In the Matter of Impasse
between
City of Norwalk
and
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District Lodge 947
PERB Case No. LA-IM-348-M
FACTFINDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Chairperson: Michael H. Leb, Arbitrator
Employer Panel Member: Oliver Yee, Esq.
Union Panel Member: Sal Vasquez – President/Directing Business Representative Employer Counsel - Barbara J. Boktor, Esq.
Union Counsel – Tiffany Crain, Esq.
Hearing Date: January 7, 2026
Hearing Location: Norwalk City Hall
Record Closed: January 27, 2026
Attachment No. 4
2 I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF REPORT This Factfinding Report and Recommendations are issued pursuant to Government Code section 3505.4 of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). The panel’s role is advisory and intended to assist the parties by providing a neutral, reasoned recommendation grounded in the statutory criteria. The parties elected to submit this matter primarily on documentary evidence rather than live testimony. Accordingly, the evidentiary record consists of Exhibits 1 through 11 and the parties’ written submissions, including the Union’s Closing Brief, the City’s Closing Brief, and the City’s Supplemental Brief. The Union elected not to submit a supplemental brief. This report emphasizes a detailed review of the exhibits, the quantitative information they contain, and the arguments advanced by each party in their post-hearing submissions. II. BACKGROUND The City of Norwalk (“the City”) is a general law city that provides core municipal services to its residents through a workforce organized into two bargaining units, including the unit represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local 947 (“the Union”). The City and the Union have a mature bargaining relationship including a history of negotiating collective bargaining agreements without the need for impasse procedures. The parties’ prior Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) expired on June 30, 2025. The parties commenced negotiations for a successor agreement on January 15, 2025. (Exhibit 11.) The Parties were able to reach tentative agreements on 18 provisions within the successor MOU. (Exhibit 1, pp. 8-9.) The issues on which agreement could not be reached were (1) salary schedule; (2) medical insurance; and (3) “me-too” clause On July 3, 2025, and August 6, 2025, the Union issued two proposals regarding Salary Schedule, Medical Insurance, and the “Me-too” Clause. (Exhibit 5 and 6). On August 6, 2025, the City issued both a Single Year Last Best and Final Offer (“LBFO”) and a Multi-year LBFO. (Exhibit 2 and 3). The parties declared impasse on September 4, 2025. The parties participated in impasse mediation during which the City issued a Final Package Proposal dated October 7, 2025 (“FPP”). (Exhibit 4.) The FPP proposed a multi-year agreement running through FY 2028-2029 which included the following terms: (1) Implementation of the 9-step Salary Structure proposed by the City (Exhibit 4, p. 10); (2) Placement of any employee who did not receive at least a 1.5% salary adjustment based on the implementation of the 9-step structure into the step one step above the employee’s placement upon implementation; (3) “Me too” language as follows: “ The City agrees that if it reaches agreement with any other bargaining unit from the date of the MOU adoption through June 30, 2029 on an across-the-board increase to the base wage rate, the City will provide the same percentage across-the-board [ATB] increase to the base wage rate” to the bargaining unit represented by the Union; (4) limited reopener on ATB “wage rate increases only in FY 26-27, 27-28, and 28-29; and (5) 3 limited reopener negotiations for FY 26-27, and 28-29 on health insurance (MOU Articles 29 and 30).
The Union did not recommend the FPP to its membership which voted it down, which, in turn, has led to this fact finding.
The fact-finding hearing was conducted on January 7, 2026 at Norwalk City Hall.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED
The parties agreed to the “me-too” clause language in a form substantially similar to if not identical to the language contained in the FPP. Thus, the remaining issues this report addresses are limited to the following:
• Whether to adopt a revised salary structure, including conversion from a five-step to a nine-step range;
• Whether to include an equity or minimum movement adjustment, and if so, the appropriate percentage;
• The appropriate term of a successor agreement and the inclusion of limit ed
reopeners on wages and insurance; and
• The effective date and retroactivity, if any, of economic changes.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ FINAL POSITIONS
A. Union Position
The Union’s position is that, effective July 1, 2025, the City should make the following adjustments to salaries and health care contributions: 1) the City should provide an across- the-board increase of 5% for all IAM 947-represented employees, 2) in addition to an across-the-board increase for all IAM 947 employees, the City should provide equity increases for all the classifications identified in the City’s Compensation Study at the rates those classifications lag behind comparable jurisdictions, 3) the City impose a cap on the increases that IAM 947-represented employees must contribute to increased health care costs. Specifically, that the City pay for increases beyond 30% or $25, whichever is greater.
