“At thisAnnual Report reviewstage, theCityCouncil must makeadeterminationthat thebenefitstothecommunityof thesurveillancetechnologyoutweighthecosts; that theproposalwill safeguardcivil libertiesandcivil rights; andthat noalternativewithalesser economiccost orimpact oncivil rightsor civil libertieswouldbeaseffective.
Basedonthefollowingfactors, thePACfindsthat thebenefitsof usingShotspotter technologydonot outweighthecoststocivil libertiesandOaklandtaxpayers, andthat therearemoreeffectivealternativestoreducegunviolencewithalesser economiccost or impact oncivil rightsandcivil liberties:
● Likeeveryother jurisdictioninthecountrywhichhasbeenresearchedandusesthetechnology, ShotSpotter hasfailedtoreducegunviolenceinOakland.● Per OPD’slast four annual reports, thefalsepositiveor “wildgoosechase” ratehasbeen74%(‘20), 83%(‘21), 76%(‘22), 78%(‘23). 1 Statistical analysishasshownthat responsetimesactuallyincreaseinShotspotter jurisdictions. 2 Withanational average86%falsealert rate, similar toOakland’s, ShotSpotter takespoliceawayfrommoreeffectivepoliceworkduetodailywildgoosechases. 3 ● ShotSpotter usefailstoleadtoasufficient number of arrests, let aloneconvictions, tohaveadeterrent effect. AccordingtoOPD, thenumber of arrestsinOaklandhavebeen8(‘20), 8(‘21), 7(‘22), and4(‘23). 4 ● Statistical analysisinother jurisdictionshasshownthat therecoveryof gunsandshell casingsat Shotspotter alert siteshavenoprovenpositivecorrelationontherateof gunviolence, nor ledtoincreasedarrestsand/or convictions 5 .BasedonDOJdata, it wasreportedthat for year 2022, for all Part 1(violent,major propertycrimes) categoriesOPD’saverageclearancerateof these7-homicide, rape, robbery, aggravatedassault, burglary, vehicletheft, larceny/theft,OPD’saverageclearanceratewas1.5%, witha6.5%clearanceratefor violentcrime. 6 Thissupportsthat evidencecollectedat thesceneisnot leadingtoprosecutionof violent crimes. 6 https://www.cjcj.org/reports-publications/report/california-law-enforcement-agencies-are-spending-more-but-solving-fewer-crimes 5 GDTseemstopositivelyimpact anumber of procedural aspectsof policeresponsetogunfire. GDTfurther demonstratesapositiveinfluenceonevidencecollection. Unfortunately, theseprocedural benefitsdidnot translatetoanymeaningful improvementstocrimecontrol outcomes.https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/308357.pdf 4 OPDAnnual Reportsfor Years2020-2023.
3 https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2021/5/3/22416397/chicago-gunshot-detection-system-dead-end-deployments-macarthur-justice-center 2 https://michaeltopper.netlify.app/research/jmp_michael_topper.pdf 1 OPDAnnual Reportsfor Years2020-2023.
● Theincreaseinnumber of alertsduetouseof ShotSpotter itself dramaticallyincreasesthenumber of incidentsrespondedto, increasingofficerworkloadwithnocommensurateincreaseinpublicsafety 7 .● ShotSpotter leadstomissioncreep, astheoverwhelmingamount of arrestsandpolicereportsfiledareduetonon-guncrimes(e.g. probationviolations,publicdrunkenness, disorderlyconduct), increasingthenegativedisparateimpact effect of over-policingonmarginalizedcommunities, whichinOaklandprimarilymeanshistoricallyBlackneighborhoods, whiledoinglittletoreducegunviolence. Oneof thedutiesof thePACistoensurethat adequatepolicyguardrailsareinplacetomitigateanydisparateimpactssuchasracialprofiling. Thehistoryof Americanpolicing, andOaklandspecifically,demonstratesthat weusesurveillancetechnologyand/or overpolicecertaincommunitiesmorethanothers. Wefindnosuchcomfort intheShotSpotter policytoguardagainst suchanimpact, asthenatureof thetechnologyitself, whichincreasesinteractionswitharmedofficers, anditslocationinminorityneighborhoods, mootspolicyguardrails.● OnMarch4, 2014, former OPDChief SeanWhent statedtotheCityCouncil thatrenewingtheShotSpotter contract was“not apriority.” 8 ● OnMarch4, 2024, theDurhamCityCouncil votednot torenewitsShotSpottercontract. 9 ● OnFebruary15, 2024, theCityof Chicago, after extensiveresearchbyitsOIGandthird-partyacademicresearchers, announcedit will let itsShotSpottercontract expireinSeptember duetolackof efficacy. 10 ● ThePACfurther findsthat therearemoreeffectivealternativeswithalessereconomiccost or impact oncivil rightsor civil liberties, includingtherecommendedreallocationof resourcesbelow.● DespiteagreeingtoabidebyaNovember 2023settlement agreement withSecureJustice, whichincludesamongother things, adheringtothesurveillancetechnologyordinance, thecorrespondingShotSpotter usepolicy, andthesettlement agreement itself, OPDadmitsinthisAnnual Report that it hasagainillegallyprovideddirect loginaccesstoathirdpartyinconflict withtheapprovedusepolicy, demonstratingdisregardfor thelawandcivilianoversight, andfurtherincreasingharmtoOaklandtaxpayersthat will againbeforcedtopaytheattorneysfeesandcourt coststoSecureJusticeasit movestoenforcethesettlement agreement andseekssanctionsagainst OPDandOCA.
