hazards, promoting education and personal preparedness will help to mitigate and reduce the severity of the hazard.
16.1.4 Identified Health Hazards in California
The California Department of Public Health has identified the conditions described in Table 16-1 as reportable human communicable diseases that could contribute to a serious epidemic in the state.
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Table 16-1. Naturally Spread Diseases Seen in California Description Examples
Animal Transmitted
These are diseases that are transmitted to humans by domestic or non- domestic animals.
• Brucellosis (undulant fever)
• Campylobacteriosis
• Escherichia coli (E. coli)
• Giardiasis
• Middle Eastern Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS)
• Plague
• Psittacosis (ornithosis,
parrot fever)
• Q Fever
• Rabies
• Salmonellosis
• Tularemia
Bloodborne
Viruses, bacteria and parasites that can be carried in blood and cause disease are known as bloodborne pathogens. Transmission of these diseases may be from direct blood contact, needle sticks, intravenous drug use, sexual behavior, insects or other vectors.
• Hepatitis C
• Malaria
Community-Acquired Infections
Community-acquired infections are infections that are contracted outside of a hospital (or are diagnosed within 48 hours of admission) without any previous health care encounter.
• Campylobacteriosis
• Influenza due to novel strains
• Legionellosis
• Meningitis (viral, bacterial,
fungal, parasitic)
• Respiratory syncytial
virus
• Smallpox
• Tularemia
Foodborne
Foodborne diseases can be spread when food becomes contaminated with fecal matter containing bacteria, viruses, or parasites. This contamination can happen at a farm, manufacturing plant, restaurant, or home. Foodborne diseases usually result in gastrointestinal illness, which can include symptoms such as diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, stomachache, and fever. People who are ill with a foodborne disease can give the infection to others, so proper hygiene and hand washing practices are essential to limit the spread of disease.
• Brucellosis
• Campylobacteriosis
• Cholera
• Ciguatera fish poisoning
• Cryptosporidiosis
• Cyclosporiasis
• Escherichia coli (E. coli)
• Giardiasis
• Listeriosis
• Salmonellosis
• Scombroid fish
poisoning
• Shigellosis
• Tularemia
• Typhoid Fever
• Vibriosis
• Yersinia enterocolitica
Mosquito-Transmitted
In addition to causing severe annoyance and allergic reaction, mosquitoes found in California are capable of spreading many diseases to humans. • Chikungunya
• Dengue
• Malaria
• West Nile
• Yellow Fever
• Zika
Respiratory Viruses
Respiratory viruses are responsible for influenza-like illness. They can also cause the common cold. The virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic is a respiratory virus. People at high risk (those with certain underlying conditions, the elderly, the very young, and pregnant women) can develop severe illness that results in hospitalization or death. • Coronaviruses (including
SARS and MERS CoV)
• Influenza
• Respiratory Syncytial Virus
• Measles
• Pertussis (whooping
cough)
Waterborne Diseases
Diseases caused by micro-organisms transmitted in water can be spread while bathing, washing, drinking water, or eating food exposed to contaminated water.
• Cholera
• Giardiasis
• Legionellosis
• Leptospirosis
• Typhoid Fever
• Vibriosis
Sexually Transmitted Disease
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention uses community engagement methods in their Community Approaches to Reducing Sexually Transmitted Diseases (CARS). California has state-mandated HIV/AIDS prevention education in middle and high schools. • Hepatitis A, B, and C
• Human Immunodeficiency
Virus/Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(HIV/AIDS)
• Syphilis
• Zika
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16.1.5 Secondary Hazards
The largest secondary impact caused by human health hazards is economic. Large outbreaks of any human health hazard could reduce the work force significantly, causing businesses and agencies to close or be greatly impacted.
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the economic impacts of a public health emergency affecting all nations across the globe. Staffing issues, supply chain disruptions, and other economic issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic continue to affect individuals, companies, and organizations.
Another secondary impact is stigmatization. The fear of the human health hazard and fear of the unknown can lead to isolation, violence, and self-inflicted injury. Hospitals and health care providers can be overwhelmed with the “worried well” seeking care and comfort. Stigmatization of those infected by the disease may also play a role, along with political polarization that results from differences of opinion on the most effective way to handle public health emergencies. Providing key and critical information can reduce and mitigate this secondary risk.
16.2 HAZARD PROFILE
16.2.1 Past Events
COVID-19 Pandemic
In March 2020, Alameda County was included in the FEMA Major Disaster Declaration for the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. As of January 2023, about 394,000 people, or 23.9 percent of the Alameda County population, had contracted the coronavirus and 2,128 people, or 0.1 percent of the population, had died from it.
As of January 2023, 73.1 percent of people in Alameda County had received the COVID-19 vaccine along with a booster dose (Alameda County 2023).
Throughout the cycle of the COVID-19 pandemic, safety precautions were adapted to current infection rates and circumstances. Tri Valley cities and Alameda County provided public service outreach through numerous channels, including the Alameda County Public Health Department website and the cities of Pleasanton, Livermore, and Dublin’s COVID-19 websites, which provide regular updates regarding:
• Vaccine information
• Business information
• Booster shots
• COVID-19 testing
• School/childcare and sports information
• Quarantine guidance
• Monoclonal antibody treatment
• Outreach activities.
Infectious Diseases
The following is a summary of recent infections disease outbreak events other than COVID-19:
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• In the United States during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, there were 60 million confirmed cases of the disease, 270,000 people hospitalized due to the illness and 12,000 deaths. In California, there were 4,134 people hospitalized due to the illness and 596 deaths. In Alameda County, there were 243 confirmed cases, with 29 deaths (City of Dublin; City of Livermore; City of Plesanton 2018). • The most recent data for influenza in California is for the 2019-2020 flu season. The California Department of Public Health identified 889 influenza-coded deaths on death certificates, compared to 613 in the 2018-2019 period, along with 22 laboratory-confirmed pediatric deaths. In Alameda County, there were 11.8 deaths from influenza per 100,000 from 2018 through 020. Overall, the influenza activity for this season was high in severity (CDPH 2021).
• California was impacted by the Enterovirus D68 outbreak in 2014. By October 2014, there were 32 reported cases in the state. Two of those cases were reported in Alameda County. • In 2015, California experienced a norovirus outbreak. Between October and December, there were 32 confirmed cases of norovirus (California Department of Public Health 2015). • In May 2022, an MPX (formerly called monkeypox) outbreak began in the United Kingdom before spreading to other countries including the United States. As of January 2023, 243 cases of MPX had been identified in Alameda County, but the risk to the general population remained low (Alameda County Health Care Services Agency 2023).
Vector-Borne
The following is a summary of recent vector-borne disease outbreak events:
• In Alameda County, between 2006 and 2015, there were 35 confirmed cases of Lyme disease and six reported cases of West Nile Virus (California Department of Public Health 2015). • As of September 16, 2016, 18 Zika cases were reported in Alameda County, all from returning travelers.
16.2.2 Location
All of the planning area is susceptible to human health hazards. While some hazards, such as Lyme disease, can have a geographic presence within the planning area, other diseases can cause exposure to the planning area from outside the local region. Planning area residents who travel can become exposed to diseases while abroad and bring the diseases back with them, potentially placing the region at risk for exposure. Frequent travel on aircraft, public transportation, and in crowded areas may increase planning area residents’ risk of contracting communicable disease. Extreme weather poses an equal human health hazard across the planning area.
16.2.3 Frequency
Predicting the future occurrences of disease outbreaks is difficult; however, based on the history of past occurrences, it is likely that the planning area will be impacted in the future. An increase in population and population density in the planning area have the potential to increase residents’ exposure and susceptibility to outbreaks. Infected mosquitos and ticks will continue to inhabit and impact the planning area.
16.2.4 Severity
The severity of the human health hazard varies from individual to individual. Typically, young children and older adults are more susceptible to acquiring communicable diseases due to developing or diminishing immune
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systems. These populations often experience the most severe of symptoms, as their immune systems are not capable of fighting off infection or efficiently regulating temperature. In general, severity varies depending on the pathology of the disease, the health of the infected, and the availability of treatments for alleviating symptoms or curing the disease.
16.3 EXPOSURE AND VULNERABILITY
Health hazards that affect residents of the Tri-Valley area and Alameda County may arise in a variety of situations, such as during a communicable disease outbreak or after a natural disaster. While all of the population in the Tri-Valley area is considered at risk to the human health hazards discussed in this chapter, the young and the elderly, pregnant women, those with compromised immune systems, and those with special needs are considered the most vulnerable. Food insecurity can impact those who lose employment during a pandemic, who are not eligible for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits due to immigration status, or who may not be able to access food at stores because of supply chain issues or lack of stock. Food banks may be the only option for these families.
16.4 FUTURE TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT
The potential for communicable diseases, vector-borne diseases or extreme weather in the planning area is not likely to lessen or prohibit growth or development.
16.5 SCENARIO
A worst-case human health scenario for the planning area would be an epidemic or large-scale incident of any of the human health hazards discussed in this chapter. Medical treatment facilities in the planning area would be overwhelmed and taxed beyond their capabilities as the numbers of patients escalates. Impacts on the work force could have acute and long-term economic impacts on the planning area’s primary employers. First responders would be exposed to the human health hazards, which could deplete the medical work force and could have profound impact on the potential escalation of the scenario.
16.6 ISSUES
Important issues associated with the human health hazards include but are not limited to the following:
• Prevention through vaccination and personal emergency and disaster preparation will help to reduce the impacts of human health hazards.
• Medical and response personnel need to be integrated in a unified command to provide care when needed in response to human health hazards.
• Medical and response personnel must be adequately trained and supplied. • Up-to-date and functional all-hazard contingency planning should be carried out. • A system needs to be in place to inform the public with a unified message about the human health hazard. • Health agencies and facilities require surge capacity management and adaptation to the rising number and needs of the region.
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17. HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS
17.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND
Although the DMA does not require an assessment of human-caused hazards, this plan includes human-caused hazards for the following reasons:
• The planning partners take a proactive approach to disaster preparedness in order to protect the public safety of all citizens.
• Preparation for and response to a human-caused disaster will involve much of the same staff training, critical decision-making, and commitment of resources as for a natural hazard. • The hazard mitigation planning effort is an opportunity to inform the public about all hazards, including human-caused hazards.
• The likelihood of a human-caused hazard in the planning area is greater than several of the identified natural hazards in this plan.
Human-caused hazards fall into the following categories:
• Intentional, criminal, malicious acts, including acts of terrorism, cyber threats, civil unrest, riots, and active threats.
• Technological incidents that arise accidentally from human activities such as the manufacture, transportation, storage and use of hazardous materials; pipeline failure and release; and transportation.
17.1.1 Intentional Hazards
This section addresses man-made hazards caused by individuals with ill-intent, specifically involving a criminal act. Terrorism, active threats, cyber threats, and civil unrest are the primary topics addressed in this section.
Terrorism
Defining Terrorism
Acts of terrorism are intentional, criminal, malicious acts with the following characteristics:
• They involve the use of illegal force.
• They are intended to intimidate or coerce.
• They are committed in support of political or social objectives.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) categorizes two types of terrorism in the United States:
• Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction. The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City is an example of domestic terrorism. The FBI is the primary response agency for domestic terrorism. The FBI coordinates domestic preparedness programs and activities of the United States to limit acts posed by terrorists, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. • International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign-based or directed by countries or groups outside the United States, or whose activities transcend national boundaries. Examples include the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the attacks of September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Three factors distinguish terrorism hazards from other types of hazards:
• In the case of chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they may have been released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first responders and emergency medical technicians. • There is limited scientific understanding of how these agents affect the population at large. • Terrorism evokes strong emotional reactions, ranging from anxiety to fear to anger to despair to depression.
Most terrorist events in the United States have been bombing attacks, involving detonated or undetonated explosive devices, tear gas, pipe bombs, or firebombs. The effects of terrorism can vary from loss of life and injuries to property damage and disruptions in services such as electricity, water supplies, transportation, or communications. The event may have an immediate effect or a delayed effect. Terrorists often choose targets that offer limited danger to themselves and areas with relatively easy public access. Foreign terrorists look for visible targets where they can avoid detection before and after an attack such as international airports, large cities, major special events, and high-profile landmarks.
Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism is the use of computers and information, particularly over the Internet, to recruit others to a cause, cause physical or financial harm, or cause a severe disruption of service. It can be driven by religious, political, or other motives. Like traditional terrorism tactics, cyberterrorism seeks to evoke strong emotional reactions, but it does so through information technology rather than a physically violent or disruptive action.
Cyberterrorism has three main types of objectives (Kostadinov 2012):
• Organizational—Cyberterrorism with an organizational objective includes functions other than cyber- attacks. Terrorist groups today use the internet every day for recruitment, training, fundraising, communication, or planning. Organizational cyberterrorism can use platforms such as social media as a tool to spread a message beyond country borders and instigate physical forms of terrorism. Organizational efforts may include system attacks as a tool for training new members of a faction in cyber warfare. • Undermining—Cyberterrorism with undermining as an objective seeks to hinder the normal functioning of computer systems, services, or websites. Such methods include defacing, denying, and exposing information. These attacks aim to undermine the victim’s high dependence on online structures to support vital operational functions. They typically do not result in grave consequences unless undertaken as part of a larger attack. Undermining attacks on computers include the following:
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➢ Physical attack against computer equipment, a computer facility, or transmission lines to disrupt the reliability of equipment.
➢ Using electromagnetic energy, usually in the form of an electromagnetic pulse, to attack computer equipment or data transmissions. By overheating circuitry or jamming communications, an electronic attack disrupts the reliability of equipment and the integrity of data. ➢ Using malicious code directed against computer processing code, instruction logic, or data. The code can generate malicious network packets that disrupt data or logic. This type of cyber-attack can disrupt the reliability of equipment, the integrity of data, and the confidentiality of communications. • Destructive—The destructive objective for cyberterrorism is what organizations fear most. Through the use of computer technology and the Internet, the terrorists seek to inflict destruction or damage on tangible property or assets, and even death or injury to individuals. There are no cases of pure cyberterrorism as of the date of this plan.
Addressing Terrorism
While education, heightened awareness, and early warning of unusual circumstances may deter crime and terrorism, intentional acts that harm people and property are possible at any time. Public safety entities react to the threat, locating, isolating and neutralizing further damage, and investigating potential scenes and suspects to bring criminals to justice. Those involved with terrorism response, including public health and public information staff, are trained to deal swiftly with the public’s emotional reaction. The area of the event must be clearly identified in all emergency alert messages to prevent those not affected by the incident from overwhelming local emergency rooms and response resources, which would reduce service to those actually affected. The public must be informed clearly and frequently about what government agencies are doing to mitigate the impacts of the event.
The public will also be given clear directions on how to protect the health of individuals and families.
In dealing with terrorism, the unpredictability of human beings must be considered. People with a desire to perform criminal acts may seek out targets of opportunity that may not fall into established lists of critical facilities. First responders train not only to respond to organized terrorism events, but also to respond to random acts by individuals who, for a variety of reasons ranging from fear to emotional trauma to mental instability, may choose to harm others and destroy property.
The Alameda County Office of Emergency Services is responsible for mitigation, preparedness, planning, coordination of response, and recovery activities related to county emergencies and disasters, including terrorism.
The department serves as the primary coordination point for emergency management’s activities affecting more than one jurisdiction, and the unincorporated areas of the county.
Active Threats
Active threats may include active shootings, secondary explosives, and/or chemical or biological threats.
Active Shooter
Active shooter attacks are typically motivated by the desire to maximize human casualties. They are differentiated from other attack types by the indiscriminate nature of the victim’s targets of opportunity rather than actions directed toward a specific target. Active shooter attacks have evolved over the last decade ranging from “lone wolf” shooters who act alone and without any organizational affiliation to organized groups acting in concert to achieve a specific objective. Current active shooter threat force tactics commonly employ a blend of lone shooters and multi-person teams as part of a larger assault.
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Active shooters may choose to use a variety of weapons during an attack. In the United States, active shooter events typically involve the use of handguns, followed by rifles, and less commonly shotguns. With additional planning and preparation, attackers periodically implement the use of explosive devices to increase the potential for loss of human life or serve as a distraction to confuse bystanders and law enforcement.
Biological Threats
Biological hazards include disease-causing microorganisms and pathogens, such as bacteria and viruses. The distinguishing characteristic of these substances is their ability to multiply within a host and cause an infection.
Some bacteria and viruses can spread from one individual to another. Infections typically occur as a result of airborne exposure, skin contact, or ingestion. In general, exposure to bacteria and viruses can occur through inhalation (as is the case with airborne B. anthracis spores, which cause anthrax), ingestion of contaminated food or water (the case with E. coli, which causes gastrointestinal infection), contact with infected individuals, or contact with contaminated surfaces (which may be harboring, for example, viruses that cause influenza). As a result, domestic and transnational threat groups have considered targeting heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems of large commercial buildings.
Anthrax has been used as a weapon for nearly 100 years and is one of the most likely agents to be used in a biological threat. Its spores are easily found in nature, can be produced in a lab, and can last for a long time. It can be released quietly and without anyone knowing. Microscopic spores can be put into powders, sprays, food, and water. Due to their size, one may not be able to see, smell or taste them (CDC 2020). Terrorists may release anthrax spores in public places. In 2001, letters containing powdered anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. mail, causing skin and lung anthrax in 22 people. Five people died, all due to lung anthrax.
If a biological attack were to occur within the planning area, a large number of personnel could be impacted.
Buildings in the impacted area and transportation infrastructure might be closed for investigation and cleanup.
These areas would not be accessible until cleanup is completed, which would impact the businesses. Hospitals could become overwhelmed with people coming in fearing contamination. Residents and businesses may need to shelter in place in the area of the attack.
Chemical Threats
Chemical weapons are often classified according to their effect on the body, based on the primary organ system affected by exposure. They are poisonous vapors, aerosols, liquids, and solids that have toxic effects on humans, animals, and plants. Exposure pathways include inhalation, skin contact, ingestion or injection. Depending on the severity of exposure, impacts may include temporary illness or injury, permanent medical conditions, or death. An attack using chemical threats can come without warning. Signs of a chemical release include difficulty breathing; eye irritation; losing coordination; nausea; or a burning sensation in the nose, throat and lungs (Ready.gov 2022).
Harmful chemicals that could be used in an attack include the following:
• Chemical weapons developed for military use (warfare agents) • Toxic industrial and commercial chemicals that are produced, transported, and stored in the making of petroleum, textiles, plastics, fertilizers, paper, foods, pesticides, household cleaners, and other products • Chemical toxins of biological origin such as ricin (DHS 2004).
There have been reports of chlorine found in explosive devices, mortars, rockets, and missiles. Chlorine has been used in the past, mainly in blunt, terrorist-style attacks. Some experts believe that groups are trying to advance
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their technology for deploying the chemical in combat operations (Military Times 2015). Chlorine is an acutely toxic industrial compound that can cause severe coughing, pulmonary, eye and skin irritation, and even death at higher concentrations (Homeland Security Digital Library 2007).
A chemical release in the planning area could lead to closed down streets and major transportation routes (including bridges) for extended periods of time, causing transportation delays and traffic. Many homes and businesses would also be impacted as they would need to be evacuated for an extended period of time. There could also be impact on the environment and/or natural resources that would require cleanup. Hazardous material response teams and fire-rescue would be needed to respond to the incident and coordinate cleanup efforts.
Explosive Devices
Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks are the favored method of terrorist groups around the world. The evolution in explosive materials, firing devices, and their ease of concealment and delivery has increased the effectiveness of this hazard. IED attacks are typically motivated by the desire to maximize human casualties.
Explosive incidents account for 70 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide. These types of attacks range from small-scale letter bombs to large- scale attacks on specific buildings. According to the FBI, 172 improvised explosive devices were reported in the United States between October 2012 and April 2013.
IEDs generally consist of TNT equivalent explosives (e.g., black or smokeless powder) in a container (e.g., galvanized pipe, paint can, etc.). These propellants are easily purchased on the commercial market. IEDs may also contain added shrapnel to induce greater casualties or shaped charges that direct the force of the explosive towards the target. Devices may be hidden in everyday objects such as briefcases, flowerpots or garbage cans, or on the person of the attacker in the case of suicide bombers. The most commonly used container is galvanized pipe, followed by PVC pipe. When shrapnel is added to the device, the type of shrapnel varies; BBs and other small pieces of hardware are common, as is glass or gravel.
An attack using IEDs or other explosive devices within the planning area has potential large-scale consequences that may require multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional coordination. Depending on the location of the attack, businesses and other venues may be closed for investigation and due to damage. If the attack occurred in or near residences, evacuations and/or sheltering may occur.
Fire as a Weapon
The use of fire for criminal, gang, and terrorist activities, as well as targeting first responders, is not new. The World Health Organization estimates that 195,000 people die each year from fire, while according to the Global Terrorism Database an average of 7,258 people die annually from terrorism, and that includes deaths in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Stewart 2013).
Cyber Threats
A cyber threat is an intentional and malicious crime that compromises the digital infrastructure of a person or organization, often for financial or terror-related reasons. Such attacks vary in nature and are perpetrated using digital mediums or sometimes social engineering to target human operators. Generally, attacks last minutes to days, but large-scale events and their impacts can last much longer. As information technology continues to grow in capability and interconnectivity, cyber threats become increasingly frequent and destructive.
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Cyber threats differ by motive, attack type and perpetrator profile. Motives range from the pursuit of financial gain to political or social aims. Cyber threats are difficult to identify and comprehend. Types of threats include using viruses to erase entire systems, breaking into systems and altering files, using someone’s personal computer to attack others, or stealing confidential information. The spectrum of cyber risks is limitless, with threats having a wide-range of effects on the individual, community, organization, and nation.
Cyber-Attacks
Public and private computer systems are likely to experience a variety of cyber-attacks, from blanket malware infection to targeted attacks on system capabilities. Cyber-attacks specifically seek to breach computer security measures designed to protect an individual or organization. The initial attack is followed by more severe attacks for the purpose of causing harm, stealing data, or financial gain. Organizations are prone to different types of attacks that can be either automated or targeted in nature. Table 17-1 describes the most common cyber-attack mechanisms faced by organizations today.
Table 17-1. Common Mechanisms for Cyber-attacks
Type Description
Socially Engineered
Trojans
Programs designed to mimic legitimate processes (e.g., updating software, running antivirus software). When the victim runs the fake process, the Trojan is installed on the system.
Unpatched Software Nearly all software has weak points that may be exploited by malware. Most common software exploitations occur with Java, Adobe Reader, and Adobe Flash. These vulnerabilities are often exploited as small amounts of malicious code are often downloaded via drive-by download.
Phishing Malicious email messages that ask users to click a link or download a program. Phishing attacks may appear as legitimate emails from trusted third parties.
Password Attacks Third party attempts to crack a user’s password and gain access to a system. Password attacks do not typically require malware, but rather stem from software applications on the attacker’s system. These applications may use a variety of methods to gain access, including generating large numbers of generated guesses, or dictionary attacks, in which passwords are systematically tested against all of the words in a dictionary.
Drive-by Downloads Malware is downloaded unknowingly by the victims when they visit an infected site.
Denial of Service
Attacks
Attacks that focus on disrupting service to a network in which attackers send high volumes of data until the network becomes overloaded and can no longer function.
