Cities Index.
View Supplemental Report - PEC 7/7/2022

Rules & Legislation Committee
June 23, 2022

Document
View Supplemental Report - PEC 7/7/2022
Meeting
June 23, 2022
Body
Rules & Legislation Committee
Original file
2.9 MB
Text extracted from the city's file for reading and search. Open the original on oakland.legistar1.com. That file is the official record.

Race for Power :

How Money in Oakland Politics
Creates and Perpetuates Disparities
Across Income and Race

September 2020
Public Ethics Commission
1 Frank Ogawa Plaza (City Hall), Room 104
Oakland, CA 94612
www.oaklandca.gov/pec
[email protected]
(510) 238-3593
City of Oakland
Public Ethics Commission

Race for Power:

How Money in Oakland Politics
Creates and Perpetuates
Disparities Across Income and Race

i
Contents
Executive Summary..................................................................................................................................... 1 Oakland Campaign Finance Outcomes ....................................................................................................... 3 Existing Laws Produced Some Benefits ................................................................................................... 4 Campaigns Need Money, Seek out Wealthy Donors............................................................................... 4 Campaign Data Reveals Racial and Income Disparities ........................................................................... 6 Non-Oaklanders Hold Political Power ..................................................................................................... 7 Campaign Donors or Independent Spenders Choose Who Wins Elections ............................................. 8 Campaign Donors May Influence Policy Outcomes ................................................................................ 8 Campaign Finance System Perpetuates Distrust in Government ............................................................ 9 The Need for Change ............................................................................................................................ 10 New Paradigm Needed for Equitable Engagement .................................................................................. 11 Equity Demands Intentional Restructuring of Systems ......................................................................... 11 Oaklander Input .................................................................................................................................... 11 Overview of Survey Responses ............................................................................................................. 12 Desire for More Information ................................................................................................................. 13 Designing the System for Equity ............................................................................................................... 15 Democracy Dollars Incentivize Broader Engagement in Seattle ........................................................... 15 Cash in the Hands of All Voters Changes Candidate Behavior .............................................................. 16 Outreach Efforts Are Critical to Building Community Engagement and Promoting Vouchers .............. 17 Community Liaisons Connect and Build Trust ....................................................................................... 17 Nonprofit Sector Working to Empower and Raise Capacity of Individual and Community Influence ... 18 Small Dollar Matching Programs Offer Another Alternative for Reform ............................................... 18 Innovative Data and Information-Sharing Empowers Communities ..................................................... 20 Empowering Communities Through Effective Public Engagement ....................................................... 21 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................ 23 APPENDIX 1: Contributions to Council Races by Oakland Residents, 2016 and 2018 ............................... 25 APPENDIX 2: Contributions to Council Races by Donor Location, 2016 and 2018 Elections ..................... 33 APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 – 2018 .................................................... 35 APPENDIX 4: Oakland Demographics ........................................................................................................ 41 APPENDIX 5: Independent Expenditures for Candidates by Committee, 2014 - 2018 .............................. 45

Page | 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a leader in social justice and civic involvement, Oakland is, in many ways, rich in dialogue and action when it comes to authentic democracy. Yet the City lacks an effective a pproach to ensuring the campaign process is equally robust in providing Oaklanders with meaningful opportunities to participate in the process of selecting its City leadership . Big money is essentially a prerequisite for winning office; local candidates who have the most financial support typically win and must rely on donors to provide financial resources needed to run an effective campaign. This reliance on money as the driving force means winners are selected and policy may be shaped by those who can contribute to political campaigns. Campaign data shows that less than half of campaign funds come from Oakland residents, only a tiny fraction of Oaklanders make contributions to candidates for political office, and that fraction is more concentrated in the whitest and wealthiest neighborhoods within the City. This system results in clear inequities in participation for people of color and low-income communities.

In 1999, Oakland created a then-new system of
providing funds to candidates seeking elective
office with the goal of reducing the influence
of money in politics and diversifying the pool
of candidates running for office, among other
aims. At that time, public funding of elections,
combined with contribution limits and other
restrictions, was the go -to solution to the
concern that contributions can have a
corrupting influence on candidates and
officeholders.

More recently, with advances in civic
engagement practices , heightened attention
to user-centered design, and expansion of
racial and socio -economic equity work,
innovative Cities are adopt ing creative
solutions to involve more of their residents in
City g overnment. In the campaign fi nance
world, these new approaches to civic
engagement and equity provide opportunities
to engage and empower voices that historically have been left out of the political process and , ultimately, to diversify and equitably expand participation in campaign and civic life.

This report evaluates outcomes from Oakland’s existing pu blic financing program and overall campaign finance system, articulates the ways in which some Oaklanders lack political power, explores current trends and b est practices across jurisdictions and subject-matter fields, and recommends a new approach for Oakland to expand and diversify participation and influence in the campaign process. Oakland must intentionally disassemble its existing campaign finance system that results in disproportionate participation, leaving out people of color and low-income communities, and instead build a civic-engagement infrastructure and political leadership evaluation, recruitment, and selection process that facilitates broad, inclusive, meaningful, and equitable engagement by all Oaklanders.

Page | 2

Page | 3

OAKLAND CAMPAIGN FINANCE OUTCOMES

The Oakland Public Ethics Commissi on ( PEC or Commission) is charged with, among other things, implementing and enforcing campaign finance, ethics, and transparency laws, and conducting reviews of these laws to determine whether changes to City ordinances are necessary. The Commission makes recommendations to City Council regarding changes in policy and law to ensure effective implementation and successful outcomes.

State and local campaign finance laws were
designed to reduce the influence of money in
politics by placing limits on contributions,
requiring the disclosure of campaign
contributions a nd expenditures on campaign
forms, and ensuring that campaign materials
include disclosure statements that identify who
provided si gnificant funding to pay for those
materials, among other provisions . Oakland’s
existing system of public financing further
provides limited financing to candidates running
for City Council district seats , with the aim of
achieving the goals listed in the sidebar on this
page. These local laws, when passed, attempted
to address the problem of money in politics:

1. First, the Oakland Campaign Reform Act ,
adopted in 1999, limits the amount of
spending on City campaigns by allowing
candidates to raise donations in substantially
larger amounts if they agree to limit their
overall campaign spending . It also impos es
contribution limits on persons giving money
to candidates running for local elective office
and requir es electronic filing of campaign
contributions and expenditures to illuminate
the flow of money through political
campaigns.

2. Second, the Limited Public Financing Act ,
adopted in 2001, aims to lessen the
fundraising burden on candidates and
enhance competition by giving candidates
some public funds for their campaigns in the
form of reimbursements for campaign
spending, so long as they meet certain
criteria.

OAKLAND ’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY GOALS
The stated purposes of the Oakland Campaign
Reform Act and Limited Public Financing Act are as
follows:

A. Ensure that all individuals and interest groups in
our City have a fair and equal opportunity to
participate in elective and governmental
processes;
B. Reduce the influence of large contributors with
a specific financial stake in matters u nder
consideration by the City, and to counter the
perception that decisions are influenced more
by the size of contributions than by the best
interests of the people of Oakland;
C. Limit overall expenditures in campaigns, thereby
reducing the pressure on can didates to raise
large campaign war chests for defensive
purposes, beyond the amount necessary to
communicate reasonably with voters.

D. Reduce the advantage of incumbents and thus
encourage competition for elective office;
E. Allow candidates and elected City officials to
spend a smaller proportion of their time on
fundraising and a greater proportion of their
time dealing with issues of importance to their
constituents and the community;
F. Ensure that serious candidates are able to raise
enough money to communicate their views and
positions adequately to the public, thereby
promoting public discussion of the important
issues involved in political campaigns; and
G. Help restore public trust in governmental and
electoral institutions.

Oakland Campaign Reform Act, OMC Section

3.12.030; Limited Public Financing Act, OMC Section

3.13.030.

Page | 4

The general framework for these laws was forward -thinking at the time they were passed; however, with advancements in laws and practices in cities and states across the nation, the Commission now reviews outcomes produced by the current system to assess whether changes are necessary to better meet Oakland’s goals.

Existing Laws Produced Some Benefits
A PEC-initiated review of Oakland’s Limited Public Financing (LPF) program conducted in coordination with the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy in 2013 concluded that, as of that time, the LPF program had not reduced the influence of large contributors in local elections . The program also had not reduced the pressure faced by candidates to fundraise, nor led to an increase in the number of candidates pursuing local office . It had, however, resulted in more competitive races – both in the number of contested races and incumbent margin of victory – and led to non -incumbent candidates who received public funds performing better across the board than non -incumbent candidates who did not receive public funds. The review further noted that Oakland’s LPF program did not increase the number and power of small donors after it became a reimbursement program in 2010.1 Lastly, the LPF program does not – and cannot – decrease the influence of large donors in local elections, due to the United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United, which restricts government from limiting independent expenditures made by persons or committees not coordinating with a candidate.2 While the 2013 review evaluated whether the LPF program was meeting its stated goals, more recent reviews look at the other side of the power scale. Rather than focusing on reducing the influence o f money in politics, these later assessments – to be discussed below – aim to understand how the system can increase power for all people to engage meaningfully in the pro cess of selecting City leaders to enhance equity, expand civic participation, and create a more authentic democracy.

