Rules & Legislation Committee
March 26, 2026

1 DATE: March 10, 2026
TO: Oakland Residents, Mayor Lee, Members of the City Council, City Attorney Richardson, City Administrator Johnson , and Police Commissioners
FROM: City Auditor Michael C. Houston, MPP, CIA
SUBJECT: Audit of Oakland Police Oversight Agencies : The Oakland Police Commission, Community Police Review Agency, and Office of the Inspector General
IN

TRODUCTION
Oakland voters have twice affirmed their commitment to civilian oversight of the Oakland Police Department (OPD) through Measures LL and S1.1 These measures, respectively passed in 2016 and 2020, established three oversight bodies: the Police Commission (Commission), the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

The Office of the City Auditor (Office) has completed a performance audit of the Commission, CPRA, and the OIG in accordance with City Charter Section 604(a), which requires performance audits of the Commission and CPRA every three years. This audit follows a previous audit the Office conducted, and brings the Office current on its requirement, evaluat ing the progress of the Commission and CPRA in implementing previous audit recommendations, each oversight body’s compliance with City Charter and Municipal C ode mandates, and the effectiveness of their oversight functions.

BACKGROUND
The Oakland Police Department (OPD) has operated under federal oversight since 2003, after a civil rights lawsuit revealed widespread misconduct and failures in internal accountability mechanisms. The lawsuit 1https://www.oaklandca.gov/Public-Safety-Streets/Police/OPD-Policies-and-Resources/ODP-Policies/Learn-More-About- Measures-LL-and-S1

AUDIT REPORT

2 resulted in a Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) that required OPD to implement 5 2 reforms, referred to as “tasks.”2 Since then, there have been ongoing changes to police oversight via voter resolutions and City Council ordinances, including an as -yet unpassed updated enabling or dinance for the OIG: In 2016, new scandals involving OPD —including a high -profile case that implicated multiple officers in the sexual exploitation of an underage victim—renewed public demand for accountability. In November 2016, Oakland voters approved Measure LL, which established: (i) a civilian Police Commission (Commission) to oversee Oakland Police Department’s policies and procedures, and (ii) the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA) to investigate complaints of police misconduct.
• In 2018, the Oakland City Council added Chapters 2.45 and 2.46 to the Oakland Municipal Code outlining the bodies’ duties and authorities.
• In November 2020, Oakland voters approved Measure S1, which amended Measure LL, expanding the independence, authority, and staffing of the Commission and CPRA. Measure S1 also established a new Office of the Inspector General (OIG) outside of the OPD to oversee OPD’s compliance with reforms mandated through the 2003 NSA.
• In 2022, a U.S. district judge ruled that OPD could enter a “one -year probationary period” after the court found that OPD had successfully implemented dozens of reform measures required by the NSA.

In 2024, however, a federal judge extended OPD’s federal oversight after independent investigations uncovered the Department’s failure to comply with two NSA requirements related to its Internal Affairs Division’s (IAD) complaint procedures and disciplinary policies. • In 2024, the City Council considered an ordinance to amend the Oakland Municipal Code and add Chapter 2.47, an updated enabling ordinance for the OIG. Proposed amendments included clarifying the Commission’s disciplinary authority and defining the OIG’s scope of work.

As of this report, OPD remains under federal oversight , and the City Council has not yet voted to adopt revisions to the enabling ordinance. Oversight staff from the OIG and CPRA reported in February 2025 that the second reading of the ordinance remains on hold pending further feedback from stakeholders.

Each of the Police Oversight Agencies Has a Distinct Role in Independent Oversight Each of the police oversight agencies has a distinct role:
• The Commission oversees OPD policies and procedures. Under City Charter Section 604, the Commission oversees OPD’s policies, practices, and customs for adherence to national standards of constitutional policing. The Commission must consist of seven regular members and two alternate members, all of whom must be Oakland residents aged 18 or older. The Mayor appoints three regular

2 The 52 tasks represent 51 items for reform and one “contractual housekeeping provision .” These are monitored by a court - appointed independent monitor. Effective 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), approved by Judge Thelton E.

Henderson, reduced the number of actively monitored tasks from 51 to 22. An Amended Memorandum of Understanding, effective 2012, further reduced the number of actively monitored tasks to 13. Since then , court orders have further reduced the number of actively monitored tasks . As of November 2025, t he three outstanding tasks are Tasks 2, 5, and 45, which relate to the timeliness standards and compliance with internal affairs investigations, complaint procedures for internal investigations, and the consistency of OPD’s discipline policy. While the independent monitor continues to assess OPD’s compliance with Tasks 2, 5, and 45, t he City Charter authorizes the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to audit all 52 tasks to promote continued compliance, as continued compliance is a requirement of the MOUs.

3 commissioners and one alternate, subject to City Council confirmation. A selection panel composed of nine members – one appointed by each City Councilmember and one by the Mayor – selects the remaining four regular commissioners and one alternate commissioner for confirmation by the City Council. All commissioners serve in a volunteer and part-time capacity. The Commission has appointing authority for the Executive Director of CPRA and the head of the OIG, the Inspector General. By design, this structure is intended to enable independent oversight. • CPRA independently investigates complaints of police misconduct. CPRA is an independent agency responsible for investigating public complaints involving use of force, in- custody deaths, profiling based on protected characteristics, untruthfulness, and assemblies protected by the First Amendment.

CPRA is required to make all reasonable efforts to complete investigations within 180 days and no later than 250 days. Once CPRA completes its investigations, it issues written findings and propose s discipline to both the Chair of the Commission and the Chief of Police. If the Chief of Police agrees with CPRA’s findings and suggested discipline, the Chief notifies CPRA’s Executive Director who then notifies the Chair of the Commission. If the Chief of Police disagrees, the Chair of the Commission appoints a discipline committee, composed of three commissioners, to adjudicate the case and make a final determination.
• The OIG monitors and audits police policies, practices, and procedures, particularly pertaining to NSA requirements. The OIG is an independent civilian oversight agency that has the authority to monitor and audit OPD and CPRA policies, practices, and procedures. As an auditing body, the OIG has authority to issue reports with recommendations for how OPD can ensure compliance with a given NSA reform. The Inspector General – similar to the CPRA E xecutive Director – is classified as a department director and has authority to hire and fire OIG staff, pursuant to limitations described in City Charter Section 604(e)7. OIG staff, similar to CPRA staff, are all paid civil service employees.

According to the City Charter Section 604(e), the Commission is responsible for hiring and supervising the Inspector General. The Commission also has authority to remove the Inspector General by an affirmative vote of at least five commissioners, only after adopting a finding or findings of cause. As the newest oversight agency in Oakland, the OIG began recruiting permanent staff in 2023.

Exhibit 1 shows the structure and relationship of the police oversight agencies.

4 Exhibit 1: The Police Commission is a Volunteer Oversight Body, Appointed by the Mayor and a Selection Panel, that Oversees Independent Police Oversight Agencies

Source: Auditor summary based on the City Charter, Municipal Code, budget, and classification specifications. For the purposes of this illustration, we define administrative authority as approvals over administrative items, such as staffing, budget, and timekeeping. We define managerial authority as program direction and supervision.

Appointment authority
Managerial authority
Removal authority
Administrative authority
Alternate
Investigative/audit authority
Appointment + Removal authority

5 RESULTS
The audit found:
• The Commission and CPRA have not yet implemented all previous audit recommendations. • The Commission, CPRA, and the OIG have met 26 of 43 select City Charter and Municipal Code requirements we tested.
• Vacancies, frozen positions, l ow minimum staffing requirements, and leadership turnover have hindered the police oversight agencies’ ability to fulfill their legally mandated duties. • The City Charter and Municipal Code are inconsistent and conflict on the hiring and removal of the heads of CPRA and the OIG.
• Structural independence would help to ensure the police oversight agencies have sufficient resources and administrative authority to meet their legal mandates.

Without sufficient resources, the police oversight agencies – the Commission, CPRA, and the OIG – have fallen short of their City Charter and Municipal Code requirements. The following sections of this report detail these findings.

The Police Commission and CPRA H ave Not Yet Implemented All Previous Audit Recommendations
The previous audit report, published in June 2020,3 found that:
• the Commission’s actions had not fully implemented requirements of the City Charter and the Municipal Code;
• the Commission's powers and duties needed clarification; • CPRA had not fully implemented City Charter and Municipal Code requirements; • CPRA’s investigative processes were not formalized, and CPRA and the Commission had not adequately defined their oversight roles; and
• the City should pursue amendments to the City Charter and Municipal Code requirements.

The audit made 41 recommendations aimed at improving the Commission and CPRA based on these findings.

As of September 2025, 27 recommendations from our previous audit of the Commission and CPRA have been either closed or implemented. Fourteen (14) of the 41 audit recommendations remain open.4

3 See Performance Audit of the Oakland Police Commission and the Community Police Review Agency , available on our website. 4 In November 2022, Oakland voters passed Measure X, which revised the City Charter to include, within the City Auditor’s authority and duties, “submitting, at a public meeting of the full City Council, a semiannual report to the Council and public on the e xtent of implementation of recommendations for corrective actions made in the City Auditor’s reports. ” To this end, our Office has and will continue to review and report on all open audit recommendations semiannually for periods ending June 30th and December 31st.