Man in the Middle Man-in-the-Middle attacks mirror victims and endpoints for online information exchange. In this type of attack, the attacker communicates with the victims, who believe they are interacting with a legitimate endpoint website. The attacker is also communicating with the actual endpoint website by impersonating the victim. As the process goes through, the attacker obtains entered and received information from both the victim and endpoint.
Malvertising Malware downloaded to a system when the victim clicks on an affected ad.
Advanced
Persistent Threat
An attack in which the attacker gains access to a network and remains undetected. Advanced Persistent Threat attacks are designed to steal data instead of cause damage.
With millions of threats created each day, the importance of protection against cyber-attacks becomes a necessary function of everyday operations for individuals, government facilities, and businesses. The increasing dependency on technology for vital information storage and the often automated method of infection means higher stakes for the success of measurable protection and education. Cyber-attacks may lead to widespread business interruptions and likely considerable repair and response costs. A cyber-attack could cause sewage pump stations to fail, which could result in contaminated beaches, unsanitary conditions and/or potentially unsafe water supply.
Since 2013, a new type of cyber-attack is becoming increasingly common against individuals and small- and medium-sized organizations. This attack is called cyber ransom. Cyber ransom occurs when an individual
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downloads ransom malware, or ransomware, often through phishing or drive-by download, and the subsequent execution of code results in encryption of all data and personal files stored on the system. The victim then receives a message that demands a fee in the form of electronic currency or cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, for the decryption code (Figure 17-1). In October 2015, the FBI said that commonly used ransomware is so difficult to override, that victims should pay the ransom to retrieve their data (BusinessInsider.com 2015) Source: (PBS 2017)
Figure 17-1. Example Pop-Up Message Indicating Ransomware Infection If an attack were to occur that impacted the planning area, multi-jurisdictional response would need to be coordinated, in accordance with local and county emergency operations plans. To reduce the planning area’s vulnerability, cyber security should be improved by providing network defense intelligence and conducting regular evaluations of network security posture and readiness. Additionally, the planning area should provide education on cyber threats and cyber-attack measurements.
Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism is the use of computers and information, particularly over the Internet, to recruit others to an organization’s cause, cause physical or financial harm, or cause a severe disruption of infrastructure service. Such disruptions can be driven by religious, political, or other motives. Like traditional terrorism tactics, cyberterrorism
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seeks to evoke very strong emotional reactions, but it does so through information technology rather than a physically violent or disruptive action. Cyberterrorism has three main types of objectives (Kostadinov 2012):
• Organizational—Cyberterrorism with an organizational objective includes specific functions outside of or in addition to a typical cyber-attack. Terrorist groups today use the internet on a daily basis. This daily use may include recruitment, training, fundraising, communication, or planning. Organizational cyberterrorism can use platforms such as social media as a tool to spread a message beyond country borders and instigate physical forms of terrorism. Additionally, organizational goals may use systematic attacks as a tool for training new members of a faction in cyber warfare. • Undermining—Cyberterrorism with undermining as an objective seeks to hinder the normal functioning of computer systems, services, or websites. Such methods include defacing, denying, and exposing information. While undermining tactics are typically used due to high dependence on online structures to support vital operational functions, they typically do not result in grave consequences unless undertaken as part of a larger attack. Undermining attacks on computers include the following (Waldron 2011):
➢ Directing conventional kinetic weapons against computer equipment, a computer facility, or transmission lines to create a physical attack that disrupts the reliability of equipment. ➢ Using electromagnetic energy, most commonly in the form of an electromagnetic pulse, to create an electronic attack against computer equipment or data transmissions. By overheating circuitry or jamming communications, an electronic attack disrupts the reliability of equipment and the integrity of data.
➢ Using malicious code directed against computer processing code, instruction logic, or data. The code can generate a stream of malicious network packets that disrupt data or logic by exploiting vulnerability in computer software, or a weakness in computer security practices. This type of cyber- attack can disrupt the reliability of equipment, the integrity of data, and the confidentiality of communications (Wilson 2008).
• Destructive—The destructive objective for cyberterrorism is what organizations fear most. Through the use of computer technology and the Internet, the terrorists seek to inflict destruction or damage on tangible property or assets, and even death or injury to individuals.
Civil Unrest
Civil disturbance refers to groups of people purposely choosing not to observe a law, regulation or rule, usually in order to bring attention to their cause, concern or agenda. Disturbances may take the form of small gatherings or large groups blocking or impeding access to planning area municipality facilities or businesses to actions directed at intimidating staff, visitors, and causing property damage. Civil disturbances can arise from a number of causes for a variety of reasons. Protests intended to be a peaceful demonstration to the public and the government can escalate into general chaos.
The circumstances surrounding civil disturbance may be spontaneous or may result from escalating tensions within an institutional facility, community or the larger society. This was the case in Ferguson, MO and other recent national examples, where local police activities resulted in a massive community response that began as protest but evolved into less controlled, potentially violent response from community members. Civil disorder can erupt anywhere, but the most likely locations are areas with large population groupings or gatherings. Civil disorder can also occur near locations where a “trigger event” occurred, as was the case in Ferguson.
The following types of large gatherings are typically associated with civil disturbances:
• Crowds:
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➢ A casual crowd is identified as individuals or small groups with nothing in common to bind them together. If they have an agenda, it is their own. Casual crowds are made up of individuals or small groups occupying the same common place.
➢ Sighting crowds are people gathering for an event. People migrating to sporting events, gathering to observe a fire or accident, and those that attend music concerts are all types of sighting crowds.
Individuals or small groups gather at these events for the same purpose. It is the event and/or one’s curiosity that compels a crowd to come together.
➢ Agitated crowds have responses based on the elements (people, space, and event). Individuals with strong emotional feelings within a crowd can quickly spread and influence the rest of the crowd. As more people within the crowd become emotionally involved, a sense of unity may develop, causing changes in the overall demeanor of the crowd. Yelling, screaming, and name-calling are all associated with an agitated crowd.
• Mobs—Mobs have all the elements found in the crowd types described above, but also display aggressive, physical, and sometimes violent actions. Under these conditions, individuals within a crowd will often say or do things they usually would not do. Extreme acts of violence and property damage are often part of mob activities. They consist of, or involve, the elements of people and groups being mixed together and becoming fluid. Mobs are usually emotional, loud, tumultuous, violent, and lawless. There are different levels of mobs (Alvarez and Bachman 2019):
➢ An aggressive mob is one that attacks, riots, and terrorizes. The object of violence may be a person, property, or both. An aggressive mob is distinguished from an aggressive crowd only by lawless activity. Examples of aggressive mobs are the inmate mobs in prisons and jails, mobs that act out their frustrations after political defeat, or violent mobs at political protests or rallies. ➢ An escape mob is attempting to flee from something such as a fire, bomb, flood, or other catastrophe.
Members of escape mobs are generally difficult to control and can be characterized by unreasoning terror.
➢ An acquisitive mob is one motivated by a desire to acquire something. Riots caused by other factors often turn into looting sprees. This mob exploits an authority’s lack of control in safeguarding property.
➢ An expressive mob is one that expresses fervor or revelry following some sporting event, religious activity, or celebration. Members experience a release of pent up emotions in highly charged situations.
➢ A flash mob is a large group of people who gather in some predetermined location, perform some brief action, and then quickly disperse. Youth flash mobs in Boston, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, New York, Kansas City, Missouri, Orange, New Jersey, and elsewhere in the United States have resulted in violence, vandalism, injuries, and arrests.
• Riots—A riot is form of civil disorder characterized by a group lashing out in a violent public disturbance against authority, property, or people. Riots typically involve vandalism and the destruction of property, public or private. The property targeted varies depending on the riot and the inclinations of those involved. Targets can include shops, cars, restaurants, government institutions, and religious buildings.
Civil disorders can result in numerous secondary hazards. Depending on the size and scope of the incident, civil disturbance may lead to widespread urban fire, utility failure, transportation interruption, and environmental hazards. Civil disorders can be a secondary hazard after a severely destructive disaster. This may include looting, blocking of roadways, which may impact emergency response vehicles, and demonstrations.
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17.1.2 Technological Hazards
Technological hazards are associated with human activities such as the manufacture, transportation, storage and the use of hazardous materials. Incidents related to these hazards are assumed to be accidental, with unintended consequences. Technological hazards in the planning area can be categorized as follows:
• Hazardous materials incidents
• Pipeline and utility failure
• Transportation accidents.
Hazardous Materials Incidents
Hazardous materials are substances that are severely harmful to human health and the environment, as defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Many hazardous materials are commonly used substances that are harmless in their normal uses but dangerous if released. The EPA designates more than 800 substances as hazardous and identifies many more as potentially hazardous due to their characteristics and the circumstances of their release.
If released or misused, hazardous substances can cause death, serious injury, long-lasting health effects, and damage to structures, other properties, and the environment. Many products containing hazardous substances are used and stored in homes, and these products are shipped daily on highways, railroads, waterways, and pipelines.
The following are the most common type of hazardous material incidents:
• Fixed-Facility Hazardous Materials Incident—This is the uncontrolled release of materials from a fixed site capable of posing a risk to health, safety and property. It is possible to identify and prepare for a fixed-site incident because federal and state laws require those facilities to notify state and local authorities about what is being used or produced at the site. • Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident— A hazardous materials transportation incident is any event resulting in uncontrolled release of materials during transport that can pose a risk to health, safety, and property as defined by Department of Transportation Materials Transport regulations. Transportation incidents are difficult to prepare for because there is little if any notice about what materials could be involved should an accident happen. Hazardous materials transportation incidents can occur at any place within the country, although most occur on the interstate highways or major federal or state highways, or on the major rail lines. In addition to materials such as chlorine that are shipped throughout the country by rail, thousands of shipments of radiological materials, mostly medical materials and low-level radioactive waste, take place via ground transportation across the United States. Many incidents occur in sparsely populated areas and affect very few people.
• Interstate Pipeline Hazardous Materials Incident—A significant number of interstate natural gas, heating oil, and petroleum pipelines run through California. These are used to provide natural gas to the utilities in California and to transport these materials from production facilities to end-users.
CERCLA, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, and California law require responsible parties to report hazardous material releases if certain criteria are met. All releases of hazardous substances (including radionuclides) exceeding reportable quantities must be reported by the responsible party to the National Response Center. If an accidental chemical release exceeds the Right-to-Know Act applicable minimal reportable quantity, the facility must notify state emergency response commissions and local emergency planning committees for any area likely to be affected by the release, and provide a detailed written follow-up as soon as practicable. Information about accidental chemical releases must be made available to the public.
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Pipeline and Utility Failure
Raw Materials Pipelines
Transmission and distribution pipelines provide two differing services. Transmission pipelines transport raw material for further refinement. These pipes are large and far reaching, operating under high pressure. Distribution pipelines provide processed materials to end users. These are smaller in diameter, some as small as a half an inch, and operate under lower pressure.
Although pipelines are the safest and most reliable way to transport natural gas, crude oil, liquid petroleum products, and chemical products, there is still an inherent risk due to the nature of the hazardous materials.
Pipelines are regulated by the Office of the State Fire Marshal. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration enforces oil and gas pipeline safety regulations. The federal government enforces hazardous material transport pursuant to its interstate commerce regulation authority. Pipelines are also monitored by system control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that measuring flow rate, temperature and pressure. The SCADA system transfers real-time data via satellite from the pipelines to a control center where the valves, pumps, and motors are remotely operated. If tampering with the pipeline occurs, an alarm sounds. The ensuing valve reaction is instantaneous, with the alarm system isolating any rupture and setting off a chain reaction that shuts down pipeline pumps and alerts pipeline operators within seconds.
Failures of distribution and transmission pipelines can occur when pipes corrode, are damaged during excavation, are incorrectly operated, or are damaged by other forces. More serious accidents occur on distribution pipelines than on any other type due to their number, intricate networking, and location in highly populated areas.
Water
Water disruption is a secondary impact from a natural disaster or intentional act. A breach in the pipelines that carry water through the planning area would have significant temporary impacts on the cities until alternative water sources are pumped and treated. Long-term disruption would have significant impacts on residences and businesses in the planning area if demand exceeds secondary supplies and water conservation measures do not provide enough relief to reduce demand to equal the secondary supplies.
Wastewater
Disruption of the planning area’s wastewater collection and wastewater treatment plants would have significant citywide and regional impacts. Such disruption could result if the system were to be overwhelmed by a significant storm or discharge of materials in such quantities that the treatment plant could not adequately treat the waste.
Natural hazards such as earthquake or flood, major power outages, or terrorism directed at the facilities and systems could disrupt the process of collecting and treating millions of gallons of sewage. Wastewater treatment plants may also have emergencies internal to the plant such as oxygen deficiencies that render them incapable of treating waste. The disruption of service may also have significant environmental impacts on the waterways adjacent to the treatment plants.
Petroleum Refineries
A petroleum refinery’s main job is to separate crude oil into its many parts, which are then reprocessed into products. The type, number, and size of process units at a particular refinery depends on factors such as the type
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of crude oil and the products made. The units making up a refinery are tanks, furnaces, distillation towers, reactors, heat exchangers, pumps, pipes, fittings, and valves. Products include the following:
• Fuels, such as gasoline, diesel, heating oil, kerosene, jet fuel, bunker fuel oil, and liquefied petroleum gas • Solvents, including benzene, toluene, xylene, hexane, and heptane, which are used in paint thinners, dry- cleaning solvents, degreasers, and pesticide solvents
• Lubricating oils and insulating, hydraulic, and medicinal oils • Petroleum wax
• Greases, which are primarily a mixture of various fillers • Asphalt.
These products can be hazardous not only in their final state but as they are being processed and refined. The principal hazards at refineries are fire and explosion. Refineries process a multitude of products with low flash points. Although systems and operating practices are designed to prevent such catastrophes, they can occur. In a refinery, hazardous chemicals can come from many sources and in many forms. In crude oil, there are not only the components sought for processing, but impurities such as sulfur, vanadium, and arsenic compounds. The oil is split into many component streams that are further altered and refined to produce the final product range. Most, if not all, of these component stream chemicals are inherently hazardous to humans, as are the other chemicals added during processing. Hazards include fire, explosion, toxicity, corrosiveness, and asphyxiation.
At refineries, the potential for fires, explosions, releases of flammable or toxic materials, or other accidents that could cause injuries, fatalities, or spills could occur and would be primarily associated with the flammable vapors and other flammable materials transported as cargo by tankers visiting the marine terminal. Damage prevention measures include routine inspection and maintenance, corrosion protection, continuous monitoring and control technologies, public awareness programs, and integrity management and emergency response plans.
Transportation Accidents
Transportation accidents are incidents involving air, road or rail travelers resulting in death or serious injury. The potential for transportation accidents that block ingress, egress, and movement through the planning area is significant, as is the likelihood of hazardous material incidents resulting from a traffic or rail accident.
17.2 HAZARD PROFILE
17.2.1 Past Events
Intentional Hazards
Terrorism Events
The Bay Area has not experienced a regional terrorism event. However, the 2016 hosting of the Super Bowl in Santa Clara County increased mainstream exposure of the Bay Area for potential future terrorist events. The following incidents in or near Alameda County have been recorded:
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• February 26, 2019—A 23-year-old Oakland man was sentenced to nearly 16 years in federal prison after he created Facebook and Twitter accounts for individuals he thought were members of ISIS. The man also stated he wanted to carry out terrorist acts in the United States in support of ISIS (DOJ 2019). • September 9, 2003—A bombing at Shaklee Corp in Pleasanton was attributed to a faction of the Animal Liberation Front (Alameda County 2012).
• August 8, 2003—Two bombings at the Chiron Corp in Emeryville were attributed to a faction of the Animal Liberation Front (Alameda County 2012).
Cyber Threats
The following recent cyber threat events in or near Alameda County have been recorded:
• In 2019, a cyber-attack locked all members of the Alameda County Bar Association out of their computers and servers for a period of time. No data was reported lost in this attack and no ransom was paid (DeepNet 2019).
• In October 2017, the Alameda County Library’s servers were hacked and the private information of up to 400,000 people was compromised. Officials are still unsure of the total scope of this attack (CBS San Francisco 2017).
• In December 2015, University of California at Berkeley experienced a massive cyber-attack that left upwards of 80,000 people exposed to cyber-crime. The university is one of the largest employers in the Bay Area, and this cyber-attack reached beyond jurisdictional and county lines to affect the entire Bay Area.
• On December 1, 2014, a global cyber-attack shut down web access to agenda, minutes, and video for many Bay Area government agencies, including Alameda County. The San Francisco-based company Granicus, which provides web services for government agencies nationwide, reported the outage (Johnson 2014).
Civil Unrest
The 2012 Alameda County Emergency Operations Plan and other resources identify the following civil unrest incidents (Alameda County 2012):
• May 1, 2021—Seven people were arrested in Oakland following annual May Day demonstrations. The individuals were arrested for a number of offenses, including assault on a police officer, assault with a deadly weapon, and resisting arrest. Some demonstrators also broke into a vacant home. • May 31, 2020 – June 1, 2020—In response to the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, at the hands of Minneapolis police, thousands of demonstrators gathered in the Bay Area. These demonstrations resulted in the looting of multiple business and shopping malls. A shooting took place in which a woman was shot in the arm. Tear gas was deployed by police, leading to further agitation (Yelimeli 2020). • November 24 – December 10, 2014—After a grand jury decision in the Michael Brown case in Ferguson, MO, there was a 17-day revolt in Oakland that resulted in marches, blocked roadways, looting of businesses, destruction of property, and arrests.
• October 20, 2011— Occupy Oakland protesters took to the streets in Oakland over economic inequality, corporate excess, and homelessness. Hundreds of participants set up tents in Frank Ogawa Plaza. Some arrests were made for disruptive behavior; however, for the most part, the protest remained peaceful.
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• January 7, 2009—This was the most notorious civil disturbance in Alameda County and occurred as a response to shooting by a Bay Area Rapid Transit police officer. It began as a peaceful protest but turned into a destructive riot resulting in trash can fires, multiple cars set on fire, broken storefront windows, and looting of stores.
Over the years, fights and lock-downs occur and some develop into full-scale threatening riots at the Alameda County Jail, Santa Rita, in Dublin. One occasion was August 26, 2010, when an inmate was killed. Security measures have not completely stopped the violence perpetrated on inmates and staff. The Federal Correctional Facility in Dublin is a low security federal correctional institution for female inmates that has not had recorded riots or fatalities.
In Pleasanton on September 9, 2016, hundreds of protesters gathered and 23 were arrested for civil disobedience at the Alameda County Fairgrounds. They gathered to protest the “militarization of police” at an event called Urban Shield, an annual law enforcement preparedness training.
Technological Hazards
Hazardous Materials
Although hazardous material incidents can happen almost anywhere, certain areas are at higher risk. Jurisdictions near roadways that are frequently used for transporting hazardous materials and jurisdictions with industrial facilities that use, store, or dispose of such materials all have an increasing potential for major incidents, as do jurisdictions crossed by certain railways, waterways, airways and pipelines. Hazardous materials are transported through the planning area via highways and pipelines. The planning area’s level of exposure to hazardous materials can be understood by examining the type of businesses, commercial traffic routes, and highway exposure.
Alameda County and its incorporated cities have experienced many accidental hazardous materials incidents. On November 7, 2007, a container ship struck a pier bumper at the western span of the Bay Bridge, which caused 58,000 gallons of bunker fuel to be released into the water. Oil slicks, oil globs, and oiled and dead wildlife were reported around the Bay and Pacific coastline. Beaches, marines and other shoreline areas were closed for cleanup in Alameda County and surrounding areas. In 2009, an oil tanker, located south of the Bay Bridge, was being fueled when human errors caused the tanks to overflow. This released 400 gallons of fuel into the bay and led to birds being oiled and approximately 6 miles of East Bay being oiled, specifically Bay Farm Island and Alameda Island (Alameda County 2012).
Table 17-2 lists the number of hazardous material incidents reported to Cal OES Warning Center by year and spill site type between 2012 through 2016. Additional historical hazardous material spill report data is available on Cal OES website. The records show that a total of 166 hazardous materials spills occurred over 5-year timeframe in Tri-Valley planning area.
Pipeline Incidents
Accidents involving underground pipelines in Alameda County have caused injury, fatalities and property damage. Recent events have involved natural gas lines in Oakland, Union City, Berkeley, and Livermore. In particular, on September 9, 2010, a natural gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno (San Mateo County) killed eight people and reduced the Crestmoor neighborhood to ashes. There have been incidents involving hazardous liquids as well, including an event on May 20, 2016, involving crude oil in Tracy (PHMSA 2022).
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Table 17-2. Hazard Materials Spills in Tri-Valley Planning Area Reported to Cal OES (2012-2016) Spill Site 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Airport 0 0 0 0 0 0
Industrial Plant 0 2 0 2 0 4
Merchant/Business 3 5 3 6 6 23
Military Base 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oil Field 0 0 0 1 0 1
Other 3 5 2 2 5 17
Pipeline 0 0 0 2 1 3
Railroad 0 1 2 2 1 6
Refinery 0 1 0 0 0 1
Residence 2 1 1 0 7 11
Road 15 11 18 14 10 68
School 0 0 0 0 0 0
Service Station 5 6 9 7 1 28
Treatment/Sewage Facility 0 1 0 0 0 1
Utilities/Substation 0 0 1 0 0 1
Waterways 1 0 0 0 1 2
Total 29 33 36 36 32 166
Source: (Cal OES 2017)
According to Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, between 2010 to July 2017, there was one reported natural gas pipeline incident in the planning area. The incident occurred on June 11, 2012, in Livermore, when Pacific Gas & Electric had an unintentional release of gas (PHMSA 2022).
Transportation Accidents
According to the 2012 Alameda County Emergency Operations Plan, the County has not experienced an incident of a commercial flight or large plane. However, a number of general aviation aircraft incidents have occurred.
These types of incidents are typically localized and somewhat contained.
Alameda County has experienced train derailments in the past. Recent events have been small, with minimal damage. In August 2004, a non-hazmat car derailed and two tank cars carrying methanol were damaged. Material release was not reported. In July 2005, a train derailed near a Kinder Morgan pipeline, which had to be shut down in case of any release (Alameda County 2012). In March 2016, 14 people were injured when a commuter train derailed after hitting a tree that had fallen onto the tracks. No fatalities were reported in this incident (Marzullo and Barnard 2016).
Between 2010 and 2022, there were three aviation fatality incidents in Livermore (along with 17 nonfatal), none in Dublin and one aviation fatality incident in Pleasanton as reported by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The following is information regarding recent fatality incidents in the planning area (NTSB 2023):
• June 1, 2015, Livermore—A Piper PA 22-135 collided with terrain after losing control mid-flight shortly after departing from Livermore Municipal Airport. One fatality resulted from this incident. • June 21, 2014, Livermore—A Parker Loehle Mustang T5151 lost control and collided with terrain after an on-flight fire of unknown origin occurred. One fatality resulted from this incident.
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• May 21, 2015, Pleasanton—A Cessna 210F collided with terrain, resulting in one fatality. The NTSB determined the pilot was varying plane altitude to avoid clouds before encountering an area of rising terrain that proved to be unavoidable.
• May 9, 2010, Livermore—A Piper PA-280235 pilot used visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in a collision with obstacles and terrain. Two fatalities occurred.