Campaigns Need Money, Seek out Wealthy Donors
Unfortunately, the current system requires candidates to raise a significant amount of money to pay for campaign costs such as campaign materials, signs , mailers, postage for mailings , campaign staff and consultants. As a result, campaigns seek out contributions from wealthy donors since those are the individuals who can afford to give money. This issue was explored in a second PEC-initiated review conducted in coordination with the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Publi c Policy in 2018 to evaluate the LPF program through an equity lens. The review sought to explore the demographics of those who participate in campaigns and identify barriers to political participation in the selection of City leaders.3 The 2018 review hi ghlighted the source of contributions made to candidate campaigns (wealthier donors) as well as the target of candidates’ campaign outre ach (prior/high propensity voters), and it concluded that the result is a system that leaves out low -income communities and communities of color who donate and vote at lower rates than wealthier, whiter communities. This system is self - perpetuating, such that candidates are incentivized to continue to focus on engaging wealthier donors

1 Evaluating Oakland’s Limited Public Financing Act, Greg Gonzales, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, Spring 2013. Up until 2010, the LPF program was a matching fund program in which the City matched, dollar-for-dollar, the first $100 of every Oakland-based contribution.
2 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 2010. 3 Enhancing Political Engagement in Oakland: Barriers and Solutions, Dyana Mardon, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, Spring 2018.

Page | 5

– who are already e ngaged in the polit ical process and who have money to give – over communities with less access and lower engagement in the City’s political process.4 The problem is that this need for money does not naturally “incentivize candidates to listen to their potential constituents; rather, it incentivizes candidates to seek out wealthy donors.”5 This is reflected in the advice that campaign consultants often provide to candidates to raise money in the hills of Oakland to pay for sending advertisements to residents in the flatlands. 6 Not only is the system set up to prefer wealthy and high propensity voters, but the people who lead and manage campaigns also naturally play a role in deciding how to conduct campaign fundraising or marketing. Local candidates and campaign workers have voiced concern about campaign consultants who guide campaigns to spend the vast majority of energy and resources on high propensity voters – people who vote in every election every time – because, consultants say, that is how you win an election.7

4 Id.
5 Enhancing Political Engagement in Oakland: Barriers and Solutions, Dyana Mardon, MPP, Spring 2018, p. 4. Citing Lioz, Adam, “Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy and Our Economy,” Demos, 2014. 6 Comments made by Dyana Mardon, summarizing interviews with local candidates during her research for Enhancing Political Engagement in Oakland: Barriers and Solutions, Dyana Mardon, MPP, Spring 2018. 7 Comments provided to Commission staff by Nayeli Maxson Velázquez, candidate for Oakland City Council District 4 in the 2018 Election, along with other candidates throughout the course of the Commission’s review.

FEEDBACK FROM CANDIDATES AND CAMPAIGN WORKERS IN THE FIELD Candidates and campaign workers speak up about traditional campaigning:
“As a candidate for office in Oakland, sitting and former councilmembers and mayors alike advised me to secure a professional consultant who had experience consulting Oakland candidates who won their election,” said Nayeli Maxson Velázquez, former candidate for City Council in 2018 . “These consultants are expensive to hire. After I had secured one such consultant, the pressure to fundraise became overwhelming.

Although my original vision was a grassroots door-to-door campaign, the pressure from consultants and from prospective endorsers to fundraise in order to establish viability made it difficult to protect time for me, the candidate, to knock on doors. My time was deemed by the experienced elected officials and professionals I spoke with as better spent on the phone raising money from those who had funds to donate than spent on speaking with prospective voters at th e door. After months of prioritizing raising money over canvassing voters, I found it difficult to stay connected to the residents I was seeking to represent and had to push back on consultants, simply raise fewer funds, and had less money to spend on onli ne ads and mailers during the final push of the campaign.”
“This method of campaigning further disenfranchises voters who are Black and of color,” said Elika Bernard, former Regional Organizing Director for a presidential campaign in Northern California. “ What it does is maintain a system that keeps wealth and political power in white communities. In my almost five months of campaigning I made thousands of phone calls. In those thousands of phone calls, I only spoke with one Black woman. I questioned senior leadership as to why this kept happening. Their response was that if people don’t engage with campaigns then their information won’t be in [the campaign consultant vendor’s voter information data system].”
Nationally, only one percent of campaign consu ltants are people of color , said Chuck Rocha, of Solidarity Strategies, upon the launch of the National Association of Diverse Consultants. “The lack of diversity among our elected officials and the top aides who help them win office impairs their ability to understand the diverse perspectives in their districts. If we are more intentional about the way that we ensure diversity in political campaigns, public offices and the rooms where decisions are made, it will transform the way that political leaders show up during moments of crisis. It is also how we can effect change that is inclusive and meaningful.”

Page | 6

Campaign Data Reveals Racial and Income Disparities
Campaign finance data8 shows that campaign donors are overrepresented in areas of the City that are disproportionately wealthy and white and non -representative of the racial and socioeconomic diversity of Oakland residents overall.9
Over half of contributions from Oakland residents (52 percent) come from neighborhoods in just four zip codes (94611, 94 610, 94618, and 94612). Over 80 percent of Oaklanders live in zip codes that are ethnically and racially diverse.10 However, campaign data from Oakland’s 2014, 2016, and 2018 election cycles shows that 42 percent of contributions made to Oakland candidates came from the three Oakland zip codes that are comprised of residents with the highest median household income in the City. Additionally, the data shows that these same zip codes contain over a 50 percent white population.11

8 The Oakland campaign finance data used for this report comes from the City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure, data from most recent filings for the years 2013 – 2019, last accessed 5/21/19. Oakland campaign committees submit campaign finance data according to the deadlines and reporting requirements of the California Political Reform Act. 9 Oakland demographic data cited in this report comes from American Community Survey (ACS) 2018 5-Year Estimates. The ACS is an ongoing survey by the U.S. Census Bureau.
10 For the purposes of this report, diverse zip codes are defined as U.S. Census Bureau Zip Code Tabulation Areas with 50 percent or more of the population identifying as "Hispanic or Latino" or a race other than "White Alone." DATA SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Tables B03002; generated by PEC staff using https://api.census.gov; Last access 24 July 2020.
11 Id.

Page | 7

The three zip codes in Oakland, mentioned above, with a majority of white residents and the highest household incomes (94611, 94618, 94610) contributed over $1 million to candidates in the last three City elections, while residents in the City’s three most diverse zip codes (94601, 94603, 94621) contributed just over $136,000. This data further highlights the fact that donors are concentrated in the wealthiest and whitest Oakland neighborhoods.

Moreover, zip code 94611, which includes Montclair and parts of the Oakland H ills, is home to just 9 percent of Oakland’s total population but is the source of 18 percent of all contributors over $100 from Oakland residents ( 400 donors per election on average). Sixty-four percent of residents in that zip code are white , and the median household income is almost double that of Oakland households overall.12
In contrast, the similarly sized zip code 94603 , which includes East Oakland , is comprised of a population made up of 96 percent people of color and households with a median income below that of Oakland overall. Here, the donors accounted for just 1 percent of all Oakland contributions of over $100 (21 donors per election on average ). All told, zip code 94611 contributed 18 times the amount to City candidates as zip code 94603 did in the last three elections.

Non-Oaklanders Hold Political Power
Across the 2014, 2016, and 2018 elections, roughly
half of all contributions to Oakland candidates
came from outside of Oakland . Contributions
coming from o utside of Oakland are quite
common across all campaigns, and some receive
an even higher proportion of outside funds.

Candidates for Council District seats not only
receive most of their funds from non -residents,
most of their Oakland donors are not distr ict
residents,13 and overall elections in districts with
larger low -income communities of color, such as
Districts 3, 6, and 7, receive more outside funding.

During the 2016 District 7 election, for example, 65
percent of itemized contributions came from
individuals, businesses, or committees based
outside of the City. Just seven percent of
contributions came from district residents.

12 Id. Median household income for Oakland residents was $68,442 in 2018. 13 Geospatial analysis by PEC staff. Data for Oakland campaign contributions was geocoded using TAMU GeoServices, a service of the Texas A&M University Department of Geography, which provides free geographic information processing services to researchers to assist in geospatial-related research and data processing, analysis, and visualization. Goldberg DW. 2019. Last accessed 5/22/2019.

Page | 8

Campaign Donors or Independent
Spenders Choose Who Wins
Elections
The fact that the donor class is not fully
representative of Oaklanders is a problem because
political giving can provide access and influence
elected officials. In addition, candidates who raise
the most money in campaign contributions almost
always win in Oakland elections, meaning those
who contribute to a candidate’s campaign – and
help their choice candidate win – are the ones who
actually get to choose City leaders.