We published the first audit recommendation follow -up report for the period through December 31, 2023 in March 2024. Since

6 • The Commission has implemented previous audit recommendations related to staffing, transparency, and public meeting procedures. For example, the Commission added a senior-level staff person to help establish its structure and priorities, developed policies and procedures for its operations and public meetings, and published annual reports summarizing its progress towards achieving its defined goals and objectives. Four recommendations to the Commission remain in process. Three of these recommendations rest on the formalization of a strategic plan to help the Commission outline the necessary activities to achieve its stated goals and objectives. • CPRA has implemented prior audit recommendations related to case management processes, and supervisory oversight, and uses standardized investigation plans reviewed by supervisors, addressing a major gap identified in the 2020 audit. CPRA has also improved its investigative reporting by implementing a prior recommendation to standardize reports to ensure consistency in ho w investigations are conducted and reported. Nine recommendations to CPRA remain partially implemented. CPRA still needs to adopt formal p olicies and procedures for investigations , establish direct access to Internal Affairs files from OPD, and implement a formal agency-wide training program.

Further, CPRA has not developed an outreach plan including goals and objectives, outreach activities, and monitoring reports to assess its progress in reaching its outreach goals. Fully implementing these recommendations is essential to furthering awareness, credibility, accessibility, and accountability for the Agency’s investigations of public complaints.

The semiannual Audit Recommendation Follow-up Report, most recently issued as of June 30, 2025, provide detailed summaries of the statuses of each of the open audit recommendations from the 2020 audit.

The Commission, CPRA, and the OIG Have Met Only 26 of 43 Select City Charter and Municipal Code Requirements
The Commission, CPRA, and the OIG are subject to numerous requirements outlined in the City Charter and Municipal Code. To assess each oversight agency’s compliance with distinct City Charter and Municipal Code mandates, this audit used a risk-based sampling methodology.5 Appendix A lists all the requirements identified for each oversight body, the requirements tested, and results.

As of the time of this audit, e ach oversight body is in partial compliance with its obligations under the City Charter and Municipal Code:
• The Police Commission was subject to 44 requirements and was in compliance with 20 out of 27 requirements we selected for testing.

then, we published three other recommendation follow-up reports for the periods through June 30, 2024 and December 31, 2024, respectively in October 2024 and March 2025, and most recently, for the period as of June 30, 2025 , published in September 2025.

The reports are accessible on the City Auditor’s website: https://www.oaklandauditor.com/reports/all -reports/. 5 We identified requirements by reviewing the language within the City Charter (Section 604) and Municipal Code (Sections 2.45 and 2.46). Requirements were generally indicated through prescriptive language such as “shall,” “must,” “at least,” or “no mo re,” though in some instances, we did not include contingent requirements or powers (e.g., “shall have the right to”). We judgmentally selected requirements for testing. Because the sample was judgmentally selected, we cannot project the results to the population.

7 • CPRA was subject to 2 3 requirements and was in compliance with 5 of 13 requirements we selected for testing.
• The OIG was subject to 5 requirements and was in compliance with 1 of 3 requirements we selected for testing.

Exhibit 2 below summarizes the select requirements with which each of the oversight agencies was either in compliance, in partial compliance, or not in compliance.

8 Exhibit 2: Each of the Police Oversight Agencies Were In Partial Compliance with Select City Charter and Municipal Code Requirements
In Compliance In Partial Compliance Not in Compliance
Police Commission
Police attendance at hearings Report to Mayor and City Council Conduct performance reviews Receipt of Chief of Police reports Full membership
Training requirements Conduct performance reviews
Rules and procedures Conduct performance reviews for
CPRA Director and Police Chief
Conflict of interest Agency oversight - case
dismissals
Discipline committee Budget item for NACOLE
conference*
Review OPD training
Propose budget for OPD training
Form for performance reviews
Agency oversight - case
prioritization
Public engagement - online
reports
Mediation rules and procedures
OPD oversight
Public engagement - feedback
Contracts training
Training for Discipline Committee
Staffing
Training
Public hearings
Annual reports
CPRA
Conflict of interest Investigation timeline (250 day
requirement) Staff to police ratio
Public accessibility - online filing Public accessibility - posted hours Public accessibility - street-level office
Videotape requirement Training Reporting duties
Director duties Rules and procedures
Background checks Complaint assignment

OIG Training requirements NSA task audits
Reporting duties

Source: Auditor summary based on results of testing for compliance with select requirements of the City Charter and Municipal Code. Note: See Appendix A for an account of all the requirements and the audit team’s assessment of risk to inform testing. *NACOLE is the National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement

9 The partial compliance indicates challenges in the oversight agencies’ ability to meet their objectives , institutionalize oversight practices, and ensure continuity over time . Noncompliance is driven by insufficient staffing due to vacant positions and low required minimum staffing levels , which ha ve caused incomplete internal processes, as well as structural limitations in the City’s oversight framework. While the Oakland City Charter and Municipal Code outline the functions and duties of each body, the po lice oversight bodies lack the resources necessary to meet those mandates. Addressing the deficiency in resources is difficult given the City’s fiscal challenges, including ongoing suspension of required minimum staffing. 6 Additionally, each body has experienced significant leadership turnover, contributing to delays and discontinuity.

Vacancies, Frozen Positions, Low Minimum Staffing Requirements, and Leadership Turnover Have Hindered the Police Oversight Agencies ’ Ability to Fulfill Their Legally Mandated Duties
Continued lack of compliance with legal mandates could weaken the public’s confidence in the City’s police oversight mechanisms, which voters approved c itywide. As noted above, lack of staff has hindered the agencies’ abilities to meet their extensive legal mandates:
• The Police Commission has just one fulltime staff to support its 44+ legal mandates and oversight of two police oversight agencies. As described in the B ackground section, the Commission is comprised of trained volunteers. The Chief of Staff works to ensure those volunteers receive Charter -required training and meet state and local open government requirements, maintains legal contracts, budgets, and all other administrative functions, such as public records compliance. The City Charter provides minimum sta ffing of “ one fulltime civil service employee who shall report to the CPRA Executive Director and whose duties shall include providing administrative support to the Commission, and attending Commission meetings.” The consolidation of strategic and administrative duties into a single position, however, creates a structural bottleneck that limits the Commission’s capacity to institutionalize organizational processes and controls to fulfill its oversight obligations. • CPRA’s investigator staffing is currently at 71 percent of its Charter requirement of one “ line investigator” per 100 police officers , risking investigation timeliness . 7 The City Charter requires at
least one line investigator for every 100 sworn OPD officers . As of January 2026, CPRA had five active investigators overseeing misconduct complaints against a department with over 600 sworn officers.

This suggests a ratio of roughly one investigator per 133 sworn officers, falling short of the City Charter mandate. To comply with the ratio, CPRA would need to fill at least two more investigator positions, to meet the minimum for filled sworn positions and three more investigators for authorized sworn positions. Insufficient staff slows case resolution times and increases the likelihood that investigations will not be completed within the legally required timeframe of “reasonable effort” to complete within 180 days and no later than 250 days. Delays also harm the credibility of the review process, and prolong stress for both complainants and officers. Under California Government Code Section 3304, police misconduct investigations must complete within one year of the alleged misconduct to impose

6 On June 11, 2025, the City Council passed Resolution 90826, suspending the minimum staffing requirement for the agency attorneys for the Police Commission and CPRA, for the FY 2025-26/2026-27 Biennial Budget, due to extreme fiscal necessity. 7 These positions are budgeted. The FY 2025 -26/2026-27 Adopted Biennial Budget cites a City Attorney opinion that finds the classifications of Complaint Investigator II and Complaint Investigator III fulfill the rol e of line investigators.

10 discipline, absent narrow exceptions. According to CPRA’s February 2025 forecast report, the agency’s average case closure time was 285 days. CPRA leadership reported that three cases in early 2025 came close to exceeding th e statute of limitations, risking the inability to discipline officers even where allegations were sustained.
• Since its creation in January 2022, the OIG has had limited filled auditor positions, inhibiting its ability to audit OPD’s compliance with the NSA tasks due to frozen and deleted audit positions. The City Charter Section 604 requires the OIG to conduct audits and share the findings with both the Commission and City Council. Since 2022, the OIG has had three auditors on staff at various times, but has experienced turnover and attrition. The FY2025-26/2026-27 Proposed Biennial Budget deleted four frozen fulltime equivalent positions from the OIG’s staff of 8.0 FTE, including a p olicy analyst, an audit manager, and two performance auditors. The approved budget maintained these positions but kept them frozen. To mitigate the lack of audit staff,8 the Inspector General has conducted evaluations and inspections. The OIG has issued policy reviews and compliance evaluations that contribute to OPD oversight. The OIG has also engaged the public through public meetings and has participated in professional development workshops . Without sufficient staffing, however, the OIG cannot meet its central mandate to audit OPD’s compliance with court -mandated reforms , the broader evaluative function required by the City Charter . In December 2025, the OIG contracted with an audit firm to conduct audits of seven NSA tasks to determine compliance.

The City Charter and Municipal Code outline minimum staffing requirements for the police oversight agencies to preserve their ability to independently fulfill their responsibilities. However, as discussed later in this report, minimum staffing requirements are not sufficient to meet those responsibilities . According to City Charter 604(e), “The City shall allocate a sufficient budget for the Commission, including the Agency and the OIG, to perform its functions and duties as set forth in this Charter sectio n 604 ...” Notwithstanding the declared extreme fiscal necessity, the obligations and expectations of the police oversight agencies cannot be met without sufficient resources.

Each agency has also experienced significant turnover in leadership since the 2020 audit, with the current Chief of Staff to the Police Commission, the CPRA Director, and Inspector General all having two years’ tenure or less . The Police Commission itself has also experienced turnover, v acancy, and below-minimum membership.

The City Charter and Municipal Code are Inconsistent and Conflict on Hiring and Removal of the Heads of CPRA and the OIG
During the audit we identified instance s where the City Charter and Municipal Code conflict on police oversight and in which the consideration of agency directors is inconsistent:

8 Under Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, a person performing audits does not need to be an auditor by title.

