Nov 19, 2024
CityofMountainView500CastroSt.MountainView,CA94041
Re:ProposedHousingDevelopmentProjectat2645–2655FayetteDrive Byemail: [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected] CC: [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; DearMountainViewCityCouncilandCityStaff,
TheCaliforniaHousingDefenseFund(“CalHDF”)submitsthislettertorequestthattheCouncilandcitystaffcomplywiththeirobligationstoprocesstheproposed7-story,70-unitapartmentbuildingat2645–2655FayetteDriveunderallrelevantstateandfederallaws.
TheCityisrequiringthisproject,andothersitisconsidering,tocomplywithnumerousaspectsofitsmunicipalcodethattogethermayrendertheprojectinfeasible.TheCity’sactionsareaviolationoftheHousingAccountabilityAct(“HAA”).Separately,theCity’scontinuedimpositionoffeesinlieuofadedicationofparklandisinviolationoftheconstitutionalprohibitiononexactionsinexcessoftheimpactsofproposeddevelopment.
I. TheCityCannotRequireBuilder’sRemedyProjectsToComplywithZoningandGeneralPlanStandards Densityandheightstandardsarenottheonlydevelopmentstandardsthatprecludehousingdevelopment.TheHAArequiresthat(emphasisadded)“Alocalagencyshallnotdisapproveahousingdevelopmentproject,includingfarmworkerhousingasdefinedinsubdivision(h)ofSection50199.7oftheHealthandSafetyCode,forverylow,low-,ormoderate-incomehouseholds,oranemergencyshelter,orconditionapprovalinamannerthatrendersthehousingdevelopmentprojectinfeasiblefordevelopmentfortheuseofverylow,low-,or 360GrandAve#323,Oakland94610www.calhdf.org
moderate-incomehouseholds,oranemergencyshelter,includingthroughtheuseofdesignreviewstandards,unlessitmakeswrittenfindings,baseduponapreponderanceoftheevidenceintherecord,astooneofthefollowing…”(Gov.Code,65589.5,subd.(d).)Basedonourenforcementwork,theCityhassomeofthehighestparkfeesinthestate.Infact,theCityitselfhascometotheconclusionthattheyareabarriertohousing.FromtheCity’sHousingElement,AppendixD,“TheeconomicanalysisthattheCityconductedaspartofthisHousingElementUpdate(seeAppendixH)foundthatMountainView’sparkdedicationrequirementshaveamoderatetomajorimpactondevelopmentcostsforrowhousesandamajorimpactondevelopmentcostsformultifamilydevelopment.” GiventhestaggeringlandcostsintheCity,andthefactthattheprojectmustprovide20%low-incomehousing(directlymitigatingtheCity’sshortageoflower-incomehousing),alsorequiringmorethan$70,000inparksfeesperunitisaclearviolationofstatelaw.(SeeGov.Code,65589.5,subd.(d).)WhileitisagoodstepthattheCityhasagreedtoreduceitsparksfeesforthisprojectto$27,120perunit,theCityshouldrememberthatthisfeeisstillshockinglyhighandwouldbeuneconomicbutfortheincrediblyhighrentsintheCity-aconditiondirectlybroughtaboutbyartificialhousingscarcitycreatedbytheCity’sownlandusepolicies(includingitsparksfees).
TheCity’sviewisthatitcanapplyany/allprovisionsofitscodetothisproject,providedthattheydonotpertainspecificallytodensity,basedonitsreadingofGovernmentCode,Section65589.5,subdivisions(f)(1)and(f)(3).Thisisincorrect.Subdivision(f)(1)allowscitiestoapplydevelopmentstandardstohousingdevelopmentsifthosestandardsare“appropriateto,andconsistentwith,meetingthejurisdiction’sshareoftheregionalhousingneed”andthestandardsare“appliedtofacilitateandaccommodatedevelopmentatthedensitypermittedonthesiteandproposedbythedevelopment.”Theparklanddedicationrequirementisalsonotcoveredbysubdivision(f)(3).Thatprovisionallowscitiestoapply“feesandotherexactionsauthorizedbystatelaw.” Builder’sremedyprojectsonlyarisewhenaCityhasfailedtoadequatelyplanforitsshareofhousingproductionrequiredunderitsRegionalHousingNeedsAllocation(“RHNA”).Inthissituation,noneofajurisdiction’sdevelopmentstandardsareconsistentwithmeetinghousingproductiongoals,becausethatjurisdictionhasfailedtoproduceaplantojustifyitspoliciesatall.Andagain,theCityherehasadmitted(initsHousingElement)thatthestandardinquestionisamajorfactorinmakinghousingdevelopmentinfeasible.ThereissimplynowaythatrequiringadedicationofparklandfromnewhousingdevelopmentisconsistentwithmeetingtheCity’sRHNAgoals.