The California Office of Traffic Safety provides the total number of fatal and injury collisions on local city streets between 2017 through 2020 (see Table 17-3). Over this period, 5,258 fatal and injury collisions occurred in the Tri-Valley planning area.
Table 17-3. Total Fatal and Injury Collision Data for Tri-Valley Planning Area Jurisdiction 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total
Dublin 128 129 162 73 492
Livermore 285 370 308 195 1,158
Pleasanton 301 284 247 147 979
Total 714 783 717 415 5,258
Source: (California OTS 2023)
The only railway accident reported in recent years occurred on March 8, 2016, when a commuter train detailed after it struck a downed tree on the tracks. The incident occurred in Niles Canyon, south of the City of Pleasanton, where two train cars derailed and one plunged into a creek. It occurred at night and only nine people were injured (San Francisco CBS 2016).
17.2.2 Location
Intentional Hazards
Terrorism, Civil Unrest, and Active Threats
The State of California and Office of Homeland Security have identified numerous high-profile targets for potential terrorists in California. Large population centers, high-visibility tourist attractions, and critical infrastructure accessible to the public present security challenges of an ongoing nature in California. The network of highways, railways, ports, and airports used to transport significant amounts of hazardous materials poses a significant technological hazards threat. Multiple incidents may happen simultaneously, and all typically require a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional response.
In particular, the Santa Rita County Jail and Federal Correctional Facility, both in Dublin, are locations where civil unrest may occur. Also, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory are U.S. Department of Energy national labs are critical facilities that may have active threats.
Cyber Threats
Both public and private operations in the Cities of Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton are threatened on a near- daily basis by the millions of currently engineered cyber-attacks developed to automatically seek technological vulnerabilities. Possible cyberterrorist targets include the banking industry, power plants, air traffic control centers, and water systems; especially facilities that rely on computers, computer systems, and programs for their operations.
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Technological Hazards
Hazardous Materials Release
Hazardous materials are stored before and after they are transported to their intended use. This may include service stations that store gasoline and diesel fuel in underground storage tanks; hospitals that store radioactive materials, flammable materials and other hazardous substances; or manufacturers, processors, distributors, and recycling plants for chemical industries that store a variety of chemicals on site (FEMA 2022). For the purpose of this plan, fixed sites include buildings or property where hazardous materials are manufactured or stored, and are regulated under various programs by the EPA.
The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) provides the EPA with authority to require reporting, record- keeping and testing requirements, and restrictions relating to chemical substances and/or mixtures. Certain substances are generally excluded from TSCA, including food, drugs, cosmetics, and pesticides. TSCA addresses the production, importation, use, and disposal of specific chemicals, including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), asbestos, radon, and lead-based paint. According to TSCA, there are no facilities with these substances in the planning area (EPA 2021).
Facilities identified in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Information databases (RCRA Info) were also reviewed for this plan. Hazardous waste information is contained in RCRA Info, a national program management and inventory system about hazardous waste handlers. In general, entities that generate, transport, treat, store, and dispose of hazardous waste are required to provide information about their activities to state environmental agencies. These agencies pass on the information to regional and national EPA offices. This regulation is governed by the RCRA, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. There are 73 RCRA facilities in Dublin, 162 facilities in Livermore, and 132 facilities in Pleasanton (EPA 2021).
Petroleum Refineries
There are five petroleum refinery operations along the Bay Area’s Contra Costa-Solano refinery belt.
Pipelines and Utilities
Distribution pipelines run through highly populated areas providing refined materials for public use and consumption. Large gas distribution lines, called “mains,” along with much smaller service lines that travel to homes and businesses, account for the vast majority of underground pipeline system.
Figure 17-2 shows gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines as well as the locations of accidents and incidents within the planning area. Both natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines traverse the planning area. The primary operator of the gas transmission pipelines is Northern California Power Agency and Pacific Gas & Electric. The primary operator for the hazardous liquid pipeline is Shell Pipeline Company (PHMSA 2023).
Zone 7 Water Agency (Zone 7), a water wholesaler, provides treated drinking water to four major retailers in the Valley area that serve approximately 240,000 people and businesses. The wholesale water has three sources:
South Bay Aqueduct that originates from the California State Water Project; Lake Del Valle storage reservoir that is approximately 10 miles from Livermore; and groundwater from local wells (Zone 7 Water Agency 2023).
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Source: (PHMSA 2023)
Figure 17-2. Gas Transmission and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines Near the Planning Area Transportation Incidents
Incidents involving hazardous materials in transit or incidents occurring on roads and rail can occur through a variety of vehicles in and around the planning area. In the City of Dublin, there are 193 miles of road and no commuter train or transportation rails. In the City of Livermore, there are 348 miles of roadway, 12 miles of railroad and the Altamont Commuter express commuter train. In the City of Pleasanton, there are 340 miles of roadway, 6 miles of commuter train, and 8 miles of transportation rail (Association of Bay Area Governments 2010).
The Tri-Valley planning area is serviced by the Livermore Municipal Airport. It was a 5,255-foot main paved runway and a second 2,700-foot unlighted training runway. The nearest airports with scheduled airline service are Oakland, San Jose, and Stockton. The main artery through the planning area is Interstate 580, which feeds traffic from the Bay Area to the Central Valley of California. Union Pacific Railroad freight line traverses the Cities of Livermore and Pleasanton and Amtrak passenger train has a station in Livermore. The Altamont Commuter Express commuter train stops in Livermore and Pleasanton. It extends from Stockton to San Jose.
17.2.3 Frequency
Intentional Hazards
Terrorism, Civil Unrest, and Active Threats
As of 2022, California’s economy was the largest of any state in the United States. The planning area’s proximity to San Francisco and Silicon Valley presents unique conditions for terrorist attacks. The transportation, energy, and communications systems that cross the planning area have impacts on the local, regional, and even national economy. In general, the risks of a terrorist event involving a WMD are as follows:
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• Chemical—The risk of a chemical event is present in the Cities of Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton.
The agricultural community in Alameda County uses and stores significant amounts of chemicals for peaceful and productive means that could be used in destructive ways. • Explosives—Pipe bomb and suspicious package events have occurred in Alameda County in the past.
While none of the events has been specifically identified as a WMD-related attack, the elements necessary to construct a WMD are readily available. Additionally, the agricultural communities maintain sufficient products and quantities for use in explosive events. • Radiological/Nuclear—The major transportation arteries for vehicles or rail that cross through the planning area contribute to the risk of a radiological event. Such products can unknowingly pass through any one of the regional transportation corridors.
• Biological—Anthrax incidents that occurred in the United States in October 2001 demonstrate the potential for spreading terror through biological WMDs. The introduction of Newcastle disease in the United States demonstrates how an agent can be introduced to livestock, causing harm to public health and the economy.
• Combined Hazards—WMD agents can be combined to have a greater total effect. When combined, the impacts of the event can be immediate and longer-term. Casualties will likely suffer from both immediate and long-term burns and contamination. Given the risks associated with chemical agents in Alameda County, the possibility exists for such a combined event to occur.
Cyber Threats
Cyber-attacks are experienced on a daily basis, often without being noticed. Up-to-date virus protection software used in both public and private sectors prevent most cyber-attacks from becoming successful. Programs that promote public education to that end are also an effective way in which to mitigate cyber threats. Cyberterrorism is much less common than cyber-attacks, and the frequency is unknown.
Technological Hazards
Hazardous material incidents may occur at any time in the Cities of Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton, given the presence of transportation routes bisecting the planning area, the location of businesses and industry that use hazardous materials, the presence of scattered illegitimate businesses such as clandestine drug laboratories at any given time, and the improper disposal of hazardous waste.
17.2.4 Severity
The severity of human-caused hazards could range from a minor transportation accident or power outage to a full- scale terrorist attack.
The term mass casualty incident (MCI) is often applied to transportation accidents involving air and rail travel, as well as multi-vehicle highway accidents. However, MCIs may also result from hazardous materials incidents or acts of violence, such as shootings or hostage situations. Effects may include serious injuries, loss of life, and associated property damage. Because large numbers of patients may be involved, significant MCIs may tax local emergency medical and hospital resources, and therefore require a regional response. MCIs may occur throughout the planning area, day or night, at any time of the year: Interstate 580 offer the potential for MCIs because of the heavy volume of traffic, although no highway or surface street in the City is exempt from this hazard.
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The railroad tracks traversing Alameda County, carrying Amtrak passengers as well as freight, also face the risk of an MCI, as do the air corridors above the county. Severe weather may play a role in roadway, air, or rail accidents. MCIs may also result from acts of violence or terrorism, which could include a chemical, biological or radiological incident, contaminating persons and requiring mass decontamination.
Hazardous Materials
Table 17-4 shows the number of injuries and fatalities associated with hazardous material spills reported to Cal OES Warning Center between 2012 through 2016. Additional historical hazardous material spill report data is available on the Cal OES website. The records show that eight people were injured and five fatalities occurred in a 5-year timeframe in planning area. Hazardous material releases also affect the environment through contamination of soil, but data are not available on the area that has been affected by such contamination.
Table 17-4. Injuries and Fatalities from Hazardous Materials Spills in Tri-Valley Planning Area Severity 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Number of Injuries 2 1 3 0 2 8
Number of Fatalities 0 1 3 1 0 5
Total 2 2 6 1 2 13
Source: Cal OES, 2017
17.2.5 Warning Time
Very few terrorism incidents—fewer than 5 percent—are preceded by a warning. Technological accidents occur without predictability under circumstances that give responders little time to prepare.
17.3 SECONDARY HAZARDS
The largest secondary impact caused by human-caused hazards would be economic, and could be significant:
• The cost of a terrorist act would be felt in terms of loss of life and property, disruption of business activity and long-term emotional impacts. Recovery would take significant resources and expense at the local level.
• Computer security breaches associated with data and telecommunications losses can have significant economic impact.
• Pipeline and tank failure impacts can include both the cost of community recovery for the area surrounding the failure site and the cost of disruption of services for the transported material. • Hazardous materials releases have the potential to cause major disruptions to local businesses that house hazardous materials. Additionally, a hazardous materials release could cause businesses to close if they are located in the path of the hazardous materials flow. • The economic impacts should a transportation facility be rendered impassable would be significant. The loss of a roadway or railway would have serious effects on the local economy and ability to provide services. Loss of major travel routes would result in loss of commerce, and could impact the ability to provide emergency services to citizens by delaying response times or limiting routes for equipment such as fire apparatus, police vehicles, and ambulances. The ability to receive fuel deliveries would also be impacted. The effects of re-routed traffic could have a serious impact on local roadways.
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17.4 EXPOSURE
17.4.1 Population
A human-caused hazard event could range from an isolated accident to a highly coordinated attack by multiple agents upon multiple targets. Large-scale incidents have the potential to kill or injure many citizens in the immediate vicinity, and may also affect people a relative distance from the initial event. Variables affecting exposure for a WMD attack and a hazardous material accident include the physical and chemical properties of the WMD, the ambient temperature, wind speed, wind direction, barometric pressure, and humidity.
Computer models can provide general data to first responders to advise evacuations or sheltering in place. With so many variables to determine “toxic endpoints” as defined by the California Environmental Protection Agency, distances are difficult to forecast. In general, those close to transportation corridors or businesses with acutely hazardous materials are more at risk for some sort of effect. Each chemical incident will be different and the scenarios are too numerous to describe in this plan.
Hazardous materials pose a significant risk to emergency response personnel. All potential first responders and follow-on emergency personnel must be properly trained to the level of emergency response actions required of their individual position at the response scene. Hazardous materials also pose a serious long-term threat to public health and safety, property and the environment.
17.4.2 Property
The planning area is located in Alameda County, among the fastest growing counties in California, making it a higher profile target for terrorism. Additionally, the planning area’s proximity to San Francisco and Silicon Valley make it vulnerable to secondary and cascading effects of a possible terrorist threat.
17.4.3 Critical Facilities
Terrorism events can pose a serious long-term threat to damaging critical facilities. In particular, the industrial corridor along the northern and northwestern portions of the county are highly visible targets. The high-profile buildings in the planning area include the Federal Correctional Facility, the Alameda County Jail - Santa Rita, and Camp Parks, which are all in Dublin. Additionally, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory are considered high profile critical facilities within the planning area. Critical facilities are limited to City facilities, Alameda County facilities, and other government facilities, private utility infrastructure and administrative offices, and medical facilities.
Critical facilities may house hazardous materials and rail, highways, and interstates transport hazardous materials on a daily basis. The exposure of critical facilities to a terrorism event or hazardous material incident is based on the facility’s criticality and physical vulnerability:
• Criticality is a measure of the potential consequence of an accidental or terrorist event as well as the attractiveness of the facility to a potential adversary or threat. The criticality for each critical facility is based on the factors shown in Table 17-5.
• Vulnerability is a measure of the physical opportunity for an accident or an adversarial attack. This assessment takes into consideration physical design, existing countermeasures, and site layout. The vulnerability for each critical facility is based on the criteria shown in Table 17-6.
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Table 17-5. Criticality Factors
Criterion Low Criticality Medium Criticality High Criticality Awarenessa Not known/Neighborhood City/Region/County State/National Hazardous
Materialsb
None / limited and secure Moderate to large and secure Large, minimum or no security Collateral Damage
Potentialc
None or low Moderate/immediate area or
within 1 mile radius
High/immediate area or within 1
mile radius
Site Populationd 0 – 300 301 – 1,000 1,001 or greater
Public/ Emergency
Functione
No emergency function, or could be
used for emergency function in the future
Support emergency function—
redundant site
Emergency function—critical
service with or without redundancy
a. Awareness—How aware is the public of the existence of the facility, site, system, or location? b. Hazardous Materials—Are flammable, explosive, biological, chemical and/or radiological materials present on site? c. Collateral Damage Potential—What are the potential consequences for the surrounding area if the asset is attacked or damaged? d. Site Population—What is the potential for mass causalities, based on the capacity of the facility. e. Public or Emergency Functions—Does the facility perform a function during an emergency? Is this facility or function capable of being replicated elsewhere?
Table 17-6. Vulnerability Criteria
Criterion Low Vulnerability Medium Vulnerability High Vulnerability Accessibilitya Remote location, secure
perimeter, tightly controlled access
Controlled access, protected or
unprotected entry
Open access, unrestricted,
patrolling security, sign restrictions
Automobile
Proximityb
Not within 75’ – 100’ Not within 25’ – 50’ Adjacent or not within 10’ Asset Mobilityc Moves or is relocated frequently Moves or is relocated occasionally Permanent/Fixed Proximity to other
Critical Facilitiesd
Greater than 1.5 – 2 miles Greater than 3/4 - 1 mile Within 1/2 – 3/4 mile Secure Designe No areas for concealment of
packages, air intakes are on roof,
access ways are not under the
structure.
Area of concealment present, greater
than 25’ from the structure; Air intakes
located at least 10’ above ground, may
have under structure access drives.
Areas of concealment within 25’,
air intakes at ground level, under
structure access drives.
a. Accessibility—How accessible is the facility or site to the public? b. Automobile Proximity—How close can an automobile get to the facility? How vulnerable is the facility to a car bomb attack? c. Asset Mobility—Is the facility or asset’s location fixed or mobile? If mobile, how often is it moved, relocated, or repositioned? d. Proximity to other critical facilities—If the facility is close to other critical facilities, then there could be an increased probability of the facility receiving collateral damage.
e. Secure design—General evaluation of areas of obstruction, air intake locations, parking lot and road design and locations and other site design aspects.
17.4.4 Environment
The risk of human-caused hazards to the environment is considerable. Hazardous materials spilled along roads or railways could easily pollute rivers, streams, wetlands, riparian areas and adjoining fields. Other hazardous materials released into the air could severely impact plant and animal species. Reducing the risk exposure to the built environment can also mitigate potential losses to the natural environment.
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17.5 VULNERABILITY
17.5.1 Population
A survey found that persons with disabilities are more anxious about their personal risk from terrorism than persons without disabilities, even when equally prepared. Another study reported that persons who increased their disaster preparations in response to the possibility of terrorist attacks included African Americans, Latinos, persons with disabilities or household dependents, and non–US-born populations (NIH National Library of Medicine 2009).
Although human-caused hazards have not resulted in a large number of deaths in this area, this type of hazard can be deadly and widespread. Injuries and casualties were not estimated for this hazard. Any individuals exposed to human-caused hazards are considered to be at risk, particularly those working as first responder professionals.
17.5.2 Property
All structures in the planning area are physically vulnerable to a human-caused hazard. The emphasis on accessibility, the opportunity for roof access, driveways underneath some structures, unmonitored areas, the proximity of many structures to transportation corridors and underground pipelines, and the potential for a terrorist to strike any structure randomly all have an impact on the vulnerability of structures.
17.5.3 Critical Facilities
The U.S. Office of Homeland Security’s 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets lays a foundation to work together to prepare and protect critical infrastructure and key assets nationwide from terrorist events. Critical facilities entities know their vulnerabilities to terrorism. They have executed numerous preparedness plans and exercises for years and fortified their facilities to minimize their vulnerability.
The impact of a hazardous material spill or transportation incident will likely be localized to the particular facility, hospital, airport, railroad, road, or highway. The potential losses to existing development vary because of the variable nature of the hazardous material spill, but costs from product loss, property damage and decontamination and other costs can add up to millions of dollars.
17.5.4 Environment
The environment vulnerable to a human-caused hazard is the same as the environment exposed to the hazard.
While human-caused disasters have caused significant damage to the environment, estimating damage can be difficult. Loss estimation platforms such as Hazus are not equipped to measure environmental impacts of these types of hazards. The best gauge of vulnerability of the environment would be a review of damage from past human-caused hazard events. Loss data for damage to the environment were not available at the time of this plan update. Capturing this data from future events could be beneficial in measuring the vulnerability of the environment for future updates.
Most hazardous materials incidents are localized and are quickly contained or stabilized. Depending on the characteristic of the hazardous material or the volume of product involved, the affected area can be as small as a room in a building or as large as many square miles that require soil remediation. More widespread effects occur
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when a product contaminates the municipal water supply or water system such as a river, lake, or aquifer. Such environmental damage can linger for decades.
17.5.5 Economic impacts
Economic impacts from human-caused hazards could be significant. The cost of a terrorist act would be felt in terms of loss of life and property, disruption of business activity and long-term emotional impacts. Recovery would take significant resources at the local level.
Utility losses could cause a reduction in employment, wholesale and retail sales, utility repairs, and increased medical risks. The planning area may lose sales tax and property taxes, and the finances of private utility companies and the businesses that rely on them would be disrupted.
The economic impact of data and telecommunications losses can be great, as computer security breaches, crime conducted via the world wide web such as identify theft, and many more forms of human-caused economic losses occur daily. Millions of dollars are lost each year as criminals and cyberterrorists steal sensitive information and funds from individuals and organizations.
The economic impacts would be significant if a transportation facility were rendered impassable. The loss of a roadway or railway would have serious effects on the planning area’s economy and ability to provide services.
Loss of travel routes on Interstate 580 would result in loss of commerce, and may impact the planning area’s ability to provide emergency services to its citizens by delaying response times or limiting routes for egress to critical healthcare facilities or ingress of equipment such as fire apparatus, police vehicles, and ambulances. Fuel deliveries would also be impacted. The effects of re-routed traffic could also have a serious impact on local roadways. Heavy traffic on routes through the planning area already occur at peak commute times when Interstate 580 is congested.
17.6 FUTURE TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT
The potential for human-caused hazards is not likely to lessen or prohibit development in the planning area. The threat of human-caused hazards and the availability of Homeland Security Funds will influence future development of critical facilities.
17.7 SCENARIO
Two human-caused hazard scenarios could have a significant impact on the planning area:
• The first scenario would involve hazardous materials being transported via rail, pipeline, or highway (Interstate 580) across the planning area. The release of hazardous materials via intentional or unintentional means could impact large population centers within the planning area. Advance knowledge of these shipments and their contents would play a role in preparedness for this scenario, thus reducing its potential impact. The biggest issue in response to hazardous material is material identification and containment.
• The second scenario would be a large-scale cyber-attack on Dublin, Livermore, and Pleasanton city servers. Such an attack would require the planning area governments to revert to non-network based operations and put a strain on daily operations. If such an attack would last for an extended period of time, fiscal operations may be impacted.
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17.8 ISSUES
Future actions needed at the local level to address human-caused hazards include but are not limited to the following:
• Continue all facets of emergency preparedness training for police, fire, public works, and city manager/public information staff in order to respond quickly in the event of a human-caused disaster.
Enhance awareness training for all employees to recognize threats or suspicious activity in order to prevent an incident from occurring.
• Work with the private sector to enhance and create business continuity plans in the event of an emergency.
• Encourage local businesses to adopt information technology and telecommunications recovery plans. • Prepare and present the human-caused hazard risk and preparedness program to the public through meetings, town hall gatherings, and preparedness fairs and outreach. • Maintain any and all citizen advisory groups and periodically e-mail emergency preparedness information including human-caused hazard preparedness instructions and reminders. • Work proactively with hazardous materials facilities to follow best management practices:
➢ Placards and labeling of containers
➢ Emergency plans and coordination
➢ Standardized response procedures
➢ Notification of the types of materials being transported through the planning area at least annually ➢ Random inspections of transporters as allowed by each company ➢ Installation of mitigating techniques along critical locations ➢ Routine hazard communication initiatives
➢ Consideration of using safer alternative products.
• Continue all facets of the hazardous materials team training and response through commitment of resources from the Fire Department budget.
• Work with the private sector to enhance and create business continuity plans in the event of an emergency.
• Coordinate with planning area school districts to ensure that their emergency preparedness plans include preparation for human-caused incidents.
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18. RISK RANKING
A risk ranking was performed for the natural hazards of concern described in this plan. This risk ranking assesses the probability of each hazard’s occurrence as well as its likely impact on the people, property, and economy of the planning area, using methodologies promoted by FEMA. The results are used in establishing mitigation priorities. This chapter summarizes the planning-area-wide risk ranking prepared by the planning team using aggregate results of the risk assessment. Results for individual municipalities are provided in the Volume 2 annexes for individual planning partners.
When available, estimates of risk were generated with data from Hazus or GIS using methodologies promoted by FEMA, based on the hazard profiles and exposure and vulnerability evaluations. For hazards of concern without quantitative datasets, qualitative assessments were used. As appropriate, results were adjusted based on local knowledge and other information not captured in the quantitative assessments.
The hazards of interest were not ranked for the following reasons:
• A key component of risk is probability of occurrence. It is not feasible to assign recurrence intervals for the hazards of interest, which generally lack extensive historical occurrence records. • Federal hazard mitigation planning regulations do not require the assessment of non-natural hazards (44 CFR, 201.6). It is FEMA’s position that this is a local decision.
18.1 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE
The probability of occurrence of a hazard is indicated by a probability factor based on likelihood of annual occurrence:
• High—Hazard event is likely to occur within 25 years (Probability Factor = 3) • Medium—Hazard event is likely to occur within 100 years (Probability Factor =2) • Low—Hazard event is not likely to occur within 100 years (Probability Factor =1) • No exposure—There is no probability of occurrence (Probability Factor = 0) The assessment of hazard frequency is generally based on past hazard events in the area. Figure 18-1 summarizes the probability assessment for each hazard of concern for this plan. These probability factors are the same for the overall planning area and for each planning partner. The probability of future events would likely affect overall Tri-Valley planning area similarly for the four planning partners.
