Palm Springs City Council
March 28, 2024

Item 3A - Page 57

7. Owners/Investors with a 5% beneficial interest in the Applicant Entity or a related entity

EXAMPLE
JANE DOE 50%, ABC COMPANY, Inc.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
A.

Motorola Solutions, Inc. 100%
[name of owner/investor] (percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
B.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
C.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
D.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
E.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Si~r~~ame, Title
s?~inlanNice President Sales Operations
Date
2-12-2019
(Revised 0913.18}

CITY OF PALM SPRINGS - PUBLIC INTEGRITY DISCLOSURE FORM

APPLICANT DISCLOSURE FORM

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ATTACHMENT C

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CITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORT

DATE: O CTOBER 12, 2023 BUSINESS & LEGISLATIVE

SUBJECT: APPROVE TWO -YEAR COOPERATIVE SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT WITH INSIGHT PUBLIC SAFETY, INC. FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF 15 FLOCK SAFETY FIXED ALPR CAMERAS

FROM: Scott C. Stiles, City Manager

BY: Police Department

SUMMARY:

Staff first presented this item at the September 26, 2023 City Council Meeting, at which time Council requested additional details on the proposal and specific information about Flock Safety, and requested the item come back as a discussion item on the October 12 agenda. This staff report provides additional information as well as responses from Flock with regard to the following topics: Data Sharing, Third- Party Vendor Access, Cloud Storage through AWS, and the incorporation of PSPD's ALPR policy into the revised agreement with Insight Public Sector, Inc.

Staff is recommending Council approve a two-year agreement for the installation of fixed ALPR cameras at strategic locations in the city . The Palm Springs Police Department already has an ALPR policy in place and is attached for review. ALPR technology uses a combination of cameras and computer software to scan the license pl ates of passing vehicles. The use of ALPR technology provides several potential benefits, including crime deterrence, real-time alerts to police when stolen or wanted vehicles enter an area, and enhanced investigative capabilities when a crime has already occurred. The two- year contract will be funded through the adopted 2023-2025 City budget.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Approve Cooperative Subscription Agreement No. 23C214 ( Attachment A) with Insight Public Sector, Inc. for 2 years, not to exceed $99,750 to implement Flock Safety fixed Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology.

2. Authorize the City Manager or designee to execute the agreement.

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BUSINESS PRINCIPAL DISCLOSURE:

Insight Public Sector, Inc. is a corporation registered in Illinois and California. See Attachment B.

BACKGROUND:

During the meeting of September 26, 2023, Council raised questions regarding the service agreement with Insight Public Sector, Inc. Specifically, Council inquired about the incorporation of PSPD's policy (Attachment C) into the updated agreement. The revised agreement now contains PSPD’s policy.

Furthermore, Council sought additional information pertaining to data storage within the Flock system and the Amazon Web Service (AWS) Government Cloud. Council’s inquiries included concerns about data security, the types of data collected, breach response protocols, and the possibility of AWS sharing or selling data to third- party vendors. Council members also inquired about data sharing with Federal or Out-of-State Agencies and the measures Flock employs to ensure these agencies do not gain access to personal identifying information. Council also inquired into the AI functions within the Flock system. Flock responded to each of these questions, and their responses can be found in Attachment H.

Additionally, Flock Safety has provided a PDF presentation detailing the use of Flock in Palm Springs. This presentation includes information about the Flock ALPR system, strategies for mitigating risk, and how Flock can assist the Police Department in terms of transparency, audits, and gaining insights into the system. Flock has also furnished a PDF document in response to the recommendations made by the ACLU, which can be found in Attachments I & J.

During the September 26
th meeting, PSPD discussed the f ederal Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) compliance protocols required of both Flock and PSPD to ensure data security in law enforcement. PSPD reached out to Flock to provide more details about their compliance with CJIS. See Attachment K.

STAFF ANALYSIS:

Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology uses a combination of cameras and computer software to scan the license plates of passing vehicles. The cameras, which can be fixed (e.g., mounted on road signs or traffic lights) or mobile (i.e., mounted on a vehicle), capture computer-readable images that allow law enforcement to compare plate numbers against plates of known stolen vehicles or vehicles associated with individuals wanted on criminal charges. When a match is found, a real- time alert is generated, notifying police of the location where the image of the stolen or wanted vehicle was captured. ALPR data can also be used by investigators, after a crime has been committed, to identify and locate associated vehicles. The Palm Springs Police Item 3A - Page 61
Department has utilized two mobile ALPR units for over 10-years. The limitation of these mobile ALPRs is that alerts and data collection only occur when that vehicle is being operated by an officer and data is also limited to the route and distance traveled by the patrol vehicle.

The addition of fixed ALPR cameras provides the city with a cost-effective force multiplier that helps direct officers to where crimes are occurring and provides invaluable investigative leads following a crime. Fixed ALPR technology is being used widely by many local police agencies to locate stolen vehicles and solve crimes where a vehicle has been used. Over time, the quality and accuracy of ALPR technology has continued to evolve, while also becoming more affordable.

Staff is utilizing a cooperative purchasing program procurement process through Omnia Partners, a national cooperative procurement organization as permitted under Palm Springs’ Municipal Code section 7.09.010. Under the Omnia Cooperative Contract No. 23-6692-03, the city can contract with Insight Public Sector, who were selected through a competitive solicitation to acquire the fixed ALPR equipment that is supplied by Flock Safety. City staff reviewed the marketplace for this technology and received uniformly positive feedback from numerous other local government agencies regarding their experiences with the quality and reliability of the ALPR systems supplied by Flock Safety.

Staff recommends the Council approve a two- year cooperative contract with Insight Public Sector Inc., for Flock Safety ALPR Camera Implementation in an amount not to exceed $99,750.00.

The proposed contract calls for Flock Safety to install and maintain fifteen ALPR cameras at locations identified by the Police Department. It also calls for Flock Safety to provide the Department with searchable access to its ALPR data, and to store the data for 30 days.

Automated License Plate Recognition Policy

Palm Springs’ Police Department’s (PSPDs) Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) policy section 430.10 - Releasing ALPR Data provides procedures to protect personal privacy in the acquisition and use of surveillance technology and provides for ongoing oversight. Additionally, this policy section prohibits PSPD personnel from sharing ALPR data with federal agencies or with law enforcement agencies outside of California.

Fixed ALPR is “surveillance technology” and California Senate Bill 34 – Automated License Plate Recognition Act requires law enforcement agencies to prov ide an opportunity for public comment.

In addition, prior to the approval by the Council of a new surveillance activity, Chief Mills recommended the completion of a Surveillance Evaluation, consisting of five specific elements.

Item 3A - Page 62
Surveillance Evaluation

(1) A description of the surveillance technology, including how it works and what information it captures;

A fixed ALPR system captures the date, time, location, license plate (state, partial, paper, and no plate), and vehicle characteristics (make, model, type, and color) of passing vehicles. FLOCK ALPR cameras are positioned to capture rear license plates only and are not designed to capture images of vehicle occupants. Flock cameras do not use facial recognition technology or capture other personal information from residents or drivers beyond license plate and vehicle data. ALPR data is transmitted in an encrypted format to, and stored by, Flock Safety, consistent with Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) protocols. The Department will access the data via a web-based platform.

(2) Information on the proposed purpose, use and benefits of the surveillance technology;

Purpose & Use:

Recent years have seen regional increases in catalytic converter thefts, auto burglaries, vehicle thefts and organized retail thefts. The community has also experienced several brazen robberies and residential burglaries. Those responsible for such crimes commonly use a vehicle to travel to and flee from the crime scene. Moreover, they often engage in criminal offenses involving multiple jurisdictions, and commonly arrive in a stolen vehicle, a vehicle bearing stolen plates, or a vehicle that law enforcement has previously connected to verified criminal activity. Identifying such vehicles, via fixed ALPR, as they enter a target area provides law enforcement an opportunity to intervene before additional crimes are committed, and potentially apprehend wanted persons or recover stolen property. ALPR data also provides investigators with an additional technique to identify and apprehend offenders
once a crime has already occurred.

Other local communities are currently using fixed ALPR technology, including Cath edral City, Rancho Mirage, Palm Desert, La Quinta, Indio, Desert Hot Springs, with others in the process of implementing the technology. Anecdotally, these jurisdictions report that since the deployment of fixed ALPR, they have experienced a marked increase in the recovery of stolen vehicles and report investigative success stories attributable to ALPR data.

Benefits of Usage:

The use of ALPR technology provides several potential benefits:

• Real-Time Alerts: When a real -time ALPR alert occurs, notifying police of the presence of a wanted or stolen vehicle, officers can respond to the area to search for the vehicle. If officers locate the vehicle, prior to making an enforcement stop, they visually confirm the plate number and manually check it against law enforcement databases to confirm the accuracy of the ALPR information and the legal justification for the stop.

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• Deterrence: Even if officers are unable to locate and stop the vehicle in question, suspects may see the police response and be deterred from further criminal activity. Indeed, the mere presence of the fixed ALPR cameras may act as a deterrent. Police personnel have reported to staff that some criminals will intentionally target jurisdictions without ALPR technology and avoid those where it is in use.

• Solving Crimes Already Committed: Commonly, by the time a crime is reported to police, the suspects have already fled the area, and it is the job of police to identify and locate the suspects later. While victims and witnesses can often provide a description of the vehicle used by a suspect, those descriptions are frequently incomplete (e.g., a partial license plate number, vehicle type and color only) or consist of a license plate number that corresponds to a stolen vehicle or a stolen plate. Inves tigators can turn that imperfect information into actionable leads by querying the ALPR database. Existing DMV databases do not offer this capability.

• Regional Coordination: ALPR data sharing among local law enforcement partners allows agencies to collaboratively investigate, identify and apprehend multi - jurisdictional offenders, or those who commit crimes in one jurisdiction but reside in another. For example, in the case of organized retail thieves, ALPR data sharing may allow investigators to connect multiple cases across disparate jurisdictions, share evidence, and obtain the best prosecutorial outcomes.

• Expanded Searchable Data Set: Private entities (e.g., shopping centers, individual retailers) utilizing ALPR cameras can share their data with local law enforcement, to include real-time alerts. This is a one -way share. In other words, an entity that shares its ALPR data with law enforcement does not gain access to law enforcement data in return. The investigative usefulness of an ALPR system is greatly enhanced as its searchable data set increases, whether from other law enforcement contributors or private entities.

The Department believes that the deployment of a fixed ALPR system, with sound policies and training, would support crime prevention, criminal apprehension, stolen vehicle recovery, and criminal investigation.

(3) The location or locations where the surveillance technology may be used;

To derive maximum benefit with the fewest cameras needed, cameras will be placed at strategically selected locations based on several factors: crime statistics, common vehicular ingress and egress points, and traffic volume. Accounting for these factors provides the greatest likelihood of capturing images of suspects’ vehicles and their license plates. While the Department has no intention of permanently installing ALPR cameras in residential neighborhoods, cameras could be temporarily repositioned in response to a Item 3A - Page 64
specific crime in a specific neighborhood. If placed in a residential neighborhood, cameras would not be positioned to capture images of homes, front yards, or pedestrians.

The Palm Springs Police Department is deeply committed to fostering transparency, trust, and community engagement in all aspects of its operations, including the placement of Flock ALPR cameras. Before deploying such cameras in neighborhoods or areas where there may be concerns about over-policing, the department will prioritize an inclusive and collaborative approach. This involves conducting thorough community assessments and seeking input from residents, community leaders, advocacy groups, and other stakeholders. The goal is to ensure that any decision to place ALPR cameras is made with a clear understanding of the community's needs and concerns. Moreover, the department will work closely with these communities to establish strict usage guidelines and policies that respect individual rights, civil liberties, and privacy while addressing legitimate law enforcement needs. By working hand-in-hand with the community, the Palm Springs Police Department aims to strike a balance between public safety and community empowerment.

(4) Existing federal, state and local laws and regulations applicable to the surveillance technology and the information it captures; the potential impacts on civil liberties and privacy; and proposals to mitigate and manage any impacts;

Some organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have generally expressed concerns about the use of ALPR, specifically on the aspects of data access, storage, retention, sharing, and reporting. The Department’s ALPR Policy is responsi ve, in whole or in part, to each of these concerns and the ACLU’s LPR guidelines. For example, while many local law enforcement agencies retain ALPR data for one year and often longer, the Department believes that a retention period of 30 days will adequat ely support its investigative needs. Only data which has been identified as relevant to a specific criminal investigation will be retained longer.

In addition to the Palm Springs Police Department’s policy, California Civil Code §1798.90.5, et seq. governs the collection of license plate information by government agencies. It spells out the policies and training that an agency must implement when collecting ALPR data. These policies, largely, address the same concerns set forth above.

The Department will ensure that its policies and training satisfy the requirements of this statute. Flock Safety has adopted a usage and privacy policy consistent with California Civil Code §1798.90.5, et seq. Moreover, by the terms of the proposed contract with the City, Floc k Safety is required to observe specific data security protocols, including restricting data access only to that which is necessary for system maintenance, logging all access by its employees, conducting quarterly compliance audits, and permitting the City to review these audits logs.

Internally, data will only be accessible to trained staff with a legitimate law enforcement need, and all queries will be logged and subject to audit. Whereas some local law Item 3A - Page 65
enforcement agencies share data with federal and out of state law enforcement agencies, the Palm Springs Police Department will only share its data with other local (State of CA) law enforcement agencies with whom an MOU is in place, and those queries would likewise be logged and available in an audit . Neither the Department, nor Flock Safety, will share the Department’s data with any non-law enforcement entities.

The Palm Springs Police Department remains steadfast in its commitment to protecting the privacy and civil rights of its community members. To that end, the department has made it abundantly clear that it will not share any data obtained through the Flock ALPR system with non-law enforcement groups or any entities seeking information unrelated to law enforcement matters. This strict policy ensures that sensitive issues such as abortions, LGBTQ rights, and immigration remain entirely separate from law enforcement data-sharing practices, safeguarding the personal information and privacy of all residents.

The department's unwavering dedication to maintaining the trust and confidentiality of its community underscores its commitment to upholding both the law and the principles of individual rights and privacy.

The Department has made accessible to the public, via its ALPR webpage, relevant policies and will include information concerning the number of cameras deployed, the data retention period, and the names of law enforcement agencies with whom it shares data. Flock Safety will also maintain a publicly accessible Transparency Portal containing much of the same information.

(5) The costs for the surveillance technology, including acquisition, maintenance, personnel and other costs, and current or potential sources of funding.

In year one, the initial deployment of this ALPR technology would come at a total cost of $50,750, including the initial installation and setup. In year two, the on- going annual cost is $45,000. This includes access to the cameras, data storage, and access to the ALPR database. The Department anticipates no more $4,000 will be needed annually to repair any damaged equipment. This project is included in the FY 2023- 2025 budget and sufficient funding is available as adopted by the city council.

This report recommends the Council approve the following:

• A two-year Cooperative contract with Insight Public Sector, Inc. (No. 23-6692-03) for Flock Safety ALPR Implementation

Evaluation

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT:

The Department consulted with several other agencies to gather best practices for the deployment, and oversight of a fixed ALPR program.

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In August 2023, the Department reviewed the attached ACLU guidelines to better understand the ACLU’s concerns about the use of ALPR technology, and to ensure PSPD’s policy addressed those concerns in amending PSPD’s ALPR policy.

Additionally, on September 18, 2023, the Department held a community meeting to address the topic with the community at large at the PSPD Training Center . See Attachments D & E.

In September 2023, the Department launched an updated informational webpage, including an opportunity for community input. See Attachment F.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
:

There are no identifiable environmental effects, climate impacts, or sustainability opportunities associated with the subject of this report. Approval of this agreement and surveillance policy are categorically exempt under CEQA regulation 15321 for enforcement actions.

ALIGNMENT WITH STRATEGIC PLANNING:

The implementation of Flock Fixed ALPR Cameras is in direct alignment with the City of Palm Springs' 2023-2025 Strategic Plan to enhance the quality of life and prioritize public safety. By strategically placing these cameras on light poles and standalone poles throughout the city, we are taking proactive measures to improve community security.

The captured license plate information will enable law enforcement agencies to effectively address and reduce criminal activities. This initiative demonstrates our commitment to fostering a safer environment for our residents and visitors, while actively supporting our goal of minimizing crime and enhancing the overall well-being of the community.

FISCAL IMPACT
:

The Department is contracting for the installation and use – not the purchase – of ALPR cameras. Flock Safety will complete the installation and setup of the cameras and will be the owner of the equipment. The cameras are solar -powered and transmit data via a wireless cell signal, requiring no utility connection. Flock Safety will maintain or replace the cameras as needed. Data storage - other than specific images identified as evidence in a criminal investigation - will be the responsibility of Flock Safety who will be responsible for maintaining CJIS data protocols, and the data will be accessed via a web platform, requiring no new software.

PSPD expects the individual camera costs at $2500 each, with the installation to vary.

PSPD believes that for the proposed 15- camera deployment, the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $50,750.00. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to be approximately $4 5,000 annually. This includes access to the cameras, data storage, and access to the ALPR database. Damaged cameras will be Item 3A - Page 67
replaced by Flock Safety at a cost of $800 per camera as referenced in the Insight Public Sector Contract citing the FLOCK End User License Agreement, with an annual cost not expected to exceed $ 4,000. This project is included in the FY 2023- 2025 budget and sufficient funding is available as adopted by the city council.

REVIEWED BY:

Department Director: Andrew Mills
Procurement and Contracting Director: Kim Baker
Assistant City Manager: Teresa Gallavan
City Manager: Teresa Gallavan for Scott C. Stiles

ATTACHMENTS:

A. Cooperative Subscription Agreement with Insight Public Sector, Inc. No. 23C214 B. Public Integrity Disclosure Form
C. Palm Springs Police Department ALPR Policy
D. Original PSPD Community Presentation
E. PSPD Town Hall Flyer
F. Image of PSPD ALPR webpage
G. ACLU Guidelines
H. Flock’s Response to Questions posed by City Council on September 26th I. Flock’s Presentation
J. Flock’s response to ACLU’s considerations when using ALPR K. Flock Safety and CJIS compliance document
L. Updated PSPD Presentation
M. ALPR Comparisons

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ATTACHMENT A

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COOPERATIVE SUBSCRIPTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE-FREE LICENSE PLATE READERS AGREEMENT NO. 23C214

This Cooperative Subscription of Infrastructure- Free License Plate Readers Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into by and between the City of Palm Springs, a California charter city and municipal corporation (“City”) and Insight Public Sector, Inc., an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business at 2701 E. Insight Way, Chandler AZ (“Contractor”). City and Contractor are sometimes individually referred to as “Party” or collectively as “Parties” in this Agreement.

1. BACKGROUND.
a. This Agreement is made and entered into in reference to the competitively solicited OMNIA Partners (formerly U.S. Communities) Contract No. #23- 6692-03 with Contractor (“Cooperative Agreement”).
b. The City desires to subscribe for 15 infrastructure- free license plate readers and associated subscription service (“Services”), as attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, the content of which is incorporated by reference to this Agreement as if fully set out her in its entirety.
c. Contractor desires to perform said Services on the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, as well as the Terms and Conditions attached hereto as Exhibit “F” and incorporated by reference herein.

2. TERM. The term of this Agreement is 2 years beginning on the date provided in the Notice to Proceed for the City’s Procurement and Contracting Department. The parties may mutually extend the term of this Agreement for up to 3 additional 1- year periods (“Option Period(s)”), provided, the parties do so in writing prior to the expiration of the original term of the then- current Option Period.

3. COMPENSATION AND PAYMENT . This Agreement is for an amount not to exceed $103,750.00, subject to approved amendments and changes. All pricing must be in accordance with the attached Quote, as shown as Exhibit “B”, the content of which is incorporated by reference into this Agreement as if fully set out here in its entirety.

4. APPROPRIATIONS. This Agreement is subject to, and contingent upon, funds being appropriated by the City Council of City for each fiscal year. If such appropriations are not made, this Agreement shall automatically terminate without penalty to City.

5. INSURANCE. Contractor shall procure and maintain, at its sole cost and expense, policies of insurance as set forth in the attached Exhibit "C", incorporated herein by reference. If no insurance is required Exhibit “C” will reflect that there are no requirements.

6. INDEMNIFICATION. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contractor shall defend (at Contractor’s sole cost and expense), indemnify, protect, and hold harmless City, its elected officials, officers, employees, agents, and volunteers (collectively the “Indemnified Parties”) , from and against any and all liabilities, actions, suits, claims, demands, losses, costs, judgments, arbitration awards, settlements, damages, demands, orders, penalties, and expenses including legal costs and attorney fees (collectively “Claims”), including but not Item 3A - Page 70
limited to Claims arising from injuries to or death of persons (Contractor’s employees included), for damage to property, including property owned by City, for any violation of any federal, state, or local law or ordinance or in any manner arising out of, pertaining to, or incident to any acts, errors or omissions, or willful misconduct committed by Contractor, its officers, employees, representatives, and agents, that arise out of or relate to Contractor’s performance of Services or this Agreement. This indemnification clause excludes Claims arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the Indemnified Parties. Under no circumstances shall the insurance requirements and limits set forth in this Agreement be construed to limit Contractor’s indemnification obligation or other liability under this Agreement. Contractor’s indemnification obligation shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement until all actions against the Indemnified Parties for such matters indemnified are fully and finally barred by the applicable statute of limitations or, if an action is timely filed, until such action is final.

7. NOTICE. Any notice required under this Agreement must be given by fax, hand delivery, or certified mail, postage prepaid, and is deemed received on the day faxed, or hand delivered or on the third day after postmark if sent by certified mail. Notice must be sent as follows:

To City: City of Palm Springs
3200 E. Tahquitz Canyon Way
Palm Springs, California 92262

To Contractor: Insight Public Sector, Inc.

Attn: Cathy Chapman
2701 E Insight Way
Chandler, AZ 85286-1930
800-467-4448

8. COMPLIANCE WITH LAW . Contractor shall comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, statutes and ordinances and all lawful orders, rules, and regulations when performing the Services. When providing the Services, Contractor shall comply with the City of Palm Springs Police Department Policy 403 (Automated License Plate Readers) to the extent such policy is applicable to Contractor’s provisions of Services. Said policy is attached hereto as Exhibit “E” and incorporated by reference herein, and may be amended from time to time. City shall provide Contractor with a copy of any amendments to such Policy.

Contractor shall be liable for all violations of such laws and regulations in connection with this Agreement.

9. CHANGES. In the event any change or changes in the work is requested by City, Parties shall execute a written amendment to this Agreement, specifying all proposed amendments, including, but not limited to, any additional fees. An amendment may be entered into:

A. To provide for revisions or modifications to documents, work product, or Work, when required by the enactment or revision of any subsequent law; or B. To provide for additional work not included in this Agreement or not customarily furnished in accordance with generally accepted practice in Contractor’s profession.

10. TERMINATION PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF TERM. City may terminate this Agreement at any time, with or without cause, upon thirty (30) days written notice to Contractor. Where termination is due to the fault of Contractor and constitutes an immediate danger to health, Item 3A - Page 71
safety, and general welfare, the period of notice shall be such shorter time as may be determined by the City. Upon receipt of the notice of termination, Contractor shall immediately cease all Services except such as may be specifically approved by the Contract Officer.

Contractor shall be entitled to compensation for all Services rendered prior to receipt of the notice of termination and for any Services authorized by the Contract Officer after such notice.

City shall not be liable for any costs other than the charges or portions thereof which are specified herein. Contractor shall not be entitled to payment for unperformed Services and shall not be entitled to damages or compensation for termination of Work. If the termination is for cause, the City shall have the right to take whatever steps it deems necessary to correct Contractor's deficiencies and charge the cost thereof to Contractor, who shall be liable for the full cost of the City's corrective action. Contractor may not terminate this Agreement except for cause, upon 30 days written notice to City.

11. COVENANT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION . In connection with its performance under this Agreement, Contractor shall not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of actual or perceived race, religion, color, sex, age, marital status, ancestry, national origin ( i.e., place of origin, immigration status, cultural or linguistic characteristics, or ethnicity), sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, physical or mental disability, or medical condition (each a “prohibited basis”). Contractor shall ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during their employment, without regard to any prohibited basis. As a condition precedent to City’s lawful capacity to enter this Agreement, and in executing this Agreement, Contractor certifies that its actions and omissions hereunder shall not incorporate any discrimination arising from or related to any prohibited basis in any Contractor activity, including but not limited to the following:
employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship; and further, that Contractor is in full compliance with the provisions of Palm Springs Municipal Code Section 7.09.040, including without limitation the provision of benefits, relating to non-discrimination in city contracting.

12. COMPLIANCE WITH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN UKRAINE. When funding for the Services is provided, in whole or in part, by an agency controlled of the State of California, Consultant shall fully and adequately comply with California Executive Order N-6-22 (“Russian Sanctions Program”). As part of this compliance process, Consultant shall also certify compliance with the Russian Sanctions Program by completing the form located in Exhibit “D” (Russian Sanctions Certification), attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Consultant shall also require any subconsultants to comply with the Russian Sanctions Program and certify compliance pursuant to this Section.

13. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Agreement, along with the Cooperative Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties concerning the subject matter of this Agreement and supersedes all prior negotiations, arrangements, agreements and understandings, either oral or written between the parties. In the event of conflict or inconsistency between this Agreement and the Cooperative Agreement, this terms and conditions in this Agreement shall prevail.
[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]

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BETWEEN THE CITY OF PALM SPRINGS
AND INSIGHT PUBLIC SECTOR, INC.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement as of the dates stated below.

CONTRACTOR:

By Date
Signature

By

Date

Signature
(2nd signature required for
Corporations)

CITY OF PALM SPRINGS:

APPROVED BY CITY COUNCIL: Date: Item No.

APPROVED AS TO FORM: ATTEST:

By

By

City Attorney City Clerk

APPROVED:

By Date
City Manager – over $50,000
Deputy/Assistant City Manager – up to $50,000
Director – up to $25,000
Manager – up to $5,000

Item 3A - Page 73
EXHIBIT “A”

SCOPE OF WORK
The Contractor is to provide a subscription service (“Services”) provided through Insight Public Sector, Inc. The system, developed by Flock Safety and licensed to Insight Public Sector, Inc., is a network of license plate readers (LPR) strategically placed in cooperation with PSPD and the Contractor.

Damaged cameras will be replaced by Flock Safety at a cost of $800 per camera as referenced in the Insight Public Sector Contract citing the FLOCK End User License Agreement, with an annual cost not expected to exceed $4,000.00
Team Configuration:

Implementation Meet with a Solutions Consultant (former LEO) to build a deployment plan based on your needs. Our Permitting Team and Installation Technicians will work to get your device network approved, installed, and activated.