B. City Position
The FPP emphasizes structural reform, fiscal sustainability, and adherence to the bargaining record. The City contends that the existing five-step structure is compressed and undermines long-term progression, and that a nine-step structure with a broader range addresses these deficiencies without requiring large across-the-board increases. (City Exs. 1, 4, 7.)
The City proposes a 1.5% minimum movement mechanism to address limited placement outcomes, asserting that this level strikes an appropriate balance between employee equity and fiscal responsibility. The City proposes limited reopeners on wages and insurance. The 4 City opposes full retroactivity, arguing that it was not a consistent bargaining demand and that retroactive liability would compound projected growth in pension and healthcare costs. V. FINDINGS OF FACT A. Salary Structure History and Compression The City’s former salary schedules generally consisted of five steps with approximately 5% increments and an overall range width of approximately 21.5%. (Ex. 1.) CPS HR and the City identify this structure as contributing to rapid top-out, compression between classifications, and limited incentives for long-term retention. (Ex. 7.) B. CPS HR Study – Market and Structural Findings The CPS HR Compensation Study evaluated 44 benchmark classifications against a stipulated comparator group. At the midpoint, 16 classifications (36%) were below market, including 15 that were more than 10% below the comparator median. (Ex. 7 at p. 8.) At the maximum, fewer classifications lagged the market, a pattern CPS HR attributes primarily to structural compression rather than pervasive underpayment. CPS HR recommended expanding range widths to approximately 30% and increasing the number of steps to nine, with smaller step differentials, as a structural remedy to address these deficiencies. (Ex. 7.) C. Nine-Step Conversion and Placement Outcomes Under the City’s proposal, incumbents are placed on the nearest step at or above their existing salary, ensuring no loss of pay. Illustrations in Exhibit 5 demonstrate that many employees formerly at Step 5 move to Steps 6 or 7 under the new structure, producing immediate increases commonly exceeding 2% and in some cases exceeding 4%. (City Ex. 5.) D. Equity Adjustment Proposals Both parties acknowledge that placement mechanics may result in comparatively modest increases for a small subset of employees. The City proposes a 1.5% minimum movement mechanism, while the Union proposes a 2.0% equity floor. (Ex. 4; Union Closing Brief.) E. Fiscal Projections and Benefit Cost Drivers Exhibit 9 contains seven-year General Fund projections showing Total Personnel Cost increasing from $38,260,539 in FY 2026 to $46,091,807 in FY 2029 and to $53,145,754 by FY 2032. Pension (CalPERS) employer costs increase from $5,943,707 in FY 2026 to approximately $7,997,782 by FY 2031. Medical Benefits and Rebates increase from $3,601,060 in FY 2026 to $6,011,699 by FY 2032, while Retiree Medical increases from $1,445,300 to $2,050,186 over the same period. (City Ex. 9.) 5 VI. STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND RATIONALE In reaching its recommendations, the panel has considered each of the statutory criteria set forth in Government Code section 3505.4(d), giving greater weight to those factors that are most directly implicated by the issues remaining at impasse. Factor (1): Applicable State and Federal Laws The panel finds no contention by either party that the proposals at issue violate applicable state or federal law. The recommended terms concerning salary structure, equity adjustments, term, reopeners, and implementation are within the scope of lawful collective bargaining under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. Accordingly, Factor (1) does not weigh in favor of either party’s final position. Factor (2): Local Rules, Regulations, or Ordinances The record does not identify any local charter provision, ordinance, or administrative rule that would prohibit adoption of either party’s proposal or the panel’s recommendation. To the extent the City’s compensation practices are governed by internal budgetary or administrative policies, those considerations are reflected in the fiscal evidence addressed under Factor (4). Factor (2) therefore does not independently resolve the dispute. Factor (3): Stipulations of the Parties The panel notes several areas of agreement reflected in the record, including the parties’ mutual reliance on the CPS HR compensation study as the analytical framework for evaluating salary structure and comparability, and the absence of dispute regarding the mechanics of converting incumbents to a nine-step salary schedule. In addition, the Union’s submission reflects a stipulated “me-too” concept tied to other bargaining-unit settlements reached through June 30, 2026. These stipulations narrow the scope of dispute and inform the panel’s analysis, but do not eliminate disagreement over the appropriate equity adjustment, term, or implementation. Factor (4) – Public Interest and Ability to Pay Union Contention: The Union argues that the City’s overall financial condition supports meaningful wage movement and that insufficient equity undermines morale and service quality. City Contention: The City responds that Exhibit 9 demonstrates substantial projected growth in non-wage costs, particularly pension and healthcare, necessitating moderation in base wage commitments. Panel Assessment: The record supports the conclusion that the Union’s proposals, viewed in isolation, would not render the City unable to meet its current obligations or continue operations. At the same time, the City’s fiscal exhibits demonstrate that personnel-related 6 costs—particularly pension and healthcare—are projected to increase materially over