Furthermore,inaccordancewithgeneralinterpretiveprovisionsforstatutes,andduetostatutoryconstructionrules(CodeCiv.Proc.,§1859),suchgeneralprotectionsof(f)(1)and(f)(3)donotoverruletheparticularprovisionsofGovernmentCode,Section65589.5,subdivision(d).TheCitymaynotconditionapprovaltorequiretheprojecttoadheretothese 2of5
variouscodesectionswithoutmakinghealthandsafetyfindingsasrequiredbytheHAA.(Id.atsubd.(d)(2).)Finally,thelegislatureclearlyestablishesthatitisthepolicyoftheStatethattheHAAshallbe“interpretedandimplementedinamannertoaffordthefullestpossibleweighttotheinterestof,andtheapprovalandprovisionof,housing.”(Id.at(a)(2)(L).)AllowingcitiestoapplyconditionsofapprovalthatrenderaffordablehousingdevelopmentsinfeasiblethroughstrainedinterpretationsisclearlyagainstthepolicyoftheStateofCalifornia.(SeeCaliforniaRentersLegalAdvocacy&EducationFundv.CityofSanMateo(2021)68Cal.App.5th820,854.) TheCitythereforemayalsonotapplyvariousotherzoningstandardstotheproject.Forexample,theCitymaynotrequireaprovisionalusepermitforthecommonroofdeck,asthisisazoningstandardwithdiscretionaryapproval.TheCityalsomaynotdisapprovetheprojectbasedonthetreeremovalpermit,asthiswouldconstituteadenialundertheHAA.(See,e.g.,SanFranciscoBayAreaRentersFederationv.CityofBerkeleyetal.,SuperiorCourtofAlamedaCounty,CaseNo.RG16834448,StipulatedOrderfiledJuly21,2017[seeattached][rulingthattheCityofBerkeleycouldnotdenyanancillarydemolitionpermitinordertostopahousingdevelopmentproject].)TheCityalsomaynotconditionprojectapprovalonanytransportationdemandmanagementprogramrequirements,orprovisionoftransitpassestoresidents(whichwouldcomeoutoftheproject’sHOAfees,regardless).
Giventhattheseconditions,inaggregate,haveatremendouslyadverseimpactonprojectviability,iftheCityinsistsonapplyingthesevariousconditionsontheproposedbuilder’sremedyprojects,thestatelaw(id.atsubd.(i))statesclearlythatitwillbeartheburdenofproofincourt(emphasisadded):
“Ifanycity,county,orcityandcountydeniesapprovalorimposesconditions,includingdesignchanges,lowerdensity,orareductionofthepercentageofalotthatmaybeoccupiedbyabuildingorstructureundertheapplicableplanningandzoninginforceatthetimethehousingdevelopmentproject’sapplicationiscomplete,thathaveasubstantialadverseeffectontheviabilityoraffordabilityofahousingdevelopmentforverylow,low-,ormoderate-incomehouseholds,andthedenialofthedevelopmentortheimpositionofconditionsonthedevelopmentisthesubjectofacourtactionwhichchallengesthedenialortheimpositionofconditions,thentheburdenofproofshallbeonthelocallegislativebodytoshowthatitsdecisionisconsistentwiththefindingsasdescribedinsubdivision(d),andthatthefindingsaresupportedbyapreponderanceoftheevidenceintherecord,andwiththerequirementsofsubdivision(o).” II. TheParklandDedicationRequirementisaPerSeRegulatoryTakingUndertheFifthAmendmentoftheUSConstitution,andtheIn-lieuFeeisanUnconstitutionalCondition 3of5