In Oakland, those who raise the largest amount of
money in campaign contributions , or who receive
the benefit of independent expenditures spent to
support them or oppose their opponents, typically
win their race for elective office.

Across the 20 14, 2016, and 2018 elections, 92
percent of the seats were won by the candidate
who received the most in contributions and/or had
the most supporting independent expenditures.

Independent expenditures, or expenditures made
in support of or opposition to a candidate running
for office paid for by individuals or committees that
are separate from a candidate’s campaign
committee, are increasing with each election cycle
and have become particularly influential in Oakland
Unified School District Board races. For example, a
single political action committee outspen t
candidates, spending over $600,000 in
independent expenditures during the 2014, 2016,
and 2018 elections. During that time, six out of the
nine candidates supported by the PAC won their
respective races for the seven-member board.

Campaign Donors May Influence
Policy Outcomes
The above dynamics result in certain groups having
greater influence over campaigns ; this in turn has
substantive impact on governme nt decisions such
as policy outcomes , argues UC Berkeley Goldman
School of Public Policy student Brooke Barron .

Barron looked further at voting and contribution
rates from low-income communities and people of
color as part of her work for the American Civil
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
Mayor City
Council, At
Large
City
Council,
District
Winning Candidates Average
Higher Total Contributions
Winning candidates All candidates
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
2014 2016 2018
Third-parties Outspent
Schoolboard Candidates
in 2016 and 2018
Candidate spending Independent expenditures
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
2014 2016 2018
Third-party Spending
Increasing
Across all City Elections
Independent Expenditures - Supporting
Independent Expenditures - Opposing

Page | 9

Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, in collaboration with Bay Rising, California Common Cause, Every Voice, and MapLight.14 This 2018 review cited multiple authorities concluding that policy outcomes depend on who engages in the political process.15 While Barron describes political participation as inclusive of voting, donating, protesting, volunteering for a campaign, contacting elected officials, and running for office, her research found that elected officials and candidates for office are most responsive to two groups: voters and political donors. The latter group, political donors, is more influential , as research cited by Barron indicates that ele cted officials are more responsive to donors’ interests and priorities than voters,16 and that non-constituent donors have more influence on policymakers than constituent non-donors.17 Political scientist Martin Gilens shows that when federal policy prefere nces diverge by income level, “the views of the affluent make a big difference, while support among the middle class and the poor has almost no relationship to policy outcomes,” and identifies the upper -income group’s disproportionate status as donors as an explanation. “When people participate in the political process through voting and donating to political campaigns, they gain access to and influence over policymakers,” Barron concludes. “Policy change requires political engagement.” Campaign Finance System Perpetuates Distrust in Government The above disincentives and political realities are both exacerbated by and contribute to the level of distrust in government – which the Commission heard from community leaders is more prevalent in low-income neighborhoods and communities of color.

Political scientists studying racial efficacy, the
perception that American institutions and society
operate and disburse j ustice in a racially equitable
manner, found that Black Americans with low feelings of racial efficacy are less likely to vote and feel less
politically efficacious, more political mistrust , and
greater feelings of alienation than do white people.18
“Trust is a luxury that many people of color do not enjoy,” said Mary Li of the Multnomah Idea Lab during a presentation on systems change through an equity lens.19

14 Building Political Power through Policy Reform in Oakland, Brooke Barron, MPP, August 2018. 15 Id. Citing Martin, Paul and Michele Claibourn. “Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, January 2013. And Griffin, John and Brian Newman. “Are Voters Better Represented?” Journal of Politics, 2005. And Barber, Michael. “Representing The Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the U.S. Senate,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 2016.
16 Barber, Michael. “Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the U.S. Senate,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 2016. 17 Rhodes, Jesse and Brian Schaffner. “Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data.” April 7, 2013. Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Nathan Gibson. “Senators Responsiveness to Donors versus Voters.” Prepared for SSRC Anxieties in Democracy Conference. Princeton University. October 2016. 18 Matt Barreto, Jonathan Collins, Gregory Leslie, Tye Rush. “Perceived Racial Efficacy and Voter Engagement Among African Americans: A Cautionary Tale from 2016.” March 2018. Using date from the African American Research Collaborative survey. Also citing prior research by Hughes and Demo 1989, Bobo and Gilliam 1990.
19 Lessons in Systems Change Through and Equity Lens, Stanford Social Innovation Review Webinar, December 12, 2018. Verbal comments made by Mary Li.
“Trust is a luxury that many people of
color do not enjoy.”
—Mary Li, Multnomah Idea Lab

Page | 10

The Need for Change
To recap , Oakland’s existing campaign finance system gives donors f rom outside of Oakland and Oakland residents in wealthier, whiter neighborhoods disproportionate influence in choosing elected officials and potentially shaping policy outcomes over everyone else. Campaign finance data shows nearly half of all donors to Oakland campaigns reside outside of the City while Oakland residents who do fund campaigns are usually from neighborhoods that are primarily wealthy and white. In a city like Oakland, where the candidate with the most funds behind them almost always wins, th is means low- income residents and people of color are disproportionately missing from the poli tical campaign decision-making process.

This is an equity issue.

For Oakland to live its values and embrace a local democracy built on principles of equity and inclusion, it must structure its campaign process so that candidates from all backgrounds can run for office and realistically win and so that the voices of low-income residents and people of color matter.

Page | 11

NEW PARADIGM NEEDED FOR

EQUITABLE ENGAGEMENT

While Oakland’s existing campaign finance and public financing laws focus mostly on the pr oblem of big money in politics, modern trends in a variety of good government disciplines inspire new thinking about both the end goals as well as the methods used to achieve them. Rooted in theories of social justice, public participatio n, racial equity, and user -centered design, enhancing meaningful and productive civic engagement should be the focus of efforts to redesign our campaign process here in Oakland. The new system should be designed to ensure that the diverse array of Oaklanders are the ones who can influence the selection of City leaders and, potentially, policy outcomes.

Equity Demands Intentional Restructuring of Systems
Democracy in America was founded on principles of equality and equal representation, but in the 21st century, “one person, one vote” does not do justice to the individual, institutional, and structural racism that has occurred throughout our nation’s history . The data discussed in prior sections of this report clearly show disparate political engagement outcomes based on race, geographic location, and socio-economic status.

Equity, not just equality, requires that we
understand and resolve structural gaps so that race,
income, or socio-economic status does not “predict
success, and we have successful systems and
structure that work for all.”
20 Racial equity means
“we no longer see disparities based on race and we
improve results for all groups.” 21 Equity
practitioners advise that, in order to appropriately
address racial inequities, we must identify racial
barriers to participation and seek out input from
those who have been marginalized in the current
system.22
Oaklander Input
The Public Ethics Commission attempted to solicit input from Oaklanders in 2018 to gather preliminary information about potential barriers to participation in the political process. Commission staff partnered with U.C. Berkeley Gol dman School graduate student Dyana Mardon in the Spring of 2018 to create an online survey of political participation beliefs and activities by Oaklanders.23

20 Advancing Racial Equity and Transforming Government: A Resource Guide to Put Ideas into Action, Local and Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity, p. 15, www.racialequityalliance.org, accessed in 2017. 21 Racial Equity: Getting to Results, Local and Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity, p. 5, May 2017. 22 Jacque Larrainzar, Policy Analyst with the City of Oakland’s Department of Race and Equity, speaking to the Commission at its subcommittee meeting on June 11, 2018
23 The link to the survey went out to all PEC email lists, website and social media platforms, including Twitter, and Facebook, as well as the City of Oakland’s main NextDoor account. Individuals and organizations that asked to receive communications about the PEC’s campaign finance project also received a direct email and invitation to send the survey link along to their friends and organization members. “We believe that in order to disrupt our
nation’s deep and pervasive inequality of
opportunity and results, generate new
possibilities for community ownership of
government, and establish a new
narrative for a truly inclusive democracy,
it is essential to transform government.”
—Government Alliance on Race & Equity

Page | 12

By June 2018, the PEC received 526 online survey responses, reflecting a group of disproportionately white (69 percent of respondents), older (60 percent were 55 or older), and higher income individuals (45 percent reported incomes of over $100,000). By compar ison, whites make up roughly 28 percent of Oakland’s population, Oakland resid ents w ho are 55 and older comprise 24 percent of the population, and 35 percent of Oaklanders make over $100,000.24 Only 12 percent of online respondents identified as Black/African American, 6 percent Asian, 6 percent Hispanic/Latino/Latina, less than 1 percent American Indian, and the rest reporting either Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, other, or two or more races.

