Strengthening Oakland's
Governance
Structure
Recommendations for a clearer, more accountable, and more effective city government
Submitted by the Mayor's Working Group on Charter Reform January 29, 2026
1 Dear Mayor Barbara Lee:
As members of the Mayor's Working Group on Charter Reform, we are honored to present to you our final
report.
Thank
you
for
entrusting
us
with
this
critical
work
and
for
your
vision
in
recognizing
that
Oakland's
future
depends
on
a
governance
structure
that
matches
the
scale
of
our
challenges
and
the
aspirations
of
our
residents.
Over the past five months, more than 750 Oakland residents have participated in our public meetings
to
learn
about
the
Charter
and
provide
feedback
for
our
deliberations.
Dozens
of
current
and
former
city
staff,
elected
officials,
and
community
organizations
provided
one-on-one
interviews
to
share
their
experience
and
expertise.
Additionally,
we
reviewed
433
survey
responses
and
conducted
extensive
research
on
governance
models
across
the
country.
Thank
you
for
your
support
of
this
public
outreach
and
your
ongoing
encouragement
to
seek
as
much
public
input
as
was
possible.
We
deeply
appreciate
the
generosity
of
all
who
have
given
their
time
to
inform
our
efforts.
Throughout this process, one message emerged consistently: Oakland's current Charter assigns powers
and
responsibilities
in
ways
that
create
confusion,
undermine
accountability,
and
impede
the
city
from
addressing
its
most
pressing
challenges
effectively.
Residents
hold
the
Mayor
accountable
for
citywide
outcomes,
yet
the
Mayor
lacks
sufficient
authority
to
deliver
results.
Meanwhile,
the
City
Council
struggles
to
provide
effective
oversight
without
clear
lines
of
responsibility
or
adequate
analytical
capacity.
This
misalignment
particularly
harms
residents
who
lack
the
time,
resources,
or
political
capital
to
navigate
a
fragmented
system,
perpetuating
inequities
across
neighborhoods.
We unanimously recommend that Oakland modify its Charter to adopt a coherent governance model.
Specifically,
we
recommend
strengthening
the
Mayor’s
powers
to
establish
clear
executive
authority
and
empowering
the
City
Council
in
ways
that
support
rigorous
legislative
and
budget
analysis
and
oversight.
Under
this
framework,
the
Mayor
would
serve
as
chief
executive
with
veto
power
over
legislation
and
budget
decisions,
while
retaining
a
City
Administrator
to
oversee
core
internal
functions.
The
City
Council
would
gain
independent
analytical
capacity
through
a
permanent
budget
and
legislative
analyst
office.
These recommendations respond directly to what we heard from Oakland residents: there is a need for
clear
accountability,
decisive
leadership,
and
a
governance
structure
that
enables
effective
action.
Oakland stands at a critical juncture. The city faces a severe structural budget deficit and persistent inequities
that
demand
coordinated,
citywide
solutions.
Charter
reform
alone
cannot
solve
these
problems,
but
it
can
create
the
conditions
that
make
solutions
possible
by
clarifying
who
is
responsible,
aligning
authority
with
accountability,
and
ensuring
that,
when
change
is
necessary,
the
path
forward
is
clear.
Thank you again for this opportunity to serve Oakland.
Respectfully submitted,
The Mayor's Working Group on Charter Reform
Facilitated by the League of Women Voters of Oakland and the San Francisco Bay Area Planning and Urban
Research
Association
(SPUR)
2 Introduction
Under the California Constitution, cities in California may be organized as either general law cities or charter
cities.
As
a
charter
city,
Oakland
has
the
authority
to
define
its
own
governmental
structure
through
a
voter-approved
charter.
While
powers
are
limited
by
the
U.S.
and
California
constitutions,
federal
laws,
and
state
laws,
charter
cities
are
authorized
to
set
the
terms
of
local
governance,
including
the
powers
of
the
mayor,
city
council,
city
administrator
,
and
other
key
officials.
Charter
cities
can
also
amend
their
charters
as
they
grow
or
as
community
needs
evolve.
Oakland faces significant challenges that require clear and decisive leadership, including a severe structural
budget
deficit,
underfunded
infrastructure,
widening
racial
and
wealth
disparities
across
neighborhoods,
and
high
public
expectations
for
transparency
and
responsiveness.
This report examines how revising the Oakland City Charter can help address these challenges.
Proposed
changes
would
achieve
several
goals:
● Eliminate the pervading confusion about who holds ultimate responsibility for running the city
and
delivering
services
● Clarify Charter powers so that elected officials can deliver services and be accountable for implementing
the
policies
and
programs
promised
during
campaigns
● Resolve operational inefficiencies that result from inadequate or overlapping authorities About the Mayor’s Working Group on Charter Reform Mayor Barbara Lee convened the Mayor’s Working Group on Charter Reform to review and provide recommendations
for
reforming
Oakland’s
Charter.
Recognizing
that
Oakland’s
governance
structure
shapes
everything
from
budget
decisions
to
service
delivery,
Mayor
Lee
charged
the
Working
Group
with
examining
how
the
Charter
could
better
support
effective
leadership
and
public
accountability
to
strengthen
public
trust.
Mayor Lee asked the Working Group to focus on three goals:
● Better define the role of elected officials ● Address responsible city financial planning ● Improve government accountability and transparency To support this work, Mayor Lee asked the League of Women Voters of Oakland (LWVO) and the San Francisco
Bay
Area
Planning
and
Urban
Research
Association
(SPUR)
to
co-facilitate
the
Working
Group.
Appointees
to
the
Working
Group
brought
backgrounds
in
labor,
business,
city
finance,
management,
ethics
and
municipal
law.
(See
Appendix
A
for
information
on
the
Working
Group
members.)
Together,
the
facilitators
have
focused
on
three
goals:
● Educate the community about what the Charter is and why it matters for daily governance and
service
delivery
● Gather community input from residents, community organizations, labor groups, businesses,
and
people
with
extensive
knowledge
of
government
operations
and
reform
3 ● Support the Working Group in producing this report , which outlines options for improving the
Charter
and
recommends
specific
changes
that
would
help
Oakland
better
meet
the
challenges
of
today
and
tomorrow.
Between August and December 2025, the Working Group engaged more than 750 residents through
public
meetings
and
listening
sessions
and
conducted
extensive
interviews
with
current
and
former
city
staff,
elected
officials,
and
community-based
organizations.
The
Working
Group
has
solicited
additional
input
through
a
survey
and
reviewed
the
433
responses
received.
(See
Appendix
B
for
a
list
of
interviewees
and
Appendix
C
for
a
summary
of
community
input.)
Key Findings
Community input consistently emphasized that Oakland’s governance challenges cannot be separated
from
the
city’s
broader
context.
Several
factors
make
it
especially
important
that
Oakland
clarify
the
governing
authority
of
each
city
official:
● Severe fiscal stress , including recurring structural budget deficits and the resulting need for greater
efficiency
to
meet
service
needs
● Deep racial, wealth, and geographic inequities , with historical disinvestment in neighborhoods
and
inequitable
service
delivery
and
infrastructure
conditions
● A history of mayors and professional administrators who have lacked sufficient authority to lead
decisively
under
the
current
Charter
4 ● A highly engaged civic culture , characterized by a desire for direct access to decision-makers,
strong
activism
around
racial
and
economic
justice,
accountability,
transparency,
and
the
influence
of
money
in
elections
Participants in community meetings and interviews repeatedly noted that the absence of clear governing
authority
fosters
informal
workarounds
and
a
reliance
on
personal
relationships.
Residents
with
the
least
time,
resources,
or
political
capital
bear
the
burden
of
figuring
out
the
resulting
systems.
Clarity
about
roles
and
responsibilities
can
not
only
cut
through
the
confusion
and
set
the
stage
for
more
effective
and
responsive
government,
but
support
the
achievement
of
greater
equity
across
Oakland’s
neighborhoods.
Oakland’s
Current
Charter
Municipal charters establish the framework for how cities govern themselves. Most U.S. cities adopt one
of
two
well-established
governance
models:
● Strong mayor:
the mayor is elected citywide and serves as the chief executive who manages city
operations,
proposes
budgets,
and
exercises
a
veto
power
over
legislation
and
the
final
budget.
● Council-manager: the city council acts as the unified legislative authority and appoints a city manager
who
directs
city
operations
and
often
proposes
a
city
budget
which
the
city
council
may
amend
before
adopting.
