Agenda packet, regular meeting — Pacific Grove City Council, September 4, 2024 (part 2 of 2)

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Model Examples (Sidewalk Treatments)
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Figures 59: Obstructions in the through zone are not pedestrian friendly. No clear delineation of public realm elements creates a disorganized public realm.

Intersections & Crosswalk Treatments:

Model Examples (Intersection & Crosswalk Treatments)

Figures 60 – 61: Intersection corner conditions that have a wide flare reduced tripping hazards and allows the pedestrian to use the ramp freely.

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Figures 64 – 66: There are opportunities to add character to the streetscape whether it is a bronze inlay of the City logo, street name, historic marker, or even a group of planter pots.

Poor Examples (Intersection & Crosswalk Treatments)
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Figure 67 - 68: Curb ramps such as this force the pedestrian into the intersection rather than in line with the crosswalk.

B. Precedent Outdoor Dining Guidelines
Santa Clarita Outdoor Dining Standards and Guidelines. 2022. https://santaclarita.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/42/migration/OTNSP_Outdoor_Dining_Guidelines.pdf Palo Alto Permanent Parklet Program. 2023.
https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/files/assets/public/v/1/public-works/engineeringservices/webpages/parklet-program/parklet-standards-adopted-final-11.13.2023.pdf San Francisco Shares Spaces Manual. 2022. https://www.sf.gov/sites/default/files/2022- 09/Shared%20Spaces%20Manual.pdf
Sausalito Proposed Parklet and Outdoor Dining Program. 2022. https://legistarwebproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/pdf/1384173/Attachment_2_- _Parklet_WG_Final_Draft_03112022_Rev_1__1_.pdf
City of San Mateo Guidelines for Expanded Outdoor Dining During Covid-19 Emergency. 2021. https://www.cityofsanmateo.org/DocumentCenter/View/81384/City-of-San-MateoOutdoor-Dining-Guidelines City of Santa Cruz Parklet Program. 2023.
https://www.cityofsantacruz.com/home/showpublisheddocument/92888/63819153433783 0000
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LOCATION
This section will be expanded upon in the full manual.

Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project (LASW) within the Lighthouse Business District in the City of Pacific Grove.

The location of the outdoor dining space in bulb out conditions shall be immediately adjacent to the restaurant façade and contained within the front sidewalls of the restaurant. The outdoor dining space shall not encroach on to the sidewalk of the adjacent properties. Further, the space may not project more than half the width of the sidewalk.

A. Considerations for Future Bulb Out Construction
Existing Conditions

1. Slope considerations.

2. Existing public realm features.

3. Existing signage.

4. Stormwater facilities.

5. Traffic and parking considerations.

6. Sidewalk treatments.

7. Intersection treatments.

8. Crosswalk treatments.

Civil Engineering Input and Design

1. Transportation design standards.

2. City standards.

3. Accessibility.

4. Engineering.

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ELIGIBILITY
This section will be expanded upon in the full manual.

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DESIGN GUIDELINES
A. Layout
This section will be expanded upon in the full manual incorporating other streets.

Bulb out layout plan for the LASW project is found on Figure 01. For other intersections, bulb -out layout and design will be modified based on existing conditions and civil engineering input and design, refer to sections LOCATION and ELIGIBILITY.

Figure 68: Layout conditions for the LASW project.

Widths
 5 ft minimum through zone – no obstructions in sidewalk.  5 ft minimum wide entry points.
 3 ft minimum wide curb ramps.

Heights
 3 ft tall maximum outdoor dining perimeter fence.

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 Max slope 5% on sidewalk per ADA Standards.
 Curb ramps per ADA Standards.

Existing Public Realm Features
 Relocation of two street trees and one streetlight.
 Addition of one street tree.
 No other furnishings are present or provided on this specific portion of the street.

Stormwater Facilities
 Engineered.

Size
 Outdoor dining area delineation ends at the property line between buildings and extends to the start of the through zone.

Building Entry Points
 All building entry points remain clear and visible for entry.

Pedestrian and Vehicular Sightlines
 AB-413 is followed.
 Visibility at intersections is improved by having a 20’ setback on crosswalk approach.  The perimeter fence does not exceed 3’ tall.
 Refer to additional engineering standards, codes, and regulations.

B. Materials
This section will be further developed based on review comments.

This section contains design guidelines on the preferred materials for outdoor dining areas in bulb out conditions. Examples of disapproved materials are also provided.

There is flexibility given to the element design and material, so restaurant establishments can provide individuality to their outdoor dining.

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All maintenance of the outdoor dining areas to be provided at the expense of the restaurant establishment.

Smoking
 Smoking will not be permitted in the outdoor dining areas.

Alcohol
 Only allowed in the restaurant and outdoor dining premises. No alcohol permitted in the public realm.
 Signage to say NO ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES BEYOND THIS POINT.  Applicants shall comply with all applicable ABC regulations regarding alcohol use for their establishment within the parklet. The issuance of an Encroachment Permit does not constitute any ABC or Zoning approvals for alcohol use by the City.

Applicants are solely responsible for securing a valid ABC license to allow/extend business operations within the encroachment area. (12.21.22 PG Draft) Cleanliness
 Outdoor dining areas shall be always maintained free of litter and debris.  The ground floor shall be always kept clean and pressure washed 3 times a year.  Any rust or discoloration of materials must be repaired or replaced.  Any broken or damaged materials to be repaired or replaced.  Any vandalism shall be repaired or replaced at the expense of the restaurant establishment.
 “Business owner or outdoor dining operator shall maintain the outdoor dining space clean. Outdoor furniture, equipment and other amenities must be removed from the outdoor dining area for extended periods of non-use (two weeks or more). The city may request removal during special events, etc.” (2014 PG Draft Standards) Afterhours Access & Maintenance
 General public to be permitted inside all outdoor dining areas in the public realm afterhours. No barriers to entry permitted at any time. During open hours?  Heating units to be placed indoors, out of the public realm after hours.  Retractable canopies to be retracted.
 All wind screens to be removed and located indoors.
 Non-bolted furniture may remain in the outdoor dining area if they are heavy enough to withstand 60 mph wind gusts (March 2023 recorded 59 MPH wind gusts in Monterey - Weather Underground History). Or they may be grouped and fastened together. When known storm events are forecasted, restaurant establishments are required to bring in all non-bolted furnishings inside.  Furniture covers are not permitted in the public realm.

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P a c i f i c G r o v e O u t d o o r D i n i n g G u i d e l i n e s | P a g e 40 of 41 | REV. 8/2024  Any plants incorporated into the outdoor dining space are to be watered and deadheaded as needed. Any dead plants to be removed and replaced.

Temporary/Seasonal Decorations
 Seasonal decorations are permitted and must be removed within one week of the holiday.

Code Compliance
 City codes.
 ADA Compliance.

Violations
 If the restaurant establishment cannot adhere to these maintenance requirements (up to 5 recorded violations by a City employee in one year), the outdoor dining area will be revoked and removed at the expense of the owner.

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APPLICATION & APPROVAL PROCESS
This section will be further developed based on review comments.

From 2014 PG Draft Outdoor Dining Design Standards

APPLICATION
Written letter. A brief description that includes the name of the restaurant, a description of proposed outdoor dining space and number of seats.

Site Plan. A plan showing the proposed outdoor dining space, to scale, including the sidewalk clearance requirement, elevations, furniture.

Photos or Drawings. Submit color photos, renderings or graphics showing the setup, type of furniture and materials of barriers.

STEPS FOR APPROVAL
1) Schedule an informal meeting with Community & Economic Development to go over your ideas for your outdoor dining. Call (831) 648-3138 to schedule a meeting. 2) Contact the Community and Economic Development Department for an application at (831) 648- 3138 or by coming to City Hall, located at 300 Forest Avenue. 3) Provide proof or public liability insurance in the amount of one million dollars, name the City as an additional insured.

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Agenda No. 12 B

CITY OF PACIFIC GROVE
300 Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, California 93950
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM: Daniel Gho, Public Works Director/Deputy City Manager MEETING DATE: September 04, 2024
SUBJECT: Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project
CEQA: Categorical Exemption, CEQA Guidelines Section 15301, Class I, Existing Facilities

RECOMMENDATION
Receive bids and authorize the City manager to prepare a budget amendment ordinance to allocate funds for the Lighthouse Avenue Widening Project for an amount of $339,304.66 which includes the base bid, a 25% construction contingency and 15% engineers oversite.

1. 2. Alternatively, discuss and take other action related to this item.

DISCUSSION
In June of 2020, the City Council ratified emergency measures taken by the City Manager to streamline the processes through which businesses could offer outside dining. By August 1, 2020, approximately 11 restaurants were operating parklets on City property under the temporary rules established by the local emergency. In 2021 and 2022, the City Council adopted an ordinance with one-year sunset provisions that clarified the scope and effect of the temporary Parklet Program and Outside Dining rules.

At its March 22, 2023, meeting, the City Council adopted Ord. 23-004, which expands the encroachment permit process to allow parklets in the public right-of-way.

With the adoption of Ord. 23-004, parklets are now authorized through an annual, temporary encroachment permit. Issuing an annual encroachment permit allows the parklets to remain temporary and revocable if the conditions noted on the encroachment permit are not met. Adoption of Ord. 23-004 also formed a subcommittee, consisting of council members Beck, Coletti and McDonnell.

Since late October 2023, council member Beck has recused herself from participation in the parklet subcommittee. The subcommittee continued its efforts and developed the Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project.

The intent of the parklet subcommittee was to address the numerous inquiries and concerns related to the three parklets at Lighthouse Ave and Fountain Ave and to devise methods to best address the safety concerns and potential conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles created by the parklets on this block.

With increased visibility and safety front of mind, the subcommittee, in consultation with the City’s contracted traffic engineer, recommended consideration of extending the sidewalk where the parklets currently exist.

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City Staff, in conjunction with the members of the subcommittee, presented a rendering and options to the City Council at their February 21, 2024 meeting. At the meeting, the Council authorized the City Manager to finalize plans and prepare a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project. At the City Council’s June 19, 2024 meeting, Staff presented the final plans and bidding package to the City Council and Council authorized the release of the RFP.

On August 9, 2024, the City received 3 bids for the construction of the Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project.

Construction Firms Bids
Silcon Constructors Inc. $242,360.53
Monterey Peninsula Engineering $419,075.00
Vanguard Construction $442,107.00

OPTIONS
Do not authorize the City Manager to initiate a budget amendment.

FINANCIAL IMPACT:

As part of the FY23/24 Capital Improvement Plan (CIP), the City Council allocated $50,000 for the Design of Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project (CIP24-06). This was harnessed to develop the plans, specifications and bidding package.

The recommendation in this report is to have Council request the City Manager to prepare a budget amendment in an amount of $339,304.66, which includes the base bid (Silcon Constructors), a 25% construction contingency and 15% engineers oversite.

Funding has yet to be allocated in Fiscal Year 2024/25 for the construction of the Lighthouse Avenue Sidewalk Widening Project. If approved, it is anticipated that a budget amendment will be drafted and presented to Council either at their September 18, 2024, or October 2, 2024, meeting. Once the first read of the ordinance has been approved, then City staff will prepare a report to the Council for the award of the construction bid that will correspond with the second read of the budget modification.

FOCUSED PRIORITY AREA: Infrastructure
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Agenda No. 12 C

CITY OF PACIFIC GROVE
300 Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, California 93950
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM: Brian Pierik, City Attorney
MEETING DATE: September 04, 2024
SUBJECT: Discussion Regarding California Voting Rights Act Issues, Impact of Ballot Measure for Measure Z (Proposes Reduction from Six Councilmembers to Four Councilmembers) and Letter Received from LULAC on August 23, 2024 and Motion to Provide Direction to City Manager.

CEQA: Does not constitute a Project per California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines Section 15378

RECOMMENDATION
Discuss California Voting Rights Act issues, Impact of Ballot Measure Z (Proposed Reduction from Six Councilmembers to Four Councilmembers) and Letter Received from LULAC on August 23, 2024.

1. Motion to Provide Direction to City Manager regarding the California Voting Rights Act which could include returning to the City Council with a Resolution of Intent to Transition from At-Large Elections to By-District Elections and retain a demographer to assist in that transition process or such other action related to this item as the Council determines appropriate.

2. DISCUSSION
A. Letters from League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)

1. August 25 2022 Letter

On August 25, 2022, the City of Pacific Grove received a letter from Andrew Sandoval on behalf of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), hereafter 8.25.22 Letter (Attachment 1). The

8.25.22 Letter included a demand that the City change its at-large voting system to a by-district voting system for city council elections. This 8.25.22 Letter was posted on the City’s website following receipt.

The case of Pico Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica was pending at the time of receipt of the 8.25.22 Letter. The California Supreme has since issued its decision in the Santa Monica case.

The 8.25.22 Letter asserts that changing to by-district elections would avoid a potential violation of the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA), protect the City from litigation under the CVRA, be consistent with the trend in California and Monterey County for cities and other jurisdictions to transition to by-district elections, and improve the accountability and responsiveness of the City’s elected officials.

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by-district elections, and improve the accountability and responsiveness of the City’s elected officials.

In a by-district electoral system, the City is divided into districts of approximately equal population and only the voters residing in each district may vote for candidates for City Council for that district. Those candidates themselves must also be residents and voters of that district. In the current at-large voting electoral system, all voters in the City are entitled to vote for all candidates running for the City Council.

2. August 23, 2024 Letter

On August 23, 2024, the City received by certified mail an undated letter (“8.23.24 Letter”) from Aidee Farias (LULAC District 12 Director), see Attachment 2. In this 8.23.24 Letter, LULAC formally requests the City to transition from at-large to district-based elections to comply with the CVRA and states their belief that the City’s at-large system dilutes minority voting strength potentially violating the CVRA.

The 8.23.24 Letter request that the City Council adopt a Resolution of Intent to transition to district-based elections within 45 days and states that the City then has 90 days to hold public hearings and adopt an ordinance establishing districts.

The 8.23.24 Letter states that the transition would align Pacific Grove with positive statewide trends including neighboring cities like Soledad, Gonzales, Greenfield and Monterey.

Finally, the 8.23.24 Letter urges Pacific Grove to avoid potential litigation, which has proven costly for municipalities and that transitioning voluntarily allows the City to maintain control over the districting process and engage the community meaningfully.

B. City Council Action
On March 6, 2024, there was a discussion regarding issues relating to the California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”), copy of the Agenda Report is Attachment 3. The action taken by the Council at that time was to authorize the City Manager to issue an Request for Proposal for the services of demographer.

Much of the information provided in the March 6, 2024 regarding the CVRA is set forth below in this Agenda Report.to again provide the Council and the public with this information.

On July 17, 2024, City Manager Matt Mogensen submitted an Agenda Report (Attachment 4A) which attached a copy of the report from National Demographic Corporation (NDC), Attachment 4B.

C. California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”)
The CVRA was enacted in 2001, Elections Code §§ 14025 - 14032. (Attachment 5.) The CVRA applies only to at-large electoral systems. The CVRA alters established standards of proof and defenses that exist under the federal Voting Rights Act, making it easier for plaintiffs to challenge the electoral system of any city or other jurisdiction that does not elect its governing board by-district. For example, under the CVRA, a plaintiff is not required to prove that, by changing to districts, there will be a least one district which has a majority of minority voters.

Importantly, the CVRA also expands the ability of plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees and expenses, making awards mandatory if plaintiffs prevail. In contrast, defendants, even if successful, cannot recover either attorneys’ fees or costs.

