AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE
CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
PRIOR TO THE MEETING
AGENDA NO: PC
MEETING DATE: February 11, 2025
AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE
CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
PRIOR TO THE MEETING
AGENDA NO: 7b
MEETING DATE: February 11, 2025
AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE
CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
PRIOR TO THE MEETING
AGENDA NO: 7c
MEETING DATE: February 11, 2025
AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE
CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
PRIOR TO THE MEETING
AGENDA NO: 7d
MEETING DATE: February 11, 2025
AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE
CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
PRIOR TO THE MEETING
AGENDA NO: 7g
MEETING DATE: February 11, 2025
2 Cruz, Seaside and all the surrounding areas have been getting sick. Symptoms include a metallic taste, skin rashes, respiratory distress, bloody noses, severe headaches and more. The county health department should be studying this, but for now a grassroots movement of citizens is working together to document their symptoms. The following image is a map created from a small sample of individuals who responded to a Facebook group poll, reporting their symptoms from the Vistra fire on January 16, 2025. The numbers on each pin represent the order each household was entered. Tracking symptoms continues with more data coming in daily.
The above map shows initial data about the locations of the health impacts of the disaster. Santa Cruz is 25 miles from Moss Landing, but there are people reporting symptoms much further than that. We currently do not know the safe distance for a BESS in proximity to any form of life. Until we know, the industry should not be allowed to build and operate these facilities.
I’m glad to see Assemblymember Addis proposing a bill that would require the CEC to reject facilities and give local communities control to decide if and where they are built. We don’t want to be the guinea pigs for an untested technology. 3 A. The Industry Has Failed To Inform the Public of the Hazards of Lithium-Ion Battery Storage.
In its Moss Landing Initial Study and “Mitigated Negative Declaration,” (MND) Vistra and its consultants never mentioned the potential for release of hazardous toxic fumes released after a thermal runaway event. The MND, dated January 25,2019, states:
THIS PROPOSED PROJECT WILL NOT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE ENVIRONMENT AS IT HAS BEEN FOUND:
a) That said project will not have the potential to significantly degrade the quality of the environment.
b) That said project will have no significant impact on long-term environmental goals. c) That said project will have no significant cumulative effect upon the environment. d) That said project will not cause substantial adverse effects on human beings, either directly or indirectly. 3
These representations were false and failed to provide warning to the community of the danger they were facing.
It would be reckless to continue operating facilities that are well known to be dangerous. There is a widely circulated database of “BESS failures” around the world (listing reported events only, there are 91). 4 A future comprehensive review of the potential impact on air quality of a BESS thermal runaway should include research from the Moss Landing catastrophic incident, as well as studies that were done in Arizona after the BESS thermal runaway that injured firefighters; the investigation done in South Korea after over 30 BESS fires, the fire and investigation in Escondido, and the Otay Mesa incident in which air quality data was collected by robots and drones.
Vistra and its consultants similarly failed to inform the residents of Morro Bay of the potential impacts of battery storage on our community, when they published their draft EIR. I coordinated a public comment letter writing campaign in 2024 in Morro Bay in response to this draft EIR, and my community spent months researching and writing about the dangers of BESS lithium-ion facilities. Our letters were posted on the city’s website, but Vistra withdrew its application indicating it planned to use AB 205 to circumvent our local community opposition. 5 Vistra did so knowing they would likely fail to get their project approved by the city of Morro Bay, but willing to force it on us anyway.
5 Vistra Battery Energy Storage System | City of Morro Bay - Official Website 4 BESS Failure Incident Database - EPRI Storage Wiki
3 County of Monterey - File #: PC 19-019
4 An article written June 5, 2021 entitled, Safety of Grid Scale Lithium-ion Battery Energy Storage Systems, describes the details of the hazard. 6 Li-ion batteries can fail by “thermal runaway” where overheating in a single faulty cell can propagate to neighbors with energy releases popularly known as “battery fires”.