GAGAS 1.27 (f) defines auditor as: “An individual assigned to planning, directing, performing engagement procedures, or reporting on GAGAS engagements (including work on audits, attestation engagements, and reviews of financial statements) regardless of job title. Therefore, individuals who may have the title auditor, information technology auditor, analyst, practitioner, evaluator, inspector, or other similar titles are considered auditors under GAGAS.”

11 1. Municipal Code Section 2.45.110 states “the Commission, with the assistance of the City Administrator shall be responsible for hiring the first and all subsequent civilian Inspectors General. ” This conflicts with City Charter Section 604(e)(6), which states the Commission has the power to fill vacancies.

2. Municipal Code Section 2.45.100(C) states “All OIG staff, including the Inspector General, shall be civil service employees in accordance with Article IX of the City Charter. ” This conflicts with City Charter Section 604(e)(7), which states, “ The staff of the Agency, OIG and Commission, with the exception of the Agency Director and Inspector General themselves , shall be civil service employees in accordance with Article IX of the City Charter” [emphasis added].

3. The City Charter Section 604(e) grants the Commission authority to terminate CPRA’s E xecutive Director by an affirmative vote of at least five commissioners. The City Charter does not indicate that a finding of cause is necessary to terminate the Executive Director. This varies from the termination requirements for the Inspector General, which requires adopting a finding or findings of cause, which may be defined by City Ordinance, under City Charter Section 604(e)(6).

4. Municipal Code 2.45.070(H) states that the Commission should, “Create a form for Commissioners to use in providing annual comments, observations and assessments to the City Administrator regarding the Inspector General's job performance. Each Commissioner shall complete the form individually and submit his or her completed form to the City Administrator confidentially.” This represents a threat to the independence of the Inspector General. Having the Inspector General report functionally to the Police Commission ensures independence because the audit function is outside the reporting line of the entities under audit.

These conflicts have significant implications on the independence of the Inspector General and CPRA Executive Director, as described in the next section. These conflicts should be resolved, as most would have been with the adoption of the Chapter 2.47 amendments described in the Background section.

Structural Independence Would Help to Ensure the Police Oversight Agencies have Sufficient Resources and Administrative Authority to Meet their Legal Mandates As described above, the Commission, CPRA, and the OIG have not, and are not able t o fulfill their oversight roles and comply with their many specific requirements under the City Charter and Municipal Code. A review of existing requirements could identify if there are requirements that should be removed or consolidated , though considering changing some existing requirements would require voter approval.9 Whether or not the oversight agencies’ requirements are changed, the City needs to identify the budgetary resources, including staffing needs to effectively provide oversight of the OPD, and accordingly allocate the necessary resources. The oversight agencies also con front inherent conflict of interest in the City

9 This was also a recommendation of the 2020 audit , which found the City Council should consider changes to the City Charter and Municipal Code including to, “Reassess the Commission’s requirements from the City Charter and the Municipal Code to determine whether a Commission comprised of part -time volunteers can effectively address those requirements, or whether the City Council should eliminate requirements in the proposed City Charter amendment or in the Municipal Code.” This recommendation was considered implemented during the audit recommendation follow up cycle as of December 31, 2023, as members of the City Council had considered this recommendation in deliberating on the proposed language for Charter Amendment S1, which changed the power, duties, and staffing of the Oakland Police Commission, and created the Office o f the Inspector General.

12 Administrator’s role in proposing allocations of resources for police oversight agencies for the consideration of the Mayor and City Council . Particularly when budgets are tight, and minimum staffing provisions are suspended, there may be an incentive to cut oversight in favor of operations, especially as the police oversight agencies are entirely funded by the City’s General Purpose Fund.

The City has budgeted all minimum staffing requirements for the agencies in the most recent budget cycle, which cut vacant positions in the Police Commission and OIG ; however, these minimums do not appear to meet the needs of at least the Police Commission and Office of the Inspector General. Minimum staffing within the Municipal Code and City Charter for police oversight agencies require:
• Police Commission: “one full-time civil service employee who shall report to the Agency Director and whose duties shall include providing administrative support to the Commission, and attending Commission meetings, ”10 ½ of a full -time equivalent administrative position “for the purpose of providing adequate administrative support for the Commission,” 11 and “the full-time equivalent non- City Attorney legal advisor position assigned by the City Attorney after consultation with the Chair […] divided into two (2) part time positions: a one -half (½) or two -thirds (⅔) time position with specific responsibilities for providing legal services to the Agency related to investigations and discipline, and a one-half (½) or one-third (⅓) time position a s legal advisor to the Commission .”12 The Commission has 1 FTE for administrative support and contracts legal counsel. • CPRA: one line investigator “ for every one hundred (100) sworn officers in the [Police] Department, rounded up or down to the nearest one hundred (100),” and no fewer than two full-time legal advisors for the Agency. The City Charter also requires at least one investigator to be a licensed attorney.13 • OIG: one full-time staff position comparable to the position of Police Program and Audit Supervisor, and one Policy Analyst position.14
The freezing of the OIG’s audit positions does not meet the requirement within Municipal Code Section

2.45.100, which states:

The City shall allocate a sufficient budget for the OIG to perform its functions and duties as set forth in section 2.45.120, below, including budgeting one (1) full -time staff position comparable to the position of Police Program and Audit Supervisor…” [emphasis added].

While the budget added $122,500 for “a qualified firm to conduct essential audits, evaluations, and reviews of OPD and CPRA ,” one audit manager cannot adequately meet the requirement of auditing 52 tasks within the NSA. For example, the City Auditor’s Office received an independent legal opinion from the City Attorney’s Office on the minimum staff require d for the City Auditor ’s Office to perform its mandated duties without material impairment. The 2010 legal opinion concluded each auditor FTE would be expected to have 1,296.75

10 City Charter Section 604 (e)(5).
11 Oakland Municipal Code 2.45.180(C)
12 Oakland Municipal Code 2.45.180 (D).
13 City Charter Section 604(e)(4) and (e)(1).
14 Oakland Municipal Code 2.45.100(C) and (D).

13 work hours per year, and estimated 10,372 hours per year were needed to complete 17 legislative requirements at that time and estimated the minimum staffing threshold of 8.0 auditor FTEs. 15 The deletion of the Police Commission’s unfilled administrative analyst position to support the Chief of Staff may violate a similar requirement of the City Charter, Section 604 (e)(1):

The City shall allocate a sufficient budget for the Commission, including the Agency and the OIG , to perform its functions and duties as set forth in this Charter section 604, including … [emphasis added].

One administrative staff person, the Chief of Staff position, appears insufficient for the support the Commission requires, especially given its extensive mandates, and the diversity and urgency of tasks required by the Charter and Municipal Code.16
CPRA is funded to the minimum staffing level but has experienced vacancies. This makes it difficult to determine sufficiency of the minimum staffing level.17 From 2017 through 2025, the vacancy rate among CPRA investigators has ranged from 22 percent to 56 percent, including frozen positions, and between 13 and 50 percent, not including frozen positions.18
Best practices and standards for independent audits and police oversight require those bodies to function without interference from the audited entity. The City Administrator’s strong influence over the OIG’s budget represents a structural threat to independence, as defined under Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, which the OIG intends to follow in addition to the Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General. Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards define structural thre ats to independence as situations when auditors report to the entities they audit, and situations when the audited entiti es diminish audit offices’ ability to conduct audits. The Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General also state that “the OIG should be funded through a mechanism that will provide adequate funding to perform its mission without subjecting it to internal or external impairments to its independence.” NACOLE, the National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, similarly affirms the impo rtance of independence for police oversight agencies. According to NACOLE, “One of the most important and defining concepts of civilian oversight of law enforcement is independence. In its broadest sense, it refers to an absence of real or

15 The 2010 legal opinion is available on the City Attorney’s website. 16 Municipal Code 2.45.180 states: “… the Commission shall provide the City Administrator with its proposal for the staff positi ons necessary to permit the Commission and the Agency to fulfill its functions and duties as set forth in this Chapter 2.45, Chapter 2.46, and as set forth in section 604 of the City Charter.” While it does not appear that there was formal proposal by the Commission on behalf of the Commission and Agency, the Chair of the Police Commission issued a statement on the adequacy of funding for effective, legally mandated civilian police oversight that states, “we have reached the limit of possible reductions that will not imperil our fundamental effectiveness.”
17 According to the National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement ’s (NACOLE) report on The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight: Key Principles and Practices for Effectiveness and Sustainability , budgets for police oversight generally do not exceed 0.5 percent of the overseen law enforcement agency’s budget, though investigation-focused models, like that of CPRA, tend to be the most expensive forms of oversight and those budgets may exceed 1 percent of the police budget. Reviewing the most recent adopted budget, Oakland’s police oversight budget is around 1.5 percent of the Police Department’s budget, which is on par with NACOLE’s survey findings.
18 This is a calculation based on positions authorized and filled, according to the first available monthly position control repo rt, and represents an estimate as staffing levels fluctuate throughout the year .

14 perceived influence from law enforcement, political actors, and other special interests looking to affect the operations of the civilian oversight agency.”
Other structural independence issues include the inability of the agencies to hire staff without Administration approval, and requirements for the agency directors to consult with the City Administrator for approval in reorganizing their organizational structure, as described in City Charter Section 604(e)(6).

City leadership should act to ensure that our community is receiving quality and consistent police oversight.

Specifically, in my opinion, the ongoing budget deficits and continued settlement agreement calls for critical examinations into the scale and scope of the oversight agencies’ roles and responsibilities, the ir budgetary resources, and their power to independently carry out their oversight function. Significant political and administrative capacity are needed to do this.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The City Attorney’s Office should provide an independent analysis of the resources needed – including staffing – to support the requirements of the police oversight agencies (the Police Commission, CPRA, and the OIG).