Because this initial round of online outreach yielded responses from a predominantly-white, older and wealthier cohort, Commission staff then partnered with Open Oakland and California College of the Arts volunteers to conduct in-person surveys of people attending community events around Oakland that yielded a predominantly African American survey group. This second survey phase yiel ded 66 responses, reflecting 45 percent identifying as Black/African American, 30 percent white/Caucasian, 8 percent Asian, 3 percent Hispanic/Latino/Latina, 1.6 percent Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 11 percent identifying as two or more races. Twenty-nine percent of in-person respondents were in the 35-49 age bracket, 24 percent were 25-34, 21 percent were 50-64, 10 percent 45-54, 8 percent 65+, and 6 percent 18-24, and the rest were under 18. Income ranges were evenly split amo ng all categories between 1 0-20 percent , except for the income range of $30 -60,000 represen ting the most respondents at 25 percent.

These survey results, while not statistically representative, provide at least a glimpse of some of the sentiments of Oaklanders on the issue of participation in campaigns and elections. This was a helpful first step in hearing from Oaklanders; however, much more community engagement is needed to solicit input from a broader, more diverse range of residents.

Overview of Survey Responses
Of the online re spondents, 45 percent said they have donated t o an Oakland candidate’s campaign and 35 percent have volunteered for a candidate’s campaign. In-person respondents were similar, with 50 percent saying they donated to an Oakland candidate’s campaign, and 31 percent saying they have volunteered for a candidate’s campaign.

A hefty 86 percent of online respondents said they believe that money influences who is elected, 74% said that money influences political outcomes, and 72 percent said that money influences the amount of access a person might have to an elected official in Oakland. Of the online respondents, 28 percent of white respondents said candidates and elected officials do not care about their concerns, compared to 44 percent of online respondents who identified as people of color and said candidates and elected officials do not care.

In-person respondents agreed even more strongly with statements about the influence of money in elections, political decisio ns, and access to officials. Most notably, 89 percent of in -person respondents believed that money influences who is elected, 94 percent believed money influences how officials make political decisions in Oakland, and 83 percent believed money influences the amount of access someone might have to an elected official in Oakland.

24 U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Tables DP05 and B19001; generated by PEC staff using https://api.census.gov; Last accessed 24 July 2020.

Page | 13

Desire for More Information
In terms of potential solutions, the online survey posed a list of seven ideas to encourage broader and more diverse political participation, with respondents favoring the avail ability of more and better information about local candidates, including information about contributions and independent expenditures made to support or oppose candidates as well as information about how their elected official has voted on issues that are important to them. For example, 78 percent of online respondents were interested in seeing information that displays legislative vote history for incumben t City Council members, with 23 percent choosing this option as their first choice am ong a list of sev en options, 31 percent as their second choice, and 24 percent as their third choice. Online responses also reflected significant interest in candidate debates to encourage broader and more diverse political participation.

The in-person surveyors altered this question to simplify it for easier consumption and instead ask ed whether the respondent agreed that the option would help them determine who to support in a local election. In-person responses showed similar interests in having access to better information about local candidates at their fingertips, being able to look up how their elected official has voted on issues that are important to them, and seeing who makes contributions and independent expenditures in support of candidates. In-person respondents also favored candidate debates as helpful to determine who to support.

This survey, while offering some idea of political involvement and feedback from Oaklanders, provides merely a small sampling of viewpoints regarding Oaklander’s current practices and potential thoughts about barriers and potential advances in political engagement in Oakland. Certainly, more work should be done, particularly by local non-profit entities with a focus on reaching traditionally disenfranchised communities, to understand barriers and incorporate these realities into better design of our local democratic systems.

Page | 14

Page | 15

DESIGNING THE SYSTEM FOR EQUITY

The design of the political engagement system is paramount to ensuring successful outcomes toward our policy objectives. In light of the problems articulated above, and in consideration of the evolution of equity, public participation, and political reform work in recent years, this section aims to provide an overview of best practices and new ideas to inspire work that could move Oakland forward . The goal is to create a campaign process that actually produces a more equitable system and ensures all of Oakland’s communities are involved in recruiting, evaluating, and selecting their City leadership.

Democracy Dollars Incentivize
Broader Engagement in Seattle
What if every Oaklander received $100 from the
City to contribute to a candidate of their choosing?
Seattle residents overwhelmingly adopted such a
measure in 2015 by approving a ballot measure to
create a Democrac y Voucher Program , the first
program in the nation to provide public funds
directly to citizens to spend on the candidate of
their choice . Starting in 2017 for two at- large
council seats and the City Attorney race, Seattle
residents received four $25 check s from the city
that they could give to their selected candidate(s).

Participating candidates who want to redeem the
City payments must meet certain requirements,
such as agreeing to accept only contributions of
$250 or less, gather a threshold number of
signatures and small contributions, and limit their
overall campaign spending.

So far, the following benefits have been reported
from Seattle’s new system:
 Contributors Tripled – Data from Seattle’s
first election cycle with vouchers in 2 017
showed the number of campaign
contributors tripled from the comparable
election cycle for the same races in 2013,
with more than 25,000 Seattle residents
participating as campaign donors in 2017,
three times the 8,200 resident donors in
2013.
 New Contributors – Roughly 84 percent of
the 2017 election cycle’s Seattle donors
were estimated to be new donors;
including about 20,900 individuals who

HONEST ELECTIONS SEATTLE
Initiative 122, passed by Seattle voters on
November 3, 2015, declared that the “peop les’
initiative measure builds honest elections in the
City of Seattle” and “prevents corruption, by
giving more people an opportunity to have their
voices heard in our democracy” and “ensuring a
fair elections process that holds our elected
leaders accountable to us by strengthening voters’
control over City government…” The measure
further imposed contribution limits, revolving
door rules, and disclosure requirements on
candidates for elective office.

The initiative, now codified as Seattle Municipal
Code Chapter 2.04, outlines the process for issuing
and redeeming Democracy Vouchers and assigns
the administration of the program to the Seattle
Ethics and Elections Commission. Four $25
vouchers are to be delivered to each registered
voter on the first busin ess day of every municipal
election year and may be completed and
submitted by mail, in person, or electronically to
the candidate, the candidate’s designee, or the
Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission.

For a candidate to be able to receive voucher
funds, the candidate must register for the voucher
program, participate in three public debates,
comply with campaign laws and spending and
contribution limits ($250 for Council and City
Attorney candidates, $500 for Mayoral
candidates), and may not solicit c ontributions to
any committee m aking independent
expenditures.

Using a Democracy Voucher is a public act, and
information about the assignment, use, and
tracking of vouchers is publicly available to
prevent forgery, fraud, or misconduct.

Page | 16

had not contributed to city candidates in the 2015 or 2013 cycles. And 71 percent of these new donors were voucher donors.25
 More Representative Contributors – An academic review of Seattle’s voucher program in 2018 found that “compared to cash contributors in the 2017 election, participants in the Democracy Voucher program were generally more representative of the Seattle electo rate. Low and moderate-income residents comprise a substantially larger share of voucher users than cash donors. Voucher users are more likely than cash donors to come from the poorest neighborhoods in the city. Residents under 30 years old make up a large r share of voucher users than cash donors.”26
 Earlier and More Participation in 2019 – In the first two months that vouchers were distributed by the city between February and April 2019, with all seven Seattle city council seats up for election in November 2019, more than 11,000 Seattle resident s had redeemed their vouchers, which is already more individual donors participating in city campaigns in all of 2015 before vouchers existed. 27 By the end of the 2019 election, 38,092 residents returned more than 147,128 Democracy Vouchers for a total disbursement of $2.5 million in public financing.28 Cash in the Hands of All Voters Changes Candidate Behavior Candidates who ran in Seattle’s first iteration of its voucher syste m experienced an entirely new framework for campaigning. Since every voter now had campaign “cash” to give to a campaign, all voters became the targ et of campaign outreach efforts. Under the new system, candidates were incentivized both to educate voters about how to use their own vouchers and to ask them to give their vouchers to support the candidate.

For example, Teresa Mosqueda, a former labor activist who is third-generation Mexican-American and the daughter of educators and social justice activists, ran under the new voucher system for the at- large district 8 City Council seat in 2017. She said the new system incentivized candidates to go out and talk to every voter, so that is how she focused her campaign . 29 “The democracy vouchers encourage
candidates to spend time talking with actual residents, rather than asking wealthy donors to write large checks,” said Mosqueda about her campaign experience. “I spent my evenings and weekends in neighborhoods around Seattle talking about the issues we care about. ” Mosqueda won her election to office with a 20-point lead and tipped the Seattle City Council toward a majority of people of color and a supermajority of women. “Candidates like me, who pledged to use democracy vouchers and refuse donations over $250, were more connected to the city’s diverse population, ” she added. As a result, she said, she spent her “first eight months in office bringing forward legislation that comes directly from community — from domestic workers protections to affordable housing solutions.” 30 The new system also can change behavior for candidates who do not participate in the voucher program but who run against candidates who do. For example, one Seattle nonprofit leader shared

25 First Look: Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program, Reducing the Power of Big Money and Expanding Political Participation. Win/Win Network and Every Voice. P. 2. November 15, 2017.
26 Jennifer Heerwig and Brian J. McCabe. Expanding Participation in Municipal Elections: Assessing the Impact of Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program. University of Washington, Center for Studies in Demography & Ecology. P. 1. April 3, 2018. 27 Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program is Already Sparking a Lively Election Season. Margaret Morales. Sightline Institute. April 23, 2019. 28 Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Democracy Voucher Program Biennial Report 2019. P. 5. 29 Teresa Mosqeuda. Seattle City Councilmember. Speaking at the Bay Area Political Equality Collaborative Convening. January 23, 2018. 30 Teresa Mosqueda. I’m Still Paying Off My Student Loans — Here’s How I Funded My Campaign (And Won). Bustle.com, August 14, 2018.