ShotSpotter Motion(Hofer, Leavitt, Katz, Suleiman)
10 https://www.npr.org/2024/02/15/1231394334/shotspotter-gunfire-detection-chicago-mayor-dropping 9 https://abc11.com/durham-shotspotter-crime-gun-shots-fired/14491996/ 8 https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/oakland-cops-aim-to-scrap-gunfire-detecting-5316060.php 7 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-023-09594-6Anecdotally, it appearsmorelikelythannot that first aidprovidedduetoShotSpotter alertsisrarelylifesaving, andmoreof theskinnedkneesandbruisedbodynature.
The PAC recommends that the City Council not renew or extend the contract with Shotspotter (now Sound Thinking) which expires June 30, 2024, and that the approximately $1.8 million+ in future savings (if a similar 2 year contract were to be renewed) be directed towards the crime lab which is greatly understaffed and lacking in capacity to process our multi-year backlog of evidence. Improved processing of evidence will increase our low clearance rates, and is a far more effective and proven alternative to improving public safety as we solve violent crimes, which should be our priority in Oakland. Oakland cannot rightfully claim to care about victims of violent crime when it takes years to process evidence, let alone lead to an arrest and/or conviction, preventing the victims themselves and their loved ones from getting justice and closure. This has been a widely known problem since at least the 2012 Alameda County Grand Jury report.
The above findings are to be included with this motion forwarded to the City Council. ----------------------------------------------------------
ANALYSIS
Our present ShotSpotter contract of $1.8M expires on June 30, 2024. Oakland has used Shotspotter since at least 2008, and in that time period, ShotSpotter has failed to positively impact the rate of gun violence in our city. Gunshot Detection Technology is an easy technology to root for, but just because a concept may be exciting and non-controversial (in theory anyway) on its face, if it is the wrong tool for the job, we need to have the courage to say so. Although the PAC’s primary responsibility is to ensure that adequate guardrails are in place to protect the civil liberties and privacy interests of Oaklanders, the cost-benefit analysis at this stage must involve consideration of whether our scarce taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely, especially as we face yet another historic projected budget deficit.
Benefits are intentionally not defined in our ordinance. The PAC has previously relied upon potential benefits to recommend continued use such as the faster rendering of first aid when we respond to a gunshot alert. However, there is no evidence before the PAC that any of the reported numbers in the report are true - they could be, but they have no support before us. OPD has historically and consistently stated to us since 2016 that they are “working on it” -when we remind them of their obligations under the ordinance to track use of surveillance technology. We do acknowledge that the vendor for this particular tech is able to supply some of the data in the report, however that reported data is likewise not independently verified, and ShotSpotter is well known for being aggressively opposed to an independent audit of their data and algorithm. They regularly challenge public record requests to their clients, and they often refuse to comply with subpoenas asking prosecutors to dismiss charges rather than be forced to open their system to inspection.
However, thelast twoyearshaveshownaremarkableincreaseinresearchintoShotSpotter’sclaimsof efficacy, asseveral policedepartmentshaveeither voluntarilyopenedtheir ownrecords, or likeChicago, hadaninspector general withsufficient authoritytoexaminewhetherShotSpotter isaneffectivetool.
