AR 7 SUPPLEMENTAL CORRESPONDENCEpdf — Pasadena City Council, January 24, 2022

Iraheta, Alba
From: Margaret Starbuck -
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2022 10:29 AM
To: PublicComment-AutoResponse
Cc: Rivas, Jessica
Subject: Public Comment City Council Meeting 1/24/22
ste Report his in the his An it on set one die inks or penatchments unles you knew the content s Dear Councilmembers,
am writing to ask you to oppose agenda item 7 on today's meeting agenda: the purchasing of additional license plate readers fror Vigilant Solutions. My concerns about this purchase are two-fold One, there have been serious privacy concerns raised about the use of ALPRs, which indiscriminately capture data about us all as we drive and then often, unless thoroughly regulated by the local contract, Vigilant sells that data on to a database that can be accessed by countless other agencies, including national agencies like ICE. An investigation by the ACLU revealed how by using ALPRs cities are basically green lighting the selling of their citizens data to Vigilant to do with as the corporation sees fit. And a separate investigation by the state auditor of CA revealed that most police departments do not have strong policies around the use of ALPRs and the data collected, which means departments are giving Vigilant license to do with the data as it pleases. I am deeply skeptical about allowing corporations to control and use private citizens data, because their bottom line is profit, not the common good. I am also opposed to sharing data between law enforcement agencies because it often leads to increased deportation and incarceration, breaking families and lives apart over non-violent crimes.

Two, I am concerned about spending $165,528 on ALPRs. That seems like a large sum to be spending on technology that comes with major privacy concerns. It has also been documented that increasing policing, surveillance, and incarceration disproportionately harms poor, Black, and Brown communities. I know that our city is facing an uptick in gun violence, most of it gang related as far as I understand. Gang intervention and community support are the tactics that have been most successful at reducing cycles of violence and death in other areas. I know that we already have a gang intervention program, but I feel strongly that if we put more funding toward building stronger intervention, de-escalation, mental health counseling, and youth activity programs instead of toward technology like ALPRs and Shot Spotter, we would ultimately save more lives and reduce gun violence further.

Please do not spend our city's money on this invasive technology that will only lead to throwing more of our young people in jail, instead of helping heal our community.

Best,
Margaret
01/24/2022
Item 7
1 Iraheta, Alba
From: ellen finkelpearl <
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2022 1:35 PM
To: PublicComment-AutoResponse
Subject: Agenda item 7: Vigilant Solutions
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. Learn more....

I write to oppose the purchase of ALPRs from Vigilant Solutions. Please refer to the excellent and thorough letter from Una Lee Jost, highlighting especially the threat that information from these readers will be used to locate and deport our immigrant neighbors. The ACLU and other civil rights groups have denounced the use of this company in particular, as one that secretly passes on information to ICE. The police have eaten up more than enough of Pasadena's budget. Vote NO on this item.

Ellen Finkelpearl
Pasadena, 91104
1 01/24/2022
Item 7
Automated License
Plate Readers??
2022 JAN 24 PM 2:19
NO.

NO
NO
I1e24/2022
Item
I oppose the acquisition of license plate readers (ALPR):

1. Inadequate public notice, stakeholder input or statutory guidance

2. Privacy and civil liberties infringement

3. Other surveillance tech (ShotSpotter) hasn't even been installed or shown its efficacy

4. September 21, 2020 resolution regarding Vigilant contract hasn't been implemented by City Yadi
Pasadena resident
City of Pasadena City Council Meeting
January 24, 2022

7. License Plate Readers (ALPR) - Vigilant Solutions / Motorola ACLU

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION
Sputhern California

VIA EMAIL
Charles Parkin
Office of City Attorney
City of Long Beach
411 West Ocean Boulevard - 9th Floor
Long Beach, California 90802
[email protected]
April 19, 2021
Re: Long Beach Police Department's Violations of State Law for Sharing License Plate Reader Data
Dear Mr. Parkin,
I write regarding the enclosed record, which indicates that the Long Beach Police Department ("the Department") shares automated license plate reader ("ALPR") data with dozens of federal and out-of-state law enforcement agencies.' Because this sharing violates state law, we ask that you immediately impose a ban on the Department from sharing in this fashion.

This letter describes the threat that the unrestricted use of ALPR technology poses to the privacy and safety of Long Beach community members, summarizes public records from this month indicating that the Department shares information about the locations of local drivers with federal and out-of-state agencies, and explains that California state law prohibits these sharing arrangements. The letter concludes by urging your office to end sharing these data.

I. ALPR Surveillance of Your Residents' Locations Violates Their Civil Liberties and Civil Rights.

No jurisdiction should acquire or deploy license plate readers, given the technology's invasiveness and the breadth of revealing information such technology can collect about individuals. ALPR systems collect and store location information about drivers whose cars pass through ALPR cameras' fields of view, which, after being matched to dates, times, and locations, can be built into a database that reveals sensitive information about where individuals work, live, ' Suhauna Hussain & Johana Bhuiyan, Police in Pasadena, Long Beach pledged not to send license plate data to ICE. They shared it anyway, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-12-21/pasadena-long-beach-police-ice- automated-license-plate-reader-data.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Hector O. Villagra
CHAIR Marla Stone VICE CHAIRS Sherry Frumkin and Frank Broccolo CHAIRS EMERITI Shari Leinwand Stephen Rohde Danny Goldberg Allan K. Jonas* Burt Lancaster* Irving Lichtenstein, MD* Jarl Mohn Laurie Ostrow* Stanley K. Sheinbaum*
*deceased
1313 WEST EIGHTH STREET • SUITE 200 • LOS ANGELES, CA 90017 • T 213.977.9500 • F 213.915.0220 • ACLUSOCAL.ORG

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associate, worship, and travel.? Much of this information has traditionally been unavailable to law enforcement without a search warrant. Further, ALPR systems are easily misused to harm minority communities-a phenomenon that has been documented for over twenty years.? As with other surveillance technologies, police often deploy license plate readers in poor and historically overpoliced areas, regardless of crime rates.4 Il. Long Beach Police Department Shares Local Residents' Data with Federal Immigration Authorities and Dozens of Out-of-State Agencies.

Documents obtained by our office in response to a California Public Records Act Request ("PRA") reveal that the Department lists dozens of federal and out-of-state agencies as sharing partners with the ability to search local ALPR data, including scans of license plates and the 2 See, e.g., You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans ' Movements, AM. CIV. LIBerTIes UnIoN, July 2013, https://www.aclu.org/other/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used- record-americans-movements; Automatic License Plate Readers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/automated-license-plate-readers (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 3 See, e.g., Angel Diaz & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Automatic License Plate Readers:

Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., Sept. 10, 2020, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license- plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations; Christine Hauser, Aurora Police Chief Apologizes After Officers Handcuff Children on the Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/us/aurora-police-black-family.html (ALPR falsely flagged a Black family's SUV as stolen, leading to a stop during which entire family, including four children, was forced to lie on the ground during the stop; Vasudha Talla, Records Reveal ICE Agents Run Thousands of License Plate Queries a Month in Massive Location Database, ACLU OF NORTHERN CAL., June 5, 2019, https://www.aclunc.org/blog/records-reveal-ice-agents-run- thousands-license-plate-queries-month-massive-location-database: Matt Cagle, San Francisco - Paying the Price for Surveillance Without Safeguards, ACLU OF NORTHERN CAL., May 22, 2014, https://www.aclunc.org/blog/san-francisco-paying-price-surveillance-without-safeguards; Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, With Cameras, Informants, NYPD Eyed Mosques, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 23, 2012, https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/with-cameras- informants-nypd-eyed-mosques; Michael Powell, Sari Horwitz & Toni Locy, Lt. Stowe's Sudden Fall From Grace, WASH. Post, Nov. 30, 1997,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/11/30/lt-stowes-sudden-fall-trom- grace/aбac37t2-57d2-47fb-b6da-0f8f6a45dde8/.
4 Dave Maass and Jeremy Gillula, What You Can Learn from Oakland's Raw ALPR Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., Jan. 21, 2015, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we- learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data (last visited April 19, 2021); BARTON GELLMAN & SAM ADLER- BELL, THE CENTURY FOUND., THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF SURVEILLANCE 2 (Dec. 2017), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/12/03151009/the-disparate-impact-of- surveillance.pdf; see also, e.g., Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have Helped Police and Lenders Target the Poor, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 22, 2016 https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-have-helped- police-and-lenders-target-the-poor/479436/ (summarizing data indicating that Oakland Police Department deployed ALPRs "disproportionately often in low-income areas and in neighborhoods with high concentrations of African-American and Latino residents").