Page | 17

his observation that Jenny Durkin, the winning mayoral candidate in the 2017 election who did not use the voucher system to fund her campaign opted to join in candidate forums that started to pop up in communities that previously were not the target of campaign efforts, simply because the new voucher availability in those communities drew the voucher system candidates there and she needed to stay competitive by being in the room with the other candidates. Durkin won, and she later hired staff into her Mayoral administration that she met in those new communities whi ch, without the voucher system in place pushing the other candidates to reach out to those communities, she would never have encountered.
31 Outreach Efforts Are Critical to Building Community Engagement and Promoting Vouchers
While the voucher system was significant as the first of its kind in the country, also significant is the level of community outreach specifically intended to engage communities of color into the campaign finance process , conducted parallel to the implemen tation of the voucher system. These civic engagement programs – some woven into the voucher program and others separate from it – provided a strong network of infrastructure that helped bridge different communities in a way that enhanced success of the program and other organizations with shared civic participation goals.

As part of the voucher program implementation, the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission (SEEC), charged with administering Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program, created an Advisory Committee to ensure a variety of local community organizations are involved in the implementation of the program – specifically, to provide staff with input on program and policy design, participation and access for diverse communities, outreach and education, and user testing . 32 With guidance from the Advisory
Committee, staff conduct ed focus groups for user testing of the design of the voucher and the messaging and communications strategies of the program. Feedback from the focus groups went into the final design of the voucher and the informational material that went out to voters, as well as other communications elements.33
Community Liaisons Connect and Build Trust
The Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission partnered with the city’s Department of Neighborhood Community Liaisons to implement outreach with communities of color to connect residents with City services and ensure that they have every opportunity to participate. Between August and October 2017, Community Liaisons conducted personal outreach at even ts, door-to-door, and via social media to Somali, Hispanic/Latino, African American, Chinese, and Vietnamese communities. 34 The City of Seattle had created Community Engagement Coordinators and Community Liaisons as part of a new strategy of bringing an equ ity focus to engaging communities – whether in civil rights advocacy or elections issues – that incorporated a people -centered approach to reaching communities through trusted sources or leaders at the neighborhood level who could help connect people to the City and

31 Aaron Robertson. Managing Director, Policy and Civic Engagement. Seattle Foundation. Interview August 17, 2018. 32 Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Democracy Voucher Program Biennial Report 2017. P. 21. Advisory Committee member organizations included Sightline Institute, League of Women Voters, Chief Seattle Club, LGBTQ Allyship, The Seattle Public Library, Latino Community Fund, King County Elections, Asian Counseling and Referral Service, Washington Democracy Hub, Washington CAN (Community Action Network), Municipal League of King County, Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Win/Win Network. 33 Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Democracy Voucher Program Biennial Report 2017. P. 9-10. 34 Seattle Democracy Voucher Program Evaluation, BERK Final Report for the City of Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. P. 11. April 25, 2018.

Page | 18

its services. These efforts included trainings, ambassador academies, and small stipends for liaisons, among others.35
In addition, Seattle’s Neighborhood Service Centers and Customer Service Bureau, all of which act as “little city halls” in a variety of locations throughout the City, were convenient drop-off locations that also made City staff available to members of the public to answer questions and educate visitors about their vouchers and the program.
36 Lastly, Seattle Ethics and Elections C ommission staff also conducted general outreach to various communities, including distributing communications via website and social media, translating materials in 15 languages, and providing 47 presentations and 57 tabling events between July 2016 and November 2017.
37 Nonprofit Sector Working to Empower and Raise Capacity of Individual and Community Influence
Concurrently to the SEEC Community Liaison work, the Seattle Foundation and King County Elections (King County includes the City of Seattle) partn ered in 2017 -18 to work with dozens of community - based organizations to increase the participation of under -represented communities in the broader democratic process. They partnered again to create the Voter Education Fund and other initiatives to invest over $400,000 in community -based organizations to help remove barriers to voting in diverse communities. Other initiatives included grants for peer learning and technical assistance to strengthen grantee abilities to have meaningful influence over systems a nd policies, as well as grants to fun d partnerships that increase the civic voice and participation of underrepresented communities. 38 These
programs, among others, grew out of the Seattle Foundation’s rebuilding of their grantmaking model in the past sever al years to focus on racial equity, impacting upstream or “root cause” policy or systems rather than focusing on effects, and creating enabling systems for communities of color to have greater influence over decisions – and decision-makers – that impact them. 39 While difficult to measure, the combination of these programs flourishing alongside Seattle’s voucher system likely helped influence the outcomes experienced in Seattle and should be something Oakland should consider if the City adopts a voucher-style financing program.

Small Dollar Matching Programs Offer Another Alternative for Reform A more common public financing model is a small -dollar matching funds system as adopted by New York City, Los Angeles, and more recently, Berkeley . Matching funds systems lift up the comparative power of small donors by using government funds to “match” contributions up to a certain amount from donors meeting certain criteria. For example, New York City operates a matching funds system for city elections that will match the first $175 raised from a city resident at a rate of six-to-one, i.e. with $1,050 in additional public funds to the candidate. That means spending time seeking a $100 donation

35 Jacque Larrainzar, Policy Analyst, City of Oakland Department of Race and Equity, former Policy Director, City of Seattle 36 Seattle Democracy Voucher Program Evaluation, BERK Final Report for the City of Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. P. 12. April 25, 2018.
37 Seattle Democracy Voucher Program Evaluation, BERK Final Report for the City of Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. P. 7. April 25, 2018.
38 Seattle Foundation. https://www.seattlefoundation.org/communityimpact/Center-Community-Partnerships/vibrant-democracy.

Accessed August 17, 2018.
39 Aaron Robertson. Managing Director, Policy and Civic Engagement. Seattle Foundation. Interview August 17, 2018.

Page | 19

from a city resident is just as valuable as spending time seeking a $700 do nation from an out-of-state lobbyist.

Candidates participating in the New York City matching funds system must meet specific eligibility requirements and thresholds, such as a certain number of $10 donations, expenditure limits, and caps on the total amou nt of public funds received. The match is only provided for contributions raised within New York City, thus incentivizing candidates to fundraise from the people t hey will eventually represent.40

The system has effectively changed the incentives for New York City candidates when fundraising.

Multiple studies have found that the system has (1) increased the number of small donors, (2) increased the proportion of candidates’ fundraising that comes from small donations, and (3) increased the socioeconomic, geographic, and racial diversity of the donor pool. 41 One Brennan Center study compared New York City’s 2009 City Council elections (which used the matching funds system) with New York State’s 2010 Assembly elections occurring in the same geographic locat ion (New York state
does not have matching funds ),
reasoning that this was the same
political geography, the same
constituents, and the same pool of
potential donors. In New York City
elections, almost 90 percent of the
city’s census block groups were home
to at least one donor , showing
residents were engaged in local
politics across the city. By contrast, in
the State Assembly elections, only 30
percent of the city’s census block
groups had a donor living in each
home.
42 The graphic to the right shows how
donations were more distributed
under the matching funds system, as
reflected in the breadth depth of
colors across the district.
43 Matching funds are already in use
across California. The City of Los

40 The thresholds number of donations that must be raised and the spending limits that must be followed all differ by office sought. 41 Michael Malbin, et. al., “Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States,” Election Law Journal, Volume 11, Number 1, 2012. Elisabeth Genn, et. al., “Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds,” Brennan Center for Justice, May 2012. Michael Malbin, et. al., “Would Revising Los Angeles’ Campaign Matching Fund System Make a Difference?” The Campaign Finance Institute, Sept. 2016.
42 Elisabeth Genn, et. al., “Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds,” Brennan Center for Justice, May 2012. 43 Michael Malbin, “Citizen Funding For Elections,” The Campaign Finance Institute, 2015.

Page | 20

Angeles operated a one- to-one matching system for years, which was increased in 2013 to a two -to- one match in primary elections and a four -to-one match in general elections , and is now a six -to-one match system.

In 2016, the City of Berkeley’s voters adopted via initiative a matching funds system that closely mirrors New York City’s six -to-one system, except that instead of requiring participating candidates to abide by an expenditure limit, Berkeley requires participating candidates to limit all donations accepted at $50, essentially making it impossib le for a Berkeley candidate participating in the matching funds system to be influenced by a direct donor.

San Francisco, Sacramento, Long Beach, and Richmond all use some version of a matching funds system, but match at lower rates.
44 It does not appear that the results found in New York City elections are replicated when a city uses a low match, such as one-to-one.