Most cities adopt versions of these two models to suit their local context. Oakland is unusual in that it
merges
elements
of
both
models
in
a
unique
way
which
creates
severe
ambiguity
about
authority
and
responsibility.
● The Mayor doesn’t serve on the council
but lacks the powers of a strong mayor. They can’t vote
on
the
council
(except
for
breaking
ties)
or
veto
its
decisions,
leaving
them
unable
to
shape
city
policy
directly.
● The City Administrator manages city agencies and operations, like in a council-manager system.
But
unlike
a
typical
city
manager
who
answers
to
the
council,
Oakland’s
Administrator
serves
at
the
Mayor’s
pleasure,
meaning
the
Mayor
can
fire
them
at
will.
● While the Mayor has no formal power to appoint department heads, they exert significant influence
over
the
Administrator
who
does.
This
complicates
the
City
Council’s
oversight
of
how
the
City
Administrator
is
implementing
the
policies
they
legislate.
Community members and city staff described this system as difficult to navigate, hard to explain, and
ill-suited
to
Oakland’s
current
challenges.
Key Finding 1: Misaligned authority creates a disconnect between public expectations and
actual
powers.
Oakland residents elect a Mayor to set a vision for the city and to lead the work of making that vision real.
Yet
even
when
a
Mayor
establishes
clear
priorities,
the
public
often
sees
a
gap
between
campaign
promises
and
actual
outcomes.
At
the
same
time,
Councilmembers
are
responsible
for
adopting
budgets
and
policies
but
lack
the
tools
to
ensure
those
decisions
are
carried
out.
5 The Charter calls for the Mayor to “give direction” to the City Administrator and for the City Council to direct
the
City
Administrator.
This
becomes
a
source
of
confusion
because
the
Mayor
and
the
City
Council
often
deliver
competing
directives
and
send
unclear
signals
about
priorities.
City
staff
particularly
underscored
the
need
for
a
system
that
prevents
conflicting
instructions
from
multiple
elected
and
appointed
officials.
Residents,
too,
want
more
clarity
about
who
is
responsible,
how
decisions
are
made,
and
where
to
go
to
report
problems.
Both
residents
and
city
employees
described
escalating
issues
through
multiple
offices,
relying
on
informal
relationships,
or
turning
to
their
Councilmembers
to
resolve
administrative
problems
—
regardless
of
whether
those
officials
have
the
official
authority
to
act.
Key Finding 2: Weak institutional alignment undermines long-term planning, fiscal discipline,
and
effective
oversight.
The lack of clear authority and responsibility echoes through the City’s financial management practices.
The
Mayor
proposes
the
city’s
budget
but
has
no
authority
to
push
back
when
the
Council
changes
it.
The
Council
depends
largely
on
the
Mayor’s
own
staff
to
analyze
the
budget,
since
they
lack
consistent
and
ongoing
access
to
independent
financial
experts.
The
City
Administrator
is
caught
in
the
middle,
forced
to
implement
a
budget
that
often
relies
on
unrealistic
assumptions
or
includes
programs
without
funding
to
pay
for
them.
Without
clear
authority
or
a
process
to
settle
disputes,
the
Mayor,
City
Council,
and
City
Administrator
struggle
to
trust
each
other.
This
makes
it
nearly
impossible
for
the
city
to
agree
on
a
sustainable
financial
plan.
As a result, the public has also lost confidence. Many people interviewed worry that Oakland is trying to
solve
complex
problems
while
running
chronic
budget
deficits
and
lacking
coordinated
financial
oversight.
A
recent
survey
by
the
Oakland
Budget
Advisory
Commission
found
that
78%
of
respondents
disapprove
of
how
the
city
is
performing,
with
many
citing
growing
distrust
in
the
city’s
budget
management.
1 Key Finding 3: Organizational complexity undermines accountability, transparency, and long-term
effectiveness.
The misalignment of roles and responsibilities in the Charter has created an environment in which multiple
actors
share
partial
authority,
but
no
single
leader
or
body
is
ultimately
responsible
for
administrative
outcomes.
Many
current
and
former
city
officers
commented
that
“everyone
is
in
charge,
and
therefore
no
one
is
in
charge.”
This
complexity
pulls
Councilmembers
out
of
their
intended
policymaking
roles,
incentivizing
them
to
intervene
in
administrative
matters
to
address
constituent
concerns
that
they
fear
will
otherwise
go
unresolved.
Staff,
meanwhile,
are
caught
between
conflicting
directives
and
insufficient
resources,
leading
to
improvised
workarounds
that
increase
organizational
risk
and
reduce
transparency.
Critical
processes
often
live
in
people’s
heads
rather
than
in
organizational
systems,
and
frequent
leadership
changes
make
it
difficult
to
build
and
sustain
institutional
knowledge.
1 City of Oakland Budget Advisory Commission. 2025 City of Oakland Resident Budget Priorities Survey . City of Oakland,
2025.
https://cao-94612.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/documents/Oakland-FY-25-27-Budget-Resident-Survey-FULL.pd f. Accessed 22 Jan. 2026. 6
Both staff and elected officials reported being routinely pulled into short-term problem-solving rather
than
long-term
strategy.
Community
members
emphasized
that
this
complexity
disproportionately
harms
residents
who
lack
the
capacity
to
navigate
a
fragmented
system.
Without
a
coherent
governance
structure
that
clearly
assigns
authority
and
supports
stable
administrative
leadership,
Oakland
cannot
build
the
institutional
capacity
required
to
improve
government
operations
and
performance.
Policy Options
Oakland has experimented with two major governance models over the past century:
council-manager
and
strong-mayor
systems.
(See
Appendix
D
for
a
history
of
Oakland’s
governance
models.)
Currently,
Oakland’s
structure
blends
both
systems
without
securing
the
benefits
of
either,
creating
structural
ambiguity
and
competing
lines
of
authority.
Shifting
decisively
to
either
model
would
eliminate
this
structural
ambiguity,
establish
a
clean
line
of
authority,
and
create
an
accountability
framework
that
aligns
with
best
practices
nationwide.
Two Approaches, Two Distinct Models
Although models of municipal government are often framed simply as “council manager” versus “strong
mayor,”
these
labels
can
mask
the
deeper
institutional
logic
behind
each
system.
Viewed
more
precisely,
the
two
models
reflect
fundamentally
different
theories
of
governance.
Policy Option A
Strong
Mayor:
A
Balanced
Separation
of
Powers
In this model, the mayor is elected citywide to serve as the city's chief executive. The mayor provides unified
administrative
direction,
proposes
the
budget,
and
holds
veto
authority
over
the
council's
legislation.
The
city
council
serves
as
the
legislative
branch,
passing
laws
and
the
budget
while
overseeing
the
mayor's
administration.
This
system
aims
for
executive
accountability
and
separated
powers,
with
a
clear
boundary
between
legislative
and
administrative
authority.
This model is used in Los Angeles, San Diego, Fresno and San Francisco,
as
well
as
in
large
U.S.
cities
like
Boston,
Cleveland,
Seattle,
and
Minneapolis.
The
Mayor
has
authority
over
administrative
departments,
budget
preparation,
and
enforcement
of
laws
and
ordinances.
Key
Charter
amendments
grant
the
Mayor
veto
power
(with
a
two-thirds
council
override),
strengthen
the
council’s
budgeting
and
oversight
functions,
clarify
appointment
and
removal
authority
for
department
heads,
and
realign
accountability
by
making
the
Mayor
directly
responsible
for
city
operations
and
enforcing
laws
and
policies.
Benefits of a strong-mayor system
A strong-mayor structure offers clear, direct accountability: the public knows exactly who is responsible
for
executive
performance,
and
every
voter
participates
equally
in
selecting
the
city’s
7 leader. With unified executive authority, department heads receive consistent priorities from one leader
rather
than
navigating
competing
directives
from
multiple
officials.
This
clarity
strengthens
coordination,
enhances
administrative
focus,
and
enables
more
decisive
responses
to
crises
or
cross-departmental
challenges.
The
model
also
creates
a
structured
framework
for
collaboration
between
branches;
veto
powers,
while
rarely
used,
encourage
negotiation
and
prevent
either
branch
from
advancing
major
policies
without
mutual
engagement.