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

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location of the scanned plate. The enclosed data sharing report dated April 6, 2021 lists the Department as a partner that allows these outside agencies to search the information collected about driver locations. This report is the latest in numerous reports which demonstrate that the Department has a long-standing, multi-year practice of sharing ALPR data with out-of-state and federal law enforcement agencies.

Il. Sharing of ALPR Data with Out-of-State Agencies Violates State Law.

Any sharing of ALPR data with out-of-state police departments and federal law enforcement agencies violates state law. First, under the California Civil Code, as amended by Senate Bill No. 34 ("S.B. 34"), "[a] public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law." Civ.

Code $ 1798.90.55(b). A "public agency" is defined as "the state, any city, county, or city and county, or any agency or political subdivision of the state." See Civ. Code § 1798.90.5(f) (emphasis added). The Civil Code, therefore, prohibits an agency from sharing or transferring ALPR information with or to these agencies, none of which are California state or local agencies.

Additionally, the California Values Act ("S.B. 54) prohibits the sharing of personal information with agencies "for immigration enforcement purposes."S Cal. Govt. Code §§ 7282, 7282.5, 7284.6(a)(1)D). Automated license plate reader data constitutes "personal information" within the meaning of S.B. 54 and the California Information Practices Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.3. Given that Long Beach data is shared with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department also violates S.B. 54.

In addition to violating the plain language of the California Values Act, sharing ALPR data with federal immigration enforcement agencies undermines the values guiding state law, as set out in the legislative findings and declarations which accompany S.B. 54:
"The Legislature finds and declares the following:
(a) Immigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community. Almost one in three Californians is foreign born and (b) A relationship of trust between California's immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the public safety of the 5 S.B. 54, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), codified at Cal. Gov't Code §§ 7282 et seq.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

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the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal of race or ethnicity in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, or denied access to education based on immigration status.... vell-being, and constitutional rights of the people of California, an o direct the state's limited resources to matters of greatest concer to state and local governments.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter shall not be construed as providing, expanding, or ratifying any legal authority for any state or local law enforcement agency to participate in immigration enforcement."
Cal. Govt. Code §§ 7284.2.

IV. Your Office Should End the Forbidden Sharing of ALPR Data, and Any Further Use of ALPRs.

We urge you and the Department to end the sharing arrangements documented above.

Further, the risks to civil liberties and civil rights that ALPR technology always creates are well-documented. For example, even if your office takes steps in conjunction with the Department to prevent the formal sharing of data with out-of-state agencies, the risk of informal sharing with these same agencies will remain. Thus, the best way to ensure that your residents are safe from unnecessary intrusion into their safety and personal lives is to reject the use of ALPR technology altogether.

Please advise us of your position by May 3, 2021. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to email me at [email protected]. I look forward to your prompt action and response.

Sincerely,
mumfless
Mohammad Tajsar
encl.

CC: Robert Luna, Chief
Long Beach Police Department

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

CITY OF PASADENA
City Council Minutes
September 21 2020 - 2:00 P.M.
.. • City Hall Council Chamber

SPECIAL MEETING
The virtual meeting was convened pursuant to Executive Order N-29-20 issued by Governor Gavin Newsom on March 17, 2020, and was held solely by videoconference/teleconference
OPENING: Mayor Tornek called the special meeting to order at 2:03 p.m. The pledge of allegiance was led by Councilmember Gordo.

ROLL CALL: Mayor Terry Tornek
Councilmembers: Vice Mayor Tyron Hampton
Councilmember Victor Gordo
Councilmember John J. Kennedy
Councilmember Steve Madison
Councilmember Gene Masuda
Councilmember Margaret McAustin
Councilmember Andy Wilson
Staff: City Manager Steve Mermeli
City Attorney/City Prosecutor Michele Beal Bagneris
City Clerk Mark Jomsky
CEREMONIAL MATTERS Mayor Tornek requested that the meeting be adjourned in memory of those that have suffered due to death and illness caused by COVID-19 in Pasadena, the nation and around the world.

Councilmember McAustin spoke on the death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and feminist icon; and asked that the meeting be adjourned her memory.

Mayor Tornek presented a prociamation declaring October 2020 as "First Tee of Greater Pasadena Month," in the City of Pasadena.

Councilmember Madison and Vice Mayor Hampton expressed
gratitudes in the commu of Greater Pasadena for their work and

CONSENT CALENDAR CONTRACT AWARD TO NATIONAL CNG & FLEET SERVICES

LLC, FOR COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS TANK INSPECTION

AND REPAIR SERVICES ON CITY-OWNED VEHICLES FOR AN
AMOUNT NOT-TO-EXCEED $375,000 FOR UP TO FIVE YEARS
Recommendation: It is recommended that the City Council:
(1) Find that this action is exempt under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in accordance with Section 15061(b)(3), the General Rule that CEQA only applies to projects that may have an effect on the environment; and
Council Minutes 1 09/21/2020

ENHANCEMENTS - TEMPORARY MOCK-UP PANELS FOR AN
AMOUNT NOT-TO-EXCEED $160,210
.. .

Item discussed separately PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: AUTHORIZE THE CITY

MANAGER TO ENTER INTO A PURCHASE ORDER WITH

VIGILANT SOLUTIONS TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENT

AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER HARDWARE AND

EQUIPMENT
RESIGNATIONS. RESIGNATION OF ANASTASCIA MEHMOOD FROM THE APPOINTMENTS, & LIBRARY COMMISSION (District 3 Nomination)

REAPPOINTMENTS

APPOINTMENT OF DAVID AZEVEDO TO THE ROSE BOWL
AQUATICS CENTER BOARD (City Nomination)

APPOINTMENT OF RENEE MORGAN-HAMPTON TO THE
CODE ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION (District 3 Nomination)
CLAIMS RECEIVED Claim No. 13,614 Desiree Salazar $ 922.25 Claim No. 13,615 James Kim 948.31
Claim No. 13,616 Cathy Ann Jones 1,300.00
Claim No. 13,617 Joseph Po 1,850.00
PUBLIC HEARINGS SET October 5, 2020, 2:00 p.m. - Declaration of Surplus Properties located at 78 N. Marengo Avenue, 255 E. Union Street, 95 N.