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Figure 18-1. Probability Factors for Hazards of Concern
18.2 IMPACT
Hazard impacts were assessed in three categories: impacts on people, impacts on property and impacts on the local economy. Numerical impact factors were assigned as follows:
• People—Values were assigned based on the percentage of the total population exposed to the hazard event. The degree of impact on individuals will vary and is not measurable, so the calculation assumes for simplicity and consistency that all people exposed to a hazard because they live in a hazard zone will be equally impacted when a hazard event occurs. It should be noted that planners can use an element of subjectivity when assigning values for impacts on people. Impact factors were assigned as follows:
➢ High—50 percent or more of the population is exposed to a hazard (Impact Factor = 3) ➢ Medium—25 percent to 49 percent of the population is exposed to a hazard (Impact Factor = 2) ➢ Low—25 percent or less of the population is exposed to the hazard (Impact Factor = 1) ➢ No impact—None of the population is exposed to a hazard (Impact Factor = 0) • Property—Values were assigned based on the percentage of the total property value exposed to the hazard event:
➢ High—30 percent or more of the total assessed property value is exposed to a hazard (Impact Factor = 3)
➢ Medium—15 percent to 29 percent of the total assessed property value is exposed to a hazard (Impact Factor = 2)
➢ Low—14 percent or less of the total assessed property value is exposed to the hazard (Impact Factor = 1)
➢ No impact—None of the total assessed property value is exposed to a hazard (Impact Factor = 0) • Economy—Values were assigned based on the percentage of the total property value vulnerable to the hazard event. Values represent estimates of the loss from a major event of each hazard in comparison to the total assessed value of the property exposed to the hazard. For some hazards, such as wildfire, landslide and severe weather, vulnerability was considered to be the same as exposure due to the lack of loss estimation tools specific to those hazards. Loss estimates separate from the exposure estimates were generated for the earthquake and flood hazards using Hazus. 1 3
2 3
2 3
2 0 1 2 3
Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake
Flooding
Landslide
Severe Weather
Wildfire
Probability Factor
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➢ High—Estimated loss from the hazard is 20 percent or more of the total exposed property value (Impact Factor = 3)
➢ Medium—Estimated loss from the hazard is 10 percent to 19 percent of the total exposed property value (Impact Factor = 2)
➢ Low—Estimated loss from the hazard is 9 percent or less of the total exposed property value (Impact Factor = 1)
➢ No impact—No loss is estimated from the hazard (Impact Factor = 0) The impacts of each hazard category were assigned a weighting factor to reflect the significance of the impact.
These weighting factors are consistent with those typically used for measuring the benefits of hazard mitigation actions: impact on people was given a weighting factor of 3; impact on property was given a weighting factor of 2; and impact on the economy was given a weighting factor of 1. Figure 18-2 and Figure 18-3 summarize the unweighted and weighted impact factors for each hazard.
Figure 18-2. Impact Factors for Hazards of Concern
Figure 18-3. Weighted Impact Factors for Hazards of Concern 2 0
3 1
2 2
1 2
0 3
1 1
2 1
2 2
3 1 1 1 1
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Dam Failure Drought Earthquake Flood Landslide Severe Weather Wildfire Impact Factor
Impact Factor (People) Impact Factor (Property) Impact Factor (Economy) 6 0
9 3
6 6
3 4
0 6
2 2
4 22 2
3 1 1 1 1
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Dam Failure Drought Earthquake Flood Landslide Severe Weather Wildfire Weighted Impact Factor
Weighted Impact Factor (People, x3) Weighted Impact Factor (Property, x2) Weighted Impact Factor (Economy, x1)
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18.3 RISK RATING AND RANKING
The risk rating for each hazard was determined by multiplying the probability factor by the sum of the weighted impact factors for people, property, and operations, as summarized in Figure 18-4.
Based on these ratings, a priority of high, medium, or low was assigned to each hazard. The hazards ranked as being of highest concern are dam failure, landslide, and earthquake. Hazards ranked as being of medium concern are flood, severe storms, severe weather, and wildfire. The hazards ranked as being of lowest concern are drought, sea-level rise/coastal erosion, and tsunami. Figure 18-5 shows the hazard risk ranking.
Figure 18-4. Total Risk Rating for Hazards of Concern
Figure 18-5. Hazard Risk Ranking
12 9
36 18
18 33
12 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Severe Weather
Wildfire
Hazard Risk Rating
Earthquake
36 Flood
18 Landslide
18 Severe Weather
33 Dam Failure
12 Drought
9 Wildfire
12 0
1 2
3 4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Values shown are risk rating. Larger circles indicate higher rating.
Highest
Risk
Medium
Risk
Lowest
Risk
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PART 3—MITIGATION STRATEGY
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19. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Hazard mitigation plans must identify goals for reducing long-term vulnerabilities to identified hazards (44 CFR Section 201.6(c)(3)(i)). The Steering Committee established a guiding principle, a set of goals and measurable objectives for this plan, based on data from the preliminary risk assessment and the results of the public involvement strategy. The guiding principle, goals, objectives and actions in this plan all support each other.
Goals were selected to support the guiding principle. Objectives were selected that met multiple goals. Actions were prioritized based on the action meeting multiple objectives.
19.1 MISSION STATEMENT
A mission statement focuses the range of objectives and actions to be considered. This is not a goal because it does not describe a hazard mitigation outcome. The Steering Committee selected the following mitigation statement for the 2023 planning effort:
“Through community partnerships, establish a plan to reduce the vulnerability to hazards in order to protect the health, safety, welfare, environment and economy of the planning area.”
19.2 GOALS
The following are the nine mitigation goals for this plan:
1. Ensure that hazards are identified and considered in land use decisions.
2. Improve local emergency management capability.
3. Promote community awareness, understanding, and interest in hazard mitigation policies and programs.
4. Incorporate hazard mitigation as an integrated public policy and standard practice.
5. Reduce community exposure and vulnerability to hazards where the greatest risk exists.
6. Increase resilience of infrastructure and critical facilities.
7. Promote an adaptive and resilient planning area that responds proactively to future conditions.
8. Develop and implement mitigation strategies that identify the best alternative to protect natural resources, promote equity, and use public funds in an efficient and cost effective manner.
9. Prioritize and direct resources to increase disaster resiliency among historically underserved populations, for individuals with access and functional needs, and in communities disproportionately impacted by disasters.
The effectiveness of a mitigation strategy is assessed by determining how well these goals are achieved.
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19.3 OBJECTIVES
Each selected objective meets multiple goals, serving as a stand-alone measurement of the effectiveness of a mitigation action, rather than as a subset of a goal. The objectives also are used to help establish priorities. The objectives are as follows:
1. Develop and provide updated information to improve the understanding of the locations, potential impacts, and linkages among threats, hazards, vulnerability, and measures needed to protect life safety health, property and the environment.
2. Use local general plan, zoning, and subdivision requirements to help establish resilient and sustainable communities.
3. Increase public participation in systems that provide warning and emergency communications.
4. Encourage the retrofit of vulnerable structures in the planning area.
5. Consider programs that incentivize risk reduction.
6. Reduce repetitive property losses due to hazards by updating land use, design, and construction policies.
7. Continually build linkages and promote dialog about emergency management within the public and private sectors.
8. Incorporate risk reduction considerations in new and updated infrastructure and development plans to reduce the impacts of hazards.
9. Inform the public, including underrepresented and marginalized community groups, on the risk of exposure to hazards and ways to increase the public’s capability to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the impacts of these events.
10. Identify projects that simultaneously reduce risk while increasing planning area resilience and sustainability.
11. Where feasible and cost-effective, research, develop, and promote adoption of building and development laws, regulations, and ordinances exceeding the minimum levels needed for life safety.
12. Encourage hazard mitigation measures that promote and enhance natural processes, minimize adverse impacts on the ecosystem, and promote social equity.
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20. MITIGATION BEST PRACTICES AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
20.1 MITIGATION BEST PRACTICES
Catalogs of hazard mitigation alternatives were developed that present a broad range of alternatives to be considered for use in the planning area, in compliance with 44 CFR (Section 201.6(c)(3)(ii)). One catalog was developed for each hazard of concern evaluated in this plan. The catalogs present alternatives that are categorized in two ways:
• By who would have responsibility for implementation:
➢ Individuals (personal scale)
➢ Businesses (corporate scale)
➢ Government (government scale).
• By what the alternative would do:
➢ Manipulate the hazard
➢ Reduce exposure to the hazard
➢ Reduce vulnerability to the hazard
➢ Build local capacity to respond to or prepare for the hazard.
Hazard mitigation actions recommended in this plan were selected from among the alternatives presented in the catalogs. The catalogs provide a baseline of mitigation alternatives that are backed by a planning process, are consistent with the established goals and objectives, and are within the capabilities of the planning partners to implement. Some of these actions may not be feasible based on the selection criteria identified for this plan. The purpose of the catalog was to provide a list of what could be considered to reduce risk of the flood hazard within the planning area. Actions in the catalog that are not included for the partnership’s action plan were not selected for one or more of the following reasons:
• The action is not feasible.
• The action is already being implemented.
• There is an apparently more cost-effective alternative. • The action does not have public or political support.
The catalogs for each hazard are presented in Table 20-1 through Table 20-7.
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Table 20-1. Alternatives to Mitigate the Dam Failure Hazard Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Relocate out of dam
failure inundation
areas.
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Elevate home to
appropriate levels.
• Build local capacity:
❖ Learn about risk
reduction for the dam
failure hazard.
❖ Learn the evacuation
routes for a dam failure
event.
❖ Educate yourself on
early warning systems
and the dissemination
of warnings.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Remove dams.
❖ Harden dams.
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Replace earthen
dams with hardened
structures.
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Flood-proof facilities
within dam failure
inundation areas.
• Build local capacity:
❖ Educate employees
on the probable
impacts of a dam
failure.
❖ Develop a continuity
of operations plan.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Remove dams.
❖ Harden dams.
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Replace earthen dams with hardened structures
❖ Relocate critical facilities out of dam failure inundation areas. ❖ Consider open space land use in designated dam failure inundation areas.
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Adopt higher regulatory floodplain standards in mapped dam failure inundation areas.
❖ Retrofit critical facilities within dam failure inundation areas. • Build local capacity:
❖ Map dam failure inundation areas.
❖ Enhance emergency operations plan to include a dam failure component.
❖ Institute monthly communications checks with dam operators. ❖ Inform the public on risk reduction techniques
❖ Adopt real-estate disclosure requirements for the re-sale of property located within dam failure inundation areas.
❖ Consider the probable impacts of climate in assessing the risk associated with the dam failure hazard.
❖ Establish early warning capability downstream of listed high hazard dams.
❖ Consider the residual risk associated with protection provided by dams in future land use decisions.
❖ Develop comprehensive planning policies that encourage wise land use in hazard prone areas.
❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that addresses the dam failure hazard.
❖ Develop a debris management plan.
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Table 20-2. Alternatives to Mitigate the Drought Hazard Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ None
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Drought-resistant landscapes
❖ Reduce water system losses
❖ Modify plumbing systems
(through water saving kits)
❖ For homes with on-site water
systems: increase storage,
utilize rainwater catchment
• Build local capacity:
❖ Practice active water
conservation
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ None
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Drought-resistant
landscapes
❖ Reduce private water
system losses
❖ Support alternative
irrigation techniques to
reduce water use and
encourage use of
climate-sensitive water
supplies
❖ For businesses with
on-site water systems:
increase storage,
utilize rainwater
catchment
• Build local capacity:
❖ Practice active water
conservation
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Groundwater recharge through stormwater management
❖ Develop a water recycling program
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Identify and create groundwater backup sources
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Reduce water system losses
❖ Distribute water saving kits
❖ Increase use of recycled water
❖ Diversify water supply diversion points
❖ Develop recycled water projects
• Build local capacity:
❖ Public education on drought resistance
❖ Identify alternative water supplies for times of drought; mutual aid agreements with alternative suppliers
❖ Implement drought contingency plan
❖ Develop criteria “triggers” for drought-related actions ❖ Improve accuracy of water supply forecasts
❖ Prioritize groundwater projects for competitive funding ❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that addresses the drought hazard
❖ Modify rate structure to influence active water conservation techniques
❖ Consider the probable impacts of climate change on the risk associated with the drought hazard
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Table 20-3. Alternatives to Mitigate the Earthquake Hazard Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate outside of hazard area (off
soft soils)
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Retrofit structure (anchor house
structure to foundation)
❖ Secure household items that can
cause injury or damage (such as
water heaters, bookcases, and
other appliances)
❖ Build to higher design
• Build local capacity:
❖ Practice “drop, cover, and hold”
❖ Develop household mitigation plan,
such as creating a retrofit savings
account, communication capability
with outside, 72-hour self-
sufficiency during an event
❖ Keep cash reserves for
reconstruction
❖ Become informed on the hazard
and risk reduction alternatives
available.
❖ Develop a post-disaster action plan
for your household
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate or relocate mission-
critical functions outside
hazard area where possible
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Build redundancy for critical
functions and facilities
❖ Retrofit critical buildings and
areas housing mission-
critical functions
• Build local capacity:
❖ Adopt higher standard for
new construction; consider
“performance-based design”
when building new structures
❖ Keep cash reserves for
reconstruction
❖ Inform your employees on
the possible impacts of
earthquake and how to deal
with them at your work
facility.
❖ Develop a continuity of
operations plan
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate critical facilities or functions outside hazard area where possible
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Harden infrastructure
❖ Provide redundancy for critical functions
❖ Adopt higher regulatory standards
❖ Identify projects that limit transportation downtime
• Build local capacity:
❖ Enhance hazard mapping based on data and
science
❖ Provide technical information and guidance
❖ Enact tools to help manage development in hazard
areas (e.g., tax incentives, information)
❖ Include retrofitting and replacement of critical
system elements in capital improvement plan
❖ Develop strategy to take advantage of post-disaster
opportunities
❖ Warehouse critical infrastructure components such
as pipe, power line, and road repair materials
❖ Develop and adopt a continuity of operations plan
❖ Initiate triggers guiding improvements (such as
<50% substantial damage or improvements)
❖ Further enhance seismic risk assessment to target
high hazard buildings for mitigation opportunities.
❖ Develop a post-disaster action plan that includes
grant funding and debris removal components.
❖ Identify food security strategies, including
distribution priorities
❖ Develop comprehensive planning policies that
encourage wise land use in hazard prone areas.
❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that
addresses the earthquake hazard.
❖ Develop a debris management plan.
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Table 20-4. Alternatives to Mitigate the Flood Hazard
Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the
hazard:
❖ Clear storm
drains and
culverts
❖ Use low-impact
development
techniques
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate outside of
hazard area
❖ Elevate utilities
above base flood
elevation
❖ Use low-impact
development
techniques
• Reduce
vulnerability:
❖ Raise structures
above base flood
elevation
❖ Elevate items
within house
above base flood
elevation
❖ Build new homes
above base flood
elevation
❖ Flood-proof
structures
• Build local
capacity:
❖ Buy flood
insurance
❖ Develop
household plan,
such as retrofit
savings,
communication
with outside, 72-
hour self-
sufficiency during
and after an
event
• Manipulate the
hazard:
❖ Clear storm drains
and culverts
❖ Use low-impact
development
techniques
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate critical
facilities or
functions outside
hazard area
❖ Use low-impact
development
techniques
• Reduce
vulnerability:
❖ Build redundancy
for critical
functions or retrofit
critical buildings
❖ Provide flood-
proofing when new
critical
infrastructure must
be located in
floodplains
• Build local capacity:
❖ Keep cash
reserves for
reconstruction
❖ Support and
implement hazard
disclosure for sale
of property in risk
zones.
❖ Solicit cost-sharing
through
partnerships with
others on projects
with multiple
benefits.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Maintain drainage system
❖ Institute low-impact development techniques on property ❖ Dredging, levee construction, and providing regional retention areas ❖ Structural flood control, levees, channelization, or revetments. ❖ Stormwater management regulations and master planning ❖ Acquire vacant land or promote open space uses in developing watersheds to control increases in runoff
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate or relocate critical facilities outside of hazard area ❖ Acquire or relocate identified repetitive loss properties ❖ Promote open space uses in high hazard areas via techniques such as: planned unit developments, easements, setbacks, greenways, sensitive area tracks. ❖ Adopt land development criteria such as planned unit developments, density transfers, clustering
❖ Institute low impact development techniques on property ❖ Acquire vacant land or promote open space uses in developing watersheds to control increases in runoff
❖ Restore existing flood control and riparian corridors • Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Harden infrastructure, bridge replacement program
❖ Provide redundancy for critical functions and infrastructure ❖ Adopt higher regulatory standards.
❖ Stormwater management regulations and master planning. ❖ Adopt “no-adverse impact” floodplain management policies that strive to not increase the flood risk on downstream communities.
❖ Preserve natural spaces that serve as buffers against flood • Build local capacity:
❖ Enhance hazard mapping based on data and science
❖ Provide technical information and guidance
❖ Enact tools to help manage development in hazard areas (stronger controls, tax incentives, and information)
❖ Incorporate retrofitting or replacement of critical system elements in capital improvement plan
❖ Develop strategy to take advantage of post-disaster opportunities ❖ Warehouse critical infrastructure components
❖ Develop and adopt a continuity of operations plan
❖ Consider participation in the Community Rating System ❖ Maintain and collect data to define risks and vulnerability ❖ Train emergency responders
❖ Create an elevation inventory of structures in the floodplain ❖ Develop and implement a public information strategy
❖ Charge a hazard mitigation fee
❖ Integrate floodplain management policies into other planning mechanisms within the planning area.
❖ Consider the probable impacts of climate change on the flood hazard ❖ Consider the residual risk associated with structural flood control in future land use decisions
❖ National Flood Insurance Program compliance
❖ Adopt a Stormwater Management Master Plan
❖ Comprehensive planning policies-Wise land use in hazard prone areas ❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that addresses the flood hazard ❖ Develop a debris management plan
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Table 20-5. Alternatives to Mitigate the Landslide Hazard Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Stabilize slope (dewater,
armor toe)
❖ Reduce weight on top of slope
❖ Minimize vegetation removal
and the addition of impervious
surfaces.
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate structures outside of
hazard area (off unstable land
and away from slide-run out
area)
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Retrofit home
• Build local capacity:
❖ Institute warning system, and
develop evacuation plan
❖ Keep cash reserves for
reconstruction
❖ Educate yourself on risk
reduction techniques for
landslide hazards
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Stabilize slope (dewater, armor
toe)
❖ Reduce weight on top of slope
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Locate structures outside of
hazard area (off unstable land
and away from slide-run out
area)
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Retrofit at-risk facilities
• Build local capacity:
❖ Institute warning system, and
develop evacuation plan
❖ Keep cash reserves for
reconstruction
❖ Develop a continuity of
operations plan
❖ Educate employees on the
potential exposure to landslide
hazards and emergency
response protocol.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Stabilize slope (dewater, armor toe)
❖ Reduce weight on top of slope
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Acquire properties in high-risk landslide areas.
❖ Adopt land use policies that prohibit the placement of habitable structures in high-risk landslide areas.
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Adopt higher regulatory standards for new
development within unstable slope areas.
❖ Armor/retrofit critical infrastructure against the impact of landslides.
• Build local capacity:
❖ Enhance hazard mapping based on data and science
❖ Provide technical information and guidance
❖ Enact tools to help manage development in hazard
areas: better land controls, tax incentives, information ❖ Develop strategy to take advantage of post-disaster
opportunities
❖ Warehouse critical infrastructure components
❖ Develop and adopt a continuity of operations plan
❖ Educate the public on the landslide hazard and
appropriate risk reduction alternatives.
❖ Develop comprehensive planning policies that
encourage wise land use in hazard prone areas.
❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that addresses
the landslide hazard.
❖ Develop a debris management plan.
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Table 20-6. Alternatives to Mitigate the Severe Weather Hazard Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ None
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Insulate house
❖ Provide redundant heat and power
❖ Insulate structure
❖ Plant appropriate trees near home
and power lines (“Right tree, right
place” National Arbor Day
Foundation Program)
• Build local capacity:
❖ Trim or remove trees that could
affect power lines
❖ Promote 72-hour self-sufficiency
❖ Obtain a NOAA weather radio.
❖ Obtain an emergency generator.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ None
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Relocate critical
infrastructure (such as power
lines) underground
❖ Reinforce or relocate critical
infrastructure such as power
lines to meet performance
expectations
❖ Install tree wire
• Build local capacity:
❖ Trim or remove trees that
could affect power lines
❖ Create redundancy
❖ Equip facilities with a NOAA
weather radio
❖ Equip vital facilities with
emergency power sources.
❖ Prioritize utility recovery
based on safety and critical
infrastructure needs
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ None
• Reduce exposure:
❖ None
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Harden infrastructure such as locating utilities
underground
❖ Trim trees back from power lines
❖ Designate snow routes and strengthen critical road
sections and bridges
• Build local capacity:
❖ Enhance hazard mapping based on data and
science
❖ Support programs such as “Tree Watch” that
proactively manage problem areas through use of
selective removal of hazardous trees, tree
replacement, etc.
❖ Establish and enforce building codes that require all roofs to withstand snow loads
❖ Increase communication alternatives
❖ Modify land use and environmental regulations to
support vegetation management activities that
improve reliability in utility corridors.
❖ Modify landscape and other ordinances to
encourage appropriate planting near overhead
power, cable, and phone lines
❖ Provide NOAA weather radios to the public
❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that
addresses the severe weather hazards
❖ Develop a debris management plan
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Table 20-7. Alternatives to Mitigate the Wildfire Hazard Personal-Scale Corporate-Scale Government-Scale
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Clear potential fuels on property
such as dry overgrown
underbrush and diseased trees
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Create and maintain defensible
space around structures
❖ Locate outside of hazard area
❖ Mow regularly
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Create and maintain defensible
space around structures and
provide water on site
❖ Use fire-retardant building
materials
❖ Create defensible spaces
around home
• Build local capacity:
❖ Employ techniques from the
National Fire Protection
Association’s Firewise
Communities program to
safeguard home
❖ Identify alternative water
supplies for fire fighting
❖ Install/replace roofing material
with non-combustible roofing
materials.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Clear potential fuels on
property such as dry
underbrush and
diseased trees
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Create and maintain
defensible space around
structures and
infrastructure
❖ Locate outside of hazard
area
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Create and maintain
defensible space around
structures and
infrastructure and
provide water on site
❖ Use fire-retardant
building materials
❖ Use fire-resistant
plantings in buffer areas
of high wildfire threat.
• Build local capacity:
❖ Support Firewise
community initiatives.
❖ Create /establish stored
water supplies to be
utilized for firefighting.
• Manipulate the hazard:
❖ Clear potential fuels on property such as dry underbrush and diseased trees
❖ Implement best management practices on public lands.
• Reduce exposure:
❖ Create and maintain defensible space around structures and infrastructure
❖ Locate outside of hazard area
❖ Enhance building code to include use of fire resistant materials in high hazard area.
• Reduce vulnerability:
❖ Create and maintain defensible space around structures and infrastructure
❖ Use fire-retardant building materials
❖ Use fire-resistant plantings in buffer areas of high wildfire threat.