These are not strictly “fires'' at all, requiring no oxygen to propagate. They are uncontrollable except by extravagant water cooling. They evolve toxic gasses such as Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) and highly flammable toxic gasses including Hydrogen (H2), Methane (CH4), Ethylene (C2H4) and Carbon Monoxide (CO). These in turn may cause further explosions or fires upon ignition. The chemical energy then released can be up to 20 times the stored electrotoxic energy.
No existing engineering standards address thermal runaway adequately, or require measures (such as those already used in EV batteries) to pre-empt propagation of runaway events.
Lacking oversight... the entire responsibility for major accident planning currently lies with local Fire and Rescue Services. Current plans may be inadequate in respect of water supplies, or for protection of the local public against toxic plumes.
The scale of Li-ion BESS energy storage envisioned at “mega scale” energy farms is unprecedented and requires urgent review. The explosion potential and the lack of engineering standards to prevent thermal runaway may put control of “battery fires” beyond the knowledge, experience and capabilities of local Fire and Rescue Services.
BESS presents special hazards to fire-fighters; four sustained life-limiting injuries in the Arizona incident.
Yet, Vistra continued operating its facilities even after so many fires were reported. Further, Vistra failed to acknowledge the additional danger of placing lithium-ion batteries in a saltwater and marine fog environment. In South Korea, the investigation previously mentioned revealed the potential impact of salt water mist on insulation resistance in the ESS. Due to the higher conductivity of salt water compared to pure water, it is easier to compromise insulation resistance which can lead to a short circuit between the terminals of the ESS and fires. 7
For perspective, when there is a thermal runaway and toxic fumes are vented, some of the toxic corrosive gasses released will include the following, as set forth in their Material Safety Data Sheets (“MSDS”):
7 Unraveling the Characteristics of ESS Fires in South Korea: An In-Depth Analysis of ESS Fire Investigation Outcomes
6 (PDF) Safety of Grid Scale Lithium-ion Battery Energy Storage Systems 5 Hydrogen fluoride (Hydrofluoric acid) :
“Colorless liquid with a pungent, irritating, penetrating odor. Concentrations above 40% fume in air. Will not burn. Cylinders or tanks may rupture and explode if heated. Highly reactive. Contact with metals, such as iron or steel, slowly releases flammable and potentially explosive hydrogen gas. VERY TOXIC. May be fatal if inhaled, absorbed through the skin or swallowed. CORROSIVE to the nose, throat and respiratory tract. Causes lung injury-effects may be delayed. CORROSIVE to the eyes and skin. Causes severe burns. May cause blindness and permanent scarring. Absorbed fluoride can cause metabolic imbalances with irregular heartbeat, nausea, dizziness, vomiting and seizures. Long-term exposure may cause skeletal fluorosis (weakened bone structure). Target Organs: Lungs, teeth, eyes, skin, bone, mucous membranes.” 8 Hydrogen Chloride:
“Potential Acute Health Effects: Very hazardous in case of skin contact (corrosive, irritant, permeator), of eye contact (irritant, corrosive), of ingestion, . Slightly hazardous in case of inhalation (lung sensitizer). Non-corrosive for lungs. Liquid or spray mist may produce tissue damage particularly on mucous membranes of eyes, mouth and respiratory tract. Skin contact may produce burns. Inhalation of the spray mist may produce severe irritation of the respiratory tract, characterized by coughing, choking, or shortness of breath. Severe over-exposure can result in death. Inflammation of the eye is characterized by redness, watering, and itching. Skin inflammation is characterized by itching, scaling, reddening, or, occasionally, blistering.