Garfield Avenue and 280 Ramona Street
October 19, 2020, 2:00 p.m. - Substantial Amendment to the 5- Year Consolidated Plan (2020-2024) and Annual Action Plan (2020-2021) Related to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act ESG-CV Funds and HOME Investment
Partnerships Program Funds
It was moved by Councilmember Kennedy, seconded by
Councilmember Wilson, to approve all items on the Consent Calendar, with the exception of Item 6 (Authorization to Enter into a Contract with Rotocraft Support, Inc.), Item 7 (Authorization to Enter into a Contract with JTD Consulting, Inc. dba Wireless Infrastructure Services), Item 8 (Modification of Repayment and Inheritance Provisions of Homeownership Opportunities Program Loans), Item 9 (Purchase Order Award to Custom Design Iron Works, Inc.), and Item 10 (Authorize the City Manager to Enter into a Purchase Order with Vigilant Solutions), which were discussed separately:

AYES: Councilmembers Gordo, Kennedy, Madison, Masuda,
McAustin, Wilson, Vice Mayor Hampton, Mayor Tornek
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
ABSTAIN: None
Council Minutes 4 09/21/2020
PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: AUTHORIZE THE CITY

MANAGER TO ENTER INTO A PURCHASE ORDER WITH

VIGILANT SOLUTIONS TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENT

AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER HARDWARE AND

EQUIPMENT
Recommendation: It is recommended that the City Council:
(1) Find that the proposed contract is not subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to State CEQA Guidelines Sections 15060(c)(2), 15060(c)(3), and 15378; as the activity will not result in a direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment;
(2) Authorize a purchase order with Vigilant Solutions, Inc., for the purchase of replacing three (3) Mobile Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) systems including hardware, equipment and an enterprise service agreement in an amount not-to-exceed $80,000.

Competitive bidding is not required pursuant to City Charter Section 1002(f), for contracts for professional and unique services; and (3) It is further recommended that the City Council grant the proposed contract an exemption from the Competitive Selection process pursuant to Pasadena Municipal Code Section 4.08.049(B) contracts for which the City's best interests are served.

Mark Jomsky, City Clerk, reported that a number of correspondence letters and emails in opposition to the staff recommendation were received, distributed to the City Council, posted on-line, and made part of the public record from the following individuals:

Mohammad Tajsar, representing Pasadena Privacy for All
Kris Ockerhauser, residence not stated
Yuny Parada, Pasadena resident
Sonja K. Berndt, Pasadena resident
David Krausse, residence not statec
Yadi Y., Pasadena resident
In addition, he read aloud comments in opposition to the staff recommendation, expressing privacy concerns, and providing comments/suggestions from the following individuals:

Adriana Bautista, Pasadena resident
Jasmine Richards, Pasadena resident
CP, San Marino resident
Jennifer Park, San Marino resident
Cynthia Park, San Marino resident
Taylor Paez, Pasadena resident
T. Jones, Pasadena resident
Concerned Pasadena Citizen
"
Kris Willis, Pasadena resident
Frank Pocino, Monrovia resident
Kenichi Yoshida, Pasadena resident
Sonja K. Berndt, Pasadena resident
Council Minutes 9 09/21/2020
Chris Merchant, Pasadena resident
Gautam Jain, Pasadena resident
David Chavez, Pasadena resident
Mark Williams, Altadena resident
! ' Ferne Hayes, Pasadena resident
Allen Shay, Pasadena resident
Olden Denham, Pasadena resident
Ryan Bell, Pasadena resident
Aletha Johnson, Pasadena resident
Edward J. Washatka, representing Privacy for All Coalition Cynthia Smith, Long Beach resident
Allison Henry, Pasadena resident
Gina Dance, Pasadena resident
Julie Hoy, Pasadena resident
Kris Ockershauser, Pasadena resident
City Manager Mermell provided introductory comments, and Police Commander Jason Clawson presented a PowerPoint presentation on the item, including background information on the City's use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR); and responded to questions.

Councilmember Madison spoke on the need to access the
information ALPR provides to solve and prevent crime. He also spoke on the need to adequately ensure that the information will not be misused, which is why the Public Safety Committee (PSC) recommended a limited two-year retention of the storage of data. ...

Councilmember Kennedy. Chair of the Public Safety Committee, provided information on the role the City's Community Police Oversight Commission would have in the matter; and provided a summary of the PSC's discussion on the item.

Councilmember Gordo expressed concerns with Vigilant Solutions ability to sell information gathered by ALPR to insurance agencies; and asked staff to ensure that the contract includes language to prevent data sharing to protect the integrity of the program and the community.

In response to Councilmember Kennedy's request for information, Michele Beal Bagneris City Attorney/City Prosecutor, stated that staff can seek to negotiate with Vigilant Solutions the privacy and limited use of the sharing of data collected to law enforcement agencies only.

Following discussion, it was moved by Councilmember Madison, seconded by Councilmember Kennedy, to approve the staff recommendation, amended to include provisions in the contract prohibiting data sharing by Vigilant Solutions for monetary reasons and to limit any data sharing to law enforcement agencies only:

Council Minutes 10 09/21/2020
AYES: Councilmembers Gordo, Kennedy, Madison, Masuda,
McAustin, Wilson, Vice Mayor Hampton, Mayor
Tornek
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
ABSTAIN: None
ABSTAIN: None
RECOMMENDATIONS COVID-19 UPDATE FROM CITY MANAGER:

FROM OFFICERS AND
DEPARTMENTS ORAL REPORTS FROM DR. YING-YING GOH, PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER, AND DR. KIMBERLY SHRINER, MEDICAL

DIRECTOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL
City Manager Mermell provided introductory comments, and Dr.

Kimberly Shriner with Huntington Hospital, provided a PowerPoint presentation on data related to COVID-19 throughout Los Angeles County and the City, including COVID-19 patients; and responded to questions. Dr. Ying-Ying Goh, Public Health Officer, provideo information related to the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths, in the nation, state, county and City; information on the new State Health Officer orders framework, "Blueprint for a Safer Economy," risk factors related to Halloween, benefits of the flu vaccination, and responded to questions.

Following discussion, by consensus of the City Council, and on order of the Mayor, the information was received and filed.

ORDINANCE - FIRST Conduct first reading of "AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF

READING PASADENA AMENDING VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE

PASADENA MUNICIPAL CODE CREATING (A) A COMMUNITY
POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION; AND (B) AN
INDEPENDENT POLICE AUDITOR"
Recommendation: It is recommended that the City Council:
(1) Find that this action is exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), pursuant to State CEQA Guidelines Section 15061(b)(3), the "general rule" that CEQA only applies to projects which have the potential for causing a significant effect on the environment; and
(2) Introduce an ordinance creating a Community Police
Oversight Commission and Independent Police Auditor, and conduct first reading of the ordinance.

Michele Beal Bagneris City Attorney/City Prosecutor, provided introductory comments, and Javan Rad, Chief Assistant City Attorney, presented a PowerPoint presentation on the item, including amendments to the ordinance, and responded to questions.

Council Minutes 11 09/21/2020
Ver tol POP report
View Selected Apprenatons
Automatcd License Plate Readers
To Better Protect Individuals' Privacy. Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects Report Number: 2019-118
Automated License Audit Highlights...

Plate Readers Our audit of the use of automated license plate readers (ALPR) at four local law enforcement agencies
highlighted the following:

To Better Protect Individuals' Privacy, Law
Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards Local law enforcement agencies did not always follow for the Data It Collects practices that adequately consider the individual's privacy in handling and retaining the ALPR images
and associated data.

February 2020
All four agencies have accumulated a large number
of images in their ALPR systems, yet most of the images do not relate to their criminal investigations—99.9 percent of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.
• None of the agencies have an ALPR usage and privacy policy that implements all the legally mandated- since 2016-requirements.
• Three agencies did not completely or clearly specify who has system access, who has system oversight, or how to destroy ALPR data, and the remaining agency has not developed a policy at all. • Two of the agencies add and store names, addresses, dates of birth, and criminal charges to their systems—some of these data may be categorized as criminal justice information and may originate from a system maintained and protected by the Department of Justice.

Three agencies use a cloud storage vendor to hold their many images and associated data, yet the agencies lack contract guarantees that the cloud vendor will appropriately protect the data.

Three agencies share their images with hundreds of entities across the U.S. but could not provide evidence that they had determined whether those entities have a right or a need to access the images.

Agencies may be retaining the images longer than necessary and thus increasing the risk to individuals' privacy.

The agencies have few safeguards for creating ALPR user accounts and have not audited the use of their systems.