Importantly,
strong-mayor
systems
give
cities
a
single
authoritative
voice
in
regional,
state,
and
federal
contexts—an
increasingly
important
asset
for
complex
urban
areas.
Tradeoffs of a strong-mayor system
The strong-mayor model concentrates power in a single elected individual, which can heighten risks of
politicization,
misuse
of
authority,
or
governance
driven
by
short-term
electoral
incentives.
The
model’s
success
depends
heavily
on
the
competence
of
the
mayor;
an
able
campaigner
is
not
necessarily
an
able
administrator.
In
Oakland’s
past,
few
candidates
for
mayor
have
had
government
administrative
experience,
though
elected
mayors
have
hired
experienced
city
administrators.
A
weak
executive
can
hinder
performance
even
with
strong
institutional
tools.
Electoral
pressures
may
drive
mayors
toward
visible
quick
wins
rather
than
long-term
investments
in
operational
and
structural
improvements.
Policy Option B
Council-Manager:
A
Council-Dominant
Legislative
Government
In this model, policy and administrative authority flow from the mayor and city council collectively, acting
as
a
single
legislative
body.
The
mayor
serves
as
a
member
of
the
council.
The
council
sets
policy,
passes
the
budget,
and
appoints
a
professional
city
manager
to
run
day-to-day
operations.
The
city
manager
implements
the
council's
policies
and
manages
staff.
This
system
aims
for
professional
administration
and
unified
legislative
power,
with
a
clear
boundary
between
policy
setting
and
management.
This approach is used in most California cities, including Berkeley,
Sacramento,
Long
Beach,
and
San
José,
as
well
as
larger
U.S.
cities
like
El
Paso
and
Phoenix.
In
larger
cities
with
an
elected
city-wide
Mayor,
the
Mayor
typically
serves
as
the
Council
President.
Sometimes,
the
Mayor
is
given
additional
powers,
such
as
proposing
the
budget,
or
even
given
a
veto
power
over
legislation,
as
is
the
case
in
Long
Beach.
Benefits of a council-manager system
A council-manager structure offers several advantages. It lays a foundation for professional management,
insulating
administrative
decisions
from
short-term
political
pressures
and
enabling
the
city
manager
to
make
technically
sound
but
politically
unpopular
decisions
regarding
resource
allocation
or
organizational
restructuring.
2 Because
city
managers
often
serve
longer
tenures
than
elected
mayors,
this
model
can
provide
continuity,
stability,
and
institutional
memory,
helping
2 Local Governmental Structures And Its Effects On Public Services https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1aGn9pRXgxcUxeIwWQNV_XATL09nbgX8C 8
maintain administrative consistency across election cycles. 3 It also distributes political power across
the
council,
ensuring
that
district
representatives,
who
are
seen
as
more
connected
to
local
neighborhoods,
have
equal
standing
in
shaping
policy
and
advocating
for
community
needs.
Tradeoffs of a council-manager system
However, these benefits come with notable tradeoffs. Without a single elected executive, accountability
becomes
diffuse,
and
voters
may
struggle
to
know
whom
to
hold
accountable
for
the
city's
performance.
A
dysfunctional
or
divided
council
can
paralyze
administrative
action,
as
the
City
Manager
relies
on
unified
direction
to
set
priorities
and
govern
effectively.
While
the
model
strengthens
professional
management,
it
can
weaken
political
leadership,
reducing
responsiveness
to
community
concerns
and
empowering
an
unelected
Administrator
to
shape
priorities
and
influence
policy
feasibility
without
direct
voter
input.
Strengths of Each System — and the Problems They Are Designed to Solve Virtually all cities in the U.S. use one of these models with some adaptations reflective of their needs, culture
and
history.
Strong mayor systems tend to work best when:
● Voters expect visible, accountable executive leadership ● There are racial, wealth and geographic disparities across neighborhoods that require a citywide
approach
● Complex intergovernmental challenges require a single, authoritative voice ● Fiscal and administrative decisions require unified direction ● Political fragmentation makes collective accountability difficult Council–manager systems tend to work best when:
● Professional administration is prioritized ● There are fewer disparities across neighborhoods ● Political conflict is relatively low-intensity ● Councils are cohesive and capable of unified direction ● Residents expect collective, rather than individualized, political leadership These distinctions matter for Oakland. In a council–manager structure, the effective “executive” is the Council’s
majority
coalition.
Residents
whose
district
representatives
fall
outside
that
majority
may
find
their
priorities
marginalized
or
absent
from
administrative
decision-making.
In
contrast,
a
strong-mayor
system
ensures
that
all
residents—regardless
of
district—have
an
equal
vote
in
selecting
the
city’s
executive
leader.
3 Rose Institute of State and Local Government. "2023 California City Managers Survey: A Profile of the Profession."
Rose
Institute
of
State
and
Local
Government,
21 June
2023,
roseinstitute.org/2023-california-city-manager-survey-a-profile-of-the-profession/ 9
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Choose One Coherent Model
A decisive shift to either a coherent strong mayor system or a coherent council-manager system would
resolve
Oakland’s
long-standing
structural
ambiguities.
Both
models
are
widely
used
across
U.S.
cities
and
represent
nationally
recognized
best
practices
in
municipal
governance.
(See
Appendix
E
for
a
cross-city
comparison
of
different
governance
models.)
The Choices
The Working Group evaluated two distinct options:
Option A: Strong Mayor
● The Mayor serves as the city’s chief executive responsible for administration and delivery of services.
● The City Council serves as the legislative body responsible for policymaking, budgeting, and oversight.
● Executive authority is unified, and accountability for citywide outcomes is clearly vested in a single,
elected
leader.
Under a strong-mayor system, Oakland has two viable structural design options that retain professional
administration:
● The Mayor appoints a City Administrator to oversee internal service functions only — such as
finance,
human
resources,
information
technology,
and
procurement
—
to
ensure
operational
consistency,
but
otherwise,
cabinet-level
officials
or
heads
of
departments
are
appointed
by,
and
report
directly
to,
the
Mayor;
or
● The Mayor appoints a City Administrator to oversee all departments , with clear authority delegated
from
the
Mayor.
Under either design choice, this system emphasizes political leadership vested in a Mayor elected citywide.
Professional
expertise
comes
from
the
City
Administrator
or
heads
of
departments
and
other
officials
to
whom
the
Mayor
delegates
authority
while
retaining
complete
accountability.
Option B: Council-Manager
● The City Council acts as the unified legislative authority. ● A City Manager is appointed to run city operations. ● The Mayor serves as head of the City Council, either with one vote or with veto authority over legislative
decisions,
as
is
the
case
in
Long
Beach.
This structure emphasizes professional expertise and collective governance. Executive authority is vested
in
an
appointed
manager
rather
than
an
elected
official.
The
National
League
of
Cities
has
10 developed a model city charter that outlines recommendations about the ideal features to include when
using
this
form.
4 Community Input
While Oaklanders expressed a wide range of views about the city’s future governance structure, they consistently
emphasized
that,
regardless
of
the
system,
they
wanted:
● Clear accountability for citywide outcomes; ● Fewer layers of bureaucracy, including eliminating duplicative roles in the Mayor’s office and the
City
Administrator’s
office,
which
slow
down
decisions
and
confuse
responsibility;
● Stronger mayoral authority to ensure a citywide approach to service delivery; and
● A structure that can allocate resources across districts with very different needs to reduce disparities
rather
than
reinforce
them.
Many participants voiced a preference for a council-manager model, valuing professional administration,
continuity,
and
reduced
political
influence.
Others
supported
a
strong-mayor
system,
emphasizing
clear
lines
of
authority,
unified
executive
direction,
and
electoral
accountability.
Still
others
were
indifferent
to
the
specific
model,
but
unanimous
on
one
point:
Oakland
must
choose
a
coherent
structure.
The
current
hybrid
approach
—
fragmented,
confusing,
and
difficult
to
navigate
—
was
seen
as
untenable.
Recommendation 2: Establish a Clear Executive Structure and Give the Mayor
the
Authority
to
Lead
Of the two options, it is the Working Group’s recommendation that Oakland adopt a strong-mayor system
with
a
clearly
defined
executive
structure.
Under
this
model,
there
should
be
no
ambiguity
about
who
leads
the
administrative
branch
of
city
government.
It
should
be
the
Mayor.
Under this design:
● The Mayor runs the city ○ The Mayor serves as chief executive, responsible for city operations and service delivery.