User Training + Support Your designated Customer Success Manager will help train your power users and ensure you maximize the platform, while our customer support team will assist with needs as they arise.

Maintenance We proactively monitor the health of your device network. If we detect that a device is offline, a full-time technician will service your device for no extra charge.

Public Relations Government Affairs

Get support educating your stakeholders, including city councils and other governing bodies.

Media Relations

Share crimes solved in the local media with the help of our Public Relations team.

System Features:

Simplified Search Get a complete view of all activity tied to one vehicle in your network of privately and publicly owned cameras.

The user-friendly search experience allows officers to filter hours of footage in seconds based on time, location, and
detailed vehicle criteria using patented Vehicle Fingerprint ™ technology. Search filters include:
• Vehicle make
• Body type
• Color
• License plates
• Partial tags
• Missing tags
• Temporary tags
• State recognition
• Decals
• Bumper stickers
• Back racks
• Top racks
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National and Local Sharing Access 1B+ additional plate reads each month without purchasing more cameras. Solve cross-jurisdiction crimes by opting into Flock Safety's sharing networks, including one-to- one, national, and statewide search networks. Users can also receive alerts from several external LPR databases:

California SVS FDLE
FL Expired Licenses
FL Expired Tags
FL Sanctioned Drivers
FL Sex Offenders Georgia DOR
IL SOS
Illinois Leads NCIC
NCMEC
Amber Alert REJIS

CCIC FBI
Real-time Alerts Receive SMS, email, and in-app notifications for custom Hot Lists, NCIC wanted lists, AMBER alerts, Silver alerts, Vehicle Fingerprint matches, and more.

Interactive ESRI Map View your AVL, CAD, traffic, and LPR alerts alongside live on- scene video from a single interactive map for a birdseye view of activity in your jurisdiction.

Vehicle Location Analysis Visualize sequential Hot List alerts and the direction of travel to guide officers to find suspect vehicles faster.

Transparency Portal Establish community trust with a public-facing dashboard that shares policies, usage, and public safety outcomes related to your policing technology.

Insights Dashboard Access at-a-glance reporting to easily prove ROI, discover crime and traffic patterns and prioritize changes to your public safety strategy by using data to determine the most significant impact.

Native MDT Application Download FlockOS to your MDTs to ensure officers never miss a Hot List alert while out on patrol.

Hot List Attachments Attach relevant information to Custom Hot List alerts. Give simple, digestible context to Dispatchers and Patrol Officers responding to Hot List alerts so they can act confidently and drive better outcomes. When you create a custom Hot List Alert, add case notes, photos, reports, and other relevant case information.

Single Sign On (SSO) Increase your login speed and information security with Okta or Azure Single Sign On (SSO). Quickly access critical information you need to do your job by eliminating the need for password resets and steps in the log-in process.

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Proposed Placement:

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EXHIBIT “B”

QUOTE / PRICING

Item 3A - Page 77

Item 3A - Page 78

Item 3A - Page 79
EXHIBIT “C”

INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
Required Coverage. Flock shall procure and maintain for the duration of this Agreement insurance against claims for injuries to persons or damages to property that may arise from or in connection with the performance of the services under this Agreement and the results of that work by Flock or its agents, representatives, employees or subcontractors.

Insurance shall be placed with insurers with a current A. M. Best rating of no less than “A” and “VII”. Flock shall obtain and, during the term of this Agreement, shall maintain policies of professional liability (errors and omissions), automobile liability, and general liability insurance for insurable amounts of not less than the limits listed herein. The insurance policies shall provide that the policies shall remain in full force during the life of the Agreement. Flock shall procure and shall maintain during the life of this Agreement Worker's Compensation insurance as required by applicable State law for all Flock employees.

Types and Amounts Required. Flock shall maintain, at minimum, the following insurance coverage for the duration of this Agreement:
(i) Commercial General Liability insurance written on an occurrence basis with minimum limits of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per occurrence and Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) in the aggregate for bodily injury, death, and property damage, including personal injury, contractual liability, independent contractors, broad- form property damage, and product and completed operations coverage; (ii) Umbrella or Excess Liability insurance written on an occurrence basis with minimum limits of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000) per occurrence and Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000) in the aggregate;
(iii) Professional Liability/Errors and Omissions insurance with minimum limits of Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000) per occurrence and Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000) in the aggregate;
(iv) Commercial Automobile Liability insurance with a minimum combined single limit of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) per occurrence for bodily injury, death, and property coverage, including owned and non-owned and hired automobile coverage; and Item 3A - Page 80
(v) Cyber Liability insurance written on an occurrence basis with minimum limits of Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000).

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EXHIBIT “D”
EXECUTIVE ORDER N-6-22 CERTIFICATION

Executive Order N -6-22 issued by Governor Gavin Newsom on March 4, 2022, directs all agencies and departments that are subject to the Governor’s authority to (a) terminate any contracts with any individuals or entities that are determined to be a target of economic sanctions against Russia and Russian entities and individuals; and (b) refrain from entering into any new contracts with such individuals or entities while the aforementioned sanctions are in effect.

Executive Order N-6-22 also requires that any contractor that: (1) currently has a contract with the City of Palm Springs funded through grant funds provided by the State of California; and/or (2) submits a bid or proposal or otherwise proposes to or enter into or renew a contract with the City of Palm Springs with State of California grant funds, certify that the person is not the target of any economic sanctions against Russia and Russian entities and individuals.

The contractor hereby certifies, SUBJECT TO PENALTY FOR PERJURY, that a) the contractor is not a target of any economic sanctions against Russian and Russian entities and individuals as discussed in Executive Order N -6-22 and b) the person signing below is duly authorized to legally bind the Contractor. This certification is made under the laws of the State of California.

Signature:

Printed Name:

Title:

Firm Name:

Date:

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EXHIBIT “E”

AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER POLICY

Item 3A - Page 83

EXHIBIT “F”
FLOCK’S TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. DEFINITIONS
Certain capitalized terms, not otherwise defined herein, have the meanings set forth or cross- referenced in this Section 1.

1.1 “Anonymized Data” means Customer Data permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information, by commercially available standards which irreversibly alters data in such a way that a data subject (i.e., individual person or entity) can no longer be identified directly or indirectly.

1.2 “Authorized End User(s)” means any individual employees, agents, or contractors of Customer accessing or using the Services, under the rights granted to Customer pursuant to this Agreement.

1.3 “Customer Data” means the data, media and content provided by Customer through the Services. For the avoidance of doubt, the Customer Data will include the Footage.

1.4. “Customer Hardware” means the third-party camera owned or provided by Customer and any other physical elements that interact with the Embedded Software and the Web Interface to provide the Services.

1.5 “Embedded Software” means the Flock proprietary software and/or firmware integrated with or installed on the Flock Hardware or Customer Hardware.

1.6 “Flock Hardware” means the Flock device(s), which may include the pole, clamps, solar panel, installation components, and any other physical elements that interact with the Embedded Software and the Web Interface, to provide the Flock Services as specifically set forth in the applicable product addenda.

1.7 “Flock IP” means the Services, the Embedded Software, and any intellectual property or proprietary information therein or otherwise provided to Customer and/or its Authorized End Users. Flock IP does not include Footage (as defined below).

1.8 “Flock Network End User(s)” means any user of the Flock Services that Customer authorizes access to or receives data from, pursuant to the licenses granted herein.

1.9 “Flock Services” means the provision of Flock’s software and hardware situational awareness solution, via the Web Interface, for automatic license plate detection, alerts, audio detection, searching image records, video and sharing Footage.

1.10 “Footage” means still images, video, audio and other data captured by the Flock Hardware or Customer Hardware in the course of and provided via the Flock Services.

1.11 “Hotlist(s)” means a digital file containing alphanumeric license plate related information pertaining to vehicles of interest, which may include stolen vehicles, stolen vehicle license plates, vehicles owned or associated with wanted or missing person(s), vehicles suspected of being involved with criminal or terrorist activities, and other legitimate law enforcement purposes. Hotlist also includes, but is not limited to, national data (i.e., NCIC) for similar Item 3A - Page 84
categories, license plates associated with AMBER Alerts or Missing Persons/Vulnerable Adult Alerts and includes manually entered license plate information associated with crimes that have occurred in any local jurisdiction.

1.12 “Installation Services” means the services provided by Flock for installation of Flock Services.

1.13 “Permitted Purpose” means for legitimate law enforcement purposes, including but not limited to the awareness, prevention, and prosecution of crime, investigations, prevention of commercial harm, to the extent permitted by law.

1.14 “Retention Period” means the time period that the Customer Data is stored within the cloud storage, as specified in the product addenda.

1.15 “Vehicle Fingerprint™” means the unique vehicular attributes captured through Services such as: type, make, color, state registration, missing/covered plates, bumper stickers, decals, roof racks, and bike racks.

1.16 “Web Interface” means the website(s) or application(s) through which Customer and its Authorized End Users can access the Services.

2. SERVICES AND SUPPORT

2.1 Provision of Access. Flock hereby grants to Customer a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to access the features and functions of the Flock Services via the Web Interface during the Term, solely for the Authorized End Users. The Footage will be available for Authorized End Users to access and download via the Web Interface for the data retention time defined on the Order Form (“Retention Period”). Authorized End Users will be required to sign up for an account and select a password and username (“User ID”). Customer shall be responsible for all acts and omissions of Authorized End Users, and any act or omission by an Authorized End User which, including any acts or omissions of authorized End user which would constitute a breach of this agreement if undertaken by customer. Customer shall undertake reasonable efforts to make all Authorized End Users aware of all applicable provisions of this Agreement and shall cause Authorized End Users to comply with such provisions. Flock may use the services of one or more third parties to deliver any part of the Flock Services, (such as using a third party to host the Web Interface for cloud storage or a cell phone provider for wireless cellular coverage).

2.2 Embedded Software License. Flock grants Customer a limited, non-exclusive, non- transferable, non-sublicensable (except to the Authorized End Users), revocable right to use the Embedded Software as it pertains to Flock Services, solely as necessary for Customer to use the Flock Services.

2.3 Support Services. Flock shall monitor the Flock Services, and any applicable device health, in order to improve performance and functionality. Flock will use commercially reasonable efforts to respond to requests for support within seventy-two (72) hours. Flock will provide Customer with reasonable technical and on-site support and maintenance services in-person, via phone or by email at [email protected] (such services collectively referred to as “Support Services”).

2.4 Upgrades to Platform. Flock may make any upgrades to system or platform that it deems necessary or useful to (i) maintain or enhance the quality or delivery of Flock’s products or Item 3A - Page 85
services to its agencies, the competitive strength of, or market for, Flock’s products or services such platform or system’s cost efficiency or performance, or (ii) to comply with applicable law.

Parties understand that such upgrades are necessary from time to time and will not diminish the quality of the services or materially change any terms or conditions within this Agreement.

2.5 Service Interruption. Services may be interrupted in the event that: (a) Flock’s provision of the Services to Customer or any Authorized End User is prohibited by applicable law; (b) any third-party services required for Services are interrupted; (c) if Flock reasonably believe Services are being used for malicious, unlawful, or otherwise unauthorized use; (d) there is a threat or attack on any of the Flock IP by a third party; or (e) scheduled or emergency maintenance (“Service Interruption”). Flock will make commercially reasonable efforts to provide written notice of any Service Interruption to Customer, to provide updates, and to resume providing access to Flock Services as soon as reasonably possible after the event giving rise to the Service Interruption is cured. Flock will have no liability for any damage, liabilities, losses (including any loss of data or profits), or any other consequences that Customer or any Authorized End User may incur as a result of a Service Interruption. To the extent that the Service Interruption is not caused by Customer’s direct actions or by the actions of parties associated with the Customer, the time will be tolled by the duration of the Service Interruption (for any continuous suspension lasting at least one full day). For example, in the event of a Service Interruption lasting five (5) continuous days, Customer will receive a credit for five (5) free days at the end of the Term.

2.6 Service Suspension. Flock may temporarily suspend Customer’s and any Authorized End User’s access to any portion or all of the Flock IP or Flock Service if (a) there is a threat or attack on any of the Flock IP by Customer; (b) Customer’s or any Authorized End User’s use of the Flock IP disrupts or poses a security risk to the Flock IP or any other customer or vendor of Flock; (c) Customer or any Authorized End User is/are using the Flock IP for fraudulent or illegal activities; (d) Customer has violated any term of this provision, including, but not limited to, utilizing Flock Services for anything other than the Permitted Purpose; or (e) any unauthorized access to Flock Services through Customer’s account (“Service Suspension”). Customer shall not be entitled to any remedy for the Service Suspension period, including any reimbursement, tolling, or credit. If the Service Suspension was not caused by Customer, the Term will be tolled by the duration of the Service Suspension.

2.7 Hazardous Conditions. Flock Services do not contemplate hazardous materials, or other hazardous conditions, including, without limit, asbestos, lead, toxic or flammable substances. In the event any such hazardous materials are discovered in the designated locations in which Flock is to perform services under this Agreement, Flock shall have the right to cease work immediately.

3. CUSTOMER OBLIGATIONS

3.1 Customer Obligations. Flock will assist Customer Authorized End Users in the creation of a User ID. Authorized End Users agree to provide Flock with accurate, complete, and updated registration information. Authorized End Users may not select as their User ID, a name that they do not have the right to use, or any other name with the intent of impersonation. Customer and Authorized End Users may not transfer their account to anyone else without prior written permission of Flock. Authorized End Users shall not share their account username or password information and must protect the security of the username and password. Unless otherwise stated and defined in this Agreement, Customer shall not designate Authorized End Users for Item 3A - Page 86
persons who are not officers, employees, or agents of Customer. Authorized End Users shall only use Customer-issued email addresses for the creation of their User ID. Customer is responsible for any Authorized End User activity associated with its account. Customer shall ensure that Customer provides Flock with up to date contact information at all times during the Term of this agreement. Customer shall be responsible for obtaining and maintaining any equipment and ancillary services needed to connect to, access or otherwise use the Flock Services. Customer shall (at its own expense) provide Flock with reasonable access and use of Customer facilities and Customer personnel in order to enable Flock to perform Services (such obligations of Customer are collectively defined as “Customer Obligations”).

3.2 Customer Representations and Warranties. Customer represents, covenants, and warrants that Customer shall use Flock Services only in compliance with this Agreement and all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to any laws relating to the recording or sharing of data, video, photo, or audio content.

4. DATA USE AND LICENSING

4.1 Customer Data. As between Flock and Customer, all right, title and interest in the Customer Data, belong to and are retained solely by Customer. Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, worldwide license to use the Customer Data and perform all acts as may be necessary for Flock to provide the Flock Services to Customer. Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data.

4.2 Customer Generated Data. Flock may provide Customer with the opportunity to post, upload, display, publish, distribute, transmit, broadcast, or otherwise make available, messages, text, illustrations, files, images, graphics, photos, comments, sounds, music, videos, information, content, ratings, reviews, data, questions, suggestions, or other information or materials produced by Customer (“Customer Generated Data”). Customer shall retain whatever legally cognizable right, title, and interest in Customer Generated Data. Customer understands and acknowledges that Flock has no obligation to monitor or enforce Customer’s intellectual property rights of Customer Generated Data. Customer grants Flock a non-exclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, license to use the Customer Generated Data for the purpose of providing Flock Services. Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Generated Data.

4.3 Anonymized Data. Flock shall have the right to collect, analyze, and anonymize Customer Data and Customer Generated Data to the extent such anonymization renders the data non- identifiable to create Anonymized Data for the purpose of training of machine learning algorithms. Customer hereby grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right to use and distribute such Anonymized Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other development, diagnostic and corrective purposes, and other Flock offerings. Parties understand that the aforementioned license is required for continuity of Services. Flock does not own and shall not sell Anonymized Data.

5. CONFIDENTIALITY; DISCLOSURES

5.1 Confidentiality. To the extent required by any applicable public records requests, each Party (the “Receiving Party”) understands that the other Party (the “Disclosing Party”) has disclosed or may disclose business, technical or financial information relating to the Disclosing Party’s business (hereinafter referred to as “Proprietary Information” of the Disclosing Party).

Proprietary Information includes non-public information provided by the Disclosing Party to the Item 3A - Page 87
Receiving Party regarding features, functionality, and performance of this Agreement. The Receiving Party agrees: (i) to take the same security precautions to protect against disclosure or unauthorized use of such Proprietary Information that the Party takes with its own proprietary information, but in no event less than commercially reasonable precautions, and (ii) not to use (except in performance of the Services or as otherwise permitted herein) or divulge to any third person any such Proprietary Information. The Disclosing Party agrees that the foregoing shall not apply with respect to any information that the Receiving Party can document (a) is or becomes generally available to the public; or (b) was in its possession or known by it prior to receipt from the Disclosing Party; or (c) was rightfully disclosed to it without restriction by a third party; or (d) was independently developed without use of any Proprietary Information of the Disclosing Party. Nothing in this Agreement will prevent the Receiving Party from disclosing the Proprietary Information pursuant to any judicial or governmental order, provided that the Receiving Party gives the Disclosing Party reasonable prior notice of such disclosure to contest such order. At the termination of this Agreement, all Proprietary Information will be returned to the Disclosing Party, destroyed or erased (if recorded on an erasable storage medium), together with any copies thereof, when no longer needed for the purposes above, or upon request from the Disclosing Party, and in any case upon termination of the Agreement. Notwithstanding any termination, all confidentiality obligations of Proprietary Information that is trade secret shall continue in perpetuity or until such information is no longer trade secret.

5.2 Usage Restrictions on Flock IP. Flock and its licensors retain all right, title and interest in and to the Flock IP and its components, and Customer acknowledges that it neither owns nor acquires any additional rights in and to the foregoing not expressly granted by this Agreement.

Customer further acknowledges that Flock retains the right to use the foregoing for any purpose in Flock’s sole discretion. Customer and Authorized End Users shall not: (i) copy or duplicate any of the Flock IP; (ii) decompile, disassemble, reverse engineer, or otherwise attempt to obtain or perceive the source code from which any software component of any of the Flock IP is compiled or interpreted, or apply any other process or procedure to derive the source code of any software included in the Flock IP; (iii) attempt to modify, alter, tamper with or repair any of the Flock IP, or attempt to create any derivative product from any of the foregoing; (iv) interfere or attempt to interfere in any manner with the functionality or proper working of any of the Flock IP; (v) remove, obscure, or alter any notice of any intellectual property or proprietary right appearing on or contained within the Flock Services or Flock IP; (vi) use the Flock Services for anything other than the Permitted Purpose; or (vii) assign, sublicense, sell, resell, lease, rent, or otherwise transfer, convey, pledge as security, or otherwise encumber, Customer’s rights. There are no implied rights.

5.3 Disclosure of Footage. Subject to and during the Retention Period, Flock may access, use, preserve and/or disclose the Footage to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or third parties, if legally required to do so or if Flock has a good faith belief that such access, use, preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to comply with a legal process, enforce this Agreement, or detect, prevent or otherwise address security, privacy, fraud or technical issues, or emergency situations. and will notify Customer so that Customer may have an opportunity to seek a protective order or limit the scope of such disclosure.

6. PAYMENT OF FEES

6.1 Billing and Payment of Fees. Customer shall pay the fees set forth in the applicable Order Form based on the billing structure and payment terms as indicated in the Order Form. If Customer believes that Flock has billed Customer incorrectly, Customer must contact Flock no later than thirty (30) days after the closing date on the first invoice in which the error or problem Item 3A - Page 88
appeared to receive an adjustment or credit. Customer acknowledges and agrees that a failure to contact Flock within this period will serve as a waiver of any claim. If any undisputed fee is more than thirty (30) days overdue, Flock may, without limiting its other rights and remedies, suspend delivery of its service until such undisputed invoice is paid in full. Flock shall provide at least thirty (30) days’ prior written notice to Customer of the payment delinquency before exercising any suspension right.

6.2 Notice of Changes to Fees. Flock reserves the right to change the fees for subsequent Renewal Terms by providing sixty (60) days’ notice (which may be sent by email) prior to the end of the Initial Term or Renewal Term (as applicable).

6.3 Late Fees. If payment is not issued to Flock by the due date of the invoice, an interest penalty of 1.0% of any unpaid amount may be added for each month or fraction thereafter, until final payment is made.

6.4 Taxes. Customer is responsible for all taxes, levies, or duties, excluding only taxes based on Flock’s net income, imposed by taxing authorities associated with the order. If Flock has the legal obligation to pay or collect taxes, including amount subsequently assessed by a taxing authority, for which Customer is responsible, the appropriate amount shall be invoice to and paid by Customer unless Customer provides Flock a legally sufficient tax exemption certificate and Flock shall not charge customer any taxes from which it is exempt. If any deduction or withholding is required by law, Customer shall notify Flock and shall pay Flock any additional amounts necessary to ensure that the net amount that Flock receives, after any deduction and withholding, equals the amount Flock would have received if no deduction or withholding had been required.

7. TERM AND TERMINATION

7.1 Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall be for the period of time set forth on the Order Form (the “Term”). Following the Term, unless otherwise indicated on the Order Form, this Agreement will automatically renew for successive renewal terms of the greater of one year or the length set forth on the Order Form (each, a “Renewal Term”) unless either Party gives the other Party notice of non-renewal at least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the then-current term.

7.2 Termination. Upon termination or expiration of this Agreement, Flock will remove any applicable Flock Hardware at a commercially reasonable time period. In the event of any material breach of this Agreement, the non-breaching Party may terminate this Agreement prior to the end of the Term by giving thirty (30) days prior written notice to the breaching Party; provided, however, that this Agreement will not terminate if the breaching Party has cured the breach prior to the expiration of such thirty (30) day period (“Cure Period”). Either Party may terminate this Agreement (i) upon the institution by or against the other Party of insolvency, receivership or bankruptcy proceedings, (ii) upon the other Party's making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or (iii) upon the other Party's dissolution or ceasing to do business. In the event of a material breach by Flock, and Flock is unable to cure within the Cure Period, Flock will refund Customer a pro-rata portion of the pre-paid fees for Services not received due to such termination.

7.3 Survival. The following Sections will survive termination: 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8.3, 8.4, 9, 10.1 and

11.6. 8. REMEDY FOR DEFECT; WARRANTY AND DISCLAIMER
Item 3A - Page 89

8.1 Manufacturer Defect. Upon a malfunction or failure of Flock Hardware or Embedded Software (a “Defect”), Customer must notify Flock’s technical support team. In the event of a Defect, Flock shall make a commercially reasonable attempt to repair or replace the defective Flock Hardware at no additional cost to the Customer. Flock reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to repair or replace such Defect, provided that Flock shall conduct inspection or testing within a commercially reasonable time, but no longer than seven (7) business days after Customer gives notice to Flock.

8.2 Replacements. In the event that Flock Hardware is lost, stolen, or damaged, Customer may request a replacement of Flock Hardware at a fee according to the reinstall fee schedule (https://www.flocksafety.com/reinstall-fee-schedule). In the event that Customer chooses not to replace lost, damaged, or stolen Flock Hardware, Customer understands and agrees that (1) Flock Services will be materially affected, and (2) that Flock shall have no liability to Customer regarding such affected Flock Services, nor shall Customer receive a refund for the lost, damaged, or stolen Flock Hardware.

8.3 Warranty. Flock shall use reasonable efforts consistent with prevailing industry standards to maintain the Services in a manner which minimizes errors and interruptions in the Services and shall perform the Installation Services in a professional and workmanlike manner. Services may be temporarily unavailable for scheduled maintenance or for unscheduled emergency maintenance, either by Flock or by third-party providers, or because of other causes beyond Flock’s reasonable control, but Flock shall use reasonable efforts to provide advance notice in writing or by e-mail of any scheduled service disruption.

8.4 Disclaimer. THE REMEDY DESCRIBED IN SECTION 8.1 ABOVE IS CUSTOMER’S SOLE REMEDY, AND FLOCK’S SOLE LIABILITY, WITH RESPECT TO DEFECTS. FLOCK DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE SERVICES WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR FREE; NOR

DOES IT MAKE ANY WARRANTY AS TO THE RESULTS THAT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE SERVICES. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION, THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS IS” AND FLOCK DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS

OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF

MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON- INFRINGEMENT. THIS DISCLAIMER ONLY APPLIES TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY THE GOVERNING LAW OF THE STATE MENTIONED IN SECTION 11.6.

8.5 Insurance. Flock will maintain commercial general liability policies to be provided as Exhibit C.

8.6 Force Majeure. Parties are not responsible or liable for any delays or failures in performance from any cause beyond their control, including, but not limited to acts of God, changes to law or regulations, embargoes, war, terrorist acts, pandemics (including the spread of variants), issues of national security, acts or omissions of third-party technology providers, riots, fires, earthquakes, floods, power blackouts, strikes, supply chain shortages of equipment or supplies, financial institution crisis, weather conditions or acts of hackers, internet service providers or any other third party acts or omissions.

9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY; INDEMNITY

9.1 Limitation of Liability. NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY, FLOCK, ITS

OFFICERS, AFFILIATES, REPRESENTATIVES, CONTRACTORS AND EMPLOYEES SHALL

NOT BE RESPONSIBLE OR LIABLE WITH RESPECT TO ANY SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS

AGREEMENT OR TERMS AND CONDITIONS RELATED THERETO UNDER ANY Item 3A - Page 90

CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, PRODUCT LIABILITY, OR OTHER THEORY: (A) FOR LOSS OF REVENUE, BUSINESS OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION; (B) INCOMPLETE, CORRUPT, OR INACCURATE DATA; (C) COST OF PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS, SERVICES OR TECHNOLOGY; (D) FOR ANY INDIRECT, EXEMPLARY, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES; (E) FOR ANY MATTER BEYOND FLOCK’S ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR REASONABLE CONTROL INCLUDING REPEAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OR INABILITY TO CAPTURE FOOTAGE; OR (F)

FOR ANY AMOUNTS THAT, TOGETHER WITH AMOUNTS ASSOCIATED WITH ALL OTHER

CLAIMS, EXCEED THE FEES PAID AND/OR PAYABLE BY CUSTOMER TO FLOCK FOR THE SERVICES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT IN THE TWELVE (12) MONTHS PRIOR TO THE

ACT OR OMISSION THAT GAVE RISE TO THE LIABILITY, IN EACH CASE, WHETHER OR NOT FLOCK HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. THIS

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF SECTION ONLY APPLIES TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY THE GOVERNING LAW OF THE STATE REFERENCED IN SECTION 11.6.

NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY, THE FOREGOING LIMITATIONS OF

LIABILITY SHALL NOT APPLY (I) IN THE EVENT OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT, OR (II) INDEMNIFICATION OBLIGATIONS.

9.2 Responsibility. Each Party to this Agreement shall assume the responsibility and liability for the acts and omissions of its own employees, officers, or agents, in connection with the performance of their official duties under this Agreement. Each Party to this Agreement shall be liable for the torts of its own officers, agents, or employees.

9.3 Flock Indemnity. Flock shall indemnify and hold harmless Customer, its agents and employees, from liability of any kind, including claims, costs (including defense) and expenses, on account of: (i) any copyrighted material, patented or unpatented invention, articles, device or appliance manufactured or used in the performance of this Agreement; or (ii) any damage or injury to property or person directly caused by Flock’s installation of Flock Hardware, except for where such damage or injury was caused solely by the negligence of the Customer or its agents, officers or employees. Flock’s performance of this indemnity obligation shall not exceed the fees paid and/or payable for the services rendered under this Agreement in the preceding twelve (12) months.

10. INSTALLATION SERVICES AND OBLIGATIONS

10.1 Ownership of Hardware. Flock Hardware is owned and shall remain the exclusive property of Flock. Title to any Flock Hardware shall not pass to Customer upon execution of this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically set forth in this Agreement. Except as otherwise expressly stated in this Agreement, Customer is not permitted to remove, reposition, re-install, tamper with, alter, adjust or otherwise take possession or control of Flock Hardware. Customer agrees and understands that in the event Customer is found to engage in any of the foregoing restricted actions, all warranties herein shall be null and void, and this Agreement shall be subject to immediate termination for material breach by Customer. Customer shall not perform any acts which would interfere with the retention of title of the Flock Hardware by Flock. Should Customer default on any payment of the Flock Services, Flock may remove Flock Hardware at Flock’s discretion. Such removal, if made by Flock, shall not be deemed a waiver of Flock’s rights to any damages Flock may sustain as a result of Customer’s default and Flock shall have the right to enforce any other legal remedy or right.

10.2 Deployment Plan. Flock shall advise Customer on the location and positioning of the Flock Hardware for optimal product functionality, as conditions and locations allow. Flock will Item 3A - Page 91
collaborate with Customer to design the strategic geographic mapping of the location(s) and implementation of Flock Hardware to create a deployment plan (“Deployment Plan”). In the event that Flock determines that Flock Hardware will not achieve optimal functionality at a designated location, Flock shall have final discretion to veto a specific location and will provide alternative options to Customer.

10.3 Changes to Deployment Plan. After installation of Flock Hardware, any subsequent requested changes to the Deployment Plan, including, but not limited to, relocating, re- positioning, adjusting of the mounting, removing foliage, replacement, changes to heights of poles will incur a fee according to the reinstall fee schedule located at (https://www.flocksafety.com/reinstall-fee-schedule). Customer will receive prior notice and confirm approval of any such fees.

10.4 Customer Installation Obligations. Customer is responsible for any applicable supplementary cost as described in the Customer Implementation Guide. (“Customer Obligations”). Customer represents and warrants that it has, or shall lawfully obtain, all necessary right title and authority and hereby authorizes Flock to install the Flock Hardware at the designated locations and to make any necessary inspections or maintenance in connection with such installation.

10.5 Flock’s Obligations. Installation of any Flock Hardware shall be installed in a professional manner within a commercially reasonable time from the Effective Date of this Agreement. Upon removal of Flock Hardware, Flock shall restore the location to its original condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted. Flock will continue to monitor the performance of Flock Hardware for the length of the Term. Flock may use a subcontractor or third party to perform certain obligations under this agreement, provided that Flock’s use of such subcontractor or third party shall not release Flock from any duty or liability to fulfill Flock’s obligations under this Agreement.

11. MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Compliance with Laws. Parties shall comply with all applicable local, state and federal laws, regulations, policies and ordinances and their associated record retention schedules, including responding to any subpoena request(s).

11.2 Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is found to be unenforceable or invalid, that provision will be limited or eliminated to the minimum extent necessary so that this Agreement will otherwise remain in full force and effect.

11.3 Assignment. This Agreement is not assignable, transferable or sublicensable by either Party, without prior consent. Notwithstanding the foregoing, either Party may assign this Agreement, without the other Party's consent, (i) to any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate entity, or (ii) to any purchaser of all or substantially all of such Party's assets or to any successor by way of merger, consolidation or similar transaction.

11.4 Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Order Form(s), the reinstall fee schedule (https://www.flocksafety.com/reinstall-fee-schedule), and any attached exhibits are the complete and exclusive statement of the mutual understanding of the Parties and supersedes and cancels all previous or contemporaneous negotiations, discussions or agreements, whether written and oral , communications and other understandings relating to the subject matter of this Agreement, and that all waivers and modifications must be in a writing signed by both Parties, except as otherwise provided herein. None of Customer’s purchase orders, authorizations or similar documents will alter the terms of this Agreement, and any such conflicting terms are Item 3A - Page 92
expressly rejected. Any mutually agreed upon purchase order is subject to these terms. In the event of any conflict of terms found in this Agreement or any other terms and conditions, the terms of this Agreement shall prevail. Customer agrees that Customer’s purchase is neither contingent upon the delivery of any future functionality or features nor dependent upon any oral or written comments made by Flock with respect to future functionality or feature.

11.5 Relationship. No agency, partnership, joint venture, or employment is created as a result of this Agreement and Parties do not have any authority of any kind to bind each other in any respect whatsoever. Flock shall at all times be and act as an independent contractor to Customer.

11.6 Governing Law; Venue. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the state in which the Customer is located. The Parties hereto agree that venue would be proper in the chosen courts of the State of which the Customer is located. The Parties agree that the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods is excluded in its entirety from this Agreement.

11.7 Special Terms. Flock may offer certain special terms which are indicated in the proposal and will become part of this Agreement, upon Customer’s prior written consent and the mutual execution by authorized representatives (“Special Terms”). To the extent that any terms of this Agreement are inconsistent or conflict with the Special Terms, the Special Terms shall control.

11.8 Publicity. Flock has the right to reference and use Customer’s name and trademarks and disclose the nature of the Services in business and development and marketing efforts.

11.9 Feedback. If Customer or Authorized End User provides any suggestions, ideas, enhancement requests, feedback, recommendations or other information relating to the subject matter hereunder, Customer or Authorized End User hereby assigns to Flock all right, title and interest (including intellectual property rights) with respect to or resulting from any of the foregoing.

11.10 Export. Customer may not remove or export from the United States or allow the export or re-export of the Flock IP or anything related thereto, or any direct product thereof in violation of any restrictions, laws or regulations of the United States Department of Commerce, the United States Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, or any other United States or foreign Customer or authority. As defined in Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”), section

2.101, the Services, the Flock Hardware and Documentation are “commercial items” and according to the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (“DFAR”) section 252.2277014(a)(1) and are deemed to be “commercial computer software” and “commercial computer software documentation.” Flock is compliant with FAR Section 889 and does not contract or do business with, use any equipment, system, or service that uses the enumerated banned Chinese telecommunication companies, equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any Flock system.

Consistent with DFAR section 227.7202 and FAR section 12.212, any use, modification, reproduction, release, performance, display, or disclosure of such commercial software or commercial software documentation by the U.S. Government will be governed solely by the terms of this Agreement and will be prohibited except to the extent expressly permitted by the terms of this Agreement.

11.11 Headings. The headings are merely for organization and should not be construed as adding meaning to the Agreement or interpreting the associated sections.

Item 3A - Page 93

11.12 Authority. Each of the below signers of this Agreement represent that they understand this Agreement and have the authority to sign on behalf of and bind the Parties they are representing.

11.13 Conflict. In the event there is a conflict between this Agreement and any applicable statement of work, or Customer purchase order, this Agreement controls unless explicitly stated otherwise.

11.14 Morality. In the event Customer or its agents become the subject of an indictment, contempt, scandal, crime of moral turpitude or similar event that would negatively impact or tarnish Flock’s reputation. Flock shall have the option to terminate this Agreement upon prior written notice to Customer.

11.15 Notices. All notices under this Agreement will be in writing and will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by email; the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service; and upon receipt, if sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. All notices will be provided to the email or mailing address listed in the Order Form.

11.16 Non-Appropriation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, all obligations of the Customer under this Agreement which require the expenditure of funds are conditioned on the availability of funds appropriated for that purpose. Customer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement for non appropriation with thirty (30) days written notice without penalty or other cost.

These Terms and Conditions are subject to change.

Item 3A - Page 94

ATTACHMENT B

Item 3A - Page 95

PUBLIC INTEGRITY DISCLOSURE

APPLICANT DISCLOSURE FORM

1. Name of Entity

2. Address of Entity (Principal Place of Business)

3. Local or California Address (if different than #2)

4. State where Entity is Registered with Secretary of State If other than California, is the Entity also registered in California? Yes No

5. Type of Entity
Corporation Limited Liability Company Partnership Trust Other (please specify)

6. Officers, Directors, Members, Managers, Trustees, Other Fiduciaries (please specify) Note: If any response is not a natural person, please identify all officers, directors, members, managers and other fiduciaries for the member, manager, trust, or other entity
________________________ Officer Director Member Manager [name] General Partner Limited Partner
Other ___________________________
_______________________________ Officer Director Member Manager [name] General Partner Limited Partner
Other __________________________
________________________________ Officer Director Member Manager [name] General Partner Limited Partner
Other __________________________
Insight Public Sector, Inc.
13755 Sunrise Valley Dr., Suite 750 Herndon VA 20171-4608 lllinlois
~ 
1K]    
Scott Friedlander      
~ President
Lisanne Steinheiser      
~ Global Compliance Officer
Erica Falchetti      
Ix] Director, Public Sector
Item 3A - Page 96

7. Owners/Investors with a 5% beneficial interest in the Applicant Entity or a related entity

EXAMPLE

JANE DOE
[name of owner/investor]
50%, ABC COMPANY, Inc.
[percentage of beneficial interest in entity and
name of entity]
A.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
B.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
C.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
D.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest in entity and name of entity]
E.
[name of owner/investor] [percentage of beneficial interest i n entity and name of entity]

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Signature of Disclosing Party, Printed Name, Title Date

N/A N/A

N/A N/A

N/A N/A

N/A N/A

N/A N/A
cuca-r&A'.dt:z: 8/29/2023
Erica Falchetti / Director, Public Sector
Item 3A - Page 97
City of Palm Springs, CA.

Business Disclosure Supplementary Instructions
In an effort to ensure we capture the required business entity information in accordance with the attached instructions, we provide you these supplementary instructions to clearly identify the required information, and the format the information should be provided.

If you, as the applicant, are a business entity (i.e. a corporation or limited liability company), and it is also comprised of other business entities as its members or having a financial interest, all other such business entities must also be disclosed, including those entities other business entities, if any.

Ultimately, the City’s disclosure document (attached) requires a listing identifying all natural persons having any financial interest over 5% of the business entities (and any other business entities comprising your business entity).

As an example, Applicant is: Acme Brothers, Inc., a California corporation, whose officers are:

John Doe, Jill Doe, and Jay Doe, which is owned 50% by Acme Brothers, LLC, a California limited liability company, and John Doe (25% interest) and Jill Doe (25% interest). Acme Brothers, LLC, is managed by Acme Brothers 2, Inc., a California corporation, whose officers are: George Doe, Bill Doe, and Jane Doe, which is owned 100% by Acme Brothers 2, LLC, a California limited liability company, which is managed by George Doe, with George Doe and Jane Doe having 50% interest each.

The full business entity disclosure in this example would resemble the following:

1. Acme Brothers, Inc., a California corporation
a. Officers: John Doe, Jill Doe, and Jay Doe
b. Ownership:
i. 50% Acme Brothers, LLC, a California limited liability company ii. 25% John Doe
iii. 25% Jill Doe

2. Acme Brothers, LLC, a California limited liability company a. Managers: Acme Brothers 2, Inc., a California corporation b. Ownership: 100% Acme Brothers 2, Inc., a California corporation

3. Acme Brothers 2, Inc., a California corporation
a. Officers: George Doe, Bill Doe, and Jane Doe
b. Ownership: 100% Acme Brothers 2, LLC, a California limited liability company

4. Acme Brothers 2, LLC, a California limited liability company a. Managers: George Doe
b. Ownership:
i. 50%
Item 3A - Page 98
Public Integrity Dlsclosure Form (002)
Final Audit Report
Created :

By:

Status:

Transaction ID:
2023-08-29
AMANDA LUEDY (AMANDALUEDY@INSIGHT .COM)
Signed
CBJCHBCAABAAZzU9Cz5_BFrHNV9fdcauBMj8kdd6D2Kf
2023-08-29
"Public Integrity Dlsclosure Form (002)" History
f:l Document created by AMANDA LUEDY ([email protected]) 2023-08-29- 9:58:27 PM GMT- IP address : 198.187.200.254 B'.. Document emailed to Erica Falchetti ([email protected]) for signature 2023-08-29 - 9:58:48 PM GMT
f:l Email viewed by Erica Falchetti ([email protected]) 2023-08-29 - 9:59:55 PM GMT- IP address : 198.187.200.254 ~ Document e-signed by Erica Falchetti ([email protected]) Signature Date: 2023-08-29 - 10:00:30 PM GMT - Time Source : server- IP address : 198.187.200.254 9 Agreement completed.
2023-08-29 - 10:00:30 PM GMT
Adobe Acrobat Sign
Item 3A - Page 99

ATTACHMENT C

Item 3A - Page 100
Policy
430
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 1 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
430.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
ALPR technology is a computer- based system that utilizes special cameras to capture license plate information. The ALPR system captures an infrared image of a license plate and converts it to a text file using Optical Character Recognition ("OCR") technology. The text is compared to various hot lists generated by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, including the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), and generates an alert when there is a hit. The ALPR system identifies license plates and will not identify the person operating the motor vehicle. The Department may, as a separate step and for legitimate law enforcement purposes per the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act, and as set forth in this Policy, undertake to identify the owner of a vehicle in the event the ALPR system generates an alert, such as by running the license plate number through the State of California Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) database.

The ALPR system shall be restricted to legitimate law enforcement uses for the purpose of furthering legitimate law enforcement goals and enhancing public safety. Such uses and goals include, but are not limited to, providing information to officers that will assist in on-going criminal investigations, crime prevention, crime detection, the apprehension of wanted persons, ensuring the safety of vulnerable individuals through the recovery of missing and endangered persons, and improving the quality of life in our community through the identification and removal of stolen or unregistered motor vehicles.

The Department shall utilize hot lists which further the above specified goals of the ALPR system, where there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason for identifying a vehicle associated with an outstanding arrest warrant, vehicles related to missing persons investigations, vehicles associated with AMBER Alerts, stolen vehicles, vehicles that are reasonably believed to be involved in the commission of a crime, vehicles which are registered to or are reasonably believed to be operated by persons who do not have a valid operator's license or who are on the revoked or suspended list, vehicles with expired registrations, vehicles registered to persons who are subject to a restraining order issued by a court or by the Parole Board, or who are subject to any other duly issued order restricting their movements, vehicles registered to persons wanted by a law enforcement agency who are of interest in a specific investigation, or vehicles registered to persons who are on any watch list issued by a State or Federal agency responsible for homeland security when information has been received concerning a specific individual. 430.2 POLICY
The policy of the Palm Springs Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

Item 3A - Page 101
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 2 It shall be the policy of the Palm Springs Police Department that all Department members abide by the policy and its procedures set forth when using the ALPR system, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of its public safety efforts in a manner that safeguards the privacy concerns of law abiding citizens.
430.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images of license plates to lists of known plates of interest.
(b) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) System: The computerized storage system of data collected from Automated License Plate Readers. (c) Hit Alert:

An audible and/or visual signal from the ALPR System activated upon the read of a license plate by the ALPR Sytem that has NOT BEEN VISUALLY VERIFIED by the ALPR operator against the photo in the ALPR System. A Hit Alert from the ALPR system may indicate that a scanned license plate number may be in the NCIC or other law enforcement database for a specific reason, including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, wanted vehicle, missing person, domestic violence protective order or terrorist-related activity. (d) Hot List:

A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest from databases including, but not limited to National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and vehicles sought by local law enforcement agencies. (e) Detection:

Data obtained by an ALPR of license plates within public view that were read by an ALPR device, including potential images of the license plate and vehicle on which it was displayed, and information regarding the location of the ALPR equipment at the time of the detection.
430.4 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Police Captain overseeing the Operations Division shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.
(b) Training requirements for authorized users.
(c) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws. (d) Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.
(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation. (f) Working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.

Item 3A - Page 102
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 3 (g) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the Police Department website.
(h) Shall submit a quarterly ALPR System Audit Report and Total Detection Report to the Chief of Police.
(i) All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access shall be managed by the ALPR Administrator who will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.
430.4 AUTHORIZED USERS
The ALPR System shall only be accessed by the following Police Department positions after the completion of Department approved training and upon the approval of the ALPR Administrator:
(a) Police Officers
(b) Police Sergeants
(c) Police Lieutenants
(d) Police Captains
(e) Police Chief
(f) Police Dispatchers
(g) Crime Analyst
(h) Community Service Officers
(i) City approved contractor for ALPR system maintenance. 430.6 ALPR OPERATIONS
Use of an ALPR isrestricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training and receiving ALPR Administrator approval.

Item 3A - Page 103
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 4 (e) No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so.
(f) ALPR operators shall ensure ALPR cameras are properly affixed to the assigned police vehicle prior to starting their shift and shall inspect the equipment for damage or excessive wear.
(g) ALPR operators shall ensure the ALPR system is functioning properly at the start of their shift.
(h) ALPR operators shall report any damage, excessive wear, and/or function issues to the ALPR Administrator via Department email immediately. (i) Login/Log-Out Procedure- To ensure proper operation and to security oversight of the ALPR system, all operators will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data.
(j) Any potential data breaches of the ALPR system shall be reported to the ALPR Administrator immediately.
(k) When an ALPR Detection alarm is received alerting an ALPR Operator of a positive Hit from the ALPR database, operators shall compare the digital image of the license plate to the Hotlist information to verify the Hit for both the state and characters on the license plate. Absent exigent circumstances, ALPR Operators shall confirm the ALPR information via radio or mobile data computer to immediately confirm the Hit prior to taking enforcement or any other type of police action
(l) If an alert is received on an incorrect letter or number on a license plate, the user should correct the number received on the hit for accurate information if the correct information is available.
430.7 ALPR SYSTEM OPERATIONS
Use of the ALPR System is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use the system for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) The ALPR system shall only be used for official law enforcement purposes. (b) No member of this department shall be permitted to access the ALPR System without first completing department-approved training and receiving ALPR Administrator approval.
(c) Database information shall be considered confidential and for law enforcement personnel only.
(d) Login/Log-Out Procedure- To ensure proper operation and to security oversight of the ALPR system, all operators will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data.
(e) ALPR System Users shall not allow non-authorized users to view system data. (f) Access to the ALPR system shall be from Department issued or Department owned computer equipment and shall not be accessed from personally owned devices without written permission from the ALPR Administrator.

Item 3A - Page 104
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 5 (g) All queries of system data shall include the reason for query and any applicable event number associated with query.
(h) Any potential data breaches of the ALPR System shall be reported to the ALPR Administrator immediately.
(i) The Palm Springs Police Department shall maintain robust security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.
430.8 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Operations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring that systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles or fixed locations to the designated storage in accordance with department procedure.

The ALPR vendor, Flock Safety, will store the ALPR data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. Flock Safety will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude the Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to City's approved retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.

All ALPR data downloaded should be stored for no longer than one year, and in accordance with the established records and retention protocols. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence until the pending litigation is resolved (Government Code § 34090.6).

ALPR technology uses cameras to capture and store images from public spaces, where persons do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. All videos gathered by these systems are for the official use of this department. The ALPR cameras will be positioned to optimize collection of images from public places to minimize collection of images from places where an expectation of privacy exists or places exposed to view (e.g., parking lot of a shop or business). 430.9 ACCOUNTABILITY AND PRIVACY
All personnel authorized to use or access ALPR System data will be accountable for knowledge of this policy. All personnel shall report errors and suspected or confirmed violations of this policy to their supervisor.

All access to the system will be logged and the Department will maintain an audit trail of requested and accessed information, including the purpose of the query.

All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means.

The Palm Springs Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

Item 3A - Page 105
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 6 (a) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52). (b) Persons approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(c) The ALPR System and software resides in a cloud-based data center featuring full redundancy and access controls.
(d) All investigative queries into collected ALPR data are logged by user and available for auditing and review by the Department as outlined in this policy. (e) ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis. To ensure proper oversight into the use of the system and adherence to this policy, all activities (plate detections, queries, reports, etc.) are automatically recorded by the system for auditing purposes. System audits shall be conducted by the Operations Captain quarterly. The audit report shall include an explanation regarding any data retained longer than than two years (e.g. data retained as evidence in a criminal case). (f) Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy.

The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
(a) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, it is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment). (b) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
(c) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.
(d) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to:
· criminal prosecution,
· civil liability, and/or
· administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and Department policies.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

Item 3A - Page 106
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 7 430.10 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures:
(a) The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes:
(a) The name of the agency.
(b) The name of the person requesting.
(c) The intended purpose of obtaining the information.
(b) The request is reviewed by the Chief of Police or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.
(c) The approved request is retained on file.
(d) Detection data will only be shared with law enforcement agencies who utilize the Law Enforcement Archival Reporting Network unless approved by the ALPR Administrator. (e) Detection data shall not be sold or transferred to non-law enforcement entities or persons.
(f) Detection data will not be shared with any federal agencies or with law enforcement agencies outside of the State of California, absent a court order or special request submitted to PSPD explaining the intended purpose of obtaining the information, and only with approval from the Chief of Police, or their designee.

Memorandum of Understanding
(a) Access to searchable data by other local law enforcement agencies shall only be granted pursuant to an MOU with that specific agency
(b) Such MOU will provide that access will only be used for legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes
The Chief of Police or the authorized designee will consider the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq), before approving the access to ALPR data.

The Palm Springs Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement.

Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55). 430.11 TRAINING
The Training Sergeant should ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

Each approved user shall have received CLETS Security Training and Approval, department approved ALPR training, and any required POST approved training prior to access or use of the ALPR System.

Item 3A - Page 107
Palm Springs Police Department
Policies
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Copyright Lexipol, LLC 2023/10/04, All Rights Reserved.

Published with permission by Palm Springs Police Department ***DRAFT*** Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) - 8 The training shall include user acknowledgement of this Policy.

Item 3A - Page 108

ATTACHMENT D

Item 3A - Page 109
Potential Use of
Automated License
Plate Recognition
(ALPR) Technology
https://www.palmspringsca.gov/September 27, 2023
Item 3A - Page 110
ALPR – What is it?
Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology uses a combination of cameras and computer software to scan the license plates of passing vehicles.

These computer-readable images allow law enforcement to compare plate numbers against plates of wanted vehicles and vehicles associated with wanted persons, missing persons, etc.
•
•
Item 3A - Page 111
ALPR – Types
Two Types of ALPR:

M Bl E
( o ed on a pol i e eh· le
F XE .
( ou ed o · po e or othe
piece o i fras rue. ure)
Item 3A - Page 112
ALPR – How It Works
t" -, I
~L ~•
Police use data f oir
specific and directed
·-- .

I c.nminal -~
~nvestigati:ons
Police attempt tia locate
and apprehend wanted
person •or vcl1r.-cle
Item 3A - Page 113
ALPR – What Problem Does it Addres?
Regional increases in property crimes, including catalytic converter thefts, auto burglaries, vehicle thefts and organized retail thefts
Recent, albeit rare, brazen robberies and assaults
Offenders commonly:
use a vehicle;
use a stolen vehicle or vehicle with a stolen plate;
engage in crimes in multiple jurisdictions;
Cost-effective force multiplier
•
•
•
0 0
0 •
Item 3A - Page 114
ALPR – What Information is Captured?
A fixed ALPR system is designed to capture:
the date, time, and location;
license plate (state, partial, paper, and no plate);
vehicle characteristics (make, model, type, and color)
•
0 0
0 Item 3A - Page 115
ALPR – What Information is Not Captured?
A fixed ALPR system is not intended to capture
A fixed ALPR system does not use facial recognition
images of vehicle occupants
•
•
Item 3A - Page 116
ALPR – Fixed ALPR vs. Red Light Cameras
A red light camera is designed to capture
A fixed ALPR system is designed to capture
driver images for driver identification
rear license plate images for vehicle identification
•
•
Item 3A - Page 117
ALPR – Legal Considerations
Only allows trained authorized users
Official Use Only
No automatic sharing of data with out of state
agencies
Routine system audits
Prohibits invasion of privacy, harassment or
intimidation, personal use
Palm Springs - ALPR Policy
Requires training
Requires limitations/controls on access
Requires limitations on sharing
State Law
• •
•
•
•
•
• •
Item 3A - Page 118
ALPR – Policy
Limited to need to know and right to know;
Criminal penalties for unauthorized access;
Training provided to employees;
Queries are logged and auditable;
Agency controls with whom data is shared;
No outside sharing by vendor;
No outside state sharing, unless a court
order or reason is provided, and approved
by the Chief of Police
Internal and External Access
CJIS-compliant transmission and storage by
vendor
Automatically purged after 30 days*
Data Integrity
Data Integrity
• •
•
• •
•
•
•
•
Item 3A - Page 119
ALPR – Uses & Benefits
Proactive Real-time alerts
Reactive (Investigative)
Searchable database
USES
Real Time Alerts
Deterrence
Solve Crimes Already
Committed
Regional Coordination

BENEFITS
• •
•
• •
0 •
Item 3A - Page 120
ALPR – Local Implementation & Collaboration
ALPR technology is an existing tool for local law enforcement including Numerous success stories and examples of where it could have been used A growing majority of agencies in the Coachella Valley currently use it Many private businesses, HOAs, and individuals have ALPR and elect to neighboring communities
in Palm Springs
share that data with law enforcement
Item 3A - Page 121
ALPR – Next Steps
Council feedback and discussion on potential implementation of ALPR Technology
Public Comments
Approve Contract with Insight Public Sector through a cooperative purchase program
Install 15 Flock ALPR cameras throughout the City of Palm Springs Item 3A - Page 122
Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR)
Questions
Item 3A - Page 123

ATTACHMENT E

Item 3A - Page 124
PSPD

TOWN HALL
Come talk with us about the following
policies as they relate to use,
transparency, and accountability.