Report: https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf Note: Three responding agencies that use ALPR systems did not indicate a retention period for their information: Bakersfield PD, Fountain Valley PD and Pasadena PD August 23, 2021
ABA AMLRICANBARASSOCIATON By David Horrigan
Data Privacy vs. Crime Prevention: The Automated License Plate Recognition Debate If your child were the victim of a kidnapping, an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) reader might be a lifesaver-figuratively and literally.

On the other hand, if you were a victim of domestic abuse, ALPR technology in the wrong hands could put you in danger, and the tragic history of World War Il taught us what can happen when totalitarian governments have an unlimited ability to collect data on their citizens.

But just what is automated license plate recognition technology, and do you really have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a number emblazoned on the front of your Ford or the back of your Buick? Police departments, privacy advocates, and the courts have entered the ALPR debate. Is the technology a godsend for safety or an Orwellian data privacy nightmare? Perhaps it's both.

Robot Readers
What are automated license plate recognition readers?
According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), ALPR technology consists typically of high-speed, high-resolution cameras with infrared filters that capture images of vehicle license plates. The images are transferred to processing applications performing optical character recognition (OCR) and then compared against law enforcement databases of license plates of interest, sometimes called "hot lists." ALPR readers can be deployed in stationary positions, including highway overpasses or streetlight poles, or in mobile units, such as police cars.

Not surprisingly, ALPR developers join many law enforcement advocates in hailing the technology as an important means of protecting the public.

The ALPR company, Leonardo, cities stories of how license plate readers can come to the rescue—including in the return of a one-year-old kidnapping victim to his mother—and the company maintains ALPR technology can make places from college campuses to hotels safer.

Many privacy advocates have a different view.

Orwellian Tech Nightmare?
The digital civil liberties group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), paints a picture of a technological Orwellian nightmare brought to us by automated license plate recognition readers. "Taken in the aggregate, ALPR data can paint an intimate portrait of a driver's life and even chill First Amendment protected activity. ALPR technology can be used to target drivers who visit sensitive places such as health centers, immigration clinics, gun shops, union halls, protests, or centers of religious worship" EFF argues in its statement on the issue.

To those who would counter that there's no reasonable expectation of privacy in a license plate number— something that is displayed openly in public for the world to see-EFF notes the compulsory nature of license plates. In essence, the EFF Big Brother argument is that the government forces you to have a license plate, and then the government tracks your every move with that license plate.

What about that one-year-old kidnapping victim?
EFF notes that law enforcement uses ALPR technology to track millions of ordinary people-and the overwhelming majority of them are not even suspected of committing any crime.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) shares EFF's concerns. "Enormous databases of innocent motorists' location information are growing rapidly. This information is often retained for years, or even indefinitely, with few or no restrictions to protect privacy rights," the ACLU argues in its position statement on ALPR.

Rules and Regulations for Readers
Citing a 2012 project in which ACLU affiliates across the nation sent public records act requests to approximately 600 local and state police departments as well as state and federal agencies, the organization says the practice is more widespread than you might think.

In addition, the ACLU says the results of its project are deeply disturbing. "The documents paint a startling picture of a technology deployed with too few rules that is becoming a tool for mass routine location tracking and surveillance," the ACLU argues.

ALPR is also becoming big business. A recent estimate by Market Study Report indicates the global market for ALPR was $794.1 million in 2019 and that it will increase to over $1.2 billion in 2025.

Not surprisingly, the data privacy debate over automated license plate recognition has reached the courts, and last fall, the Virginia Supreme Court weighed in on this legal technology dilemma.

In Neal v. Fairfax Cty. Police Dep't, 849 S.E. 2d 123 (2020), Virginia's high court reversed a lower court and held a local police department's use of ALPR technology did not violate Virginia's Government Data Collection and Dissemination Act (the "Data Act").

In Neal, Harrison Neal filed a Freedom of Information Act request with Virginia's Fairfax County Police Department, seeking the department's ALPR data for his vehicle. The police returned two sheets of paper, each with a photo of his vehicle and his license plate, each with the time and date the photo was taken.

Neal filed suit, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the police department from collecting and storing ALPR data without any suspicion of criminal activity—the so-called "passive use" of ALPR, where the readers are collecting data from each passing vehicle.

In the proceeding that became known as "Neal I," the trial court granted summary judgment to the police, holding the department's use of ALPR technology did not violate Virginia's Data Act because the data collected did not constitute "personal information" under the act.

However, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. Although the high court conceded that "a license plate number stored in the ALPR database would not be personal information because it does not describe, locate, or index anything about an individual," the court said that didn't end the data privacy inquiry because the pictures and data associated with each license plate number did constitute "personal information" under the Data Act.

On remand, the lower court held the ALPR record-keeping process—the technology combined with other law enforcement databases—-did constitute an information system under the Data Act, and the police department appealed.

In considering the case on its return visit to the Virginia Supreme Court, the high court noted—almost refreshingly--the limits of its inquiry and that our courts are not here to make public policy. "In resolving this case, our task is not to reach the right public policy balance by weighing competing demands for efficiency and security against considerations of privacy. Our duty is more modest: we must determine from the text and structure of the Data Act where the legislature has drawn the line," Justice Stephen McCullough wrote for the court.

In reversing the lower court again, the Virginia Supreme Court noted the additional fact-finding by the lower court on remand and held the ALPR system did not violate the Data Act because the ALPR system itself— without the use of other law enforcement databases—was not an "information system" under the act because it did not contain the "name, personal number, or other identifying particulars of a data subject." Why the ALPR Debate Matters
Justice McCullough did an excellent job of articulating why this debate matters when he wrote in Neal:
"Modern technology enables governments to acquire information on the population on an unprecedented scale. National, state, and local governments can use that information for a variety of administrative purposes and to help apprehend dangerous criminals. But knowledge is power, and power can be abused." Even the police chiefs' organization cautions that access to ALPR databases should be limited to authorized law enforcement personnel who have met minimum training, certification, and background checks, and that there should be stringent data audits.

Attorney Gail Gottehrer, who has served as a member of Connecticut's Task Force to Study Fully Autonomous Vehicles and on the New York State Bar Association's Transportation Committee, sees the important role humans play in the data privacy aspects of automated technologies. "ALPR technologies, like many emerging technologies, are tools. Whether they help achieve public safety goals or threaten privacy rights depends on who uses them and the ways in which they are used. On their own, ALPR technologies may not reveal much about a specific individual, but when government or private entities combine ALPR data with other data in their possession, the result may be a disturbingly comprehensive profile of that person, Gottehrer said.

However, Gottehrer notes there are ways to reduce the danger of such disturbingly comprehensive profiles. "Ways to maximize the benefits of ALPR technologies and minimize the privacy risks associated with them include limiting the types of entities that can collect and use ALPR data and the purposes for which they can use the data—as well as delineating when (or if) the data can be shared, and the period of time for which the data can be kept, after which it (and all copies and backups) must be destroyed," Gottehrer added As Gottehrer notes, with any technology, its success or failure depends on how it's used. There's a reason we say "People, process, and technology," and not "Technology and those other two extraneous, superfluous elements."
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial insurance_practice/committees/automobile-litigation/data-privacy-vs-crime-prevention/ Iraheta, Alba
From: Una Lee Jost < >
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2022 12:14 PM
To: PublicComment-AutoResponse; Bell, Cushon; Dyson, Darla; Porras, Susana; Sullivan, Noreen; Morales, Margo; Suzuki, Takako; Thyret, Pam; Gordo, Victor Subject: Jan. 24, 2022 Pasadena City Council Meeting - Public Comment - Agenda Item 7 Attachments: aclu_AutomaticLicensePlateReaders.pdf; aclu_AutomatedLicensePlateReaders_ICE.pdf; eff_AutomatedLicensePlateReaders.pdf
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. Learn more... https://mydoit.cityofpasadena.net/sp?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB0010263>.