○ All executive authority ultimately rests with the Mayor to ensure unified direction and accountability.
● The Mayor can veto the council’s decisions ○ The Mayor has veto power over all legislation, including laws, policies and budget decisions.
This
ensures
the
council
doesn’t
pass
policies
that
are
unrealistic,
unfunded,
or
not
possible
to
implement.
○ The council can override a mayoral veto with a two-thirds vote, preserving the balance of
power
between
branches.
● The Mayor retains a City Administrator to oversee core internal functions ○ The Mayor nominates a City Administrator, who must be confirmed by the City Council.
4 "Model City Charter, 9th Edition." National Civic League, https://www.nationalcivicleague.org/model-city-charter-9th-edition/ 11 ○ The City Administrator oversees essential administrative functions and appoints the leaders
of
departments
and
citywide
functions
including:
■ Finance ■ Human resources ■ Information technology ■ Procurement ■ Citywide systems such as permitting ● The Mayor can assign additional responsibilities to the City Administrator ○ Beyond these core internal functions, the Mayor has discretion to delegate other responsibilities
to
the
City
Administrator
as
needed.
● Deputy mayors or cabinet officials oversee policy departments ○ Deputy mayors or cabinet-level officials lead departments organized by policy focus such
as
public
safety,
public
works,
economic
development,
and
housing.
The rationale:
The Working Group believes this approach best fits Oakland for multiple reasons. One of the most significant
reasons,
stressed
throughout
by
both
the
public
and
interviewees,
is
that
a
strong
mayor
system
offers
a
way
to
establish
clear
accountability
for
how
the
city
is
run
in
a
way
that
aligns
with
public
expectations.
In
particular,
the
responsibility
for
service
delivery
rests
with
the
Mayor
who
organizes
and
coordinates
departments
and
provides
mechanisms
to
process
requests
for
services
efficiently
and
transparently.
In addition, to creating clear accountability aligned with public expectations, we believe the strong mayor
model
will
achieve
the
following
objectives:
● Promote fiscal discipline by improving the coordination of budget decisions between the Mayor
and
City
Council
through
the
addition
of
veto
power
● Enable citywide leadership to address racial, geographic, and wealth disparities ● Respond to Oakland’s high level of civic engagement and demand for visible, effective leadership
● Simplify the administrative chain of command while preserving professional management where
it
is
most
effective.
Community Input
Community members repeatedly expressed that when things go wrong, whether related to public safety,
homelessness,
street
conditions,
or
service
delivery,
they
put
the
accountability
on
the
Mayor.
Yet
under
the
current
structure,
the
Mayor
lacks
sufficient
authority
to
ensure
implementation.
Residents emphasized that Charter changes should provide:
● Decisive leadership in the face of a major budget deficit ● A citywide approach to addressing disparities across neighborhoods ● A direct connection between advocacy, decision-making, and implementation At the same time, residents also expressed these priorities:
12 ● Maintaining professional administrative expertise ● Securing continuity and institutional knowledge ● Protecting long-term projects from short-term political pressures Establishing a clear executive structure would empower leadership to deliver equitable outcomes informed
by
community
participation
citywide.
This
is
especially
critical
right
now,
given
Oakland’s
current
fiscal
challenges.
With
a
growing
structural
budget
deficit
and
limited
margin
for
inefficiency,
the
city
cannot
afford
diffuse
authority
or
fragmented
implementation.
Oakland
requires
leadership
that
is
both
empowered
and
accountable.
Recommendation 3: Strengthen the Council’s Legislative Capacity to Improve
Accountability
and
Oversight
A strong executive requires a legislative branch that is structurally sound and adequately empowered.
To
achieve
a
true
balance
of
power
under
a
strong-mayor
system
and
ensure
accountability,
Oakland
must
strengthen
the
City
Council’s
legislative
capacity
and
clarify
its
role
as
the
city’s
primary
policymaking
and
oversight
body.
Strengthening Legislative Capacity
A strong executive branch requires an equally strong legislative branch to provide oversight, accountability,
and
checks
and
balances.
As
noted
above,
in
the
proposed
system,
responsibility
for
running
the
city
and
providing
services
rests
with
the
Mayor.
Responsibility
to
set
policy
and
oversee
that
the
city
is
run
optimally
and
services
are
provided
in
a
timely
and
efficient
manner,
rests
with
the
Council.
Clarifying
roles
and
strengthening
both
constituent
services
in
the
executive
branch
and
legislative
capacity
on
the
council
will
enable
Councilmembers
to
focus
on
their
policy
and
oversight
responsibilities
while
ensuring
that
residents
receive
the
responsive
service
they
deserve,
ultimately
improving
city
governance
for
everyone.
To strengthen the council’s legislative capacity, the Working Group recommends:
Building independent legislative analysis capacity
The council should reallocate funds to reestablish a permanent budget and legislative analyst office, similar
to
those
in
Los
Angeles,
San
Diego,
and
the
California
legislature.
This
office
would
provide
independent
analysis
of:
● Budgets and fiscal impacts ● How proposed policies may interact or conflict with existing policies ● Staffing implications of proposed policies and legislation to ensure what is proposed can be implemented
within
a
specific
timeframe
● Operational capacity to manage changes and additions to existing operations Clarifying and strengthening oversight authority
The council's oversight powers should be clearly articulated in the Charter to allow for stronger powers
of
inquiry,
including:
13 ● The ability to conduct legislative hearings ● The authority to summon testimony and subpoena witnesses These powers are common in other strong mayor cities and are already granted to other city officers.
These
changes
elevate
the
council
from
a
hybrid
legislative/constituent-services
body
to
a
professional
legislative
branch
with
clear
authority.
They
will
achieve
the
following
goals:
● Clarify the council's role as head of the legislative branch ● Strengthen oversight and transparency ● Improve budget accountability ● Establish a durable system of checks and balances ● Enable better constituent service through the executive branch (see above) Structural Changes to the Council
Prior to 1998, there were nine council-members, seven elected by district and two elected at-large, including
the
Mayor
who
also
served
as
the
President
of
the
Council.
(See
appendix
D.)
This
was
useful
to
help
balance
citywide
interests
with
district
interests.
When
the
Mayor
was
removed
from
the
City
Council
in
1998,
the
council
was
left
with
eight
members.
Because
this
even
number
of
council
members
increases
the
likelihood
of
tie
votes
on
critical
legislation,
the
current
Charter
allows
the
Mayor
to
cast
tie-breaking
votes.
This
arrangement
is
unique
among
strong-mayor
cities,
where
mayors
typically
do
not
participate
in
legislative
voting.
To restore a functional legislative body with an odd number of members, the Working Group considered
two
approaches:
phasing
out
the
at-large
council
seat
or
adding
a
ninth
councilmember
(a
second
at-large
representative).
The
Working
Group
recommends
the
first
option,
phasing
out
the
at-large
seat,
for
the
following
reasons:
● Because a strong Mayor with veto power to influence citywide priorities makes the role of at-large
Councilmembers
to
provide
citywide
representation
less
significant.
● Having both a strong Mayor and one at-large Councilmember confuses voters as to the Councilmember’s
role.
● Phasing out the at-large position would reduce cost for salary and staff support, while the alternative
of
adding
a
ninth
member
would
increase
costs.
This change would create a seven-member council, an odd number that eliminates the need for mayoral
tie-breaking
and
thereby
maintains
clear
separation
between
legislative
and
executive
functions.
Establishing
a
Full-Time
City
Council
Most strong-mayor cities have full-time councils, while council-manager cities often have part-time councils.
Oakland’s
Charter
does
not
specify
whether
council
service
is
full-time
or
part-time,
though
full-time
service
is
generally
assumed.
This
ambiguity
is
inconsistent
with
how
Oakland
defines
expectations
for
other
elected
officials
and
with
the
practices
of
comparable
strong-mayor
cities.
(See
Appendix
E.)
14 The working group recommends making it explicit in the Charter that the council serves as a full-time
legislative
body.
The
council
should
be
capable
of
providing
robust
oversight,
conducting
thorough
policy
analysis,
and
serving
as
an
effective
check
on
executive
power.
To
establish
this
clearly,
the
Charter
should:
● Specify full-time council service. Make explicit what is currently only assumed, bringing consistency
to
how
Oakland
defines
the
role
and
compensation
of
all
its
elected
officials
and
aligning
with
other
comparable
strong-mayor
cities.