the coming years, independent of negotiated wage adjustments. Accordingly, while the panel agrees that the Union’s proposals do not threaten the City’s financial viability, the panel also finds that the City’s concern with long-term fiscal sustainability is well grounded. Factor (4) therefore supports a balanced approach that provides meaningful employee relief while avoiding commitments that could compound projected cost growth or limit flexibility in future fiscal years. Factor (5) – Comparability Union Contention: The Union relies on CPS HR midpoint lag data to argue that employees trail the market and require additional wage movement. City Contention: The City argues that CPS HR data must be interpreted in light of structural compression and that maximum-range comparisons demonstrate alignment. Panel Assessment: The parties rely on the CPS HR compensation study as the primary source of external comparability evidence. That study compares 44 benchmark classifications to a stipulated group of comparator agencies and evaluates compensation at multiple reference points, including minimum, midpoint, and maximum. (Ex. 7.) The Union emphasizes CPS HR’s finding that a number of benchmark classifications fall below market at the midpoint, including several classifications identified as more than ten percent below the comparator median. The Union argues that midpoint lag is a meaningful indicator of overall market competitiveness and supports additional wage adjustments beyond structural reform. The City does not dispute the existence of midpoint lag for certain classifications, but argues that the CPS HR data must be interpreted in context. The City notes that the same study reflects closer alignment with the market at the maximum of the range and attributes midpoint lag primarily to the compressed five-step salary structure rather than to pervasive underpayment. The City relies on CPS HR’s recommendation to expand range widths and increase the number of steps as the appropriate remedy. The panel finds that the CPS HR data, viewed as a whole, support the City’s characterization of the comparability issue as predominantly structural. CPS HR expressly identifies the limited number of steps and narrow range widths as contributing to rapid top-out and distorted midpoint comparisons. In this context, midpoint lag does not necessarily indicate that employees are systematically underpaid relative to the market, but rather that the existing structure constrains progression through the range. At the same time, the panel recognizes that structural reform alone may not result in perceptible first-year wage movement for all employees, particularly those whose placement on the expanded nine-step structure yields smaller incremental increases. To 7 that extent, the Union’s concern regarding comparability in practice—not merely in theory—is well taken. Accordingly, the panel concludes that Factor (5) supports a hybrid approach: adoption of the CPS HR-recommended nine-step salary structure to address the underlying structural causes of midpoint lag, coupled with a modest equity adjustment to ensure that the transition produces meaningful movement for employees whose initial placement would otherwise result in limited increases. This approach aligns with the methodology and intent of the CPS HR study and appropriately balances the competing interpretations of the comparability data presented by the parties. Factor (6) – Cost of Living Union Contention: The Union contends that inflation and cost-of-living increases since expiration of the prior agreement have eroded employees’ real wages, and that cost-of-living trends support additional economic adjustments to ensure that negotiated compensation provides meaningful relief. City Contention: The City acknowledges inflationary pressures but argues that cost-of-living data must be considered in conjunction with overall compensation and long-term fiscal obligations and cautions against adopting automatic or permanent wage increases based solely on fluctuating inflation measures. Panel Assessment: The panel recognizes that cost-of-living increases have affected bargaining-unit employees during the period following expiration of the prior memorandum of understanding. The Union cites inflationary pressures as contributing to erosion in real wages and argues that cost-of-living trends are a relevant consideration in evaluating whether the parties’ proposals provide meaningful economic relief. The City does not dispute that inflation has occurred, but emphasizes that cost-of-living data must be considered in conjunction with overall compensation and long-term fiscal obligations. The City further notes that inflation rates have fluctuated over recent years and cautions against adopting automatic mechanisms that could produce permanent wage increases disconnected from future fiscal conditions. The panel finds that cost-of-living considerations are relevant and provide important context for evaluating the parties’ proposals, but do not, standing alone, dictate a single outcome. Rather, Factor (6) informs the panel’s assessment of whether the overall economic package appropriately balances employee purchasing power with fiscal prudence. In this regard, the panel finds that cost-of-living concerns may reasonably be addressed through different mechanisms, including a defined cost-of-living adjustment or a limited wage reopener during the contract term. Each approach presents tradeoffs between predictability and flexibility. A defined adjustment can provide certainty to employees and assist in long-term planning, while a reopener allows the parties to revisit wages based on 8 updated economic and fiscal information. The appropriate mechanism must therefore be evaluated in light of the full record, including the extent of first-year wage