❖ Consider higher regulatory standards (such as Class A roofing)
❖ Establish biomass reclamation initiatives
• Build local capacity:
❖ Enhance hazard mapping based on data and science
❖ More public outreach and education efforts, including an active Firewise program
❖ Possible weapons of mass destruction funds available to enhance fire capability in high-risk areas
❖ Identify fire response and alternative evacuation routes ❖ Seek alternative water supplies
❖ Become a Firewise community
❖ Use academia to study impacts/solutions to wildfire risk ❖ Establish/maintain mutual aid agreements between fire service agencies.
❖ Create/implement fire plans
❖ Consider the probable impacts of climate change on the risk associated with the wildfire hazard in future land use
decisions
❖ Develop comprehensive planning policies that encourage wise land use in hazard prone areas.
❖ Develop a post-disaster recovery plan that addresses the wildfire hazard.
❖ Develop a debris management plan.
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20-9
20.2 ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
Adaptive capacity is defined as “the ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences” (IPCC, 2014b). This term is typically used while discussing climate change adaptation; however, it is similar to the alternatives presented in the tables for building local capacity. In addition to hazard-specific capacity building, the following list provides general alternatives that planning partners considered to build capacity for adapting to both current and future risks (California Emergency Management Agency 2012):
• Incorporate climate change adaptation into relevant local and regional plans and projects. • Establish a climate change adaptation and hazard mitigation public outreach and education program. • Build collaborative relationships between regional entities and neighboring communities to promote complementary adaptation and mitigation strategy development and regional approaches. • Establish an ongoing monitoring program to track local and regional climate impacts and adaptation strategy effectiveness.
• Increase participation of low-income, immigrant, non-English-speaking, racially and ethnically diverse, and special-needs residents in planning and implementation. • Ask local employers and business associations to participate in local efforts to address climate change and natural hazard risk reduction.
• Conduct a communitywide assessment and develop a program to address health, socioeconomic, and equity vulnerabilities.
• Focus planning and intervention programs on neighborhoods that currently experience social or environmental injustice or bear a disproportionate burden of potential public health impacts. • Use performance metrics and data to evaluate and monitor the impacts of climate change and natural hazard risk reduction strategies on public health and social equity. • Develop coordinated plans for mitigating future flood, landslide, and related impacts through concurrent adoption of updated general plan safety elements and local hazard mitigation plans. • Implement general plan safety elements through zoning and subdivision practices that restrict development in floodplains, landslide, and other natural hazard areas. • Identify and protect locations where native species may shift or lose habitat due to climate change impacts (sea level rise, loss of wetlands, warmer temperatures, and drought). • Collaborate with agencies managing public lands to identify, develop, or maintain corridors and linkages between undeveloped areas.
• Promote economic diversity.
• Incorporate consideration of climate change impacts as part of infrastructure planning and operations. • Conduct a climate impact assessment on community infrastructure. • Identify gaps in legal and regulatory capabilities and develop ordinances or guidelines to address those gaps.
• Identify and pursue new sources of funding for mitigation and adaptation activities. • Hire new staff or provide training to current staff to ensure an adequate level of administrative and technical capability to pursue mitigation and adaptation activities.
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21-1
21. PLAN ADOPTION AND MAINTENANCE
21.1 PLAN ADOPTION
A hazard mitigation plan must document that it has been formally adopted by the governing bodies of the jurisdictions requesting federal approval of the plan (44 CFR Section 201.6(c)(5)). For multi-jurisdictional plans, each jurisdiction requesting approval must document that it has been formally adopted. DMA compliance and its benefits cannot be achieved until the plan is adopted. This plan was submitted for a pre-adoption review to Cal OES and FEMA Region 9 prior to adoption. Once pre-adoption approval was provided, all planning partners formally adopted the plan. Copies of the resolutions adopting this plan for all planning partners can be found in Appendix D of this volume.
21.2 PLAN MAINTENANCE STRATEGY
Plan maintenance is the formal process for achieving the following:
Ensuring that the hazard mitigation plan remains an active and relevant document and that the planning partnership maintains its eligibility for applicable funding sources Monitoring and evaluating the plan annually and producing an updated plan every five years Continuing public participation throughout the plan maintenance and implementation process Incorporating the mitigation strategies outlined in this plan into existing planning mechanisms and programs, such as any relevant comprehensive land-use planning process, capital improvement planning process, and building code enforcement and implementation.
A steering committee will be maintained to participate in the plan maintenance strategy, which is summarized in Table 21-1. The sections below further describe each element. Livermore Senior Planner Jake Potter is tasked with overseeing the overall plan maintenance, evaluation, monitoring, and updating. He will oversee scheduling regular meetings to review planning strategies, review action items and their status, develop any reports, and coordinate related activities to ensure active use of this plan. Mr. Potter will assemble a hazard mitigation plan review team that consists of at least one representative from the planning partners not less than once a year during the life of the plan in order to evaluate and monitor its progress, address any updates, and make necessary and appropriate changes to the plan.
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Table 21-1. Plan Maintenance Matrix
Approach Timeline Lead Responsibilitya Support Responsibility Monitoring
Preparation of status updates and
action implementation tracking as part
of submission for midterm progress
report.
2-1/2 years after the
adoption and final
approval of the plan by
FEMA. Actual reporting
period TBD
Dublin City Manager Jurisdictional points of
contact identified in Volume 2
annexes
Livermore City Manager
Pleasanton City Manager
Dublin San
Ramon
Services
District
General Manager
Evaluation
Review the status of previous actions
as submitted by the monitoring task
lead and support to assess the
effectiveness of the plan; compile the
midterm progress report; assess
appropriate action for preparing the
next hazard mitigation plan update.
2-1/2 years after final
plan approval by FEMA,
or upon comprehensive
update to General Plan
or major disaster
City of Dublin
City of Livermore
City of Pleasanton
Dublin/San Ramon Services District
Jurisdictional points of
contacts identified in Volume
2 annexes
Update b
The Tri-Valley partnership will
reconvene the planning partners, at a
minimum, every 5 years to guide a
comprehensive update to review and
revise the plan.
Every 5 years or upon
comprehensive update
to General Plan or major
disaster
The governing body for all planning
partners covered by this plan
Jurisdictional point of
contacts identified in Volume
2 annexes
Grant Monitoring and Coordination
As grant opportunities present
themselves, the Tri-Valley planning
partners will consider options to
pursue grants to fund actions
identified in this plan
As grants become
available
Alameda County Emergency
Managers Association provides a
regional platform for grant notification
and coordination
Jurisdictional point of
contacts identified in Volume
2 annexes
Continuing Public Involvement
The principle means for providing the
public access to the implementation of
this plan will be the Tri-Valley hazard
mitigation plan website:
https://www.tri-valley-hmp.com/
Annually Planning Partners All planning partners will
provide a link to website on
their jurisdictional websites.
Information will be available
at city halls and the DSRSD
main office. Update
information will be sent via
social media and distributed
to community groups,
including ones that include
socially vulnerable
populations
Plan Integration
Integrate relevant information from the
hazard mitigation plan into other plans
and programs where viable and
opportunities arise
Ongoing The governing body for all planning
partners covered by this plan
Jurisdictional point of
contacts identified in Volume
2 annexes
a. Responsible lead party may designate an alternate
b. The approach to the plan update process may change based on partnership decisions made during the evaluation phase and the preparation of the midterm progress report.
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21. Plan Adoption and Maintenance
21-3
21.2.1 Plan Monitoring
The planning team and the Steering Committee have established goals and objectives and have prioritized mitigation actions that will be implemented through existing plans, policies, and programs. The planning partners will have individual responsibility for overseeing and monitoring the plan implementation, with primary responsibility identified in each jurisdictional annex plans (see Volume 2) and summarized in Table 21-1. At a minimum, the planning partners will track and report the status of the jurisdiction-specific hazard mitigation actions for inclusion into a midterm progress report.
21.2.2 Plan Evaluation
Plan evaluation will be achieved through the assessment of the status of actions as submitted by planning partners for the development of a midterm progress report. Each planning partner will evaluate the progress of its individual action plan at the midterm of the period between the completion of this plan and the next update. This progress report should be completed within two and a half years of plan approval, or upon initiation of an accelerated plan update as described under Section 21.2.3, whichever occurs first. The review will include the following:
• Summary of any hazard events that occurred during the performance period and the impact these events had on the planning area
• Review of mitigation success stories
• Review of continuing public involvement
• Brief discussion about why targeted strategies were not completed • Re-evaluation of the action plan to determine if the timeline for identified projects needs to be amended (such as changing a long-term project to a short-term one because of new funding) • Recommendations for new projects
• Changes in or potential for new funding options (grant opportunities) • Impact of any other planning programs or actions that involve hazard mitigation.
The Steering Committee has created a template to guide the planning partners in preparing a progress report (see Appendix E). The progress report template may be used as a tool for annual progress reporting at the discretion of the planning partners and based on available jurisdictional resources. The completed report should be distributed as follows:
• Posted on the hazard mitigation website dedicated to the hazard mitigation plan • Provided to the local media through a press release
• Presented to planning partner governing bodies to inform them of the progress of actions implemented during the reporting period.
Progress reporting is not a federal requirement. However, it may enhance the planning partnership’s opportunities for funding. While failure to implement this component of the plan maintenance strategy will not jeopardize a planning partner’s compliance under the DMA, it may jeopardize its opportunity to partner and leverage funding opportunities with other partners. Upon completion, the mid-term progress report will be posted to the hazard mitigation website, which will invite the public to provide comment on its content.
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21.2.3 Plan Update
Local hazard mitigation plans must be reviewed, revised if appropriate, and resubmitted for approval in order to remain eligible for benefits under the DMA (44 CFR, Section 201.6(d)(3)). The planning partners intend to update the hazard mitigation plan on a five-year cycle from the date of initial plan adoption. This cycle may be accelerated to less than five years based on the following triggers:
• A presidential disaster declaration that impacts the planning area • A hazard event that causes loss of life
• A comprehensive update of a planning partner’s general plan.
The update will, at a minimum, include the following elements:
• The update process will be convened through a steering committee. • The hazard risk assessment will be reviewed and, if necessary, updated using best available information and technologies.
• The action plans will be reviewed and revised to account for any actions completed, dropped, or changed and to account for changes in the risk assessment or new policies identified under other planning mechanisms (such as the comprehensive plan).
• The draft update will be sent to appropriate agencies and organizations for comment. • The public will be given an opportunity to comment on the update prior to adoption. • Planning partner governing bodies will adopt the updated plan.
When developing the midterm progress report, jurisdictional partners will evaluate the appropriate course of action for a plan update. The progress report will recommend a process for updating the plan based on available resources, regional initiatives, and overall timing. Options for updating this plan include the following:
• Development of an updated multi-jurisdictional plan similar to the current plan • Development of single jurisdictional plans
• Participation in development of an operational-area initiative led by Alameda County.
21.2.4 Grant Monitoring and Coordination
The Alameda County Emergency Managers Association provides an opportunity to maintain awareness of current and future grant opportunities. Currently, Dublin, Livermore, Pleasanton and Dublin/San Ramon Services District participate in this association through the Alameda County Fire Department’s contracted emergency management services. All planning partners have agreed to continue to coordinate with each other as grant opportunities arise.
21.2.5 Continuing Public Involvement
The public will continue to be apprised of the plan’s progress through the hazard mitigation website and by distribution of the midterm progress report to the media. The website will house the final plan and become the central source of information about the plan, the partnership and plan implementation and the platform for the public to provide comment on plan directives and initiatives. The website will also house the mid-term progress report as discussed in Section 21.2.1 and will be set up so that the public can provide comment on the report’s content and conclusions. All planning partners have agreed to provide links to the website on their individual
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21. Plan Adoption and Maintenance
21-5
websites. The City of Livermore has agreed to maintain the hazard mitigation plan website. Copies of the plan will be distributed to local libraries. Upon initiation of future update processes, a new public involvement strategy will be initiated based on guidance from a new steering committee. This strategy will be based on the needs and capabilities of the Planning Partnership at the time of the update.
The public outreach strategy used during development of the current update, as described in Section 3.8.1, provides a framework for public engagement through the planning process. It can be adapted for continued public outreach through the plan performance period. Information, updates, and opportunities for public involvement, including outreach to socially vulnerable communities, may be distributed via social media to community groups and organizations and made available at government offices and other venues.
Throughout the performance period, each planning partner will maintain regular public outreach through social media. Posts will include information about progress on specific mitigation actions underway or complete, hazard events that have occurred since the plan’s adoption, upcoming and recent meetings of the plan maintenance steering committee, and upcoming dates related to progress reports or the next plan update. The StoryMap that was created as part of this plan’s development will be maintained and updated, with each planning partner providing pertinent content for the updates. Hazard-related presentations will be given to elected officials and to schools and community groups. Partners will continue to assess public understanding of hazards and mitigation through questionnaires and surveys. Outreach materials will emphasize photos, quotes, and other elements most likely to engage a wide range of the public.
21.2.6 Integration with Other Planning Mechanisms
The information on hazard, risk, vulnerability, and mitigation contained in this plan is based on the best science and technology available at the time this plan was prepared. The comprehensive plans of the planning partners are considered to be integral parts of this plan. The planning partners, through adoption of comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, have planned for the impact of natural hazards. The plan development process provided them with the opportunity to review and expand on policies contained within these planning mechanisms. The planning partners used their comprehensive plans and the hazard mitigation plan as complementary documents that work together to achieve the goal of reducing risk exposure to the citizens of the planning area. An update to a comprehensive plan may trigger an update to the hazard mitigation plan.
All municipal planning partners committed to linking the hazard mitigation plan to their comprehensive plans by identifying a mitigation action as such and giving that action a high priority. Other planning processes and programs to be coordinated with the recommendations of the hazard mitigation plan include the following:
• Emergency response plans
• Capital improvement programs
• Municipal codes
• Community design guidelines
• Water-efficient landscape design guidelines
• Stormwater management programs
• Water system vulnerability assessments
• Master fire protection plans.
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Specific activities identified for incorporating mitigation into other planning mechanisms can be found in each jurisdictional annex located in Volume 2 of this hazard mitigation plan. Some action items in this plan can be implemented through creation of new educational programs, continued interagency coordination, or improved public participation. As information becomes available from other planning mechanisms that can enhance this plan, that information will be incorporated via the update process.
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history.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fanthrax%2Fresources%2Fhistory% 2Findex.html.
—. 2018. Landslides and Mudslides. Accessed March 14, 2023. https://www.cdc.gov/disasters/landslides.html. —. 2016. Pandemic Basics. November 3. Accessed January 14, 2023. https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic- resources/basics/index.html.
CDPH. 2021. "Influenza Surveillance Report 2019-2020 Season." CDPH. June. Accessed January 14, 2023. https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Immunization/Annual 2019-20_FluReport.pdf.
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City of Dublin; City of Livermore; City of Plesanton. 2018. "Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan; Volume 1—Planning Area-Wide Elements." September.
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—. n.d. Livermore Municipal Water. Accessed June 23, 2022. https://www.livermoreca.gov/government/public- works/water-resources/livermore-municipal-water.
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/.
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2019. Can Climate Affect Earthquakes, Or Are the Connections Shaky? October 29. Accessed November 23, 2021. https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2926/can-climate- affect-earthquakes-or-are-the-connections-shaky/.
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National Institutes of Standards and Technology. 2011. Wind Zone Map. September 13. Accessed 2022. https://www.nist.gov/image/windzonemapjpg.
National Science & Technology Council. 2019. "National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan." Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mitigation Working Group; Space Weather, Security and Hazards Subcommittee; Committee on Homeland and National Security. Accessed April 7, 2023. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/National-Space-Weather-Strategy- and-Action-Plan-2019.pdf.
National Weather Service. 2023. Climate. Accessed March 31, 2023. https://www.weather.gov/wrh/Climate?wfo=mtr.
—. 2019. How Dangerous Is Lighting? Accessed May 2, 2022. https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-odds. —. 2009b. National Weather Service Glossary. Accessed November 22, 2021. https://w1.weather.gov/glossary/. —. n.d. What is the heat index? https://www.weather.gov/ama/heatindex.
NOAA. 2023. Atmospheric Rivers Hit West Coast. January 25. Accessed April 2, 2023. https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/news/atmospheric-rivers-hit-west- coast#:~:text=From%20late%20Dec.,Canada%2C%20hitting%20California%20particularly%20hard. —. 2022. Flash Flooding Definition. November 4. Accessed November 4, 2022. https://www.weather.gov/phi/FlashFloodingDefinition.
NOAA NCEI. 2022 . Storm Events Database. November 4. Accessed November 4, 2022. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/listevents.jsp?eventType=%28Z%29+Coastal+Flood&eventType =%28C%29+Flash+Flood&eventType=%28Z%29+Flood&eventType=%28Z%29+Lakeshore+Flood&be ginDate_mm=02&beginDate_dd=22&beginDate_yyyy=2017&endDate_mm=11&endDate_dd=04&en.
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PHMSA. 2022. Distribution, Transmission & Gathering, LNG, and Liquid Accident and Incident Data. December
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U.S. Global Change Research Program. 2014. "Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment." https://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports/climate-change-impacts-united- states-third-national-climate-assessment-0.
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References
References-9
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Appendix A. Hazard Mitigation Survey Results
EXHIBIT A
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A-1
A. HAZARD MITIGATION SURVEY RESULTS
EXHIBIT A
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Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 1 / 22
0.69% 4
80.42% 464
2.95% 17
69.32% 400
6.41% 37
6.07% 35
54.77% 316
33.28% 192
Q1 Which of the following natural hazards have you experienced in the Tri- Valley planning area? (Check all that apply)
Answered: 577 Skipped: 8
Total Respondents: 577
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Dam Failure
Drought
Landslide &
Mass Movemen...
Earthquake
Flood
None
Severe Weather
(i.e., high...
Wildfire
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Dam Failure
Drought
Landslide & Mass Movements (geologic hazards)
Earthquake
Flood
None
Severe Weather (i.e., high wind, heavy rain, lightning) Wildfire
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Q2 How concerned are you about the following natural hazards in the Tri- Valley area?
Answered: 580 Skipped: 5
Dam Failure
Drought
Landslide &
Mass Movemen...
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Earthquake
Flood
Severe Weather
(i.e., high...
EXHIBIT A
382
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 4 / 22
59.07%
329
19.57%
109
9.16%
51 3.95%
22 2.51%
14 5.75%
32 557
1.63 0.70%
4 4.70%
27 15.51%
89 30.14%
173
48.95%
281
0.00%
0 574
4.22 35.83%
201
32.26%
181
20.68%
116
5.53%
31 3.03%
17 2.67%
15 561
2.05 1.21%
7 14.34%
83 30.05%
174
28.67%
166
25.56%
148
0.17%
1 579
3.63 35.39%
201
33.63%
191
19.89%
113
6.51%
37 3.17%
18 1.41%
8 568
2.07 13.26%
76 31.59%
181
30.19%
173
15.01%
86 9.25%
53 0.70%
4 573
2.75 4.89%
28 16.06%
92 19.90%
114
28.62%
164
30.54%
175
0.00%
0 573
3.64 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not Concer… Somewhat … Concerned Very Conce…
Extremely … N/A
Wildfire
NOT
CONCERNED
SOMEWHAT
CONCERNED
CONCERNED VERY
CONCERNED
EXTREMELY
CONCERNED
N/A TOTAL WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
Dam
Failure
Drought
Landslide &
Mass
Movements
(geologic
hazards)
Earthquake
Flood
Severe
Weather
(i.e., high
wind,
heavy rain,
lightning)
Wildfire
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52.59% 294
39.36% 220
17.89% 100
20.93% 117
14.13% 79
10.73% 60
30.95% 173
33.63% 188
84.08% 470
Q3 How would you prefer to be notified about a disaster event?(Check all that apply)
Answered: 559 Skipped: 26
Total Respondents: 559
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Television
Radio
Neighbors
(word of mouth)
Facebook
Twitter
Instagram
Nextdoor
Nixle
AC Alert
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Television
Radio
Neighbors (word of mouth)
Facebook
Twitter
Instagram
Nextdoor
Nixle
AC Alert
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Q4 What steps has your household taken to prepare for a disaster? (Check all that apply)
Answered: 580 Skipped: 5
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Received First
Aid/CPR...
Made a fire
escape plan
Designated an
evacuation...
Identified
utility shut...
Maintain an
emergency...
Installed
smoke detect...
Maintain a
fire...
Stored medical
supplies (fi...
Registered to
receive...
Purchased
additional...
None
EXHIBIT A
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45.00% 261
36.03% 209
25.00% 145
63.10% 366
69.31% 402
92.07% 534
74.14% 430
68.45% 397
76.03% 441
19.14% 111
2.07% 12
Total Respondents: 580
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Received First Aid/CPR training
Made a fire escape plan
Designated an evacuation meeting place
Identified utility shutoff locations
Maintain an emergency supply kit (batteries, flashlights, battery-powered radio, food/water) Installed smoke detectors on each level of the house
Maintain a fire extinguisher at home
Stored medical supplies (first aid kit, medications)
Registered to receive emergency alerts
Purchased additional insurance
None
EXHIBIT A
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Q5 How prepared is your household to deal with a hazard event? Check one:
Answered: 569 Skipped: 16
9.67%
55 78.38%
446
11.95%
68 569
2.26 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not at all p… Somewhat … Very prepar…
Check one:
NOT AT ALL PREPARED SOMEWHAT PREPARED VERY PREPARED TOTAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE Check one:
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18.45% 107
27.59% 160
50.17% 291
1.55% 9
1.03% 6
0.34% 2
0.86% 5
Q6 Where do you live?
Answered: 580 Skipped: 5
TOTAL 580
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
San Ramon
Alameda County
(Unincorpora...
I do not live
in the...
If you live in
Unincorporat...
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
San Ramon
Alameda County (Unincorporated)
I do not live in the Tri-Valley planning area
If you live in Unincorporated County, please provide the name of your community.
EXHIBIT A
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9.81% 53
16.48% 89
20.37% 110
2.59% 14
4.63% 25
46.11% 249
Q7 Where do you work?
Answered: 540 Skipped: 45
TOTAL 540
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
San Ramon
Alameda County
(Unincorpora...
I am
unemployed o...
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Dublin
Livermore
Pleasanton
San Ramon
Alameda County (Unincorporated)
I am unemployed or retired.
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Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 11 / 22
90.33% 523
9.67% 56
Q8 Do you own or rent your place of residence?
Answered: 579 Skipped: 6
TOTAL 579
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Own
Rent
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Own
Rent
EXHIBIT A
390
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 12 / 22
54.06% 313
45.94% 266
Q9 When you moved into your home, did you consider the impact a disaster could have on your home?
Answered: 579 Skipped: 6
TOTAL 579
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Yes
No
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Yes
No
EXHIBIT A
391
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 13 / 22
82.27% 450
17.73% 97
Q10 Would the disclosure of natural hazard information influence your decision to purchase or move into a home today?
Answered: 547 Skipped: 38
TOTAL 547
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Yes
No
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Yes
No
EXHIBIT A
392
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 14 / 22
4.60% 21
5.69% 26
6.13% 28
23.63% 108
19.47% 89
2.19% 10
57.55% 263
7.22% 33
Q11 Is your home located in any of the following hazard areas (check all that apply):
Answered: 457 Skipped: 128
Total Respondents: 457
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
FEMA
designated...
Dam failure
zone
High
liquefaction...
Near an active
fault (withi...