● Prohibit outside employment for council members. A clear prohibition on outside employment
ensures
independence,
eliminates
conflicts
of
interest,
and
reinforces
the
council’s
full-time
focus
on
legislative
work,
consistent
with
expectations
in
other
strong-mayor
cities.
In parallel, salary setting provisions for councilmembers should be aligned with those for other elected
city
officials
including
establishing
a
metric
or
benchmark
to
establish
base
salaries
and
cost
of
living
increases.
There
should
be
a
comprehensive
salary
survey
of
similarly
sized
strong-mayor
cities
to
establish
market-appropriate
compensation
for
full-time
legislative
work.
Other
cities
use
clear
benchmarks:
for
example,
Los
Angeles
ties
council
salaries
to
municipal
judges’
pay.
By
contrast,
the
current
Charter
only
authorizes
an
increase
for
City
Council
members
by
up
to
five
percent
annually,
but
provides
no
means
to
reset
the
salary
base
even
when
existing
compensation
levels
fall
below
market
standards.
Oakland
should
adopt
a
similar
approach
to
other
cities
that
provide
objective
standards
and
regular
recalibration,
moving
away
from
the
current
system
where
council
salaries
only
receive
cost-of-living
adjustments
whereas
the
Mayor,
City
Attorney,
and
City
Auditor
have
salaries
reset
biennially
through
market
comparisons.
Any
proposed
changes
that
will
impact
the
budget
will
need
to
be
deliberated
and
decided
on
in
the
larger
budgetary
context.
When council members have the time, compensation, and institutional support needed to govern, the
entire
system
benefits:
legislative
quality
improves,
oversight
becomes
more
rigorous,
fiscal
decisions
become
more
informed,
and
the
council
can
fully
play
its
role
as
a
check
and
balance
in
a
strong-mayor
system.
Community Input
Throughout the engagement process, council members, staff, and community members described a
council
that
is
asked
to
do
too
much
with
too
little
support.
Councilmembers
are
held
accountable
for
constituent
concerns
without
the
ability
to
hold
the
administration
responsible
for
performance.
Meanwhile,
their
key
functions
of
policy
making
and
oversight
are
under-resourced.
A stronger council will create a healthier balance of power. Clear executive leadership must be paired with
a
legislative
body
capable
of
rigorous
oversight
and
informed
decision-making.
This
balance
is
essential
in
a
city
with
high
levels
of
civic
engagement
and
expectations
for
transparency,
where
residents
want
both
decisive
leadership
and
meaningful
democratic
accountability.
Future
Considerations
The Working Group deliberately limited its scope to focus on core structural reforms where clear, unified
recommendations
could
be
made.
Given
the
complexity
of
Oakland’s
governance
challenges
15 and the limited time available, the group prioritized establishing fundamental clarity on the city’s form
of
government
and
essential
accountability
mechanisms.
This
intentional
restraint
allows
Oakland
to
address
foundational
questions
first
before
tackling
secondary
issues
that
require
deeper
analysis
or
depend
on
decisions
about
the
basic
structure.
Some issues raised fell outside the recommendations that the Working Group chose to make but warrant
additional
review
and
analysis.
The
Working
Group
recommends
re-examining
these
questions
as
part
of
a
future
phase
of
Charter
review.
Determine whether the City Attorney and City Auditor Should Continue to Be Elected or Be Appointed
Throughout
the
Working
Group
process,
many
interviewees
and
community
members
questioned
whether
the
positions
of
City
Attorney
and/or
the
City
Auditor
should
be
appointed
rather
than
elected.
While
this
merits
exploration
(especially
if
moving
back
to
a
council-manager
system),
the
Working
Group
is
not
recommending
changes
at
this
time.
The
City
Attorney
and
City
Auditor
should
retain
independent,
impartial
voices
regardless
of
whether
they
are
elected
or
appointed.
Many
expressed
concern
that
retaining
this
focus
can
be
challenging
when
someone
must
campaign
for
office.
Others
shared
concern
that
by
making
these
roles
appointed,
they
may
have
a
hard
time
maintaining
their
independence.
In
either
event,
clarifying
the
roles
and
responsibilities
of
the
positions
would
be
helpful.
Assess Rules Regarding the City’s Oversight Bodies Several
people
encouraged
the
Working
Group
to
evaluate
Charter
rules
regarding
the
city’s
various
oversight
bodies.
For
example:
● Several interviewees favored revising the responsibilities of the Mayor and the Police Commission
in
relation
to
the
hiring
of
the
Chief
of
Police.
● Others advocated the importance of adequate resources for the Public Ethics Commission and
the
City
Auditor’s
office
to
ensure
they
are
fully
empowered
to
address
concerns
of
corruption
and
malfeasance.
● Some suggested empowering the Public Ethics Commissioners to hire their own Executive Director
to
ensure
independence.
The Working Group determined that these issues were outside the scope of its review and would require
more
time
and
analysis.
The
group
is
therefore
not
recommending
changes
at
this
time.
Strengthen Financial Decision-Making
The
Working
Group
discussed
several
ideas
to
improve
trust
in
the
city's
financial
management
and
address
concerns
about
long-term
fiscal
stability.
Currently,
the
city
lacks
an
independent
entity
with
the
power
to
certify
revenue
projections,
which
allows
the
City
Council
to
pass
budgets
or
legislation
based
on
revenue
assumptions
that
differ
from
those
provided
by
the
Finance
Department.
This
undermines
confidence
in
the
city's
financial
planning.
Several possibilities were raised for consideration in future Charter review:
● Independent City Controller : Establishing an independent controller with authority to certify revenue
projections
could
provide
a
neutral
arbiter
of
financial
forecasts
and
prevent
the
adoption
of
budgets
based
on
unrealistic
assumptions.
● Long-Range Financial and Capital Planning Requirements : Some city charters mandate the
adoption
of
multi-year
financial
plans
or
capital
plans.
Given
Oakland's
structural
budget
16 deficit and deferred infrastructure maintenance, such requirements could encourage more disciplined
long-term
planning.
The Working Group determined that these complex financial governance questions require deeper analysis
beyond
the
scope
of
this
review.
However,
they
merit
serious
consideration
in
a
future
phase
of
Charter
reform
focused
on
fiscal
sustainability
and
transparency.
Next
Steps
Together, Recommendations 1 through 3 form a coherent governance framework: a clear executive structure,
a
strengthened
legislative
branch,
and
accountability
aligned
with
public
expectations.
Any
changes
to
Oakland’s
Charter
must
be
approved
by
Oakland
voters.
Path to the Ballot The Working Group’s charge was to analyze Oakland’s governance challenges, evaluate alternative models,
and
identify
the
Charter
changes
that
could
better
define
the
roles
of
elected
officials,
strengthen
financial
management,
and
improve
accountability
and
transparency.
(See
Appendix
F
for
the
full
list
of
changes
proposed.)
With
this
report,
that
work
is
complete.
The
next
stage
—
determining
what
ultimately
appears
before
voters
—
rests
with
the
Mayor
and
the
City
Council.
Mayor Lee will work with the City Council will determine which elements of the Working Group’s recommendations
to
advance
in
a
ballot
measure.
Any
ballot
measure
will
require
public
education
and
robust
outreach
regardless
of
whether
it
proceeds
through
a
public
legislative
process
with
opportunities
for
public
input
or
through
a
signature-gathering
campaign.
Ultimately,
Oakland
voters
will
assess
whether
any
proposal
reflects
a
coherent
design
that
merits
their
affirmative
vote.
Implementation
Any Charter amendment adopted by voters will require a thoughtful implementation period. Major governance
transitions,
particularly
those
involving
organizational
structure,
budgeting
authority,
or
shifts
in
executive
leadership,
must
be
carefully
phased
to
ensure
continuity
of
services
and
to
minimize
disruption.
Oakland
should
prepare
for
multiple
stages
of
implementation,
including
administrative
restructuring,
updating
ordinances
to
align
with
the
new
Charter,
and
ensuring
that
staff
have
the
tools,
training,
and
resources
needed
to
operate
under
a
clarified
system
of
authority.
True
Charter
reform
is
not
simply
a
vote;
it
is
a
transition
that
demands
coordination,
planning,
and
clear
communication.
Keeping the Charter a Living Document
One of the lessons from this process is that the Charter must be treated as a living document, not a static
set
of
rules.
