1 INDEPENDENT POLICE AUDITORS’ REPORT
Review of Investigations Completed as of 5-31-25
Presented to the Honorable City Council
City of Palo Alto
2025
Prepared by: Michael Gennaco and Stephen Connolly
Independent Police Auditors for
the City of Palo Alto
2 Introduction
This Report is one of the shortest in our tenure as the oversight entity of the Palo Alto Police Department (PAPD). On a twice-yearly basis, our responsibility is to review and write about cases completed by PAPD management across specifically delineated categories. That "workload" is accordingly driven by timing and by PAPD activity, both in the field and in the agency's own review processes.
This installment covers the first six months of 2025. It includes discussion of one misconduct allegation (initiated by the Department itself to address potential violations of its vehicle pursuit policy), one use of force (in which a less-lethal weapon was used to facilitate the detention of a suicidal woman with a knife), and three incidents involving "pointed firearms" (all of which were found to be justified and consistent with training).
We found ourselves in basis alignment with the Department's resolution of each of these matters. As in the past, we also offer related recommendations that are meant to enhance future operational effectiveness.
Variations in the number and complexity of cases during a specific period are familiar to us from our years in Palo Alto (as well as our work in other jurisdictions). Though this is one of the smaller groupings, the limited number of public complaints of misconduct (here zero) and criteria-matching force incidents is in fact consistent with PAPD's recent history.
And the tracking of pointed firearm events continues to become sharper as the process evolves with time.
3 Internal Complaint Investigation
Case 1:
Factual Overview
PAPD received a report of a strong-arm robbery of a postal carrier that resulted in the taking of her cell phone. Several officers responded to a nearby city in response to tracking indications as to the phone's location. While in that city, the subject officer engaged in a pursuit of a vehicle that appeared to be fleeing from an officer affiliated with the neighboring jurisdiction.
That pursuit ended without apprehension of the suspect. But when the subject officer observed the same car upon returning to Palo Alto; it fled again and left behind a passenger whom the officer detained. The subject officer then attempted to join the subsequent pursuit when the driver sped away.
Eventually, the subject was successfully detained by other PAPD units.
PAPD Investigation
When reviewing the pursuit documentation, PAPD became concerned that the subject officer may have violated the Department’s vehicle pursuit policy. Accordingly, PAPD management self-initiated an investigation into those concerns. PAPD's subsequent assessment of the incident was thorough, and included an evaluation of vehicle speeds, body-worn and in-car video cameras, police reports, and statements from the subject officer.
The investigation revealed that during the second pursuit, the subject officer drove left of the concrete median with oncoming vehicles present on several occasions, drove through intersections against the light, and reached speeds of 91 miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone.
PAPD determined that the officer committed four sustained violations of the Department’s vehicle pursuit policy:
Initial Pursuit
1. Failure to notify the supervisor of the pursuit or its justification.
2. Failure to broadcast any information advising that he was in pursuit.
Second Pursuit
3. Joining the pursuit without supervisor authorization. 4 4. Driving without regard for public safety.
IPA Review
IPA reviewed all of the investigative materials developed during PAPD’s investigation and concurred with the findings of PAPD. The investigation and subsequent analysis were rigorous.
Vehicle pursuits are among the most dangerous of law enforcement activities, creating a risk not only to participating officers and the subjects being pursued but also to uninvolved motorists and pedestrians. As a result, police agencies have established detailed policies that are intended to balance those risks against the interest in apprehending those that flee.
The evidence was clear in this case that the subject officer did not consider the limitations and requirements set out in policy when engaged in either pursuit. To PAPD’s credit, it also recognized the misconduct and appropriately found the officer in violation of Departmental expectations as set out by policy.
Use of Force Cases
Case 1: Use of Less Lethal Munition on Suicidal Person
Factual Overview
PAPD was called to a location in which others had observed a female with a knife apparently trying to hurt herself by using the knife on her lower arms and wrists. Officers arrived on scene and one officer took the role of crisis negotiator. The negotiating officer attempted to get her to drop the knife as other members of the response team were assigned roles of less lethal and lethal cover.