2. In conjunction with relevant stakeholders , including the Police Commission, the Community Policy Review Agency (CPRA), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the City Council should develop and adopt revisions to the Municipal Code and pursue changes to the City Charter as needed, to resolve conflicts between the Municipal Code and the City Charter, namely in clarifying whether the Inspector General is a civil service position, removing language that requires Police Commissioners to submit performance appraisals of the Inspector General to the City Administrator, and considering whether a finding or findings of cause are needed to terminate CPRA’s Executive Director.

RESPONSES FROM THE POLICE COMMISSION , CITY ATTORNEY , AND

CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT JENKINS
Written responses from the Police Commission, City Attorney, and City Council President Kevin Jenkins are attached at the end of the report. Council President Jenkins did not provide a letter, but the response from his staff on Recommendation 2 is included in the implementation plan.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I want to express our appreciation to the Police Commission and Chief of Staff to the Police Commission, the Community Police Review Agency, the Office of the Inspector General, and the City Attorney’s Office for their cooperation during this audit. I also want to acknowledge the staff who contributed to this audit, Performance Audit Manager Stephanie Noble and Assistant City Auditor Eduardo Luna. Last, I want to extend special thanks to Marie Warchol, who provided valuable research , objective perspective, and methodological rigor to this project as part of their capstone project through the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley.

15 STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH AUDITING STANDARDS
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings an d conclusions based on our audit objectives. Government auditing standards require that auditors and audit organizations avoid situations that could lead reasonable and informed third parties to conclude that the auditors and audit organization are not ind ependent and thus not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues associated with conducting the engagement and reporting on the work (GAGAS 3.19). Standards also require that, when auditors do not comply with applicable GAGAS requirements because of law, regulation, scope limitations, restrictions on access to records, or other issues affecting the audit, the auditors should document the departure from the GAGAS requirements and the impact on the audit and on the auditors’ conclusions (GAGAS 8.136).

Our Office is required by Oakland City Charter Section 604 to complete an audit of the Oakland Police Commission, which oversees the Community Police Review Agency and Office of the Inspector General. During the course of this legally m andated audit, within the FY 2025 -26 and 2026 -27 Biennial Budget process, the Administration informally proposed to combine the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of the City Auditor to reduce redundancy. As this proposal directly related the audited entity and our own function, we believe this could lead a reasonable and informed third party to conclude that the auditors and audit organization were not independent or were not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues associated with the engagement. This represents a threat of undue influence, that influences or pressures from sources external to the audit organization will affect an auditor’s ability to make objective judgments (GAGAS 3.30(e)). While we cannot terminate this audit, due to legal requirements, we have disclosed the City Auditor’s memo responding to this informal proposal as an appendix to this report. We followed all other audit standards to the best of our ability, and we believe that the evidence obtain ed provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DISCLOSURE ON INDEPENDENCE
During the course of this audit, City officials began informal inquiries into the potential to house the OIG within the City Auditor’s Office. In response, I issued a letter (dated June 26, 2025) outlining my position on those proposals to the Mayor, City Council, and City Attorney, and copied the Inspector General. That letter stated my neutrality on the merits of the proposal, but noted conflicts and resources required; namely, that the City Auditor must retain structural independence under Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, and cannot have staff reporting to another body, such as the Inspector General to the Police Commission, and that the City Auditor cannot audit its own operations. The two-page letter is provided in Appendix B.

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The objectives of the audit were to assess the extent to which each oversight body is acting in accordance with its City Charter and Municipal Code requirements; identify obstacles, if any, each oversight body faces in meeting the requirements laid out in the City Charter and Municipal Code ; and evaluate the extent to which the oversight bodies provide effective oversight of OPD.

The scope of the audit included activities of the Police Commission, CPRA, and OIG from January 2020 through December 2025.

16 METHODOLOGY
The objective of this audit was to review the City’s police oversight agencies, as described above. To this end, we reviewed management controls relevant to the objective and assessed the activities, policies, and procedures of the Commission, CPRA, and the OIG through the following steps:

We reviewed relevant materials:
• Review of the Office of the City Auditor’s June 2020 audit report, as well as the September 2025 audit recommendation follow-up report, to assess past findings and track progress. • Analysis of the City Charter Section 604, Oakland Municipal Code Chapters 2.45 and 2.46, and the proposed ordinance to amend the Municipal Code and add Chapter 2.47. • Review of civilian police -oversight standards, including NACOLE (National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement) guidance on civilian oversight practices. • Assessment of internal documents produced by the Commission, CPRA, and OIG, including annual reports, strategic planning documents, policies, contracts, and internal training records.

We conducted interviews and consulted with staff:
• Interviews with Commission staff, CPRA leadership and investigators, and OIG personnel to gather information on roles, internal controls, challenges, and practices. • Observation of an in -person CPRA database training session to gain an understanding of CPRA’s investigative database practices and challenges.

We tested for compliance:
• Application of a risk -based selection process to test a subset of City Charter and Municipal Code requirements relevant to each oversight body. Because this was a judgmental sample, the results cannot be projected back to the population.
• Review of compliance questionnaires shared with each oversight body.

We analyzed staffing and resource constraints:
• Analysis of staffing reports and vacancy data to assess capacity gaps and resource constraints across oversight bodies.
• Evaluation of the impact of staffing and frozen positions on each body’s ability to fulfill its mandates.

17 APPENDIX A
Requirements of Police Oversight Agencies (the Police Commission, CPRA, and the OIG) with the City Auditor’s Consideration of Risk to Inform Testing for Compliance To assess each oversight body’s compliance with its distinct City Charter and Municipal Code mandates, this audit used a risk -based sampling methodology. A targeted risk -based approach allow ed the audit to focus resources on the most consequential legal obligations for each oversight body.

Table 1: Compliance Spreadsheet for Police Commission
# Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
1 City
Charter
Section
604(b)(2)
Public hearing
Conduct public
hearings at least once a
year on Department
policies, rules, practices,
customs, and General
Orders
Low Not tested
The Commission regularly posts
public hearing meetings
relating to Department
practices on its website. The
Police Commission meets the
2 nd and 4th Thursday of each
month.
2 City
Charter
Section
604(b)(7)
Budget review
Review the Mayor's
proposed budget to
determine whether
budgetary allocations
for the Department are
aligned with the
Department's policies,
procedures, customs,
and General Orders
Low Not tested
The Commission has a public-
facing Budget Ad Hoc
Committee tasked with
developing the Commission's
budget proposal and reviewing
the budget proposals of the
CPRA, OIG, and Police
Department, particularly
regarding mental health
resources.
3 City
Charter
Section
604(b)(7)
Public hearings -
frequency
Conduct at least one
public hearing on the
Department budget per
budget cycle and shall
forward to the City
Council any
recommendations for
change
Low Not tested
The Commission's public
hearing meeting minutes on its
website.
4 City
Charter
Section
604(b)(8)
Police attendance at
hearings
Require the Chief of
Police or the Police
Chief's designee to
attend Commission
meetings
Medium Implemented
The Commission has a regular,
recurring agenda item for Police
Department updates. The Chief
of Police or a designee attends
the meetings.

18 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
5 City
Charter
Section
604(b)(9)
Receipt of Chief of
Police reports
Require the Chief of
Police to submit an
annual report to the
Commission regarding
such matters as the
Commission shall
require, including, but
not limited to, a
description of
Department
expenditures on
community priorities as
identified by the
Commission.

Medium Implemented
OPD posts annual reports
online. Staff report OPD
submits those to the
Commission as well as
requesting regular reports from
the Chief using a template for
data and information the
Commission requires. The most
recent OPD Annual Report
posted is for 2022.OPD and
Commission staff attribute the
gap in reporting to turnover
within the Chief role.
6 City
Charter
Section
604(b)(10)
Report to Mayor and
City Council
Report at least once a
year to the Mayor, the
City Council, and to the
public to the extent
permissible by law, the
information contained
in the Chiefs report in
addition to such other
matters as are relevant
to the functions and
duties of the
Commission.

Medium Partially
implemented
The Commission publishes an
annual report on the work of the
Commission. Staff report that
they are working on a draft
report to summarize Chief's
reports, to be submitted to the
Mayor and City Council.
7 City
Charter
Section
604(c)(1)
Chief of Police
removal
If removing the Chief of
Police, the Commission
must follow certain
requirements such as
following a process for
notification,
substantiation, and
documentation
Low Not tested
Internal controls, involving
independence structure of
stakeholders, suggests this is
lower risk.
8 City
Charter
Section
604(c)(1)
Full membership
Consist of 7 regular
members and 2
alternate members who
don't have certain
conflicts of interest
High Partially
implemented
The Commission has ongoing
vacancies. Current members do
not appear to have conflicts
listed within the City Charter.
9 City
Charter
Section
604(c)(9)
Training requirements
Receive orientation and
training as required by
ordinance
High Implemented
Commission staff has worked to
standardize required orientation
on NeoGov, the City's employee
training platform.

Commissioners have received
trainings as they have come
onboard, but staff report there
had been some delay with the
transition to an eLearning
system. As of December 2025, all
Commissioners completed their
trainings within NeoGov.
10 City
Charter
Section
604(d)(1)
Regular meeting
cadence
Meet at least twice a
month unless it deems
one meeting is
sufficient in a particular
month
Low Not tested
The Commission's website lists
meeting dates that occur at
least twice a month and
demonstrate consistent
compliance.