movement resulting from salary structure changes and the need to address other unresolved compensation issues during the term. Factor (7) – Overall Compensation Union Contention: The Union emphasizes that employees bear rising benefit costs and that overall compensation analysis should account for take-home pay impacts. City Contention: The City emphasizes that employer-paid pension and healthcare costs significantly increase total compensation costs regardless of wage increases. Panel Assessment: In evaluating total compensation, the panel considers not only base wages, but also employer-paid benefits, including pension contributions, health insurance premiums, and retiree medical obligations. Exhibits 9 and 10 demonstrate that these benefit components represent a substantial and increasing share of the City’s personnel costs, independent of negotiated wage increases. The Union argues that employees experience compensation primarily through take-home pay and out-of-pocket costs, and emphasizes that rising medical premiums and cost sharing have diminished the practical value of wage increases. The Union therefore contends that both wage adjustments and health insurance provisions must be evaluated together to assess whether the overall compensation package provides meaningful economic relief. The City, while acknowledging employee concerns regarding healthcare costs, emphasizes that the City bears the majority of benefit cost growth and that escalating pension and healthcare expenditures materially affect the City’s long-term fiscal obligations. The City further argues that structural wage reform—rather than across-the-board wage increases—provides a more sustainable means of improving compensation over time. The panel finds that the conversion from a five-step to a nine-step salary structure represents a significant component of overall compensation. By expanding range widths and increasing the number of progression steps, the revised structure addresses compression, extends earnings growth over a longer portion of an employee’s career, and reduces the rapid top-out that characterized the prior structure. When combined with a targeted equity adjustment, the structural changes produce immediate and ongoing compensation improvements that are not fully captured by base wage comparisons alone. With respect to health insurance, the panel does not find the Union’s proposal to be unreasonable or fiscally destabilizing in the short term. However, given the City’s stated intention to undertake a comprehensive review of health insurance offerings and the recurring nature of benefit cost commitments, the panel finds that deferring resolution of health insurance through limited reopeners appropriately balances the Union’s concern regarding out-of-pocket costs with the City’s need to evaluate long-term sustainability. 9 Accordingly, the panel concludes that Factor (7) supports an overall compensation approach that combines structural wage reform and a modest equity adjustment, while preserving a mechanism to address health insurance issues within the term based on more complete information. Factor (8) – Other Traditional Factors (Including Retroactivity) The parties dispute whether retroactive implementation of economic terms is appropriate. The City correctly notes that full retroactivity to the date of contract expiration or to earlier bargaining milestones was not proposed during negotiations, and that the FPP was rejected by the Union’s membership in October 2025. The panel agrees that the bargaining record does not reflect a clear or mutually understood demand for full retroactivity to the contract expiration date. The panel nevertheless finds that some measure of retroactivity is appropriate under the circumstances presented here. Since the October 2025 vote, the parties have proceeded through the statutory impasse resolution process, and several additional months have elapsed. As of January 7, 2026, the matter had effectively transitioned from active bargaining to panel deliberation, and the remaining delay reflects the normal operation of the statutory process rather than continued negotiations or unilateral conduct by either party. The panel therefore distinguishes between full retroactivity to the date of contract expiration—which the panel does not find supported by the bargaining record—and limited retroactivity to a date that reasonably reflects the passage of time following impasse and submission to factfinding. In the panel’s judgment, January 7, 2026 (the day of this Factfinding Hearing) represents a fair and rational implementation date that acknowledges the delay experienced by employees while avoiding the fiscal and precedent-setting concerns associated with full retroactivity. In reaching this conclusion, the panel also considers the City’s fiscal evidence. Exhibits 9 and 10 demonstrate that pension and healthcare costs are increasing and that retroactive wage adjustments carry recurring cost implications. However, the panel finds that limited retroactivity to January 7, 2026—particularly in the context of the structural wage reforms and targeted equity adjustment recommended herein—does not materially undermine the City’s ability to meet its financial obligations or plan responsibly for future fiscal years. The panel further notes that the recommended retroactive date is not intended to assign fault or reopen bargaining history, but rather to equitably account for the time elapsed since impasse while preserving the integrity of the bargaining process. Accordingly, the panel concludes that retroactive implementation of the recommended economic terms effective January 7, 2026 appropriately balances the interests of the parties and the public under Government Code section 3505.4(d). 