Matching programs differ from voucher programs in that individuals still need to provide the initial contribution, albeit a small amount, i n order to trigger distribution of additional funds to the candidate. Vouchers, by contrast, are provided to everyone in the City in a manner that intends to provide equity across the board.

Innovative Data and Information-Sharing Empowers Communities The above reforms, and particularly the voucher system, aim to enhance participation by incentivizing candidates to seek out contributions from all residents, not just the wealthy . In addition, innovations in civic engagement and technology enhance participation by illuminating the activities in and around government in a way that provides information and access at one’s fingertips so those who are participating can make informed decisions about who can best represent them . Mobile phone applications, online resources, community events, and in-person tutorials are some of the ways cities can provide more and better information about candidates , and in turn, invite and empower individuals to participate in the process in an easier and more effective manner.

Innovative online tools provide new ways of accessing information and data in user -friendly formats developed for easy viewing of what was previously unavailable online or in any electronic form. For example, Oakland’s Open Disclosure application, designed by OpenOakland volunteer coders and designers in partnership with the Public Ethics Commission, displays local campaign funding data in a way that is easy to consume by an everyday resident. The application also links to VotersEdge, a broader state platform designed by Maplight and the League of Women Voters of California Education Fund that provides a comprehensive, nonpartisan online guide to elections covering federal, state, and local races across California. Oakland voters can therefore get consolidated information about candidates, ballot measures, and campaign finance information in one virtual place.

While Oakland leads other cities in its availability of campaign finance data, the City does not collect and publish City councilmember vote history data online. As mentioned earlier in this report, 78 percent of online survey respondents (and similar representation by in -person survey respondents)

44 For more information about public financing systems around California, see Nicholas Heidorn, “California Municipal Democracy Index,” California Common Cause, December 2016.

Page | 21

expressed interest in such information as helpful in determining whether to support the incumbent candidate or a new candidate for that seat.

Empowering Communities Through Effective Public Engagement Leading practitioners in public engagement note that traditional ideas about the “public square” are out of date . The traditional expectation was that information should go out first and that people needed to be educated and then they would become politically involved. “Instead of a linear progression from education to involvement,” they argue, “public life seems to seethe and spark with connections and reactions th at are often unexpected and always hard to map.” 45 Practitioners now instead ask “how to bring ‘new voices’ – meaning young people, poor people, recent immigrants, and people of color – into the public square.”46
It is important to consider different types of engagement, including “thick” engagement, which occurs mainly in groups – either face-to-face, online, or both – and consists of dialogue, deliberation, and action planning, versus “thin” engagement by individuals – usually online – that is easier, fast er and potentially more viral. 47 The new online environment is seen as both transformative and yet still not equitable and empowering for people of color, low-income people, and other marginalized groups.48 In addition, more attention must be given to questions of infrastructure and how institutions ought to operate, including serving as potential intermediaries or platforms that can collect and organize big data, and curate and interpret that data for its community. 49 To help communities build new public squares that facilitate equitable technological interaction and meaningful personal network connections, thought leaders suggest focusing on the following four questions:50

1. What kinds of infogagement [information plus engagement] infrastructure and institutions at the community level would support the best flow of news, information, and engagement?

2. How can such an infrastructure support a high level of democratic engagement across the community, especially for people who have borne the brunt of past injustices and inequalities?

3. What should be the complementary, constructive, yet independent roles of journalists, public officials, and technologists?

4. What are the core democratic skills needed by people in each of these professions, and how can we provide them?

45 Infogagement: Citizenship and Democracy in the Age of Connection. Matt Leighninger. Philanthropy for Active Civic Engagement. September 2014. P. 1.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. P. 1, 2, 12.
50 Id. P. 3.

Page | 22

The Public Ethics Commission published a collaborative transparency report in 2014 to help guide the City toward a more advanced approach to opening up City government, not just by making records more accessible but also by expanding the way the city pr oactively involves, collaborates, and empowers its residents. The Commission highlighted the International Association of Public Participation’s spectrum of participation as follows:
51 Innovative cities are pushing the envelope on moving their organizations toward the “Empower” end as much as feasible, depending on the issue and level of public impact of a decision. Oakland should keep this empowerment-oriented framework in mind as it considers how best to design a new public financing system.

51 Toward Collaborative Transparency, January 2014, Public Ethics Commission, citing the International Association of Public Participation Spectrum, which was reprinted with permission from the IAPP.

Page | 23

CONCLUSION

Oakland’s system of campaign finance, which drives the selection of City government leaders, is ripe for redesign. The goal of this report was to identify areas where the City’s current public financing system fails to achieve its intended objectives and to explore alternatives to the current system that could produce better outcomes for Oakland. Based on the above research, the Commission makes the following findings:

1. Outcomes produced by the current system show significant disparities in who has influence in the selection of City leadership and , potentially, the resulting decision-making process. While this concept of certain individuals and groups having outsized influence is nothing new, the data now provides clear evidence of the disparities and a foundational benchmark that can be used to measure improvement.

2. A system of providing Democracy dollars (like the Seattle Democracy Voucher Program) shows the most promise for bringing equity to the campaign finance process since it equips all voters with campaign “cash” to contribute to campaigns, thereby incentivizing candidates to engage across demographics regardless of wealth and history of prior engagement.

3. A Democracy dollar system must be accompanied by broad public engagement infrastructure- building efforts, similar to those created in Seattle, to ensure a fertile ecosystem of candidates and community leaders, conn ections between City liaisons and communities, effective communications and outreach, and other elements needed for successful integration of a new system of broader and more diverse participation.

In addition to the above findings, the Commission recommends the City explore the following ideas as part of reforms that could further develop a more authentically democratic process:

1. Candidate support – Providing candidates with more resources, support, and a platform fo r communicating would reduce a candidate’s need to fundraise to pay for the costs of campaigning, thus lessening the big money side of the scale and lifting the public participation side. Resources and support may include offerings such as a “how to run for office” workshop for fi rst-time candidates, a recording opportunity to make a 30 -second campaign video through the City’s KTOP recording studio, a 30 -minute recorded interview option where a neutral moderator interviews each candidate with the same set of questions and the City posts all candidate interviews online, and a website platform available to each candidate, along with training on how to set up a campaign website and initiate fundraising. Alameda County also should consider providing voter data to candidates at no cost so candidates can initiate voter outreach without having to use campaign funds to pay the cost of acquiring this public information (or paying consultants to purchase it).

2. Candidate information hub – Survey respondents expressed interest in seeing more trustworthy information, from neutral sources rather than from campaigns themselves, regarding candidates running for office so they have the tools to assess a candidate’s performance and potential as a City leader. The Commission currently partners with Open Oakland, the city’s Code for America brigade of volunteer civic technology coders and designers, to provide a consolidated and easy -to-use website for information about who is funding and supporting candidate and ballot measure campaigns in Oakland. The City an d its partners should consider how to produce, offer and share more content about candidates Page | 24
r
unning for office more widely and in a manner that is meaningful to residents, particularly low-income communities and people of color. Candidate forums should be video-recorded and made available for online viewing.

3. Incumbency information and access – To ensure fairness when an incumbent is in office, in a position to make and influence decisions on laws, policies, and contracts, and has access to City communicati on methods and target audience, there must be restrictions in place to maintain a level playing field. This might include stricter limits on the use of City resources to communicate to constituents, particularly during the 6 -12 months before an election. I n addition, the City should collect and provide easy public access to Councilmember vote history that shows how the incumbent has voted on legislation and other matters while in office so the public can further discern whether they want the incumbent to continue to stay in office.

4. Additional restrictions – The City should continue to explore and develop creative solutions that lift up the voices of Oaklanders from all demographics in contrast to allowing the system of big money, and particularly big money from outside of Oakland, flowing into local races that impact those who live and work here. This might include contribution restrictions placed on those who do not live or work in Oakland or incentiv es for seeking out locally -based contributions over those from outside of Oakland as a way to empower those who are affected by local decisions. Such restrictions could supplement a new public fina ncing approach to cultivate trust by marginalized Oaklanders who may believe they have no chance at effective participation against well-funded interests.

A
t this moment in our nation’s history, Oakland has an opportunity to rethink its outdated campaign finance system and reshape it into a process that facilitates meaningful dialogue, widespread outreach and communication across all demographics, and expansive and diverse participation by all Oaklanders of all races and income levels. The above findings, including data showing outcomes for the past several elections, provide a benchmark from which we can build new programs and effect better outcomes toward the vision we want: widespread, inclusive, and equitable influen ce by Oaklanders in the political process, and specifically, the selection of City elected leaders.