Potential Chronic Health Effects: Slightly hazardous in case of skin contact (sensitizer). CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: Classified 3 (Not classifiable for human.) by IARC [Hydrochloric acid]. MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. TERATOGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. DEVELOPMENTAL TOXICITY: Not available. The substance may be toxic to kidneys, liver, mucous membranes, upper respiratory tract, skin, eyes, Circulatory System, teeth. Repeated or prolonged exposure to the substance can produce target organs damage. Repeated or prolonged contact with spray mist may produce chronic eye irritation and severe skin irritation. Repeated or prolonged contact with spray mist may produce chronic eye irritation and severe skin irritation. Repeated or prolonged exposure to spray mist may produce respiratory tract irritation leading to frequent attacks of bronchial infection. Repeated exposure to a highly toxic material may produce general deterioration of health by an accumulation in one or many human organs.” 9
9 Hydrochloric acid MSDS
8 Hydrofluoric Acid MSDS.pdf
6 Hydrogen Cyanide:
“…this gas mixture is a colorless gas which is odorless. Hydrogen Cyanide is an extremely toxic gas; even brief over-exposures to relatively low doses may have significant health consequences. Acute low-level exposure can cause symptoms such as cyanosis, headache, dizziness, unsteadiness of gait, a feeling of suffocation and nausea.
Additionally, releases of this gas mixture may produce oxygen-deficient atmospheres (especially in confined spaces or other poorly-ventilated environments); individuals in such atmospheres may be asphyxiated.” 10
Carbon Monoxide:
“Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure; Contains gas under pressure; may explode if heated; extremely flammable gas, may damage fertility or the unborn child, and toxic if inhaled.”11 None of this information was in the Moss Landing Phase I MND, so residents of those communities are just now learning about it from their own tragic experiences.
B. Industry Will Posture that the New Technology Of Containerized Batteries is Safe, But It Is Neither New Nor Safe.
The following images are a few from the new “safer” BESS fires in “container” battery storage systems. These are just a few examples, but each of these fires produced copious amounts of toxic gasses and are good examples of why BESS facilities should NOT operate under the containerized alternative.
1. Escondido, CA: September, 2024
2. Neermor, Germany: April 27, 2024
3. Moorabool, Australia: July 30, 2021
11 Carbon Monoxide MSDS
10 Hydrogen Cyanide MSDS
7 8
The fires are so hot they burn through these containers. Upon an investigation of the July 30, 2021 fire in Australia, it was determined that the wind was the dominant contributory factor in the propagation of fire from one Megapack of batteries to the neighboring Megapack above. Even using the containers, the industry has not been able to actually make them safe.
“Mitigation measures” for the hazards from containerized batteries are not really what they are sold to be. In an April 24, 2024 Morro Bay community meeting, Vistra presented what they referred to as mitigation measures for their proposed facility in Morro Bay. The feature they promoted was a vent that would blow the toxic plume out of the top of the container when the batteries overheated and caught fire, and said they would instruct residents to close their windows and turn off their ventilation systems (as Moss Landing residents were instructed to do). This is not mitigation; it is another significant and unmitigable impact. Vistra’s design approach included “M-dampers” that release heat and gas to minimize propagation, and “deflagration panels” that automatically open with predetermined pressure to prevent explosion similar to the design in a”Power” magazine article dated July 1, 2021.12 These images are disturbing 12 Protecting Battery Energy Storage Systems from Fire and Explosion Hazards 9 and provide even more evidence that the facility should not be near humans or wildlife.
It is possible that when toxic gases are released under this future scenario, if the incident does not result in actual flames it might not even be reported because “the system was operating as designed.”
In a July 20, 2021 article from Powermag.com, Protecting Battery Energy Storage Systems from Fire and Explosion Hazards, it was acknowledged that “[t]here are serious risks associated with lithium-ion battery storage systems” but indicated the container design contains vents on the top to “safely direct an explosion upward...” This is not encouraging, is unsafe, and would likely require an EPA permit.
Industry Will Posture That LFP Batteries Are Safer than MNC, But They Are Not.
The battery storage industry will be promoting another theme that the industry is switching to LFP (Lithium Ion Phosphate) batteries as they are safer than MNC (Manganese Nickel Cobalt), but recent research and reported battery fires indicates this is not the case.