10 VII. PANEL’S REASONED RECOMMENDATIONS After careful consideration of the entire record, including Exhibits 1 through 11 and the parties’ written submissions, and having evaluated the parties’ final positions under each of the statutory criteria set forth in Government Code section 3505.4(d), the panel concludes that a balanced resolution is warranted—one that provides meaningful and perceptible economic relief to employees while remaining fiscally responsible and consistent with the bargaining record. 9-Step Salary Structure The panel finds that the primary economic issue presented in this case is structural rather than purely quantitative. The CPS HR compensation study, relied upon by both parties, persuasively demonstrates that the City’s prior five-step salary structure contributed to compression, rapid top-out, and distorted midpoint comparisons. The panel therefore concludes that conversion to a nine-step salary structure with expanded range widths is an appropriate and necessary foundation for addressing comparability and long-term compensation concerns. Equity Adjustment At the same time, the panel recognizes that structural reform alone may not result in meaningful first-year wage movement for all employees. Both parties acknowledge this concern through their respective proposals for a minimum movement or equity adjustment. The panel recognizes that the FPP included a 1.5% minimum movement mechanism, while the Union proposed a 2.0% equity adjustment. The difference between the parties’ positions is therefore relatively narrow in percentage terms and reflects a disagreement at the margins rather than a fundamental dispute regarding the appropriateness of an equity floor. The panel finds that, in general terms, the incremental cost associated with an additional one-half percent equity adjustment is relatively modest when viewed in the context of the City’s overall personnel budget and the total cost of the structural salary reforms recommended herein. The panel finds that adoption of a 2.0% equity adjustment does not materially alter the City’s long-term cost trajectory as reflected in Exhibits 9 and 10, particularly when considered in conjunction with the absence of full retroactivity to contract expiration, the limited nature of the retroactivity recommended herein, and the structural—not across-the-board—character of the wage changes. From the employees’ perspective, the panel finds that the difference between a 1.5% and 2.0% equity adjustment is meaningful. A 2.0% floor more clearly ensures perceptible first-year wage movement for employees whose placement on the expanded nine-step structure 11 would otherwise yield limited increases and reduces the likelihood that such employees will view the structural conversion as largely prospective in effect. Accordingly, the panel concludes that the Union’s proposed 2.0% equity adjustment represents a reasonable and proportionate resolution of the parties’ narrow disagreement, providing enhanced assurance of meaningful first-year movement without undermining the City’s demonstrated interest in fiscal sustainability. Term In evaluating the appropriate term of the successor agreement, the panel considers not only the nominal fiscal years covered, but the practical timing of implementation. Although negotiations concern a successor agreement beginning in FY 2025–2026, the record reflects that implementation will occur well into that fiscal year. As a result, a shorter nominal term would, in practice, require the parties to return to negotiations or impasse resolution almost immediately. The panel therefore concludes that a four-year agreement best promotes labor stability while the parties implement significant structural wage reforms and address unresolved benefit issues. A longer term reduces the likelihood of repeated impasse proceedings and provides a meaningful opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the revised salary structure and equity adjustment. The panel further finds that staggered reopeners appropriately balance predictability and flexibility. A health insurance reopener after the first year recognizes the Union’s concern regarding rising out-of-pocket costs while crediting the City’s representation that it requires time to complete a comprehensive review of its health insurance offerings. The panel emphasizes that this structure presumes that such a review will commence promptly, so that informed bargaining can occur when the reopener is triggered. A wage reopener after the second year provides the parties with an opportunity to reassess wages based on observed outcomes of the new salary structure, equity adjustment, and cost-of-living conditions, without reopening wage issues prematurely. Taken together, this framework provides stability in the near term while preserving flexibility to address evolving economic and benefit considerations during the later years of the agreement. COLA In weighing the cost-of-living considerations discussed under Factor (6), the panel concludes that a defined, one-time cost-of-living adjustment is preferable in this case to reopening wages during the second year of the agreement. Although a limited wage reopener would preserve flexibility, the panel finds that, especially in light of the insurance issues discussed, the parties are better served by having the wage issue resolved for the second year. 12 The panel further notes that, although the recommended successor agreement is nominally a four-year agreement beginning in FY 2025–2026, implementation will occur well into that fiscal year. As a practical matter, the parties will be approaching the end of the agreement’s effective life by the time the recommended terms are implemented. In this context, a defined adjustment provides greater certainty to both parties and more accurately reflects the limited remaining duration of the agreement.