Oakland’s
last
major
Charter
revision
in
1998
attempted
a
structural
shift
that
left
unresolved
inconsistencies
and
created
the
hybrid
system
the
city
struggles
with
today.
A
Charter
should
evolve
as
governance
needs
change,
new
challenges
emerge,
and
public
expectations
shift.
To ensure continued alignment, the Working Group recommends a more regular, formalized process
for
Charter
review.
This
may
include
establishing
a
Charter
Review
Commission
every
10 years,
similar
to
models
used
in
other
cities,
with
a
clearly
defined
mandate:
to
assess
how
the
17 governance system is performing, evaluate whether amendments are needed, and engage residents in
a
transparent
process.
A
commission
would
prevent
the
accumulation
of
structural
contradictions,
ensure
the
Charter
remains
aligned
with
best
practices,
and
allow
Oakland
to
correct
course
as
conditions
evolve.
In addition, Oakland could build on the community education and engagement opportunities that were
piloted
in
this
process
to
explore
incorporating
a
Civic
Assembly
or
other
resident-centered
deliberative
bodies
into
future
Charter
review
efforts.
These
assemblies,
composed
of
randomly
selected
residents
reflective
of
the
city’s
diversity,
can
provide
a
powerful,
independent
perspective
and
strengthen
public
legitimacy
while
building
civic
literacy,
muscle,
and
trust.
Civic
assemblies
are
increasingly
used
in
cities
worldwide
to
bring
community
members
into
complex
policy
conversations
in
an
informed,
constructive
way.
What Charter Reform Can’t Do
Finally, it is essential to recognize what Charter reform cannot solve on its own. Even a well-designed governance
structure
cannot
guarantee
strong
leadership,
resolve
political
conflict,
eliminate
resource
constraints,
or
substitute
for
effective
management
systems.
Community
members
repeatedly
raised
issues
such
as
the
need
for
a
functional
311
system,
stronger
performance
management,
and
more
consistent
service
delivery.
These
operational
challenges
require
investment,
capacity,
and
leadership.
What
a
coherent
Charter
can
do
is
create
the
conditions
in
which
those
improvements
become
possible,
by
clarifying
who
is
responsible,
aligning
authority
with
accountability,
and
ensuring
that
when
change
is
necessary,
the
path
for
making
it
is
clear.
18 Appendix A Members of the Mayor’s Working Group on Charter Reform Mayor Barbara Lee asked the League of Women Voters of Oakland and the San Francisco Bay Area Planning
and
Urban
Research
Association
(SPUR)
to
co-facilitate
the
Working
Group.
The
following
members
were
selected
to
participate:
Fred Blackwell , CEO of the San Francisco Foundation. An Oakland native, Mr. Blackwell has extensive
government
experience,
including
serving
as
Interim
City
Administrator
and
Assistant
City
Manager
for
the
City
of
Oakland,
and
as
Executive
Director
of
the
Oakland
Redevelopment
Agency
and
Director
of
the
Mayor’s
Office
of
Community
Development
in
San
Francisco.
Hon. Barbara J. Parker , former Oakland City Attorney. A graduate of Harvard Law School and resident
of
Haddon
Hill,
Ms.
Parker
was
Oakland’s
City
Attorney
from
2011
to
2024,
advising
the
City
Council
extensively
on
matters
pertaining
to
good
governance.
A
practicing
attorney
for
more
than
40 years
in
the
private
and
public
sectors,
she
also
served
previously
as
an
Assistant
U.S.
Attorney.
Corey Cook , Vice President and CEO of Cal Poly Solano Campus. A former Saint Mary’s College professor,
Mr.
Cook
has
taught
classes
on
environmental
politics
and
policy,
urban
politics
and
policy,
and
data
analysis
and
visualization
with
policy
research
expertise
on
electoral
reform,
alternative
voting
systems,
political
geography,
and
political
representation.
Ben Rosenfield , Public Finance Expert. Mr. Rosenfield has 25 years of experience in local government,
including
16 years
as
San
Francisco’s
City
Controller,
where
he
managed
the
City’s
$14
billion
budget
through
some
of
its
most
challenging
periods,
including
the
Great
Recession,
the
COVID-19
pandemic,
and
multiple
leadership
transitions.
Zach Goldman , Policy and Labor Leader. Mr. Goldman is an Oakland resident, policy advocate, and labor
leader
with
two
decades
of
experience
working
in
local
government
and
community
and
labor
advocacy.
He
currently
serves
as
a
staff
director
of
SEIU
Local
1021,
an
organization
representing
60,000
public
sector
and
nonprofit
workers,
many
of
whom
provide
direct
services
to
Oaklanders.
Ahmed Ali Bob , Board Chair, Oakland Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Bob has dedicated his
career
to
reducing
barriers
to
opportunity
for
underserved
communities
through
work
in
local
government,
the
nonprofit
sector,
and
the
tech
industry.
As
Director
of
Social
Impact
at
Block,
Inc.,
he
directs
efforts
to
increase
economic
empowerment
and
expand
opportunities
for
vulnerable
populations.
Mark Morodomi , former Counsel, Oakland Public Ethics Commission. Mr. Morodomi, former Supervising
Deputy
City
Attorney
at
the
Oakland
City
Attorney’s
Office,
has
served
as
counsel
to
the
Oakland
Public
Ethics
Commission,
the
Oakland
City
Auditor,
and
the
San
Francisco
Ethics
Commission
and
as
Chief
of
Enforcement
for
California’s
Fair
Political
Practices
Commission..
Richard Fuentes , Manager of Special Projects, Executive Office of Performance and Budget, San Francisco
Bay
Area
Rapid
Transit
(BART).
At
BART,
Richard
leads
federal
and
state
grants
advocacy
efforts.
He
also
serves
on
the
Executive
Board
of
AFSCME
Local
3993
and
is
a
small
business
owner
in
19 Oakland. In the past, he was Legislative Director for former Oakland Councilmember Ignacio De La Fuente.
About the Facilitators League of Women Voters of Oakland is a nonpartisan, grassroots organization working to protect and
expand
voting
rights
and
ensure
everyone
is
represented
in
our
democracy.
The
league
empowers
voters
and
defends
democracy
through
advocacy,
education,
and
litigation
at
the
local,
state,
and
national
levels.
San Francisco Bay Area Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR) is a nonprofit public policy
organization
in
San
Francisco,
San
José,
and
Oakland.
SPUR
brings
people
together
to
address
the
big
challenges
that
cities
in
the
Bay
Area
face.
Through
research,
education,
and
advocacy,
SPUR
works
across
areas
of
governance,
housing,
planning,
transportation,
sustainability,
and
hazard
resilience
to
create
an
equitable,
sustainable,
and
prosperous
region
for
all.