10 “Researchers in the United Kingdom have analyzed lithium-ion battery thermal runaway off-gas and have found that nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) batteries generate larger specific off-gas volumes, while lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries are a greater flammability hazard and show greater toxicity, depending on relative state of charge (SOC).”13
In addition, the BESS fire database indicates there have been six reported fires with LPF batteries in the last five years. 14 The obvious conclusion is that there is no technology developed yet that will make any type of lithium battery storage safe enough to be in proximity to people, wildlife, etc.
C. Senator Laird’s Proposals Do Not Protect Californians from Toxic Battery Fires In a “Statement By Senator John Laird On Moss Landing Fire,” dated January 21, 2025, Senator Laird suggests only post-fire proposals (he opposes AB 303):
To help rebuild community trust that the facility can operate safely, significant changes are necessary. While the system currently remains offline, Vistra must take immediate steps to address these issues, including:
● Providing the Monterey Bay Air Resources District with sufficient SPM Flex gas detectors to effectively track hydrogen fluoride (HF) levels. ● Collaborating with the North County Fire Protection District to expand their capacity and readiness to respond to incidents of this scale.
● Initiating additional environmental monitoring and testing such as air, soil, water, and particulate matter assessments.
● Presenting emergency safety plans required under SB 38 at a public forum to increase transparency and accountability.
Of course these measures should all be taken, but they will not stop future fires and this list will not rebuild trust. The BESS facility and others in Moss Landing should be shut down until the full impacts to the environment and human health from the Moss Landing fire are revealed.
Further; SB 38, a measure requiring reporting and safety protocols that was proposed by Senator Laird and Dawn Addis and passed into law, had no enforcement mechanism and did not go far enough to actually prevent BESS fires. It appears that the fires cannot be prevented, so siting requirements are the answer until a better technology is developed for large scale energy storage. 14 https://storagewiki.epri.com/index.php/BESS Failure Incident Database 13 How safe are lithium iron phosphate batteries? – pv magazine International 11 D. Ab 303 Could Go Further To Protect Californians From Toxic Battery Fires, But It Is The Best Option For Now, If Cities And Counties Also Act.
The most important provision of AB 303 returns decision-making for BESS project approvals to the local cities and counties in which they are sited. This aspect of the law is crucial as the residents of these cities and towns have the right to decide their own fate and not have a dangerous industry that they don’t want in their communities forced on them. I fully support this provision.
a. Setbacks Under AB 303 are Inadequate. California Residents Many Miles from Moss Landing are Sick From The Toxic Corrosive Gasses, The setback portion of AB 303 prohibits the project if it is located within 3200 feet of a sensitive receptor or is located on an environmentally sensitive site, but 3200 feet is an outdated and arbitrary figure. Moss Landing is teaching us that the distance should be in miles, not feet, but we do not know the actual safe distance yet.
The law also has no setback for Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Areas (ESHA). The law seems to state that facilities cannot be built right on ESHA, but right next to it would be fine. A safe distance is not yet known, but people 40 miles from the Moss Landing fire have reported symptoms from the toxic, corrosive gasses emitted from that fire. Heavy metals traced to the batteries were detected in the soil at high levels two miles from the fire, and are likely affecting the protected sea otters and their nurseries, along with other species in Elkhorn Slough. This evidence, only just now developing, must be considered when fashioning new safety laws.
At least one lawsuit has already been filed in the Moss Landing disaster. People 30 to 40 miles away from the fire in Santa Cruz and Felton are showing symptoms, and the long term impacts to their health, and the health of the environment and estuary are as yet unknown. The facts surrounding these environmental and health impacts will take time to reveal themselves and will guide us to better siting requirements for BESS.
Until then, a combination of AB 303 and county moratoriums to develop stricter setbacks seems like the best solution.