After several minutes of unsuccessful negotiation, the female began walking in the direction of the PAPD response team, still holding the knife. Responding PAPD personnel’s tactical deployment options were limited because the woman was on a narrow pathway. At that time, the negotiating officer yelled at the female to drop the knife and the less lethal operator yelled “Sage.”1 The less lethal operator then delivered one round that struck the female in the abdomen and caused her to go to the ground.
The response team then advanced on the female and was able to successfully dislodge the knife from her and take her into custody. She was handcuffed and admitted to the
1 The term “Sage” refers to the model of less lethal munition that was deployed; it fires a heavy rubber projectile.
5 hospital for treatment of her self-inflicted wounds as well as the abdominal bruise caused by the less lethal munition.
At the hospital, the female said that her intent had been to end her life, and that she had hoped that the on-scene officers would kill her.
Supervisory Review of Force
PAPD’s robust supervisory review found that the use of the less lethal munition was consistent with the Department’s use of force policy. It noted that when the female began to advance on the officers still holding the knife, she presented a threat that justified the use of force.
To the Department’s credit, the secondary reviewer agreed with the assessment that a supervisor and officer who were on scene when the force occurred should have submitted supplemental reports to document their actions and observations of the incident. More significantly and creditably, PAPD’s leadership crafted an intervention whereby the two who did not write a supplemental report receive training on Department expectations of documentation when a serious force incident occurs.
IPA Review
IPA reviewed the police report, body worn camera footage, and the supervisory review and concurred that the use of force was consistent with PAPD’s use of force policy.
IPA also observed the multiple requests of the negotiator to drop the knife and to engage with the female. Once the female began to walk toward the arrest team, those commands became more forceful and the less lethal operator yelled “I’m going to Sage you.”2 Yet none of the commands directed at the female instructed her to stop her forward movement which was the concerning act that provoked the deployment of the less lethal munition. Ideally, instead of repeating the previously ignored instructions of “drop the knife” and yelling “Sage” (which was mostly for the benefit of the arrest team advising of imminent deployment), it would have been helpful for the command of “stop” to also have been directed to the woman.3
2 PAPD policy states that a “verbal warning of the intended use of the device should precede its application, unless it would otherwise endanger the safety of officers or is not practicable due to the circumstances.”
3 PAPD’s internal review concluded that there was technical compliance with the warning policy but noted that no member of the public would be reasonably expected to know what “I’m going to Sage you” means. It noted that subjects should have a chance to understand what a verbal warning is intending to convey, so that they can make a more informed decision if they want to comply with the commands of officers. To PAPD’s credit, the secondary reviewer directed that alternative warning options be developed and then presented to all sworn personnel at a future “Sage” training session. The reviewer noted that if officers were provided in advance with various 6 Moreover, the supervisory review found that two of the body-worn cameras assigned to supervisors did not function during the negotiations and use of force deployment.
Fortunately, other officers on scene did capture the incident. But it should be concerning that the two cameras assigned to supervisors did not properly function during the incident.
To its credit, PAPD’s internal review agreed and the second level supervisor crafted further instructions to supervisors on ways to ensure that the body worn cameras are timely examined in cases where footage is not captured.4 RECOMMENDATION One: PAPD should evaluate the warnings in any use of force incident to determine whether different warnings might have been effective.
RECOMMENDATION Two: PAPD should continue to emphasize to supervisors the need to timely review body-worn cameras when they do not operate as intended to ensure that the operators had undertaken proper testing and maintenance protocols.
"Pointed Firearm" Incidents
In keeping with a new protocol that is now in its third year, PAPD provided us with review packages for the completed managerial assessments of encounters that involved the pointing of a gun by one or more officers. There were three separate events within this audit period.
Below is a summary of the context for the deployments, along with the Department's supervisory assessment of each.