Dear Pasadena City Council Members:

I'm Una Lee Jost, PUSD parent, and long-time resident of Pasadena, District 4.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Agenda 7.

I'm deeply troubled by the proposed transaction with Vigilant Solutions, LLC for automated license plate readers.

According to ACLU, the nation's oldest defender of civil liberties, documents received from public records act requests to 600+ law enforcement agencies paint a "startling" picture of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) deployed "with too few rules that is becoming a tool for mass routine location tracking and surveillance." (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aclu.org%2Fissues%2Fprivacy- technology%2Flocation-tracking%2Fautomatic-license-plate- readers&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C773db9aca160428ff4ff08d9df760bc6%7C82d9fc00 2c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786521712453487%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLСJQ|joiV2luMzliLСJВТil6Іk1haWwiLCJХVCI6Мn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=2m9cfGРa9DoJlEu3ХZkЗfYІ0cjLМХf0і%2 FFIAincShtc%3D&reserved=0)
A March 2019 ACLU report specifically named Vigilant Solutions, noting ICE's "sweeping use of a vast automated license plate reader (ALPR) database run by a company called Vigilant Solutions." In the report, ACLU noted how its "grave concerns" about the civil liberties risks of license plate readers take on greater urgency as this surveillance information fuels ICE's deportation machine:
"We already knew that ICE engages in egregious conduct: from arresting a father dropping off his daughter at school to detaining a woman in court seeking a protective order against an abuser. But adding license plate surveillance with its attendant misuse...magnifies ICE's threats to community safety. And now we know which local police departments are helping ICE terrorize immigrant communities by sharing license plate information." (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aclunc.org%2Fblog%2Fdocuments-reveal- ice-using-driver-location-data-local-police-
deportations&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C773db9aca160428ff4ff08d9df760bc6%7C82d 9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786521712453487%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJW|joiMC4 wLjAwMDAiLCJQljoiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=QJARgQFyaM2RmMSa0B2bAww E8btP1mgAhe9BXQ2nbss%3D&reserved=0) 01/24/2022
Item 7
1 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit digital rights organization, has called for an audit of Vigilant Solutions:
"Through years of research spanning California (and beyond), EFF has discovered that agencies that access ALPR data are often ignorant or noncompliant when it comes to the transparency and accountability requirements of state law.

Furthermore, their agreements with the vendor Vigilant Solutions often include "non-disparagement" and "non- publication" clauses that contractually bind them to Vigilant Solutions' "media messaging" and prevent agencies from speaking candidly with the press. Meanwhile, training materials created by Vigilant Solutions explicitly recommend that police leave ALPR out of its reports whenever possible. "But documents obtained as part of the ACLU's lawsuit brings another factor into play: sometimes the claims are just jaw-droppingly inaccurate.
"One email in particular shows exactly how ICE could access data collected at shopping malls through a regional fusion center, despite the mall operator and Vigilant Solutions' repeated denials that it was happening." (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eff.org%2Fdeeplinks%2F2019%2F03%2Fhe res-why-you-cant-trust-what-cops-and-companies-claim-about-automated- license&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C773db9aca160428ff4ff08d9df760bc6%7C82d9fc00 2c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786521712453487%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJW|joiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQ|joiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=QgRfbrq%2FJ5eu%2Flptqh861ERWNZT TMOGSewQXy2cQyV1%3D&reserved=0)
Cities like Alameda and Culver City have already rejected contracts for license plate surveillance. I urge the Council to do likewise and reject any contracts for license plate surveillance, including any proposed transactions with Vigilant Solutions. We need you as our City leaders to take immediate action to limit the exposure of local residents' information to ICE and withhold information from fusion centers that do not do the same.

I also urge the Council to develop and pass ordinances to require transparency, oversight, and approval whenever our City's police department considers purchasing surveillance technology, in line with ACLU recommendations (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aclu.org%2Fother%2Fyou-are-being- tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record-americans-movements%3Fredirect%3Dtechnology-and- liberty%2Fyou-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used- record&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C773db9aca160428ff4ff08d9df760bc6%7C82d9fc002 c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786521712453487%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoiMC4wLjAw MDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=N107B5SR2NCgem6EFhkuxwazxSE4Dh 9K25ipmNf%2BME0%3D&reserved=0)
As the Movement for Black Lives notes, "the explosion of surveillance, policing, mass criminalization, incarceration, and deportation that has devastated Black communities over the past four decades has been fueled by large-scale investments at all levels of government, accompanied by massive disinvestment from meeting community needs. (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fm4bl.org%2Fpolicy-platforms%2Fend-the-war- communities&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C773db9aca160428ff4ff08d9df760bc6%7C82d 9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786521712453487%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoiMC4 wLjAwMDAiLCJQ|joiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=4%2BcbVuOk%2FuCMJOwhul0c QxKUClb2afvgBcQDvgrrcX8%3D&reserved=0)
Instead of relying on surveillance as a solution, I urge the Council to invest in making our communities stronger and safer through investing in community needs such as quality, affordable housing, community-based transformative violence prevention and intervention strategies, and supports for criminalized populations.

Thank you for representing the concerns of our community.

Automatic License Plate Readers | American Civil Liberti... https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-..

ACLU

AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS
A little-noticed surveillance technology designed to track the movements of every passing driver is fast proliferating on America's streets. Automatic license plate readers-mounted on police cars or on objects like road signs and bridges-use small high-speed cameras to photograph thousands of plates per minute.

The information captured by the readers-including the license plate number and the date, time, and location of every scan-is being collected and sometimes pooled into regional sharing systems. As a result, enormous databases of innocent motorists' location information are growing rapidly.

This information is often retained for years, or even indefinitely, with few or no restrictions to protect privacy rights.

In July 2012, ACLU affiliates in 38 states and Washington, D.C., sent public records act requests to almost 600 local and state police departments, as well as other state and federal agencies, to obtain information on how these agencies use license plate readers. In response, we received thousands of pages of documents detailing the use of the technology around the country.

The documents paint a startling picture of a technology deployed with too few rules that is becoming a tool for mass routine location tracking and surveillance. As the technology spreads, the ACLU calls for the adoption of legislation and law enforcement agency policies adhering to strict privacy principles to prevent the government from tracking our movements on a massive scale.
1 of 4 1/24/22, 11:58
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Home > Blog >
Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations
Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver
Location Data From Local Police for
Deportations
Mar 13, 2019
f
By: Vasudha Talla Y @ACLU_NorCal
UPDATE: The Union City Police Department informed
the ACLU that it does not operate license plate cameras and has no license plate detection data to share with
ICE. Union City provided a recent sharing report and
screenshots showing that ICE is not listed as a sharing partner and that Union City has not contributed
"detections" data to the LEARN database.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is using
mass location surveillance to target immigrants. And
local governments like Merced and Union City,
California, are helping - feeding their residents'
personal information to ICE, even when it violates local privacy laws or sanctuary policies. Today, the ACLU is
urging an immediate end to this information sharing.

Records obtained by the ACLU of Northern California
in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit detail ICE's
1 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From... https://www.aclunc.org/blog/documents-reveal-ice-using-... sweeping use of a vast automated license plate reader
(ALPR) database run by a company called Vigilant
Solutions. Over 9,000 ICE officers have gained access
to the Vigilant system under a $6.1 million contract that the public first learned of last year. ICE has access to over 5 billion data points of location information
collected by private businesses, like insurance
companies and parking lots, and can gain access to an
additional 1.5 billion records collected by law
enforcement agencies.

Over 80 local law enforcement agencies, from over a
dozen states, have agreed to share license plate
location information with ICE. Emails show local police handing driver information over to ICE informally,
violating local law and ICE policies.