In Banning Ranch Conservancy v. the City of Newport Beach, 2 Cal.5th 918, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 392 P.3d 455 (Cal. 2017), the California Supreme Court addressed treatment of ESHAs in an Environmental Impact Report. In that case, the Coastal Commission staff pointed out that under the Coastal Act, development must avoid impacts to ESHA, indicating that the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) §30240 does not permit “non-resource dependent impacts to an ESHA area.” §30240 states that development in areas adjacent to environmentally sensitive habitat areas and 12 parks and recreation areas shall be sited and designed to prevent impacts which would significantly degrade those areas, and shall be compatible with the continuance of those habitat and recreation areas.
What this language implies is that if a development is adjacent to an ESHA, it must not cause impacts that would significantly degrade the ESHA itself, and whatever setback is necessary to accomplish that must be applied. The Supreme Court’s interpretation is more protective than the current language of AB 303; therefore I would suggest adopting the language of CEQA§30240 above, prohibiting BESS developments adjacent to ESHA, etc. to prevent impacts that would significantly degrade those areas.
While Banning Ranch was a Coastal Zone case, the same logic should apply to environmental impacts to all forms of life off the coast as well, including humans, wildlife, protected species, forests, wetlands, plant life and agriculture. b. Every Bess Application Should Undergo A Full Environmental Impact Report.
Every proposed battery storage project should undergo a strict environmental review including a full Environmental Impact Report. Moss Landing is an example of how badly an environmental review (they submitted a simple MND) can be done, with disastrous consequences.
The provisions of CEQA should be strictly followed for BESS facilities, not swept aside or rushed through. This means all of the potentially significant impacts are reviewed, and all of the potentially adverse impacts to humans and wildlife. Now that we have seen the damage these lithium batteries can do, every project application should require a full EIR under AB 303.
c. Every Bess Facility Of Any Size Should Be Subject To AB 303.
The law states that it applies only to BESS facilities over 200 MW in size, but there is no rational basis for the restriction. Even a Tesla car fire with its lithium-ion batteries produces copious amounts of toxic black smoke, so there is no BESS that is too small for this legislation.
13 E. San Luis Obispo County Board Of Supervisors Should Adopt An Emergency Moratorium on BESS Applications For A Minimum Of Two Years So That Siting Standards Can Be Enacted.
It is clear that cities and counties need to do their own research to determine where, if at all, to site BESS facilities to keep all forms of life safe. The industry is not going to do this for us; indeed we will be misled by the industry and their PR firms. This research takes time; the health and environmental data coming in from Moss Landing will take time. Owners of businesses in the city of San Luis Obispo, the wineries in Paso Robles, and other businesses and residents should be educated and brought into the conversation so that they may participate in an informed way. The days in which a fortune 500 company can secretly ram a project past environmental and safety regulations need to be over.
The Otay Mesa/Escondido/Valley Center/Moss Landing examples are more than enough evidence that lithium-ion batteries can cause catastrophic damage to a community. Moss Landing residents are still suffering health consequences, soil and water testing are ongoing, and the long term environmental impacts to humans, agriculture and wildlife are not yet known. This dangerous industry should not be allowed to continue to run roughshod, and frighten, endanger and sicken the residents 14 of California, and poison wildlife and crops. Several counties have moratoriums and the city of Morro Bay just adopted one as well. Los Angeles County just adopted a moratorium after the Moss Landing fire. 15 A county-wide moratorium for San Luis Obispo will serve to protect our community while we determine if there is a safe location in SLO county to place a BESS, or if this lithium-ion battery storage idea should be halted while a safer technology is adopted. Therefore, in addition to my support for AB 303, I ask the Board of Supervisors of San Luis Obispo county to adopt a county-wide emergency moratorium on BESS projects of any size, immediately.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Respectfully,
Jeanne Marie Colby
15 Orange County, California officials enact emergency moratorium on new BESS in wake of fire at Moss Landing
AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE
CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED BY THE
CITY COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC REVIEW
PRIOR TO THE MEETING
AGENDA NO: 9a
MEETING DATE: February 11, 2025