19 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
11 City
Charter
Section
604(d)(1)
Public notice
Notify the public of the
time and place of the
meeting and provide
time for public
comment at each
meeting
Low Not tested
The Commission's website lists
the location and time of its
meetings that occur at least
twice a month and demonstrate
consistent compliance.
12 City
Charter
Section
604(d)(1)
Meeting location
Meet at least twice a
year in locations other
than City Hall
Low Not tested
The Commission's 2023 Annual
Report, the most recent at the
time of audit initiation in
January 2025, discussed
meeting locations suggesting
compliance with this
requirement.
13 City
Charter
Section
604(d)(2)
Rules and procedures
Establish rules and
procedures for the
conduct and operations
of its business
High Implemented
The Police Commission Rules of
Order are posted publicly on the
Commission's website.
14 City
Charter
Section
604(e)(8)
Conflict of interest
No current or former
sworn employee of the
Department, or current
official, employee or
representative of an
employee association
representing sworn
police officers, is eligible
for any staff position in
the Commission.

Medium Implemented
No current Commissioners
appear to have conflicts under
this requirement. Staff report
that the Selection Panel is
responsible for ensuring
appropriate vetting and
eligibility for the Commission.

The City Council confirms
candidates.
15 City
Charter
Section
604(e)(6)
Conduct performance
reviews
The Commission shall
periodically conduct a
performance review of
the Agency Director
and Inspector General.

Medium Partially
implemented
The Commission has
established an ad hoc Staff
Search/Evaluations Committee,
tasked with meeting this
requirement. Staff report that
the Commission scheduled a
closed session item for
evaluation of the interim CPRA
Director and that they initiated
proceedings to conduct a
performance evaluation of the
Inspector General as of
December 2025. Due to
changes in leadership for the
Police Department, OIG, and
CPRA, staff report that the
Commission has most recently
been focused on interim
leadership and recruitment
searches.
16 City
Charter
Section
604(g)(2)
Discipline committee
In adjudications of
Agency's findings and
discipline, the Chair of
the Commission shall
appoint a Discipline
Committee comprised
of three
Commissioners
Medium Implemented
Each Commissioner must first
complete Phase 1 of training
upon appointment, after which
they become eligible to serve on
the Discipline Committee. Staff
report that members rotate
participation based on
availability and that all current
Commissioners have been
trained.

20 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
17 Municipal
Code

2.45.050
Voting members
There shall not be more
than seven (7) voting
members of the
Commission at any
given time
Low Not tested
Not tested, due in part to there
being only seven
Commissioners (with two
vacancies) during the time of
the audit.
18 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (A)
Retention policy Maintain all electronic
communications
Low Not tested
Not tested due to breadth of
scope. Commissioners have
oaklandcommission.org email
addresses managed by the
City's IT Department.
19 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (B)
Confidentiality
Maintain confidentiality
of its business in
accordance with state
and local law
Low Not tested
Not tested due to breadth of
scope. The Commission's Code
of Conduct, which is part of
Commissioners' orientation
binder, includes a provision to
maintain confidentiality unless
expressly authorized by the
Chair, the Commission's legal
advisor, or a court order. The first
phase of Commissioner training
includes a module on
confidentiality.
20 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (C)
Review OPD training
Review and comment
on education and
training the
Department provides
its sworn employees
regarding certain
topics pertaining to
mental health
Medium Implemented
Commission ad hoc
committees, such as Racial
Profiling, have discussed
education and training. The
reporting template for the
Chief's regular reports also has
an item on mental health
training. Commissioner Farmer
presented on Wellness
Oversight & Community
Building in a presentation dated
September 11, 2025, as part of
Suicide Prevention Awareness
Month.
21 Municipal
Code

2.45.070
(D)
Propose budget for
OPD training
Prepare and deliver to
the Mayor, City
Administrator, and
Chief by April 15 of each
year or another date set
by Mayor, a proposed
budget for providing
education and training
the Department
provides its sworn
employees
Medium Implemented
Staff report this is agendized
annually. The Budget Ad Hoc
Committee is responsible for
reviewing Police Department
budget proposals. Staff reported
that the required public budget
hearing was held late this year,
on July 24, 2025.
22 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (E)
Chief of Police
removal - finding of
cause
If removing the Chief of
Police, the Commission
must define "cause"
according to certain
criteria
Low Not tested
Internal controls, involving
independence structure of
stakeholders, suggests this is
lower risk.

21 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
23 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (F)
Receipt of Chief of
Police reports
Notify the Chief
regarding what
information will be
required in the Chief's
annual report to the
Commission which shall
include certain topics
listed in Municipal
Code
Low Not tested The Municipal Code outlines
topics for the Chief's report.
24 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (G)
Conduct performance
reviews
Conduct an annual
performance review of
the Agency Director
and of the Chief of
Police
Medium Not
Implemented
There are no closed session
reports of the Commission for
performance reviews, though
staff note that the development
of performance criteria will
assist them with evaluating a
new Inspector General, CPRA
Director, and Chief of Police.
25 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (G)
Conduct performance
reviews for CPRA
Director and Police
Chief
Determine the criteria
for evaluating the
Agency Director's and
the Chief's job
performance, and
communicate those
performance criteria, in
addition to any other
job performance
expectations, to the
Agency Director and
the Chief one (1) full year
before conducting any
evaluation of their job
performance
Medium Partially
implemented
The Commission has drafted
performance criteria and
performance rubrics for the
Inspector General and CPRA
Director. Criteria for the Police
Chief is in process as well. 26
Municipal
Code

2.45.070
(H)
Form for performance
reviews
Create a form for
Commissioners to use
in providing annual
comments,
observations and
assessments to the City
Administrator
regarding the Inspector
General's job
performance. Each
Commissioner shall
complete the form
individually and submit
his or her completed
form to the City
Administrator
confidentially.

Medium Implemented
The Commission has drafted
performance criteria and
performance rubrics for the
Inspector General and CPRA
Director. It does not appear that
Commissioners completed
these forms for the Inspector
General. As noted in the body of
the report, Municipal Code

2.45.070 (H) conflicts with City
Charter Section 604, which
states the Inspector General
shall be appointed by and
reports to the Commission.

22 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
27 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (I)
Request semi-annual
reports from City
Attorney
Request that the City
Attorney submit semi-
annual reports to the
Commission and to City
Council which shall
include a listing and
summary of certain
topics.

Low Not tested
The Municipal Code outlines
topics for the City Attorney's
reports.
28 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (J)
Agency oversight -
case prioritization
Provide policy
guidelines to the
Agency Director for
assistance in
determining case
prioritization
High Implemented
Staff have formalized through
policy a weekly meeting to
provide the Agency Director
assistance in determining case
prioritization.
29 Municipal
Code 2.45
(K)
Public engagement -
online reports
Make certain materials
available on public
website (e.g., annual
reports by each body)
High Implemented
The annual reports of the Police
Commission, CPRA, and OIG are
publicly available online on their
respective websites, which
Commission staff have linked to
the Commission's websites.

Agency Director reports are
regular agenda items. The
Chief's annual report does not
appear to be on the Police
Commission's website, while
there are annual reports on
OPD's website, the most recent
report is for 2022.
30 Municipal
Code

2.45.070
(M)
Agency oversight -
case dismissals
Review the Agency's
dismissal and/or
administrative closure
of all complaints of
misconduct involving
Class I offenses
Medium Partially
implemented
Staff report this is an item under
consideration by the CPRA &
OIG Policies Ad Hoc Committee
of the Commission, which is
tasked with reviewing and
establishing policies and
procedures of CPRA, and that
the policies are under review of
the City Attorney's Office prior
to implementation.

23 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
31 Municipal
Code

2.45.070
(N)
Mediation rules and
procedures
Establish rules and
procedures for the
mediation and
resolution of complaints
of misconduct.

High Implemented
The Commission voted to
approve an amended mediation
program on September 25,
2025. The amendments
intended to clarify the scope,
process, and administration of
CPRA's mediation program.
32 Municipal
Code

2.45.070
(P)
OPD oversight
Review and comment
on the Department's
policy and/or practice of
publishing Department
data sets and reports
regarding various
Department activities,
submit its comments to
the Chief, and request
the Chief to consider its
recommendations and
respond to the
comments in writing
Medium Implemented
The Commission has provided
the Police Chief with a data
template for regular written
reports.
33 Municipal
Code

2.45 .070
(Q)
Public engagement -
feedback
Solicit and consider
input from members of
the public regarding
the quality of their
interactions with the
Agency and the
Commission
High Implemented
Members of the public regularly
speak and Commission
meetings. Staff report that on
occasion, the Commission
issues surveys to solicit
community feedback.
34 Municipal
Code

2.45.070 (S)
Contracts training
Each commissioner
must complete contract
training before voting
on a contract
Medium Implemented
Commissioners are required to
take training on Contracting
Policies and Procedures within
the second phase of their
onboarding training.
35 Municipal
Code

2.45.090 (A)
Public engagement -
KTOP
Video recordings of all
open sessions of
Commission meetings
shall be aired on KTOP-
TV10
Low Not tested
Meetings appear publicly
accessible based on a review of
the Commission's website.
36 Municipal
Code

2.45.100 (A)
OIG oversight
Advise OIG of its
priorities and functions
and duties the
Commission establishes
for the OIG
Low Not tested
The Commission has an ad hoc
committee on CPRA & OIG
Policies.