The ACLU's grave concerns about the civil liberties
risks of license plate readers take on greater urgency
as this surveillance information fuels ICE's deportation machine. Many communities have license plate
readers: high-speed cameras mounted on police cars,
road signs, or bridges that can photograph every
passing license plate. Together with time, date, and
location coordinates, the information is stored for
years, generating a literal and intimate roadmap of
people's private lives. Vigilant also sells ALPR systems to local police and hosts location information collected by law enforcement and private companies in a
massive database called LEARN.

We already knew that ICE engages in egregious
conduct: from arresting a father dropping off his
2 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From... https://www.aclunc.org/blog/documents-reveal-ice-using-.. daughter at school to detaining a woman in court
seeking a protective order against an abuser. But
adding license plate surveillance with its attendant
misuse - police spying on Muslim Americans or
unlawfully detaining a black woman at gunpoint -
magnifies ICE's threats to community safety. And now
we know which local police departments are helping
ICE terrorize immigrant communities by sharing license
plate information.

A Nationwide Mass-Surveillance Dragnet
Contract documents show that ICE has long desired
the ability to locate people with laser-like precision.

After prior attempts were scuttled because of privacy
concerns, ICE rushed to finalize a 2017 contract with
Thomson Reuters for access to the Vigilant database.

The $6.1 million contract gives ICE access to the
Vigilant database through September 2020. Not only
does Vigilant's existing database contain over 5 billion license plate scans nationwide, but the database would
continue adding, from commercial sources, "an
average of 150-200 million unique" license plate
scans each month.

Vigilant draws its license plate information from the
"most populous 50 metropolitan areas" in the country,
corresponding to almost 60 percent of the U.S.
population.
he map below shows the densiry and coverage of Vigilant's commercial L.PR dilla. Red areas has gher concenrations followed by yellow and greet
3 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
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Number Metro Area
New York-NorthernNewJersey-LongIsland.NY-NJ-PA
LosAngeler-longBcach-SantaAna.CA
3 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Chicago-Jolier-Naperville. I1.-IN-WI
5 Houston-Sugarl and-Baytown.TX
6 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
7 Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale,AZ.
8 Miami Font auderdale-PompanoBeach.FL.
9 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario.CA
10 SanAntonio-NewBraunfels.TX
11 Baltimorc-Towson.MD
12 SanDiego-Carlsbad-SanMarcos, CA
13 Atlanta-SandySprings-Marietta.GA
14 KansasCity.MO-KS
15 VirginiaBeach-Norfolk-NewportNews. VA-NC
16 SanFrancisco-Oakland-Fremont. CA
17 Austin-RoundRock-SanMarcos,TX
18 St.Louis,MO-IL
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor.OH
20 Richmond. VA
ICE was also told that law enforcement agencies "could
provide hundreds of millions more LPR scans available
for ICE to search" and that its database held "500
million" license plate locations collected by law
enforcement.

License plate information collected and shared by
police and sheriffs are key to the surveillance dragnet.

Vigilant encourages law enforcement to share location
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Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From... https://www.aclunc.org/blog/documents-reveal-ice-using-... information collected locally with hundreds of other
agencies nationwide, making it "as easy as adding a
friend on your favorite social media platform."
In training materials, ICE was given the tools to make
friends with local police: an interactive map of the
United States displaying the agencies using Vigilant
software, together with "a step-by-step guide (with
pictures!)" containing instructions on requesting
access from local agencies to their residents' location information.

Search Box
Map Satellite
ML
Mexico
¡ Pasta Rico
Caribbiest See
Google /2018 Googie NECk Terms of Use
Figure 1: List of Low Enforcement Agencies Who May Provide Data to LEARN (as of May 2018) ICE's efforts to exploit locally collected location
information are working. An internal report lists the 80 local agencies nationwide that granted ICE ongoing
access to license plate locations of their residents,
including "sanctuary cities" like Union City, California.

We do not know whether police gave notice to their
residents before agreeing to share years of intimate
details with ICE.
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In addition to ongoing access to local information, ICE makes individual requests to friendly police for
surveillance. Released emails reveal a years-long
relationship between an ICE officer and a detective in a fusion center - an intelligence-sharing agency long-
criticized by the ACLU for violating civil liberties - in Orange County, California.

The detective searched the Vigilant database at the
request of ICE and shared the results:

From: Ex Dri
Sent: Wednesday. March 7, 2018 10:41 AM
Subject: NVLS
Will you please rurAl plate ox 0x7 i am only able to pull from comercial databases for now
Thanks!
Intelligence Rescarch Specialist
Narcotics and Gang Group
Homcland Security Investigations
From: FaR: 007er:

To:

Subpace: As AVIS
Date: Wechescay. March: 01. 20186:04:13 PM
Attachments:

Hithere. Serry: didnit reply sooner. I was sieeping after my graveyard shift when you emailed me
I attached the LR report.. 1 LE scan that i could find.. hope you are well
Orange County Intel gence Assessment Center (OCHC)
I Mabra Potice Departmery
resk (714) 289 Gren
These emails and others reveal ICE's methods for
6 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From... https://www.aclunc.org/blog/documents-reveal-ice-using-... circumventing both internal privacy rules and attempts
by local law enforcement agencies to lock down their
information. These informal inquiries violate ICE's
privacy rules requiring all use of ALPR technology to be documented and justified. And ICE exploits friendly
intermediaries like the Orange County detective to
obtain information collected by another law
enforcement agency that may not want ICE to have
access to its information. This contradicts ICE's claim that "there are no circumstances where ICE can gain
access through the vendor system if a law enforcement
agency has chosen not to share its data."
With more than 9,200 ICE employees with accounts on
the Vigilant database - many of whom have
deportation as their primary work - privacy safeguards
are essential. Yet ICE's so-called Privacy Guidance
contains gaping holes that enable ICE to infringe on
civil liberties. ICE can sweep up to "five years" of driver information when searching for an immigrant to deport.

Storing that much location information is both a
significant invasion of privacy and entirely unnecessary to find someone's current location. The privacy rules
also do not prevent ICE from ensnaring other
individuals - whom they are not looking for -
increasing the chances of baseless stops and false
arrests.

ICE's privacy rules fail to adequately protect First
Amendment-protected speech and activity. While the
guidance requires ICE abide by its Sensitive Location
policy - limiting surveillance near schools, hospitals, 7 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From... https://www.aclunc.org/blog/documents-reveal-ice-using-... churches, protests, or weddings - there is no way for
ICE to know before searching the Vigilant database
whether the search will turn up driver information near those locations.

Resistance Is Local
In California, police sharing resident location
information with ICE violates the law.

Senate Bill 34 and the California Values Act (SB 54) -
passed to protect privacy and immigrant safety -
prohibit local law enforcement agencies from sharing
license plate information and personal information for
immigration enforcement or with out-of-state or federal agencies. Many localities have gone beyond that to
adopt ordinances to provide sanctuary to immigrants.

Today, the ACLU called on local law enforcement
agencies to stop sharing their residents' location
information with ICE.

California state lawmakers should now call for the
state auditor to review compliance with SB 34 and SB

54. In addition, communities must regain control over their personal information. Some have already rejected
contracts for license plate surveillance — like Alameda and Culver City in California. And all communities
should pass ordinances to require transparency,
oversight, and approval whenever a police department
considers purchasing surveillance technology.
8 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
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If these ordinances existed, and the right questions
were being asked and answered from the start, places
like Union City wouldn't be endangering their
communities by sharing location information with ICE,
which is in direct conflict with their sanctuary policies and the law. Local governments need to take
immediate action to limit the exposure of local
residents' information to ICE and withhold information
from fusion centers that do not do the same.

ICE has long embraced technology to target
immigrants. Now it's taking surveillance to an
unprecedented level to target vulnerable communities
- and sweeping up everyone else in the process. It's
time to take back control of our information and make
sure our communities aren't collaborating with ICE.

Vasudha Talla is a staff attorney with the ACLU of
Northern California.