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Importantly, even if the City were to successfully defend itself against a CVRA lawsuit, nothing prevents a different set of plaintiffs from filing a new CVRA demand against the City potentially plunging the City into litigation again. The only absolute protection for the City against a lawsuit under the CVRA is the implementation of single-member by-district elections.

The CVRA prohibits at-large electoral systems that impair the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class. Plaintiffs in a CVRA case must prove that racially polarized voting occurs in specified elections.

D. Pico Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica On September 20, 2023, the California Supreme Court issued its modified ruling in the case of Pico Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal. 5th 292 (2023) (see Attachment 6), that plaintiffs must also prove that the combination of at-large voting and voting patterns reflecting racial polarization results in the dilution of the ability of protected class voters to elect chosen candidate or influence the outcome of elections. In other words, plaintiffs must prove that they would have the opportunity to elect chosen candidates in a legal alternative electoral system such as a by-district system or alternatives that may be available in charter cities (e.g., cumulative voting; ranked choice voting; limited voting, etc.).

The Santa Monica case has been remanded to the trial court for consideration of the dilution issue under the standard set in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Given the flexibility of this standard, there is no “bright-line” percentage beneath which an action under the CVRA cannot be sustained. Even a protected class that forms a relatively small percentage of a city’s population may be able to state a cause of action for violation of the CVRA. Also, small cities are as vulnerable as larger jurisdictions.

Electoral influence was not an issue in the Santa Monica case. In the Santa Monica case, the Latino plaintiffs alleged that in a by-district electoral system in which Latinos constituted about 30 percent of eligible voters in a district, Latinos would be successful in electing chosen candidates because of the characteristics of the voters in the neighborhoods in that district.

The League of California Cities provided a summary of the Santa Monica case on August 30, 2023 (Attachment 7).

E. Remedies
In CVRA cases, the court has broad jurisdiction to order additional “appropriate” remedies. In all CVRA cases to date, the court has ordered the losing jurisdiction to implement by-district election.

City of Highland: In this case, the city argued that the admitted CVRA violation could be remedied through use of a cumulative voting system. Plaintiffs argued in favor of by-district elections and won.

City of Palmdale: In the Palmdale case, the remedies included shortening the terms of office of council members elected in the at-large system and ordering a special election in which all the new district seats were on the ballot at the same time. The City was permitted to re-stagger the terms of office after that first election in the new districts.

F. Attorneys’ Fees
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As mentioned above, the CVRA contains an attorneys’ fee-shifting provision that operates in only one direction, in favor of plaintiffs. The CVRA mandates that the defendant shall pay the reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses of plaintiffs who prevail in a CVRA lawsuit. Plaintiffs can also prevail through a settlement which results in a change to by-district election without a court order.

Exposure to payment of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses has been a significant incentive motivating other jurisdictions to transition to by-district elections because of the extremely high expense of CVRA trials. Both parties must retain expert witnesses, often three or four on issues such as demographics, racially polarized voting, the efficacy of alternative voting systems, and the totality of the circumstances supporting a showing of the undiluted ability of protected class voters to elect chosen candidates. Examples of the recovery of attorneys’ fees by plaintiffs by court order include:

City of Santa Monica: The outstanding demand for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees through trial is $22 million. The Santa Monica case involved a six-week trial;

City of Palmdale: the City paid approximately $4.5 million to the prevailing plaintiffs;

City of Highland: this case which concerned only the remedy to be implemented because the city had conceded liability, the city paid plaintiffs $1 million;

City of Santa Clara: the prevailing plaintiffs collected $3.5 million in fees and expenses through trial;

City of Modesto: this was the very first CVRA case to go to trial and the City prevailed at trial, but then was reversed on appeal, the city paid plaintiffs approximately $3.5 million for attorneys’ fees.

Settlements have also been expensive with payments in the range of $300,000 to $1 million for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees depending on the stage of the litigation in which the case was settled.

In addition to these mandatory payments to plaintiffs’ attorneys, defending jurisdictions must pay their own attorneys and expenses of litigation, including expert witnesses, which generally run in the millions of dollars as well.

No jurisdiction has yet successfully defended itself in a CVRA case that has gone to trial. However, were that to happen, the defendant is not entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees or costs of litigation and would remain exposed to a CVRA demand and lawsuit in the future by a different set of plaintiffs.

G. City Charter
Pacific Grove’s Charter provides that, “The Mayor and the members of the Council shall be elected from the City at large.” (Charter of the City of Pacific Grove, Art. 6.) Ordinarily, this provision could be changed only with approval of the majority of the voters of the City.

Some cities, including charter cities have used a state law, Government Code Section 34886, to transition to by-district elections without first placing the issue of the change on the ballot. Section 34886 provides:

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mayor, as described in subdivisions (a) and (c) of Section 34871, without being required to submit the ordinance to the voters for approval. An ordinance adopted pursuant to this section shall comply with the requirements and criteria of Section 21130 of the Elections Code and include a declaration that the change in the method of electing members of the legislative body is being made in furtherance of the purposes of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 14025) of Division 14 of the Elections Code).

Some charter cities that have transitioned from at-large elections to by-district elections have interpreted their respective charters as permitting the change without a vote. For example, the Charter of the City of Monterey, in contrast to the Charter of the City of Pacific Grove, does not specify the City’s method of electing its legislative body. Accordingly, the city did not place the change to by-district elections on the ballot.

The City of Sunnyvale’s charter did specify at-large elections for the city council and when the city transitioned to by-district elections, the process included a charter amendment ballot measure authorizing the change which was approved by the voters.

The City of Santa Rosa’s charter also specified at-large elections for the city council. The City adopted an Ordinance in 2018 and a Charter amendment to provide for district elections was approved by the voters on November 8, 2022.

No court has ruled on the legality of charter cities with at-large elections specified in the charter using Government Code Section 34886 to transition to by-district elections without a charter amendment vote.

In the case of Jauregui v. City of Palmdale, 226 Cal. App. 4th 781, 798 (2014), the court held that if a charter city’s electoral system is adjudicated to cause dilution of the voting rights of a protected class, then state law prevails over the Charter.

H. Process for Transitioning from At-Large Elections to By-District Elections The process of transitioning from at-large elections to by-district elections is controlled by California Elections Code § 10010 (Attachment 8), which specifically applies to charter cities.

The City should retain the services of a demographic firm to assist with the transitioning process.

Elections Code § 10010 provides for the following process for transition from at large elections to district elections:

1. Public Hearing to Consider a Resolution of Intent to Transition from At-Large Elections to By-district Elections; Request to Retain Demographer to Assist City with drawing of district maps

2. First Public Hearing on composition of possible districts before draft maps are drawn

3. Second Public Hearing no more than 30 days after First Public Hearing on composition of possible districts before draft maps are drawn

4. Publication of Draft Maps and Election Sequence – at least 7 days prior to public hearing on maps
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5. First Public Hearing on Draft Maps

6. Second Public Hearing on Draft Maps no more than 45 days after First Public Hearing on Draft Maps: Consider Introduction (First Reading) of Ordinance to transition from at-large elections to by-district elections.

7. Consider Adoption (Second Reading) of Ordinance to transition from at-large elections to by-district elections; public hearing required in connection with adoption of Ordinance; Ordinance becomes effective 30 days after adoption.

I. Timing
Elections Code Section 10010 includes the so-called “safe harbor” language if the City adopts a Resolution of Intent to Transition from at large Elections to by-district Elections within 45 days of the receipt of the 8-23-24 Letter. 45 days from August 23, 2024 is October 7, 2024. There is a City Council meeting on October 2, 2024 which would be last regular City Council meeting before October 7, 2024.

If the City adopts a Resolution of Intent on October 2, 2024, then 90 days thereafter is January 1, 2025 as the deadline to complete the process of the public hearings described in Section 10010 (a) and adoption of an ordinance approving a district map.?
The January 1, 2025 deadline can be extended by up to 90 days upon agreement with LULAC which would extend the deadline to complete the transition process to March 31, 2025 if the City adopts a Resolution of Intent on October 2, 2024.?
If the January 1, 2025 deadline were to remain, then the multiple hearings required by Section 10010 would be occurring in November and December 2024 during the holiday season.?? The purpose of the 90 days extension as described in Section 10010 is to “provide additional time to conduct public outreach, encourage public participation, and receive public input.” Upon direction from the City Council contact can be made with LULAC to inquire if they will agree to extend the 90 day deadline to March 31, 2025 if the City adopts a Resolution of Intent before October 7, 2024.?
J. Ballot Measure Z – Six Councilmembers To Four Councilmembers Ballot measure Z set for the November 5, 2024 Election, if approved, would reduce the number of Councilmembers from six to four.

If the ballot measure is not approved, and the City adopts a Resolution of Intent to Transition to districts, then there would be a need adopt a district map for six districts.? ? If the ballot measure is approved, and the City adopts a Resolution of Intent to Transition to districts, then there would be a need adopt a district map for four districts.? K. Costs
If the City adopts a Resolution of Intent before October 7, 2024 and if the City completes the transition to district either 90 days thereafter, or 180 days thereafter if LULAC approves a 90 day extension of the deadline, then there is a cap under Elections Code Section 10010 “safe harbor” provisions on the recovery for the “cost of the work project generated to support the notice.” PGCC 9-4-24

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There must be a demand in writing?for those costs with financial documentation. The costs can include attorneys’ fees and demographer fees and related costs.?? The cap was $30,000, but that has increased over the years with CPI and that cap is now about $37,500.00. If the City does not meet the deadlines in the CVRA, then there is no cap on the amount of costs that can be recovered in any litigation which might be filed against the City.

L. Conclusion
The recommended action is for the Council to discuss the CVRA issues and provide direction to the City Manager on how to proceed in response to the Letter from LULAC received on August 23, 2024 which could include returning to the City Council with a Resolution of Intent to Transition from At-Large Elections to By-District Elections and retain a demographer to assist in that transition process or such other action related to this item as the Council determines appropriate.

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
This activity has no potential for resulting in either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and as such, is not a “project” subject to the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 14 Cal. Code Regs § 15378.

OPTIONS
N/A
FINANCIAL IMPACT:

If the Council gives direction to return with a Resolution of Intent to Transition from At-Large Elections to District Elections, then the financial impact would include staff time, costs for a demographer to assist with the transition and preparation of draft district maps and potentially costs payable to LULAC not to exceed $37,500.00.

FOCUSED PRIORITY AREA: Not Applicable.

Attachments
LULAC Letter of August 25, 2022
LULAC Letter of August 22, 2024
Agenda Report dated March 6, 2024
Agenda Report dated July 17, 2024
Demographic Report by NDC
CVRA Elections Code Sections 14025 - 14032
Pico Neighborhood v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal. 5th 292 (2023) League of California Cities paper dated August 30, 2023 California Elections Code § 10010
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Agenda No. 12 A

CITY OF PACIFIC GROVE
300 Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, California 93950
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM: Brian Pierik, City Attorney
MEETING DATE: March 6, 2024
SUBJECT: Request Direction by Council to City Manager to Issue a Request for Proposal for a Demographer in Connection with the California Voting Rights Act CEQA: Does not constitute a Project per California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines Section 15378

RECOMMENDATION
Motion to:

1. Direct City Manager to issue a Request for Proposal for a qualified demographer to study the demographics of the City including:
a. The population of the City and its various racial and ethnic groups under the 2020 Census. b. The most recent estimates of the proportion of eligible voters in the various racial and ethnic groups in the City.
c. Estimate of the socio-economic characteristics of the various racial and ethnic groups in the City. d. The criteria governing the design of electoral districts for the election of City Council members.e. A proposed timeline for the transition to by-district elections should the City Council decide upon that course of action.

2. Direct City Manager to return to the City Council with the demographer’s report for discussion and further direction.

DISCUSSION
A. Letter from League of United Latin American Citizens On August 25, 2022, the City of Pacific Grove received a letter from Andrew Sandoval on behalf of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) The letter included a demand that the City change its at-large voting system to a by-district voting system for city council elections. (“LULAC Letter” Attachment 1) The LULAC Letter was posted on the City’s website following receipt.

The case of Pico Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica was pending at the time of receipt of the LULAC letter. The California Supreme has since issued its decision and the status of the Santa Monica case is discussed below.

The LULAC Letter asserts that changing to by-district elections would avoid a potential violation of the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA), protect the City from litigation under the CVRA, be consistent with the trend in California and Monterey County for cities and other jurisdictions to transition to by-district elections, and improve the accountability and responsiveness of the City’s elected officials.

In a by-district electoral system, the City is divided into districts of approximately equal population and only the voters residing in each district may vote for candidates for City Council for that district. Those candidates themselves must also be residents and voters of that district. In the current at-large voting electoral system, all 8/23/24, 8:31 PM Print Agenda Report
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voters in the City are entitled to vote for all candidates running for the City Council.

B. California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”)
The CVRA was enacted in 2001, Elections Code §§ 14025 - 14032. (Attachment 2) The CVRA applies only to at-large electoral systems. The CVRA alters established different standards of proof and defenses than exist under the federal Voting Rights Act, making it easier for plaintiffs to challenge the electoral system of any city or other jurisdiction that does not elect its governing board by-district. For example, under the CVRA, a plaintiff is not required to prove that by changing the districts that there will be a least one district which has a majority of minority voters.

C. Pico Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica The California Supreme Court recently ruled in Pico Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal. 5th 292 (2023) (see Attachment 3), that plaintiffs must also prove that the combination of at-large voting and voting patterns reflecting racial polarization results in the dilution of the ability of protected class voters to elect chosen candidate. In other words, plaintiffs must prove that they would have the opportunity to elect chosen candidates in a legal alternative electoral system such as a by-district system or alternatives that may be available in charter cities (e.g., cumulative voting ranked choice voting; limited voting, etc.).

The CVRA purports to protect electoral “influence” as well as the ability to elect chosen candidates. No court has ruled on the meaning of electoral “influence” in the 23 years since enactment of the CVRA. Electoral influence was not an issue in the Santa Monica case. In the Santa Monica case, the Latino plaintiffs alleged that in a by-district electoral system in which Latinos constituted about 30 percent of eligible voters in a district, Latinos would be successful in electing chosen candidates because of the characteristics of the voters in the neighborhoods in that district.

The League of California Cities provided a summary of the Santa Monica case on August 30, 2023 (Attachment 4).

D. Remedies
In CVRA cases, the court has broad jurisdiction to order additional “appropriate” remedies. In all CVRA cases to date, the court has ordered the losing jurisdiction to implement by-district election. 8/23/24, 8:31 PM Print Agenda Report
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E. Attorneys Fees
As mentioned above, the CVRA contains an attorneys’ fee-shifting provision that operates in only one direction, in favor of plaintiffs. The CVRA mandates that the defendant shall pay the reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses of plaintiffs who prevail in a CVRA lawsuit. Plaintiffs can also prevail through a settlement which results in a change to by-district election without a court order.

Both parties must retain expert witnesses, often three or four on issues such as demographics, racially polarized voting, the efficacy of alternative voting systems, and the totality of the circumstances supporting a showing of the undiluted ability of protected class voters to elect chosen candidates. Examples of the recovery of attorneys fees by plaintiffs by court order include:

City of Santa Monica: The outstanding demand for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in through trial is $22 million; City of Palmdale: the City paid approximately $4.5 million to the prevailing plaintiffs; City of Highland: this case which concerned only the remedy to be implemented because the city had conceded liability, the city paid plaintiffs $1 million; City of Santa Clara: the prevailing plaintiffs collected $3.5 million in fees and expenses through trial; City of Modesto: this was the very first CVRA case to go to trial and the City prevailed at trial, but then was reversed on appeal, the city paid plaintiffs approximately $3.5 million for attorneys fees.