24 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
37 Municipal
Code

2.45.130 (A)
Training for Discipline
Committee
Commissioners must
complete orientation
and other certain
trainings (listed in

2.25.190) before sitting
on a discipline
committee
High Implemented
Staff report that each
Commissioner must first
complete Phase 1 of training
upon appointment, after which
they become eligible to serve on
the Discipline Committee. Staff
report that members rotate
participation based on
availability and that all current
Commissioners have been
trained. Phase 1 training covers
OPD operations, policies,
procedures, the City Charter,
due process, civil rights, ethics,
confidentiality, the Brown Act,
and Public Records Act.
38 Municipal
Code

2.45.150
Approval for standing
committees
Obtain City Council
approval prior to the
creation of any standing
committee
Low Not tested The Commission only has ad
hoc committees.
39 Municipal
Code

2.45.150
Committees - cost
consideration
Proposals to create a
standing committee of
the Commission must
include information
regarding the costs
associated with staffing
the standing
committee
Low Not tested The Commission only has ad
hoc committees.
40 Municipal
Code

2.45.180 (A)
Staffing
Provide the City
Administrator with its
proposal for the staff
positions necessary to
permit the Commission
and the Agency to fulfill
its functions and duties
as set forth in this
Chapter 2.45, Chapter

2.46, and as set forth in
section 604 of the City
Charter
High Implemented
The Commission has provided
proposals for the staff positions
required to support the
functions of the Commission.

The Chair of the Police
Commission also issued a
statement on Adequate
Funding for Effective, Legally
Mandated Civilian Police
Oversight. The statement does
not propose staff positions
necessary, but notes cuts will
imperil performance.
41 Municipal
Code

2.45 .190
Training
Within six months of
appointment, or as soon
thereafter as possible,
each commissioner
shall complete trainings
outlined in Municipal
Code Chapter 2.45.190
High Implemented
Commission staff has worked to
standardize required orientation
on NeoGov, the City's employee
training platform.

Commissioners have received
trainings as they have come
onboard, but staff report there
had been some delay with the
transition to an eLearning
system. As of December 2025, all
Commissioners completed their
trainings within NeoGov.

25 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
42 Municipal
Code

2.45.190 (M)
Budget item for
NACOLE conference
Within the
Commission's budget
there shall be a line
item for attendance at
conferences offered by
organizations such as
the National Association
for Civilian Oversight of
Law Enforcement
Medium Partially
implemented
The FY 2025-27 Biennial Budget
does not include a line item for
attendance at conferences
offered by organizations such as
the National Association for
Civilian Oversight of Law
Enforcement. The Budget's
summary of Measures LL and S1
do not list the conference
among required allocations.

Staff report that this has been
challenged by ongoing budget
constraints, but at least some
Commissioners are budgeted to
attend.
43 Municipal
Code

2.45.200
Public hearings
Determine the order
and conduct of any
public hearing
Medium Implemented
The Commission has a Code of
Conduct which includes
responsibilities of the Chair, and
Rules of Order, which includes a
chapter on organization and
meetings.
44 2.45.220 Annual reports
Submit annual
reports to the Mayor,
City Council, and the
public.

High Implemented
The Police Commission’s
website has publicly posted
Annual Reports. Staff
transmitted the most recent
annual report to the Mayor's
Office and City Council by email.

26 Table 2: Compliance Spreadsheet for CPRA
# Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
1 City
Charter
Section
604(e)(4)
Staff to police
ratio
The staff of the Agency
shall consist of no fewer
than one line investigator
for every one hundred
(100) sworn officers in the
Department, rounded up
or down to the nearest one
hundred (100).

Medium Not
Implemented
As of December 2025, CPRA
leadership reports they have three
'field' investigators on staff. CPRA
has been hiring for investigator
positions. A staff of just three
investigators, though, represents
approximately one line
investigator for every 212 sworn
police, based on filled positions.
2 City
Charter
Section
604(e)(4)
Attorney
requirement
At least one investigator
shall be a licensed
attorney.

Low Not tested
This requirement has been
waived under a declaration of
extreme fiscal necessity. CPRA has
two attorneys on staff. 3
City
Charter
Section
604(e)(7)
Background
checks
Background checks shall
be required for all Agency
investigator applicants
before they are hired by
the Agency. Such
background checks shall
not be performed by the
[Police] Department.

Low Not tested
Internal controls through the HR
hiring system suggest this is
lower risk. The investigator class
specification notes, as a
requirement, that investigators
must go through a thorough
background check.
4 City
Charter
Section
604(e)(8)
Conflict of
interest
No current or former
sworn employee of the
Department, or current
official, employee or
representative of an
employee association
representing sworn police
officers, is eligible for any
staff position in the
Agency,
High Implemented Staff report this should be flagged
during hiring pre-screening.
5 City
Charter
Section
604(f)(1)
Complaint
intake
The Agency shall forward a
copy of each complaint it
receives to the
Department within one
business day of receipt,
and the Department shall
forward a copy of each
complaint it receives to the
Agency within one
business day of receipt.

Low Not tested Not tested due to breadth of
scope.
6 City
Charter
Section
604(f)(1)
Reporting
duties to Police
Commission
The Agency Director shall
submit to the Commission
each month a list of all
investigations it is
conducting
Low Not tested
Police Commission agendas have
regular reports from CPRA, listing
investigations.

27 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
7 City
Charter
Section
604(f)(3)
Investigation
timeline (250
day
requirement)
The Agency shall complete
its investigations within
two hundred and fifty (250)
days of the filing of the
complaint, with the
Agency unless the Agency
Director, in the Agency
Director's discretion,
makes a written finding
that exceptional
circumstances exist in a
particular case that are
beyond the Agency's
control
High Partially
Implemented
CPRA retains a pending case list
to track the dates cases were
received. Given the shortage of
staffing, however, it is difficult to
ensure cases are completed
within 250 days. CPRA has
focused more on a 1-year goal,
representing the statute of
limitations for most cases. For
cases completed in September
2025, 14 of 18 were completed
within 250 days. Cases completed
in September took a median of
176 days to complete, and all were
completed within 365 days. There
were not specific written findings
of exceptional circumstances, but
generally cases may exceed the
250-day goal due to complexity,
for example, if there are a
significant number of subject
officers, witnesses, or allegations.

Staff report they have newly
implemented a 250-day form for
investigators to complete, which
will document the specific
reasons for a case taking more
than 250 days to complete.
8 City
Charter
Section
604(f)(3)
Investigation
timeline (30 day
requirement)
Within thirty (30) days of
completion of the
investigation, the Agency
Director shall issue written
findings and proposed
discipline regarding the
allegations stated in the
complaint to the Chair of
the Commission and the
Chief of Police.

Medium Not tested
Staff report the Director provides
written findings and proposed
discipline regarding all cases to
the Chief of Police or his
representative by email.

Previously, notice of all written
findings and discipline were
provided to the Chair of the Police
Commission through monthly
reports. Now, staff copy the Chair
of the Commission on the emails
sent to the Chief advising about
the disposition of cases.
9 City
Charter
Section
604(f)(3)
Investigation
timeline (48-
hour
requirement)
The Agency Director shall
issue written findings and
proposed discipline within
forty-eight (48) hours of
completion of any
investigation of Level 1 use
of force (as defined by
Department policy), sexual
misconduct or
untruthfulness.

Low Not tested

28 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
10 City
Charter
Section
604(f)(4)
Reporting
duties to District
Attorney
To the extent allowed by
law and after consultation
with the Commission, the
Agency shall forward
information to other
enforcement agencies,
including but not limited
to the Alameda County
District Attorney, when
such information
establishes a reasonable
basis for believing that a
crime may have been
committed by a sworn
Department employee
Low Not tested
11 City
Charter
Section
604(g)(2)
Adjudication
procedures
Specific adjudication
procedures spelled out in
Section 604(g). E.g., if the
Chief of Police agrees with
the Agency's findings and
proposed discipline, the
Police Chief shall notify the
Agency Director who shall
notify the Chair of the
Commission of the agreed-
upon findings and
proposed discipline. The
Agency Director shall
submit the Chief's findings
and proposed discipline in
addition to the Agency's
findings and proposed
discipline to the Chair of
the Commission.

Low Not tested
Internal controls involving
multiple stakeholders suggests
this is lower risk.
12 Municipal
Code

2.46.020
Public
accessibility -
street-level
office
Some of the Agency staff
should be located in a
street-level or ground-floor,
visible office that is
accessible by public
transportation. The
Commission, in
consultation with the
Agency Director, shall
determine the number of
existing Agency staff who
would work at such a
location.

Medium Not
Implemented
CPRA had intended to complete
space renovations for its lease at
the ground-floor space in 150
Frank Ogawa Plaza, in the old
ProArts space, but experienced
issues due to budget constraints.

Staff report that this lease has
been extinguished.

29 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
13 Municipal
Code

2.46.020
Public
accessibility -
posted hours
Hours of operation for this
location shall be clearly
posted on the office door
and inside the office. The
address of this office
location, together with
hours of operation and a
telephone number shall be
posted on the City's
website and on the
Agency's website
Medium Partially
Implemented
The CPRA website has the
address, hours of operation, and
telephone number for the 250
Frank Ogawa Plaza location
posted. This office is not street-
level.
14 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(A)
Complaint
intake
Use the same complaint
form as used by the
Department in receiving all
public complaints
concerning alleged
misconduct, including
complaints from
Department non-sworn
employees. All complaints,
wherever filed, shall be
date-stamped and
numbered sequentially. A
copy of the numbered and
date-stamped complaint
shall be provided to the
complainant and to the
Department's Internal
Affairs Division within one
(1) business day of receipt.

Low Not tested Not tested due to breadth of
scope.
15 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(B)
Public
accessibility -
online filing
Make complaint forms
available to the public by
posting the forms and
information about the
complaint process on the
Agency's website and by
accepting the online filing
of complaints and
attachments via the
Agency's website, and by
making information about
the complaint process
available at other public
locations to be determined
by the Agency Director.