20 Appendix B
Interviewees
Isaac Abid, Revitalize East Bay
Derek
Barnes,
Chief
Executive
Officer,
East
Bay
Rental
Housing
Association
John
Bauters,
Revitalize
East
Bay
Leo
Bazile,
Former
Oakland
City
Councilmember
Jeff
Bellisario,
Bay
Area
Council
Justin
Bibb,
Mayor
of
Cleveland
Rowena
Brown,
At-large
Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Paul
Buddenhagen,
City
Manager,
City
of
Berkeley
Keith
Carson,
Former
Alameda
County
Supervisor
Tiffany
Chu,
Chief
of
Staff
to
Mayor
Michelle
Wu,
City
of
Boston
Andreas
Cluver,
Vice
President,
Port
of
Oakland
Niccolò
De
Luca,
Vice
President
and
Chief
Advocacy
Officer,
Townsend
Public
Affairs
Monica
Davis,
Deputy
City
Administrator,
City
of
Oakland
Pamala
Drake,
Drake
Talk
Oakland
Lori
Droste,
Former
Berkeley
City
Councilmember;
Housing
and
Planning
Policy
Director,
SPUR
Suzanne
Doran,
Director
of
the
Public
Ethics
Commission,
City
of
Oakland
Deborah
Edgerly,
Former
City
Administrator,
City
of
Oakland
Nancy
Falk,
Oakland
Charter
Reform
Project
Steven
Falk,
Oakland
Charter
Reform
Project
Carroll
Fife,
District
3 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Darlene
Flynn,
Director
of
the
Department
of
Race
and
Equity,
City
of
Oakland
Nikki
Fortunato-Bas,
District
5 Supervisor,
Alameda
County
Noel
Gallo,
District
5 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Henry
Gardner,
Former
City
Manager,
City
of
Oakland
Ben
Gould,
Oakland
Charter
Reform
Project
Stasia
Hansen,
Policy
and
Research
Director,
East
Bay
Alliance
for
a
Sustainable
Economy
Elihu
Harris,
Former
Oakland
Mayor
Nicholas
Heidorn,
Former
Executive
Director
of
the
Public
Ethics
Commission,
City
of
Oakland
Laura
Hill,
Vice
President
of
Public
Policy,
Bay
Area
Council
Ken
Houston,
District
7 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Michael
Houston,
City
Auditor,
City
of
Oakland
Mike
Hutchinson,
District
4 Director,
Oakland
School
Board
Kevin
Jenkins,
City
Council
President
and
District
6 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Bradley
Johnson,
Finance
Director,
City
of
Oakland
21 Jestin Johnson, City Administrator, City of Oakland Sarah
Karlinsky,
Director
of
Research
and
Policy,
Terner
Center
Preston
Kilgore,
Deputy
Chief
of
Staff,
Mayor
Barbara
Lee
Barb
Leslie,
President
&
CEO,
Oakland
Chamber
of
Commerce
Dan
Lindheim,
Goldman
School
of
Public
Policy,
UC
Berkeley
Pat
Martel,
West
Coast
Regional
Director,
ICMA
Lynette
Gibson
McElhaney,
Former
Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Ryan
Micik,
Former
Chair
of
the
Public
Ethics
Commission,
City
of
Oakland
Huy
Nguyen,
President,
Oakland
Police
Officer's
Association
Shereda
Noshakare,
Managing
Partner
Oakland
and
East
Bay,
Lighthouse
Public
Affairs
Karely
Ordaz
Salto,
Director
of
CEO
Affairs,
San
Francisco
Foundation
Jean
Quan,
Former
Mayor
of
Oakland
Yvette
Radford,
Regional
Vice
President
for
External
&
Community
Affairs,
Kaiser
Permanente
Janani
Ramachandran,
District
4 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Asha
Reed,
City
Clerk,
City
of
Oakland
Louise
Renne,
Renne
Public
Law
Group
Ryan
Richardson,
City
Attorney,
City
of
Oakland
Suzanne
Robinson,
Bay
Area
Council
John
Russo,
Former
City
Attorney,
City
of
Oakland
Libby
Schaaf,
Former
Mayor
of
Oakland
Loren
Taylor,
Former
Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Danny
Wan,
Former
Executive
Director,
Port
of
Oakland
Charlene
Wang,
District
2 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Zac
Wasserman,
Partner
and
Lawyer,
Wendel,
Rosen,
Black
&
Dean
LLP
Dee
Williams-Ridley,
Former
Berkeley
City
Manager
Zachary
Unger,
District
1 Councilmember,
City
of
Oakland
Francis
Upton,
Public
Ethics
Commission
Chair,
City
of
Oakland
22 Appendix C
Summary of Community Input
Interviews
The League of Women Voters and SPUR conducted more than 60 interviews with current and former
city
leaders
and
officials,
as
well
as
other
subject
matter
experts
from
different
cities
and
educational
institutions.
The
interviews
focused
on
three
main
areas:
defining
roles,
improving
financial
management,
and
strengthening
accountability/transparency.
The
most
common
topics
from the discussions have been summarized here: Interviews - Summary “Talk of the Town” Community Conversations
The Working Group hosted 14 community sessions throughout Oakland in November and December
of
2025,
including
one
focused
on
current
city
staff.
A
summary
of
the
input
received
can
be found here: . The archive of physical worksheets that were Community Sessions - Summarycollected at the events can be found at: Talk of the Town Worksheets Survey The
Working
Group
issued
a
community
survey
that
received
433
responses.
The
survey
responses
can be viewed here: . Oakland Charter Reform Working Group Survey Results Research Repository
The Working Group compiled research that was reviewed to inform this work. In addition, a number of
community
members
shared
resources
as
well.
The
articles
and
reports
that
were
reviewed,
outside
of
what
has
been
cited
in
this
report
can
be
found
here:
Charter Reform Academic Research Review
23 Appendix D
Oakland’s History with Different Models of Municipal Government
Oakland has experimented with two major governance models over the past century:
council-manager
and
strong-mayor
systems.
1931–1998: The Council-Manager Era In 1931, Oakland adopted a council-manager model to bring professional
management
and
reduce
corruption.
Authority
rested
with
the
City
Council
as
a
collective
body.
5 1980: District Representation After decades of community activism to increase representation on the
City
Council,
voters
passed
Measure
H,
which
tied
Oakland
City
Council
elections
to
individual
districts,
ushering
in
greater
racial
and
political
diversity
on
the
council.
6 1984–1996: Failed Attempts at Reform By the 1980s, dissatisfaction with weak mayoral authority led to
reform
efforts.
Mayor
Lionel
Wilson,
the
first
Black
mayor
in
Oakland,
was
the
first
to
seek
executive
power
after
discovering
he
couldn’t
achieve
his
goals
with
a
City
Manager
who
did
not
share
his
vision
.
7 His
1984
ballot
measure
fell
short
at
48%.
Another
attempt
in
1996,
backed
by
Mayor
Elihu
Harris,
also
failed
with
47%
support.
8 1998–2004: The Provisional Strong-Mayor System In 1998, Jerry Brown successfully championed Measure
X,
which
passed
with
75%
of
the
vote
and
created
a
trial
strong-mayor
system
for
six
years.
The
Mayor
gained
direct
administrative
authority
while
the
City
Council
retained
legislative
powers.
9 2005–Present: The Hybrid System Brown’s 2002 effort to make the strong-mayor system permanent
failed.
10 A
Charter
Review
Commission
then
crafted
a
compromise:
the
Mayor
leads
the
executive
branch
but
lacks
full
operational
authority
or
veto
power.
This
hybrid
model,
adopted
in
2004,
gives
Oakland
a
structure
that
blends
both
systems
without
securing
the
benefits
of
either,
creating
structural
ambiguity
and
competing
lines
of
authority.
11 11
Measure X Related Charter Amendments & Resolution, City Council's Legislative Analyst Office, December 2, 2003,
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eaOQodSIHAhQ-BpQXp4mxfCBgdM8Es0F/view?usp=sharing
10 Brent McDonald, Oakland's "Strong Mayor" Reconsidered, 92 Nat'l Civic Rev. 57 (Fall 2003) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p3XeSX9A6FDWy_Kz6hm5r8FeTZGqRmKy/view?usp=sharing
9 Measure X Victory for Jerry Brown Strong-mayor." San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 1998, www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Measure-X-Victory-for-Jerry-Brown-Strong-mayor-2981070.php
8 “Oakland Should Employ Strong Mayor." San Francisco Chronicle,October 26, 1996, www.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/EDITORIALS-Oakland-Should-Employ-Strong-Mayor-2962217.php
7 Svara, James H., and Douglas J. Watson, editors. More than Mayor or Manager: Campaigns to Change Form of Government
in
America's
Large
Cities
.
Georgetown
University
Press,
2010.
https://dokumen.pub/more-than-mayor-or-manager-campaigns-to-change-form-of-government-in-americas-l arge-cities-1nbsped-9781589016200-9781589017092.html
6 D
arwin
BondGram,
“District
Elections:
The
Surprising
History
Explaining
How
We
Vote
in
Oakland,"
Oaklandside,
29 Sept.
2020,
oaklandside.org/2020/09/29/district-elections-the-surprising-history-explaining-how-we-vote-in-oakland/
5 Frederickson, H. George, et al. “Municipal Reform in Mayor-Council Cities: A Well-Kept Secret.” State & Local Government
Review
,
vol.
35,
no.
1,
2003,
pp.
7–14.
JSTOR
,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4355328. Accessed 9 Dec. 2025.
24 Appendix E
Forms
of
Government
and
Powers
in
12 U.S.
Cities
The following cross-city analysis was provided to the working group for their analysis.