Settlements have also been expensive with payments in the range of $300,000 to $1 million for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees depending on the stage of the litigation in which the case was settled.

In addition to these mandatory payments to plaintiffs’ attorneys, defending jurisdictions must pay their own attorneys and expenses of litigation, which generally run in the millions of dollars as well.

F. City Charter
Pacific Grove’s Charter provides that , “The Mayor and the members of the Council shall be elected from the City at large.” (Charter of the City of Pacific Grove, Art. 6.) Ordinarily, this provision could be changed only with approval of the majority of the voters of the City. Some cities, including charter cities have used a state law, Government Code § 34886, to transition to by-district elections without placing the issue of the change on the ballot. Section 34886 provides:

Notwithstanding Section 34871 or any other law, the legislative body of a city may adopt an ordinance that 8/23/24, 8:31 PM Print Agenda Report
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requires the members of the legislative body to be elected by district or by district with an elective mayor, as described in subdivisions (a) and (c) of Section 34871, without being required to submit the ordinance to the voters for approval. An ordinance adopted pursuant to this section shall comply with the requirements and criteria of Section 21130 of the Elections Code and include a declaration that the change in the method of electing members of the legislative body is being made in furtherance of the purposes of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 14025) of Division 14 of the Elections Code).

The City of Santa Rosa’s charter also specified at-large elections for the city council; however, that city interpreted its charter as enabling the city to use section 34886, above, to transition to by-district elections without first amending the city charter.

No court has ruled on the legality of charter cities with at-large elections specified in the charter using section 34886 to transition to by-district elections without a charter amendment vote.

G. Process for Transitioning to By-District Elections
The process of transitioning to by-district elections is controlled by California Elections Code § 10010 (Attachment 5), which specifically applies to charter cities.

Elections Code § 10010 requires a minimum of five public hearings as follows:

Activity Timing (EC § 10010)
Retain Demographer.

Pass Resolution of Intent to Change to Singlemember Districts; Adopt Tentative Calendar.

Passage of resolution commences
90-day safe harbor period, which
can be extended within
parameters.

Hold two Public Hearings on the Composition of
Possible Districts Before Draft Maps Are Drawn.

No more than 30 days apart
Publish Draft Maps and Election Sequence. 7 days prior to 1st public hearing on maps
Hold First of Two Public Hearings on Draft Maps. No more than 45 days apart Publish any Additional Maps With Election
Sequence.
7 days prior to 2nd public hearing
Hold 2nd Public Hearing on Draft Maps; Select
Preferred Map.

Within 45 days of 1st public
hearing
Hold Final Public Hearing to Adopt Districting
Plan and Sequence of Election To Be Implemented
Contingent on Voter Approval of a Charter
At least 7 days after any changes
to map proposed for adoption
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Amendment Providing for By-district Elections of
City Council Members.

Deadline for Delivering to Monterey County
Board of Supervisors Charter Amendment Ballot
Measure Materials and Resolution Requesting
Consolidation With the Statewide General
Election.

August 9, 2024
First City Council Elections Conducted By-district
if Charter Amendment Approved by the Voters.

November 2026
H. Conclusion
In order to evaluate the City’s demographics and the potential issues regarding the California Voting Rights Act, the recommendation is for the City Council to direct the City Manager to issue an Request for Proposal for a qualified demographer to study the demographics of the City and return to the City Council with the report by the demographer for discussion and further direction.

OPTIONS
None.

FINANCIAL IMPACT:

Staff time for the preparation of the Request for Proposal.

FOCUSED PRIORITY AREA:Not Applicable.

Attachments
12A PPT
1 - LULAC Letter
2 - CVRA Elections Code Sections 14025-14032
3 - PICO Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal. 5th 292 (2023) 4 - League of California Cities Paper Dates August 30, 2023 5 - California Elections Code Section 10010
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Agenda No. 8 D

CITY OF PACIFIC GROVE
300 Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, California 93950
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM: Matthew Mogensen, City Manager
MEETING DATE:July 17, 2024
SUBJECT: City of Pacific Grove Informational Report on Demographics CEQA: Does not constitute a Project per California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines Section 15378

RECOMMENDATION
Motion to:

1. Receive and file the City of Pacific Grove informational report on demographics prepared by National Demographic Corporation.

2. Direct City Manager to take an alternative action related to this item.

DISCUSSION
On March 6, 2024, the City Council discussed the issuance of a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a demographer to study the demographics of the City. National Demographic Corporation (NDC) was selected to perform the demographic work requested in the RFP. Attached is the City of Pacific Grove Report on Demographics prepared by NDC. This report provides a demographic overview of the City's residents as well as a series of tables that depict the economic characteristics by race/ethnicity.

The Report by NDC is being submitted to you for your information.

OPTIONS
Receive and file the information report on City of Pacific Grove demographics prepared by NDC.

Alternatively, the Council may provide an alternate direction to the City Manager regarding this item.

FINANCIAL IMPACT:

There is no financial impact of receiving the informational report.

FOCUSED PRIORITY AREA:Not Applicable.

Attachments
NDC Demographic Report
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City of Pacific Grove June 11, 2024
Report on Demographics
Phone: (818) 254-1221 P.O. Box 5271 [email protected] FAX (818) 254-1221 Glendale, CA 91221 www.NDCresearch.com

1. Demographic Overview
The California adjustment to the 2020 Census counted 15,125 residents of Pacific Grove.

Total Population
Total Percent
Non-Hispanic White 10,669 71%
Latino/Hispanic 2,165 14%
Black/African-American 276 2%
Asian/Pacific Islander 1,344 11%
City Total 15,125
In Voting Rights-related litigation (both California and Federal), the most significant demographic data are the Citizen Voting Age Population data, as the courts view that data as the best available estimate of the population eligible to vote.

Citizen Voting Age Population
Total Percent
Non-Hispanic White 9,455 80%
Latino/Hispanic 1,249 11%
Black/African-American 198 2%
Asian/Pacific Islander 830 7%
City Total 11,915
The current Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) is from the latest Special Tabulation of the American Community Survey (2018-2022). The Census Bureau releases new updates every year.

Estimates of voting and turnout can also be made using surname data provided by the California Secretary of State’s California Statewide Database. Non-Hispanic White and Black/AfricanAmerican estimates can then be derived by applying their share of CVAP to the remaining voters (who were not identified as Latino/Hispanic or Asian-American based on their surnames). The following show the percentage of all registered voters and the percentage of voters casting ballots who belong to each racial or ethnic group listed:

Nov. 2022
Registration Nov. 2022 Turnout Nov. 2020 Turnout
Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent
Non-Hispanic White 8,744 83% 6,216 85% 8,121 84%
Latino/Hispanic 940 9% 548 7% 730 8%
Black/African-American 353 3% 250 3% 113 1%
Asian/Filipino 434 4% 268 4% 354 4%
City Total 10,509 7,310 9,615
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National Demographics Corporation

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The same data can be used to calculate the turnout rates within each racial or ethnic group:

Nov. 2022 Nov. 2020
Non-Hispanic White 71% 90%
Latino/Hispanic 58% 84%
Black/African-American 71% 90%
Asian/Filipino 62% 83%
City Total 70% 89%

2. Economic Characteristics by Race/Ethnicity
Median
Income
Percent
below
poverty
Non-Hispanic White $107,150 6.5%
Latino/Hispanic $91,122 5.2%
Black/African-American $67,083 12.9%
Asian/Pacific Islander $118,125 6.9%
City Total $102,553 7.1%
Housing Characteristics by Race/Ethnicity
Owners Renters
Non-Hispanic White 52% 48%
Latino/Hispanic 41% 59%
Black/African-American 0% 100%
Asian/Pacific Islander 42% 58%
City Total 49% 51%
Education Attainment Race/Ethnicity
High School
Graduates
College
Graduates
Non-Hispanic White 97% 61%
Latino/Hispanic 87% 35%
Black/African-American 97% 30%
Asian/Pacific Islander 89% 61%
City Total 96% 57%
Immigration & English Fluency by Race/Ethnicity
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Foreign
Born Naturalized
Speak English
less than Very
Well
Non-Hispanic White 8% 75% 1%
Latino/Hispanic 18% 69% 6%
Black/African-American 7% 100% 0%
Asian/Pacific Islander 57% 61% 17%
City Total 13% 68% 3%

3. Fair Maps Act criteria and process requirements for drawing City Council election districts
Criteria
The Fair Maps Act of 2019 and Fair Maps Act of 2023 modified the criteria required for cities drawing or adjusting their council districts (Elections Code section 21130(a-e)). The criteria, in order of priority, are the following:
(1) Equal population using the latest Census as adjusted for the incarcerated population (21130(a))
(2) Boundaries consistent with the Federal Voting Rights Act (21130(b)). As part of this process, cities are required to produce a report to “determine whether it is possible to create an election district or districts in which a minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district” (21130(b)(1)).

Furthermore, if a city “conducts an analysis to determine wither ‘racially polarized voting’ exists,” a summary must be published before adopting election district boundaries or within seven days, whichever occurs first (21130(b)(2)).
(3) Geographic contiguity (21130(c)(1)
(4) Communities of interest and neighborhoods, as defined as “population that shares common social or economic interests and should be included within a single election district for purposes of its effective and fair representation.” This may include shared policy concerns, characteristics of the community, or history, but not “relationships with political parties, incumbents or political candidates.” (21130(c)(2))
(5) Following natural and artificial boundaries that are “easily identifiable and understandable by residents” (21130(c)(3)).
(6) Compactness, as defined as not bypassing nearby populations in favor of more distant populations (21130(c)(4).

Finally, jurisdictions are prohibited from adopting districts “for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party” (21130(d)).

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These criteria must be applied in that order of priority, and no other criteria may be prioritized over these criteria (21130(e)). These criteria apply to both Charter and General Law cities (21120), unless it is a charter city where the “city’s charter provides two or more mandatory traditional redistricting criteria other than the requirement that districts be equal in population” (21130(g)).

Process
In short, the process requires, at a minimum, the following:

1. Jurisdiction adopts a “Resolution of Intent” declaring its decision to move to by-district elections and laying out a tentative schedule for the process.

2. Jurisdiction issues report evaluating whether it is possible to draw one or more districts where a protected class (as defined in the Federal Voting Rights Act) is able to constitute a majority of the electorate.
 If the districting body conducted a racially polarized voting analysis, that report must also be released at this time.

3. Jurisdiction holds two public hearings to gather public input on communities of interest (and to educate the public on the process) – no draft maps are included at this stage. These two hearings must be within 30 calendar days of each other.

4. Jurisdiction draws and posts draft map(s) and proposed election sequence for those maps.

5. Jurisdiction holds two public hearings on the draft maps “prior to the public hearing at which the maps are adopted”. These two hearings must be within 45 calendar days of each other.

The following are the two official statutes governing the steps in the districting process:

Elections Code 21130 (b):

The districting body shall adopt election district boundaries that comply with the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, and the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq.).
(1) Consistent with the districting body’s existing obligations under the federal Voting Rights Act, the districting body shall determine whether it is possible to create an election district or districts in which a minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, as set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and as interpreted in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act with respect to redistricting. The districting body shall publish on its redistricting web page, at a minimum, the results of its analysis within seven days of completing the analysis or prior to adopting election district boundaries, whichever occurs first. (2) If the districting body, consistent with its existing obligations under the federal Voting Rights Act, conducts an analysis to determine whether “racially polarized voting,” as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act, exists in the local jurisdiction, the districting body shall publish on its redistricting web page, at a minimum, a PGCC 9-4-24

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summary of its analysis and findings within seven days of completing the analysis or prior to adopting election district boundaries, whichever occurs first.

Elections Code 10010:
(a) A political subdivision that changes from an at-large method of election to a districtbased election, or that establishes district-based elections, shall do all of the following before a public hearing at which the governing body of the political subdivision votes to approve or defeat an ordinance establishing district-based elections:
(1) Before drawing a draft map or maps of the proposed boundaries of the districts, the political subdivision shall hold at least two public hearings over a period of no more than 30 days, at which the public is invited to provide input regarding the composition of the districts. Before these hearings, the political subdivision may conduct outreach to the public, including to non-English-speaking communities, to explain the districting process and to encourage public participation. (2) After all draft maps are drawn, the political subdivision shall publish and make available for release at least one draft map and, if members of the governing body of the political subdivision will be elected in their districts at different times to provide for staggered terms of office, the potential sequence of the elections. The political subdivision shall also hold at least two additional hearings over a period of no more than 45 days, at which the public is invited to provide input regarding the content of the draft map or maps and the proposed sequence of elections, if applicable. The first version of a draft map shall be published at least seven days before consideration at a hearing. If a draft map is revised at or following a hearing, it shall be published and made available to the public for at least seven days before being adopted.
(b) In determining the final sequence of the district elections conducted in a political subdivision in which members of the governing body will be elected at different times to provide for staggered terms of office, the governing body shall give special consideration to the purposes of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, and it shall take into account the preferences expressed by members of the districts.

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1 CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS CODE
§ 14025. Short title
Effective: January 1, 2003
This act shall be known and may be cited as the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 § 14026. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(a) “At-large method of election” means any of the following methods of electing members to the governing body of a political subdivision:
(1) One in which the voters of the entire jurisdiction elect the members to the governing body. (2) One in which the candidates are required to reside within given areas of the jurisdiction and the voters of the entire jurisdiction elect the members to the governing body. (3) One that combines at-large elections with district-based elections. (b) “District-based elections” means a method of electing members to the governing body of a political subdivision in which the candidate must reside within an election district that is a divisible part of the political subdivision and is elected only by voters residing within that election district. (c) “Political subdivision” means a geographic area of representation created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a general law city, general law county, charter city, charter county, charter city and county, school district, community college district, or other district organized pursuant to state law.
(d) “Protected class” means a class of voters who are members of a race, color, or language minority group, as this class is referenced and defined in the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq.).
(e) “Racially polarized voting” means voting in which there is a difference, as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq.), in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and in the choice of candidates and electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate. The methodologies for estimating group voting behavior as approved in applicable federal cases to enforce the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq.) to establish racially polarized voting may be used for purposes of this section to prove that elections are characterized by racially polarized voting.

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2 § 14027. At-large method of election affecting protected class voters An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class, as defined pursuant to Section 14026.
§ 14028. Violation of protected class voter rights; determination (a) A violation of Section 14027 is established if it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision or in elections incorporating other electoral choices by the voters of the political subdivision. Elections conducted prior to the filing of an action pursuant to Section 14027 and this section are more probative to establish the existence of racially polarized voting than elections conducted after the filing of the action. (b) The occurrence of racially polarized voting shall be determined from examining results of elections in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected class or elections involving ballot measures, or other electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members of a protected class. One circumstance that may be considered in determining a violation of Section 14027 and this section is the extent to which candidates who are members of a protected class and who are preferred by voters of the protected class, as determined by an analysis of voting behavior, have been elected to the governing body of a political subdivision that is the subject of an action based on Section 14027 and this section. In multiseat at-large election districts, where the number of candidates who are members of a protected class is fewer than the number of seats available, the relative groupwide support received by candidates from members of a protected class shall be the basis for the racial polarization analysis. (c) The fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting, or a violation of Section 14027 and this section, but may be a factor in determining an appropriate remedy.
(d) Proof of an intent on the part of the voters or elected officials to discriminate against a protected class is not required.
(e) Other factors such as the history of discrimination, the use of electoral devices or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of at-large elections, denial of access to those processes determining which groups of candidates will receive financial or other support in a given election, the extent to which members of a protected class bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns are probative, but not necessary factors to establish a violation of Section 14027 and this section.