High Implemented
Information about the complaint
process is posted online. There is a
complaint portal online at
https://apps.oaklandca.gov/cprap
ublic/Home.aspx.

30 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
16 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(C)
Training
Ensure that all
investigators receive any
necessary training in
conducting fair and
impartial investigations.

High Partially
Implemented
Staff report that investigators
have received training, but that
was not consistently documented
prior to April 2025. Moving
forward, staff anticipate
bimonthly training, which will be
logged.
17 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(E)
Videotape
requirement
Videotape the interviews of
all Subject Officers who are
alleged to have committed
a Class I offense
Medium Implemented
Staff report that all subject officer
interviews for Class I offenses are
videotaped. Investigators have
been instructed to take video
recorders to all such interviews.

For a sample of 10 random Class I
allegations, staff had video
recordings of interviews for two.

The other cases did not require
interviews due to other
exculpatory video evidence (such
as body worn camera or
surveillance footage) that
precluded the need to interview.
18 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(F)
Videotape
requirement
Request, without requiring,
that the complainant(s)
and witnesses of Class I
allegations agree to be
audiotaped or videotaped
if, in the Agency's
discretion, its investigation
would benefit from such
taping
Medium Not tested
Staff report that CPRA routinely
video records all officer interview
for Class 1 allegations and audio
records all other officer interviews.

For civilian witnesses, staff report
that CPRA audio records all
interviews upon securing
permission from the witness.

Investigators are informed of this
practice.
19 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(G)
Rules and
procedures
Establish rules and
procedures for the
operation of its business
including, but not limited
to, procedures for the
intake of complaints
High Partially
Implemented
CPRA is still working to complete
a manual. Full implementation
has been delayed due to turnover
in the Director.
20 Municipal
Code

2.46.030
(H)
Reporting
duties
No less than twice a year
and as permitted by
applicable law, issue a
report to the Public Safety
Committee which shall
include certain specified
information (e.g., number
of complaints submitted to
Agency, type of
complaints, number of
completed investigations,
etc.)
Medium Not
Implemented
CPRA publicly reports on similar
information to the Police
Commission. There do not appear
to be regular reports to the Public
Safety Commission as required by

2.46.30 (H). Staff agree that it is
not clear whether there had been
similar biennial reports to the
Public Safety Committee, but that
they intend to do so on a go-
forward basis.

31 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
21 Municipal
Code

2.46.040
Director duties
Agency Director fulfills
responsibilities such as
identifying staff positions,
assigning complaints to
investigators, reporting to
Commission once a month
regarding pending cases
via a written report, etc.

Medium Implemented
The Agency Director reports to
the Commission and is
responsible for day-to-day
operations, including assigning
staff to investigate complaints
and monitoring the progress of
investigations, monitoring CPRA's
workload, and reporting to the
Commission monthly on pending
cases.
22 Municipal
Code

2.46.050
Background
checks
Background checks shall
be performed on all new
Agency Complaint
Investigators and on the
Agency Director
Medium Implemented
Staff report this has been
implemented and that the
background checks are handled
by Human Resources
Management. The investigator
class specification notes, as a
requirement, that investigators
must go through a thorough
background check.
23 Municipal
Code

2.46.060
Complaint
assignment
Upon the agreement of
the Chief, the Agency
Director, the
complainant(s) and the
subject officer(s), the
Agency Director shall
appoint a qualified
mediator with at least five
(5) years of experience in
mediating employment or
other relevant disputes,
from a conflict resolution
company or association
that employs mediators, to
mediate a final resolution
of the complaint in
accordance with the
Commission's established
rules and procedures.

Medium Partially
Implemented
CPRA staff report they are
working with the City Attorney's
Office and OPD to initiate
mediation. CPRA has selected a
conflict resolution agency to
mediate cases selected for
conflict resolution, to be paid by a
grant from Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Services.

32 Table 3: Compliance Spreadsheet for the OIG
# Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
1 City
Charter
Section
604 (f)(5)
NSA task audits
The OIG shall audit the
Department's
compliance with the fifty-
two (52) tasks described
in the Settlement
Agreement in United
States District Court case
number C00-4599,
Delphine Allen, et al., v.

City of Oakland, et al., and
make recommendations
to the Department, the
Commission, and the City
Council based on its
audit(s)
Medium Not
implemented
The OIG reports it has not been
able to audit the tasks due to a
lack of audit staff. However, the
OIG has issued reviews and
evaluations. As of December
2025, it has contracted with a
firm to audit seven tasks.
2 City
Charter
Section
604 (f)(5)
Reporting duties
OIG shall provide written
reports of the results of
its audits to the
Commission and the City
Council, and, upon
request, shall publicly
report on the results of
any audits to the
Commission and/or the
City Council in a manner
consistent with all
applicable confidentiality
requirements.

Medium Not
implemented
The OIG reports it has not been
able to audit the tasks due to a
lack of audit staff. The OIG
intends to provide written
reports to the Commission and
Council when its able.
3 City
Charter
Section
604 (f)(5)
Training requirements
The Inspector General
shall receive orientation
and training as required
by Ordinance, including
but not limited to
orientation and training
in the areas of
Department operations,
policies and procedures,
including discipline
procedures for police
officer misconduct and
failure to act, Procedural
Justice, conflict
resolution, national
standards of
constitutional policing,
best practices for
conducting
investigations, and labor
rights and laws.

High Implemented
The Inspector General has
received trainings and
orientation that include police
operations, trainings received by
Police Commissioners, and
trainings on best practices for
investigations and audits.
33 # Legal
Reference
Shorthand
Requirement Requirement Risk Results Comments
4 Mu
nicipal
Code

2.45.80 (E)
Videotape recordings
The Commission and the
OIG shall follow
Department policies and
procedures regarding
the release of videotape
and audio tape
recordings of alleged
Class 1 violations
committed by police
officers.

Medium Not
a
pplicable
The OIG reports it has not
released subject recordings.
5 Municipal
Code

2.45.120
(H)
Confidentiality
requirement
Any reports, plans, audits,
reviews and
recommendations
generated by the OIG
shall not disclose
information in violation
of state and local law
regarding the
confidentiality of
personnel records,
including but not limited
to California Penal Code
section 832.7
Low Not tested
I
nternal controls, including
required training, suggest this is
lower risk.
34 APPENDIX B
City Auditor’s June 26, 2025 letter to the Mayor, City Council, and City Attorney documenting his position on the informal inquiries into the potential of the City Auditor’s Office to house the OIG within the City Auditor’s Office.

Office of the City Auditor
CITY HALL · ONE FRANK H. OGAWA PLAZA, 4TH FLOOR · OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA · 94612 Michael C. Houston, MPP, CIA
City Auditor
(510) 238-3378
FAX (510) 238-7640
TDD (510) 238-3254
www.oaklandauditor.com
June 26, 2025
Dear Mayor Lee, Councilmembers, and City Attorney Richardson, In 2024, the City Council considered a proposal for the November 5, 2024 Municipal Election that aimed to “strengthen the independence of the Office of the Inspector General” by having the City Auditor appoint the Inspector General. More recently, during the 2025-26/2026-27 Biennial Budget process, an informal proposal emerged to combine the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of the City Auditor to reduce redundancy. The purpose of this letter is to formally state my position on these proposals and make clear how they would affect the Office of the City Auditor.

First, I am neutral on the merits of the above proposals. Second, any future proposals to alter the organizational structure of the independent Office of the City Auditor must consider the following:

The City Auditor must retain structural independence. The City Auditor or staff of the Office of the City Auditor cannot report to the Police Commission. The City Auditor reports directly to and is accountable solely to Oakland residents. The City Charter ensures the City Auditor is structurally independent from the City Council, the Mayor, the City Administrator, and political appointees. Currently, the Inspector General is appointed by and reports to the Police Commission, which is made up of Mayoral appointees and appointees from a selection panel made up of appointees of the Mayor and the City Council. Furthermore, if the Inspector General and/or staff from the Inspector General’s Office were to report to the City Auditor and/or be absorbed into the Office of the City Auditor, the affected employees should report solely to the City Auditor, and not to anyone outside of the Office of the City Auditor. To avoid an inherent conflict between the duties of the City Auditor and the Inspector General, the City Charter section that established the Inspector General would need to be amended or revised.

Proposals must consider financial and staffing resources needed to comply with City Charter and Municipal Code mandates. The City Charter and Municipal Code detail the Cl1Y HALL · ONE FRANK H. OGAWA PLAZA, 4TH FLOOR · OAKLAND , CALIFORNIA • 94612

1. 2.
35 Mayor Lee, Councilmembers, and City Attorney Richardson June 26, 2025

authority, responsibilities, and duties of the City Auditor and the Inspector General, as well as their respective offices. Proposals need to consider minimum staffing requirements already in place to enable the City Auditor and the Inspector General to fulfill existing mandates of these two officials’ respective offices. For example, the City Charter establishes a minimum staffing level (via the passage of Measure X in 2022), of 14 fulltime equivalent positions for the Office of the City Auditor based on 2022 duties and responsibilities. If the Office of the City Auditor is to absorb additional responsibilities and duties, the Office will likely require increased funding for additional staff and operational capacity over and beyond the current minimum staffing level.

3. The City Auditor cannot audit their own operations. The City Charter requires the Office of the City Auditor to adhere to the U.S. Comptroller General’s Government Auditing Standards, which guide our Office to perform work that is consistently of the utmost quality, and preserves the Office’s objectivity, independence, and competence.

Government Auditing Standards prohibit auditors from conducting audits of their own operations. The Office of the City Auditor would not be able to audit the staff, duties, and responsibilities it absorbs from the Inspector General and/or the Office of the Inspector General.