Page | 25
APPENDIX 1: CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNCIL
RACES BY OAKLAND RESIDENTS, 2016 AND 2018

Page | 26
Page | 27

Page | 28

Page | 29

Page | 30

Page | 31

Page | 32
APPENDIX 2: Contributions to Council Races by Donor Location, 2016 and 2018 Elections Office Donor location Donor district Total contributions Percentage City Council, District 1 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $31,186 21.7% Donor outside district $41,082 28.5%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $5,645 3.9%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $66,045 45.9%
City Council, District 1 Total $143,958 100.0%
City Council, District 2 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $78,531 25.6% Donor outside district $92,894 30.3%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $21,725 7.1%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $113,497 37.0%
City Council, District 2 Total $306,647 100.0%
City Council, District 3 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $19,627 14.7% Donor outside district $38,335 28.8%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $2,850 2.1%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $72,421 54.4%
City Council, District 3 Total $133,233 100.0%
City Council, District 4 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $86,885 17.7% Donor outside district $139,644 28.5%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $34,175 7.0%
UNKNOWN Donor outside district $25 0.0%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $229,031 46.8%
City Council, District 4 Total $489,760 100.0%
City Council, District 5 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $20,404 20.5% Donor outside district $33,597 33.8%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $4,522 4.5%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $40,894 41.1%
City Council, District 5 Total $99,418 100.0%
Page | 33
APPENDIX 2: Contributions to Council Races by Donor Location, 2016 and 2018 Elections Office Donor location Donor district Total contributions Percentage City Council, District 6 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $46,119 13.5% Donor outside district $139,114 40.8%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $17,465 5.1%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $138,512 40.6%
City Council, District 6 Total $341,210 100.0%
City Council, District 7 IN OAKLAND Donor in district $6,100 6.6% Donor outside district $26,630 28.7%
OUT OF STATE Donor outside district $7,650 8.2%
WITHIN CA Donor outside district $52,450 56.5%
City Council, District 7 Total $92,830 100.0%
DATA SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19. Geospatial analysis by PEC staff. Data for Oakland contributions geocoded using TAMU GeoServices, a service of the Texas A&M University Department of Geography. Goldberg DW. 2019. Texas A&M University Geoservices.

Page | 34
APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 - 2018 Election Office Outcome Candidate Contributions Loans Public Financing
IE -
Support
IE -
Against
11/4/2014 City Auditor Won Roberts, Brenda $69,175 $62,000 $0 11/4/2014 City Auditor Lost Raphael, Len $37,785 $0 $0
11/4/2014 City Council, District 2 Won Guillen, Abel $110,520 $0 $17,921 $132,453 11/4/2014 City Council, District 2 Lost Blackburn, Kevin $62,212 $1,600 $17,921 11/4/2014 City Council, District 2 Lost King, Dana $93,612 $0 $17,921 $1,129 11/4/2014 City Council, District 2 Lost Park, Andrew $67,826 $0 $17,921 11/4/2014 City Council, District 4 Won Campbell Washington, An $105,078 $140 $17,921 $110,082 11/4/2014 City Council, District 4 Lost Broadhurst, Jill $85,821 $0 $17,921 11/4/2014 City Council, District 6 Won Brooks, Desley $70,779 $2,500 $17,921 $1,129 11/4/2014 City Council, District 6 Lost Johnson, Michael $39,742 $13,000 $0 11/4/2014 City Council, District 6 Lost Moore, James $10,758 $0 $0 11/4/2014 City Council, District 6 Lost Nosakhare, Shereda $30,925 $4,000 $17,921 11/4/2014 Mayor Won Schaaf, Libby $458,908 $0 $0 $9,894 11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Kaplan, Rebecca $347,445 $0 $0 $11,444 $8,450 11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Karamooz, Saied $2,610 $0 $0
11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Mccullough, Pat $200 $0 $0
11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Parker, Bryan $416,132 $70,000 $0 $20,296 11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Quan, Jean $404,861 $106,000 $0 $8,450 11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Ruby, Courtney $160,160 $18,000 $0 11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Siegel, Dan $264,569 $175,000 $0
11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Tuman, Joe $278,014 $8,000 $0 $8,450 11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Washington, Sammuel $30,335 $0 $0
11/4/2014 Mayor Lost Williams, Charles $11,835 $0 $0
11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 2 Won Eng, Aimee $28,845 $0 $0 $51
11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 4 Won Senn, Nina $23,232 $3,500 $0 $34,119 Page | 35
APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 - 2018 Election Office Outcome Candidate Contributions Loans Public Financing
IE -
Support
IE -
Against
11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 4 Lost Debro, Karl $4,174 -$8,000 $0
11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 4 Lost Shakir-Gilmore, Saleem $17,639 $0 $0 $34,066 11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 4 Lost Spigner, Cheri $18,748 $0 $0
11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 6 Won Gonzales, Shanthi $65,861 $0 $0
11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 6 Lost Almanzor, Renato $12,093 $0 $0 $63,318 11/4/2014
School Board Director,
OUSD District 6 Lost Dobbins, Christopher $5,000 $0 $0
DATA SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e- filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

Page | 36
APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 - 2018 Election Office Outcome Candidate Contributions Loans Public Financing
IE -
Support
IE -
Against
11/8/2016 City Attorney Won Parker, Barbara $67,909 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, At Large Won Kaplan, Rebecca $147,423 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, At Large Lost Hummel, Francis ''Matt'' $1,750 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, At Large Lost Moore, Peggy $118,646 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, At Large Lost Quan, Bruce $75,623 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, At Large Lost Sidebotham, Nancy $396 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, District 1 Won Kalb, Dan $113,161 $0 $35,844 $13,242 11/8/2016 City Council, District 1 Lost Corbett, Kevin M. $42,542 $0 $34,645 11/8/2016 City Council, District 3 Won Gibson-Mcelhaney, Lynett $127,257 $0 $6,807 11/8/2016 City Council, District 3 Lost Session, Noni D. $10,634 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, District 5 Won Gallo, Noel $48,119 $0 $35,844 $39,316 11/8/2016 City Council, District 5 Lost Gonzales, Viola $69,742 $15,000 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, District 7 Won Reid, Larry $72,976 $0 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, District 7 Lost Hodge, Marcie $24,064 $19,857 $0 11/8/2016 City Council, District 7 Lost Imara, Nehanda $24,966 $5,000 $0 11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 1 Won London, Jody $22,344 $0 $0 $2,691
11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 1 Lost Macleay, Don $5,144 $0 $0
11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 3 Won Hinton Hodge, Jumoke $25,392 $7,575 $0 $90,423 11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 3 Lost Wiginton, Kharyshi ''Ms. K $5,798 $0 $0 $7,405 11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 5 Won Torres, Rosie $25,033 $2,750 $0 $7,405 $6,988 11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 5 Lost Hassid, Mike $8,486 $0 $0
Page | 37
APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 - 2018 Election Office Outcome Candidate Contributions Loans Public Financing
IE -
Support
IE -
Against
11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 5 Lost Hutchinson, Mike $7,405
11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 5 Lost Trenado, Huber $21,685 $0 $0 $99,289 11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 7 Won Harris, James $27,586 $0 $0 $122,967 11/8/2016
School Board Director,
OUSD District 7 Lost Jackson, Chris $13,562 $0 $0 $7,405 $6,988 DATA SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e- filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

Page | 38
APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 - 2018 Election Office Outcome Candidate Contributions Loans Public Financing
IE -
Support
IE -
Against
11/6/2018 City Auditor Won Ruby, Courtney $47,225 $1,500 $0 11/6/2018 City Auditor Lost Roberts, Brenda $57,047 $0 $0 11/6/2018 City Council, District 2 Won Fortunato Bas, Nikki $133,395 $5,000 $18,345 $113,017 11/6/2018 City Council, District 2 Lost Guillen, Abel $200,652 $0 $18,345 $47,524 $4,808 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Won Thao, Sheng $100,088 $0 $18,345 $115,667 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Lost Harris, Pamela $71,451 $6,000 $18,345 $435 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Lost Hummel, Francis ''Matt'' $14,929 $1,500 $18,345 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Lost Maxson, Nayeli $58,294 $0 $18,345 $435 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Lost Michelson, Charlie $95,313 $0 $15,288 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Lost Simmons, Joseph $59,142 $38,600 $0 11/6/2018 City Council, District 4 Lost Tanios, Joseph $24,920 $0 $14,441 11/6/2018 City Council, District 6 Won Taylor, Loren $150,965 $0 $18,345 11/6/2018 City Council, District 6 Lost Brooks, Desley $105,785 $100 $0 $25,363 $167,016 11/6/2018 City Council, District 6 Lost Middleton, Natasha $77,815 $0 $18,345 11/6/2018 City Council, District 6 Lost Rodriguez, Marlo $25,483 $15,080 $0 11/6/2018 City Council, District 6 Lost Whitaker, Mya $18,176 $0 $0 $435 11/6/2018 Mayor Won Schaaf, Libby $501,645 $0 $0 $7,672 11/6/2018 Mayor Lost Brooks, Cat $190,048 $0 $0 $2,363
11/6/2018 Mayor Lost Houston, Ken $0 $0 $0
11/6/2018 Mayor Lost Karamooz, Saied $9,549 $0 $0
11/6/2018 Mayor Lost Price, Pamela $97,996 $32,500 $0
11/6/2018 Mayor Lost Tatmon, Marchon $20,837 $5,267 $0
11/6/2018 Mayor Lost Troupe, Cedric $0
11/6/2018
School Board Director,
OUSD District 2 Won Eng, Aimee -$2,915 -$3,500 $0
Page | 39
APPENDIX 3: Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014 - 2018 Election Office Outcome Candidate Contributions Loans Public Financing
IE -
Support
IE -
Against
11/6/2018
School Board Director,
OUSD District 4 Won Yee, Gary $27,899 $5,000 $0 $145,995 11/6/2018
School Board Director,
OUSD District 4 Lost Doutherd, Clarissa $55,131 $0 $0 $20,847 11/6/2018
School Board Director,
OUSD District 6 Won Gonzales, Shanthi $40,473 $0 $0 $1,577 11/6/2018
School Board Director,
OUSD District 6 Lost Wilson, Anthony $12,255 $0 $0
DATA SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

Page | 40
APPENDIX 4. OAKLAND DEMOGRAPHICS
Oakland Zip Codes with Percentage of Population and Race/Ethnicity Zip Code
Pct. Total
Population
Pct.