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3 § 14029. Remedies for violation of §§ 14027 and 14028 Upon a finding of a violation of Section 14027 and Section 14028, the court shall implement appropriate remedies, including the imposition of district-based elections, that are tailored to remedy the violation. § 14030. Attorney’s fees and costs
In any action to enforce Section 14027 and Section 14028, the court shall allow the prevailing plaintiff party, other than the state or political subdivision thereof, a reasonable attorney’s fee consistent with the standards established in Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49, and litigation expenses including, but not limited to, expert witness fees and expenses as part of the costs. Prevailing defendant parties shall not recover any costs, unless the court finds the action to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
§ 14031. Implementation as constitutional protection
This chapter is enacted to implement the guarantees of Section 7 of Article I and of Section 2 of Article II of the California Constitution.
§ 14032. Voter private right of action
Any voter who is a member of a protected class and who resides in a political subdivision where a violation of Sections 14027 and 14028 is alleged may file an action pursuant to those sections in the superior court of the county in which the political subdivision is located.

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PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.

CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Defendant and
Appellant.

S263972
|
August 24, 2023
|
As Modified September 20, 2023
Synopsis
Background: Neighborhood organization and registered
voter brought action alleging that city's at-large voting system for nonpartisan elections for city council
discriminated against Latinos, in violation of California Voting Rights Act and California Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause. Following bench trial, the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. BC616804, Yvette M. Palazuelos, J., 2019 WL 10854474, entered judgment in plaintiffs'
favor on constitutional and statutory claims and ordered city to switch to district-based voting. City appealed. The Court of Appeal, 51 Cal.App.5th 1002, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 530,
reversed. Review was granted.
[Holding:] The Supreme Court, Evans, J., held that
plaintiffs, after establishing existence of racially polarized voting, were not required to prove that minority group of Latino voters would constitute a majority, or near majority, of hypothetical single-member district.

Court of Appeal reversed; remanded.

Opinion, 51 Cal.App.5th 1002, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 530,
depublished.

Procedural Posture(s): Petition for Discretionary Review; On Appeal; Judgment.

West Headnotes (17)
[1] Election Law Vote Dilution
Election Law Compactness and cohesiveness
of minority group
In two significant respects, California Voting
Rights Act (CVRA) makes it easier than § 2 of
VRA to challenge State's or political
subdivision's at-large method of election: first,
CVRA, unlike VRA, does not require plaintiff to
demonstrate that members of minority group
would be geographically compact or
concentrated enough to constitute a majority of
hypothetical single-member district, and second,
while plaintiff can succeed under either VRA or
CVRA by showing that at-large method dilutes
minority group's voting power by impairing its
ability to elect candidates of its choice, only
CVRA allows plaintiff to prevail by
demonstrating, in the alternative, that at-large
method impairs minority group's ability to
influence election outcome. Voting Rights Act of
1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(b); Cal. Elec.

Code §§ 14027, 14028(c).
[2] Election Law Vote Dilution
A court presented with a vote-dilution claim
challenging an at-large voting system under § 2
of the VRA, or under the California Voting
Rights Act (CVRA), which applies to
nonpartisan elections, should undertake a
searching evaluation of the totality of the facts
and circumstances, including the characteristics
of the specific locality, its electoral history, and
an intensely local appraisal of the design and
impact of the contested electoral mechanisms, as
well as the design and impact of the potential
alternative electoral system. Voting Rights Act of
1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(b); Cal. Elec.

Code §§ 14026(a, c), 14027, 14028(e).
[3] Election Law Compactness and cohesiveness
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Election Law Racially polarized or bloc voting
An at-large electoral system or multimember
district can qualify as a prohibited vote-dilution
practice under § 2 of the VRA when the plaintiff
can show that a bloc-voting majority is usually
able to defeat candidates supported by a
politically cohesive, geographically insular
minority group, and the greater the degree to
which the electoral minority is homogenous and
insular and the greater the degree that bloc voting
occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater
will be the extent to which the minority's voting
power is diluted. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2,
52 U.S.C.A. § 10301.
[4] Election Law Compactness and cohesiveness
of minority group
Election Law Racially polarized or bloc voting
Plaintiff asserting vote-dilution challenge to atlarge voting system, under § 2 of VRA, must satisfy three threshold conditions under
Gingles: first, minority group must be
sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute majority in single-member district,
second, minority group must be politically
cohesive, and third, white majority must vote
sufficiently as bloc to enable it, in absence of
special circumstances, such as minority
candidate running unopposed, usually to defeat
minority group's preferred candidate. Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301.
[5] Election Law Vote Dilution
Once the plaintiff asserting vote-dilution
challenge to at-large voting system, under § 2 of
VRA, has satisfied the three threshold conditions
under Gingles, trial court is to consider
totality of the circumstances and determine,
based upon a searching practical evaluation of
past and present reality, whether the political
process is equally open to minority voters, and
this determination is peculiarly dependent upon
the facts of each case, and requires an intensely
local appraisal of the design and impact of
contested electoral mechanisms. Voting Rights
Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301.
[6] Election Law Vote Dilution
Under totality of circumstances approach for
considering vote-dilution challenge to at-large
voting system, under § 2 of VRA, court considers
a number of factors that typically may be
relevant, including: history of voting-related
discrimination in State or political subdivision;
extent to which voting is racially polarized;
extent to which State or political subdivision has
used voting practices or procedures that tend to
enhance opportunity for discrimination against
minority group, such as unusually large election
districts, majority vote requirements, and
prohibitions against bullet voting; exclusion of
members of minority group from candidate
slating processes; extent to which minority group
members bear effects of past discrimination in
areas such as education, employment, and health,
which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in political process; use of overt or
subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and
extent to which members of minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. §
10301.
[7] Election Law Compactness and cohesiveness
of minority group
Election Law Racially polarized or bloc voting
For a vote-dilution challenge to an at-large
method of election under Section 2 of the VRA,
or under the California Voting Rights Act
(CVRA), which applies to nonpartisan elections,
a plaintiff must show polarized voting, i.e.,
members of minority group vote as a politically
cohesive unit, while the majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat minority
group's preferred candidate. Voting Rights Act of
1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301; Cal. Elec.

Code §§ 14026(a, c, e), 14027, 14028(a).
[8] Statutes Context
A court construing a statute does not view a
fragment in isolation, but considers the statute as
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the overall statutory structure, so that it may best
identify and effectuate the scheme's underlying
purpose.
[9] Election Law Dilution of voting power in
general
To establish vote dilution under § 2 of the VRA,
a court must find a reasonable alternative
practice as a benchmark against which to
measure the existing voting practice. Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301.
[10] Election Law Racially polarized or bloc voting
While the existence of racially polarized voting
is relevant to a vote-dilution claim under § 2 of
the VRA, and is indeed a key element for the
claim, it is not in itself sufficient, and dilution
requires a showing that the minority group has
less ability to elect its preferred candidate. Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301.
[11] Election Law Racially polarized or bloc voting
The existence of racially polarized voting is not,
in itself, sufficient for a vote-dilution claim under
the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA)
challenging a nonpartisan at-large voting system,
and dilution requires a showing that the minority
group has less ability to elect its preferred
candidate or influence the election's outcome
than it would have if the at-large system had not
been adopted. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 14026(a, c),
14027.
[12] Election Law Vote Dilution
To establish the dilution element for a votedilution claim under the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) challenging a nonpartisan at-large
voting system, the plaintiff must identify a
reasonable alternative voting practice to the
existing at-large electoral system that will serve
as the benchmark undiluted voting practice. Cal.

Elec. Code §§ 14026(a, c), 14027.
[13] Election Law Compactness and cohesiveness
of minority group
The rationale for requiring, in a vote-dilution
challenge under § 2 of the VRA to an at-large
voting system, that the challenger demonstrate
that the minority group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district is that if the minority
group is spread evenly throughout a
multimember district, or if, although
geographically compact, the minority group is so
small in relation to the surrounding white
population that it could not constitute a majority
in a single-member district, these minority voters
cannot maintain that they would have been able
to elect representatives of their choice in the
absence of the multimember electoral structure.

Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. §
10301.
[14] Municipal Corporations Nature and
constitution of body in general
To prevail on vote-dilution challenge under
California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) to at-large
method of nonpartisan elections for city council,
challengers, after establishing existence of
racially polarized voting, were not required to
prove that minority group of Latino voters would
constitute a majority, or near majority, of
hypothetical single-member district, where
winning candidates often earned only plurality of
vote; accordingly, what was required to establish
dilution of Latino voters' ability to elect
candidates of their choice was proof that, under
some lawful alternative electoral system, Latino
voters would have potential, on their own or with
help of crossover voters, to elect their preferred
candidate, and lawful alternative electoral
systems could include, but were not limited to,
single-member district elections. Cal. Elec. Code
§§ 14026(a, c, e), 14027, 14028(a).
[15] Election Law Compactness and cohesiveness
of minority group
To establish, under the California Voting Rights
Act (CVRA), that an at-large voting system for
nonpartisan elections dilutes a minority group's
ability to elect its preferred candidate, a plaintiff
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representatives under some lawful alternative
electoral method, and one way to do this would
be to show that minority group would be
sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district,
but that is not the only way, and plaintiff could
demonstrate minority group's ability to attract
crossover votes for its preferred candidate, or
plaintiff may identify nondistrict remedies that
would enable minority group, on its own or with
assistance of crossover votes, to elect its
preferred candidate. Cal. Elec. Code §§ 14026(a,
c, e), 14027.
[16] Election Law Vote Dilution
Key inquiry in establishing dilution, in votedilution challenge to at-large voting system for nonpartisan elections under California Voting
Rights Act (CVRA), of minority group's ability
to elect its preferred candidate is what percentage
of vote would be required to win, an inquiry that
is not short-circuited merely because minority
group may fall short of absolute majority or
something close to it, and in predicting how
many candidates are likely to run and what
percentage may be necessary to win, courts may
consider experiences of similar jurisdictions that
use district elections or other alternatives to
traditional at-large elections, and courts should
keep in mind that the inquiry at liability stage is
simply to prove that a solution is possible, and
not necessarily to present final solution. Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. §
10301(b); Cal. Elec. Code §§ 14026(a, c), 14027,
14028(e).
[17] Election Law Vote Dilution
The dilution element for a vote-dilution
challenge to an at-large voting system under § 2
of the VRA, or under the California Voting
Rights Act (CVRA), which applies to
nonpartisan elections, ensures that the minority
group is not made worse off, and to replace atlarge elections with district elections under a dilution theory, a successful plaintiff must show
not merely that the minority group would have a
real electoral opportunity in one or more
hypothetical districts, but also that the
incremental gain in the group's ability to elect its
candidate of choice in such districts would not be
offset by a loss of the group's potential to elect its
candidates of choice elsewhere in the locality.

Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C.A. §
10301(b); Cal. Elec. Code §§ 14026(a, c), 14027.
**57 ***322 Second Appellate District, Division Eight,
B295935, Los Angeles County Superior Court, BC 616804,
Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge
Attorneys and Law Firms
Lane Dilg, City Attorney, George Cardona, Interim City
Attorney; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Marcellus A. McRae, Kahn A. Scolnick, Tiaunia N.

Henry and Daniel R. Adler, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Cole Huber and Derek P. Cole for League of California
Cities and California Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Strumwasser & Woocher, Bryce A. Gee, Los Angeles, and
Caroline C. Chiappetti for The Santa Monica Transparency Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.

John K. Haggerty as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

The Law Office of Joseph Pertel, Joseph A. Pertel; and
Christopher M. Harding, Santa Monica, for League of
Women Voters of Santa Monica, Alliance of Santa Monica
Latino and Black Voters, Human Relations Council Santa
Monica Bay Area and Community for Excellent Public
Schools as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.

Shenkman & Hughes, Kevin I. Shenkman, Mary R. Hughes,
Los Angeles, Andrea A. Alarcon; Law Office of Robert
Rubin, Robert Rubin, San Francisco; Goldstein, Borgen,
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Bellows, Ginger L. Grimes, Oakland; Parris Law Firm, R.

Rex Parris, Ellery S. Gordon, Lancaster; Law Offices of Milton C. Grimes, Milton C. Grimes; Schonbrun Seplow
Harris & Hoffman, Paul Hoffman and John Washington,
Culver City, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Panish Shea & Boyle and Brian Panish, Los Angeles, for
Richard Polanco, Sergio Farias, Juan Carrillo, Richard Loa and Austin Bishop as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Hogan Lovells US, Ira M. Feinberg, Erin Chapman, Zach
Martinez, Patrick C. Hynds, Derek Centola and Joseph M.

Charlet for FairVote as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger, Douglas E.

Mirell and Michelle A. Mabugat, Los Angeles, for Sara
Sadhwani, Bernard Fraga, Janelle Wong, Marisa Abrajano, Jason Casellas, Lorrie Frasure, Matthew Mendez Garcia,
Christian Grose, Eric Gonzalez Juenke, Jane Junn, Taeku Lee, Gabriele Magni, Jennifer Merolla, Melissa Michelson, Jessica Lavariega Monforti, Jason Morin, Ricardo Ramírez, Paru Shah, LaFleur Stephens, Dara Strolovitch, Christopher Towler and Tom Wong as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

UCLA Voting Rights Project, Chad W. Dunn and Sonni
Waknin for Matt Barreto, Lorrie Frasure, Chelsea Jones, Natalie Masuoka, Gary Segura, Efrén Pérez and Chris
Zepeda-Millán as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Keker, Van Nest & Peters, R. Adam Lauridsen and Connie P.

Sung, San Francisco, for Asian Americans Advancing
Justice–Asian Law Caucus, Asian Americans Advancing
Justice–Los Angeles and Asian Law Alliance as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Rosenfeld Meyer & Susman and Todd W. Bonder, Beverly
Hills, for Oscar de la Torre as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Lowenstein & Weatherwax, Nathan Lowenstein and Kenneth
J. Weatherwax, Los Angeles, for Bruce A. Wessel as Amicus Curiae.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Jonathan L. Wolff, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Heather Hoesterey and Kristin A. Liska, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Attorney
General as Amicus Curiae.

Stephen Bosworth and L. Stevan Leonard as Amicus Curiae.

Opinion
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
*305 **58 ***323 Local governments make many of the
most important decisions that affect Californians' everyday lives. They build and repair public streets, they define a neighborhood's character through planning and zoning, and they decide where to place public parks and where to allow restaurants, bars, and liquor stores to operate. They make decisions about public transit and decide where to site industries that cause pollution. They provide police services and determine the level and type of policing and other first responder services, they educate our children, they operate or regulate local utilities, and they have the power to levy taxes.

The people exercise control over these choices by electing representatives to city councils, county boards, boards of education, community college boards, special district boards, and other bodies.

The genius of representative government, in all its guises, is that it is responsive to the people it serves. But its ability to be responsive is dependent in a fundamental way on the
assumption that each ***324 person's vote is of equal
weight. While we often take that assumption for granted, sometimes the actual value of one's vote can vary based on the way the voting is structured. For example, a minority of voters may find itself unable to elect even a single member of a multimember body when the members are elected *306 at large, but would be able to elect one or more
representatives if the members were elected by districts or by another lawful method.

In such circumstances, the voting rules may effectively decide whether a group of voters can have a voice in the myriad decisions made by local representatives. With a seat at the table, the voters' representative can have a say in the topics and terms of the debate on the many crucial decisions that local governments make. Without a seat, though, the PGCC 9-4-24

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To address this problem, federal and state law restrict atlarge voting systems from unfairly submerging or diluting the votes of a minority in the majority's greater numbers.

Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act of **59 1965 ( 52 U.S.C. § 10301; VRA) prohibits states and their political subdivisions from using an at-large method of election when such a scheme would “result in unequal access to the
electoral process” based on protected characteristics of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. (
Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) 478 U.S. 30, 46, 106 S.Ct.
2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 ( Gingles).) In an effort to provide greater protections to California voters than those provided by the VRA, the Legislature subsequently enacted the
California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (Elec. Code, § 14025 et seq.; CVRA). The CVRA prohibits an at-large method of
election “that impairs the ability of a protected class” (id., § 14027) — as defined by race, color, or language minority group (id., § 14026, subd. (d)) — “to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class” (id., § 14027). [1] Both statutory schemes require a plaintiff to show racially polarized voting — i.e., that the protected class members vote as a politically cohesive unit, while the majority votes “sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat” the protected class's preferred candidate. ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752; accord, Elec. Code, §§ 14026, subd. (e) [providing that “racially polarized voting” may be
established by “[t]he methodologies for estimating group voting behavior as approved in applicable federal cases to enforce the [VRA]”], 14028, subd. (a).) The CVRA,
however, “make[s] it easier to successfully challenge at-large districts” in two significant respects. (Assem. Com. on Elections, Reapportionment and Const. Amends., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 18, 2002, p. 4.) First, the CVRA, unlike the VRA, does not require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the members of the protected class would be geographically compact or
concentrated enough to constitute a majority of a
hypothetical single-member district. (Compare Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (c) with Gingles, at p. 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) *307 Second, while a plaintiff can succeed under either the VRA or the CVRA by showing that the at-large method
dilutes a protected class's voting power by impairing its ability “to elect” candidates of its choice ( 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); Elec. Code, § 14027), only the CVRA allows the plaintiff to prevail by demonstrating, in the alternative, that the at-large method impairs the class's ability “to influence the outcome of an election.” ***325 (Elec. Code, § 14027, italics added; cf. League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry (2006) 548 U.S. 399, 446, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 ( LULAC) (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.)
[“The failure to create an influence district ... does not run afoul of § 2 of the [VRA]”].)
In this case, the trial court determined that because of racially polarized voting, the at-large method of electing city council members in the City of Santa Monica (the City)
diluted Latino voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates and their ability to influence the outcome of council elections, as compared to several alternative electoral methods, including district elections. To remedy this
violation, the trial court ordered the City to promptly conduct a special election using a seven-district map drafted by an expert who testified at trial.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the judgment and then reversed. It disagreed with the trial court's finding that the atlarge method of election had “impaired Latinos' ability to elect candidates of their choice or to influence the outcome of an election.” In the Court of Appeal's view, there had been no dilution of Latino voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates because Latino voters were too few and too
geographically dispersed “to muster a majority, no matter how the City might slice itself into districts.” The court likewise found no dilution of Latino voters' ability to influence the outcome of an election because a group's
ability to influence an election, the Court of Appeal
reasoned, has no meaning independent of the group's ability to elect its preferred candidate. In light of its findings, the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to consider whether racially polarized voting had been established.

We conclude the Court of Appeal misconstrued the CVRA.

To prevail on a CVRA **60 claim, a plaintiff who has
established the existence of racially polarized voting in an atlarge system need not prove that the protected class would constitute a majority — or, as the City proposes, a near PGCC 9-4-24

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candidates often earn only a plurality of the vote.

Accordingly, what is required to establish “dilution” of a protected class's “ability ... to elect candidates of its choice” (Elec. Code, § 14027) is proof that, under some lawful
alternative electoral system, the protected class would have the *308 potential, on its own or with the help of crossover voters, to elect its preferred candidate. The lawful alternative electoral system may include, but is not limited to, singlemember district elections. [2] A court presented with a dilution claim should undertake a searching evaluation of the totality of the facts and
circumstances (see, e.g., Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (e)), including the characteristics of the specific locality, its electoral history, and “ ‘an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact’ of the contested electoral mechanisms” as well as the design and impact of the potential alternative electoral system. ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752; see Allen v. Milligan (2023) 599 U.S. 1, ––––, 143 S.Ct. 1487 [216 L.Ed.2d 60, 75] ( Milligan).) In
predicting how many candidates are likely to run and what percentage may be necessary to win, courts may also
consider the experiences of other similar jurisdictions that use alternative electoral systems. (Cf. Gingles, at p. 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752.)
Because the Court of Appeal did not evaluate the dilution element of the CVRA under this standard, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the Court ***326 of
Appeal for it to reconsider in the first instance the CVRA claim presented here.

I. Background
Defendant, the City of Santa Monica, has a seven-member city council. Members are elected at large through staggered elections: four are elected during the year of a presidential election, while the other three are elected during the year of a gubernatorial election. Plaintiff Pico Neighborhood
Association is a nonprofit organization dedicated to
advancing the interests of the residents of the City's Pico neighborhood, where its Latino residents are concentrated.

While Latinos constitute only 13.64 percent of the City's citizen-voting-age population, they make up 30 percent of Pico's citizen-voting-age population.

In April 2016, plaintiffs Pico Neighborhood Association and Maria Loya, a Latina registered voter, filed this action against the City, alleging that the City's at-large method of electing its city council unlawfully impaired the ability of Latino voters to elect their preferred candidates or,
alternatively, to influence the outcome of council elections.

The at-large scheme, in plaintiffs' view, violated the CVRA as well as the equal protection clause of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)).

Following a six-week trial, the Los Angeles County Superior Court ruled in plaintiffs' favor on both claims, but this appeal concerns only the CVRA claim. After reviewing elections over the preceding 24 years, the court *309 declared that “a consistent pattern of racially-polarized voting emerges. In most elections where the choice is available, Latino voters strongly prefer a Latino candidate running for Defendant's city council, but, despite that support, the preferred Latino candidate loses.” Indeed, at the time of the court's ruling, “only one Latino ha[d] been elected to the Santa Monica City Council in the 72 years of the current election system.”1 The court further observed that the statistical evidence of racially polarized voting was corroborated by multiple
qualitative factors within the meaning of Elections Code section 14028, subdivision (e): a history of discrimination against Latinos in Los Angeles County generally and in the City specifically; the use **61 of staggered elections, which may have discriminatory effects in some circumstances; an income disparity between the City's Latinos and its majority population that is “far greater than the national disparity”; the use of racist appeals in city council campaigns; and the lack of responsiveness to the interests and concerns of the City's Latino community, including the substantial
underrepresentation of Latinos on the City's various
commissions.

The trial court further found that the City's at-large voting system unlawfully diluted the electoral strength of its Latino residents within the meaning of the CVRA, in that several alternative voting systems — e.g., district-based elections, cumulative voting, limited voting, and ranked choice voting — would better enable Latino voters “to elect candidates of PGCC 9-4-24

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The City successfully petitioned for a writ of supersedeas to stay the trial court's order for new elections pending
resolution of its appeal. In that appeal, the Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court judgment, finding that the City's at-large voting system violated neither the CVRA nor the California Constitution. The Court of
Appeal began by rejecting plaintiffs' one-sentence argument that a CVRA violation could be established merely by
evidence of racially polarized voting without any further showing that the City's at-large voting system “diluted” Latino voting power as compared to “ ‘some alternative
method of election.’ ” The court next concluded that
changing from an at-large system (where Latinos constituted approximately 14 percent of the voting population) to a district system *310 (where Latinos would constitute 30 percent of a district centered around the Pico neighborhood) would not enhance Latino voters' ability to elect their candidates of choice or influence the outcome of an election in a “legally significant” way and therefore failed to
demonstrate that the City's at-large system “dilut[ed]” their voting power within the meaning of the CVRA. Plaintiffs' theory, the Court of Appeal reasoned, “would create absurd results,” in that “any unrealized increase in a group's percentage would satisfy the dilution element,” even if the group had “a vanishingly small numerical presence.” The court likewise rejected plaintiffs' contention that other voters might “ ‘cross over’ and vote for Latino candidates, buoying Latino power and clearing the 50 percent threshold to
electoral success.” Such a suggestion, the Court of Appeal claimed, “arbitrarily embraces racially polarized voting when it helps and abandons it when it hurts.” In light of its conclusion that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate dilution, the court did not consider whether plaintiffs had
demonstrated the existence of racially polarized voting.

We granted plaintiffs' petition for review to determine what constitutes dilution of a protected class's ability to elect candidates of its choice or to influence the outcome of an election within the meaning of the CVRA. We also ordered depublication of the Court of Appeal opinion. (Pico
Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2020) 270
Cal.Rptr.3d, 474 P.3d 635 .)
II. Discussion
Different electoral systems can lead to different outcomes. (See Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems As
Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution (1992) 21 Stetson
L.Rev. 743, 743 (Engstrom).) For example, where a racial minority and a racial majority consistently prefer different candidates, “multimember districts and at-large voting
schemes may ‘ “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.” ’ ” ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) The use of at-large voting schemes in such circumstances allows the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, not only to regularly defeat the candidates preferred by the minority ( id. at p. 48, 106 S.Ct. 2752), but also to “ ‘ignore
[minority] interests without fear of political consequences,’ [citation] leaving **62 the minority effectively
unrepresented.” ( Id. at p. 48, fn. 14, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) If, on the other hand, the political unit were “divided into single-member districts,” those same minority groups “may be able to elect several representatives.” ( Rogers v. Lodge (1982) 458 U.S. 613, 616, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012.) This potential disparity is why the high court has “stated on many occasions that multimember districting ***328 plans, as well as at-large plans, generally pose greater threats to minority-voter *311 participation in the political process than do single-member districts.” ( Growe v. Emison (1993)
507 U.S. 25, 40, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388.)
The VRA and the CVRA each offer an opportunity for racial and language minority groups to challenge the dilution of their voting power caused by at-large voting systems. But they do so in somewhat different ways. Because the CVRA bears some similarities to the VRA, while also seeking to address perceived inadequacies in the VRA, we begin with a review of both statutory schemes.

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1. The VRA
[3] The VRA, as amended in 1982, prohibits a state or its political subdivisions from using any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority group]” where, “based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of [the protected] class of citizens ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate ... to elect representatives of their choice.” ( 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a), (b).) An at-large
electoral system or multimember district2 can qualify as a prohibited practice under the VRA when the plaintiff can show that a bloc-voting majority is “usually ... able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,
geographically insular minority group.” ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 49, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) “ ‘[T]he greater the degree to which the electoral minority is homogenous and insular and the greater the degree that bloc voting occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater will be the extent to which the minority's voting power is diluted by
multimember districting.’ ” ( Id. at p. 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) [4] [5] [6] A plaintiff asserting a “vote dilution” challenge to an at-large voting system under the VRA must satisfy “three threshold conditions.” ( Voinovich v. Quilter (1993) 507 U.S. 146, 157, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500.) “First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and *312 geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district. ... Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. ... Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed, [citation] — usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.” ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 50–51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, fn. omitted.) Once those predicate facts have been established, “the trial court is to consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and to determine, based ‘upon a searching practical evaluation of the “past and present reality,” ’ [citation], whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. ‘ “This determination is peculiarly dependent ***329 upon the facts of each case,” ’ [citation], and requires ‘an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact’ of the contested electoral mechanisms.” ( Id. at p. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) In
undertaking this analysis, the court considers a number of factors that “typically may be relevant” to a claim under the VRA ( Gingles, at p. 44, 106 S.Ct. 2752) and that are
sometimes called “ ‘the Senate factors’ **63 ” 3 because they appeared in the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee majority report that accompanied the bill amending the VRA (YumoriKaku v. City of Santa Clara (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 385, 394, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 437).

2. The CVRA
While the CVRA is “much like” the VRA in some ways,
there are notable differences between the two statutory schemes. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 9, 2002, p.

2.) Four stand out in this proceeding. First, unlike the VRA, the CVRA applies only to “[a]n at-large method of election” (Elec. Code, § 14027) for nonpartisan offices (id., § 14026, subds. (a), (c); see Cal. Const., art. II, § 6). Second, the CVRA addresses not only impairments to a protected class's “ability ... to elect candidates of its choice” (Elec. Code, § 14027; cf. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) [“opportunity ... to elect representatives of their choice”]), but also the class's “ability to influence the outcome of an election” (Elec. Code, § 14027, italics added). Third, the CVRA made it easier to challenge at-large electoral systems by explicitly rejecting the first Gingles *313 precondition: “The fact that
members of a protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially
polarized voting, or a violation of Section 14027 and this section, but may be a factor in determining an appropriate remedy.” (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (c).) Fourth, the CVRA includes its own list of potentially probative factors, many of which overlap with the Senate factors above, but cautions that they are “not necessary factors to establish a violation” of the CVRA. (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (e).)4
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requires a plaintiff claiming vote dilution arising from an atlarge voting system to establish the existence of racially polarized voting — i.e., that the protected class members vote as a ***330 politically cohesive unit, while the majority votes “sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat” the protected class's preferred candidate. ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752; accord, Elec. Code, §§ 14026, subd. (e) [providing that “racially polarized voting” may be
established by “[t]he methodologies for estimating group voting behavior as approved in applicable federal cases to enforce the [VRA]”], 14028, subd. (a).)5
B. Defining Terms in the CVRA
The CVRA prohibits the use of an at-large method of
election when it “impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who **64 are members of a protected class.” (Elec. Code, § 14027.) Plaintiffs contend that the City's at-large city council elections prevent Latino voters from electing, either on their own or with the support of crossover voters, their preferred candidate. They argue this diluted their ability to elect their candidate of choice as well as their ability to influence the outcome of an election.

The statute, however, does not define “dilution,” “ability ... to elect candidates of its choice,” or “ability ... to influence the outcome of an election.” (Ibid.) The meaning of these *314 undefined terms presents a pure question of law that we review de novo. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 505 P.3d 212.)

1. “Dilution”
In plaintiffs' view, proof of racially polarized voting, in itself, establishes “dilution” within the meaning of the CVRA.

They rely on the “plain language” of Elections Code section 14028, subdivision (a), which provides, “A violation of Section 14027 is established if it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision ....” (Italics added.) According to plaintiffs, “Section 14028 expressly states how a violation of Section 14027 is shown” — i.e., simply by demonstrating the existence of racially polarized voting in an at-large jurisdiction.
[8] [9] [10] When considered in isolation, this single sentence might arguably be susceptible to plaintiffs' reading.

However, a court construing a statute does not view a
fragment in isolation, but considers the statute as a whole, in context with related provisions and the overall statutory structure, so that it may best identify and effectuate the scheme's underlying purpose. (See People v. Pennington
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 786, 795, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 448, 400 P.3d

14.) As plaintiffs concede, and as the legislative history reveals, the CVRA is in many ways “very similar” to the VRA. (Governor's Off. of Planning & Research, Enrolled
Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) July 1, 2002, p. 4.) When we construe “dilution” under the
CVRA, we must therefore be mindful that it is a term of art with a settled meaning under section 2 of the VRA: “ ‘The phrase vote dilution itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained.’ ” ( Holder v. Hall (1994) 512 U.S. 874, 880, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 129
L.Ed.2d 687 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) To establish vote dilution under the VRA, “a court must find a reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark ***331 against which to measure the existing voting practice.” ( Holder, at p. 880, 114 S.Ct. 2581 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); id. at p. 887, 114 S.Ct. 2581 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.) [“On this, there is general agreement”]; id. at p. 951, 114 S.Ct. 2581 (dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.) [“There is widespread agreement”].) So while the existence of racially polarized voting “ ‘is relevant to a vote dilution claim’ ” under the VRA (
Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 55, 106 S.Ct. 2752) — and is indeed “a key element” ( ibid.) — it is not in itself
sufficient.
[11] We find, for several reasons, the same is true under the CVRA. The similarities between the two schemes strongly suggest that “dilution” requires not only a showing that racially polarized voting exists, but also that the protected class thereby has less ability to elect its preferred candidate or *315 influence the election's outcome than it would have if the at-large system had not been adopted. (Cf. Ferra v.

Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858, 874,
280 Cal.Rptr.3d 783, 489 P.3d 1166 [concluding that the Legislature intended to adopt the “ ‘widely understood’ ” PGCC 9-4-24

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Berkeley (1988) 47 Cal.3d 512, 533, 253 Cal.Rptr. 839, 765 P.2d 46 [concluding that undefined “terms of art” in a statute refer to the definitions provided by federal law].) Although the legislative history materials can be read in different ways, one committee analysis recognized that the CVRA targets racially polarized voting in at-large elections only “if it Impairs the Right of Protected Groups” to elect their
preferred candidates or influence the outcome of an election. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 2002, p. 2.) After all, “the very concept of vote dilution implies — and, indeed, necessitates — the existence of an ‘undiluted’ practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured.” ( **65 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (1997) 520 U.S. 471, 480, 117 S.Ct. 1491, 137 L.Ed.2d 730.)
[12] Plaintiffs' construction would allow a party to prevail based solely on proof of racially polarized voting that could not be remedied or ameliorated by any other electoral
system. Moreover, such a construction would render the
word “dilution” in Elections Code section 14027 surplusage.

Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal that dilution is a separate element under the CVRA. To establish the
dilution element, a plaintiff in a CVRA action must identify “a reasonable alternative voting practice” to the existing atlarge electoral system that will “serve as the benchmark ‘undiluted’ voting practice.” (Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., supra, 520 U.S. at p. 480, 117 S.Ct. 1491.)

2. “The Ability ... to Elect Candidates of Its Choice”
The CVRA does not explicitly define what it means to
“impair[ ] the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice.” (Elec. Code, § 14027.) On this question, we find the VRA illuminating, but not dispositive.
[13] An at-large electoral system impairs a protected class's ability “to elect representatives of their choice” under the federal act ( 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)) only when the class can “demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district.” ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) The rationale for the VRA approach is that “if the minority group is spread evenly throughout a
multimember district, or if, although geographically
compact, the minority group is so small in relation to the surrounding white population that it could not constitute ***332 a majority in a single-member district, these minority voters *316 cannot maintain that they would have been able to elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the multimember electoral structure.” ( Gingles, at p. 50, fn. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752.)
For some period after Gingles, it was uncertain whether the first Gingles requirement (i.e., whether the minority group is sufficiently large and compact) could be satisfied by proof that the minority population “is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to support the minority's preferred candidate.” ( Bartlett v. Strickland (2009) 556 U.S. 1, 13, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173
(plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) ( Strickland).) Strickland
settled the question. It held that the VRA does not impose “a duty to give minority voters the most potential, or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting crossover voters.” ( Strickland, at p. 15, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plur. opn. of
Kennedy, J.).) Dispensing with the requirement that the minority group, by itself, be sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in the hypothetical district, the court reasoned, “would call in question the Gingles
framework.” ( Strickland, at p. 16, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)
The Court of Appeal effectively embraced the Strickland approach in construing the CVRA. It required a showing that Latino voters could constitute a majority, all by themselves, in a hypothetical single-member district. Indeed, it noted that “30 percent is not enough to win a majority” and rejected plaintiffs' contention that an ability to elect a preferred candidate could be shown in this case if non-Latino voters were to “ ‘cross over’ and vote for Latino candidates,
buoying Latino power and clearing the 50 percent threshold to electoral success.”
The Court of Appeal erred in importing the VRA's majorityminority requirement into the CVRA. In enacting the CVRA, the Legislature wanted to make it “easier” for protected classes to demonstrate an ability to elect their preferred candidates under an alternative voting system. (Assem. Com. on Elections, Reapportionment and Const. Amends.,
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racially polarized voting, or a violation **66 of Section 14027 and this section ....” (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (c); see Sen. Com. on Elections and Reapportionment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended
May 1, 2001, p. 3 [“Unlike the preconditions established by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, this bill does not require that the minority community be geographically compact or concentrated”]; Assem. Com. on Elections,
Reapportionment and Const. *317 Amends., Analysis of Sen.

Bill No. 976, supra, as amended Mar. 18, 2002, p. 4 [“This bill requires that only two of those [ Gingles] conditions be met”].)
The Legislature's rationale for rejecting the majorityminority requirement seems clear enough: It would make little sense to require CVRA plaintiffs to show that the protected class could constitute a majority of a hypothetical district, given that the CVRA is not limited to ability-to-elect claims nor are its remedies limited to district elections. (See, e.g., Sanchez v. City of Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 660, 670, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 [“In a cumulative voting
system, a politically cohesive but geographically dispersed minority group can ***333 elect a single candidate ...
although it would be unable to elect any candidates in a conventional winner-take-all at-large system and could not form a majority in any feasible district in a district system”].) Though the parties have focused in this court on district elections, the trial court found that, in addition to district elections, several alternative at-large election methods — cumulative voting, 6limited voting, 7 and ranked choice voting 8 — would each enhance Latino voting power and
their ability to elect candidates of their choice. None of these methods would require a winning candidate to muster a
majority in a hypothetical district. We can think of no reason why a CVRA claim based on any of these alternate at-large election methods should depend on such a showing. (Cf.

Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (c) [“that members of a protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated ... may be a factor in determining an appropriate remedy”].)
Furthermore, the Legislature clearly intended to make the CVRA more expansive than the VRA — by, for example,
explicitly recognizing claims based on dilution of the “ability to influence the outcome of an election.” (Elec. Code, § 14027.)
Even in the context of district elections, the Court of Appeal's focus on a majority-minority district was
misguided. The Court of Appeal feared that allowing a
plaintiff to rely on crossover votes “arbitrarily embraces racially polarized voting when it helps and abandons it when it hurts,” which it viewed as creating “a manipulable
standard boiling down to plaintiff always wins.” But far from embracing racially polarized voting “when it *318 helps” and abandoning it “when it hurts,” plaintiffs are merely pointing out the differing effects of racially polarized voting in two different settings. To challenge an at-large electoral system, a plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of racially polarized voting — i.e., cognizable differences “in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and in the choice of candidates and electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate.” (Elec. Code, § 14026, subd. (e).) The plaintiff must next show that the protected class would have the potential to elect its preferred candidate or candidates under a different electoral system (say, district elections). In calculating the protected class's voting strength under the alternative system, the plaintiff does not “abandon[ ]” racially polarized voting. Rather, the plaintiff must **67 prove that, assuming the same degree of racial polarization, the greater concentration of protected class voters in the hypothetical district would nonetheless be sufficient to enable them to elect their preferred candidate when
combined with the available crossover votes. Alternatively, the plaintiff may be able to demonstrate sufficient voting strength where racially polarized voting by other ***334 voters in the hypothetical district is lower than in the community as a whole. In neither instance is the plaintiff seeking to “abandon” racially polarized voting “when it hurts.”9
[14] The City's position in this court is slightly more nuanced, but no more persuasive. The City allows that there may be “room to expand vote-dilution claims beyond section 2's narrow ambit,” but only “where the relevant minority group would account for a near-majority of voters in a hypothetical district with a history of reliable crossover support from PGCC 9-4-24

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depend on the existence of a near majority in some
hypothetical district that would never be drawn or used. *319 These omissions counsel against adoption of the City's position. Rather than quibble over whether a protected class falls on one side or the other of an undefined near-majority line, we think it more sensible to inquire directly whether the prospect of crossover support from other voters under a lawful alternative electoral scheme would offer the protected class, whatever its size, the potential to elect its preferred candidate. When the hypothetical alternative is district elections, a high degree of racially polarized voting may, in many cases, effectively require the protected class to
constitute a substantial or very substantial minority of voters.

The higher the degree of racial polarization, the greater the percentage required by the protected class to demonstrate it would be able, in combination with crossover voters, to elect its preferred candidate. But there is no reason to layer this inquiry with an additional predicate showing of some
undefined near majority. All that is required is that the protected class be “sufficiently large ... to elect candidates of its choice,” even if it falls short of “an absolute majority of the relevant population.” ( De Grandy, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 1008, 1009, 114 S.Ct. 2647.)10
We are also sensitive to the fact that Gingles's majorityminority requirement is a poor fit for the CVRA, which applies ***335 exclusively to nonpartisan elections. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 6.) In the City, for example, multiple candidates may vie for office, and a plurality can be
sufficient to win. Requiring a protected class to demonstrate it could constitute a majority or near-majority of a
hypothetical district would impose a threshold far higher than what the protected class's preferred candidate would actually need to be **68 elected. (See Romero v. City of Pomona (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1418, 1424, fn. 7 [“Less than a majority, of course, might suffice in a district where candidates are elected by plurality”], overruled on other grounds in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp. (9th
Cir. 1990) 929 F.2d 1358, 1363.) We therefore decline to require a protected class demonstrate it would constitute a majority or near majority of a hypothetical district in all circumstances.

3. “Dilution” of “the Ability ... to Elect Candidates of Its Choice”
[15] Accordingly, to establish dilution of a protected class's ability to elect its preferred candidate under the CVRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate “the potential to elect
representatives” under some lawful alternative electoral *320 method. ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50, fn. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) One way to demonstrate the class's potential to elect its preferred candidates would be to show, as the VRA requires, that the class would be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district.” ( Gingles, at p. 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) But that is not the only way. (See Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (c).) Because the CVRA applies exclusively to nonpartisan
elections, where there may be more than two candidates, the winner may prevail with far less than a majority of the vote.

Moreover, the protected class may be able to demonstrate its ability to attract crossover votes for its preferred candidate.

Finally, a plaintiff may identify nondistrict remedies that would enable the class, on its own or with the assistance of crossover votes, to elect its preferred candidate. The minority population percentage necessary to win an election under some alternative at-large electoral systems — cumulative or ranked-choice voting, for example — may be less than 25 percent. (See Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Education (M.D.Ala. 1988) 699 F.Supp. 870, 874 ( Dillard) [“in a
jurisdiction with seven seats, the threshold of exclusion[11] would be 12.5% plus” in a cumulative voting system];
Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing
Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies (1998) 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 333, 342 [threshold for ranked-choice voting “is identical to that of cumulative voting”].)
Determining whether the protected class has the potential to elect its preferred candidate under some alternative system requires a “ ‘functional’ analysis of the political process” in that locality and a “ ‘searching practical evaluation of the “past and present reality.” ’ ” ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 62–63, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) Courts should consider the
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Pico Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal.5th 292 (2023) 534 P.3d 54, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 23 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8126... © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14 (see, e.g., Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (e)), including the characteristics of the specific locality, its electoral history, and “ ‘an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact’ of the contested electoral mechanisms” as well as the design and impact of the potential alternative system. ( Gingles, at p. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752; see ***336 Milligan, supra, 599 U.S. 1, 143 S.Ct. 1487 [216 L.Ed.2d at p. 75].) This factspecific inquiry accords with the legislative understanding that California is a large and diverse state that needs a flexible approach to address our changing demographics. (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 2002, p. 2 [“In California, we face a unique situation where we are all minorities”].) [16] The key inquiry in establishing dilution of a protected class's ability to elect its preferred candidate under the CVRA, therefore, is what percentage of the vote would be required to win — an inquiry that is not short-circuited *321 merely because the protected class may fall short of an absolute majority (or something close to that). In predicting how many candidates are likely to run and what percentage may be necessary to win, courts may also consider the
experiences of other similar jurisdictions that use district elections or other alternatives to traditional at-large elections.

Courts should likewise keep in mind that the inquiry at the liability **69 stage “is simply ‘to prove that a solution is possible, and not necessarily to present the final solution to the problem.’ ” ( Pope v. County of Albany (2d Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d 565, 576; see Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50, fn. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752.)
At the remedial stage the focus will shift to which electoral system is “appropriate” and “tailored to remedy the
violation.” (Elec. Code, § 14029.) If the court selects a district remedy, then there must also be at least two public hearings before the maps are drafted and at least two more hearings once the maps have been drawn and published. (Id., § 10010, subds. (a)(1), (2), (c).) In other words, the remedy the court ends up selecting under section 14029 may, but need not, be the benchmark the plaintiff offered to show the element of dilution.

The Court of Appeal feared that failing to craft a majorityminority requirement “would give a winning cause of action to any group, no matter how small, that can draw a district map that would improve its voting power by any amount, no matter how miniscule.” To prove its point, the court offered a hypothetical in which a protected class's share of the
electorate could increase from 0.1 percent under an at-large system to 1.5 percent in a proposed district. Even though the group's voting power would increase 15-fold, it could have “no practical numerical influence in any voting system” because there would be “simply too few voters ... to be numerically effective in an environment of race-based
voting.” This would, the Court of Appeal warned, “merely ensure plaintiffs always win.”
We agree with the Court of Appeal that a plaintiff cannot prove dilution of its ability to elect its preferred candidate under the CVRA by showing that its voting share would
increase 15-fold, from 0.1 percent to 1.5 percent, in a hypothetical district. In that circumstance, as the Court of Appeal explained, “[t]here are simply too few voters ... to be numerically effective in an environment of race-based
voting.” But it does not follow that a majority (or nearmajority) requirement should be judicially engrafted onto the CVRA. After all, by eliminating Gingles's geographic
compactness requirement, the Legislature rejected any
requirement that the protected class constitute a majority of a hypothetical district. (See Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (c).) What enables courts to sort successful claims from
unsuccessful claims is the dilution element itself, which requires the plaintiff to show that the protected class would, under some lawful alternative, have a “real *322 electoral opportunity” to elect its candidate of choice, either on its own or with the aid of crossover voters. ( ***337
LULAC, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 428, 126 S.Ct. 2594; see
Pope v. County of Albany, supra, 687 F.3d at p. 575, fn. 8.)12 [17] The dilution element also ensures the protected class is not made worse off. To replace at-large with district elections under a dilution theory, a successful plaintiff must show not merely that the protected class would have a real electoral opportunity in one or more hypothetical districts, but also that the incremental gain in the class's ability to elect its candidate of choice in such districts would not be offset by a loss of the class's potential to elect its candidates of choice elsewhere in the locality. (Cf. Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003) 539 U.S. 461, 479, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 156 L.Ed.2d 428 [“in examining whether the new plan is retrogressive, the inquiry must encompass the entire statewide plan as a whole”].) While “[t]he fact that the proposed remedy does not benefit PGCC 9-4-24

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Pico Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal.5th 292 (2023) 534 P.3d 54, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 23 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8126... © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15 all of the [protected class] in the City does not justify denying any remedy at all” (Gomez v. Watsonville (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d 1407, 1414, italics added), it remains the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that some lawful alternative method of election would improve the protected class's
overall ability to elect its preferred candidates. As both sides in this proceeding agree, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a net gain in the protected class's potential to elect candidates under an alternative system, it has not shown the at-large method of election “impairs” the ability of the protected class to elect its preferred **70 candidates. (Elec. Code, § 14027; cf. Beer v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 130,
141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 [“the purpose of § 5 [of the VRA] has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise”].)
We also reject the City's contention that a majority-minority requirement — or something close to it in the form of a nearmajority requirement — is necessary to avoid difficult constitutional questions under the equal protection clause. In the City's view, it would be perilous for courts to draw racebased districts in the absence of a compelling justification. (See Cooper v. Harris (2017) 581 U.S. 285, 291–293, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 197 L.Ed.2d 837.) Merely increasing the
percentage of minority voters in a hypothetical district where “the increase will have no real-world effect,” the City warns, is not a compelling justification. But the CVRA does not require a court to grant relief that has no real world effect. As stated above, the alternative voting system must offer the protected class at least a “potential” to elect its preferred candidates that did not exist under the at-large system. ( *323 Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50, fn. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) Moreover, nothing in the CVRA requires a
municipality or a court to select a district-based remedy or, even if it chooses to do so, to draw district lines, as the City contends, based “principally on race.” To the contrary:

California law directs that district boundaries comply with the state and federal Constitutions (as well as the VRA) (Elec. Code, § 21621, subd. (b)) and requires, to the extent practicable, that boundaries be “geographically contiguous” and maintain the integrity of “any local neighborhood or local community of interest.” (Id., subd. (c)(1), (2).) State law also encourages district lines to be drawn along ***338 “natural and artificial barriers” and with “geographical compactness.” (Id., subd. (c)(3), (4).) The City does not explain how or why districts drawn in accordance with the above criteria would run afoul of the Constitution. (See Miller v. Johnson (1995) 515 U.S. 900, 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 [“legislatures will ... almost always be aware of racial demographics”]; cf. ibid. [strict scrutiny applies only where “race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision” and “the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations”].) Indeed, assuming lines are drawn “based on proper factors,” whether to create a district where a protected class has the potential to elect its candidate of choice is “a matter of legislative choice or discretion.” ( Strickland, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 23, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see Higginson v.