Finally, please engage with me directly on any ideas or proposals that might impact me or my Office. My team and I are clearly affected by these matters and can offer valuable insights to how they may influence the City and its residents.

Thank you for your partnership in serving the City of Oakland, and for your attention to this matter. Please contact me if you have questions or would like to discuss these issues further.

Respectfully,
Michael C. Houston
City Auditor
cc: Zurvohn Maloof, Oakland Inspector General
Michael Houston (Jun 26, 202516:23 PDT)
36 OPC RESPONSE T

O CITY AUDIT REPORT
February 2, 2026

To: City Auditor Michael C. Houston, MPP, CIA
Cc: Mayor Lee; Members of the City Council; Shawana Booker; City Attorney Richardson; City Administrator Johnson; Assistant City Administrator Phillips; Stephanie Noble; Antonio Lawson; Zurvohn Maloof; Katina Ancar
From: Chair Garcia-Acosta, Oakland Police Commission
Re: Oakland Police Commission Response to the Final Audit Report The Oakland
Police Commission (Commission) expresses its appreciation for the City Auditor’s comprehensive assessment. The Commission offers the following responses and clarifications of the Final Audit Report’s (Report’s) findings and recommendations:

Throughout, the Report references the essential requirement for the Commission and its constituent parts (including the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)) to maintain structural independence. Stating that independence is a prerequisite to the Commission’s ability to ensure that its resources and administrative/governing authority are free from detrimental impairments, the Report expressly identifies such independence as essential to operational autonomy, the Report emphasizes the National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement’s (NACOLE’s) admonition that independence is [o]ne of the most important and defining concepts of civilian oversight of law enforcement …. In its broadest sense, it refers to an absence of real or perceived influence from law enforcement, political actors, and other special interests….
1 37

The Commission concurs that an oversight body cannot be “independent” if its operations are influenced by the entity subject to oversight (here, the Oakland Police Department), swayed by political concerns, or hindered by inadequate resources. To ensure effective oversight, the City must pursue all efforts to prevent the Commission from becoming a captive of law enforcement authorities.

To this end, the Report’s First Recommendation calls on the Oakland City Attorney to conduct an independent assessment of the Commission’s resources and staffing needs without Commission collaboration. For the purposes of defining its needs, the Commission does not view an analysis led by the City Attorney as “independent.” No basis exists to conclude that the City Attorney possesses information superior to that of the Commission and its Agencies concerning their own staffing and resource requirements. The City Attorney’s dual role advising the OPD (the law enforcement body subject to Commission oversight) creates a potential conflict of interest that could compromise the office’s ability to conduct an unbiased resource assessment. Therefore, any analysis conducted by the City Attorney cannot be considered independent. A genuinely objective resource assessment should be performed by a neutral party with civilian oversight experience in direct consultation with the Commission, CPRA, and OIG.

The Report confirms that vacancies, frozen positions, and below minimum staffing levels have hindered the Commission’s ability to implement some of its duties to the fullest extent. With regard to the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA or the Agency), the Report provides that the Agency’s investigators are currently staffed at 71% of their mandated requirement. The City Charter requires that CPRA have one (1) line investigator (Complaint Investigator II or “CI II”) for every 100 Oakland Police Department officers. Thus, at current levels, CPRA should employ seven (7) “Level II” Complaint Investigators. However, with current funding, CPRA has only been able to hire three (3) full-time CI II. Although CPRA also employs two (2) Supervisory Investigators (Complaint Investigators III), these two employees manage the line investigators and oversee case intake; they do not conduct investigations. As a result, 2 38
contrary to the Report’s calculations, CPRA presently has only three (3) of the mandated seven (7) line investigators - or just 43% of Charter-mandated investigative staff. Consistent with the Report’s findings about the dearth of resources available to the Commission (and the above clarifications), any proposed City Charter amendments beyond those eliminating express conflicts should significantly increase the Commission’s finances to meet its responsibilities rather than diminish its oversight obligations to correspond to its inadequate funding.

As noted above, the Report identifies conflicts between the City Charter and Municipal Code affecting the Commission and suggests that Council adopt revisions to the Municipal Code and pursue Charter changes as needed (Second Recommendation). In particular, the Report recommends Municipal Code revisions to clarify the Inspector General’s civil service status and reporting/termination provisions. The Commission believes the conflict is resolvable via Municipal Code revision without resort to the onerous Charter amendment process. Nonetheless, any Charter modifications beyond the Report’s Second Recommendation must be informed by the needs of the Commission itself. The Commission’s 2024 proposals to adjust its Enabling Ordinances serve as instructive guidance for eliminating confusion and improving the Commission’s oversight effectiveness.

The Commission stands ready to collaborate on a process that centers independence, transparency, and sufficiency of resources to fulfill voters’ mandates.

Sincerely,
Ricardo Garcia-Acosta
Ricardo
Garcia-Acosta
Chair, Oakland Police Commission
3 39
3456489v1

CITY OF OAKLAND
ONE FRANK H. OGAWA PLAZA x 6 TH FLOOR x OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94612 Office of the City Attorney
Ryan Richardson FAX:
(510) 238-3601
(510) 238-6500
City Attorney TTY/TDD: (510) 238-3254
February 5, 2026
Michael Houston, City Auditor Office
of the City Auditor
One Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 4
th Floor
Oakland, California 94612
Re: City Attorney’s Response to Recommendation 1 of City Auditor’s 2025 Audit of Oakland Police Oversight Agencies
Dear City Auditor Houston:

The City Auditor’s 2025 Audit of Oakland Police Oversight Agencies recommends that the City Attorney’s office provide an independent analysis of the staffing resources needed by the Police Commission, Community Police Review Agency and the Office of Inspector General to meet the requirements placed on them by the City’s Charter and Municipal Code. While our office would not conduct this type of analysis exclusivel y utilizing internal staff, we are capable of commissioning and managing such a study and have done so in the past on at least one occasion. 1 While our office is always fully occupied providing critical and time-sensitive legal advice, we recognize that a staffing study could bene fit the City and we stand willing to help. If the City Council wants our office to administer a study to help inform the Council’s budget decisions, and allocates sufficient funding to our office for us to engage outside expertise, we will assist.

To the extent the Police Commission believes that Oakla nd’s police oversight agencies should directly contract for and manage a staffing study that will potentially benefit their own agencies and further reasons that doing so would decrease potential conflicts of interest and increase public confidence, we respectfully disagree. Even so, by no means do we insist that the City Attorney’s office be tasked with managing a study. In sum, we sincerely thank the City Auditor’s office for their work, and we await direction, if any, from the City Council.

Very truly yours,

RYAN RICHARDSON
City Attorney
cc: Mayor Barbara Lee
Members of the City Council
Jestin Johnson, City Administrator
Ricardo Acosta-Garcia, Police Commission Chair
Antonio Lawson, CPRA Director
Zurvohn Maloof, Inspector General
1 In 2010 our office contracted with MGT consulting group to produce a study of the City Auditor’s resource needs . https://www.oaklandcityattorney.org/wp-content/oca-reports/public-legal-opinions-and-public-reports/2010-05-27- Legal-Opinion-2010.pdf
y
yy ,

RYRYRYYYYRYYRYRYRYRYYRYRYYYRYRYYYRYRYYYYRYYYYYRYYYYYRYYYYYYYYYYRYYYYYYYRYYRYYYYYRYYYYYRYYRYRYYYYYYRYYYYYYYRYYRYYYYYYYRYRYYYYYYYYYRYYYRYRYYYYRRYYRYRYAAAAAAAAAAANAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRICIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII HARDSON CiCiCiCCCCiCiCiCCCCiCiCiCiCiCCCCCCCCiCCCCCCCCCCCCiCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC ty Attorney 40 Office of the City Auditor
Audit of Oakland Police Oversight Agencies: The Oakland Police Commission, Community Police Review Agency, and
Office of the Inspector General
City Administration’s Recommendation Implementation Plan Rec# City Auditor’s Recommendations Management Action Plan Responsible Party
Target Date for
Completion
1 The City Attorney’s Office should provide an independent analysis of the resources needed – including staffing – to support the requirements of the police oversight agencies (the Police Commission, Community Police Review Agency, and the Office of the Inspector General).

The City Attorney agrees with this
recommendation. While our office is
always fully occupied providing critical and
time-sensitive legal advice, we recognize
that a staffing study could benefit the City
and we stand willing to help. If the City
Council wants our office to administer a
study to help inform the Council’s budget
decisions, and allocates sufficient funding
to our office for us to engage outside
expertise, we will assist.

City Attorney’s
Office
TBD, pending
budget allocation
2 In conjunction with relevant stakeholders, including the Police Commission, the Community Police Review Agency
(CPRA), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the City Council should develop and adopt revisions to the
Municipal Code and pursue changes to the City Charter as needed, to resolve conflicts between the Municipal Code and the City Charter, namely in clarifying whether the Inspector General is a civil service position, removing language that requires Police Commissioners to submit performance
appraisals of the Inspector General to the City Administrator, and considering whether a finding or findings of cause are needed to terminate CPRA’s Executive Director.

Chapter 604 of the Oakland City Charter
provides the most updated guidance
regarding the referenced entities and
supersedes any outdated language within
the Oakland Municipal Code (OMC). As the
City of Oakland is evaluating and assessing
possible government restructuring
through Charter change as this time, we
are deferring any revisions referencing this
section until any Charter changes adopted
by the voters. The City Council will
continue to monitor developments as it
relates to Charter reform and make OMC
revisions as necessary and in alignment
with policy, procedure and government
structure.

City Council Deferred
41