Drones
Automated license plate readers
(ALPR)

POLICY TOPICS
Military
Equipment
www.palmspringsca.gov
760-323-8119

CONTACT US
Monday,
September 18, 2023
@ 5:30 PM
PSPD Training Center
200 S. Civic Drive, Palm Springs
• • e
0 Item 3A - Page 125

ATTACHMENT F

Item 3A - Page 126
ALIPR Tec:hnology
The Palm Springs Police Department uses automated license plate recogn· ion (ALPR) teclrno logy to deter criminal activity and assist in criminal invest igations in Palm Springs_ The t,echnology uses a combinat ion of cameras: and compute r software to scan the license plates of passing vehicles, and provides several benefits , including crime deterrence, real-time aler s to police when stolen or wanted vehicles enter an area, and enhanced investigative capabilities when a crime has already occurred.

Explore th is web page to learn more about our use of ALPR techno logy and the privacy safeguar,ds we have put in place (following the recommendat ions of he American Civil liberties Union; see tl1eir report below), and to ask questio ns about ALPR techrrnlogy via the web form at the bottom of this page.

If you would like more informatio n about ALPR technology, please see the below links. • ACLU Reper : Making Smart Decisio ns About Surveillance • ALPR infor mation from t l,e Internationa l Assoc iation of Chiefs of Police What is ALPR and how does it work?
What are the uses and benefits of AlPR technology?
What information is captured by ALPR technology?
What information is NOT captured by ALPR technology?
How long is this information retained?
What sort of privacy safeguards exist?
frequently Asked Questions
Still have Questions on ALPR Technology? Submit your Questions Here. +
+
+
+
-1-
+
Item 3A - Page 127

ATTACHMENT G

Item 3A - Page 128
Making
SMart
DeciSionS
about
Surveillance
A Guide for Community
trAnspArenCy,
ACCountAbility
& oversi Ght
the ACLU
of CALiforni A
APriL 2016
• •
Item 3A - Page 129

urveillance is on the rise in our communities, but basic transparency, oversight, and accountability remain the exception, not the rule. Police are spending billions of dollars on very sophisticated and invasive surveillance technology from license plate readers and cell phone trackers to facial recognition and drones. Too many of these programs are moving forward without public conversation, careful consideration of the costs and benefits, or adequate policies in place to prevent misuse and protect rights. As a result, surveillance may enable high-tech profiling, perpetuate systems of abusive policing, and undermine trust in law enforcement, particularly in communities of color where police misconduct has been rampant and community relationships have been strained. It’s time for change.

Communities must be equal partners in any decision about the use of surveillance technology. They need to know when and why surveillance is being considered, what it is intended to do, and what it will really cost — both in dollars and in individual rights. They need to be certain that any proposal includes strong mechanisms for transparency, accountability, and oversight. Otherwise, public trust can be easily damaged, and communities can end up saddled with systems that are too invasive, very expensive, and much less effective at accomplishing community safety goals than initially imagined.

This guide provides a step-by-step framework to approach surveillance proposals, properly evaluate their true costs, and develop policies that provide transparency, oversight, and accountability. Its checklist walks community members, policymakers, and law enforcement officials through essential questions to ask and answer about surveillance proposals, and includes dozens of case studies highlighting smart approaches and missteps to avoid. The guide concludes with model language for policymakers to adopt to make sure the right process is used every time a surveillance proposal is considered.

We hope you will find this document and its supporting materials (available online at aclunc.org/smartaboutsurveillance) useful in ensuring your community is making informed decisions about surveillance.

N i c o l e A . O z e r P e t e r B i b r i n g Technology and Civil Liberties Policy Director Police Practices Director ACLU of California ACLU of California
S
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1 ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SMARTABOUTSURVEILLANCE

Authors: Chris Conley, Matt Cagle, Peter Bibring, Jessica Farris, Linda Lye, Mitra Ebadolahi, and Nicole Ozer, ACLU of California Contributing Writers: Addison Litton and Thomas Mann Miller Design & Layout: Gigi Pandian & Daniela Bernstein

This publication was underwritten with support from the ACLU Foundation and the ACLU’s generous members and donors.

PUBLISHED BY THE ACLU OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND EDITION — APRIL 2016

CONTENTS
Technology Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 2 Key Questions to Answer Before Moving Forward with Any Surveillance Proposal .......................... 3 Why It Matters: The Costs and Consequences of Surveillance ................................................................. 4 Surveillance Impacts Civil Rights and Community Trust ................................................................................ 4 Surveillance Carries Both Immediate and Ongoing Financial Costs ............................................................. 7 Surveillance Must Take Evolving Privacy Law into Account ......................................................................... 8 Necessary Steps when Considering a Surveillance Proposal ................................................................... 11 Collectively Evaluate the Effectiveness, Costs and Alternatives Before Making Decisions about Surveillance ................................................................................................................................................. 11 Establish a Surveillance Use Policy to Mitigate Harms and Protect Rights ................................................ 17 Ensure Accountability by Enforcing Policies and Encouraging Ongoing Public Engagement .............. 21 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 24 Appendix: Model Surveillance & Community Safety Ordinance ............................................................ 25 Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................... 29 Item 3A - Page 131
2 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES

TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS ("ALPRS") : Soph isricared camera sysrems mounred ro police cars or lighr posrs rhar scan license plares rhar come into view. They are ofren used ro look for vehicles of imeresr, such as stolen cars, bur in rhe pwcess may record rhe time and place of every single vehicle rhar drives by.

BODY CAM ERAS: Small cameras worn by police rhar record aud io and video. These cameras can record anyth ing from rypical public inrcracr ions with pol ice ro sou nds and images ar rallies or eve11 lewd banrer in a squad car. Some body cameras are always on, ochers are controlle d by rhe wearer.

DRONES : Unmanned aerial vehicles rhac may carry cameras, microph ones, or ocher sensors or devices. Drones range from small "quadcopccrs" rhar can maneuver near ground level ro high-altirndc planes wirh exrrcmely powerful cameras. Drones arc often quicrcr than rradjtional aircrafr, makj ng ir possible rouse them for surreptirious surveillance.

VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: Camera sysrcms chat allow remote observation or recording of acciviry in public spaces. Video feeds may be actively monicored in hopes of sporting crime as it happens or recorded for potential use for invesrigarion and prosecution. Studies have repeatedly show n cameras are costly and of limited use in preventing or solving serious crime .

FACIAL RECOGNITION: Software chat idenrifies a person in phoros or videos based on various characteristics of the person's face. The accuracy of facial recognirion can vary widely.

LOCATION TRACKING: A range of techniques used co remotely crack a person's locacion. GPS (Global Positioning System) devices, ranging from modern cell phones to "darts" that can be fired at a moving car, determine their own location based on satellite signals. Electronic com mun icarions devices including phones can also be cracked by identifying che cell rowers or wireless networks the device uses. Location information can be obtained every few seconds and may be accurate co within a few feet.

AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING: Software cools chat collects posts and ocher information on sites such as Twiner and Faccbook . lhesc rools may also analyze the collected data in order ro derive information such as social connecrions or political views.

INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY ("IMSI") CATCHERS: A device chat emulates a cell phone tower in order to interact with nearby cell phones, [MSI catchers, commonly known as Stingrays (the brand name of one such device), identify nearby devices a11d can also be configured co inrercepc and capture che contents of communicat ions including calls, text messages, or Imernec acriviry. Many IMSI catchers operate in dragnet fashion, scooping up information about every phone in range.

DAT A MIN ING: Techniques co discover statistical patterns, nends and ocher information in a collection of data. For example, analysis of connec tions on social networks can reveal hidden, sensirive information such as seXLtal orientation .

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KEY QUESTIONS TO ANSWER

BEFORE MOVING FORWARD WITH

ANY SURVEILLANCE PROPOSAL
WHY ARE YOU CONSIDERING SURVEILLANCE?
D What specific prob lem is your community trying to address? D How effective will surveillance be in addressing this concern? D Are there alternatives that would be more effective, less expensive, or have less impact on civil liberties? WHAT ARE THE COSTS AND RISKS?
D What are the financial costs of surve illance, including long-term training, operation and maintenance? D What impact would surveillance have on privacy, free speech, and civil rights? D How could surveillance affect crust in law enforcement? D Have you completed a Surveillance Impact Report?

IS THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY ENGAGED IN EVALUATING THE PROPOSAL FROM THE OUTSET?
D Have you sought input on prior ities, costs and risks from all segments of your community? D Is there a Surveillance lmpact Report and Surveillance Use Policy for the community ro review? D Will there be public hearings and debate before seeking any funds or purchasi ng any techno logy? IS SURVEILLANCE THE RIGHT CHOICE?
D Have elected policymakers reviewed the Surveillance Impact Report and Surveillance Use Policy? Have chey had an opportunity ro hear public concerns?
D W ill local policymakers specifically vote ro app rove rhe project moving forward? Will chis happen before seeking any funds or purchasing any technology?
D Will your community re-evaluate any surveillance program annually and determine whether the program shou ld be continued, modified, or abandoned?
WILL THESE QUESTIONS BE ANSWERED EVERY TIME?
D Has your communiry passed a Surveillance & Communiry Sa.fery Ordinance ro make sure chese questions are consistently asked and answered every time surveiUance is considered and to ensure proper transparency, oversight and accountabi lity?
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4 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES Why It Matters: The Costs and Consequences of Surveillance Surveillance technology is often proposed as an efficient public safety tool. But too often, proposals ignore not only the true financial costs of surveillance technology but also their potential to infringe on civil rights and undermine public trust and effective policing. Communities should identify and assess all of the harms and costs of surveillance as early in the consideration process as possible in order to determine whether moving forward with a surveillance technology is really the right choice.

A. SURVEILLANCE IMPACTS CIVIL RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY TRUST The community at large can pay a heavy price if
surveillance technology is acquired and deployed
without evaluating its impact on civil rights and its
potential for misuse. Surveillance can easily intrude
upon the individual rights of residents and visitors,
perpetuate discriminatory policing, or chill freedom of expression, association, and religion — freedoms that
public officials are sworn to protect.
1 As a result,
surveillance can erode trust in law enforcement, making it harder for officers and community members to work
together to keep the community safe.2

1. SURVEILLANCE CAN INTRUDE UPON COMMUNITY
MEMBERS’ RIGHTS
The greatest cost of surveillance technology may not be financial but personal: the invasion and infringement of civil rights. Various types of surveillance technology are capable of capturing and storing vast amounts of information about community members and visitors: the political rallies and religious services they attend, the health services they use, the romantic partners they have, and more. Just the perceived threat of surveillance has the potential to harm community members by discouraging individuals from participating in political advocacy, opposing police misconduct, evaluating reproductive choices, exploring their sexuality, and engaging in other activities that are clearly protected by the federal and California constitutions. And, too often, this perception is grounded in reality, as demonstrated by Fresno’s use of social media monitoring software that flagged “#blacklivesmatter” as an indicator of criminal activity. 34 There are many examples of the misuse of surveillance to target individuals based on their race, ethnicity, associations, or religious or political activities. Police in Santa Clara used a GPS device to track a student due to his father’s association with the local Muslim Community Association.5 Police in Michigan sought “information on all the cell phones that were congregating in an area where a labor-union protest was expected.”6 The NSA specifically monitored the email of several prominent Muslim-Americans with no evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing.7 In Britain, where video surveillance is pervasive, a European Parliament “[S]urveillance  programs  follow  a  long
history of law enforcement targeting African
American  and  other  minority  groups….  We
need … a future in the city where our police
department  and  other  public  institutions
have  true  community  oversight  and
accountability.”
The  Rev.  B.T.  Lewis  and  Taymah  Jahsi,
Organizers, Faith in Community in Fresno
2 Civil Rights Principles in an Era of Big Data, signed by fourteen of the nation’s leading civil and human rights groups, sounds the alarm on how surveillance technology often disproportionately affects communities of color and religious and ethnic minorities. It calls for technology to be “designed and used in ways that respect the values of equal opportunity and equal justice” and urges users to “stop high‐tech profiling” and “preserve constitutional principles.” The document further calls for search warrants and other independent oversight of law enforcement and “clear limitations and robust audit mechanisms to make sure that if these tools are used it is in a res ponsible and equitable way.”4
r
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5 ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SMARTABOUTSURVEILLANCE
study showed that “the young, the male and the black were systematically and disproportionately targeted not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for ‘no obvious reason.’”8 Surveillance programs that do not focus on individual targets can be particularly problematic. Tracking entire groups or communities extends “guilt by association” to those who have done nothing wrong, discourages participation in local activities, and alienates community members. And once members of the group are tainted with such suspicion, it becomes easy to justify prying into their private lives, or even threatening them with further consequences if they do not cooperate with additional surveillance efforts.9 101112

SURVEILLANCE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVISTS
The government has a long and troubled history of abusing surveillance powers to target political and social activists. From the  “Red Squads” of the early 20th cent ury to the FBI’s efforts to infiltrate and discredit antiwar and civil rights activists in the 1960s, to recent surveillance of the Black Lives Matter movement:
 The  Department  of  Homeland  Security  monitored  the  social  media a c c o u n t s  o f  B l a c k  L i v e s Matter members and collected details about the locations of members and plans for peaceful protests in Ferguson, Baltimore, and New York City. This led many to question why the DHS — formed to combat terrorism — was surveilling members of a peaceful domestic social justice movement.10
 Police  in  Fresno,  California,  secretly  acquired  and  tested  multiple  social  media  surveillance tools  that  encouraged  surveillance  of  hashtags  like  #BlackLives Matter,  #dontshoot,  and #wewantjustice and assigned individuals a “threat level.” This led to nationwide negative press attention and calls for reform from community members, all of w hich forced the police chief to issue a public apology.11
 Authorities in the Oregon Department of Justice came under fire  when it was revealed that a senior  investigator  had  used  software  to  conduct  surveillance  o f  hashtags  including #BlackLivesMatter, which returned results for civil rights advocates, including the president of the  Urban  League  of  Portland.  The  story  triggered  a  public  apology  by  Oregon’s  Attorney General and led to an internal investigation.12
Intelligence reforms born from lawsuits and congressional inqui ries have led many law enforcement agencies  to  bar  the  collection  of  information  about  political  activism  and  other  First  Amendment‐ protected activities without a j ustifiable suspicion of crimina l activity. But surveillance of Black Lives Matter  demonstrates  a  need  for  similar  restrictions  on  the  use of  surveillance  technology  today  to ensure that it is not used to chill or undermine political and social activism.

Item 3A - Page 135
6 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES “Dragnet” surveillance often targets communities of color:
for example, in Oakland, the police have
disproportionately used license plate readers in African- American and Latino neighborhoods.13 In Compton,
police flew a plane rigged with high-powered surveillance cameras overhead for weeks without the public’s
knowledge or consent.14 Because it involves collecting vast amounts of information, dragnet surveillance also creates the potential for all sorts of abuse, from NSA analysts tracking romantic partners
15 to a Washington, D.C. police
lieutenant blackmailing patrons of a gay bar.1617 18
Surveillance carries privacy and free speech threats even if it is conducted solely in public places. This is particularly true when surveillance information is aggregated to build a robust data profile that can “reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.”19
As Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has noted,
“a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements … reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” In addition, “[a]wareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms.”
20 2. SURVEILLANCE CAN ERODE TRUST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
When law enforcement fails to fully engage with community members about the impact of surveillance — or, worse, entirely skirts the democratic process by acquiring and deploying surveillance technology without public discussion at all — it erodes trust even further, making it even harder for law enforcement officers to work with the community to solve crimes and protect public safety.

In the years after the September 11th attacks, the New York Police Department created a secretive intelligence wing that infiltrated Muslim neighborhoods with undercover officers, where they monitored the daily lives of and compiled dossiers about Muslim-Americans engaging in constitutionally protected activities in cafes, bookstores, and private residences with no
evidence of illegal activity.21 22These activities gravely harmed the community’s trust in law enforcement and led to a multi-year lawsuit and settlement that barred the
NYPD from conducting investigations on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity, and mandated implementation of a series of reforms designed to deter warrantless surveillance.

In Compton, news broke about an aerial surveillance
program that watched the whole community and was
intentionally kept “hush-hush” by the Sheriff’s Department to deter civil rights complaints. Both citizens and lawmakers were up in arms that they had been kept in the dark about such intrusive surveillance. Angry community members rightly questioned, "Why are we the target? As citizens we deserve [to know]. We are not all criminals.... It's an invasion of privacy.” The Mayor called for a “citizen private protection policy,” ensuring that the community would be notified before any new surveillance equipment was deployed or used.23
“One  of  the  most  alarming  parts  of  that
history has been the ways that surveillance
h a s  b e e n  m i s u s e d  a g a i n s t  B l a c k  p e o p l e who  have  been  advocating  for  their
justice. It’s been used to discredit, abuse,
and incarcerate.”
O p a l  T o m e t i ,  B l a c k  L i v e s  M a t t e r  c o ‐ founder17
"Those of us from marginalized communities
grew up in environments very much shaped
by  surveillance,  which  has  been  utilized  to
r a m p  u p  t h e  c r i m i n a l  j u s t i c e  s y s t e m  a n d increase deportations….”
Steven Renderos, Center for Media Justice
18 “The effects of surveillance on New York
Muslim communities have been
devastating.… Community members’ ties
to local police precincts have
deteriorated due to distrust and fear.”
H i n a  S h a m s i ,  A C L U  N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y Project Director
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B. SURVEILLANCE CARRIES BOTH IMMEDIATE AND ONGOING FINANCIAL COSTS In addition to the costs to civil rights and civil liberties, the fiscal impact of surveillance can be extensive.

Modifying current infrastructure, operating and maintaining systems, and training staff can consume limited time and money, even if federal or state grants fund initial costs. Surveillance technologies may also fail or be misused, resulting in costly lawsuits. To calculate the full financial cost of surveillance technology, communities must look beyond the initial sticker price. 24 1. SURVEILLANCE REQUIRES INFRASTRUCTURE, STAFFING, TRAINING, AND MAINTENANCE The hidden costs of infrastructure, training and staffing, operations and maintenance, and the potential for budget overruns, can dwarf the cost of acquiring surveillance technology in the first place. Communities that have failed to accurately estimate the full financial cost of a surveillance system have dealt with massive cost overruns and programs that failed to accomplish their stated purpose. For example, Philadelphia planned to spend $651,672 for a video surveillance program featuring 216 cameras. Instead, it spent $13.9 million on the project and wound up with only 102 functional cameras after a year, a result the city controller described as “exceedingly alarming, and outright excessive — especially when $13.9 million is equivalent to the cost of putting 200 new police recruits on our streets.”25 To avoid a similar incident in your community, it is essential to identify all of the costs required to install, use, and maintain surveillance technology before making a decision about whether to do so.

2. SURVEILLANCE CAN CREATE FINANCIAL RISKS INCLUDING LITIGATION AND DATA BREACH Surveillance programs that fail to include proper safeguards to prevent errors or misuse and protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, or that inadequately enforce such safeguards, can lead to expensive litigation that diverts resources from other public services. For example, Muslim residents in Orange County filed a discrimination lawsuit when it was revealed that state agents were sending informants into mosques to collect information on the identities and activities of worshippers.
26 The NYPD paid $2 million in attorney fees for
spying on New York’s Muslim communities.27 Even technical glitches can create the potential for costly lawsuits and other expenses: the City of San Francisco was embroiled in a multi- year civil rights lawsuit after wrongly pulling over, handcuffing, and holding at gunpoint an innocent woman due to an error by its ALPR system.28 29
The collection of surveillance data also creates the risk of data breaches that can incur significant public costs as well as endanger residents’ privacy and economic security.

Even following best practices (which itself can entail significant expense) is not enough to prevent every breach. California law requires that a local agency notify residents about a security breach.30 And the fiscal costs of a breach of sensitive surveillance data could be very high: a 2015 report found that companies spent an average of $3.7 million to resolve a data security breach.31 The more information your community collects and retains, the greater the risk and potential cost of a breach. “When  you’re  considering  a  new
technology, it’s important to evaluate
not only the upfront costs but also the
c o s t s  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e  a n d  u p g r a d e s that will occur down the road.”
Captain  Michael  Grinstead,  Newport
News (VA) Police Department24
“After  public  backlash  about  Oakland’s
proposed  Domain  Awareness  Center,
we really had to regroup and think about
how we needed to proceed.”
Renee  Domingo,  former  Oakland
Emergency Services Coordinator
29 ,
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8 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES

3. LACK OF PROPER PROCESS CAN WASTE TIME AND MONEY
Failing to thoroughly discuss surveillance proposals and listen to community concerns early in the process can result in massive backlash and wasted time and funds when plans are suspended or ultimately cancelled. Oakland was forced to scrap most of the planning for its ill-fated Domain Awareness Center and scale the project back considerably after community members protested the misleading mission statement and lack of transparency for the project.32 In Santa Clara County, a secretive process to purchase a Stingray cell surveillance device was derailed by the County Executive after it sidestepped necessary community debate and county oversight.33 34
Community members grounded San Jose’s secret drone
purchase and the police were forced to apologize for the lack of transparency and community input. 35 Engaging with the community before taking steps to go forward with a surveillance proposal is essential to avoiding similar mistakes that spark widepsread community outrage and waste time and resources.

C. SURVEILLANCE MUST TAKE EVOLVING PRIVACY LAW INTO ACCOUNT The use of surveillance technology is facing increased scrutiny and limits. Courts and lawmakers at the state and federal level, driven by increased public concern about privacy, are acting to protect individual rights and civil liberties. As a result, your community needs to consider both the existing laws and the potential for legal change, including the policy and individual rights concerns that are driving that change, when evaluating a surveillance proposal. 36
In recent years, federal courts have repeatedly reinforced legal protections for individual rights in the context of today’s technology. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously told law enforcement to “get a warrant” to search an arrestee’s cell phone. In another unanimous decision, the Court also ruled a warrant is required to use a GPS beeper to track a suspect’s vehicle, with a majority of the Court suggesting that using technology to track an individual’s location — even in public — over an extended period of time triggers constitutional scrutiny. 37 Finally, multiple federal courts declared the NSA’s
warrantless collection of telephone metadata unlawful, with one criticizing its “almost Orwellian” scope.
38 Surveillance
programs that fail to account for this trend may well be held unconstitutional, and criminal investigations based on evidence from those programs could be jeopardized.

The California Constitution is even more protective of community members’ privacy, including in public spaces. The state right to privacy expressly gives Californians a legal and enforceable “right to be left alone” that protects interests in privacy beyond the home.
39 The California Supreme Court has held that covertly
“infiltrating” and monitoring the activities of students and professors at classes and public meetings without any indication of criminal activity violated the California Constitution, 40 as did warrantless aerial surveillance
of a resident’s backyard.41 Californians’ right to free expression also extends outside of the home, even to privately owned areas like shopping centers.42
Numerous laws and regulations also place limits or requirements on the use of surveillance technology. The federal Wiretap Act and its California counterpart limit the use of surveillance technology capable of “The fact that technology now allows an
individual  to  carry  such  information  in
his hand does not make the information
any  less  worthy  of  the  protection  for
which the Founders fought.”
Riley v. California, U.S. Supreme Court36
“SJPD should have done a better job
of  communicating  the  purpose  and
acquisition  of  the  UAS  (Unmanned
A e r i a l  S y s t e m )  d e v i c e  t o  o u r
community….The community should
have  the  opportunity  to  provide
feedback, ask questions, and express
their  concerns  before  we  move
forward with this project.”
San Jose Police Department34
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intercepting the contents of live communications. And in 2015, California lawmakers enacted three separate laws that specifically address issues related to surveillance technology:
 Collection of Electronic Information: The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act requires a search warrant when collecting electronic information with surveillance technology like cell phone tracking technology. It also requires a warrant for searching electronic devices or compelling email, location information, or other metadata from service providers. The law creates additional procedural safeguards, including notice to the suspect, and allows for suppression or court-mandated deletion of information obtained or retained in violation of the law.43  Automated License Plate Readers: Newly enacted California law requires an opportunity for public comment, a written, publicly available use policy that is “consistent with respect for an individual’s privacy and civil liberties,” and reasonable security safeguards for any use of automated license plate readers. Individuals can sue for harms due to a security breach or other unauthorized disclosures.44
 Cell Phone Tracking Technology: Newly enacted California law requires public process, local legislative approval for all agencies other than sheriffs, a public use and privacy policy that is “consistent with respect for an individual’s privacy and civil liberties,” and the disclosure of agreements with other agencies concerning the use of IMSI catchers and other cell phone tracking technology. The law also allows an individual to sue an agency for violating these provisions. 45 There have also been bipartisan legal changes at both the federal and state level to rein in surveillance. In 2016, federal lawmakers adopted reforms related to NSA spying.46 Eighteen other states have enacted laws restricting law enforcement access to location information,47 and a majority of states have introduced legislation aimed at curbing the use of drones for surveillance purposes.4849 These state and federal changes are driven by a clear shift in public attitudes towards surveillance. Community members want and expect reform at both the state and local level to increase transparency, accountability, and oversight for surveillance technology. Two thirds of California voters want to see local elected officials like City Councilmembers or County Supervisors approve new surveillance technologies before they can be used. Similarly, a strong majority of voters want to see both local (65 percent) and state (64 percent) policies SURVEY OF LIKELY 2016 CALIFORNIA VOTERS FINDS STRONG SUPPORT FOR REFORMS TO SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY USE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Likely 2016 voters polled in a Califor nia statewide survey strongly favor local and state level reforms of law enforcement surveillance technology practices.49 A summary of key findings from the survey:

Reform Proposal Support
Require the local City Council or Board of Supervisors to vote to approve new surveillance technology before it is used by local police. 67% Develop and enforce local policies to set limits on surveillance technology used by police. 65%
Develop and enforce statewide policies to set limits on surveillance technology used by police. 64%
Require law enforcement agencies to publicly report how often they are using surveillance. 62%
Provide public notification prior to local police buying new technology for surveillance. 58%
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10 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES developed and enforced that set limits on police use of surveillance technology. Voters also want to see steps taken to require public reporting from law enforcement agencies regarding the frequency of use of surveillance technologies (62 percent) as well as public notification before the purchase of any new surveillance technologies (58 percent).50 51
All of these factors have led many communities to move
forward with local ordinances that ensure transparency, accountability, and oversight for all surveillance
technologies.
52 Your community should follow their lead
and thoroughly evaluate any surveillance proposal in
order to protect the rights of your community members,
identify hidden costs and financial risks, and ensure that you comply with existing laws and are consistent with
increasing public concerns about privacy.