Becerra (9th Cir. 2019) 786 Fed.Appx. 705, 707–708.) That's precisely the choice the Legislature made in enacting the CVRA: “An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice ....” (Elec. Code, § 14027.)

4. “Dilution” of “the Ability ... to Influence the Outcome of an Election”
Unlike its federal analogue, the CVRA prohibits the use of an at-large electoral system that dilutes not only the ability of a protected class “to elect candidates of its choice,” but also “its ability to influence the outcome of an election.” (Elec.

Code, § 14027.) The inclusion of the latter phrase further supports our conclusion that the CVRA cannot be read in the limited manner the City would like; indeed, the influence prong suggests a focus broader than the class's ability to elect its preferred candidates (with or without the help of
crossover voters). (Cf. Strickland, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 13, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [“a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected”]; LULAC, supra,
548 U.S. at pp. 445–446, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (plur. opn. of
Kennedy, J.) [distinguishing between a group's “ability to influence the outcome [of an election] between some
candidates, none of whom is their candidate of choice,” and the ability to elect “their candidate of choice”]; **71 10 Ill.

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Pico Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal.5th 292 (2023) 534 P.3d 54, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 23 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8126... © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16 Comp. Stat. 120/5-5(b) [“The phrase *324 ‘influence district’ means a district where a racial minority or language minority can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected”].) As the Attorney General (who is appearing in this action as amicus curiae) suggests, a protected class's ability to influence the outcome of an election could include, for example, “forming a coalition with another group to elect a candidate acceptable to each” or “blocking an unacceptable candidate.”
We need not decide the scope of the CVRA's ability-toinfluence prong in this case, however. Plaintiffs did not argue in the trial court or in this court an influence theory distinct from their claim that the City's at-large election system diluted their ability to elect their candidates of choice.

III. Conclusion
A group's ability “to compete successfully at electoral politics, in short, is often dependent on how the competition is structured.” (Engstrom, supra, 21 Stetson L.Rev. at p. 743.) The CVRA represents the Legislature's effort to make that competition more fair. It bars the use of an at-large method of election if that method ***339 dilutes a protected class's ability to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election. Dilution occurs when an at-large system denies a protected class the potential to elect its preferred candidate or influence the election's outcome. The plaintiff in a CVRA action must identify a lawful alternative to the existing at-large electoral system that will serve as the benchmark undiluted voting system.

A protected class has the ability to elect its preferred candidate if it would have the potential to elect that
candidate, on its own or with the assistance of crossover support from other voters, under an alternative voting
system; there is no additional requirement that the protected class constitute a majority or near-majority of a hypothetical district. A court presented with a dilution claim should undertake a searching evaluation of the totality of
circumstances (see, e.g., Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (e)), including the characteristics of the specific locality, its electoral history, and the design and impact of the at-large system as well as the potential impact of lawful alternative electoral systems. In predicting how many candidates are likely to run and what percentage may be necessary to win, courts may also consider the experiences of other similar jurisdictions that use district elections or some method other than traditional at-large elections.

We express no view on the ultimate question of whether the City's at-large voting system is consistent with the CVRA.

The parties vigorously contested in the Court of Appeal whether plaintiffs had established two elements of a *325 CVRA claim: whether voting in city council elections was racially polarized and whether the at-large method of
election diluted the voting power of Latino residents in those elections. Because the Court of Appeal concluded that
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate dilution of the Latino vote, it did not consider whether voting in council elections was racially polarized. We have determined that the Court of Appeal relied on an incorrect legal standard to conclude that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the dilution element of their CVRA claim. Under the circumstances, we find it
appropriate to remand the matter to the Court of Appeal to decide in the first instance whether, under the correct legal standard, plaintiffs have established that at-large elections dilute their ability to elect their preferred candidate; whether plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of racially
polarized voting; and any of the other unresolved issues in the City's appeal. (See Central Coast Forest Assn. v. Fish & Game Com. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 594, 606, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 389 P.3d 840.)
Disposition
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

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JENKINS, J.

All Citations
15 Cal.5th 292, 534 P.3d 54, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 23 Cal.

Daily Op. Serv. 8126, 2023 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8739
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Pico Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal.5th 292 (2023) 534 P.3d 54, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 23 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8126... © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18 Footnotes
1 The City asserts that in the 2020 city council election, four and one-half years after plaintiffs filed this action, three of the five winning candidates were Latino. Plaintiffs dispute this characterization of the winning candidates' ethnicities.

Given the limited issue before us, we express no view on the dispute. 2 “In an at-large (or multi-member district) system, all voters elect all representatives, and each voter has as many ballots as there are positions available. This system contrasts with a single-member district plan, under which the entire political jurisdiction is divided into districts roughly equal in population, each of which selects one representative by vote within the district.” ( Badillo v. Stockton (9th Cir. 1992) 956 F.2d 884, 889.) 3 The Senate factors include “the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.” ( Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 44–45, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) 4 The CVRA factors include “the history of discrimination, the use of electoral devices or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of at-large elections, denial of access to those processes determining which groups of candidates will receive financial or other support in a given election, the extent to which members of a protected class bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns.” (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (e).) 5 We do not consider here whether the City's elections are racially polarized — an issue the Court of Appeal has not yet addressed — but we do note that, under the CVRA, “[e]lections conducted prior to the filing of an action ... are more probative to establish the existence of racially polarized voting than elections conducted after the filing of the action.” (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (a).)
6 Under cumulative voting, “a voter receives as many votes as there are candidates to elect, but may cast multiple votes for a single candidate.” ( Portugal v. Franklin County (Wash. 2023) 530 P.3d 994, 1002 ( Portugal).) 7 Under limited voting, “a voter receives fewer votes than there are candidates to elect.” ( Portugal, supra, 530 P.3d at p. 1002.)
8 Under ranked choice voting, a voter ranks candidates in order of preference. In an election to fill more than one seat, such as for a city council, each ballot is counted at the start of tabulation as one vote for its first-choice ranked candidate. Any candidate with more votes than the election threshold (see fn. 11, post) is declared elected. If the first round of the vote counting does not fill all the seats, then the system consults the next-ranked choices from the ballots supporting the candidate with the least number of votes, the next-ranked choices from the surplus ballots (i.e., those in excess of what was needed for the elected candidate to win), or both. Jurisdictions use a variety of methods to determine when and how to transfer the nextranked choices from surplus ballots. This form of tabulation continues PGCC 9-4-24

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Pico Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Monica, 15 Cal.5th 292 (2023) 534 P.3d 54, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 23 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8126... © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 19 until all seats are filled. (See Tideman, The Single Transferable Vote (Winter 1995) 9 J. Econ. Persp. 27, 27–28, 32– 35; see generally Note, The Madisonian Case for Ranked Choice Voting: Federalist No. 10, Preferential Voting, and the American Democratic Tradition (2021) 23 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 953, 963.) 9 We recognize that where there is complete racial polarization, the protected class may itself need to make up a majority of the district in order to have an ability to elect its preferred candidate. But “ ‘[i]n practice, such extreme conditions are never present.’ ” ( Strickland, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 45, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.) [“No voting group is 100% cohesive”]; see id. at pp. 32–33, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.) [“of course minority voters constituting less than 50% of the voting population can have an opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice, as amply shown by empirical studies confirming that such minority groups regularly elect their preferred candidates with the help of modest crossover by members of the majority”].) As the high court has acknowledged, “there are communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect candidates of their choice.” ( Johnson v. De Grandy (1994) 512 U.S. 997, 1020, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 ( De Grandy).) 10 An amicus curiae letter submitted in support of Pico Neighborhood Association's petition for review by the chairs of the Assembly's Latino, Black, and Asian and Pacific Islander caucuses recites that while some members were elected in majority-minority districts, many others were elected in districts in which their membership group made up only 20 to 40 percent of the eligible voters. The trial court here similarly found that candidates from minority groups who had been “unsuccessful in at-large elections have won district elections” in districts “where the minority group is one-third or less of a district's electorate.”
11 “The threshold of exclusion ‘is the percentage of the vote that will guarantee the winning of a seat even under the most unfavorable circumstances.’ ” ( Dillard, supra, 699 F.Supp. at p. 874.) It “is calculated according to the following formula: 1/(1 + number of seats available).” ( U.S. v. Vill. of Port Chester (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 704 F.Supp.2d 411, 450.)
12 Plaintiffs suggest it would be rare for a group constituting less than 25 percent of the relevant voting population to make the required showing. We have no occasion here to explore that suggestion, since the Latino population in the proposed district exceeds that threshold.

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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Proposed Legislation
West's Annotated California Codes
Elections Code (Refs & Annos)
Division 10. Local, Special, Vacancy, and Consolidated Elections (Refs & Annos) Part 1. General Provisions
Chapter 2. District Boundaries (Refs & Annos)
West's Ann.Cal.Elec.Code § 10010
§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of election to district-based election or establishing district-based elections; public hearings; application; notice of action Effective: January 1, 2020
Currentness
(a) A political subdivision that changes from an at-large method of election to a district-based election, or that establishes district-based elections, shall do all of the following before a public hearing at which the governing body of the political subdivision votes to approve or defeat an ordinance establishing district-based elections:
(1) Before drawing a draft map or maps of the proposed boundaries of the districts, the political subdivision shall hold at least two public hearings over a period of no more than 30 days, at which the public is invited to provide input regarding the composition of the districts. Before these hearings, the political subdivision may conduct outreach to the public, including to non-English-speaking communities, to explain the districting process and to encourage public participation. (2) After all draft maps are drawn, the political subdivision shall publish and make available for release at least one draft map and, if members of the governing body of the political subdivision will be elected in their districts at different times to provide for staggered terms of office, the potential sequence of the elections. The political subdivision shall also hold at least two additional hearings over a period of no more than 45 days, at which the public is invited to provide input regarding the content of the draft map or maps and the proposed sequence of elections, if applicable. The first version of a draft map shall be published at least seven days before consideration at a hearing. If a draft map is revised at or following a hearing, it shall be published and made available to the public for at least seven days before being adopted. (b) In determining the final sequence of the district elections conducted in a political subdivision in which members of the governing body will be elected at different times to provide for staggered terms of office, the governing body shall give special consideration to the purposes of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, and it shall take into account the preferences expressed by members of the districts.
(c) This section applies to, but is not limited to, a proposal that is required due to a court-imposed change from an at-large method of election to a district-based election.

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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 (d) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) “At-large method of election” has the same meaning as set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 14026. (2) “District-based election” has the same meaning as set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 14026. (3) “Political subdivision” has the same meaning as set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 14026. (e)(1) Before commencing an action to enforce Sections 14027 and 14028, a prospective plaintiff shall send by certified mail a written notice to the clerk of the political subdivision against which the action would be brought asserting that the political subdivision's method of conducting elections may violate the California Voting Rights Act of 2001. (2) A prospective plaintiff shall not commence an action to enforce Sections 14027 and 14028 within 45 days of the political subdivision's receipt of the written notice described in paragraph (1). (3)(A) Before receiving a written notice described in paragraph (1), or within 45 days of receipt of a notice, a political subdivision may pass a resolution outlining its intention to transition from at-large to district-based elections, specific steps it will undertake to facilitate this transition, and an estimated timeframe for doing so. (B) If a political subdivision passes a resolution pursuant to subparagraph (A), a prospective plaintiff shall not commence an action to enforce Sections 14027 and 14028 within 90 days of the resolution's passage. (C)(i) A political subdivision and the prospective plaintiff who first sends a notice pursuant to paragraph (1) may enter into a written agreement to extend the time period described in subparagraph (B) for up to an additional 90 days in order to provide additional time to conduct public outreach, encourage public participation, and receive public input. The written agreement shall include a requirement that the district boundaries be established no later than six months before the political subdivision's next regular election to select governing board members. However, in a political subdivision that holds a primary election as part of its process for selecting governing board members, the written agreement shall include a requirement that district boundaries be established no later than six months before the political subdivision's next regular primary election.
(ii) No later than 10 days after a political subdivision enters into a written agreement pursuant to clause (i), the political subdivision shall prepare and make available on its internet website a tentative schedule of the public outreach events and the public hearings held pursuant to this section. If a political subdivision does not maintain an internet website, the political subdivision shall make the tentative schedule available to the public upon request.

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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 (f)(1) If a political subdivision adopts an ordinance establishing district-based elections pursuant to subdivision (a), a prospective plaintiff who sent a written notice pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) before the political subdivision passed its resolution of intention may, within 30 days of the ordinance's adoption, demand reimbursement for the cost of the work product generated to support the notice. A prospective plaintiff shall make the demand in writing and shall substantiate the demand with financial documentation, such as a detailed invoice for demography services. A political subdivision may request additional documentation if the provided documentation is insufficient to corroborate the claimed costs. A political subdivision shall reimburse a prospective plaintiff for reasonable costs claimed, or in an amount to which the parties mutually agree, within 45 days of receiving the written demand, except as provided in paragraph (2). In all cases, the amount of the reimbursement shall not exceed the cap described in paragraph (3). (2) If more than one prospective plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement, the political subdivision shall reimburse the prospective plaintiffs in the order in which they sent a written notice pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e), and the 45- day time period described in paragraph (1) shall apply only to reimbursement of the first prospective plaintiff who sent a written notice. The cumulative amount of reimbursements to all prospective plaintiffs shall not exceed the cap described in paragraph (3).
(3) The amount of reimbursement required by this section is capped at thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), as adjusted annually to the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, United States city average, as published by the United States Department of Labor.

Credits
(Added by Stats.2014, c. 873 (A.B.1440), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2015. Amended by Stats.2016, c. 737 (A.B.350), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2017; Stats.2017, c. 561 (A.B.1516), § 51, eff. Jan. 1, 2018; Stats.2018, c. 277 (A.B.2123), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; Stats.2019, c. 497 (A.B.991), § 105, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.)
Editors' Notes
Relevant Additional Resources
Additional Resources listed below contain your search terms.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
2014 Legislation
Section 9 of Stats.2014, c. 873 (A.B.1440), provides:
“SEC. 9. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” 2016 Legislation
Section 2 of Stats.2016, c. 737 (A.B.350), provides:

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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 “SEC. 2. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” 2017 Legislation
Stats.2017, c. 561 (A.B.1516), made nonsubstantive changes to maintain the code.