Accordingly, the panel recommends a cost-of-living adjustment effective July 1, 2026, equal to the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), Los Angeles–Long Beach–Anaheim Area, All Items (Not Seasonally Adjusted), as published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, measured from July 2025 to July 2026. Given that the adjustment applies to a single year and follows substantial first-year wage movement, the panel does not find it necessary to impose caps or floors.
In recommending a defined cost-of-living adjustment rather than a wage reopener, the panel seeks to balance recognition of inflationary conditions with the need for predictability and to allow the parties to focus bargaining efforts during the term on health insurance and related benefit issues.
Health Insurance
The panel does not find the Union’s proposal to be unreasonable or fiscally destabilizing in the short term. The record supports the conclusion that the Union’s proposal would not pose an existential threat to the City’s finances. However, the panel also credits the City’s representation that it requires additional time to complete a comprehensive review of health insurance options in light of escalating and recurring benefit costs. In this context, the panel finds that a limited reopener on health insurance appropriately balances the Union’s legitimate concern regarding out-of-pocket costs with the City’s need for a more complete analytical foundation before making long-term benefit commitments.
Retroactivity
Finally, the panel addresses the issue of retroactivity. The City is correct that full retroactivity to the date of contract expiration was not consistently proposed during bargaining, and the panel does not find the record to support retroactive implementation to that date. Nevertheless, the panel is mindful that the Union’s membership vote rejecting the City’s final proposal occurred in October 2025, and that several additional months have elapsed through the statutory impasse resolution process. As of January 7, 2026, the matter had effectively transitioned to panel deliberation, and further delay reflects the normal operation of the statutory process rather than continued negotiations.
The panel therefore concludes that limited retroactivity to January 7, 2026 appropriately balances the equities. This date acknowledges the passage of time following impasse, provides employees with partial relief for the delay in implementation, and avoids the fiscal and precedent concerns associated with full retroactivity. The panel finds that this limited retroactivity, when considered in conjunction with the structural wage reforms and equity 13 adjustment recommended herein, does not materially impair the City’s financial ability to meet its obligations or plan responsibly for future fiscal years.
Taken together, the panel finds that the recommended package reflects a reasoned synthesis of the evidence, the parties’ positions, and the statutory criteria. While no recommendation can fully satisfy both parties, the panel concludes that this approach provides a fair, balanced, and sustainable resolution that best serves the interests of the employees, the City, and the public.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Term
Adopt a four-year Memorandum of Understanding covering fiscal years 2025–2026 through 2028–2029, consistent with the analysis set forth above.
Salary Structure
Implement the nine-step salary structure recommended by CPS HR, with expanded range widths, and place incumbents on the nearest step at or above their current salary so that no employee experiences a reduction in pay.
Equity Adjustment
Provide a 2.0% equity adjustment for employees whose placement on the new nine-step salary structure would otherwise result in less than a 2.0% increase upon implementation.
Cost-of-Living Adjustment
Effective July 1, 2026, adjust salary schedules by a one-time cost-of-living adjustment equal to the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), Los Angeles–Long Beach–Anaheim Area, All Items (Not Seasonally Adjusted), as published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, measured from July 2025 to July 2026, with no cap or floor.