“With a surveillance equipment ordinance,
any of the existing equipment that Oakland
might already have or any that is soon to
come out will have to go through the
vetting process.”
Brian Hofer, Chair, Oakland Domain
Awareness Center Privacy Committee51
ENACT A SURVEILLANCE & COMMUNITY SAFETY ORDINANCE
TO MAKE SURE THE RIGHT PROCESS IS FOLLOWED EVERY TIME
Passing the Surveillance & Communi ty Safety Ordinance included  in the Appendix to this guide will h e l p  y o u r  c o m m u n i t y  a v o i d  p r o b l e m s  d o w n  t h e  l i n e  b y  f o l l o w i n g  the  right  process  every  time.  It ensures that there is community analysis of surveillance techno logy whenever it is considered, that local lawmakers approve each step, and that any surveillance program that is approved includes both a  Surveillance  Use  Policy  that  safeguards  individual  rights  and  transparency  and  accountability mechanisms to ensure that the Policy is followed.

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Necessary Steps when Considering a Surveillance Proposal Surveillance can be misused in ways that harm community members, undermine public safety goals, and saddle taxpayers with unnecessary costs. That’s why it is essential to publicly and thoroughly evaluate surveillance proposals. The following section will help your community — including diverse residents, public officials, and law enforcement — work together to determine whether surveillance really makes sense and put in place robust rules to ensure proper use, oversight, and accountability if your community decides to move forward with a surveillance proposal.
53 A. COLLECTIVELY EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS, COSTS AND ALTERNATIVES BEFORE MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance should only be a means to an end, never an end in itself. That means that your community should have an actual purpose in mind or problem that needs to be addressed before even considering surveillance technology. Once you have that, you can collectively evaluate whether surveillance is likely to effectively accomplish your goals, as well as estimate the costs to both your community’s budget and to individual rights.

1. DECIDE AS A COMMUNITY: INVOLVE THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY
FROM THE START
The best way to consider whether surveillance is the right choice and to avoid costly mistakes is to engage the entire community — including law enforcement, local lawmakers, and members of the public — in a thorough discussion about any surveillance proposal.

Different segments of your community are likely to bring valuable perspectives to the process of evaluating whether to acquire and use surveillance technology. And the time to engage with your community is at the very beginning of the process, before any funding is sought, technology is acquired, or system is used. 54 Several cities considering proposals to introduce or expand surveillance have found it useful to actively
engage community members through working
groups and ad-hoc committees to shape policy and
provide oversight. The Redlands Police
Department convened a Citizens’ Privacy Council,
open to any city resident of the city, to provide
advice on surveillance-camera policies and oversee
police use of the cameras.
55 Richmond formed an56
ad-hoc committee to evaluate policies for its video
“The public debate that the surveillance ordinance
will require on new technologies and their uses will
be beneficial for everyone, including city officials,
to  help  them  learn  more  about  how  these
programs work and what they mean to the public.”
Joe  DeVries,  Oakland  Assistant  to  the  City
Administrator56
Fewer  than  15  percent  of
California  communities  publicly
debated  surveillance  programs
before  moving  forward.  (ACLU
2014)
54 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issued CCTV: Developing Privacy Best Practices, a report that encourages government agencies to build privacy,  civil  rights,  and  civil  liberties  considerations  into the  design,  acquisition,  and  operations  of video surveillance systems. An a ppendix highlights the need to  follow the Fair Information Practice Principles  of  Transparency,  Individual  Participation,  Purpose  Specification,  Data  Minimization,  Use Limitation, Data Quality and Integrity, Security, Accountability, and Auditing.53 Item 3A - Page 141
12 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES surveillance program.57 And in 2014, following community backlash and the vote not to expand Oakland’s Domain
Awareness Center, the City Council created a Privacy and Data Retention Ad Hoc Advisory Committee comprised of diverse community members to create safeguards to protect privacy58 rights and prevent the misuse of data for a scaled-back system to be used at the Port of Oakland.59 Oakland now has a formal Privacy Commission, which will provide advice to the City of Oakland on best practices to protect privacy rights in connection with the City's purchase and use of surveillance equipment and other technology that collects or stores data.60
 Is the community engaged in an informed debate about any surveillance proposal? It is never too early for a public debate about a surveillance proposal. Community members should know what kind of surveillance is being considered, what it is intended to do and how it will affect them at the earliest stages of the process, when their input can bring out important information, highlight community concerns, and help avoid unforeseen problems and community backlash. 61 The public should be given effective notice that surveillance is being considered. Effective notice means more than a line item in a public meeting agenda. Law enforcement should proactively contact community groups, including those representing ethnic and religious communities, and local media to increase public awareness early in the process and engage the entire community with the issue. 62

“Technology  can  only  serve
democracy  to  the  degree  that  it  is
democratized.”
Malkia  Cyril,  Director,  Center  for
Media Justice58
CASE STUDY: SANTA CLARA COUNTY CANCELS STINGRAY BUY DUE TO TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS
In 2015, the Santa Clara County  Executive rejected the Sheriff’ s proposal to purchase a Stingray after  the  Board  of  Supervisors  questioned  the  expense  and  secrec y  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t .  T h e  B o a r d questioned how they could be asked to spend more than $500,000 of taxpayer money to approve a  purchase  that  was  shrouded  in  secrecy  even  from  the  Board  its elf.  The  County  Executive ultimately rejected the purchase because the company providing the Stingray refused to “agree to even the most basic criteria we have in terms of being responsive to public records requests… We had to do what we thought was right.”61
CASE STUDY: OAKLAND’S “DOMAIN AWARENESS CENTER” FORCED TO SCALE BACK AFTER KEEPING COMMUNITY IN THE DARK
In 2013, the City of Oakland tried to expand its “Domain Awareness Center,” originally focused on the Port of Oakland, into a citywide surveillance network linking together video cameras from local streets and schools, traffic came ras, and gunshot microphones.  Instead of soliciting early public input  about  the  expanded  system,  Oakland  tried  to  move  forward  without  any  meaningful engagement  with  the  community.  Residents  were  outraged,  and  the  City  Council  voted  against expanding the system.62
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An informed debate also requires that your63
community have access to a wide range of
information in order to assess how surveillance
would work in practice and whether it would advance
local goals. Community meetings with various
speakers representing different perspectives (not just
law enforcement and the technology vendor) can
help the community understand how the surveillance
technology actually works and its potential
implications. The entity seeking to acquire new
surveillance technology should also prepare and
release a Surveillance Impact Report and a
Surveillance Use Policy to help everyone understand how a technology will work, its potential costs, and the safeguards that will prevent its misuse if the proposal were approved. Your community may also consider convening an ad-hoc committee of local
residents, experts and advocates who can work
together to make recommendations or help complete these documents.64 “It  is  critical  to  our  judicial  system  and  our
democracy that the  public and  our elected
representatives be informed about the use
of  these  devices  so  that  we  can  have  a
d i s c u s s i o n  a b o u t  t h e i r  p r i v a c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s and make informed decisions about policies
for their use.”
Joe  Simitian,  Santa  Clara  County
Supervisor63
USE A SURVEILLANCE IMPACT REPORT TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION The scope and potential costs of a surveillance technology shou ld be assessed and made available to the community through a Surveillance Impact Report. This report should include:
o Information  describing  the  technology,  how  it  works,  and  what  i t  collects,  including technology specification sheets from manufacturers;
o The proposed purposes(s) for the surveillance technology; o The location(s) it will be deployed and crime statistics for any location(s); o An assessment identifying any potential impact on civil liberties and civil rights and discussing any plans to safeguard the rights of the public; and
o The fiscal costs for the surveillance technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, and any current or potential sources of funding.

A  worksheet  to  help  your  communi ty  prepare  a  Surveillance  Impac t  Report  is  available  at aclunc.org/smartaboutsurveillance.

CASE STUDY: SANTA CRUZ COUNCILMEMBERS LACK INFORMATION FOR ALPR

DECISION
After the Santa Cruz City Council approved the use of federal funds to purchase ALPRs for the police department,  councilmembers  noted  that  they  did  not  have  a  lot  o f  information  about  the technology or its impact on the community at the time of its decision.  When one councilmember was asked what effect the scanners might have on community members, he replied, “I don’t know enough about the technology.” Another was unaware of privacy is sues, admitting, “The council didn’t get much correspondence about the potential for the erosion of civil rights that these kinds of devices can cause....”64
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14 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES  How will the community decide whether to proceed with a surveillance proposal? Community members deserve more than just information about surveillance proposals: they need the opportunity to help determine whether the proposal actually benefits the community and how or whether it should move forward, either by giving input to local policymakers at public hearings or by casting their own ballot on the issue.

In either case, initial community approval should be obtained before any steps towards acquiring surveillance technology are taken, including applying for funding from outside entities. This ensures that external grants do not circumvent the proper democratic process and cut community members out of the loop. Local policymakers or the community as a whole should be given additional opportunities to weigh in if the proposal changes or as more details become available. 65 2. DEFINE THE PURPOSE: ASK HOW AND WHETHER THIS TECHNOLOGY WILL AID YOUR COMMUNITY Your community cannot determine whether surveillance is an appropriate solution if you have not first identified the problem. Defining the specific purpose or issues that surveillance is intended to address is essential to evaluate the likely effectiveness of surveillance and to identify alternatives that might provide a better fit for your community’s needs and budget. It can help highlight the individuals or communities who are likely to be most impacted by surveillance and ensure that their thoughts and concerns are fully understood. It also provides a starting point for crafting a Surveillance Use Policy by defining specific objectives for which surveillance is appropriate and barring its use outside of those purposes.  What specific community purposes will be aided by adopting this technology?

A well-defined community purpose should include a specific problem and a measurable outcome that the community desires. Vague purposes such as “protecting our city from criminals” make it difficult for the community to understand how surveillance might be used or how its effectiveness might be measured. In contrast, a purpose such as “increase recovery of stolen vehicles” succinctly identifies an outcome desired by community members and helps frame public discussion. That discussion may in turn lead you to narrow or alter the purposes for which surveillance should be used, if you decide to use it at all. 66 CASE STUDY: OAKLAND SPENDS $2M ON “HARDLY USED” POLICE TECHNOLOGY The  cash‐strapped  city  of  Oakland  learned  the  hard  way  that  acquiring  new  police  technology without a clearly defined purpose can be a waste of time and money. A city audit revealed that the city had squandered almost $2 million on hardly used police tec hnology between 2006 and 2011.

The  auditor  recommended  steps  to  ensure  that  technology  purchases  were  intended  to  fulfill specific strategic objectives and regular evaluation of their effectiveness.66 CASE STUDY: SAN JOSE’S DRONE GROUNDED UNTIL COMMUNITY APPROVES San Jose residents were outraged when they learned that their p olice department had purchased a drone without any public debate. Amid critical media coverage  and protests from community groups, civil‐rights advocates, an d local residents, police apo logized and said they would ground the drone until they could conduct adequate public outreach.65 Item 3A - Page 144
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 Will this surveillance technology help your community achieve that purpose? After your community identifies the purposes that surveillance technology might be able to address, you should evaluate whether the proposed technology would actually achieve them. Manufacturer’s claims should not be taken at face value, and certainly not in isolation. Instead, your community should look at all of the evidence or arguments suggesting that surveillance will or will not effectively help you achieve your defined purpose.67
 Are there better alternatives to achieve your purpose? Even if the proposed surveillance technology does seem likely to help your community achieve its purpose, there still may be alternatives that are just as (or more) effective, less expensive, and/or less likely to be misused or otherwise negatively impact your community members.

In particular, you should compare the effectiveness and costs of technology-based solutions with non- technology-oriented approaches to address the problem. For example, multiple studies have shown that traditional approaches such as increased lighting and foot patrols significantly reduce crime. 68 You should not automatically assume that surveillance technology will be more effective.69

3. IDENTIFY THE COSTS AND RISKS: EXAMINE FINANCIAL, LEGAL, AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES Even if a specific technology is appropriate for your community’s purposes, there still may be financial, legal and practical concerns that may make adopting it undesirable. This section will help you measure the likely costs of surveillance so that you can determine whether they are truly outweighed by the expected benefits.

CASE STUDY: CITIES REPLACE RED LIGHT CAMERAS WITH LONGER YELLOW LIGHTS California  cities  are  increasingly  shutting  down  red  light  cameras  as  evidence  mounts  that  the cameras  increase,  rather  than  decrease,  traffic  accidents.  For example,  in  Walnut,  CA,  a  study found that red light cameras resulted in dramatic increases in “red light running collisions” (400%), “rear end collisions” (71%) and “broadside collisions” (100%)” and that “no argument can be made that photo enforcement has improved safety . . . within the cit y of Walnut. In fact, the use of red light cameras appears to have decreased safety and put roadway  users at increased risk.” In light of this evidence, more than half of the California cities that once used red light cameras have ended their  programs,  turning  instead  to  alternatives  that  have  proven  more  effective  at  preventing accidents such as longer yellow lights at dangerous intersections.69 CASE STUDY: SAN FRANCISCO RECONSIDERS PLANS TO EXPAND
SAFETY CAMERA PROGRAM THAT FAILS TO IMPROVE COMMUNITY SAFETY In 2005, San Francisco set out to  deter violent crime and provide police with an investigative tool by installing video cameras in the City’s high‐crime, high‐traf fic areas. However, p ost‐installation crime statistics published by ma ndate under a city ordinance re vealed that the cameras neither reduced crime nor assisted in solving them in any meaningful way. In fact, the cameras only led to six suspects being charged by the SFPD between 2005 and 2008. As a result, the Police Commission reconsidered its plans to expand the program.67
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16 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES  How much will the technology cost your community to acquire and operate? Deciding how to allocate funds is one of your
community’s most important tasks. Every dollar
your community spends on surveillance
technology is a dollar it cannot spend on some
other community need. Costs related to
surveillance technology will include personnel
time, training costs, maintenance and upkeep, as
well as any network and storage costs for the
data your community may collect. Potential costs
associated with risks of data breach or lawsuits
based on abuse of surveillance also need to be
recognized.
70 Questions about costs cannot be dismissed solely
because your community is seeking grant funding to pay for the technology. These grants are attractive for obvious reasons: they appear to allow your community to buy a technology without having to spend local taxpayer dollars. But outside grants may not cover the costs that follow a technology’s adoption, particularly the long-term costs of operation, repairs, and personnel. Estimating these costs as accurately as possible — and making sure those estimates are shared with the community and made part of the debate about adopting surveillance — is key.
 What are the legal risks and associated potential costs of the surveillance proposal? Surveillance technology can carry a number of significant legal risks and requirements, in part because of rapid changes to privacy and surveillance law. Even under current law, misuse of surveillance systems or data, or technical glitches outside of your control could subject your community to potential legal liability.

And as courts and lawmakers continue to reassess how privacy and free speech rights should apply in the digital age, there is a risk that your community’s investment in surveillance technology could leave it saddled with equipment that can no longer be legally used as intended. These factors need to be accounted for when performing a cost-benefit analysis of any surveillance proposal. 71 “One more question to ask ourselves is whether
w e  a r e  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e that  is  needed  to  support  technology  —  the
costs of monitoring it and of staffing technology
units at a time when departments are laying off
civilians. We really need to think about all of the
aspects of technology when initial investments
are being made.”
P o l i c e  E x e c u t i v e  R e s e a r c h  F o r u m ,  “ H o w  A r e Innovations in Technology Affecting Policing?”70
CASE STUDY: FBI REMOVES GPS TRACKERS AFTER SUPREME COURT RULES THAT WARRANTLESS TRACKING IMPLICATES FOURTH AMENDMENT
The  FBI  had  installed  approximately  3,000  GPS  trackers  on  cars throughout  the  United  States, without a warrant, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that their use implicated the Fourth Amendment.  As  a  result,  the  FBI  deactivated  the  warrantless  trackers,  and  its  agents  had  to physically retrieve them. Obtaining warrants before using those GPS trackers would have ensured the constitutionality of obtained evidence and saved the FBI considerable time and effort.71 Item 3A - Page 146
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 How could the surveillance proposal negatively impact public safety or individual rights? A surveillance proposal designed to benefit your community may carry side effects that undermine that objective. Insecure systems can present a tempting target for hackers, potentially making your community less safe in the process. Surveillance programs that target or disproportionately impact communities of color or other marginalized groups can make it harder for law enforcement to work cooperatively with those groups to investigate crimes. And surveillance can chill political and social engagement such as attendance at political rallies, gun shows, or religious ceremonies if community members fear that their lives are constantly being monitored. Identifying the harms as well as benefits of surveillance is an important part of evaluating any proposal.72
B. ESTABLISH A SURVEILLANCE USE POLICY TO MITIGATE HARMS AND PROTECT RIGHTS
If after careful consideration and public debate your community decides that a particular surveillance technology is worth adopting, you need to ensure that policies are in place so that it is used properly. A clear, legally enforceable Surveillance Use Policy that provides guidance about when and how to use surveillance can safeguard individual rights while protecting local law enforcement and your entire community from costly lawsuits, bad press, loss of community trust, and more. Recognizing the necessity of use policies, Seattle and Spokane, Washington, recently passed ordinances requiring police to develop use guidelines for new surveillance equipment before using it.
73 74

CASE STUDY: REDLANDS DEPLOYS INSECURE CAMERA NETWORK
The surveillance camera network in the city of Redlands made the news for the wrong reasons when computer security experts demonstrated how easily they could take control of the cameras.

Although the police department expressed concern about “people  with criminal intent using the public  camera  feed  to  case  homes  or  businesses  or  track  the  police  force,”  the  network  was deployed  with  no  security  at  all.  Even  after  the  story  broke,  the  network  was  secured  with  an outdated encryption protocol that a researcher described as “putting a diary lock on your front door.”
72 CASE STUDY: ALAMEDA COUNTY SOLICITS PUBLIC INPUT FOR STINGRAY POLICY Before  upgrading  its  cell  phone  surveillance  technology,  the  Alameda  County  District  Attorney publicly released its draft use policy and solicited feedback f rom the community. In response to feedback, the District Attorney made changes that resulted in a  policy requiring a warrant for the use of the device and strict limits on how data could be used.  This transparent and democratic process helped build community trust and ensured a stronger set of safeguards would be in place from the start.74
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18 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES Here are some of the key elements of a robust, legally enforceable Surveillance Use policy:

1. USE APPROPRIATELY: PLACE CLEAR LIMITS ON SURVEILLANCE If your community has been following this guide, you’ve already defined community purposes that justify a particular technology. Now it’s time to use those purposes to decide and codify both the acceptable uses that will benefit the community and those that are simply prohibited. Doing so safeguards against use of the technology in a manner the community never intended.
 When is surveillance permitted or prohibited?
The first step is straightforward but essential: defining how and when the technology may be used. Every entity in your community that conducts surveillance should have a policy that clearly specifies appropriate uses of each technology and bars all other uses.

In order to benefit from and reflect community input and oversight, technology should only be used for the particular purposes for which it was acquired. Any proposed new uses should be subject to the same public discussion as the acquisition of new technology, allowing the community to weigh in on the appropriateness of any expanded purpose.

Your policy needs to be consistent with constitutional
guarantees of privacy, equal protection, freedom of
speech, and freedom of religion. In fact, your use
policy should not only address clearly unlawful but
also potentially unlawful uses of surveillance
technology. If there are questions about the legality of a specific practice, your use policy should prohibit that practice until there is a definite answer.
75  What legal or internal process is required to use surveillance? It is also important to ensure that all legally required and internal processes are followed each time surveillance is used. These processes help to prevent unauthorized or outright illegal uses and also make sure that even appropriate uses of the surveillance technology minimize the impact on individual rights. 76 In many cases, the best way to ensure that legal requirements are satisfied is to require a search warrant prior to conducting surveillance, allowing the court system to play a role in overseeing the program. With the streamlined modern warrant process, officers can seek a judge’s approval quickly and easily by simply placing a phone call or using a mobile device.77
Internal recordkeeping, including recording the reason for each use of surveillance, can also help ensure compliance with the appropriate use policy and create an audit trail for ongoing feedback and oversight.  How are officers trained before they conduct surveillance? Having clear policies is not helpful if the people using the technology or the data it collects lack the underlying knowledge to comply with those policies. Training programs for anyone involved with surveillance must be comprehensive, encompassing not just the technology and Surveillance Use Policy but the purposes and legal rules that inform the Policy. Training should spell out both the obligations of anyone using the technology and the consequences for policy violations.

The police need to “have more of a dialog
with the council, because we are the ones
that . . . approve funding decisions and we
want to make sure . . . that you are
hearing everything that we hear as well.”
Seattle Councilmember Bruce Harrell 76
Publicly available use policies
were found for less than 1 in
5 local California surveillance
programs  (ACLU  2014
research).
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 Are you only collecting necessary data?
Ensuring that surveillance technology is used in a way that accomplishes its stated purpose without collecting additional data is a straightforward way to reduce the risk of privacy invasions. That’s why the federal statute authorizing wiretaps has from its inception required “minimization” — an effort to make sure that even after a warrant has been issued and collection is underway, police only intercept communications relevant to the investigation, not every communication made by the target.78 The same principle should be applied to other forms of surveillance, requiring a reasonable effort to avoid collecting superfluous information. For example, a police department that deploys drones to an accident scene to quickly identify any need for police or emergency intervention does not need to record and retain video footage.79

2. PREVENT MISUSE OF DATA: LIMIT WHEN DATA CAN BE USED AND WHO CAN ACCESS IT Even data collected for a legitimate purpose can be put to illegitimate uses. It is essential that your community establish clear rules so that surveillance data is used only for approved purposes. Doing so not only prevents outright abuses of the data that can erode public trust but also keeps “mission creep” from altering the balance that you have already worked out between government actions and individual liberties.  How will surveillance data be secured?
The first step in preventing misuse of data is ensuring that it is stored securely. Technical safeguards are necessary to help protect community members’ data from accidental disclosure and misuse. You should consult with experts and implement safeguards at multiple levels that protect data at all points in its lifespan.

Your community may already possess secure storage space separated from other databases and computer systems. This provides you with an obvious level of control. If you choose to store data elsewhere, you must ensure that it is secure and subject to your safeguards. Your community should also designate someone as an authority or custodian with responsibility over community members’ data and your storage systems.
80 CASE STUDY: OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL RETAINS ONLY ALPR HITS The Ohio State Highway Patrol policy for automated license plate readers (ALPRs) states, “all ‘non‐ hit’  captures  shall  be  deleted  immediately.”  The  ALPR  program  i s  intended  to  detect  stolen vehicles, Amber Alerts, and persons with outstanding warrants.  As a result, retaining data about “non‐hit” vehicles does not further that purpose, and a policy  of deleting that data immediately protects the community from unnecessary risks.79
CASE STUDY: MONTEREY COUNTY SUFFERS DATA BREACH
DUE TO “TOTALLY OBSOLETE” DATA PRACTICES
Monterey County’s computer systems were breached in 2013 and the personal information of over 140,000  local  residents  was  stolen.  A  subsequent  grand  jury  investigation  concluded  that  the breach stemmed from “totally obsolete” data practices and a fai lure to follow privacy laws. The grand jury warned of “serious financial consequences” if the county failed to change its practices.80 Item 3A - Page 149
20 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES  Under what circumstances can collected data be accessed or used? In addition to technical safeguards to protect data, you should also limit the circumstances under which it can be legitimately accessed or used. These limits should be based on the specific purposes your community agreed to when it adopted the technology. For example, if the purpose of the technology is to address specific violent crimes, your policy might allow database searches only as part of an official investigation of a violent crime, and only for data that is related to that investigation. Data access and use policies that are consistent with the articulated purposes for the system will provide guidance to operators and engender community trust by deterring abuses that can follow unfettered access to surveillance data.

Your community’s goal of balancing privacy and security will be easier to achieve if particular data access and use limits are accompanied by steps to ensure the rules are followed. Database access should be limited — for example, by only allowing junior staff to access data with the permission and guidance of a more senior officer, or by limiting data access solely to senior officers. As explained earlier, training is a must. Restricting data access to a limited set of trained employees decreases the potential that community members’ data can be misused. To ensure targeted use of data, it may be appropriate to require a search warrant or similar external process before the data can be accessed at all. 81  What limits exist on sharing data with outside entities? Placing limits on how data use is a great step, but third parties that receive the collected data may not have the same limits in place. To protect residents’ privacy and prevent uses of information contrary to community desires, it is important to articulate when — if ever — the technology’s purposes justify sharing any collected information. During the public debate over your Surveillance Use Policy, the community should decide when sharing is permissible and when it is prohibited.

If data can be shared, your community must also determine how to ensure that the entity receiving the data lives up to your community’s standards. This may require contractual language binding the third party to your data policies and safeguards. For example, the city of Menlo Park, California, specifically requires by ordinance that any agreement with Northern California’s fusion center demand compliance with the City’s own retention policy.
82 If a potential recipient of your data cannot agree with your policies or conditions, the best choice is to not share your data.

3. LIMIT DATA RETENTION: KEEP INFORMATION ONLY AS LONG AS NECESSARY The longer you retain information, the greater the potential privacy and security risks. The easiest way to minimize these risks is to retain only necessary information and to delete it after the purpose for its collection is achieved.

CASE STUDY: LAX POLICIES LEAD TO “LOVEINT” ABUSE
Without strong policies limiting access to data, the temptation  to misuse government databases for  personal  interests  can  be  hard  to  resist.  The  NSA  even  has a  specific  term,  LOVEINT,  for employees  who  monitor  their  significant  others.  Two  Fairfield, C A ,  o f f i c e r s  c o u l d  f a c e  c r i m i n a l charges after using a statewide police database to screen women from online dating sites.81 Item 3A - Page 150
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 Does retaining data help accomplish the purpose for which the technology was acquired? To maximize the usefulness of your technology and minimize civil liberties concerns, a retention period should not be longer than necessary to directly advance community purposes. For instance, deploying automated license plate readers to83
locate stolen or Amber Alert vehicles
is not aided by the collection of
historical data. Retaining data “just in
case it becomes useful” increases the
risk that data will be used contrary to
the purpose agreed upon by the
community or wind up in the hands of
a bad actor. Retaining data can also increase the costs of surveillance by requiring expensive storage solutions and making it harder to effectively use the system. Focusing on the specific objective that surveillance is intended to accomplish can help you determine a retention period that balances that objective with the costs and risks associated with data retention.  Are there other legal or policy reasons that inform your data retention policy? There may be other legal and policy issues that affect your data retention policy, informed by legal concerns unrelated to your community’s purposes. For example, your community should choose a retention period that balances a desire to be responsive to public records requests with residents’ civil liberties, including privacy. Responsiveness to records requests should not be a primary justification for an extended retention period, however, since community concerns about surveillance are better addressed by retaining less information in the first place.  What happens when the data retention period expires?
To prevent misuse of data after your community’s desired retention period has lapsed, ensure that data is regularly deleted after that time. This can be accomplished via automated technical measures or periodic audits.