Hispanic or
Latino
Pct. Black
or African
American Pct. Asian Pct. White
Pct. Native
Hawaiian
and Other
Pacific
Islander
Pct.

American
Indian and
Alaska
Native
Pct. Some
Other Race
Pct. Two or
More
Races
94601 11.8 50.2 18.8 17.0 9.7 0.7 0.3 0.2 3.2
94602 6.8 16.9 14.1 20.3 40.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 5.8
94603 7.8 57.8 28.8 5.4 4.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 2.7
94605 9.8 24.2 43.5 6.4 17.5 0.2 0.3 0.6 7.3
94606 8.7 20.4 17.8 36.0 20.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.5
94607 5.9 14.0 31.6 26.7 22.2 0.6 0.8 0.2 3.9
94608 6.9 12.7 24.0 15.4 40.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 5.7
94609 5.2 12.6 23.3 11.2 44.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 7.4
94610 7.1 11.2 16.1 14.5 51.6 0.0 0.3 0.5 5.8
94611 8.9 6.8 6.3 15.2 63.9 0.6 0.2 0.4 6.6
94612 3.6 9.6 26.5 26.5 31.3 0.4 0.9 0.6 4.2
94613 0.2 29.7 4.4 23.3 34.0 0.5 0.0 0.2 7.8
94618 3.9 8.4 3.3 12.6 68.6 0.4 0.1 0.6 5.9
94619 5.5 17.2 21.9 19.3 33.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 6.8
94621 8.0 60.4 30.0 2.5 3.8 1.4 0.1 0.2 1.8
DATA SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Tables B03002; generated by PEC staff using https://api.census.gov; Last accessed 24 July 2020.

Page | 41
APPENDIX 4. OAKLAND DEMOGRAPHICS
Oakland Zip Codes with Population and Race/Ethnicity
Zip Code
Est.

Population,
Total
Hispanic or
Latino
Black or
African
American Asian White
Native
Hawaiian
and Other
Pacific
Islander
American
Indian and
Alaska
Native
Some other
race
Two or
more
races
94601 52,299 26,232 9, 838 8, 868 5, 052 3 78 18 3 97 1, 651 94602 29,933 5,046 4,210 6,071 12,224 211 184 257 1,730 94603 34,593 19,983 9, 950 1, 867 1, 388 3 23 81 67 93 4 94605 43,112 10,425 18,757 2,751 7,560 94 109 269 3,147 94606 38,303 7,821 6 ,826 13 ,784 7,807 23 8 23 3 24 2 1, 352 94607 26,254 3,683 8 ,295 7 ,021 5 ,820 14 6 20 3 54 1 ,032 94608 30,289 3,858 7,276 4,659 12,260 201 145 168 1,722 94609 22,811 2,867 5 ,317 2 ,554 10 ,213 36 72 70 1, 682 94610 31,496 3,524 5,082 4,568 16,261 6 82 145 1,828 94611 39,384 2,684 2, 486 5 ,972 2 5,158 23 4 90 176 2, 584 94612 16,062 1,542 4 ,262 4 ,260 5 ,029 57 14 8 93 6 71 94613 861 256 38 201 293 4 - 2 67 94618 17,041 1,433 56 9 2, 152 11, 682 76 14 10 4 1, 011 94619 24,308 4,193 5,327 4,680 8,177 101 79 95 1,656 94621 35,287 21,299 10 ,574 8 71 1, 342 50 1 23 59 6 18 DATA SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5 -Year Estimates, Tables B03002; generated by PEC staff using https://api.census.gov; Last accessed 24 July 2020.

Page | 42
APPENDIX 4. OAKLAND DEMOGRAPHICS
Oakland Zip Codes with Median Household Income and Percentage of Households by Income Range Zip Code Households
Median
Household
Income
0 to $59K $60K to $99K $100K to $149K $150K to $199K $200K or more 94601 15,430 $46,830 60.7 20.5 11.0 4.7 3.2
94602 11,854 $90,661 34.8 19.5 15.6 11.5 18.6 94603 9,901 $50,742 57.7 22.9 14.2 3.4 1.8 94605 15,951 $69,087 45.9 21.7 15.6 7.6 9.2 94606 15,201 $53,108 55.2 20.8 13.3 6.1 4.6 94607 11,300 $50,149 55.9 14.7 13.4 7.0 9.1
94608 14,114 $82,753 39.5 17.6 19.6 10.1 13.2 94609 9,740 $80,026 38.9 19.9 18.4 10.6 12.2 94610 15,327 $96,681 30.8 20.0 20.1 10.7 18.4 94611 17,494 $124,483 26.0 16.9 14.9 12.2 30.1 94612 8,788 $51,006 55.2 16.1 11.1 5.8 11.8 94613 4 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
94618 7,285 $156,116 18.5 15.3 13.5 15.3 37.4 94619 9,063 $85,855 34.5 21.5 16.0 11.8 16.2 94621 9,602 $38,591 66.5 20.2 9.4 2.4 1.5
DATA SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5 -Year Estimates, Tables B19001 and B19013; generated by PEC staff using https://api.census.gov; Last accessed 24 July 2020.

Page | 43

Page | 44
APPENDIX 5: Independent Expenditures for Candidates by Committee, 2014 - 2018 Committee Name 2014 2016 2018 Grand total

FAMILIES AND EDUCATORS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, SPONSORED BY GO PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADVOCATES $131,553 $329,345 $145,995 $606,893
UNITY PAC, A SPONSORED COMMITTEE OF THE ALAMEDA LABOR COUNCIL, AFL-CIO $178,487 $105,974 $284,461 EAST BAY WORKING FAMILIES, A COALITION OF UNIONS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS $140,825 $140,825

OAKLANDERS FOR RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP, OPPOSING DESLEY BROOKS FOR OAKLAND CITY COUNCIL 2018 $135,785 $135,785
OAKLAND EDUCATION ASSOCIATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE $59,239 $19,304 $78,543 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTER LOCAL 55 POLITICAL ACTION, SPONSORED BY: INT'L ASSOC. OF FIREFIGHTER LOCAL 55 $16,113 $55,640 $71,753 OAKLAND POLICE OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION - POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE $18,983 $52,410 $71,393 CITIZENS FOR OAKLAND $42,250 $42,250

CITIZENS FOR A UNITED OAKLAND, OPPOSING DESLEY BROOKS FOR CITY COUNCIL 2018 $31,230 $31,230
WORKING FAMILIES FOR ABEL GUILLEN FOR OAKLAND CITY COUNCIL 2014, SPONSORED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 55 PAC AND TEAMSTERS DRIVE COMMITTEE - FEC #C00032979 $23,523 $23,523 OAKPAC, OAKLAND METROPOLITAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE $11,846 $11,846

GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT REBECCA KAPLAN FOR CITY OF OAKLAND MAYOR 2014 $10,000 $10,000

OAKLAND RISING COMMITTEE SPONSORED BY MOVEMENT STRATEGY CENTER ACTION FUND $9,185 $9,185
OUTFRONT MEDIA LLC $7,672 $7,672
OAKLAND CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE $5,723 $5,723
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 595 PAC $5,000 $5,000 CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS COPE $1,543 $1,543
Page | 45
APPENDIX 5: Independent Expenditures for Candidates by Committee, 2014 - 2018 Committee Name 2014 2016 2018 Grand total
EAST BAY RENTAL HOUSING ASSOCIATION PAC $148 $148
$443,479 $441,142 $653,153 $1,537,774
SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

Page | 46

Public Ethics Commission
1 Frank Ogawa Plaza (City Hall), Room 104
Oakland, CA 94612
www.oaklandca.gov/pec
[email protected]
(510) 238-3593

← All documents from this meeting