Wildfire prone
area
Landslide area
Don't know
Other (please
specify)
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
FEMA designated floodplain
Dam failure zone
High liquefaction zone
Near an active fault (within 1 mile)
Wildfire prone area
Landslide area
Don't know
Other (please specify)
EXHIBIT A
393
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 15 / 22
4.65% 25
23.98% 129
11.90% 64
61.34% 330
1.86% 10
Q12 Do you have hazard-specific insurance (check all that apply)? Answered: 538 Skipped: 47
Total Respondents: 538
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Flood
insurance
Earthquake
insurance
Not sure
Neither
Other (please
specify)
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Flood insurance
Earthquake insurance
Not sure
Neither
Other (please specify)
EXHIBIT A
394
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 16 / 22
Q13 What is the primary language spoken or written in your home? Answered: 559 Skipped: 26
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
English
Spanish
Mandarin
Chinese
(Traditional)
Punjabi
Hindi
Tagalog
Vietnamese
Korean
Other (please
specify)
EXHIBIT A
395
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 17 / 22
96.06% 537
0.54% 3
0.72% 4
0.00% 0
0.18% 1
0.36% 2
0.18% 1
0.00% 0
0.18% 1
1.79% 10
TOTAL 559
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
English
Spanish
Mandarin
Chinese (Traditional)
Punjabi
Hindi
Tagalog
Vietnamese
Korean
Other (please specify)
EXHIBIT A
396
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 18 / 22
43.55% 243
50.72% 283
42.47% 237
68.64% 383
27.06% 151
55.20% 308
52.15% 291
15.41% 86
Q14 Which of the following resources do you use to receive news and information about the Tri-Valley area?
Answered: 558 Skipped: 27
Total Respondents: 558
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Social Media
(Facebook,...
Nextdoor
Neighbors
(word of mouth)
Email and/or
text messages
Nixle
Local TV news
Local online
news
Other (please
specify)
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Social Media (Facebook, Twitter)
Nextdoor
Neighbors (word of mouth)
Email and/or text messages
Nixle
Local TV news
Local online news
Other (please specify)
EXHIBIT A
397
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 19 / 22
40.29% 220
65.93% 360
31.87% 174
28.57% 156
50.18% 274
38.10% 208
7.33% 40
12.82% 70
Q15 Which incentives would encourage you to retrofit your home to protect against natural disasters? (Check all that apply)
Answered: 546 Skipped: 39
Total Respondents: 546
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Building
permit fee...
Insurance
premium...
Mortgage
discount
Low interest
loan
Free local
government...
Grant funding
None of the
above
Not applicable
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Building permit fee waiver
Insurance premium discount
Mortgage discount
Low interest loan
Free local government technical assistance
Grant funding
None of the above
Not applicable
EXHIBIT A
398
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 20 / 22
42.99% 233
16.24% 88
60.15% 326
20.11% 109
32.29% 175
Q16 If a natural disaster such as a large earthquake were to strike tomorrow... (Check all that apply)
Answered: 542 Skipped: 43
Total Respondents: 542
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
I feel
confident th...
I am unsure
how to prote...
I keep an
emergency ki...
I have
practiced an...
I am unsure
where I woul...
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
I feel confident that I know how to protect myself
I am unsure how to protect myself
I keep an emergency kit with spare food and water for myself and my family I have practiced an evacuation plan and/or know where I and my family would go if we needed to evacuate our home I am unsure where I would go if I needed to evacuate my home
EXHIBIT A
399
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 21 / 22
Q17 Please indicate how you feel about the following statement: (Check one)"It is the responsibility of government (local, state, and federal) to provide education and programs that promote citizen actions that will reduce exposure to the risks associated with natural hazards." Answered: 556 Skipped: 29
4.14%
23 6.29%
35 15.29%
85 40.47%
225
33.81%
188
556
3.94 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Strongly Di… Somewhat … Neutral Somewhat …
Strongly Ag…
Choose one:
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE
NEUTRAL SOMEWHAT
AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE
TOTAL WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
Choose
one:
EXHIBIT A
400
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Public Survey 22 / 22
Q18 OPTIONAL: If you want to receive information regarding emergency preparedness classes in the Tri-Valley area, please provide your email address.
Answered: 214 Skipped: 371
EXHIBIT A
401
Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
Appendix B. Summary of Federal and State
Agencies, Programs and Regulations
EXHIBIT A
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B-1
B. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES,
PROGRAMS AND REGULATIONS
Existing laws, ordinances, plans and programs at the federal and state level can support or impact hazard mitigation actions identified in this plan. Hazard mitigation plans are required to include a review and incorporation, if appropriate, of existing plans, studies, reports, and technical information as part of the planning process (44 CFR, Section 201.6(b)(3)). The following federal and state programs have been identified as programs that may interface with the actions identified in this plan. Each program enhances capabilities to implement mitigation actions or has a nexus with a mitigation action in this plan. Information presented in this section can be used to review local capabilities to implement the actions found in the jurisdictional annexes of Volume 2. Each planning partner has individually reviewed existing local plans, studies, reports, and technical information in its jurisdictional annex, presented in Volume 2.
FEDERAL
Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) seeks to prevent discrimination against people with disabilities in employment, transportation, public accommodation, communications, and government activities. Title II of the ADA deals with compliance with the Act in emergency management and disaster-related programs, services, and activities. It applies to state and local governments as well as third parties, including religious entities and private nonprofit organizations.
The ADA has implications for sheltering requirements and public notifications. During an emergency alert, officials must use a combination of warning methods to ensure that all community members have all necessary information. Those with hearing impairments may not hear radio, television, sirens, or other audible alerts, while those with visual impairments may not see flashing lights or other visual alerts. Two technical documents for shelter operators address physical accessibility needs of people with disabilities, as well as medical needs and service animals.
The ADA intersects with disaster preparedness programs in regard to transportation, social services, temporary housing, and rebuilding. Persons with disabilities may require additional assistance in evacuation and transit (e.g., vehicles with wheelchair lifts or paratransit buses). Evacuation and other response plans should address the unique needs of community members. Local governments may be interested in implementing a special-needs registry to identify the home addresses, contact information, and needs for community members who may require more assistance.
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Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan; Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan B-2
FEMA hazard mitigation project grant applications require full compliance with applicable federal acts. Any action identified in this plan that falls within the scope of this act will need to meet its requirements.
Bureau of Land Management
The U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) funds and coordinates wildfire management programs and structural fire management and prevention on BLM lands. BLM works closely with the Forest Service and state and local governments to coordinate fire safety activities. The Interagency Fire Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho serves as the center for this effort.
Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or nation origin and requires equal access to public places and employment. The Act is relevant to emergency management and hazard mitigation in that it prohibits local governments from favoring the needs of one population group over another.
Local government and emergency response must ensure the continued safety and well-being of all community members equally, to the extent possible. FEMA hazard mitigation project grant applications require full compliance with applicable federal acts. Any action identified in this plan that falls within the scope of this act will need to meet its requirements.
Clean Water Act
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) employs regulatory and non-regulatory tools to reduce direct pollutant discharges into waterways, finance municipal wastewater treatment facilities, and manage polluted runoff. These tools are employed to achieve the broader goal of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s surface waters so that they can support “the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water.”
Evolution of CWA programs over the last decade has included a shift from a program-by-program, source-by- source, and pollutant-by-pollutant approach to more holistic watershed-based strategies. Under the watershed approach, equal emphasis is placed on protecting healthy waters and restoring impaired ones. Numerous issues are addressed, not just those subject to CWA regulatory authority. Involvement of stakeholder groups in the development and implementation of strategies for achieving and maintaining water quality and other environmental goals is a hallmark of this approach.
The CWA is important to hazard mitigation in several ways. There are often permitting requirements for any construction within 200 feet of water of the United States, which may have implications for mitigation projects identified by a local jurisdiction. Additionally, CWA requirements apply to wetlands, which serve important functions related to preserving and protecting the natural and beneficial functions of floodplains and are linked with a community’s floodplain management program. Finally, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System is part of the CWA and addresses local stormwater management programs. Stormwater management plays a critical role in hazard mitigation by addressing urban drainage or localized flooding issues within jurisdictions.
FEMA hazard mitigation project grant applications require full compliance with applicable federal acts. Any action identified in this plan that falls within the scope of this act will need to meet its requirements.
EXHIBIT A
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B. Summary of Federal and State Agencies, Programs and Regulations B-3
Community Development Block Grant Disaster Resilience Program In response to disasters, Congress may appropriate additional funding for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Community Development Block Grant programs to be distributed as Disaster Recovery grants (CDBG-DR). These grants can be used to rebuild affected areas and provide seed money to start the recovery process. CDBG-DR assistance may fund a broad range of recovery activities, helping communities and neighborhoods that otherwise might not recover due to limited resources. CDBG-DR grants often supplement disaster programs of FEMA, the Small Business Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Housing and Urban Development generally awards noncompetitive, nonrecurring CDBG-DR grants by a formula that considers disaster recovery needs unmet by other federal disaster assistance programs. To be eligible for CDBG- DR funds, projects must meet the following criteria:
• Address a disaster-related impact (direct or indirect) in a presidentially declared county for the covered disaster
• Be a CDBG-eligible activity (according to regulations and waivers) • Meet a national objective.
Incorporating preparedness and mitigation into these actions is encouraged, as the goal is to rebuild in ways that are safer and stronger. CDBG-DR funding is a potential alternative source of funding for actions identified in this plan.
Community Rating System
The CRS is a voluntary program within the NFIP that encourages floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements. Flood insurance premiums are discounted to reflect the reduced flood risk resulting from community actions meeting the following three goals of the CRS:
• Reduce flood losses.
• Facilitate accurate insurance rating.
• Promote awareness of flood insurance.
For participating communities, flood insurance premium rates are discounted in increments of 5 percent. For example, a Class 1 community would receive a 45 percent premium discount, and a Class 9 community would receive a 5 percent discount. (Class 10 communities are those that do not participate in the CRS; they receive no discount.) The discount partially depends on location of the property. Properties outside the special flood hazard area receive smaller discounts: a 10-percent discount if the community is at Class 1 to 6 and a 5-percent discount if the community is at Class 7 to 9. The CRS classes for local communities are based on 18 creditable activities in the following categories:
• Public information
• Mapping and regulations
• Flood damage reduction
• Flood preparedness.
CRS activities can help to save lives and reduce property damage. Communities participating in the CRS represent a significant portion of the nation’s flood risk; over 66 percent of the NFIP’s policy base is located in
EXHIBIT A
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Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan; Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan B-4
these communities. Communities receiving premium discounts through the CRS range from small to large and represent a broad mixture of flood risks, including both coastal and riverine flood risks.
Disaster Mitigation Act
The DMA is the current federal legislation addressing hazard mitigation planning. It emphasizes planning for disasters before they occur. It specifically addresses planning at the local level, requiring plans to be in place before Hazard Mitigation Assistance grant funds are available to communities. This plan is designed to meet the requirements of DMA, improving eligibility for future hazard mitigation funds.
Emergency Relief for Federally Owned Roads Program
The U.S. Forest Service’s Emergency Relief for Federally Owned Roads Program was established to assist federal agencies with repair or reconstruction of tribal transportation facilities, federal lands transportation facilities, and other federally owned roads that are open to public travel and have suffered serious damage by a natural disaster over a wide area or by a catastrophic failure. The program funds both emergency and permanent repairs. Eligible activities under this program meet some of the goals and objectives for this plan and the program is a possible funding source for actions identified in this plan.
Emergency Watershed Program
The USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) administers the Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) Program, which responds to emergencies created by natural disasters. Eligibility for assistance is not dependent on a national emergency declaration. The program is designed to help people and conserve natural resources by relieving imminent hazards to life and property caused by floods, fires, windstorms, and other natural occurrences. EWP is an emergency recovery program. Financial and technical assistance are available for the following activities (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2018):
• Remove debris from stream channels, road culverts, and bridges • Reshape and protect eroded banks
• Correct damaged drainage facilities
• Establish cover on critically eroding lands
• Repair levees and structures
• Repair conservation practices.
This federal program could be a possible funding source for actions identified in this plan.
Endangered Species Act
The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted in 1973 to conserve species facing depletion or extinction and the ecosystems that support them. The act sets forth a process for determining which species are threatened and endangered and requires the conservation of the critical habitat in which those species live. The ESA provides broad protection for species of fish, wildlife and plants that are listed as threatened or endangered. Provisions are made for listing species, as well as for recovery plans and the designation of critical habitat for listed species. The ESA outlines procedures for federal agencies to follow when taking actions that may jeopardize listed species and
EXHIBIT A
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B. Summary of Federal and State Agencies, Programs and Regulations B-5
contains exceptions and exemptions. It is the enabling legislation for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Criminal and civil penalties are provided for violations of the ESA and the Convention.
Federal agencies must seek to conserve endangered and threatened species and use their authorities in furtherance of the ESA’s purposes. The ESA defines three fundamental terms:
• Endangered means that a species of fish, animal or plant is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” (For salmon and other vertebrate species, this may include subspecies and distinct population segments.)
• Threatened means that a species “is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.” Regulations may be less restrictive for threatened species than for endangered species. • Critical habitat means “specific geographical areas that are…essential for the conservation and management of a listed species, whether occupied by the species or not.” Five sections of the ESA are of critical importance to understanding it:
• Section 4: Listing of a Species—The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) is responsible for listing marine species; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for listing terrestrial and freshwater aquatic species. The agencies may initiate reviews for listings, or community members may petition for them. A listing must be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.” After a listing has been proposed, agencies receive comment and conduct further scientific reviews for 12 to 18 months, after which they must decide if the listing is warranted. Economic impacts cannot be considered in this decision, but it may include an evaluation of the adequacy of local and state protections. Critical habitat for the species may be designated at the time of listing.
• Section 7: Consultation—Federal agencies must ensure that any action they authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed or proposed species or adversely modify its critical habitat. This includes private and public actions that require a federal permit. Once a final listing is made, non-federal actions are subject to the same review, termed a “consultation.” If the listing agency finds that an action will “take” a species, it must propose mitigations or “reasonable and prudent” alternatives to the action; if the proponent rejects these, the action cannot proceed. • Section 9: Prohibition of Take—It is unlawful to “take” an endangered species, including killing or injuring it or modifying its habitat in a way that interferes with essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.
• Section 10: Permitted Take—Through voluntary agreements with the federal government that provide protections to an endangered species, a non-federal applicant may commit a take that would otherwise be prohibited as long as it is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity (such as developing land or building a road). These agreements often take the form of a “Habitat Conservation Plan.” • Section 11: Citizen Lawsuits—Civil actions initiated by any citizen can require the listing agency to enforce the ESA’s prohibition of taking or to meet the requirements of the consultation process.
FEMA hazard mitigation project grant applications require full compliance with applicable federal acts. Any action identified in this plan that falls within the scope of this act will need to meet its requirements.
EXHIBIT A
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Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan; Tri-Valley Local Hazard Mitigation Plan B-6
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Dam Safety Program The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) cooperates with a large number of federal and state agencies to ensure and promote dam safety. More than 3,000 dams are part of regulated hydroelectric projects in the FERC program. Two-thirds of these are more than 50 years old. As dams age, concern about their safety and integrity grows, so oversight and regular inspection are important. FERC inspects hydroelectric projects on an unscheduled basis to investigate the following:
• Potential dam safety problems
• Complaints about constructing and operating a project • Safety concerns related to natural disasters
• Issues concerning compliance with the terms and conditions of a license.
Every five years, an independent engineer approved by the FERC must inspect and evaluate projects with dams higher than 32.8 feet (10 meters), or with a total storage capacity of more than 2,000 acre-feet.
FERC monitors seismic research and applies it in performing structural analyses of hydroelectric projects. FERC also evaluates the effects of potential and actual large floods on the safety of dams. During and following floods, FERC visits dams and licensed projects, determines the extent of damage, if any, and directs any necessary studies or remedial measures the licensee must undertake. The FERC publication Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects guides the FERC engineering staff and licensees in evaluating dam safety.
The publication is frequently revised to reflect current information and methodologies.
FERC requires licensees to prepare emergency action plans and conducts training sessions on how to develop and test these plans. The plans outline an early warning system if there is an actual or potential sudden release of water from a dam due to failure. The plans include operational procedures that may be used, such as reducing reservoir levels and reducing downstream flows, as well as procedures for notifying affected community members and agencies responsible for emergency management. These plans are frequently updated and tested to ensure that everyone knows what to do in emergency situations.
Federal Wildfire Management Policy and Healthy Forests Restoration Act Federal Wildfire Management Policy and Healthy Forests Restoration Act (2003). These documents call for a single comprehensive federal fire policy for the Interior and Agriculture Departments (the agencies using federal fire management resources). They mandate community-based collaboration to reduce risks from wildfire.
National Dam Safety Act
Potential for catastrophic flooding due to dam failures led to passage of the National Dam Inspection Act in 1972, creation of the National Dam Safety Program in 1996, and reauthorization of the program through the Dam Safety Act in 2006. National Dam Safety Program, administered by FEMA requires a periodic engineering analysis of the majority of dams in the country; exceptions include the following:
• Dams under jurisdiction of the Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley Authority, or International Boundary and Water Commission
• Dams constructed pursuant to licenses issued under the Federal Power Act
EXHIBIT A
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B. Summary of Federal and State Agencies, Programs and Regulations B-7
• Dams that the Secretary of the Army determines do not pose any threat to human life or property.
The goal of this FEMA-monitored effort is to identify and mitigate the risk of dam failure so as to protect lives and property of the public. The National Dam Safety Program is a partnership among the states, federal agencies, and other stakeholders that encourages individual and community responsibility for dam safety. Under FEMA’s leadership, state assistance funds have allowed all participating states to improve their programs through increased inspections, emergency action planning, and purchases of needed equipment. FEMA has also expanded existing and initiated new training programs. Grant assistance from FEMA provides support for improvement of dam safety programs that regulate most of the dams in the United States.
National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions, alongside technical and economic considerations.
The National Environmental Policy Act established the Council on Environmental Quality, whose regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) set standards for compliance. Consideration and decision-making regarding environmental impacts must be documented in an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment. Environmental impact assessment requires the evaluation of reasonable alternatives to a proposed action, solicitation of input from organizations and individuals that could be affected, and an unbiased presentation of direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts. FEMA hazard mitigation project grant applications require full compliance with applicable federal acts. Any action identified in this plan that falls within the scope of this act will need to meet its requirements.
National Fire Plan
The 2001 National Fire Plan was developed based on the National Fire Policy. A major aspect of the National Fire Plan is joint risk reduction planning and implementation carried out by federal, state and local agencies and communities. The National Fire Plan presented a comprehensive strategy in five key initiatives:
• Firefighting—Be adequately prepared to fight fires each fire season. • Rehabilitation and Restoration—Restore landscapes and rebuild communities damaged by wildfires. • Hazardous Fuel Reduction—Invest in projects to reduce fire risk. • Community Assistance—Work directly with communities to ensure adequate protection. • Accountability—Be accountable and establish adequate oversight, coordination, program development, and monitoring for performance.
National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) makes federally backed flood insurance available to homeowners, renters, and business owners in participating communities that enact floodplain regulations. Participation and good standing under NFIP are prerequisites to grant funding eligibility under the Robert T. Stafford Act.
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Flood Study and Mapping
For most participating communities, FEMA has prepared a detailed Flood Insurance Study. The study presents water surface elevations for floods of various magnitudes, including the 1-percent-annual-chance flood and the
0.2-percent-annual-chance flood.
Base flood elevations and the boundaries of the flood hazard areas are shown on Flood Insurance Rate Maps, which are the principle tool for identifying the extent and location of the flood hazard. Flood Insurance Rate Maps are the most detailed and consistent data source available, and for many communities they represent the minimum area of oversight under the local floodplain management program. Structures permitted or built in a jurisdiction before its first flood map was approved are called “pre-FIRM” structures, and structures built afterwards are called “post-FIRM.” The insurance rate is different for the two types of structures. In recent years, Flood Insurance Rate Maps have been digitized as Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps, which are more accessible to community members, local governments and stakeholders.
Requirements for Development Regulations
NFIP participants must, at a minimum, regulate development in floodplain areas in accordance with NFIP criteria.
Before issuing a permit to build in a floodplain, participating jurisdictions must ensure that three criteria are met:
• New buildings and those undergoing substantial improvements must, at a minimum, be elevated to protect against damage by the 1-percent-annual-chance flood. • New floodplain development must not aggravate existing flood problems or increase damage to other properties.
• New floodplain development must exercise a reasonable and prudent effort to reduce its adverse impacts on threatened salmonid species.
NFIP participation is limited to local governments that possess permit authority and have the ability to adopt and enforce regulations that govern land use. This does not typically apply to special purpose districts.
Repetitive Loss Properties and Areas
A repetitive loss property is defined by FEMA as an NFIP-insured property that has experienced any of the following since 1978, regardless of any changes in ownership:
• Four or more paid losses in excess of $1,000
• Two paid losses in excess of $1,000 within any rolling 10-year period • Three or more paid losses that equal or exceed the current value of the insured property.
Repetitive loss properties make up 1 to 2 percent of flood insurance policies in force nationally, yet they account for 40 percent of the nation’s flood insurance claim payments. The government has instituted programs encouraging communities to identify and mitigate the causes of repetitive losses. A recent report on repetitive losses by the National Wildlife Federation found that 20 percent of these properties are outside any mapped 100- year floodplain. The key identifiers for repetitive loss properties are the existence of flood insurance policies and claims paid by the policies.
FEMA-sponsored programs, such as the CRS, require participating communities to identify repetitive loss areas.
A repetitive loss area is the portion of a floodplain holding structures that FEMA has identified as meeting the
EXHIBIT A
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definition of repetitive loss. Identifying repetitive loss areas helps to identify structures that are at risk but are not on FEMA’s list of repetitive loss structures because no flood insurance policy was in force at the time of loss.
National Incident Management System
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a systematic approach for government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together to manage incidents involving hazards. The NIMS provides a flexible but standardized set of incident management practices. Incidents typically begin and end locally, and they are managed at the lowest possible geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level. In some cases, success depends on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions, levels of government, functional agencies, and emergency responder disciplines. These cases necessitate coordination across a spectrum of organizations.
Communities using NIMS follow a comprehensive national approach that improves the effectiveness of emergency management and response personnel across the full spectrum of potential hazards (including natural hazards, technological hazards, and human-caused hazards) regardless of size or complexity.
Although participation is voluntary, federal departments and agencies are required to make adoption of NIMS by local and state jurisdictions a condition to receive federal preparedness grants and awards. The content of this plan is considered to be a viable support tool for any phase of emergency management. The NIMS program is considered as a response function, and information in this hazard mitigation plan can support the implementation and update of all NIMS-compliant plans within the planning area.
National Landslide Preparedness Act
The 2021 National Landslide Preparedness Act authorized a national landslide hazards reduction program and a 3D elevation program within the USGS. This broadened the existing Landslide Hazards Program (under the Natural Hazards Mission Area) and the 3D Elevation Program (under the National Geospatial Program). The act required coordination among federal agencies through an Interagency Coordinating Committee on Landslide Hazards representing USGS and other agencies. The act calls for development of a national strategy for landslide loss reduction and a publicly accessible national landslide database of landslide hazard and risk.