Thanks to the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
MuckRock for their work documenting the widespread
sharing of license plate information among law
enforcement agencies nationwide.
9 of 10 1/24/22, 10:24
Here's Why You Can't Trust What Cops and Companies C... https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/heres-why-you-can...

OWTO FIX THE INTERNE
HOW PRIVATE IS YOUR BANK ACCOUNT?
LISTEN NOW!

TELECTRONIC

I FRONTIER

FOUNDATION
Here's Why You Can't Trust What
Cops and Companies Claim About
Automated License Plate Readers
Emails Prove ICE Could Access Data from Orange County
Shopping Malls, Despite the Companies' Denials
In response to an ACLU report on how law enforcement agencies share information collected by automated license plate readers (ALPRs) with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, officials have been quick to deny and obfuscate despite documentary evidence obtained directly from ICE itself through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
Let's be clear: you can't trust what ALPR company Vigilant Solutions and its clients say. It's time for higher authorities to conduct an audit.

Through years of research spanning California (and beyond), EFF has discovered that agencies that access ALPR data are often ignorant or noncompliant when it comes to the transparency and accountability requirements of state law. Furthermore, their agreements with the vendor 1 of 9 1/24/22, 12:01
Here's Why You Can't Trust What Cops and Companies C... https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/heres-why-you-can...

Vigilant Solutions often include "non-disparagement" and "non-publication" clauses that contractually bind them to Vigilant Solutions' "media messaging" and prevent agencies from speaking candidly with the press. Meanwhile, training materials created by Vigilant Solutions explicitly recommend that police leave ALPR out of its reports whenever possible.

But documents obtained as part of the ACLU's lawsuit brings another factor into play: sometimes the claims are just jaw-droppingly inaccurate.

One email in particular shows exactly how ICE could access data collected at shopping malls through a regional fusion center, despite the mall operator and Vigilant Solutions' repeated denials that it was happening.

For background: ALPR is a technology that allows law enforcement and private companies to track the travel patterns of drivers, through networks of cameras that record license plates, along with time, date and location. That information is uploaded to a database that users can search to find out where a vehicle travelled, reveal what vehicles visited particular locations, and receive real- time alerts on vehicles added to watch lists. It is a mass surveillance technology that captures information on everyone, regardless of whether their vehicle is tied to an investigation.

Last summer, EFF volunteer Zoe Wheatcroft, a high school student in Mesa, Ariz., discovered a curious document on a website belonging to the Irvine Company, a real estate developer based in Orange County. The document showed that private security patrols were using ALPR to gather data on customers at Irvine Company-owned shopping malls. As EFF reported, Irvine Company then transferred that information to Vigilant Solutions, a controversial ALPR vendor well-known for selling data to ICE.

We asked the mall operator, Irvine Company, to explain itself, but it refused to answer questions. However, after EFF published its report, Irvine Company told reporters ALPR data was not shared with ICE, but only three local police departments. Then Vigilant Solutions issued a press release saying "the entire premise of the article is false," and accused EFF of "creating fake news." Vigilant Solutions also demanded we retract the post and apologize, saying that it was "evaluating potential legal claims" against EFF.

What they wouldn't say publicly is that within within two weeks, Irvine 2 of 9 1/24/22, 12:01
Here's Why You Can't Trust What Cops and Companies C... https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/heres-why-you-can.

Company quietly terminated its whole ALPR program. EFF only learned of this six months later from Irvine Company directly, but the company's spokesperson refused to tell us the motivation behind ending the surveillance, beyond it being a business decision.

What Really Happened in Orange County
EFF began to investigate Irvine's Claims that its ALPR data from the shopping malls was tightly controlled and could never be shared with ICE. We filed public records requests with the police department that Irvine Company said were the only agencies allowed to access the data. None of them were able to produce any documentation limiting data sharing—or indeed any limitations at all on data could be used or shared.

Then, earlier this year, the ACLU received more than 1,800 pages of ICE records about the agency's use of ALPR and Vigilant Solutions' technology. Buried in the set is an email exchange that shows unequivocally that ICE accessed the Irvine Company's shopping center data just months before EFF's report.

According to the records: In October 2017, an official with Homeland Security Investigations, an arm of ICE, sent an email to a detective with the La Habra Police Department, who was working out of the regional "fusion center," the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center. The ICE HSI specialist asked the detective to run a license plate for them, with no explanation of the purpose of the search, even though documenting a purpose is required by California law.

A few hours laters, the La Habra detective responded with a PDF attachment exported from Vigilant Solutions' LEARN software that included the plate scans:
"i attached the report... there are a LOT of scans, most of them from fashion island security.. he spends a lot of time parked there." 3 of 9 1/24/22, 12:01
Here's Why You Can't Trust What Cops and Companies C... https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/heres-why-you-can... ¡ attached the report.. there are a LOT of scans, most of them from fashion island security. he spends alot of time parked there. but there are a few others that might be beneficial... hope you are wel!..
me
EM6I (647NG) Detective
Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC)
La Habra Police Department
desk (714) 289-EMAN
cell 949)29461
This email wasn't just the smoking gun: it was the bullet. The document demonstrates that data could be transferred to ICE
What They Claimed: The Irvine Company said the data was only shared with the Irvine, Newport and Tustin police departments. "We have been assured through conversations with Vigilant that only those police departments are receiving information," a spokesperson told the Orange County Register. Vigilant Solutions backed up the claim, writing "As Irvine Company has stated, it is shared with select law enforcement agencies to ensure the security of mall patrons."
What the Emails Actually Show: A La Habra Police detective had access to mall data through the fusion center. Neither La Habra nor OCIAC are one of the three agencies the data access was supposed to be limited to. This raises the question, who else had access to the data? As a fusion center, OCIAC exists to facilitate the exchange of information across agencies. "Intelligence processes — through which information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated—are a primary focus" of the fusion center, according to OCIAC's website.

What They Claimed: In its press release, Vigilant said, "These law enforcement agencies do not have the ability in Vigilant Solutions' system to electronically copy this data or share this data with other persons or agencies, such as ICE." What the Emails Actually Show: Within hours of receiving the request from ICE, the La Habra Detective was easily able to copy the data as a PDF and share it with ICE via email.
4 of 9 1/24/22, 12:01
Here's Why You Can't Trust What Cops and Companies C... https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/03/heres-why-you-can...

EFF reached out both to Irvine Company and Vigilant Solutions prior to publishing this report. Irvine Company would only confirm the date that it stopped the ALPR program, but would provide no further information. Motorola Solutions, which acquired Vigilant Solutions earlier this year sent the following statement:

We are aware of the ACLU of Northern California's recent report on license plate recognition data and assertions regarding data access by the Irvine Company. The referenced incident predates Motorola Solutions' ownership of Vigilant Solutions, and we are currently working with Vigilant to assess the situation in greater detail.

Motorola Solutions is committed to the highest standard of integrity and data protection, which includes ensuring that vehicle location data is accessed only by authorized law enforcement agencies in accordance with applicable laws and industry standards. We also are committed to working with our customers and partners to ensure that use of vehicle location data hosted in our database is appropriately safeguarded to minimize the potential for misuse by any person.

Motorola Solutions deeply respects individual privacy rights and is committed to mitigating privacy risks associated with data collection, use and storage.

Considering the historic wall of secrecy maintained by Vigilant Solutions and its clients, we believe it is time for a more thorough accounting than just an internal review. We urge the California legislature and the state auditor to investigate Vigilant Solutions and its government clients to find out the truth about how our data is shared with ICE and other agencies and whether these law enforcement agency are violating state laws regulating the use of this mass surveillance technology.