Reopeners
a. Include a limited reopener on health insurance after the first year of the agreement. b. Include a limited reopener on wages after the second year of the agreement.
Retroactivity
Implement the recommended economic terms retroactive to January 7, 2026, for the reasons set forth under Factor (8).
February 2, 2026 ______________________
Michael H. Leb
Fact Finding Panel Chair
13239022.2 NO040-049
City of Norwalk Factfinding Panel Member’s Recommendations
As the representative of the City of Norwalk (“City”) to the Factfinding Panel, I, Oliver Yee, respectfully concur in part and dissent in part to the Factfinding Report and Recommendations (“Report”) issued by Panel Chair Michael Leb (“Panel Chair”) in the Factfinding involving the City and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 947 (“Union”) in the matter PERB Case No. LA-IM- 348-M.
I respectfully concur with the Panel Chair’s recommendation to implement the nine-step salary structure that was recommended and proposed by consulting firm CPS HR as part of the City’s compensation study. This compensation study was agreed upon by both the City and Union, including an agreement on the comparator cities to be used for the study; and the goal of the study was to bring the salary range for employees up to a competitive market point. I further concur with the Panel Chair’s finding that the current five-step salary structure is in need of reform; and that the nine- step salary structure allows for an expanded range in salary that addresses long-term compensation concerns. In addition, the nine-step salary structure would result in not only immediate salary increases for employees, but long-term salary growth. As an example, an employee at the top step of the current five-step salary structure would have additional opportunities of salary growth via continued movement up the steps until step nine.
In its final proposal issued back on August 6, 2025, the City proposed implementation of the nine-step salary structure. The Union rejected this proposal.
Accordingly, the City was prohibited from implementing the nine-step salary structure.
Had the Union accepted the City’s proposal at that time, the nine-step salary structure could have been in place since late summer/early fall of 2025. Accordingly, the delay in implementation of the nine-step salary structure and the corresponding wage increases that would have resulted from it was not due to any City action. Had the Union accepted the City’s proposal back on August 6, 2025, the nine-step salary structure would be in place today.
I dissent from the Panel Chair’s other findings. Those findings do not effectively balance the long-term financial stability and responsibility of the City, the interests and welfare of the public, and needs of the employees.
13239022.2 NO040-049
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend adoption of the City’s last, best and final offer issued on August 6, 2025, which importantly includes the immediate implementation of the nine-step salary structure. I also recommend adoption of the tentative agreements reached between the parties up until August 6, 2025.
Respectfully submitted by:
February 10, 2026 ___________________________
Oliver Yee
City of Norwalk Factfinding Panel Member
/s/ Oliver Yee
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CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART OF UNION PANEL MEMBER SALVADOR VAZQUEZ Case No. LA-IM-348-M
WEINBERG, ROGER &
ROSENFELD
A Professional Corporation
800 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1020
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 380-2344
Salvador “Sal” Vasquez
Union Panelist
President Directing Business Representative
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 947
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
City of Norwalk,
Employer,
v.
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 947,
Union.
PERB Case No. LA-IM-348-M
CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT
IN PART OF UNION PANEL MEMBER
SALVADOR VASQUEZ
Factfinding Date: January 7, 2026
Chairperson: Michael H. Leb, Arbitrator
I. TERM
I dissent from the chairperson’s recommendation on this issue. The Union’s position is that the contract term should be one year, effective July 1, 2025 to June 31, 2026.
II. SALARY STRUCTURE
I concur in part and dissent in part with the Chairperson’s recommendation to adjust the salary structure. I concur that the nine-step salary structure is permissible, only if every bargaining unit employee receives at least a 2% increase upon implementation.
III. COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENT
I concur in part and dissent in part with the Chairperson’s recommendation that, effective July 1, 2026, the City adjust salary schedules by a one-time cost-of living adjustment equal to the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U, Los Angeles- 1 2
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CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART OF UNION PANEL MEMBER SALVADOR VAZQUEZ Case No. LA-IM-348-M
WEINBERG, ROGER &
ROSENFELD
A Professional Corporation
800 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1020
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 380-2344
Long Beach-Anaheim Area, All Items (Not Seasonally Adjusted), as published by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, measured from July 2025 to July 2026, with no cap or floor.
I concur that the salary adjustment, as described, should take place, effective July 1, 2026.