Presidential Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Management Executive Order 11988 requires federal agencies to avoid to the extent possible the long and short-term adverse impacts associated with the occupancy and modification of floodplains and to avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain development wherever there is a practicable alternative. It requires federal agencies to provide leadership and take action to reduce the risk of flood loss, minimize the impact of floods on human safety, health, and welfare, and restore and preserve the natural and beneficial values of floodplains. The requirements apply to the following activities:
• Acquiring, managing, and disposing of federal lands and facilities • Providing federally undertaken, financed, or assisted construction and improvements • Conducting federal activities and programs affecting land use, including but not limited to water and related land resources planning, regulation, and licensing.
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Presidential Executive Order 11990, Protection of Wetlands Executive Order 11990 requires federal agencies to provide leadership and take action to minimize the destruction, loss or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial values of wetlands. The requirements apply to the following activities:
• Acquiring, managing, and disposing of federal lands and facilities • Providing federally undertaken, financed, or assisted construction and improvements • Conducting federal activities and programs affecting land use, including but not limited to water and related land resources planning, regulation, and licensing.
All actions identified in this plan will seek full compliance with all applicable presidential executive orders.
Rural Development Program
The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development Program is to help improve the economy and quality of life in rural America. The program provides project financing and technical assistance to help rural communities provide the infrastructure needed by rural businesses, community facilities, and households. The program addresses rural America’s need for basic services, such as clean running water, sewage and waste disposal, electricity, and modern telecommunications and broadband. Loans and competitive grants are offered for various community and economic development projects and programs, such as the development of essential community facilities including fire stations. This program is a potential source of funding for actions identified in this plan.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Dam Safety Program
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers operates and maintains approximately 700 dams nationwide. It is also responsible for safety inspections of some federal and non-federal dams in the United States that meet the size and storage limitations specified in the National Dam Safety Act. The Corps has inventoried dams; surveyed each state and federal agency’s capabilities, practices and regulations regarding design, construction, operation and maintenance of the dams; and developed guidelines for inspection and evaluation of dam safety. The Corps maintains the National Inventory of Dams, which contains information about a dam’s location, size, purpose, type, last inspection and regulatory status.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Flood Hazard Management
The following U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authorities and programs related to flood hazard management:
• The Floodplain Management Services program offers 100-percent federally funded technical services such as development and interpretation of site-specific data related to the extent, duration and frequency of flooding. Special studies may be conducted to help a community understand and respond to flood risk.
These may include flood hazard evaluation, flood warning and preparedness, or flood modeling. • For more extensive studies, the Corps of Engineers offers a cost-shared program called Planning Assistance to States and Tribes. Studies under this program generally range from $25,000 to $100,000 with the local jurisdiction providing 50 percent of the cost.
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• The Corps of Engineers has several cost-shared programs (typically 65 percent federal and 35 percent non-federal) aimed at developing, evaluating and implementing structural and non-structural capital projects to address flood risks at specific locations or within a specific watershed:
➢ The Continuing Authorities Program for smaller-scale projects includes Section 205 for Flood Control, with a $7 million federal limit and Section 14 for Emergency Streambank Protection with a $1.5 million federal limit. These can be implemented without specific authorization from Congress. ➢ Larger scale studies, referred to as General Investigations, and projects for flood risk management, for ecosystem restoration or to address other water resource issues, can be pursued through a specific authorization from Congress and are cost-shared, typically at 65 percent federal and 35 percent non- federal.
➢ Watershed management planning studies can be specifically authorized and are cost-shared at 50 percent federal and 50 percent non-federal.
• The Corps of Engineers provides emergency response assistance during and following natural disasters.
Public Law 84-99 enables the Corps to assist state and local authorities in flood fight activities and cost share in the repair of flood protective structures. Assistance is provided in the flowing categories:
➢ Preparedness—The Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act establishes an emergency fund for preparedness for emergency response to natural disasters; for flood fighting and rescue operations; for rehabilitation of flood control and hurricane protection structures. Funding for Corps of Engineers emergency response under this authority is provided by Congress through the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act. Disaster preparedness activities include coordination, planning, training and conduct of response exercises with local, state and federal agencies. ➢ Response Activities—Public Law 84-99 allows the Corps of Engineers to supplement state and local entities in flood fighting urban and other non-agricultural areas under certain conditions (Engineering Regulation 500-1-1 provides specific details). All flood fight efforts require a project cooperation agreement signed by the public sponsor and the sponsor must remove all flood fight material after the flood has receded. Public Law 84-99 also authorizes emergency water support and drought assistance in certain situations and allows for “advance measures” assistance to prevent or reduce flood damage conditions of imminent threat of unusual flooding.
➢ Rehabilitation—Under Public Law 84-99, an eligible flood protection system can be rehabilitated if damaged by a flood event. The flood system would be restored to its pre-disaster status at no cost to the federal system owner, and at 20-percent cost to the eligible non-federal system owner. All systems considered eligible for Public Law 84-99 rehabilitation assistance have to be in the Rehabilitation and Inspection Program prior to the flood event. Acceptable operation and maintenance by the public levee sponsor are verified by levee inspections conducted by the Corps on a regular basis. The Corps has the responsibility to coordinate levee repair issues with interested federal, state, and local agencies following natural disaster events where flood control works are damaged.
These authorities and programs are all available to the planning partners to support any related mitigation actions.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams Program The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams Program was officially implemented in 1978 with passage of the Reclamation Safety of Dams Act (Public Law 95-578). This act was amended in 1984 under Public Law 98-404, in 2000 under Public Law 106-377, in 2002 under Public Law 107-117, and in 2004 under Public Law 108-439. Program development and administration of dam safety activities is the responsibility of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Dam Safety Office located in Denver, Colorado.
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Dams must be operated and maintained in a safe manner, ensured through inspections for safety deficiencies, analyses utilizing current technologies and designs, and corrective actions if needed based on current engineering practices. In addition, future evaluations should include assessments of benefits foregone with the loss of a dam.
For example, a failed dam can no longer provide needed fish and wildlife benefits.
The primary emphasis of the Safety Evaluation of Existing Dams program is to perform site evaluations and to identify potential safety deficiencies on Bureau of Reclamation and other Interior Department dams. The basic objective is to quickly identify dams which pose an increased threat to the public, and to quickly complete the related analyses in order to expedite corrective action decisions and safeguard the public and associated resources.
The program focuses on evaluating and implementing actions to resolve safety concerns at Bureau of Reclamation dams. Under this program, the Bureau of Reclamation completes studies and identifies and implements needed corrective action on Bureau of Reclamation dams. The selected course of action relies on assessments of risks and liabilities with environmental and public involvement input to the decision-making process.
U.S. Fire Administration
There are federal agencies that provide technical support to fire agencies/organizations. For example, the U.S.
Fire Administration, which is a part of FEMA, provides leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support for fire agencies and organizations.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service fire management strategy uses prescribed fire to maintain early successional fire-adapted grasslands and other ecological communities throughout the National Wildlife Refuge system.
STATE
AB 9: Fire safety: wildfires: fire adapted communities.
This bill establishes the Regional Forest and Fire Capacity Program to support regional leadership, build local and regional capacity, and develop, prioritize, and implement strategies and projects that create fire-adapted communities by improving watershed health, forest health, community wildfire preparedness, and fire resilience.
AB 32: The California Global Warming Solutions Act
This bill identifies the following potential adverse impacts of global warming:
“… the exacerbation of air quality problems, a reduction in the quality and supply of water to the state from the Sierra snowpack, a rise in sea levels resulting in the displacement of thousands of coastal businesses and residences, damage to marine ecosystems and the natural environment, and an increase in the incidences of infectious diseases, asthma, and other human health-related problems.” AB 32 establishes a state goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 (a reduction of approximately 25 percent from forecast emission levels), with further reductions to follow. The law requires the state Air Resources Board to do the following:
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• Establish a program to track and report greenhouse gas emissions. • Approve a scoping plan for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions from sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
• Adopt early reduction measures to begin moving forward. • Adopt, implement and enforce regulations—including market mechanisms such as “cap and-trade” programs—to ensure that the required reductions occur.
The Air Resources Board has adopted a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit and an emissions inventory, along with requirements to measure, track, and report greenhouse gas emissions by the industries it determined to be significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
AB 38: Fire Safety: Low-Cost Retrofits: Regional Capacity Review: Wildfire Mitigation
Requires the seller of any real property located in a high or very fire hazard severity zone to provide a disclosure notice, as specified, to the buyer with information relating to fire hardening improvements on the property.
Requires the California Natural Resources Agency, in consultation with the State Fire Marshal and the Forest Management Task Force, to review the regional capacity of each county that contains a very high fire hazard severity zone to improve forest health, fire resilience, and safety.
Requires the California Office of Emergency Services to enter into a joint powers agreement with the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection to administer a comprehensive wildfire mitigation and assistance program to encourage cost-effective structure hardening and facilitate vegetation management, contingent upon appropriation by the Legislature.
AB 70: Flood Liability
This bill provides that a city or county may be required to contribute a fair and reasonable share to compensate for property damage caused by a flood to the extent that it has increased the state’s exposure to liability for property damage by unreasonably approving new development in a previously undeveloped area that is protected by a state flood control project, unless the city or county meets specified requirements.
AB 162: Flood Planning
This California State Assembly Bill passed in 2007 requires cities and counties to address flood-related matters in the land use, conservation, and safety and housing elements of their general plans. The land use element must identify and annually review the areas covered by the general plan that are subject to flooding as identified in floodplain mapping by either FEMA or the state California Department of Water Resources. During the next revision of the housing element on or after January 1, 2009, the conservation element of the general plan must identify rivers, creeks, streams, flood corridors, riparian habitat, and land that may accommodate floodwater for the purpose of groundwater recharge and stormwater management. The safety element must identify information regarding flood hazards, including:
• Flood hazard zones
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• Maps published by FEMA, the California Department of Water Resources, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Central Valley Flood Protection Board, and the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)
• Historical data on flooding
• Existing and planned development in flood hazard zones.
The general plan must establish goals, policies and objectives related to flooding risks, including:
• Avoiding or minimizing the risks of flooding new development • Evaluating whether new development should be located in flood hazard zones • Identifying construction methods to minimize damage.
AB 162 establishes goals, policies and objectives related to flooding risks. It establishes procedures for the determination of available land suitable for urban development, which may exclude lands where FEMA or the California Department of Water Resources has concluded that the flood management infrastructure is not adequate to avoid the risk of flooding.
AB 267: California Environmental Quality Act: Exemption: Prescribed Fire, Thinning, and Fuel Reduction Projects
Current law, until January 1, 2023, exempts from the requirements of CEQA prescribed fire, thinning, or fuel reduction projects undertaken on federal lands to reduce the risk of high-severity wildfire that have been reviewed under the federal National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Current law requires the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, beginning December 31, 2019, and annually thereafter until January 1, 2023, to report to the relevant policy committees of the Legislature the number of times the exemption was used. This extends the exemption from CEQA and the requirement on the department to report to the relevant policy committees of the Legislature to January 1, 2026.
AB 380: Forestry: Priority Fuel Reduction Projects
On March 22, 2019, the Governor issued a proclamation of a state of emergency directing the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection to implement fuel reduction projects for communities at greatest risk of wildfire to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire. The proclamation of a state of emergency exempts the identified fuel reduction projects from various legal requirements, including, among others, requirements regarding public contracting for those projects, requirements for environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act for those projects, and licensure requirements for individuals conducting certain activities for those projects.
This bill requires the department, before December 31, 2022, and before December 31 of each year thereafter, to identify priority fuel reduction projects, as provided. The bill exempts the identified priority fuel reduction projects from legal requirements in a similar manner as provided in the proclamation of a state of emergency described above.
AB 431: Forestry: Timber Harvesting Plans: Defensible Space: Exemptions The Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 prohibits a person from conducting timber operations, as defined, unless a timber harvesting plan prepared by a registered professional forester has been submitted to, and approved
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by, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The act authorizes the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection to exempt from some or all of those provisions of the act a person engaging in specified forest management activities, as prescribed, including, only until January 1, 2022, the cutting or removal of trees on the person’s property in compliance with specified defensible space requirements. This bill extends to January 1, 2026, the board’s authorization to exempt a person engaging in the cutting or removal of trees on the person’s property in compliance with the specified defensible space requirements.
AB 497: Forestry and Fire Protection: Local Assistance Grant Program: Fire Prevention Activities: Street and Road Vegetation Management Under existing law, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection is required to develop, implement, and administer forest improvement and fire prevention programs in the state. Existing law requires the department to establish a local assistance grant program for fire prevention activities in California. Existing law requires the department to prioritize, to the extent feasible, projects that are multiyear efforts and to prioritize grant applications from specified local agencies.
This bill appropriated $25,000,000 to provide the local assistance grants. It requires the department to prioritize projects that manage vegetation along streets and roads to prevent the ignition of wildfire and that require the funds for purposes of purchasing equipment necessary for the project.
AB 575: Civil Liability: Prescribed Burning Activities: Gross Negligence This bill provides that a private entity engaging in a prescribed burning activity that is supervised by a person certified as burn boss is liable for damages to a third party only if the prescribed burning activity was carried out in a grossly negligent manner.
AB 642: Wildfires
This omnibus fire prevention bill makes changes to support cultural and prescribed fire, including the creation of a Cultural Burning Liaison at the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and requires a proposal for creating a prescribed fire training center in California. The Act requires the Director of Forestry and Fire Protection to identify areas in the state as moderate and high fire hazard severity zones and to classify areas into fire hazard severity zones based on additional factors including possible lightning caused ignition. The bill requires a local agency, within 30 days of receiving a transmittal from the director that identifies fire hazard severity zones, to make the information available for public comment.
AB 747: Required Information for General Plan Safety Elements This bill requires California communities with general plans to address evacuation routes in the safety element of the general plan. Information on the evacuation routes and their capacity, safety and viability under a range of emergency scenarios must be provided. For communities that have not adopted a local hazard mitigation plan, the safety element must be updated with this information by January 1, 2022. For those with a local hazard mitigation plan, the requirement applies upon the next revision of the hazard mitigation plan on or after January 1, 2022.
Communities that have adopted a local hazard mitigation plan, emergency operations plan, or other document that fulfills the goals and objectives of this law may comply with this requirement by summarizing and incorporating by reference the other plan or document in the safety element.
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In subsequent revisions to the safety element, communities also will be required to identify new information relating to flood and fire hazards and climate adaptation and resiliency strategies applicable to the city or county that was not available during the previous revision of the safety element. These subsequent updates must occur upon each revision of the general plan housing element or local hazard mitigation plan and not less than once every eight years.
AB 800: Wildfires: Local General Plans: Safety Elements: Fire Hazard Severity Zones
Existing law requires the Director of Forestry and Fire Protection to identify areas of the state as very high fire hazard severity zones, and requires each planning agency to prepare, and the legislative body of each county and city to adopt, a comprehensive, long-term general plan, including a safety element, for the physical development of the county or city. Existing law requires each city or county that contains a very high fire hazard severity zone to submit the draft element of, or draft amendment to the safety element its general plan to the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection and to every local agency that provides fire protection to territory in the city or county at least 90 days before adoption or amendment.
This requires the director to also identify areas of the state as moderate and high fire hazard severity zones. It requires the draft element of, or draft amendment to, the safety element of a county or city’s general plan to be submitted to the state board and to every local agency that provides fire protection to territory in the city or county at least 90 days before the adoption or amendment to the safety element of its general plan for each city or county that contains a moderate or high fire hazard severity zone.
Existing law requires the state board and authorizes a local agency to review the draft or an existing safety element and recommend changes to the planning agency regarding uses of land and policies in state responsibility areas and very high fire hazard severity zones and regarding methods and strategies for wildland fire risk reduction and prevention within state responsibility areas and very high fire hazard severity zones.
This bill also requires the state board and authorizes a local agency to review the draft or an existing safety element and recommend changes to the planning agency regarding uses of land and policies in moderate and high fire hazard severity zones and regarding methods and strategies for wildland fire risk reduction and prevention within moderate and high fire hazard severity zones.
The existing Subdivision Map Act vests the authority to regulate and control the design and improvement of subdivisions in the legislative body of a local agency, and sets forth procedures governing the local agency’s processing, approval, conditional approval, or disapproval, and filing of tentative, final, and parcel maps, and the modification thereof. The act generally requires a subdivider to file a tentative map or vesting tentative map with the local agency, and requires the local agency to approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove the map within a specified time period. Before approving a tentative map, or a parcel map for which a tentative map was not required, for an area located in a state responsibility area or a very high fire hazard severity zone, existing law requires a legislative body of a county to make specified findings. Existing law requires a legislative body of a county to transmit these findings to the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection.
This requires a legislative body of a county to make specified findings before approving a tentative map, or a parcel map for which a tentative map was not required, for areas located in moderate and high fire hazard severity zones, and requires these findings to be transmitted to the state board.
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By requiring new duties on a county, the bill imposes a state-mandated local program. The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement. This bill provides that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to statutory provisions.
AB 1255: Fire Prevention: Fire Risk Reduction Guidance: Local Assistance Grants
This bill requires the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, in coordination with the Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency, to facilitate regional, habitat-specific, and area-specific approaches to fire risk reduction, prevention, and restoration of projects that improve community safety, protect sites and structures, restore burned habitat, reduce catastrophic wildfires, and protect natural resources. It requires the department to develop policies, funding programs for which the funding shall be contingent upon subsequent appropriation in the annual Budget Act or a similar statute for this purpose, and relevant program guidelines that promote specified objectives. The bill requires various state entities to establish grant programs, for which funding shall be contingent upon subsequent appropriation, to fulfill the specified objectives.
AB 1295: Residential Development Agreements: Very High Fire Risk Areas Current law requires the Director of Forestry and Fire Protection to identify areas in the state as very high fire hazard severity zones based on the severity of fire hazard that is expected to prevail in those areas and requires each local agency to designate, by ordinance, the very high fire hazard severity zones in its jurisdiction. Current law additionally requires the director to classify lands within state responsibility areas into fire hazard severity zones. This bill prohibits the legislative body of a city or county from entering into a residential development agreement for property in a very high fire risk area. The bill defines “very high fire risk area” for these purposes to mean a very high fire hazard severity zone designated by a local agency or a fire hazard severity zone classified by the director.
AB 1439: Property Insurance Discounts
This bill requires a residential property insurance policy to include a discount if a local government of the jurisdiction where the insured property is located funds a local wildfire protection or mitigation program. Because the bill mandates discounts for specified residential property insurance policies, thus affecting the Insurance Commissioner’s consideration of a rate, the bill would amend Proposition 103.
AB 1500: Safe Drinking Water, Wildfire Prevention, Drought Preparation, Flood Protection, Extreme Heat Mitigation, and Workforce Development Bond Act of 2022
If approved by the voters, this bill would authorize the issuance of bonds in the amount of $6,700,000,000 pursuant to the State General Obligation Bond Law to finance projects for safe drinking water, wildfire prevention, drought preparation, flood protection, extreme heat mitigation, and workforce development programs.
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AB 2140: General Plans—Safety Element
This bill provides that the state may allow for more than 75 percent of public assistance funding under the California Disaster Assistance Act only if the local agency is in a jurisdiction that has adopted a local hazard mitigation plan as part of the safety element of its general plan. The local hazard mitigation plan needs to include elements specified in this legislation. In addition, this bill requires Cal OES to give preference for federal mitigation funding to cities and counties that have adopted local hazard mitigation plans. The intent of the bill is to encourage cities and counties to create and adopt hazard mitigation plans.
AB 2800: Climate Change—Infrastructure Planning
This California State Assembly bill passed in 2016 and until July 1, 2020, requires state agencies to take into account the current and future impacts of climate change when planning, designing, building, operating, maintaining, and investing in state infrastructure. The bill, by July 1, 2017, and until July 1, 2020, requires an agency to establish a Climate-Safe Infrastructure Working Group to examine how to integrate scientific data concerning projected climate change impacts into state infrastructure engineering.
Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act
The Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act was enacted in 1972 to mitigate the hazard of surface faulting to structures for human occupancy. The Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act’s main purpose is to prevent construction of buildings used for human occupancy on the surface trace of active faults. Before a new project is permitted, cities and counties require a geologic investigation to demonstrate that proposed buildings will not be constructed on active faults. The act addresses only the hazard of surface fault rupture and is not directed toward other earthquake hazards, such as liquefaction or seismically induced landslides. The law requires the State of California Geologist to establish regulatory zones around the surface traces of active faults and to issue appropriate maps. The maps are distributed to all affected cities, counties, and state agencies for their use in planning and controlling new or renewed construction. Local agencies must regulate most development projects within the zones. Projects include all land divisions and most structures for human occupancy. All seismic hazard mitigation actions identified in this plan will seek full compliance with the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act.
Board of Forestry and Fire Protection Fire Safe Regulations California’s Board of Forestry and Fire Protection is authorized to adopt regulations to implement specified programs. To become effective, the Office of Administrative Law must approve these regulations. Once adopted, Board regulations are placed in Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations. The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection then implements the regulations.
Since 1991, the Board’s Fire Safe Regulations have set the floor for fire safety standards for perimeters and access to all residential, commercial, and industrial building construction in state responsibility areas. They address road standards for fire equipment access, standards for road and building signs, minimum private water supplies for emergency fire use, and fuel breaks and greenbelts. Starting on July 1, 2021, these requirements will also apply in the local responsibility areas and will address construction on ridgelines.
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California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CAL FIRE has responsibility for wildfires in areas of the county that are not under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service or a local fire organization, including lands designated as State Responsibility Areas. CAL FIRE also has fire protection responsibilities by contract and mutual aid agreements. For example, CAL FIRE provides year- round fire protection under Amador Plan agreements with certain local government agencies (Public Resources Code §4144). Through these agreements, CAL FIRE provides local structural and wildfire protection or dispatch services to a community and maintains a staffing level that otherwise would be available only during the fire season. The local entity pays the additional cost of the service.
California Department of Parks and Recreation (State Parks) State Parks manages portions of the California coastline including coastal wetlands, estuaries, beaches, and dune systems. The State Parks Resources Management Division has limited wildfire protection resources available to suppress fires on State Park lands.
California Department of Water Resources
In California, the Department of Water Resources is the coordinating agency for floodplain management. The department works with FEMA and local governments by providing grants and technical assistance, evaluating community floodplain management programs, reviewing local floodplain ordinances, participating in statewide flood hazard mitigation planning, and facilitating annual statewide workshops. Compliance is monitored by FEMA regional staff and by the Department of Water Resources.
California Division of Safety of Dams
California’s Division of Safety of Dams (a division of the Department of Water Resources) monitors the dam safety program at the state level and maintains a working list of dams in the state. When a new dam is proposed, Division engineers and geologists inspect the site and the subsurface. Upon submittal of an application, the Division reviews the plans and specifications prepared by the owner to ensure that the dam is designed to meet minimum requirements and that the design is appropriate for the known geologic conditions. After approval of the application, the Division inspects all aspects of the construction to ensure that the work is done in accordance with the approved plans and specifications. After construction, the Division inspects each dam to ensure that it is performing as intended and is not developing problems. The Division periodically reviews the stability of dams and their major appurtenances in light of improved design approaches and requirements, as well as new findings regarding earthquake hazards and hydrologic estimates in California. Over 1,200 dams are inspected by Division engineers on a yearly schedule to ensure performance and maintenance of dams (California Department of Water Resources 2021b).