Before data is collected, your community should also decide whether there are any specific circumstances that justify the retention of data beyond your community’s chosen retention period. For instance, it might be appropriate to preserve data relevant to a specific ongoing investigation, data necessary to complete an investigation of internal data misuse, and data relevant to a criminal defendant’s case. Any such conditions should be informed by your community’s purposes and clearly articulated in your Surveillance Use Policy.

C. ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY BY ENFORCING POLICIES AND ENCOURAGING ONGOING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
Even if your community has already deployed surveillance technology, the community as a whole has a crucial role in ensuring that the public interest is promoted through its use. One key question is whether your Surveillance Use Policy is effectively safeguarding individual rights and preventing abuses. A second is whether the assumptions you made when you approved surveillance in the first place still hold true after actual experience with the technology and its impact. Revamping or even cancelling an ineffective or imbalanced program is better than wasting time, money, and community trust on a tool that does more harm than good.
“If there’s anything of a criminal nature recorded on video, it’s  grabbed  and  inventoried  within  hours.  Most
everything  else  is  never  looked  at  again,  so  it’s  purged automatically.”
Commander Steven Caluris, Chicago Police Department83
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22 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES

1. IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS ABUSES: AUDIT USE OF TECHNOLOGIES AND DATA AND ADDRESS ANY MISUSE The safeguards in your Surveillance Use Policy are only worthwhile if the policy is actually followed. But given the secretive nature of many forms of surveillance, ensuring compliance takes conscious effort. Strong internal and external oversight and auditing can help identify isolated or systemic abuses of surveillance technology, and legally enforceable sanctions can deter both.

 How are operators supervised?
Personnel management and technical measures both
facilitate internal oversight of your technology and data.

Designating a chain of command for a given surveillance technology helps specific personnel understand what
responsibilities they have over the equipment or data and makes it easy to trace where misuse occurred. All of this helps your community deter abuses and guarantee that
resources are used wisely.
84  How will misuses of the technology be identified?
The best way to identify misuse of surveillance is to “watch the watchers” by keeping thorough records of each time surveillance is deployed or surveillance data is called up. The person or persons with oversight responsibility should be independent, given full access to the technology and database, and empowered to receive complaints about misuse and draw conclusions that can lead to legally enforceable consequences. To catch what human oversight misses, your community should ensure that technical measures including access controls and audit logs are in place. Placing the oversight authority with a third party such as the City Council or a citizen panel may also increase the likelihood that the misuses are accurately identified. 85
 What legally enforceable sanctions exist to deter misuse and abuse of this technology? By establishing consequences for violations of the guidelines, your community encourages proper use of the technology and sends a message that community values apply to everyone. Depending on the circumstances, sanctions ranging from retraining to fines, suspensions, or termination may be appropriate for violations of your Surveillance Use Policy. In addition, your community should provide an appropriate remedy for anyone harmed by an abuse. Legally enforceable sanctions discourage misuse and guarantee that aggrieved community members will be made whole. “As  stewards  of  the  public’s
interests, we know the government
doesn’t  get  to  simply  say  ‘trust  us’
and  carry  on:  we  have  to  earn  that
trust on a daily basis. We have to be
accountable and transparent….”
Former Oakland Mayor Jean Quan84
CASE STUDY: FRESNO ADOPTS ANNUAL AUDIT OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE When the Fresno Police Department proposed a citywide video‐pol icing program using live‐feed cameras, the city council required an annual independent audit  to ensure that all of the privacy and security guidelines for the  system’s use were being followe d. Fresno Police Chief Jerry Dyer said he supported the audit: “I have no doubt the audit will be  very helpful to our ongoing video policing operations.” The city appointed a retired federal district court judge as auditor, who then examined current use of the system and made specific policy recommendations.85 Item 3A - Page 152
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2. KEEP THE DIALOG OPEN: ENCOURAGE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT AND ONGOING DISCUSSION Community oversight and feedback plays two essential roles in ensuring that any current surveillance program actually benefits your community. First, transparency about abuses of surveillance allows the community to determine whether the Surveillance Use Policy or any associated sanctions need to be revised to address the issue. Second, as your community learns first-hand whether surveillance is effective and how it impacts different individuals and groups, you may wish to reassess the purposes for which surveillance should be used or even whether it should still be used at all. Surveillance should be under the control of the community at all times, not just when it is initially being considered.
 How will the community continue to be informed about the surveillance program? It is important that your community’s oversight mechanisms not only are in place before surveillance is used but also remain available as long as the surveillance program continues or any collected data remains. This allows the community to continue to learn about and provide feedback on the effectiveness and impact of surveillance, and provides the information you will need to evaluate any changes going forward.

One of the most effective ways to keep your community informed is to produce an annual report about each surveillance technology that has been used in the past year. This report should include:
o A description of how and how often the technology was used; o Information, including crime statistics, that indicate whether the technology was effective at accomplishing its stated purpose;
o A summary of community complaints or concerns about the technology; o Information about any violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, data breaches, or similar incidents, including the actions taken in response, or results of any internal audits; o Whether and how data acquired through the use of the technology was shared with any outside entities;
o Statistics and information about Public Records Act requests, including responses; and o The total annual costs for the technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and any external funding available to fund any or all of those costs in the coming year.

In addition, there may be other ways to provide your community with information about the operation and effectiveness of the surveillance program. Responding to Public Records Act requests with as much information as possible, taking into account factors such as the privacy rights of individuals whose information may be included in the requested data, is one way to allow interested community members access to concrete information about the program. Creating standing committees of community members, regularly holding public events and forums, and establishing open inspection periods for the technology can also help keep the community informed.
 How will local officials and the public re‐evaluate the decision to engage in surveillance or the existing policies and safeguards?
The community’s decision to approve surveillance should be reconsidered on an annual basis. If there is evidence that calls into question the conclusion that the benefits of surveillance outweigh costs and concerns, or that there are better ways to achieve the same purpose with fewer costs or risks, policymakers should seek community input and take whatever action is appropriate to address these concerns. That may involve narrowing the purpose or scope of surveillance, requiring modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy, or exploring alternatives that better address community needs.

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24 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES Conclusion
Communities increasingly understand the need to make smart choices about surveillance technology and ensure that time, energy, and resources are not spent on systems that cost more, do less, and threaten the rights of community members. Community members demand — and deserve — a voice in any decisions about surveillance technology. Proper transparency, accountability, and oversight must be the rule in considering any surveillance technology proposal. We hope the recommendations in this guide help you work to enact local and state policies to ensure consistent public process each time surveillance technology is considered.

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Appendix: Model Surveillance & Community Safety Ordinance A. KEY PRINCIPLES OF THE MODEL ORDINANCE
o Informed Public Debate at Earliest Stage of Process: Public notice, distribution of information about the proposal, and public debate prior to seeking funding or otherwise moving forward with surveillance technology proposals.
o Determination that Benefits Outweigh Costs and Concerns: Local leaders, after facilitating an informed public debate, expressly consider costs (fiscal and civil liberties) and determine that surveillance technology is appropriate or not before moving forward. o Thorough Surveillance Use Policy: Legally enforceable Surveillance Use Policy with robust civil liberties, civil rights, and security safeguards approved by policymakers. o Ongoing Oversight & Accountability: Proper oversight of surveillance technology use and accountability through annual reporting, review by policymakers, and enforcement mechanisms.

B. MODEL ORDINANCE TEXT
The [Council/Board of Supervisors] finds that any decision to use surveillance technology must be judiciously balanced with the need to protect civil rights and civil liberties, including privacy and free expression, and the costs to [City/County]. The [Council/Board] finds that proper transparency, oversight, and accountability are fundamental to minimizing the risks posed by surveillance technologies. The [Council/Board] finds it essential to have an informed public debate as early as possible about whether to adopt surveillance technology. The [Council/Board] finds it necessary that legally enforceable safeguards be in place to protect civil liberties and civil rights before any surveillance technology is deployed. The [Council/Board] finds that if surveillance technology is approved, there must be continued oversight and annual evaluation to ensure that safeguards are being followed and that the surveillance technology’s benefits outweigh its costs.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the [Council/Board] of [City/County] adopts the following:

Section 1. Title
This ordinance shall be known as the Surveillance & Community Safety Ordinance.

Section 2. [Council/Board] Approval Requirement
1) A [City/County] entity must obtain [Council/Board] approval at a properly-noticed public hearing prior to any of the following:
a) Seeking funds for surveillance technology, including but not limited to applying for a grant or soliciting or accepting state or federal funds or in-kind or other donations; b) Acquiring new surveillance technology, including but not limited to procuring such technology without the exchange of monies or consideration; c) Using new surveillance technology, or using existing surveillance technology for a purpose, in a manner or in a location not previously approved by the [Council/Board]; or d) Entering into an agreement with a non-[City/County] entity to acquire, share or otherwise use surveillance technology or the information it provides. 2) A [City/County] entity must obtain [Council/Board] approval of a Surveillance Use Policy prior to engaging in any of the activities described in subsection (1)(b)-(d).

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26 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES Section 3. Information Required
1) The [City/County] entity seeking approval under Section 2 shall submit to the [Council/Board] a Surveillance Impact Report and a proposed Surveillance Use Policy at least forty-five (45) days prior to the public hearing.
2) The [Council/Board] shall publicly release in print and online the Surveillance Impact Report and proposed Surveillance Use Policy at least thirty (30) days prior to the public hearing.

Section 4. Determination by [Council/Board] that Benefits Outweigh Costs and Concerns The [Council/Board] shall only approve any action described in Section 2, subsection (1) of this ordinance after making a determination that the benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and that the proposal will safeguard civil liberties and civil rights.

Section 5. Compliance for Existing Surveillance Technology Each [City/County] entity possessing or using surveillance technology prior to the effective date of this ordinance shall submit a proposed Surveillance Use Policy no later than ninety (90) days following the effective date of this ordinance for review and approval by [Council/Board]. If such review and approval has not occurred within sixty (60) days of the submission date, the [City/County] entity shall cease its use of the surveillance technology until such review and approval occurs.

Section 6. Oversight Following [Council/Board] Approval 1) A [City/County] entity which obtained approval for the use of surveillance technology must submit a Surveillance Report for each such surveillance technology to the [Council/Board] within twelve (12) months of [Council/Board] approval and annually thereafter on or before November 1. 2) Based upon information provided in the Surveillance Report, the [Council/Board] shall determine whether the benefits to the community of the surveillance technology outweigh the costs and whether civil liberties and civil rights are safeguarded. If the benefits do not outweigh the costs or civil rights and civil liberties are not safeguarded, the [Council/Board] shall direct that use of the surveillance technology cease and/or require modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy that will resolve the above concerns.
3) No later than January 15 of each year, the [Council/Board] shall hold a public meeting and publicly release in print and online a report that includes, for the prior year:
a. A summary of all requests for [Council/Board] approval pursuant to Section 2 or Section 5, including whether the [Council/Board] approved or rejected the proposal and/or required changes to a proposed Surveillance Use Policy before approval; and b. All Surveillance Reports submitted.

Section 7. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this Ordinance:
1) “Surveillance Report” means a written report concerning a specific surveillance technology that includes all of the following:
a. A description of how the surveillance technology was used; b. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s);
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d. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response;
e. Information, including crime statistics, that help the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes; f. Statistics and information about public records act requests, including response rates; and g. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year. 2) “[City/County] entity” means any department, bureau, division, or unit of the [City/County]. 3) “Surveillance technology” means any electronic device, system utilizing an electronic device, or similar used, designed, or primarily intended to collect, retain, process, or share audio, electronic, visual, location, thermal, olfactory or similar information specifically associated with, or capable of being associated with, any individual or group.
4) “Surveillance Impact Report” means a publicly released written report including at a minimum the following: (a) Information describing the surveillance technology and how it works, including product descriptions from manufacturers; (b) information on the proposed purposes(s) for the surveillance technology; (c) the location(s) it may be deployed and crime statistics for any location(s); (d) an assessment identifying any potential impact on civil liberties and civil rights and discussing any plans to safeguard the rights of the public; and (e) the fiscal costs for the surveillance technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, and any current or potential sources of funding.
5) "Surveillance Use Policy" means a publicly released and legally enforceable policy for use of the surveillance technology that at a minimum specifies the following:
a. Purpose: The specific purpose(s) that the surveillance technology is intended to advance. b. Authorized Use: The uses that are authorized, the rules and processes required prior to such use, and the uses that are prohibited.
c. Data Collection: The information that can be collected by the surveillance technology. d. Data Access: The individuals who can access or use the collected information, and the rules and processes required prior to access or use of the information. e. Data Protection: The safeguards that protect information from unauthorized access, including encryption and access control mechanisms.
f. Data Retention: The time period, if any, for which information collected by the surveillance technology will be routinely retained, the reason such retention period is appropriate to further the purpose(s), the process by which the information is regularly deleted after that period lapses, and the specific conditions that must be met to retain information beyond that period.
g. Public Access: How collected information can be accessed or used by members of the public, including criminal defendants.
h. Third Party Data Sharin
g: If and how other [City/County] or non-[City/County] entities can access or use the information, including any required justification or legal standard necessary to do so and any obligations imposed on the recipient of the information. i. Training: The training required for any individual authorized to use the surveillance technology or to access information collected by the surveillance technology, including any training materials.
j. Auditing and Oversight: The mechanisms to ensure that the Surveillance Use Policy is followed, including internal personnel assigned to ensure compliance with the policy, internal recordkeeping of the use of the technology or access to information collected by the technology, technical measures to monitor for misuse, any independent person or entity with oversight authority, and the legally enforceable sanctions for violations of the policy.

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28 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES Section 8. Enforcement
1) Any violation of this Ordinance constitutes an injury, and any person may institute proceedings for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce this Ordinance.
2) A court shall award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the plaintiff who is the prevailing party in an action brought to enforce this Ordinance.
3) In addition, for a willful, intentional, or reckless violation of this Ordinance, an individual shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 per violation, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or both such a fine and imprisonment.

Section 9. Severability
The provisions in this Ordinance are severable. If any part or provision of this Ordinance, or the application of this Ordinance to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Ordinance, including the application of such part or provisions to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected by such holding and shall continue to have force and effect.

Section 10. Effective Date
This Ordinance shall take effect on [DATE].

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1 For example, the San Francisco Police Department’s Mission Statement states that “policing strategies must preserve and advance democratic values” and that “police must respect and protect the rights of all citizens as guaranteed by the state’s Constitution.” Police Department, Mission Statement, http://sf-police.org/index.aspx?page=1616. 2 B.T. Lewis & Taymeh Jahsi, Stop using social media to monitor south Fresno’s protesters, The Fresno Bee, Feb. 10, 2016, available at http://www.fresnobee.com/opinion/readers-opinion/article59388976.html. 3 Matt Cagle. This Surveillance Software is Probably Spying on #BlackLivesMatter, ACLU of Northern California (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/surveillance-software-probably-spying-blacklivesmatter. 4 See Press Release, Leadership Conference, Civil Rights Principles for the Era of Big Data, http://www.civilrights.org/press/2014/civil-rights-principles-big-data.html. 5 Terrence O’Brien, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, Wired.com, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.wired.com/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/.
6 Michael Isikoff, FBI Tracks Suspects’ Cell Phones Without a Warrant, Newsweek, Feb, 18, 2010 (updated Mar. 13, 2010), available at http://www.newsweek.com/fbi-tracks-suspects-cell-phones-without-warrant-75099. 7 David Kravets, Rights Groups Decry New NSA Leak: Snooping on Muslim-Americans’ E-mail, Ars Technica (July 9, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/07/rights-groups-decry-new-nsa-leak-snooping-on-muslim-americans-e- mail/.
8 Matt Apuzzo and Al Baker, New York to Appoint Civilian to Monitor Police’s Counterterrorism Activity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/nyregion/new-york-to-appoint-monitor-to-review-polices- counterterrorism-activity.html; Case page, Raza v. City of New York – Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program, Jan. 7, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/cases/raza-v-city-new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance- program.
9 See Tanvir v. Holder, Case No. 13-CV-6951 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 22, 2014) (First Amended Complaint), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/lawsuit-accusing-us-of-putting-people-on-no-fly-list-after-they- say-they-wont-spy/941/.
10 George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson, The Intercept, July 24, 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/documents-show-department-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter- since-ferguson/.
11 Matt Cagle. This Surveillance Software is Probably Spying on #BlackLivesMatter, ACLU of Northern California (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/surveillance-software-probably-spying-blacklivesmatter; see also Shaun King, Fresno police join group of officials monitoring #BlackLivesMatter hashtag, labeling a peaceful movement a threat, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 17, 2015, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/king-monitoring-blacklivesmatter-labels-movement- threat-article-1.2468808.
12 David Rogers, Black Lives Matter Supporters in Oregon Targeted by State Surveillance, ACLU Speak Freely blog, Nov. 11, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/black-lives-matter-supporters-oregon-targeted-state-surveillance; Courtney Sherwood, Oregon attorney general ‘appalled’ by probe of Black Lives Matter, Reuters, Nov. 11, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oregon-race-idUSKCN0T104N20151112. 13 Jeremy Gillula and Dave Maass, What You Can Learn from Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Jan. 21, 2015, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data. 14 Angel Jennings, Richard Winston & James Rainey, Sherriff’s Secret Air Surveillance of Compton Sparks Outrage, L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriffs-surveillance-compton-outrage- 20140423-story.html.
15 Andrea Peterson, LOVEINT: When NSA Officers Use Their Spying Power on Love Interests, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/24/loveint-when-nsa-officers-use-their- spying-power-on-love-interests/.
16 See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, New Tracking Frontier: Your License Plates, Wall St. J., Sep. 29, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443995604578004723603576296. 17 Jenna McLaughlin, The FBI v. Apple Debate Just Got Less White, The Intercept, Mar. 8, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/03/08/the-fbi-vs-apple-debate-just-got-less-white/. 18 Rania Khalek, Activists of Color Lead Charge Against Surveillance, NSA, Truthout, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.truth- out.org/news/item/19695-activists-of-color-at-forefront-of-anti-nsa-movement. 19 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
20 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955, 56 (2012).

Endnotes
Item 3A - Page 159
30 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES

21 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Defends Tactics over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New Details on Muslim Surveillance, Huffington Post (Feb 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tactics- over_n_1298997.html; Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, New York Drops Unit That Spied on Muslims, N.Y. Times, April 15, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-on-muslims-is- disbanded.html.
22 Hina Shamsi and Ramzi Kassem, The NYPD spied on Muslim Americans. Will a court settlement change anything?, The Guardian, Jan. 8, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/08/nypd-spied-muslim-americans-will- court-settlement-bring-change.
23 Angel Jennings, Richard Winston & James Rainey, Sherriff’s Secret Air Surveillance of Compton Sparks Outrage, L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriffs-surveillance-compton-outrage- 20140423-story.html.
24 Police Executive Research Forum, How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming Policing? 26 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter PERF Report], available at http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/ how%20are%20innovations%20in%20technology%20transforming%20policing%202012.pdf. 25 Press Release, Office of the Controller, Butkovitz Alarmed by Police Camera Program, June 20, 2012, http://www.philadelphiacontroller.org/page.asp?id=792.
26 See Fazaga v. FBI, 844 F.Supp.2d 1022 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 27 Adam Goldman, NYPD settles lawsuits over Muslim monitoring, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nypd-settles-lawsuits-over-muslim- monitoring/2016/01/07/bdc8eb98-b3dc-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html. 28 See Tim Cushing, Another Bogus Hit from a License Plate Reader Results in Another Citizen Surrounded by Cops with Guns Out, TechDirt (May 23, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140513/07404127218/another-bogus-hit-license-plate- reader-results-another-citizen-surrounded-cops-with-guns-out.shtml. 29 Symposium, The Value of Privacy, U. Cal.-Hastings School of L. Const. L. Q., Apr. 7, 2014 (oral remarks), available at http://livestre.am/4P7Lk.
30 Cal. Civil Code § 1798.29 (2014).
31 Larry Ponemon, Cost of Data Breaches Rising Globally, Says ‘2015 Cost of a Data Breach Study: Global Analysis,’ May 27, 2015, https://securityintelligence.com/cost-of-a-data-breach-2015/. 32 Will Kane, Oakland to Limit Surveillance Center to Port, Airport, S.F. Gate, Mar. 6, 2014, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-to-limit-surveillance-center-to-port-5290273.php. 33 Cyrus Farivar, In rare move, Silicon Valley county gov’t kills stingray acquisition, Ars Technica, May 7, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/in-rare-move-silicon-valley-county-govt-kills-stingray-acquisition/. 34 Press Release, San Jose Police Provide Statement Regarding Purchase of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), San Jose Police Dept., Aug. 5, 2014, available at http://www.sjpd.org/iNews/viewPressRelease.asp?ID=1874. 35 Robert Salonga, San Jose: Police apologize for drone secrecy, promise transparency, San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 5, 2014, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_26279254/san-jose-police-apologize-secret-drone-purchase- promise.
36 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. (2014), Slip Op. at *28. 37 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
38 Charlie Savage and Jonathan Wiseman, N.S.A. Collection of Bulk Call Data Is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. Times, May 7, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/us/nsa-phone-records-collection-ruled-illegal-by-appeals-court.html; Klayman v. Obama, Civ. No. 13-0851 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013). 39 Ballot Pamplet., Proposed Amendments to Cal. Const. with Arguments to Voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972). 40 White v. Davis, 533 P.2d (Cal. 1975).
41 People v. Cook 41 Cal. 3d 373 (1985).
42 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1979) (holding that, under the California Constitution, members of the public have a legal right to pass out pamphlets and seek signatures in a privately owned shopping center), aff’d, .447 U.S. 74 (1980).
43 Cal. Penal Code §§ 1546-1546.4. See generally Tracy Seipel and Eric Kurhi, California digital privacy laws boosted, protecting consumers from Big Brother, big business, San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 9, 2015, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/health/ci_28948653/california-digital-privacy-laws-boosted-protecting-consumers- from.
44 Cal. Gov’t Code § 53166.
45 Cal. Civil Code §§ 1798.29, 1798.82, and 1798.90.5.

Item 3A - Page 160
31 ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SMARTABOUTSURVEILLANCE

46 Jennifer Steinhauer and Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is Sharply Limited, N.Y. Times, Jun. 2, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but- showdown-looms.html?_r=0; see also U.S.A. Freedom Act, H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. (2016). 47 Allie Bohm, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States, ACLU Free Future (April 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/status-location-privacy-legislation-states (as of May 6, 2014).
48 Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU Free Future (April 22, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states (as of May 6, 2014). 49Smart About Surveillance, ACLU of California, http://www.aclunc.org/smartaboutsurveillance. 50 Id.
51 Interview with Brian Hofer, Transparency over secrecy: Oakland’s surveillance policy, KALW Local Public Radio, available at http://kalw.org/post/transparency-over-secrecy-oakland-s-surveillance-policy#stream/0. 52 See Bonnie Eslinger, Menlo Park Council Approves Ordinance Regulating Police Use of Surveillance, San Jose Mercury News, May 14, 2014, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_25766277/menlo-park-council-approves- ordinance-regulating-police-use; Seattle City Council Enacts Groundbreaking Legislation Protecting Residents’ Civil Liberties, Local Progress (May 1, 2013), http://localprogress.org/seattle-city-council-enacts-groundbreaking-legislation-protecting- residents-civil-liberties/.
53 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, CCTV: Developing Best Practices (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_cctv_2007.pdf. 54 State of Surveillance in California – Findings and Recommendations, ACLU of California, Jan. 2015, available at https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/201501-aclu_ca_surveillancetech_summary_and_recommendations.pdf. 55 Redlands Police Department, Citizen Privacy Council, http://www.cityofredlands.org/police/CPC. 56 Halima Kazen, Watching the Watchers: Oakland Seeks Control of Law Enforcement Surveillance, The Guardian, July 13, 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/13/oakland-law-enforcement-surveillance. 57 Memorandum, Establishing Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Community Warning System and Industrial Safety Ordinance (Sept. 18, 2012), http://64.166.146.155/agenda_publish.cfm?mt=ALL&get_month=9&get_year=2012&dsp=agm& seq=12339&rev=0&ag=241&ln=23604&nseq=0&nrev=0&pseq=12303&prev=0. 58 Keynote address of Malkia Cyril, Targeted Surveillance, Civil Rights, and the Fight for Democracy, Center for Media Justice, Oct. 13, 2015, available at http://centerformediajustice.org/2015/10/13/targeted-surveillance-civil-rights-and-the-fight- for-democracy/.
59 See Memorandum, City Administrator’s Weekly Report (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/report/oak046804.pdf. 60 http://www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/CityAdministration/d/PrivacyAdvisoryCommission/index.htm 61 Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-phones-shhh-its-secret.html?_r=0; Cyrus Farivar, In rare move, Silicon Valley county gov’t kills stingray acquisition, Ars Technica, May 7, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/in-rare-move-silicon-valley-county-govt-kills-stingray-acquisition/. 62 Ali Winston, Oakland City Council Rolls Back the Domain Awareness Center, East Bay Express (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2014/03/05/oakland-city-council-rolls-back-the-dac. 63 Cyrus Farivar, In rare move, Silicon Valley county gov’t kills stingray acquisition, Ars Technica, May 7, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/in-rare-move-silicon-valley-county-govt-kills-stingray-acquisition/. 64 John Malkin, Surveillance City? GoodTimes, Jan 29, 2014, http://www.gtweekly.com/index.php/santacruznews/goodtimescoverstories/5386surveillancecity.html. 65 Robert Salonga, San Jose: Police Apologize for Drone Secrecy, Promise Transparency, San Jose Mercury News, Aug 5, 2014, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_26279254/san-jose-police-apologize-secret-drone-purchase- promise.
66 See Oakland City Auditor, Police Technology Performance Audit: FY 2006–07 through 2010–11 (2012), available at http://www.oaklandauditor.com/images/oakland/auditreports/0pd%20tech.pdf. 67 See Citris, Cistris Study on SF Public Cameras Released (Jan. 9, 2009), http://citris-uc.org/citris-study-on-sf-public- cameras-released/.
68 See David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, Effects of Improved Street Lighting on Crime: A Systematic Review, Home Office Research Study 251 (Aug. 2002), p. 42; Ronald V. Clarke, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Improving Street Lighting to Reduce Crime in Residential Areas (Dec. 2008), available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e1208-StreetLighting.pdf; Jay Beeber, Collision Analysis of the Photo Enforced Intersection in Walnut, CA, http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2014/ca-walnut.pdf. 69 See Steve Scauzillo, Red Light Cameras Being Stopped, L.A. Daily News (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140121/red-light-cameras-being-stopped.