I dissent to the extent that the cost-of-living adjustment infers a multi-year agreement. As noted above, the Union agrees to a one-year agreement term only.
IV. REOPENERS
I dissent from the chairperson’s recommendation that the contract includes any reopeners.
As noted above, the Union agrees to a one-year agreement term only. I further dissent that the contract would not include any change to the status quo regarding health care, for the reasons described below in VI.
V. RETROACTIVITY
I dissent from the chairperson’s recommendation that the effective date of the economic terms should be January 7, 2026. The Union’s position is that economic terms should be retroactive to the beginning of the contract term, July 1, 2025.
VI. HEALTH CARE
I dissent from the chairperson’s lack of recommendation to change the status quo related to health care contributions. The Union’s position is that, effective January 1, 2026, the City should impose a cap on the increases that IAM District Lodge 947-represented employees must contribute to increased health care costs. Specifically, that the City pays for increases beyond 30% or $25 dollars, whichever is greater.
The above proposal would only begin to address the inequities in pay and health care costs that exist in the Norwalk General and Hourly Units. As discussed at the fact-finding hearing, City’s management enjoys premium healthcare with no ($0.00) out-of-pocket costs for any individual management employees. Precisely, Management’s Agreement states that:
The City shall allocate the full insurance premium of the highest family plan rate as designated by CalPERS for the acquisition of health benefits.
Employees will receive a rebate of 50% of any unused allocation. The City's contribution for dental insurance shall be 100% employer-paid for family coverage for the term of this MOU. The City’s contribution for 1 2
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CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART OF UNION PANEL MEMBER SALVADOR VAZQUEZ Case No. LA-IM-348-M
WEINBERG, ROGER &
ROSENFELD
A Professional Corporation
800 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1020
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 380-2344
vision insurance shall be 100% employer-paid for family coverage for the term of this MOU.1 (emphasis added)
The Union’s proposal provides an extremely small step towards equalizing the disparity that exists between a zero-cost premium healthcare to management, and the enormously high out- of-pocket costs IAM-employees currently pay. Currently, the City contributes only $1,600 per month for IAM-represented healthcare in the general unit. The City proposes no increase contributions at all, and that no cap take effect. This means that some IAM-represented employees will pay nearly $800 out-of-pocket for one month of healthcare in 2026. Still others will pay $616.66 and $235.82 per month. The cost to implement the Union’s proposed cap is only $4,164.10 per month, or $48.969.20 per year, to the City. Considering management has zero out-of-pocket costs, and the City Manager’s monthly salary effective June 22, 2025, was $29,928 (x 12 = $359,136/year),2 imposing a cap on the amount IAM employees must contribute to health care is “pennies” within the City’s budget. Though just pennies to the City’s budget, this enormously modest request could have a massive impact on the IAM members’ ability to pay their basic monthly bills.
This proposal still does not bring the City close to providing equality between management and IAM-represented employees in terms of their health care costs. Even accepting this proposal, management continues to enjoy the highest cost health care for free because IAM employees are paying out of their meager salaries for their healthcare costs. The Union’s proposal simply limits the increasing amounts that its members must pay out of their low incomes for a basic benefit.
The City has never disputed that it has the funds to pay for this modest Union proposal.
1 See Memorandum of Understanding Between The City of Norwalk and the Norwalk Association of Management Employees, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2029, at p. 11, available at:
https://cms3.revize.com/revize/norwalkca/Documents/Departments%20&%20Services/Human% 20Resources/Memorandum%20of%20Understanding%20(MOUs)/NAME%20MOU%202025- 2029%20FINAL.pdf?t=202509031359570&t=202509031359570.
2 See Resolution No. 25-28, City of Norwalk, June 17, 2025, available at https://cms3.revize.com/revize/norwalkca/Documents/Departments%20&%20Services/Human% 20Resources/RES%2025-28%20Salary%20Schedule%20as%20of%2006-22- 2025_Approved.pdf?t=202508121842160&t=202508121842160.
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CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART OF UNION PANEL MEMBER SALVADOR VAZQUEZ Case No. LA-IM-348-M
WEINBERG, ROGER &
ROSENFELD
A Professional Corporation
800 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1020
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 380-2344
Dated: February 11, 2026
By: SALVADOR VASQUEZ
Salvador “Sal” Vasquez
Union Panelist
President Directing Business Representative
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 947