California Environmental Quality Act
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was passed in 1970, shortly after the federal government enacted the National Environmental Policy Act, to institute a statewide policy of environmental protection. CEQA requires state and local agencies in California to follow a protocol of analysis and public disclosure of the potential environmental impacts of development projects. CEQA makes environmental protection a mandatory part of every California state and local agency’s decision-making process.
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CEQA establishes a statewide environmental policy and mandates actions all state and local agencies must take to advance the policy. Jurisdictions conduct analysis of the project to determine if there are potentially significant environmental impacts, identify mitigation measures, and possible project alternatives by preparing environmental reports for projects that requires CEQA review. This environmental review is required before an agency takes action on any policy, program, or project. Any project action identified in this plan will seek full CEQA compliance upon implementation.
California Fire Alliance
The California Fire Alliance (CFA) was established in response to directives from the 2001 National Fire Plan.
The CFA pursues four strategies to deal with the National Fire Plan’s community assistance initiative:
• Work with communities at risk from wildfires to develop community-based planning leadership and facilitate the development of community fire loss mitigation plans, which transcend jurisdiction and ownership boundaries.
• Assist communities in development of fire loss mitigation planning, education and projects to reduce the threat of wildfire losses on public and private lands.
• Develop an information and education outreach plan to increase awareness of wildfire protection program opportunities available to communities at risk.
• Work collaboratively to develop, modify and maintain a comprehensive list of communities at risk.
California Fire Plan
The State Board of Forestry and CAL FIRE have prepared a comprehensive update of the California Fire Plan for wildfire protection. The planning process included defining a level of service measurement; considering assets at risk; incorporating the cooperative interdependent relationships of wildfire protection providers; providing for public stakeholder involvement; and creating a fiscal framework for policy analysis. The California Fire Plan’s overall goal is to reduce costs and losses from wildfire in the state by protecting assets at risk through pre-fire management and by reducing the spread of fire through more successful initial response.
California Fire Safe Council
In 1993, the statewide Fire Safe Council, consisting of private and public membership, was formed to educate and encourage Californians to plan and prepare for wildfires by reducing the risk of fire to property, communities, and natural/structural resources. In 2002, this group created a nonprofit organization and board of directors, called the California Fire Safe Council. The Council works with the California Fire Alliance to facilitate the distribution of National Fire Plan grants for wildfire risk reduction and education (www.grants.firesafecouncil.org). The Council also provides assistance to local Fire Safe Councils through its website (www.firesafecouncil.org), the distribution of educational materials, and technical assistance, primarily through regional representatives. More than 130 local Fire Safe Councils have formed in California to plan, coordinate, and implement fire prevention activities.
California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid Plan The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services Fire and Rescue Branch administers the California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid Plan. The agency provides guidance and procedures for agencies developing
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emergency operations plans, as well as training and technical support, primarily to overall emergency service organizations and urban search and rescue teams.
California General Planning Law
California state law requires that every county and city prepare and adopt a comprehensive long-range plan to serve as a guide for community development. The general plan expresses the community’s goals, visions, and policies relative to future land uses, both public and private. The general plan is mandated and prescribed by state law (Cal. Gov. Code §65300 et seq.), and forms the basis for most local government land use decision-making.
The plan must consist of an integrated, internally consistent set of goals, policies, and implementation measures.
In addition, the plan must focus on issues of the greatest concern to the community and be written in a clear and concise manner. City and county actions, such as those relating to land use allocations, annexations, zoning, subdivision and design review, redevelopment, and capital improvements, must be consistent with the plan.
California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan
Under the DMA, California must adopt a federally approved state multi-hazard mitigation plan to be eligible for certain disaster assistance and mitigation funding. The intent of the State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan is to reduce or prevent injury and damage from hazards in the state through the following:
Documenting statewide hazard mitigation planning in California Describing strategies and priorities for future mitigation activities Facilitating the integration of local and tribal hazard mitigation planning activities into statewide efforts Meeting state and federal statutory and regulatory requirements.
The plan is an annex to the State Emergency Plan, and it identifies past and present mitigation activities, current policies and programs, and mitigation strategies for the future. It also establishes hazard mitigation goals and objectives. The plan will be reviewed and updated annually to reflect changing conditions and new information, especially information on local planning activities.
Under 44 CFR Section 201.6, local hazard mitigation plans must be consistent with their state’s hazard mitigation plan.
California Residential Mitigation Program
The California Residential Mitigation Program was established in 2011 to help Californians strengthen their homes against damage from earthquakes. The program is a joint powers authority created by Cal OES and the California Earthquake Authority, which is a not-for-profit, publicly managed, privately funded provider of home earthquake insurance to California homeowners and renters.
Earthquake Brace + Bolt was developed to help homeowners lessen the potential for damage to their houses during an earthquake. A residential seismic retrofit strengthens an existing older house, making it more resistant to earthquake activity such as ground shaking and soil failure. The seismic retrofitting involves bolting the house to its foundation and adding bracing around the perimeter of the crawl space. Most homeowners hire a contractor to do the retrofit work, and owners of houses in ZIP Codes with house characteristics suitable for this type of retrofit are eligible for up to $3,000 toward the cost. A typical retrofit by a contractor may cost between $3,000
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and $7,000, depending on the location and size of the house, contractor fees, and the amount of materials and work involved. If the homeowner is an experienced do-it-yourselfer, a retrofit can cost less than $3,000.
California State Building Code
California Code of Regulations Title 24 (CCR Title 24), also known as the California Building Standards Code, is a compilation of building standards from three sources:
• Building standards that have been adopted by state agencies without change from building standards contained in national model codes
• Building standards that have been adopted and adapted from the national model code standards to meet California conditions
• Building standards authorized by the California legislature that constitute extensive additions not covered by the model codes adopted to address particular California concerns.
The state Building Standards Commission is authorized by California Building Standards Law (Health and Safety Code Sections 18901 through 18949.6) to administer the processes related to the adoption, approval, publication, and implementation of California’s building codes. These building codes serve as the basis for the design and construction of buildings in California. The national model code standards adopted into Title 24 apply to all occupancies in California, except for modifications adopted by state agencies and local governing bodies. Since 1989, the Building Standards Commission has published new editions of Title 24 every three years.
On January 1, 2014, California Building Code Accessibility Standards found in Chapter 11B incorporated the 2010 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Standards as the model accessibility code for California. The purpose was to ensure consistency with federal guidelines. As a result of this incorporation, the California standards will fully implement and include 2010 ADA Standards within the California Building Code while maintaining enhanced levels of accessibility already provided by existing California accessibility regulations. All planning partners that have building code and permit authority have adopted building codes that are in full compliance with the California State Building Code.
Disadvantaged and Low-income Communities Investments
Senate Bill (SB) 535 directs state and local agencies to make investments that benefit California’s disadvantaged communities. It also directs the California Environmental Protection Agency to identify disadvantaged communities for the purposes of these investments based on geographic, socio-economic, public health, and environmental hazard criteria. Assembly Bill (AB) 1550 increased the percent of funds for projects located in disadvantaged communities from 10 to 25 percent and added a focus on investments in low-income communities and households. This program is a potential alternative source of funding for actions identified in this plan.
Division of the State Architect’s AB 300 List of Seismically At-Risk Schools In 2002, California’s Division of the State Architect completed an inventory of public school buildings built before 1978 that identifies buildings with characteristics that might make them unsafe in future earthquakes. This inventory provides a list of potentially at‐risk schools known as the AB 300 list (the inventory was authorized by Assembly Bill 300 in 1999). Using available information on school buildings’ dates of construction, seismic retrofits, and structural systems (wood‐frame, concrete shear wall, or steel moment frame, etc.), the inventory
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categorized California public school buildings into one of two categories: those expected to perform well in future earthquakes; and those that are not expected to perform well and require more detailed seismic evaluation.
The Division of the State Architect recommends that public schools on this list undergo detailed seismic evaluations to determine if they pose life safety risks, but the state has neither required nor funded school districts to do this.
Governor’s Executive Order S-13-08
Governor’s Executive Order S-13-08 enhances the state’s management of climate impacts from sea level rise, increased temperatures, shifting precipitation and extreme weather events. There are four key actions in the executive order:
• Initiate California’s first statewide climate change adaptation strategy to assess expected climate change impacts, identify where California is most vulnerable, and recommend adaptation policies. This effort will improve coordination within state government so that better planning can more effectively address climate impacts on human health, the environment, the state’s water supply and the economy. • Request that the National Academy of Science establish an expert panel to report on sea level rise impacts in California, to inform state planning and development efforts. • Issue interim guidance to state agencies for how to plan for sea level rise in designated coastal and floodplain areas for new projects.
• Initiate a report on critical infrastructure projects vulnerable to sea level rise.
Office of the State Fire Marshal
The Office of the State Fire Marshal is a division of CAL FIRE that has a wide variety of fire safety and training responsibilities and provides technical support to fire agencies/organizations.
Senate Bill 92: Public Resources Portion of Biennial Budget Bill The State of California updated its requirements regarding emergency action plans (EAPs) via Senate Bill 92, which became effective in June 2017 as part of the state Legislature’s biennial budget process. The bill required dam owners to submit EAPs to Cal OES and the Department of Water Resources for approval by January 1, 2018 (for extremely high hazard dams), January 1, 2019 (for high-hazard dams), and January 1, 2021 (for significant hazard dams). The EAPs were to include the following (California Government Code Section 8589.5; Cal OES, 2018):
• Emergency notification flow charts
• Information on a four-step response process
• Description of agencies’ roles and actions in response to an emergency incident • Description of actions to be taken in advance of an emergency • Inundation maps
• Additional information such as revision records and distribution lists.
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After the EAPs are approved by the state, the law requires dam owners to send the approved EAPs to relevant stakeholders. Local public agencies can then adopt emergency procedures that incorporate the information in the EAP in a manner that conforms to local needs and includes methods and procedures for alerting and warning the public and other response and preparedness related items (State of California, 2018).
SB 92 also requires dams other than low-risk dams to have current inundation mapping, which must be updated every 10 years, or sooner if specific circumstances change. EAPs also must be updated every 10 years. It provides the Department of Water Resources with enforcement tools, including fines and operational restrictions for failure to comply. Cal OES is required by the law to work with state and federal agencies, dam owners, planners, and the public to make dam failure inundation maps available to community members interested in learning their dam failure inundation risk.
Senate Bill 97: Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Senate Bill 97, enacted in 2007, amends CEQA to clearly establish that greenhouse gas emissions and the effects of greenhouse gas emissions are appropriate subjects for CEQA analysis. It directs the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research to develop draft CEQA guidelines for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions or their effects by July 1, 2009, and directs the California Natural Resources Agency to certify and adopt the CEQA Guidelines by January 1, 2010.
Senate Bill 99: Evacuation Route Planning
Senate Bill 99, enacted in 2019, requires that cities’ and counties’ general plans address evacuation routes from any hazard area identified in the safety element. Under this law, the safety element must include information to identify residential developments in hazard areas that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes. Each city or county must update its safety element with the new information upon the next revision of its housing element on or after January 1, 2020.
Senate Bill 182 Local Government: Planning and Zoning: Wildfires California Senate Bill 182 made a number of changes to state law regarding planning for and permitting development in areas designated as very high fire risk areas. The bill requires a local jurisdiction to do the following:
• Include a comprehensive retrofit strategy in its safety element to reduce the risk of property loss and damage during wildfires.
• Amend its land use element to identify all very high fire risk areas and to establish measures to protect lives and property from unreasonable risk of wildfire.
• Adopt a very high fire risk overlay zone for its zoning ordinance. • Allocate a lower portion of projected future housing to very high fire hazard severity zones This bill prohibits local governments from entering into a development agreement for property in a very high fire risk area, approving a permit for a project in a very high fire risk area, or approving a tentative map for a subdivision in a very high fire risk area, unless the jurisdiction makes specified findings based on substantial evidence.
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Senate Bill 379: General Plans: Safety Element—Climate Adaptation Senate Bill 379 builds upon the flood planning inclusions into the safety and housing elements and the hazard mitigation planning safety element inclusions in general plans outlined in AB 162 and AB 2140, respectively.
SB 379 focuses on a new requirement that cities and counties include climate adaptation and resiliency strategies in the safety element of their general plans beginning January 1, 2017. In addition, this bill requires general plans to include a set of goals, policies and objectives, and specified implementation measures based on the conclusions drawn from climate adaptation research and recommendations.
Senate Bill 1000: General Plan Amendments—Safety and Environmental Justice Elements
In 2016, Senate Bill 1000 amended California’s Planning and Zoning Law in two ways:
The original law established requirements for initial revisions of general plan safety elements to address flooding, fire, and climate adaptation and resilience. It also required subsequent review and revision as necessary based on new information. Senate Bill 1000 specifies that the subsequent reviews and revision based on new information are required to address only flooding and fires (not climate adaptation and resilience).
Senate Bill 1000 adds a requirement that, upon adoption or revision of any two other general plan elements on or after January 1, 2018, an environmental justice element be adopted for the general plan or environmental justice goals, policies and objectives be incorporated into other elements of the plan.
Senate Bill 1241: General Plans: Safety Element—Fire Hazard Impacts In 2012, Senate Bill 1241 passed requiring that the safety elements of all future general plans address fire risk in state responsibility areas and very high fire hazard severity zones. The bill requires cities and counties to make findings regarding available fire protection and suppression services before approving a tentative map or parcel map.
Standardized Emergency Management System
CCR Title 19 establishes the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to standardize the response to emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions. SEMS is intended to be flexible and adaptable to the needs of all emergency responders in California. It requires emergency response agencies to use basic principles and components of emergency management. Local governments must use SEMS by December 1, 1996, to be eligible for state funding of response-related personnel costs under CCR Title 19 (Sections 2920, 2925 and 2930). The roles and responsibilities of Individual agencies contained in existing laws or the state emergency plan are not superseded by these regulations. This hazard mitigation plan is considered to be a support document for all phases of emergency management, including those associated with SEMS.
Western Governors Association Ten-Year Comprehensive Strategy The Western Governors Association Ten-Year Comprehensive Strategy: A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildfire Risks to Communities and the Environment (August 2001) is strategy implementation plan prepared by federal and Western state agencies that outlines measures to restore fire-adapted ecosystems and reduce hazardous fuels.
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Appendix C. Risk Assessment Mapping
Methodology
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C. RISK ASSESSMENT MAPPING METHODOLOGY
DAM FAILURE INUNDATION MAPPING
Dam breach inundation maps, including inundation boundaries and depth grids, were downloaded from the California Department of Water Resources’ (DWR) website - https://fmds.water.ca.gov/maps/damim/. As required by California Water Code section 6161, the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) at DWR reviews and approves inundation maps prepared by licensed civil engineers and submitted by dam owners for extremely high, high, and significant hazard dams and their critical appurtenant structures. Inundation maps are based on a hypothetical failure of a dam or critical appurtenant structure and the information depicted on the maps is approximate. The dams and failure scenarios are as follows:
• 1.056—Del Valle (National Dam ID CA00043): Scenario shows inundation extents for sunny day failure of the Main Dam and of Outlet 1. Files downloaded from DSOD website generated on 9/27/2019. • 1.062—Patterson (National Dam ID CA00048): Scenarios show a composite inundation extent for individual sunny day failures at the Northwest, West, and Southeast sections of Patterson Dam. Files downloaded from DSOD website generated on 12/6/2019.
EARTHQUAKE MAPPING
Liquefaction Susceptibility
The liquefaction dataset used in this analysis was created by the Association of Bay Area Governments.
National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) Soils NEHRP soils information is derived from a shear wave velocity (Vs30) data produced by the California Geological Survey in 2015. The Vs30 data represents simplified geologic units that have been correlated to the time-averaged shear-wave velocity in the upper 30 meters of the earth’s surface. The geologic units were compiled from published maps that range in scale from 1:250,000 to 1:24,000. (Wills, et. al., 2015) Shake Maps
A shake map is designed as a rapid response tool to portray the extent and variation of ground shaking throughout an affected region immediately following significant earthquakes. Ground motion and intensity maps are derived from peak ground motion amplitudes recorded on seismic sensors (accelerometers), with interpolation based on estimated amplitudes where data are lacking, and site amplification corrections. Color-coded instrumental intensity maps are derived from empirical relations between peak ground motions and Modified Mercalli intensity. For this plan, shake maps were prepared by the USGS for five earthquake scenarios:
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• An earthquake on the Calaveras (No) fault with the following characteristics:
➢ Magnitude: 6.86
➢ Epicenter: N 37.65 W 121.93
➢ Depth: 10.4 km
• An earthquake on the Greenville (No) fault with the following characteristics:
➢ Magnitude: 6.86
➢ Epicenter: N 37.70 W 121.68
➢ Depth: 11.3 km
• An earthquake on the Hay Wired fault with the following characteristics:
➢ Magnitude: 7.05
➢ Epicenter: N 37.80 W 122.18
➢ Depth: 8.0 km
• An earthquake on the Las Positas fault with the following characteristics:
➢ Magnitude: 6.5
➢ Epicenter: N 37.65 W 121.74
➢ Depth: 9.6 km
• An earthquake on the Mount Diablo Thrust South fault with the following characteristics:
➢ Magnitude: 6.5
➢ Epicenter: N 37.82 W 121.79
➢ Depth: 9.0 km
FLOOD MAPPING
Flood hazard areas are from the Alameda County countywide effective FEMA Digital Flood Insurance Rate Map (DFIRM) dated December 21, 2018. The latest Letters of Map Revision were updated on February 9, 2022, and have been incorporated since the effective date.
LANDSLIDE MAPPING
Data on susceptibility to deep-seated landslides was provided by the California Geological Survey. The map and associated data show the relative likelihood of deep-seated landsliding based on regional estimates of rock strength and steepness of slopes. On the most basic level, weak rocks and steep slopes are most likely to generate landslides. The map uses detailed information on the location of past landslides, the location and relative strength of rock units, and steepness of slope to estimate susceptibility to deep-seated landsliding (0 to X, low to high).
This landslide susceptibility map is intended to provide infrastructure owners, emergency planners and the public with a general overview of where landslides are more likely to occur. (Wills, et. al., 2011)
WILDFIRE MAPPING
Wildfire hazard areas are from the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. The data shows the moderate, high, and very high wildfire hazard severity zones.
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REFERENCES
Wills, C.J., Gutierrez, C.I., Perez, F.G., and Branum, D.B., 2015, A next-generation Vs30 map for California based on geology and topography: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America.
Wills C.J., Perez, F., Gutierrez, C. 2011. Susceptibility to deep-seated landslides in California: California Geological Survey Map Sheet 58.
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Appendix D. Plan Adoption Resolutions from
Planning Partners
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D. PLAN ADOPTION RESOLUTIONS FROM PLANNING
PARTNERS
To Be Provided With Final Draft
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Appendix E. Progress Report Template
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E. PROGRESS REPORT TEMPLATE
Reporting Period: (Insert reporting period)
Background: The Cities of Dublin, Livermore and Pleasanton, the Dublin San Ramon Services District, and participating local jurisdictions, developed a hazard mitigation plan to reduce risk from all hazards by identifying resources, information, and strategies for risk reduction. The federal Disaster Mitigation Act requires state and local governments to develop hazard mitigation plans as a condition for federal disaster grant assistance. To prepare the plan, the participating planning partners organized resources, assessed risks from natural hazards, developed planning goals and objectives, reviewed mitigation alternatives, and developed an action plan to address probable impacts from natural hazards. By completing this process, these jurisdictions maintained compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act, achieving eligibility for mitigation grant funding opportunities afforded under the Robert T. Stafford Act. The plan can be viewed on-line at:
INSERT LINK
Summary Overview of the Plan’s Progress: The performance period for the Hazard Mitigation Plan became effective on ____, 2023, with the final approval of the plan by FEMA. The initial performance period for this plan will be 5 years, with an anticipated update to the plan to occur before ______, 2028. As of this reporting period, the performance period for this plan is considered to be __% complete. The Hazard Mitigation Plan has targeted __ hazard mitigation actions to be pursued during the 5-year performance period. As of the reporting period, the following overall progress can be reported:
• __ out of __ actions (__%) reported ongoing action toward completion. • __ out of __ actions (__%) were reported as being complete. • __ out of __ actions (___%) reported no action taken.
Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide an annual update on the implementation of the action plan identified in the Hazard Mitigation Plan. The objective is to ensure that there is a continuing and responsive planning process that will keep the Hazard Mitigation Plan dynamic and responsive to the needs and capabilities of the planning partners. This report discusses the following:
• Natural hazard events that have occurred within the last year • Changes in risk exposure within the planning area
• Mitigation success stories
• Review of the action plan
• Changes in capabilities that could impact plan implementation • Recommendations for changes/enhancement.
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The Hazard Mitigation Plan Steering Committee: The Hazard Mitigation Plan Steering Committee, made up of planning partners and other stakeholders within the planning area, reviewed and approved this progress report at its annual meeting held on _____, 20XX. It was determined through the plan’s development process that a steering committee would remain in service to oversee maintenance of the plan. At a minimum, the Steering Committee will provide technical review and oversight on the development of the annual progress report.
It is anticipated that there will be turnover in the membership annually, which will be documented in the progress reports. For this reporting period, the Steering Committee membership is as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. Steering Committee Members
Name Title Jurisdiction/Agency
Natural Hazard Events within the Planning Area: During the reporting period, there were __ natural hazard events in the planning area that had a measurable impact on people or property. A summary of these events is as follows:
• __________________________
• __________________________
Changes in Risk Exposure in the Planning Area: (Insert brief overview of any natural hazard event in the planning area that changed the probability of occurrence or ranking of risk for the hazards addressed in the hazard mitigation plan)
Mitigation Success Stories: (Insert brief overview of mitigation accomplishments during the reporting period)
Review of the Action Plan: Table 2 reviews the action plan, reporting the status of each action. Reviewers of this report should refer to the Hazard Mitigation Plan for more detailed descriptions of each action and the prioritization process.
Address the following in the “status” column of the following table:
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• Was any element of the action carried out during the reporting period? • If no action was completed, why?
• Is the timeline for implementation for the action still appropriate? • If the action was completed, does it need to be changed or removed from the action plan? Table 2. Action Plan Matrix
Action Taken?
(Yes or No) Timeline Priority Status
Status (X,
O,✓)
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Action #__—______________________[description]
Completion status legend:
✓= Project Completed
O = Action ongoing toward completion
X = No progress at this time
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Changes That May Impact Implementation of the Plan: (Insert brief overview of any significant changes in the planning area that would have a profound impact on the implementation of the plan. Specify any changes in technical, regulatory and financial capabilities identified during the plan’s development) Recommendations for Changes or Enhancements: Based on the review of this report by the Hazard Mitigation Plan Steering Committee, the following recommendations will be noted for future updates or revisions to the plan:
• __________________________
• __________________________
• __________________________
• __________________________
• __________________________
• __________________________
Public review notice: The contents of this report are considered to be public knowledge and have been prepared for total public disclosure. Copies of the report have been provided to the governing boards of all planning partners and to local media outlets. The report is posted on the Tri-Valley Hazard Mitigation Plan website. Any questions or comments regarding the contents of this report should be directed to:
Insert Contact Info Here
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Appendix F. Steering Committee Meeting
Materials
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