Seattle Boston Cleveland Portland San Diego Fresno Oakland Long Beach El Paso Phoenix San Jose Sacramento Population 780,995 673,458 365,379 635,749
1,404,452 550,105 443,554 450,901 681,723 1,673,164 997,368 535,798 Form of Government
Strong Mayor- Council
Strong Mayor- Council
Strong Mayor- Council
Mayor- Council (NEW as of Jan 2025)
Strong Mayor- Council (since 2006)
Strong Mayor- Council
Mayor- Council
Council- Manager
Council- Manager (adopted 2004)
Council- Manager
Council- Manager
Council- Manager
Executive Authority
Mayor serves as Chief Executive
Mayor serves as Chief Executive
Mayor serves as Chief Executive
Mayor has administrative authority
Mayor serves as Chief Executive
Mayor serves as Chief Executive
Executive power rests with City Admin
Vested in Council as a whole
Vested in Council as a whole
All powers vested in Council
Vested in Council
Council retains executive/legislative authority
Legislative Authority
City Council is primary legislative body
City Council is primary legislative body
City Council is primary legislative body
City Council is primary legislative body
City Council is primary legislative body
City Council is primary legislative body
City Council is primary legislative body
Mayor is Chief Legislative Officer; Council is legislative body All power concentrated in Council
All power concentrated in Council
All power concentrated in Council
All power concentrated in Council
Mayoral veto Mayor can veto legislation; Council can override with 2/3 vote Mayor can veto legislation; Council can override with 2/3 vote Mayor can veto legislation; Council can override with 2/3 vote Mayor can veto legislation and break ties on non-emergency ordinances; 9 of 12 votes needed for emergency ordinances Mayor can veto legislation; Council can override with 6 of 9 votes Mayor can veto legislation; Council can override with 5 of 7 votes No mayoral veto
Mayor can veto any action of City Council; Council can override with 2/3 vote Mayor can veto and break ties; Council can override with 3/4 vote Mayor has no veto power
Mayor has no veto power
Mayor has no veto power
Hires/fires department directors
Mayor directly appoints department heads; many appointments require Council confirmation Mayor directly appoints department heads
Mayor directly appoints department heads; Some appointments require Council Mayor through City Admin
Sole authority through City Manager, though City Manager was let go in 2025 Mayor through City Manager
City Admin City Manager
City Manager
City Manager
City Manager
City Manager
25 confirmation Votes on Legislation
Only Council can vote on legislation
Only Council can vote on legislation
Only Council can vote on legislation
Council votes on legislation, Mayor can break ties Only Council can vote on legislation
Only Council can vote on legislation
Council votes on legislation, Mayor can break ties Mayor presides but has no vote; council votes
Mayor is a member of Council, can break ties; Council votes Mayor is a member of the Council; Council votes on legislation Mayor serves as Council President; Council votes on legislation Mayor is a member of the Council; Council votes on legislation Introduces Policy
Mayor can propose legislation; only Council can introduce Mayor or Council can introduce; only Council votes Mayor or Council can introduce; only Council votes Mayor or Council can introduce
Mayor can recommend legislation; only Council can introduce Mayor or Council can introduce
Only Council can introduce
Mayor or Council can introduce
Mayor or Council can introduce
Mayor or Council can introduce
Mayor recommends priorities; Mayor or council can introduce Mayor or Council can introduce
Places measures on the ballot
Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Mayor or Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures
Council can refer measures; citizens can initiate via petition Council can refer measures
Appoints City Attorney
Voters elect Mayor appoints Corporation Counsel
Mayor appoints Director of Law
Mayor appoints; Council confirms
Voters elect Council appoints
Voters elect Voters elect Council appoints
Council appoints
Council appoints
Council appoints
Appoints City Auditor
Council appoints
No City Auditor; State Auditor oversees
No City Auditor; State Auditor oversees; Bureau of Internal Audit reports to Mayor Voters elect No City Auditor; Independent Budget Analyst appointed by Council No City Auditor; City Manager appoints City Controller, Council confirms Voters elect Voters elect Council appoints and manages Internal Auditor Council appoints
Council appoints
Council appoints
Proposes budget
Mayor submits budget proposal
Mayor submits budget proposal
Mayor submits budget proposal
Mayor proposes with City Admin
Mayor submits budget proposal
Mayor submits budget proposal
Mayor proposes with support of City Admin
City Manager proposes
City Manager develops
City Manager prepares and submits
City Manager drafts; Mayor recommends priorities
City Manager develops
Approves budget
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts
Council amends and adopts; public hearing required Council amends and adopts
26 Has a City Manager/Administrator
No City Manager, Mayor serves role
No City Manager, Mayor serves role
No City Manager, Mayor serves role
Mayor appoints City Admin
Mayor appoints and removes City Manager
Mayor appoints City Manager
Mayor appoints City Admin, Council confirms
Mayor appoints City Manager
Council appoints City Manager; 2/3 vote to remove Council appoints City Manager; 2/3 vote to remove Council appoints City Manager
Mayor appoints City Manager; serves at pleasure of Council, 2/3 vote to remove Oversees day-to-day operations Mayor directs city departments
Mayor directs city departments
Mayor directs city departments
Mayor directs through City Admin
Mayor directs through City Manager
Mayor directs through City Manager
City Admin City Manager
City Manager
City Manager
City Manager
City Manager
Council structure
9 members: 7 districts, 2 at-large
13 members: 9 districts, 4 at-large
15 members / wards (recently redrawn from 17)
12 members: 4 districts, 3 per district
9 members / districts
7 members / districts
8 members: 7 districts, 1 at-large
9 members / districts
9 members: 8 districts, 1 Mayor
9 members: 8 districts, 1 Mayor
11 members: 10, 1 Mayor
9 members: 8 districts, 1 Mayor Council subpoena power Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No Council staffing
Each member has Legislative Assistant
Each council office has staff
Each member has Executive Assistant
Unknown, new structure evolving
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff
Each council office has staff Council full-time or part-time Full-time Full-time Not clearly defined
Not clearly defined Full-time
Not clearly defined
Not clearly defined Part-time Part-time Part-time Full-time Full-time
27 Appendix F
Charter
Changes
All Charter changes in any proposed ballot measure will be made pursuant to legal advice of the
City
Attorney
or
other
Charter
law
experts.
The
table
below
indicates,
informally
and
unofficially,
Charter
amendments
that
might
be
required
or
considered
should
the
recommendations
of
the
Working
Group
be
incorporated
into
a
ballot
measure.
Charter Section Proposed Changes ARTICLE II: City Council Section 200: Composition of the Council Section 202: Council Salaries Section 203: Nomination and Election of Councilmembers Section 204: Terms of Office, Term Limits Section 209: Quorum Section 210: Council Action Section 213: Emergency Ordinances ● Remove references to "Councilmember at-large" and reduce the number of council members ● Remove the Mayor's power to break ties ● Revise compensation provisions ● Change quorum, affirmative vote, and emergency vote requirements to align with the reduced size of City Council ARTICLE III: The Mayor Section 305: Functions, Powers and Duties Generally, modify the powers and functions of the mayor to reflect the role of a strong mayor. Specifically: ● Add line-item veto power over budget and legislation ● Add that Mayor shall be the Chief Executive Officer responsible for the proper and efficient administration of all affairs of the city and for enforcing all laws ● Modify language of powers vis-à-vis the City Administrator regarding oversight and city administration ARTICLE V: The City Manager Section 503. Powers of Appointment and Removal Section 504. Duties ● Change the title to City Administrator or move into Article IV on City Officers ● Revise to limit powers and duties in line with enhanced powers of the Mayor and limited scope ARTICLE VI: Administrative Organization Section 600: Administrative Organization Authorized ● Revise to reflect that the Mayor will organize the administration and apportion powers and responsibilities among the City Administrator and other members of the administration
28 Appendix G
Acknowledgements
We
extend
our
sincere
gratitude
to
the
San
Francisco
Foundation
for
their
generous
support,
which
enabled
the
robust
community
engagement
that
made
this
work
possible.
We are also grateful to the City of Oakland Parks and Recreation Department, the Oakland Public
Library,
the
East
Bay
Regional
Parks
District,
and
St.
Mary's
Center
for
providing
access
to
their
gathering
spaces.
We thank Evitarus for their support in developing the survey, Together Pictures for developing
an
informative
and
fun
educational
video,
Change
Consulting
for
their
communications
support,
and
Sean
Dugar
for
his
vision
and
support
in
ensuring
that
the
working
group
received
broad
community
input.
Finally, we are deeply grateful to everyone who participated and dedicated their time, expertise,
experience,
and
knowledge
to
this
effort.
29