Today, baseduponstatistical analysis, wecanstatethefollowingabout ShotSpotter:
LACKSEFFICACY1. ShotSpotter hasnever beenshowntoreducegunviolenceinastatisticallysignificantmanner inacitywheretheymaintainapresence.2. Onaverageacrossthecountry, andinOaklandper OPD’sownnumbers, 86%of “alerts”arewildgoosechases, wherenoactionableintel or evidenceisobtained. Thesewildgoosechasestakeplaceawayfromother valuablepolicework, anespeciallyheightenedconcerninOaklandwherewedonot havesufficient staff topoliceacityofthissize. Wedoubt anyof youwouldcontinuetopaymillionsof dollarsfor aproduct thatprovidesnovalue86%of thetime.
FromMacArthur JusticeCenter at NorthwesternUniversityof Law(ChicagoPDShotSpotter):
Ananalysisof thecity’sgunshot detectionsystemreleasedMondayfoundthatnearly86%of policedeploymentstoalertsof gunfirepromptednoformal reportsof anycrime.
Theresearch, conductedbytheMacArthur JusticeCenter at theNorthwesternUniversitySchool of Law, showsthereweremorethat 40,000“dead-enddeployments” togunshot alertsrecordedbetweenJuly2019andmid-April —anaverageof 61eachday.
Just 10%of thealertsover that periodsent officersoncallsthat likelyinvolvedguns, theresearchersfoundafter analyzingrecordskept bythecity’sOfficeofEmergencyManagement andCommunications. https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2021/5/3/22416397/chicago-gunshot-detection-system-dead-end-deployments-macarthur-justice-center
3. Shotsfiredcallsfor serviceintheGDTareawere15%morelikelytobeunfounded.4. For fatal shootings, GDTtreatment wasnot associatedwithincreasedlikelihoodofballisticevidencecollectionor caseclearance.5. For non-fatal shootings, GDTtreatment wasnot associatedwithincreasedlikelihoodofballisticevidencecollectionor caseclearance.6. GDTmaynot addvaluetoinvestigationsandmayincreasepatrol workload. (TheEffect of Gunshot DetectionTechnologyonEvidenceCollectionandCaseClearanceinKansasCity, Missouri. Journal of Experimental Criminology2023.)
MAYINCREASERATEOFVIOLENCE
7. Useof GDTmayescalateviolent interactionswithrespondingpolicethat believeanarmedanddangerousshooter ispresent. GDTsensorsinUScities, andhereinOakland, areplacedprimarilyinlower incomeneighborhoodsthat arehistoricallyBlackneighborhoods. Soundthinking’sCEOlikestosaythat thesecommunitiesare“underservedandoverpoliced” andyet hisproduct seemstodefendthat statusquobyunnecessarilybringingarmedofficersintomorefrequent contact, whilenot reducinggunviolenceinthat samecommunity.
ResultsindicateinChicago:• 15.6morefatal shootingsoccurredinGDTtarget areasover thedurationof theinterventionperiod, onaverage.• 77.5morenon-fatal shootingsoccurredinGDTtarget areasover thedurationof theinterventionperiod, onaverage.• 115moregunassaultsandrobberiesoccurredinGDTtarget areasover thedurationoftheinterventionperiod, onaverage. (NationalCriminalJusticeReferenceService- OfficeofJusticePrograms,TheImpactofGunshotDetectionTechnologyonGunViolenceinKansasCityandChicago:AMulti-ProngedEvaluation,January2024 )
RESPONSETIMESINCREASEINGDTCOVEREDAREAS
ShotSpotter offersasolutionwhereinpoliceofficersaredispatchedtoadditional instancesofpotential gunfire. InChicago, thesettingof thispaper, thisresultsinapproximately70ShotSpotter-relateddispatcheseachday, equatingto75total hoursof officer time. Thisrepresentsatwo-foldincreaseinthenumber of gunfirereportsthat requireofficerstoengageinrapidresponse.
InChicago, thisamountstoapproximately70instancesper-daywherebyofficersareimmediatelydispatchedtopotential instancesof gunfire. However, thisallocationdivertspoliceresourcesawayfromconfirmedreportsof 911emergencies, creatingdelaysinrapidresponse—acritical component of policingwithhealthandsafetyimplications. Inthispaper, weutilizevariationintimingfromShotSpotter rolloutsacrossChicagopolicedistrictsfrom2016-2022toestimatethecausal effectsof ShotSpotter on911emergencyresponsetimesthataredesignatedasPriority1(immediatedispatch). Usingcomprehensive911dispatchdatafromtheChicagoPoliceDepartment, wefindthat ShotSpotter implementationcausespoliceofficerstobedispatchedone-minuteslower (23%increase) andarriveon-scenenearlytwo-minuteslater (13%increase). Moreover, theseeffectsaredrivenbyperiodswithfewerpoliceon-dutyandtimesof daywithlarger numbersof ShotSpotter-relateddispatches.Consequently, whenrespondingtoemergencycalls, policeofficers’ successratein arrestingperpetratorsdecreasesbyapproximately9%, withnotablylargedecreasesinarrestsfor domesticbattery(14%).