Subordination of legislation by Stats.2017, c. 561 (A.B.1516), to other 2017 legislation, see Historical and Statutory Notes under Business and Professions Code § 2221.1.
2019 Legislation
Stats.2019, c. 497 (A.B.991), made nonsubstantive changes to maintain the code.

Subordination of legislation by Stats.2019, c. 497 (A.B.991), to other 2019 legislation, see Historical and Statutory Notes under Business and Professions Code § 1686.
2020 Legislation
Governor Newsom issued the following executive order, N-34-20, dated March 20, 2020, which read:
“WHEREAS on March 4, 2020, I proclaimed a State of Emergency to exist in California as a result of the threat of COVID-19; and
“WHEREAS hundreds of local governments across the state have also declared states of emergency, imposed or recommended social distancing, and taken other significant steps in response to COVID-19; and “WHEREAS various political subdivisions within California are in the process of changing from an at-large method of election to district elections, existing law requires public hearings to be conducted within prescribed timeframes as part of this change, and conducting such hearings within these timeframes would be incongruent with public health officials’ guidance regarding social distancing; and
“WHEREAS California held a Presidential Primary Election on March 3, 2020, for which ballot counting, tabulation, and other responsibilities related to the official canvass, including certification of the canvass, audits and/or manual tallies of election results, and reporting of the official canvass results, remain outstanding or ongoing; and “WHEREAS COVID-19 and the response thereto may impair the ability of relevant state and local officials, including county elections officials and the Secretary of State, and the volunteers supporting them, to meet statutory deadlines associated with these responsibilities; and
“WHEREAS on November 15, 2019, I proclaimed a Special General Election to be held on May 12, 2020, to fill a vacancy in the State Senate seat representing the 28th Senate District of the State, in Riverside County; and PGCC 9-4-24

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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 “WHEREAS on November 15, 2019, I proclaimed a Special General Election to be held on May 12, 2020, to fill a vacancy in the U.S. House of Representatives seat representing the 25th Congressional District of the State, which covers portions of the counties of Ventura and Los Angeles; and “WHEREAS on April 7, 2020, a Special Recall Election will be held in the City of Westminster, in the County of Orange; and
“WHEREAS state law would ordinarily require that these elections be conducted using in-person voting at polling locations throughout the jurisdiction; and
“WHEREAS the generalized use of in-person voting presents risks to public health and safety in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and could risk undermining social distancing measures imposed by the State Public Health Officer, as well as other aspects of the response to COVID-19; and
“WHEREAS our elections must be accessible, secure, and safe; and “WHEREAS California’s existing vote-by-mail procedures can be used to allow these three elections to go forward in a manner that is accessible, secure, and safe.
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State of California, in accordance with the authority vested in me by the State Constitution and statutes of the State of California, and in particular, Government Code sections 8567 and 8571, do hereby issue the following Order to become effective immediately:
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
“1) The timeframes for conducting the hearings required when a political subdivision changes from an at-large method of election to a district-based election, as set forth in Elections Code section 10010, are suspended for any subdivision, until such time as neither state nor local public health officials recommend or impose social distancing measures in the relevant subdivision. Following that time, the relevant subdivision shall hold the required hearings in a manner that ensures the public is provided advance notice and is afforded an opportunity to participate in the postponed hearings; subdivisions are urged to ensure that this process includes effective outreach to individuals with disabilities, individuals who primarily speak languages other than English, and other individuals who may have particularized needs. “2) Notwithstanding Elections Code sections 3019, 15100-15112, 15300-15376, 15400-15402, 15450-15490, and 15500-15505; California Code of Regulations, Title 2, sections 20027, 20108.75, 20108.8, and 20110-20126; and any other applicable provision of state law, all deadlines associated with completing, auditing, and reporting on the official canvass of the March 3, 2020, Presidential Primary Election are extended by 21 days. Counties are urged to complete activities related to the official canvass according to the deadlines ordinarily imposed by state law, to the extent possible. The Secretary of State is requested to issue guidance to county elections officials concerning compliance with this paragraph. “3) Notwithstanding Elections Code sections 1500 and 4000-4007 (including, but not limited to, the conditions otherwise imposed on all-mail ballot elections in Election Code section 4000 and 4001.5), and any other applicable provision of state law, the April 7, 2020, Special Recall Election to be held in the City of Westminster; the May 12, 2020, Special General Election to be held within the 25th Congressional District of the State; and the May 12, 2020, Special General Election to be held within the 28th Senate District of the State shall each be held as an all-mail ballot election and conducted according to those provisions of the Elections Code that govern all-mail ballot elections, including but not limited to PGCC 9-4-24

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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Elections Code sections 3000-3026 and 4100. The respective county elections officials responsible for conducting each respective election shall transmit vote-by-mail ballots to all voters eligible to vote in each respective election.

Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Order, elections officials are also authorized, and encouraged, to make in-person voting opportunities available on or before Election Day for each of these elections in a manner consistent with public health and safety, to maximize voter accessibility. Elections officials shall provide maximum possible notice to voters about how to participate in each of these elections, paying particular attention to the needs of voters at high risk from COVID-19, individuals with disabilities, and other voters with particularized needs. “4) Notwithstanding Elections Code sections 3019, 15100-15112, 15300-15376, 15400-15402, 15450-15490, and 15500-15505; California Code of Regulations, Title 2, sections 20027, 20108.75, 20108.8, and 20110-20126; and any other applicable provision of state law including, but not limited to, any applicable state regulation, all deadlines associated with completing, auditing, and reporting on the official canvass of the May 12, 2020, Special General Elections to be held within the 25th Congressional District of the State and the 28th Senate District of the State are extended by 21 days. Counties are urged to complete activities related to the official canvass according to the deadlines ordinarily imposed by state law, to the extent possible. The Secretary of State is requested to issue guidance to county elections officials concerning compliance with this paragraph.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as soon as hereafter possible, this Order be filed in the Office of the Secretary of State and that widespread publicity and notice be given of this Order. “This Order is not intended to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the State of California, its agencies, departments, entities, officers, employees, or any other person. “IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the State of California to be affixed this 20th day of March 2020.
“GAVIN NEWSOM
“Governor of California
“ATTEST:
“ALEX PADILLA
“Secretary of State”
For Executive Order N-48-20 issued by Governor Newsom, relating to the manner of conducting local special elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, see Historical and Statutory Notes under Elections Code § 1500. 2021 Legislation
For Executive Order N-08-21 issued by Governor Newsom, relating to the expiration and applicability of certain COVID-19 provisions, see Historical and Statutory Notes under Government Code § 21220.

Former Notes
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§ 10010. Political subdivision changing from at-large method of..., CA ELEC § 10010 © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Former § 10010, enacted as § 10012 by Stats.1961, c. 23, § 10012, amended by Stats.1963, c. 971, § 1; Stats.1967, c. 509, § 2, renumbered § 10010 and amended by Stats.1975, c. 1158, § 17, amended by Stats.1984, c. 32, § 7; Stats.1993, c. 1302 (S.B.535), § 37, relating to sample ballots for elections other than direct or presidential primaries, was repealed by Stats.1994, c. 920 (S.B.1547), § 1. See Elections Code § 13303.

Former § 10010, enacted by Stats.1961, c. 23, § 10010, was renumbered § 10008 and amended by Stats.1975, c. 1158, § 15.

Notes of Decisions containing your search terms (0)
View all 2
West's Ann. Cal. Elec. Code § 10010, CA ELEC § 10010
Current with urgency legislation through Ch. 1 of 2024 Reg.Sess. Some statute sections may be more current, see credits for details.

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Agenda No. 13 A

CITY OF PACIFIC GROVE
300 Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, California 93950
TO: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
FROM:

Daniel Gho, Public Works Director/Deputy City Manager; George Fuerst, Environmental Programs Manager
MEETING DATE: September 04, 2024
SUBJECT: Outdoor Art Donation Proposal of Stained Glass "The Butterflies" from Nader Agha
CEQA: Does not constitute a Project per California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines Section 15378

RECOMMENDATION

1. Discuss proposed gift of stained glass window and provide direction the City Manager.

2. Alternatively, discuss and take other action related to this item

DISCUSSION
The donation of a large stained-glass piece titled "The Butterflies" has been proposed by Nader Agha/The Agha Family. The 12' x 8' stained-glass window, consisting of three panels forming a semicircle of fluttering monarchs, was designed by Nader Ahga and spent decades as the feature fenestration of the Holman Building.

The Beautification and Natural Resources Commission reviewed the Art Acceptance Form on October 17, 2023, “Commissioner discussion was led by Chair Myers, who moved that we accept the piece of art for the City and to let council work out all the details. It passed unanimously 4-0.” Further details are included in the attached proposal, including requests for exemptions to certain requirements of Council Policy 900-3 Acceptance of Art Donations. Policy 900-3 limits the control that a donor of art has on the work after donation. Exceptions to the Acceptance of Outdoor Art Donations Policy 900-3 can only be granted by City Council.

Requested deviations from the existing policy are extensive and could create short-term and long-term administrative challenges. It is the recommendation of staff that we do not deviate from policy 900-3.

If the Council authorizes staff to proceed with the drafting of a proposed agreement, the following conditions may be incorporated:

1. The installation location is yet to be determined and will require additional consideration by the donor, staff, governing bodies, and the public. The City reserves the right to select the location based on safety, security and feasibility.

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2. Nader Agha / The Agha Family will pay for all costs of design, permitting, legal, engineering, fabrication, installation, lighting, maintenance, and removal of the piece/commemorative plaque through an escrow account.

3. Design, permitting, legal, engineering, fabrication, installation, lighting, maintenance, and removal of the piece/commemorative plaque must be approved by the City.

4. An escrow account would be established and funded by Nader Agha / The Agha Family prior to any costs incurred by the City. Initial escrow account funding would be $125,000. This escrow account shall be replenished from time-to-time in the event of depletion of funds. The City solely determines the amount of additional escrow funding required. In the event of failure to provide sufficient additional escrow funds in a timely manner the City may dispose of the donation in any manner without consultation with Nager Agha/The Agha Family.

5. The Nader Agha / The Agha Family would secure insurance indemnifying the City for all liability associated with the piece for the duration of when the piece resides on municipal property or within the control of the City.

6. The City accepts no responsibility for the care, preservation or maintenance of the piece except as expressly described in the donation agreement.

7. The City may reproduce images of the piece and use such images in any manner without permission of or compensation to Nader Agha / The Agha Family. Where practical, such images may be acknowledged to Nader Agha / The Agha Family.

OPTIONS
Take an alternative action
FINANCIAL IMPACT:

Staff resources to consummate the donation agreement and begin implementation.

FOCUSED PRIORITY AREA: Not Applicable.

Attachments
Donor Proposal
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City of Pacific Grove, California
City Council Policy
Policy Governing Policy No. Effective Date Page
Acceptance of Outdoor Art Donations 900-3 August 2, 2017 1 of 2 PURPOSE:

The City receives donations of both art and funding for outdoor civic art from citizens and organizations. Chapter 3.24 of the Municipal Code establishes duties and functions for the Beautification and Natural Resources Commission including standards related to works of art. This policy further establishes guidelines for the evaluation, receipt and use of proposed art and art fund donations.

Public art enhances the appearance of public places, beautifies the City, and stimulates public gathering and public discussion. The City has limited capital funds to expend on outdoor civic art and relies primarily on donation. This policy is intended to provide clarity of expectations for both the City and donors so that donations may best meet the goals of each party.

Policies 100-13 Bequests and Fungible Donation and Appreciated Real Estate, 200-6(E ) Library Acceptance of Art Gifts Policy, and 200-6 (I ) Library Gift Acceptance Policy for Print and NonPrint Materials may also be referred to as appropriate.

POLICY & PROCEDURE:

1. Anyone wishing to donate art or art funding to the City of Pacific Grove must first provide comprehensive information about each piece of art or proposed art work by completing and submitting the Art Acceptance Form (attachment).

2. Art Acceptance Forms may be submitted to the Pacific Grove Beautification and Natural Resources Commission.

3. The Beautification and Natural Resources Commission will use the Art Acceptance Form as a basis for evaluating the art proposed for donation and making a recommendation to Council. In evaluating the art works, the Beautification and Natural Resources Commission will work with the Museum, the Library, and/or other City staff, as appropriate. City staff will consult the advisory board (e.g. Museum Board, Library Board) of the involved City department.

4. Evaluation of art works will consider each piece’s intended use and disposition, artistic merit, historical significance, local interest, commercial value, and impact on City government including ongoing maintenance costs.

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Acceptance of Outdoor Civic Art Donation–Council Policy No. 900-3 Page 2

5. The Beautification and Natural Resources Commission, City staff, and the relevant advisory body will make a recommendation to the City Council whether or not to accept the proposed donation. All accepted donations shall be unconditional, transferring ownership and all rights of ownership to the City. Donations are accepted only with the understanding that the City has the right to determine retention, location or disposal of the donation. The City may sell the item for value and use the proceeds for any purpose appropriate to the City’s Charter.

6. The City Council shall make the final determination on whether the City will accept or decline the proposed donation.

7. Issues and legalities involved in donation of art works are numerous, and there will be occasions when the City Attorney’s advice may be essential. For example, an artist may be entitled under law to a royalty under certain circumstances of resale; a copyright may be involved; an artist may ask for rights and privileges such as the first chance to purchase, borrowing for an exhibition, reproduction rights, control of alterations, repairs or restoration.

8. A written agreement with the artist shall be executed with the City prior to commencement of any work of art proposed on City property or commissioned by the City.

9. All required City permits for installation and siting of art pieces on City property shall be obtained. The outdoor placement of any artwork shall not interfere with natural resources.

Adopted January 3, 2001 - Minute Motion
Amended August 3, 2017 – Resolution 17-017
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CITY OF PACIFIC GROVE
300 Forest Avenue, Pacific Grove, CA 93950
Tel: 831.648.3190 Fax: 831.648.3184
www.cityofpacificgrove.org
Art Acceptance Form
Date of Application to Donate
Signature of Applicant

HISTORY OF THE PIECE PROPOSED FOR DONATION
Donor Legal Owner
Name Name
Phone Phone
Fax Fax
Email Email
Mailing
Address
Mailing
Address
Applicant Previous Owner(s)/History of Ownership
Name
Phone
Fax
Email
Mailing
Address
(Attach additional pages if necessary for any section)
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DESCRIPTION OF WORK (PHOTO MUST BE ATTACHED)
Name of Work
Artist
Medium
Date of Work
Dimensions of Work
Appraised Value
Content/Description
Condition
Artist Biography
(Summary)
Special Requirements /
Conservation Measures
Maintenance
(materials, cost, etc)
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INTENDED USE
Selective Display/Exhibit
Research
Circulation/Loan
Sale

REASONS FOR ACCEPTANCE
Artistic Merit
Historical Significance
Local Interest
Commercial Value

CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTANCE
Specified Recipient
Storage Requirements
Proposed Location
Special Requirements /
Conservation
(Attach additional pages if necessary for any section)
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(Leave blank; this page is for City use only)

INTENDED USE
Selective Display/Exhibit
Research
Circulation/Loan
Sale

REASONS FOR ACCEPTANCE
Artistic Merit
Historical Significance
Local Interest
Commercial Value

CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTANCE
Storage Requirements
Cost Impact and
Maintenance
Proposed Location
Proposed Department
Responsibility
Special Requirements /
Conservation

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACCEPTANCE (ACCEPT / DECLINE, SIGNATURE, DATE) Beautification Commission
Museum of Natural History
Public Library
Other Recipient Department
(if Applicable)
Approved by City Council Date
Mayor’s Signature Date
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Pacific Grove City CouncilSeptember 4, 2024

Pacific Grove City Council
September 4, 2024