TheFifthAmendmentoftheConstitutionprohibitsgovernmentsfromtakingprivatepropertywithoutjustcompensation.TheFifthAmendmenthasbeeninterpretedbytheU.S.SupremeCourttoprohibitzoningandlanduseregulationsthateffectivelydepriveanownerofprotectedpropertyrights.(SeePennCentralTransportationCo.v.NewYorkCity(1978)438U.S.104.)Perhapsthemostclearcutregulatorytakingoccurswhenalanduseregulationallowsforapermanentphysicaloccupationofprivateproperty.(Lorettov.TeleprompterManhattanCatvCorp.(1982)458U.S.419.)ThereisperhapsnomoreobviousexampleofaviolationoftheregulatorytakingdoctrinethanthepolicyenactedbyMountainViewhere.TheCityrequires,throughzoningregulation,thatpropertyownersdeedtheirprivatepropertyovertotheCitywithoutjustcompensation,forpublicuseasapark.Thefactthatthisdedicationisonlyrequiredasaconditionofapprovalforresidentialdevelopmentdoesnotallowittoescapeconstitutionalscrutiny.TheSupremeCourthaslongheldthatregulatoryconditionsondevelopmentapprovalsthatwouldotherwiseconstitutetakingsmustbereasonablyrelatedtomitigatingimpactsofthatdevelopment,androughlyproportionaltothoseimpacts.(Nollanv.CaliforniaCoastalComm'n(1987)483U.S.825(Nollan);Dolanv.CityofTigard(1994)512U.S.374(Dolan).)TheCityhasestablishednosuchrelationshipbecauseitcannot.Adesiretoacquireanddevelopparklandisnotanimpactofnewdevelopmenttobemitigated,andevenifitwere,the$70,000perunitfee(or$27,120perunit,ifdiscounted)iswildlyoutofproportiontoanypurportedimpact.TheCityisfreetoacquirepropertyfornewparksbyacquiringpropertyontheprivatemarket,orbyuseofeminentdomainpowersprovidingjustcompensationtopropertyowners,butitcannotsimplyenactaregulationrequiringthatdevelopersgivelandtotheCitywithoutjustcompensation.
TheCityperhapsenactedtheparklanddedicationpolicyunderthemistakenimpressionthatitisrenderedlegalbyallowingdeveloperstopayafeein-lieuofdedicatinglandforparks.PriorCaliforniacaselawhadindicatedthatlegislativelyenactedfeesarenotsubjecttoconstitutionaltakingslimits.(SanRemoHotelv.CityandCountyofSanFrancisco(2002)27Cal.4th643,668.)Recently,theU.S.SupremeCourtdecidedthatthisisdefinitelynotthecase.(Sheetzv.Cnty.ofElDorado(2024)601U.S.267.)InSheetz,theCaliforniaCourtofAppealhadruledthatatrafficimpactfeewasnotsubjecttotherequirementsofNollanandDolan,becauseitwasalegislativelyenactedexaction,followingtheSanRemoHoteldecision.(Id.at407.)TheU.S.SupremeCourtoverturnedthisruling,findingthatfeesimposedaslegislativeenactmentsaresubjecttoNollanandDolan.(Id.at280.)AftertheSheetzdecision,thereisnoquestionthattheNollanandDolanstandardsapplytotheparklanddedicationandin-lieufeerequirementsatissueforthisdevelopment.BecausetheCityhasnotestablishedanynexusbetweennewdevelopmentandtheneedtoacquireanddevelopparkland,northatthe$70,000feeisproportionatetoanyimpactsofnewhousingonparkland,theCityisprohibitedfromapplyingthispolicytonewhousingdevelopmentincludingthecurrentproposalbeforeyou. ⬢⬢⬢
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Asyouarewellaware,Californiaremainsinthethroesofastatewidecrisis-levelhousingshortage.Ifwedonotallowsufficienthousingdevelopment,moreandmoreCalifornianswillbecomeandremainhomeless.CalHDFurgestheCitytoapprovethisbuilder’sremedyprojectwithoutimposingtheaforementionedconditions,asisrequiredbystateandfederallaw.IftheCitydeclinestoheedtheaboveguidanceandimposestheparkdedicationrequirementsonthisoranyotherhousingdevelopments,CalHDFispreparedtobringlegalactiontoinvalidatetheseconditionsandthecitywidepolicy.
CalHDFisa501(c)3non-profitcorporationwhosemissionincludesadvocatingforincreasedaccesstohousingforCaliforniansatallincomelevels,includinglow-incomehouseholds.YoumaylearnmoreaboutCalHDFatwww.calhdf.org.
Sincerely,
DylanCaseyCalHDFExecutiveDirector
JamesM.LloydCalHDFDirectorofPlanningandInvestigations
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