Item 3A - Page 161
32 MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES

70 PERF Report, supra note 24, at 44.
71 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Joann Pan, FBI Turns Off 3000 GPS Devices After Ruling, Mashable (Feb. 27, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/02/27/fbi-turns-off-3000-gps-devices/. 72 Kashmir Hill, Whoops, Anyone Could Watch California City’s Police Surveillance Cameras, Forbes.com (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/08/11/surveillance-cameras-for-all/. 73 Seattle City Council Enacts Groundbreaking Legislation Protecting Residents’ Civil Liberties, Local Progress (May 1, 2013), http://localprogress.org/seattle-city-council-enacts-groundbreaking-legislation-protecting-residents-civil-liberties/; Jamela Debelak, ACLU of Washington, Surveillance: Spokane Acts to Protect Privacy and Provide Transparency (Aug. 21, 2013), https://aclu-wa.org/blog/surveillance-spokane-acts-protect-privacy-and-provide-transparency. 74 Matt Cagle, Alameda County Just Got a Privacy Upgrade – Alameda County, It’s Your Move, ACLU of Northern California blog, Nov. 17, 2015, https://www.aclunc.org/blog/california-just-got-privacy-upgrade-alameda-county-its-your-move. 75 State of Surveillance in California – Findings and Recommendations, ACLU of California, Jan. 2015, available at https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/201501-aclu_ca_surveillancetech_summary_and_recommendations.pdf. 76 Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee May 2, 2012, Seattle Channel, at 38:55, http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/20122013-public-safety-civil-rights-and-technology- committee/?videoid=x23397.
77 Terry McFadden, Technology Helping Police to Receive Warrants Faster, WNDU.com (July 8, 2013), http://www.wndu.com/ news/specialreports/headlines/Technology-helping-police-to-receive-search-warrants-faster--214651051.html. 78 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2014).
79 Ohio State Highway Patrol Policy No. OSP-103.29 (revised Dec. 23, 2008). 80 Julia Reynolds, Monterey County Grand Jury Finds Computer Data Risks, Monterey Herald, Aug. 21, 2014, available at http://www.montereyherald.com/news/ci_26009592/monterey-county-grand-jury-finds-computer-data-risks. 81 Dianne Feinstein, NSA Officers Spy on Love Interests, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 2013, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/23/nsa-officers-sometimes-spy-on-love-interests/; Anjali Hemphill, Dating on Duty: Officers Accused of Screening Dates Using Police System, CBS 13 Sacramento (Aug. 22, 2014), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2014/08/22/dating-on-duty-officers-accused-of-screening-dates-using-police-system/. 82 See Bonnie Eslinger, Menlo Park Council Approves Ordinance Regulating Police Use of Surveillance, San Jose Mercury News, May 14, 2014, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_25766277/menlo-park-council-approves- ordinance-regulating-police-use.
83 PERF Report, supra note 24, at 36.
84 Dan Brekke, Oakland Approves Scaled-Back Version of Disputed Surveillance Center, KQED.com, Mar. 5, 2014, http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/03/04/oakland-mayor-jean-quan-suggests-scaling-back-domain-awareness-center. 85 George Hostetter, Former Judge Wanger Writes Far-Ranging Audit on Fresno Video Policing, Fresno Bee, Jan. 7, 2014, available at http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/01/07/3701754/judge-wanger-delivers-impressive.html.

Back Cover Citations

Editorial, ACLU offers a smart safeguard for using surveillance technology, The Los Angeles Times, Nov. 23, 2014, available at http://www. latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-surveillance-and-privacy-20141123-story.html.

Editorial, Bay Area governments must protect citizen privacy, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 25, 2015, available at http://www.sfchronicle. com/opinion/editorials/article/Bay-Area-governments-must-protect-citizen-privacy- 6101993.php.

Steven Greenhut, Surveillance is sneaking its way into cities, The San Diego Union-Tribune, Nov. 17, 2014, available at http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2014/nov/17/surveillance-sneaking-cities-model-ordinance-aclu/.

Editorial, ACLU push for surveillance policy is timely, San Jose Mercury News, Nov. 13, 2014, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/ opinion/ci_26932183/mercury-news-editorial-aclu-push-surveillance-policy-is.

Item 3A - Page 162
Police are spending billions of
dollars on very sophisticated
and invasive surveillance
technology. Too many of these
programs are moving forward
without public conversation,
careful consideration of the
costs and benefits, or adequate
policies in place to prevent
misuse and protect rights.

This guide provides a step-
by-step framework to
ask and answer the right
questions about surveillance
proposals and build in proper
mechanisms for transparency,
accountability, and oversight.

The guide also includes dozens
of case studies highlighting
smart approaches and missteps
to avoid and model language
for policymakers to adopt to
make sure the right process is
used every time a surveillance
proposal is considered.
“ The ACLU’s approach to vetting new technologies is so pragmatic that cities
, counties and law enforcement
agencies throughout California would be foolish
not to embrace it. ”
–Editorial, Los Angeles Times
“
We urge mor
e city and county governments to…[study]
an ordinance that would set specific rules about what
can be done with citizens’ private information. ”
–Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle

“
It’
s easy to see the value in [ACLU’s] approach—in all
areas of government... “
– Steven Gr
eenhut, San Diego Union-Tribune
“ Elected leaders
, not police departments, should set
policy for the use of surveillance equipment. This is the ACLU recommendation. It’s also common sense. “
–Editorial, San Jose Mercury News
•
ACLU

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBER TIES UNION
of CALIFORNIA
Item 3A - Page 163

ATTACHMENT H

Item 3A - Page 164
Contract Questions
Can we add the city’s license plate reader policy to the agreement? ○ We can certainly explore this with our legal team, Flock however has no access to your data or the ability to enforce your administrative policy.

AWS/ Data Storage Questions
How do we handle data privacy and / or a breach of the data? a. Data security
i. Unique instance of Amazon Web Services Government Cloud

1. Only authorized users can have this

2. AES-256 encryption
ii. Cameras do not have public facing IP addresses

1. Not possibly to remotely hack
b. What data is collected?
i. License plates and vehicle details.
ii. No personally identifiable information (PII) - it would be a list of license plates and pictures of cars. But not connect to the DMV or owners of the vehicles.
c. What happens if there is a breach?
i. We will follow all state guidelines on notification. Some states have specific ways we must notify (i.e via email to all customers, on a public posting, or on our website, etc.)
ii. Note - the obligation to notify might depend on where the breach came from. If the breach occurred on our Amazon web hosting service, then Amazon may have to notify users.
iii. Also, Flock’s has an E&O policy with an insurance company that specializes in Cyber Liability. The aggregate limit is 5,000,000 and the per occurrence limit is 3,000,000, and it does include 3rd party coverage.

There are coverages imbedded in the policy in multiple places that are unique to our insurer.

How is the data stored in AWS but they don't have access or can see the data? Please see the AWS-CJIS document attached.

Can AWS or Flock sell the data to third party vendors?
No.

The data is owned by the City of Palm Springs and can only be shared by your police department within the system to other police departments for legal law enforcement purposes. Every search by every user is tracked and auditable by your police department.

Item 3A - Page 165
Will Flock share PSPD's data with Federal or Out of State Agencies? If no, how can we guarantee that? What protections and audits are in place? Flock does not have access to your data nor can it share it. Your contract with Flock outlines that commitment from us.

Explain how the AI tech works within Flock.

Flocks Falcon cameras are motion detection activated. They are focused on the road and capture the back of vehicles and their license plates. Our machine learning technology verifies the license plate and provides alerts on vehicles that match those on a wanted list ( In California that will be the California Stolen Vehicle System) . The machine also categorizes the unique vehicle features for future search. Example Color, Model. There is no filter for people, nor is there facial recognition within our system.

Insight Co-Op
Flock Safety has several unique features, including our sole source with the Axon evidence.com system, our unique vehicle fingerprint technology as well as proprietary network.

Item 3A - Page 166
System Screen Shots
Search- Lookup Tool
Immigration Warning- State of California
Q Search Alerts Map VMS Devices Sharing Insights Adm1n Flock Adm 1n • Q :o Search I Search Advanced Search · lookup Tool
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Item 3A - Page 167

ATTACHMENT I

Item 3A - Page 168
+ Palm Springs, CA
Item 3A - Page 169
Eliminate crime and shape a
safer future, together.

Item 3A - Page 170
Why Flock Safety?
---------,, ------------------------------g __________ -- @--------:..---- -­--------------- -
f i'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 171
What we observe:
the current reality
● Limited Police Resources
● Crime is on the rise
● Trust is needed more
than ever
What we believe:
the opportunity
● Technology multiplies the
force
● Capture and distribute
objective evidence to the
right user
● Engage community to
support and grow
Item 3A - Page 172
How does the technology
work?
Item 3A - Page 173
When you get Flock you get:

Flock Safety provides your police department with
indiscriminate evidence from fixed locations. We
provide all of the maintenance so that your police
department and city staff can focus on keeping your
city safe and prosperous.

INFRASTRUCTURE-FREE
Reduce time to value and
utility costs with full-service
deployment.
24/7 COVERAGE
Capture objective vehicle
data around the clock to
multiply your force.

REAL-TIME ALERTS
• NCIC
• NCMEC (Amber Alert)
• Custom Hot Lists

Ethically Made
• No people
• No facial recognition
• No traffic enforcement
• Indiscriminate evidence
f i'ock safety
Q =
License plate
[iliill OR 093LKD
(A Color/Make
~ Black Chevrolet
0 Item 3A - Page 174
What this IS What this is NOT
● License plate recognition
● Gathers objective evidence
and facts about vehicles, not
people
● Alerts police of wanted
vehicles
● Used to solve crime
● Adheres to all state laws
● Not facial recognition
● Not tied to Personal
Identifiable Information
● Not used for traffic
enforcement
● Data not stored beyond 30
days →
automatically
deletes every 30 days
Item 3A - Page 175
Proactive: Real time Alerts when stolen or
wanted vehicles enter your city
Investigative: As clearance Rates
increase, crime rates decrease
Flock cameras serve as a deterrent
How does this
technology prevent
and eliminate
crime?
Ն Replace image]
• • •
f i' o ck safety
Item 3A - Page 176
Mitigating Risk
Item 3A - Page 177
Protecting Privacy
● Footage owned by Agency/City and
will never by sold or shared by Flock
● 30 day data retention, then deleted
● Short retention period ensures that
all data not associated with a crime
is automatically deleted &
unrecoverable
● Takes human bias out of
crime-solving by detecting
objective data, and detecting
events that are objectively illegal
(ex. Stolen vehicles)
● All data is stored securely in the AWS
Cloud, and end to end encryption of all
data
● Search reason is required for audit trail
● NOT facial recognition software
● NOT predictive policing
● NO PII is contained in Flock
● NOT used for traffic enforcement
● Not connected to registration data or 3rd
party databases (Carfax, DMV)
● Transparency Portal (optional)
Item 3A - Page 178
Transparency + Insights
Measure ROI and promote the ethical use
of public safety technology
Transparency Portal
● Customizable for each agency
● Display technology policies
● Publish usage metrics
● Share downloadable Search audits
Insights Dashboard
● Measure crime patterns and ROI
● Audit Search history
Examples
● Click here for Morgan Hill PD
● Click here for Vallejo PD
Vallejo CA PD
Transparency Portal
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Item 3A - Page 179
Already solving and
preventing crime
Item 3A - Page 180
City of La Quinta
Riverside County SO
City of Moreno Valley
Santa Maria PD
San Jose PD
Vallejo PD
El Centro PD
Alameda County SO
City of Palm Desert
City of Rancho Mirage
City of La Puente
Elk Grove PD
Vacaville PD
Chino PD
City of Eastvale
Ontario PD
El Monte PD
Concord PD
San Mateo County SO
Corona PD
Oroville PD
Bakersfield PD
City of San Jacinto
Flock Safety In California
Plus, many more
commercial and
private customers
City of Lake Forest
City of Temecula
Culver City PD
Morgan Hill PD
Alhambra PD
City of Lancaster
Tracy CA PD
Hemet PD
City of Fairfield
Benicia PD
Redlands PD
San Leandro PD
Placer County SO
Beverly Hills PD
City of San Clemente, CA
El Cerrito PD
City of Salinas
City of Yorba Linda
El Cajon PD
City of Los Altos Hills
Riverside PD
Montclair PD
City of Stanton
City of La Canada Flintridge
Piedmont PD
Gilroy PD
City of West Hollywood
Lompoc PD
City of San Ramon
San Joaquin County SO
Yuba County Sheriff's Office
Seaside PD
Colton PD
City of Pico Rivera
San Marino PD
Alameda PD
City of Norco
Rocklin PD
Ventura County SO
Richmond PD
Glendora PD
Baldwin Park PD
Costa Mesa PD
Fresno PD
Milpitas PD
Town of Danville
City of Santa Fe Springs
West Covina PD
Atherton PD
City of Menifee
Hayward PD
Barstow PD
City of Dana Point
South San Francisco PD
Carmel By The Sea PD
San Mateo PD
Lake County Sheriff's
Office
Nevada County SO
Azusa PD
Desert Hot Springs PD
The Presidio Trust
Item 3A - Page 181
Timeline
● El Cajon PD Installed 40 LPR
Cameras throughout their city.
● In the first few weeks of having
some of their cameras installed
they have arrested 2 adults and 4
juveniles in the possession of
stolen vehicles.

Hate Crime Targeting LA Synagogue
El Cajon PD
El Cajon, CA
East County license plate­
reading cameras assist in
stolen vehicle arrest
Item 3A - Page 182
Timeline
On February 16th, 4:15 PM, the Los
Angeles Police Department put out the
vehicle plate information of the suspect
involved in two shootings at synagogues
in their area.

Cathedral City PD received this
information and ran the vehicle’s plate in
Flock and discovered that the suspect
vehicle had entered Cathedral City.

A flyer with the suspect’s information and
vehicle description was sent out to patrol.

Officers responded to a shot fired call at
5:24 PM and the synagogue shooter was
on scene.

Officers recognized the suspect vehicle as
the one from the flyer. Suspect was taken
into custody.

Hate Crime Targeting LA Synagogue
Cathedral City PD
Cathedral City, CA
Desert Sun.

CATHEDRAL CITY
After LA synagogue shootings,
suspect tracked down, arrested in
Cathedral City
28-year-old has a history of anti-Semitic threats and admitted to targeting Jewish men, FBI says
Item 3A - Page 183
Case Study: Smash and Grab Robbery
● January 2022 - Five suspects attempt a
Smash & Grab at a Jewelry store but are
chased off by the owner
● But here’s what didn’t make the news…
● Suspect vehicle identified using Flock
● SBPD thought the suspects would try
again, potentially more violently
● Vehicle placed on a custom hotlist
● SBPD receives a real time alert that the
suspects are returning
● Officers locate the vehicle within seconds
preventing another attempt
San Bruno, CA
San Bruno, PD
San Bruno jewelry store owner stops attempted
smash-and-grab robbery
- ABC 7 News - Bay Area
Item 3A - Page 184
Case Study: Auto Theft
Chamblee, GA
Chamblee PD
Stranger on Stranger Abduction August,
28 2020
When every second matters,
Flock Safety’s Machine Vision
is Critical
12:33 PM
1:01 PM
2:30 PM
5:03 PM
6:00 PM
Amber Alert Issued
Search Conducted with Flock Safety
Suspect Vehicle Located
Felony Stop + Arrest
Baby Reunited with Mother
0 


0 


0 

0 


0 Item 3A - Page 185

ATTACHMENT J

Item 3A - Page 186
Developing your ALPR policy
Ethics-Driven Innovation
In the ACLU’s reports on ALPR, they make recommendations for law enforcement who consider using ALPR. Flock addressed each of these in our system design and implementation. (4) Consult legal counsel
(a) Flock welcomes conversations with legal counsel.
(5) Open to public input and receive approval from
democratically elected governing bodies
(a) Flock encourages all agencies to seek democratic
approval.
(6) Operate in public and disclose use of ALPR
(a) Flock developed a transparency portal.
(7) Public audits and reports
(a) Flock requires an investigative reason to search,
and we provide an audit report to system
administrators.
(1) Short data retention
(a) Flock by default deletes the data every 30
days, allowing a detective to use the footage
for investigative purposes
(b) Flock is among the shortest of all the state
statutes on data retention
(2) No hot lists unless independently verified.
(a) The FBI curates NCIC hot list plates; the
NIJ curates NAMUS; DOJ funds and
curates NCMEC.
(b) Most ALPR policies require hot list
verification before action.
(c) HOAs cannot create hot lists.
(3) No data sharing with 3rd parties.
(a) Flock does not share with 3rd parties
f i' o c k safety
Item 3A - Page 187

ATTACHMENT K

Item 3A - Page 188
July 2022
Flock Safety & CJIS Compliance
Flock Safety’s ALPR solution leverages plate number extract files from National, State,
and local hotlist databases to provide real time alerting to Law Enforcement agencies with the goal of Eliminating Crime.

The most common hotlist extract file used with LPR solutions is the NCIC file provided by the FBI. This file is composed of hotlist entries submitted by agencies across the US and only contains license plate number and state, reason, vehicle description, and ORI number of the submitting law enforcement agency.

In order to access this file on behalf of a Law Enforcement agency, Flock Safety has read and understood the CJIS Security Policy (currently v5.9, dated 6/1/20) provided by the FBI. As a result, Flock Safety has implemented the necessary process and technologies to meet or exceed the “minimum standards of security requirements” outlined in the FBI’s CJIS Security Policy.

The following document lays out the processes and technologies implemented by Flock Safety for compliance with the FBI’s CJIS Security Policy. The following policy areas are as outlined in the CJIS Security Policy (v5.9).

As of July 2022, there is no central CJIS authorization body, no accredited pool of independent assessors, nor a standardized assessment approach to determining whether a particular solution is considered CJIS compliant. Flock Safety is committed to helping agencies to meet CJIS requirements as published by the FBI.

Additional References
FBI CJIS Security Policy
AWS CJIS Policy
1170 Howell Mill Rd. NW · Suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30318
fi'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 189
Policy Area 1—Information Exchange Agreements
As part of all Flock Safety contracts for service, whether as part of a purchase, trial, or shared access agreement*, Flock Safety and the agency enter into an “Information Exchange Agreement” in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

This MOU represents the commitment between the agency and Flock Safety to ensure prevention of unauthorized disclosure, alteration, or misuse of the CJIS data leveraged by the law enforcement agency via the Flock Safety solution. *An agency who has not purchased Flock Safety cameras but has access to cameras purchased by another entity
Policy Area 2—Security Awareness Training
All Flock Safety employees that interact with CJIS data or access infrastructure that handles CJIS data undergo the necessary Security Awareness Training, as well as a fingerprint-based background check. Additionally, these employees sign the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Security Addendum.

Policy Area 3—Incident Response
Flock Safety is committed to the security of all customer data CJIS or otherwise. In the case of an incident Flock Safety de fines its steps around reporting of accidental or malicious attacks that expose CJIS data.
1170 Howell Mill Rd. NW · Suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30318
fi'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 190
Policy Area 4—Auditing and Accountability
Flock Safety is dedicated to the appropriate use of the Flock Safety technology by both Flock Safety customer users and Flock Safety employees. As a result, Flock Safety provides robust auditing that cover the events outlined in the FBI’s CJIS Security Policy and more.

As part of these auditing events Flock Safety captures Date/Time, what was accessed, the type of access, who accessed it, and the outcome of that access. All audit information is stored for a minimum of 1 year, as outlined in the FBI’s CJIS Security Policy.

Policy Area 5—Access Control
To ensure appropriate Access Control for both Flock Safety customer users and Flock Safety employees, Flock Safety has implemented granular access permissions that allow for the creation of roles associated with individuals based on the necessary control criteria set by the law enforcement agency under the CJIS policy.

All Flock Safety solutions hosted in AWS leverage AES 256 symmetric encryption in accordance with the CJIS Security Policy. Additionally, Flock Safety leverages FIPS 140-2-compliant APIs and storage in the AWS GovCloud. Flock Safety leverages secure, encrypted sessions to AWS servers using HTTPS (Transport Layer Security [TLS]).

Please see the AWS CJIS Compliance Overview for additional information.

Policy Area 6—Identi
fication and Authentication
All Flock Safety users have a unique UUID (128-bit) that identi fies them throughout the Flock Safety solution. This UUID is maintained even if changes are made to the user account (e.g., name change or permissions).

Flock Safety requires the use of secure passwords and provides multi factor authentication (MFA) solutions for additional security measures. 1170 Howell Mill Rd. NW · Suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30318
fi'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 191
Policy Area 7—Configuration Management
All changes to Flock Safety software and cloud hardware are logged and documented. Flock Safety leverages CJIS compliant hardware, with CJIS compliant access restrictions (physical and digital), which is hosted by AWS in their AWS GovCloud in the US.

Flock Safety maintains detailed network diagrams that outline the components of the Flock Safety system and the interactions between those components.

Please see the AWS CJIS Compliance Overview for additional information.

Policy Area 8—Media Protection
Flock Safety leverages CJIS compliant hardware, with CJIS compliant access restrictions (physical and digital), which is hosted by AWS in their AWS GovCloud in the US.

All Flock Safety solutions hosted in AWS leverage AES 256 symmetric encryption in accordance with the CJIS Security Policy. Additionally, Flock Safety leverages FIPS 140-2-compliant APIs and storage in the AWS GovCloud. Flock Safety leverages secure, encrypted sessions to AWS servers using HTTPS (Transport Layer Security [TLS]).

All Flock Safety license plate and image data is hard deleted based on the Flock Safety retention policy, or any democratically created retention policy by the agency.

Please see the AWS CJIS Compliance Overview for additional information.

Policy Area 9—Physical Protection
Flock Safety leverages CJIS compliant hardware, with CJIS compliant access restrictions (physical and digital), which is hosted by AWS in their AWS GovCloud in the US.

Please see the AWS CJIS Compliance Overview for additional information. 1170 Howell Mill Rd. NW · Suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30318
fi'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 192
Policy Area 10—Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity
Flock Safety leverages CJIS compliant hardware, with CJIS compliant access restrictions (physical and digital), which is hosted by AWS in their AWS GovCloud in the US.

All Flock Safety solutions hosted in AWS leverage AES 256 symmetric encryption in accordance with the CJIS Security Policy. Additionally, Flock Safety leverages FIPS 140-2-compliant APIs and storage in the AWS GovCloud. Flock Safety leverages secure, encrypted sessions to AWS servers using HTTPS (Transport Layer Security [TLS]).

Please see the AWS CJIS Compliance Overview for additional information.

Policy Area 11—Formal Audits
Flock Safety is ready to comply with and formal audits needed to ensure CJIS compliance.

Policy Area 12—Personnel Security
All Flock Safety employees that interact with CJIS data or access infrastructure that handles CJIS data undergo the necessary Security Awareness Training, as well as a fingerprint-based background check. Additionally, these employees sign the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Security Addendum. 1170 Howell Mill Rd. NW · Suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30318
fi'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 193
Policy Area 13—Mobile Devices
Flock Safety solutions are cloud hosted and delivered as a web application. As a result, all Flock Safety solutions can be accessed by a computer or mobile device with a current generation web browser. As with any web-based application, the Flock Safety solution can be blocked or limited by any
firewall or other security protocols
implemented on law enforcement agency computers or mobile devices.

No matter the type of device, all Flock Safety solutions follow the necessary security protocols for access, audits, media protection, and overall security as covered in the proceeding Policy Areas.

Any requirements around the use of the Flock Safety solution via a mobile device shall be covered by the agency's CJIS policy, as is the case with any other computer owned/used by the law enforcement agency.
1170 Howell Mill Rd. NW · Suite 210, Atlanta, GA 30318
fi'ock safety
Item 3A - Page 194

ATTACHMENT L

Item 3A - Page 195
Potential Use of
Automated License
Plate Recognition
(ALPR) Technology
www.palmspringsca.govOctober 12,
2023
C
Item 3A - Page 196
ALPR – What Information is Captured?
• A fixed ALPR system is designed to capture:
⚬ the date, time, and location;
⚬ license plate (state, partial, paper, and no plate);
⚬ vehicle characteristics (make, model, type, and color) Item 3A - Page 197
ALPR – What this IS and is NOT
What this IS What this in NOT
• License plate recognition
• Gathers objective evidence and
facts about vehicles, not people
• Alerts police of wanted vehicles
• Used to solve crime
• Adheres to all state laws
• Not facial recognition
• Not tied to Personal Identifiable
Information
• Not used for traffic enforcement
• Data not stored beyond 30 days →
automatically deletes every 30 days
(Retention time can be adjusted + or -)
Item 3A - Page 198
ALPR – Fixed ALPR vs. Red Light Cameras
• A red light camera is designed to capture
driver images for driver identification
• A fixed ALPR system is designed to capture
rear license plate images for vehicle identification
Item 3A - Page 199
ALPR – Legal Considerations
Palm Springs - ALPR Policy
• Only allows trained authorized users
• Official Use Only – Reasonable Suspicion
• No out of state sharing*
• Routine system audits
• Prohibits invasion of privacy, harassment or
intimidation, personal use
State Law
• Requires training
• Requires limitations/controls on access
• Requires limitations on sharing
Item 3A - Page 200
ALPR – Policy
Internal and External Access
• Limited to need to know and right to know;
• Criminal penalties for unauthorized access;
• Training provided to employees;
• Queries are logged and auditable;
• Agency controls with whom data is shared;
• No sharing by vendor;
• No outside state sharing
• Court order
• Request to Chief of Police – Major
Crime
Data Integrity
• CJIS-compliant transmission and storage by
vendor. Amazon Web Services (AWS) using
AES256 bit encryption, a standard
encryption system used by both the Federal
Government and the National Security
Agency.