RELATED CASES:

AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE

READERS (ALPR)
5 of 9 1/24/22, 12:01
Iraheta, Alba
From: Una Lee Jost <
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2022 6:16 PM
To: PublicComment-AutoResponse; Bell, Cushon; Dyson, Darla; Porras, Susana; Sullivan, Noreen; Morales, Margo; Suzuki, Takako; Thyret, Pam; Gordo, Victor; Hampton, Tyron; Williams, Felicia; "JohnJKennedy@ cityofpasadena.net gmasuda"@cityofpasadena.net; Rivas, Jessica; Madison, Steve; Wilson, Andy
Subject: Re: Jan. 24, 2022 Pasadena City Council Meeting - Public Comment - Agenda Item 7 CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. Learn more... https://mydoit.cityofpasadena.net/sp?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB0010263>.

Dear Pasadena City Council Members:

I want to reiterate that Vigilant Solutions is an *untrustworthy* vendor:

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit digital rights organization, shows why you cannot trust Vigilant Solutions:
"Through years of research spanning California (and beyond), EFF has discovered that agencies that access ALPR data are often ignorant or noncompliant when it comes to the transparency and accountability requirements of state law.

Thank you,
~ Una
On 1/24/22 12:13 PM, Una Lee Jost wrote:
> Dear Pasadena City Council Members:
> I'm Una Lee Jost, PUSD parent, and long-time resident of Pasadena, > District 4.
1 01/24/2022
Item 7
>
> Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Agenda 7. > I'm deeply troubled by the proposed transaction with Vigilant > Solutions, LLC for automated license plate readers.
> According to ACLU, the nation's oldest defender of civil liberties, > documents received from public records act requests to 600+ law > enforcement agencies paint a "startling" picture of automated license > plate readers (ALPRs) deployed "with too few rules that is becoming a > tool for mass routine location tracking and surveillance." > (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww > .aclu.org%2Fissues%2Fprivacy-technology%2Flocation-tracking%2Fautomati > c-license-plate-readers&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.n > et%7C3aabc57aa2f2452f441908d9dfa8974f%7C82d9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e4 > 91%7C1%7C0%7C637786738078207245%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJW|joiMC4wLj > AwMDAiLCJQ|joiV2luMzliLCJBTil6ik1haWwiLCJXVC16Mn0%3D%7C2000&sdata= > y1E%2FVDZucDwu2mmUwhcwo61%2FA%2B2XerBhV1jk2%2FqbiCs%3D&reserved=0) >
>
> A March 2019 ACLU report specifically named Vigilant Solutions, noting > ICE's "sweeping use of a vast automated license plate reader (ALPR) > database run by a company called Vigilant Solutions." > In the report, ACLU noted how its "grave concerns" about the civil > liberties risks of license plate readers take on greater urgency as > this surveillance information fuels ICE's deportation machine:
>
> "We already knew that ICE engages in gregious conduct: from arresting > a father dropping off his daughter at school to detaining a woman in > court seeking a protective order against an abuser. But adding license > plate surveillance with its attendant misuse...magnifies ICE's threats > to community safety. And now we know which local police departments > are helping ICE terrorize imigrant communities by sharing license > plate information."
>
> (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww > .aclunc.org%2Fblog%2Fdocuments-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data-l > ocal-police-deportations&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena. > net%7C3aabc57aa2f2452f441908d9dfa8974f%7C82d9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e > 491%7C1%7C0%7C637786738078207245%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJW|joiMC4wL > jAwMDAiLCJQ|joiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000&sdata > =451iC8JQgEvHcU4etozMWLLULBJEHsNqEiVnj6sQn%2Fs%3D&reserved=0) > The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit digital rights > organization, has called for an audit of Vigilant Solutions:
> "Through years of research spanning California (and beyond), EFF has > discovered that agencies that access ALPR data are often ignorant or > noncompliant when it comes to the transparency and accountability > requirements of state law. Furthermore, their agreements with the 2 > vendor Vigilant Solutions often include "non-disparagement" and > "non-publication" clauses that contractually bind them to Vigilant › Solutions' "media messaging" and prevent agencies from speaking > candidly with the press. Meanwhile, training materials created by > Vigilant Solutions explicitly recommend that police leave ALPR out of > its reports whenever possible.
> "But documents obtained as part of the ACLU's lawsuit brings another > factor into play: sometimes the claims are just jaw-droppingly inaccurate. > "One email in particular shows exactly how ICE could access data > collected at shopping malls through a regional fusion center, despite > the mall operator and Vigilant Solutions' repeated denials that it was > happening."
>
> (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww > . eff.org%2Fdeeplinks%2F2019%2F03%2Fheres-why-you-cant-trust-what-cops- > and-companies-claim-about-automated-license&data=04%7C01%7Cairahet > a%40cityofpasadena.net%7C3aabc57aa2f2452f441908d9dfa8974f%7C82d9fc002c > 664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786738078207245%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbG > Zsb3d8eyJWljoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQljoiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVC16Mn0% > 3D%7C2000&sdata=liwTrGaKL9GDzAvT655dF0qZFBfHIct8QnAHfMdYvo%3D&amp > ;reserved=0)
> Cities like Alameda and Culver City have already rejected contracts > for license plate surveillance. I urge the Council to do likewise and > reject any contracts for license plate surveillance, including any > proposed transactions with Vigilant Solutions. We need you as our > City leaders to take immediate action to limit the exposure of local > residents' information to ICE and withhold information from fusion > centers that do not do the same.
> I also urge the Council to develop and pass ordinances to require > transparency, oversight, and approval whenever our City's police > department considers purchasing surveillance technology, in line with > ACLU recommendations
> (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww > .aclu.org%2Fother%2Fyou-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-ar > e-being-used-record-americans-movements%3Fredirect%3Dtechnology-and-li > berty%2Fyou-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used > -record&data=04%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C3aabc57aa2f > 2452441908d9dfa8974f%7C82d9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637 > 786738078207245%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d&eyJW|joiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQljoiV2 > luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000&sdata=BmPmwZzBluVmAa%2 > F8xF1h4H23azQJ%2BZYAJcASYz2MVk1%3D&reserved=0)
>
>
> As the Movement for Black Lives notes, "the explosion of surveillance, > policing, mass criminalization, incarceration, and deportation that > has devastated Black communities over the past four decades has been > fueled by large-scale investments at all levels of government, 3 > accompanied by massive disinvestment from meeting community needs. > (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fm4b > l.org%2Fpolicy-platforms%2Fend-the-war-on-black-communities&data=0 > 4%7C01%7Cairaheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C3aabc57aa2f2452f441908d9dfa89 > 741%/C82d9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1%7C0%7C637786738078207245%7C >Uпknown%7СTWFpbGZsbЗd8eyJWIjoiМC4wLjАwМDАіLСJQ|joiV2luMzliLCJBTit6ık1h > aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000&sdata=onXXjDMHse4hj9eYxrWnZZJ3RJY×4BFU2x > ikpmwyn64%3D&reserved=0)
>
> Instead of relying on surveillance as a solution, l urge the Council > to invest in making our communities stronger and safer through > investing in community needs such as quality, affordable housing, > community-based transformative violence prevention and intervention > strategies, and supports for criminalized populations. > Thank you for representing the concerns of our community.

Una Lee Jost
Attorney & Counselor-at-Law
Jost Legal, 530 S. Lake Ave. #274, Pasadena, CA 91101 [email protected] | 626.344.8021 | https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jostlegal.com%2F&data=04%7C01%7Ca iraheta%40cityofpasadena.net%7C3aabc57aa2f2452f441908d9dfa8974f%7C82d9fc002c664402a28fc6bcdc32e491%7C1 %7C0%7C637786738078207245%7CUnknown%7СTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoіМC4wLjAwМDAіLCJQljoiV2luMzlïLСJBTil6Ik1h aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000&sdata=EQ8Zsyf9OtTV0qxNrVkXZv0gcH%2FpzBdzrdhlj7mhAb1%3D&reserve d=0
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Pasadena City CouncilJanuary 24, 2022

Pasadena City Council
January 24, 2022