ShotSpotter forcesofficerstomaketrade-offsinfavor of respondingtoShotSpotter alerts.Consistent withthismechanism, responsetimesfromother time-sensitivecalls(Priority2) arealsoincreased, andinaddition, time-insensitivecalls(Priority3) showsuggestiveevidenceoflonger delays, providingfurther evidenceof heightenedofficer responsibilities. Consequently,theseelevatedresponsetimescomeat asignificant cost. InSection5.3, weanalyzetherelationshipbetweenpoliceresponsetimeandthelikelihoodof anarrest. Wefindthat Priority1callsare8%lesslikelytohavetheperpetrator arrested, consistent withBlanesi Vidal andKirchmaier (2018) whoattributefaster rapidresponsetohigher crimeclearancerates. Theeffect isparticularlystrongincallsregardingdomesticbattery(14%) anddomesticdisturbances(13%)—twosituationswherereoffendingislikely(Maxwell et al., 2001).
Wefindthat policedispatchesfor emergencymedical servicesaredelayedbynearlyoneminuteduetoShotSpotter implementation. Asmentionedearlier, thiscouldprolongtreatment tocritical injuriesif ambulancepersonnel arewaitingfor policetoarrivetoacrimescene. Inturn,thiscouldhavesignificant implications, aslonger travel timesandambulanceresponsetimeshavebeenlinkedtohigher mortalityrates(Avdic, 2016; Wilde, 2013). https://michaeltopper.netlify.app/research/jmp_michael_topper.pdf
POLICEWORKLOADINCREASESWITHOUTINCREASEINPUBLICSAFETY
Apartiallyblock-randomizedfieldexperiment inPhiladelphia, PA, suggestedthat GDTdispatchesmayplaceasignificant burdenonpolicepatrol operations(Ratcliffeet al.,2019). Policeresponsestogunshot incidentsincreasedbyover 259%inthe800feetsurroundingtheGDTtarget locationsover the8-monthstudyperiod, but therewasnosignificant increaseinthenumber of confirmed, or “founded,”gunfireincidents. Ratcliffeet al. (2019) concludedtheGDTsystemsubstantiallyincreasedtheworkloadof policeattendingtoincidentsfor whichnoevidenceof gunfirewasfound, whilehavingnoeffectonconfirmedshootingevents. Policeworkloadincreaseshavealsobeenobservedelsewhere, withpoliceresponsestogunfireincreasing80%inSt. Louis(Mares&Blackburn,2021) and287%inDallas(Mazerolleet al., 1998) followingtheintroductionof GDT. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-023-09594-6 In2011, OPDannouncedit plannedtostopinvestigatingnon-homiciderequestsover threeyearsoldbecauseof a15percent increaseinbackloggedcases. Thereport alsohighlighted650unsolvedsexual assault casesand330unsolvedhomicidesthat havegoneuntestedforlackof resources.
Asaresult of understaffingandunderfunding, theOPD’sfingerprint divisionhasahistoricalbacklogof over 10,000casesandisnowcollectinghalf of thefingerprintsit did10yearsago,despiteanincreaseinthecrimerate. “Duetolackof fundingbyelectedofficialsinOakland, manyrequestsfor forensictestinghavesimplybeencanceled, leavingvictimstowonder if their caseswill ever besolved,” thejuryreported. https://thepioneeronline.com/11490/politics/grand-jury-says-oakland-and-alameda-county-should-merge-crime-labs/ (2012grandjuryreport) Asweepingaudit bytheofficeof CaliforniaAttorneyGeneral Xavier Becerrafoundnearly1,200untestedrapekitsat theOaklandPoliceDepartment, accountingfor about 9%of thenearly14,000untestedkitsheldbylaw enforcement agenciesacrossCalifornia. https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Audit-finds-Oakland-police-have-1-200-untested-15271265.php(May2020)