Data Integrity
• Automatically purged after 30 days*
Item 3A - Page 201
ALPR – Protecting Privacy
• Footage owned by Agency/City
• 30 day data retention, then deleted
• Takes human bias out of crime-solving by detecting
objective data, and detecting events that are
objectively illegal (ex. Stolen vehicles)
• All data is stored securely in the AWS Cloud, and end to end encryption of all data
• Search reason is required for audit trail
• NO facial recognition software
• NO predictive policing
• NO PII is contained in Flock
• NOT used for traffic enforcement
• Not connected to registration data or 3rd party
databases (Carfax, DMV)
• Transparency Portal (optional)
Item 3A - Page 202
ALPR – Uses & Benefits
USES
• Proactive Real-time alerts
• Reactive (Investigative)
⚬ Searchable database

BENEFITS
• Real Time Alerts
• Deterrence
• Solve Crimes Already
Committed
• Regional Coordination
Item 3A - Page 203
ALPR – Local Implementation & Collaboration
• ALPR technology is an existing tool for local law enforcement including neighboring communities
• Numerous success stories and examples of where it could have been used in Palm Springs
• A majority of agencies in the Coachella Valley currently use it • Many private businesses, HOAs, and individuals have ALPR and elect to share that data with law enforcement
Item 3A - Page 204
ALPR – Case Study
Suspects arrested after
shooting 3 people, killing 1 of
them
Incident Details
On October 31, 2022, PSPD responded to a shooting incident with multiple victims at the Raising Cane’s Restaurant in Palm Springs. Officers arrived and found four people had been shot, one of them killed. All of the victims were U.S. Marines who were involved in a brief confrontation with the suspects just prior to the shooting.

PSPD obtained surveillance video from the location with vehicle information and entered that information into the Flock system.

Within 24 hours, PSPD received an alert the suspect vehicle was near Indio. Officers were dispatched to the area and located the vehicle. T wo suspects were identified and arrested for the murder and attempted murder of 4 people.

October 31, 2022
Photo” The Desert
Sun
s C
Item 3A - Page 205
ALPR – Case Study
Man accused in two
homicides in Palm Springs
arrested after lead from Flock
Incident Details
On January 25, 2021, Jennifer Dillon, a 59-year-old female was found deceased inside her home. Forensic evidence identified her death as a homicide.

On July 30th, 2021, Joseph Rajczi, an 80-year-old male was found deceased in his residence. His death was ruled a homicide.

PSPD canvassed the neighborhoods and submitted forensic evidence for clues. Both homicides showed signs that one person may be involved in both murders. Months went by before PSPD received a break in the case. A vehicle description was provided without a license plate and PSPD enlisted the help of the Cathedral City Police Department to search for similar vehicle descriptions. A possible match was provided to PSPD
investigators via a lead from a Flock camera PSPD to the 31- year-old male suspect who was arrested and charged with both murders.

Photo: KESQ
September 8,
2021
NEWS
Man arrested in connection w'ith two separate
Palm Springs m1urders
Item 3A - Page 206
ALPR – Case Study
Hate Crime Targeting LA
Synagogue - Suspect Located
in Cathedral City
Incident Details
On February 16th, around 4:15 PM, LAPD shared vehicle
license information of the suspect involved in two shootings at synagogues in Los Angeles.

Local agencies, PSPD and Cathedral City PD obtained this information and ran the vehicle’s plate in Flock where it was discovered the suspect vehicle had entered Cathedral City .

A short time later, officers located and arrested the suspect without incident after receiving a shots fired call in Cathedral City .

This alert also allowed PSPD to immediately deploy staff to its local synagogues in the event the suspect continued on his rampage.

I
.
l
Item 3A - Page 207
ALPR – Transparency
Transparency + Insights
Measure ROI and promote the ethical use
of public safety technology
Transparency Portal
• Display technology policies
• Publish usage metrics
• Share downloadable Search audits
Dashboard
• Measure crime patterns and ROI
• Audit Search history
Example
• Click here for Vallejo PD
WHY FLOCK?
Privacy
The police department places a high priority on safeguarding the privacy of our community members. Flock has stringent data protection protocols in place to ensure that surveillance footage remains secure and accessible only to authorized law enforcement personnel. We are committed to respecting the privacy of residents and maintaining the confidentiality of their personal information. We are also committed to keeping the data within the State of California and our policy prohibits the sharing of ALPR data with out-of-state agencies.

Affordability and Scalability
Affordability is paramount for the police department, as the affordability of Flock ALPR cameras enables large-scale deployments of flock safety solutions without causing financial strain. During our research Flock was found to be the most cost appropriate solution compared to other ALPR solutions.

Regional Sharing
The police department encourages regional collaboration and data sharing among neighborhoods to enhance community safety. Through our Flock safety initiatives, law enforcement agencies (Cathedral City, Desert Hot Springs, Rancho Mirage, Palm Desert, La Quinta, and Indio), and neighborhoods can work together to share surveillance data, fostering a stronger sense of community and promoting cooperation among residents. This collaborative approach contributes to making our entire region a safer place for all residents.

Accurate Data Retrieval
Flock's system, equipped with state-of-the-art technology, enables accurate data retrieval. Whether it involves reviewing footage for security incidents, or criminal investigations, our system provides law enforcement with reliable and precise data retrieval capabilities. This accuracy enhances the effectiveness of our efforts to maintain community safety and aids in the swift and efficient resolution of incidents.

Item 3A - Page 209
ALPR – Next Steps
• Council feedback and discussion on potential implementation of ALPR T echnology
• Approve Contract with Insight Public Sector through a cooperative purchase program
• Install 15 Flock ALPR cameras throughout the City of Palm Springs Item 3A - Page 210
Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR)
Questions
Item 3A - Page 211

ATTACHMENT M

Item 3A - Page 212

PALM SPRINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Flock vs. Other ALPR Companies
When the Palm Springs Police Department considered the implementation of Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) systems like Flock Safety in comparison to other systems, several key factors were considered. Here is a comparative overview of Flock Safety ALPRs and other ALPR systems:

Focus on Community Safety:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety emphasizes community safety and has gained popularity in smaller communities, homeowners' associations, and municipalities due to its dedication to public safety.

Other ALPR Systems: Some other ALPR systems may have a broader focus beyond community safety, catering to different types of organizations or agencies.

Privacy Considerations:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety has a 30-day data retention policy and ensures data privacy by not sharing information with out-of-state agencies, immigration, or third-party vendors. It also does not employ facial recognition technology.

Other ALPR Systems: Privacy practices may vary among different ALPR systems and could be influenced by the specific policies and practices of the organizations using them.

Data Security:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety stores data securely on AWS Government Cloud, which is designed to meet stringent government security requirements, enhancing data security.

Other ALPR Systems: Data security practices may differ among various ALPR systems, depending on the security measures implemented by the respective organizations.

Machine Learning:
(<1%) of data from Flock cameras that get anonymized and stripped of any metadata, which is then used to teach Flock’s software how to find specific types of vehicles and vehicle attributes Item 3A - Page 213
(the “machine learning”). No data is ever sold to third parties. Internally, Flock confirms that the images identified are accurate and utilizes the information to improve our machine learning capabilities.

Example: A new 2024 Red Ferrari comes out. We pull examples of Red Ferraris and feed it to our algorithm so that our cameras now know what a Red Ferrari looks like and doesn’t mistake it for a Red Lamborghini. To do this, we strip the image of ALL data. It’s just used for this limited purpose of making the system better at delivering the service.

This is similar to a Google Captcha that asks you to “select all of the fire hydrants” or “click all of the traffic lights”. All you see is an image, which does not tell you when/where the image was taken and provides no additional data beyond a visible screenshot. Flock uses the same process to manually validate images, internally.

Community Integration:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety's approach is community-centric, making it accessible to a wide range of community organizations, including neighborhoods, local businesses, and homeowners' associations.

Other ALPR Systems: Integration and accessibility of other ALPR systems may vary based on the types of organizations they serve and their target markets.

Ease of Deployment:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety offers plug-and-play installation, making it user-friendly and accessible for communities looking to enhance their safety quickly.

Other ALPR Systems: Deployment ease can differ among various ALPR systems, with some potentially requiring more extensive integration efforts.

Use for Traffic Enforcement:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety explicitly does not use its ALPR technology for traffic enforcement, focusing solely on public safety and security.

Other ALPR Systems: The use of ALPR technology for traffic enforcement may vary depending on the policies and priorities of other ALPR system providers.

Cost and Accessibility:

Flock Safety: Flock Safety's affordability and accessibility made it an attractive option for the Palm Springs Police Department.

Other ALPR Systems: Pricing and accessibility of other ALPR systems may vary based on the specific offerings and target markets of different providers, but the other systems we evaluated Item 3A - Page 214
came at a significant cost increase. As an illustration, while Vigilant's Fixed ALPR solutions come at an approximate price of $165,528 for an 11-camera package, Flock offers a significantly more cost-effective option at just $45,000 for a 15-camera package.

In summary, we found the choice between Flock Safety and other ALPR systems was dependent on our specific needs and priorities. Flock Safety is particularly appealing to smaller communities and community-centric organizations with a strong emphasis on privacy and data security. We found that other ALPR systems, in contrast, cater to different types of organizations with varying policies and priorities. It was essential for the Palm Springs Police Department to carefully evaluate our goals and requirements when selecting an ALPR system to ensure it aligns with our unique needs and values.

Item 3A - Page 215

ATTACHMENT D

Item 3A - Page 216

CITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORT

DATE: JANUARY 25, 2024 BUSINESS & LEGISLATIVE

SUBJECT: SECURITY CAMERAS, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS

PURCHASED AND CONTROLLED BY PRIVATE ENTITIES

FROM: Scott C. Stiles, City Manager

BY: Police Department

SUMMARY:

This staff report is presented at the request of the City Council to initiate a discussion regarding the operation and control of private security cameras or automated license plate readers (ALPRs), specifically those within Homeowners Associations (HOAs), and the regulation of cameras that may encroach upon City right of way. The purpose of this report is to provide information and considerations for the City Council's deliberation on this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

Direct Staff as appropriate.

BACKGROUND:

The operation and control of private security cameras have become increasingly relevant in our community, with growing concerns for public safety and the need for enhanced security measures. This discussion encompasses two primary aspects:

Operation of Security Cameras in HOAs and Neighborhoods: Many HOAs and residential communities have expressed interest in installing security cameras and automated license plate readers to enhance the safety of their neighborhoods. These entities have approached the C ity for encroachment permits to install such cameras on City sidewalks or other public right of way adjacent to their communities.

Control of Security Cameras Encroaching on City Property: The question arises as to whether the City has the authority to regulate the operation of security cameras that encroach upon City right of way, particularly when those cameras are placed there at the request of private entities.

Item 3A - Page 217
STAFF ANALYSIS:

The Police Department and City Attorney have provided their insights on this matter:

Police Department: The Police Department acknowledges the potential benefits of security cameras in improving public safety and aiding law enforcement. However, they also express concerns about privacy implications and the need to strike a balance between security and individual rights.

City Legal Department: The City Attorney has not identified any cities that currently regulate the operation of security cameras on private property, including any cities that regulate such cameras that encroach upon city right of way. There are concerns that such regulation, especially on exclusively private property, may be difficult given the already wide-spread use of security cameras (i.e., Ring cameras).

DISCUSSION POINTS FOR CITY COUNCIL:

The City Council is requested to consider the following discussion points:

Regulation of Security Cameras on Private Property: Discuss the feasibility and legality of regulating the operation of security cameras on private property, especially when they encroach upon City right of way. Consider the potential benefits and drawbacks of such regulation.

Privacy Concerns: Evaluate the privacy concerns associated with the operation of security cameras, keeping in mind residents' rights to privacy and protection.

Community Safety: Assess the role of security cameras in enhancing community safety and assisting law enforcement agencies in crime prevention and investigation.

Encroachment Permit Process: Determine whether adjustments should be made to the encroachment permit process for HOAs and Neighborhoods requesting permission to install security cameras within City right of way.

Access: When contemplating access requirements for security cameras, such as Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), that are situated on City right of way, it is important to address various access scenarios.

Firstly, when a neighborhood group funds the installation of an ALPR camera on City right of way, the question arises as to whether the City should require that the Neighborhood group grant access to the camera to the P olice Department. Alternatively, should the neighborhood group have the flexibility to decide whether they grant the P olice Department sole access while retaining access themselves?

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Secondly, in the case of private entities that purchase ALPRs, there are typically options for accessing the data captured by the cameras. Some private entities may choose to maintain access to the ALPR data, allowing them to retain control over the inform ation collected. On the other hand, other private entities may opt to provide the police department with exclusive access, thereby relinquishing their own access to the camera's data.

The determination of access requirements in these scenarios is a matter of considerable importance, as it not only affects public safety but also has implications for individual privacy. To ensure that the use of security cameras on City property aligns with the City's objectives and adheres to privacy and legal constraints, it is essential to establish clear guidelines and engage in thoughtful deliberation on this matter.

Legal Consultation: Consider seeking further legal advice and exploring case law to understand the extent to which the City can regulate security cameras on private property.

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT:

Numerous neighborhood associations have engaged in dialogues with both the local police department and Flock Safety regarding the procurement of Flock ALPR cameras within their respective neighborhoods or homeowners' associations (HOAs). Notably, a Neighborhood situated on the southern end of Palm Springs has secured the necessary funding to acquire two Flock ALPR cameras intended for their community. These cameras are slated to be installed on City property, and as part of their initiative the Neighborhood group intends to grant exclusive access to the Police Department. To facilitate this endeavor, the Neighborhood group has submitted permit applications for the installation of the two Flock ALPR cameras.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
:

This staff report and the requested action is not a “project” for purposes of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), as it is merely an opportunity for the City Council to discuss this issue and possibly provide further direction in order to study and evaluate the issue.

ALIGNMENT WITH STRATEGIC PLANNING:

Private entities who purchase ALPR cameras for their neighborhoods that encroach on City right of way can align with the City Council’s priority 1B, Crime Reduction in several ways:

Enhanced Surveillance: Flock ALPR cameras provide an additional layer of surveillance in neighborhoods. They can capture license plate data, which can be valuable for law enforcement in identifying and tracking vehicles associated with criminal activities. This enhanced surveillance can deter criminal behavior, making neighborhoods safer.

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Community Engagement: Allowing private entities, such as Neighborhood groups, to invest in security measures demonstrates a community's active participation in crime prevention. This engagement fosters a sense of ownership and responsibility among residents, promoting a collaborative approach to addressing crime issues.

Quick Response: ALPR cameras can alert law enforcement to suspicious or wanted vehicles in real-time. This rapid response capability enables law enforcement to intervene promptly, preventing crimes or apprehending suspects before they can evade capture.

Data Sharing: When private entities provide access to law enforcement agencies, it facilitates data sharing. This collaboration allows law enforcement to use the collected information effectively to analyze patterns, identify potential threats, and allocate resources strategically for crime prevention efforts.

Cost-Effective Solutions: Allowing private entities to purchase and maintain these cameras that encroach on City right of way can be cost -effective for the City. It reduces the financial burden on municipal budgets while expanding the coverage of security cameras throughout the City.

Deterrence Factor: The presence of visible security cameras, such as ALPRs, acts as a deterrent to potential criminals. Knowing that their activities may be recorded and investigated can discourage criminal behavior in the first place.

FISCAL IMPACT
:

N/A.

REVIEWED BY:

Department Director: Andrew G. Mills
City Manager: Scott Stiles

ATTACHMENTS:

A. Police Department Presentation PPT

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ATTACHMENT A

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NEIGHBORHOOOD

CRIME PREVENTION
ALPR Cameras, Ring Cameras, etc.
-
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Neighborhood Cameras
Flock Safety, Inc. can
contract with local police
departments as well as
neighborhoods for Flock
ALPR cameras.
01 Neighborhoods that pay for
Flock Cameras have
the option of only sharing
data with the police
department if a crime
occurs, which gives the
neighborhood 100% control
of the footage, or,
02 Neighborhoods who want
to pay for cameras can give
the police department 24/7
access to the neighborhood
ALPR, at which point the
neighborhood does not
have access to the data.
03 Item 3A - Page 223
Background
• Security cameras are installed across the city in various neighbo
rhoods installed on individual homes.
• These cameras, owned by residents, Homeowners
Asso
ciations (HOAs), or neighborhood groups, are not
subject to city regulation.
• Control and access to the footage from these residential and H
OA security cameras are managed by individual
homeowners or the respective HOA.
• Current placement of these cameras is restricted
exc
lusively to private properties.

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Current Interest
• Several neighborhoods and
busin
esses have expressed
interest in having Flock cameras,
which would be under the
surveillance of the PSPD.
• One particular neighborhood
has al
ready acquired two
cameras and wishes to grant
exclusive access to the police
department. However, approval
is required for these cameras to
be installed on city property.

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Considerations
• City ordinance dictates the regulation of
sur
veillance cameras intended for
placement on public land.
• Is there a need to contemplate
reg
ulations for surveillance cameras
within Homeowners Associations (HOAs)
or neighborhood areas?
• Propose establishing formal
Memor
andums of Understanding
(MOUs) between neighborhoods or
HOAs and the police department,
enabling police department access to
monitor surveillance cameras through
their software systems.

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ATTACHMENT E

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[Administrative Code - Surveillance Technology Policy for Police Department Use of Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras]

Ordinance approving Surveillance Technology Policy for Police Department use of non-City entity surveillance cameras and establishing a sunset date one year fifteen months after the effective date of the ordinance.

NOTE: Unchanged Code text and uncodified text are in plain Arial font.

Additions to Codes are in single-underline italics Times New Roman font.

Deletions to Codes are in strikethrough italics Times New Roman font.

Board amendment additions are in double-underlined Arial font.

Board amendment deletions are in strikethrough Arial font.

Asterisks (* * * *) indicate the omission of unchanged Code subsections or parts of tables.

Be it ordained by the People of the City and County of San Francisco:

Section 1. Background.
(a) Administrative Code Chapter 19(B) establishes requirements that City departments must follow before they may use or acquire new Surveillance Technology. Under Administrative Code Section 19B.2(a), a City department must obtain Board of Supervisors approval by ordinance of a Surveillance Technology Policy before: (1) seeking funds for Surveillance Technology; (2) acquiring or borrowing new Surveillance Technology; (3) using new or existing Surveillance Technology for a purpose, in a manner, or in a location not specified in a Board-approved Surveillance Technology ordinance; (4) entering into agreement with a non-City entity to acquire, share, or otherwise use Surveillance Technology; or (5) entering into an oral or written agreement under which a non-City entity or individual regularly provides the department with data or information acquired through the entity’s use of Surveillance Technology.

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(b) Under Administrative Code Section 19B.2(b), the Board of Supervisors may approve a Surveillance Technology Policy ordinance under Section 19B.2(a) only if: (1) the department seeking Board approval first submits to the Committee on Information Technology (COIT) a Surveillance Impact Report for the Surveillance Technology to be acquired or used; (2) based on the Surveillance Impact Report, COIT develops a Surveillance Technology Policy for the Surveillance Technology to be acquired or used; and (3) at a public meeting at which COIT considers the Surveillance Technology Policy, COIT recommends that the Board adopt, adopt with modification, or decline to adopt the Surveillance Technology Policy for the Surveillance Technology to be acquired or used.
(c) Under Administrative Code Section 19B.4, the City policy is that the Board of Supervisors will approve a Surveillance Technology Policy ordinance only if it determines that the benefits that the Surveillance Technology ordinance authorizes outweigh its costs, that the Surveillance Technology Policy ordinance will safeguard civil liberties and civil rights, and that the uses and deployments of the Surveillance Technology under the ordinance will not be based upon discriminatory or viewpoint-based factors or have a disparate impact on any community or Protected Class.

Section 2. Surveillance Technology Policy Ordinance for Police Department Use of Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras.
(a) Purpose. The Police Department seeks Board of Supervisors authorization under Section 19B.2(a) to use surveillance cameras and surveillance camera networks owned, leased, managed, or operated by non-City entities to: (1) temporarily live monitor activity during exigent circumstances, significant events with public safety concerns, and investigations relating to active misdemeanor and felony violations; (2) gather and review historical video footage for the purposes of conducting a criminal investigation; and (3) gather Item 3A - Page 229
and review historical video footage for the purposes of an internal investigation regarding officer misconduct.
(b) Surveillance Impact Report. The Police Department submitted to COIT a Surveillance Impact Report for Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras. A copy of the Police Department Surveillance Impact Report for Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras is in Board File No. 220606, and is incorporated herein by reference. (c) Public Hearings. Between March 25, 2022 and April 21, 2022, inclusive, COIT and its Privacy and Surveillance Advisory Board (PSAB) conducted four public hearings at which they considered the Surveillance Impact Report referenced in subsection (b) and developed a Surveillance Technology Policy for the Police Department’s use of non-City entity surveillance cameras. A copy of the Surveillance Technology Policy for the Police Department’s use of the Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras (“San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy”) is in Board File No. 220606, and is incorporated herein by reference.
(d) COIT Recommendation. On April 21, 2022, COIT voted to recommend the SFPD Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy to the Board of Supervisors for approval. (e) Findings. The Board of Supervisors hereby finds that the stated benefits of the Police Department’s use of non-City entity surveillance cameras outweigh the costs and risks of use of such Surveillance Technology; that the SFPD Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy, as modified by the Board of Supervisors, will safeguard civil liberties and civil rights; and that the uses and deployments of non-City entity surveillance cameras, as set forth in the SFPD Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy, will not be based upon discriminatory or viewpoint-based factors or have a disparate impact on any community or a protected class.

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Section 3. Approval of Modified Policy.

The Board of Supervisors hereby approves the SFPD Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy for a one-year period, with the following modifications:. (a) The section entitled, “Purpose and Scope,” is amended to include the following language as the last paragraph: “Absent a subpoena or search warrant, SFPD access to all systems noted in this Policy will be obtained through the express consent of the individual or entity managing the surveillance system at the time of request. SFPD does not and shall not manage a surveillance camera registry, have public observation devices, or have a Ring/Neighbors or similar partnership agreements.”
(b) The section entitled, “Policy Statement,” is amended as follows: (1) the second bullet point under the second paragraph is amended to include “or memorandum of understanding” after the words “contractual agreement”; and (2) the sentence, “These exclusions shall be governed by a separate use policy compliant with the requirements of Section 19B.” shall be added as the final paragraph in that section. (c) The section entitled “Authorizes Use(s)” is amended as follows: (1) paragraph number 1 is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following paragraph number 1:
“Temporary live monitoring (a) during an exigent circumstance as defined by Administrative Code Section 19B; (b) during Significant Events with public safety concerns only for placement of police personnel due to crowd sizes or other issues creating imminent public safety hazards; or (c) in the course of a specific criminal investigation if an SFPD Captain or member in rank above Captain confirms in writing that the department has credible information of criminal activity and live monitoring is being requested in furtherance of that criminal investigation. Temporary live monitoring will cease, and the connection will be severed, within 24 hours after the non-city entity has provided access to SFPD. SFPD shall not record or duplicate the live monitoring feed using any electronic device, including body Item 3A - Page 231
worn cameras or cell phones. If SFPD observes misdemeanor or felony violations on the live monitoring feed, nothing in this policy ordinance prohibits SFPD from deferring to authorized use No. 2 or No. 3 of this section.”; (2) in paragraph number 2, the word “specific” is inserted before the words “criminal investigation.”
(d) The section entitled, “Prohibitions,” is amended as follows: (1) in the fifth bullet point, the phrase “for reasons outside of redeployment needs,” is deleted and the phrase “unless there are exigent circumstances or for placement of police personnel,” is inserted after the words “First Amendment activities”; (2) in the fifth bullet point, the word “imminent” is inserted before the phrase “public safety hazards”; and (3) the following paragraph shall be added as the seventh bullet point, “SFPD is prohibited from seeking to obtain surveillance footage for purposes of enforcing prohibitions on reproductive care or interstate travel for reproductive care. Except as required by law, SFPD shall not share surveillance footage with any law enforcement agency for purposes of enforcing prohibitions on reproductive care or interstate travel for reproductive care. Unless legally required, SFPD will not share footage with non-California law enforcement agencies.”
(e) In the section entitled, “Policy Requirements,” the last paragraph under the sub- subsection “Data Security,” that begins with “Reporting,” is amended to insert the following sentences after the sentence that ends with “Board of Supervisors” and before the sentence that begins with “The reporting requirement shall commence . . . ”: “The quarterly report shall identify whether each request was granted or denied by the Captain or member in rank above Captain; the justification for granting the request if it was granted, including the reason(s) why the Captain or member in rank above Captain found the information credible; whether the request was granted by the non-City entity; whether the images were used to bring criminal charges; the types of charges brought; and the results of the charges.” Item 3A - Page 232
(f) In the section entitled, “Policy Requirements,” under the subsection, “Data Sharing,” the second bullet point under “A. Internal (City Entity) Data Sharing,” is amended to insert the words “and federal” after the phrase “in accordance with California.” (g) In the section entitled, “Policy Requirement,” the subsection “Data Retention,” is amended as follows: (1) the sentence “The Department’s data retention period and justification are as follows:” is amended to read: “The Department’s data retention period is as follows:”; (2) the paragraph after the first bullet point that begins with “Security Camera shared with Department . . .” is deleted in its entirety and replaced with: “Security Camera data shared with Department by a non-City entity will be stored only for the period necessary for investigation, prosecution, or litigation following an incident. All historical footage is associated with a specific criminal investigation and is tagged as evidence. This data shall be retained as required by State evidence retention laws. Camera footage associated with an officer misconduct or Officer Involved Shooting (OIS) investigation shall be maintained in perpetuity.”; (3) the paragraph after the second bullet point that begins with “Justification,” is deleted in its entirety and replaced with “Any historical video not tagged into evidence and subject to the use requirements of Chapter 19B shall be deleted within 90 days.” (h) The Police Department shall place a copy of the modified policy in Board File No. 220606 within 30 days of the effective date of this ordinance.

Section 4. Sunset Provision. Unless reauthorized by ordinance, the SFPD Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy, as modified herein, shall expire one year fifteen months after the effective date of this ordinance. Upon expiration, the City Attorney is authorized to remove the SFPD Non-City Entity Surveillance Cameras Policy to be removed from the Appendix to Administrative Code Chapter 19B.

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Section 45. Effective Date. This ordinance shall become effective 30 days after enactment. Enactment occurs when the Mayor signs the ordinance, the Mayor returns the ordinance unsigned or does not sign the ordinance within ten days of receiving it, or the Board of Supervisors overrides the Mayor’s veto of the ordinance.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DAVID CHIU, City Attorney

By: /s/ Zachary Porianda

ZACHARY PORIANDA
Deputy City Attorney

n:\govern\as2022\1900636\01627144.docx

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