1. Officers conducted a high-risk traffic stop of a male who had violated a restraining order, and whom they knew to have a criminal history. The man eventually stopped but remained barricaded inside the vehicle and refused to surrender. A standoff ensued and
options to consider for verbal warnings, they may be more likely to give a warning that more understandably conveys to the subject what may be about to happen. The reviewer concluded that this, in turn, may increase the opportunity for subjects to comply with commands, and for officers to avoid having to use force. PAPD’s secondary reviewer should be commended for identifying the issue and developing a remedial plan designed to improve officer performance.
4 For example, personnel are instructed to “test” their body worn cameras at the beginning of any shift to ensure that they are functioning properly and properly charged. Supervisors reviewing any defective body worn camera deployment were instructed to timely check to see if the operator had undertaken such a test; the ability to do so expires within 60 days of the incident.
Moreover, we have been advised that PAPD is in the process of switching out its body-worn camera inventory due to the camera’s age and similar concerns with the performance of the cameras in recent months.
7 lasted for nearly two hours before one of the officers successfully achieved the man's peaceful surrender. During the incident, two different officers who were providing lethal cover pointed their respective weapons at separate points in the process. The (second officer took over for the first, to allow that person to engage in negotiations with the subject.)
No issues were identified in the supervisory review; on the contrary, the reviewer found the officers' actions to be effectively controlled, and the actual weapon pointing was quite limited.5
2. Three PAPD officers responded to a call involving a possible commercial burglary in progress. Two subjects were eventually detained in the shrubbery surrounding the property. One surrendered without incident; the other, in a different location, tried to conceal himself. Two officers both pointed their firearms at the man while one gave commands. Then one re-holstered before moving in to handcuff the subject while the other provided cover.
The officers' actions were found to be consistent with training and expectations in terms of their weapon use. However, one of the three involved officers (including one of the weapon-pointers) was not wearing a body-worn camera).6 This issue was determined to be an inadvertent mistake related to the spontaneous need for response; it was addressed by the reviewing supervisor.
3. An officer located a vehicle that had been flagged by an alert system in connection with a recent home invasion robbery; after calling for backup and initiating a traffic stop, the officer was notified that the occupants were potentially armed and dangerous.
Accordingly, the officer exited the patrol car and pointed a firearm at the driver, who had pulled over without incident. The officer kept the weapon pointed until the arrival of a partner made it safe to approach; the officer was able to determine that the driver was cooperative and not holding a weapon, and accordingly re-holstered. The arrest proceeded without further incident.
The supervisor memo pointed out that the officer did not activate a body-worn camera until approximately the one-minute mark of the traffic stop. The officer's explanation revolved around the need to sync a new camera after a battery had died earlier in the
5 We noted that the officers were notably solicitous of the man after securing his cooperation, even offering him water after he had been handcuffed. This was in keeping with the professional demeanor – and language – that we noted in each of these incidents.
6 That officer's relevant actions were at least captured by another officer's recording. 8 shift; the officer initially neglected to remove the camera from the in-car docking station but then remembered and put it on. This issue was addressed and memorialized.
IPA Review
We agreed with the determination that the officers' respective actions were valid in the context of the different enforcement actions involved. We also found that the review process was effectively robust. Supervisors did a meticulous assessment of camera recordings to identify key passages (which sometimes involved matching a different officer's camera to the actions of a pointing officer). And, interestingly, in at least one case the officers appeared to "err on the side of caution" by acknowledging their weapon points when video evidence was inconclusive as to their direction of aim while providing cover.
Expectations about rigorous documentation and thoughtful review seem to be becoming second nature in the agency, which is encouraging to see.
Meanwhile, we note a less favorable issue that has come to our attention before. In two of the three cases, at least one of the officers did not have a complete video record of his or her actions. Though the lapses were not overly detrimental in establishing what occurred (primarily due to the presence of other officers), and while both officers had understandable and mitigating explanations for the respective occurrences, we again urge PAPD to continue its emphasis on compliance with camera policy and expectations.