Public Safety Committee
May 20, 2026

Sabha, Tamer
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humaira afzal ....

Wednesday, May 20, 2026 12:20 PM
Sabha, Tamer; Gao, Beilei; Diaz, Eligio
Public comment part 1 on Agenda item 3 (Flock) Public Safety mtg 5/20/2026 [I ] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. For more information about the Phish Alert Button view article "KB0011474" on the DolT portal.

Members of the Public Safety Committee,
I am sending an updated version of email that I sent for the March 2026 meeting because I do not see it posted as correspondence (although I could have overlooked it due to the large volume of public comment posted). The discussion ofALPRs at the March meeting ended early because committee members had to leave and the April meeting was canceled, so these comments remain relevant to the meeting today..

I made a few updates. Those are in bold and highlighted.

Best,
Humaira
Pasadena - District 7
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—-— Forwarded Message -——
From: humaira afzal
Date: On Tuesday, March 17th, 2026 at 5:57 PM
Subject: Email 1 on Public Safety Committee item 4 (3/18/26) Flock To: [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>
This is email #1 of 3 emails on Item 4 - Flock
Members of the Public Safety Committee,
Cities and counties across the country are terminating or significantly changing their Flock contracts in response to concerns about privacy, mass surveillance and the security of data. Pasadena needs to join them. Despite repeated assurances, the Pasadena Police Department, the data from the Flock automated license plate readers (ALPRs) can never be sufficiently safe. There have been many documented examples (including in California) of out-of-state and federal agencies getting access to ALPR data in states in which data sharing is against state law. No matter how conscientiously PPD controls access locally, it cannot control the actions of users at the hundreds of other agencies that have access to Pasadena data on the Flock network. And the PPD doesn't exactly have a strong track record of properly securingALPR data. In 2020, for example, the PPD was sharingALPR data with ICE'S Homeland Security Investigations at the same time that it was promising City Council that it has "robust policies and procedures" in place to prevent immigration authorities from getting access (see email #2).

PPD cannot even keep its written policy on ALPRs in the Policy Manual remotely up to date (see email #3). You'll find nothing about this in PPD's various reports or presentations because unfavorable information is never acknowledged or included.
1 This document is a partial compilation of (1) cities and counties that have terminated or reduced Flock use, and (2) cities and counties (including many in CA) that have have had federal or out-of-state agencies access their data in violation of state law.

It is way beyond time that City Council start taking public concerns seriously and have a comprehensive and in-depth public discussion about the future of Flock and other surveillance technology in Pasadena.

Some recommendations:
• Request a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the Flocl< ALP Rs from the Community Police Oversight Commission (CPOC) in a public forum and require that it include presentations by experts from the ACLU and from privacy and surveillance technology experts. • Do not buy any more surveillance equipment or technology or extend or renew any contracts without comprehensive analysis and assessment by CPOC, the Public Safety Committee, and the City Council.
• Require that the PPD provide detailed data and analysis of the use of ALPR data for solving crime that includes statistics and a cost-benefit analysis. (Anecdotal data is not analysis. "Success stories" aren't analysis. Proclaiming "What would have happened if we'd had cameras" is not analysis.)
• Prohibit PPD from activating any new, upgraded, or additional features or capabilities of the Flock cameras (such as facial recognition or integration with other platforms) without approval from CPOC, Public Safety Committee and City Council.
• Request that City Staff present detailed information on existing ALPR contracts, the options for terminating existing contracts early, and the options for not renewing current contracts . •
• Disclose all campaign contributions made to City Council members from individuals, organizations or other entities (including PACs and unions) with an economic or other interest in increasing the use of surveillance technology by Pasadena PD and other law enforcement agencies.
• Examine the role of Flock Safety in directly or indirectly providing data to federal or out-of-state agencies involved in detaining or deporting immigrants, tracking people seeking health care, or in surveilling people who are exercising constitutionally protecting rights. • While re-evaluating the use of Flock and other ALPR systems in Pasadena, require that PPD o Take the concerns of community members seriously. We are deeply concerned about the safety of our community; Flock Safety is primarily concerned with making money by facilitating mass surveillance
o Completely rewrite and update the ALPR policy (Policy 462) in the PPD Policy Manual within 30 days.
o Acknowledge and address the documented examples of federal and out-of-state agency access to CA ALPR data.
o Acknowledge and address the fact that Pasadena PD has previously shared data with federal and out-of-state agencies in violation of state law. o Respond to all public records requests regarding Flock or other surveillance technology contracts and communications with Pasadena PD, the City of Pasadena, or affiliated organizations within 10 business days
2 0
0 Require more detailed info for the reasons for ALPR queries. "Investigation," "call for service," "wanted," and just the case number in the Reason column are meaningless and not transparent.

Dramatically reduce the retention time for Pasadena ALPR data on the Flock network. New Hampshire data only stays in the system for 3 minutes! o Post a map of all City of Pasadena ALPR cameras prominently on the city website. o Present a comprehensive inventory of technology equipment (including software and Al) and contracts (with dates) at least annually and also as part of any new PPD request to purchase new technology equipment services or to extend or renew existing contracts or replace existing equipment.

Humaira Afzal
Pasadena - District 7
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3 Sabha, Tamer
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humaira afzal
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 1:02 PM
Sabha, Tamer; Gao, Beilei; Diaz, Eligio
Public comment part 2 on Agenda item 3 (Flock) Public Safety mtg 5/20/2026 [ l ] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. For more information about the Phish Alert Button view article "KB0011474" on the DolT portal.

This email was originally sent for the March meeting, which ended abruptly due to a loss of quorum. Updates are in bold and highlighted.

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——- Forwarded Message -——
From: humaira afzal
Date: On Tuesday, March 17th, 2026 at 6:01 PM
Subject: Email 2 on Public Safety Committee item 4 (3/18/26) Flock To: [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>
This is email #2 of 3 emails on Item 4 - Flock
Members of the Public Safety Committee,
The Pasadena Police Department repeatedly neglects to acknowledge or mention that its "robust policies and procedures" have failed to prevent data sharing multiple times. PPD also routinely fails to mention that many other CA agencies that have access to Pasadena ALPR data have shared data with federal and/or out-of-state agencies. PPD also habitually omits or downplays very relevant information about data security issues from its reports and presentations.

This document is a partial compilation of (1) cities and counties that have terminated or reduced Flock use, and (2) cities and counties (including many in CA) that have have had federal or out-of- state agencies access their data in violation of state law.

The "brief history" below shows a pattern: PPD asks for more ALPR equipment. Community members and privacy and civil rights organizations object because of the risks to privacy and data security. The new equipment is approved anyway. The things that people warned about happen.

PPD asks for more ALPRs and doesn't mention data sharing violations in its report or presentation.

People again warn about the risks. PPD gets more ALPR equipment approved. The things that people warned about happen again.

September 2020
PPD asks for $80,000 for 3 new ALPRs. Pasadena Privacy for All and other community members oppose the acquisition and express concern that out-of-state agencies federal immigration authorities will get access to the .information. PPD assures the Committee that "robust policies 1 and procedures are in place to prevent the system and the information it gathers from being used inappropriately or differently from its intended purpose." The Public Safety Committee approves the request.

December 2020
The local chapter of the ACLU obtains documents showing that, as of 11/2/2020, Pasadena PD was sharing data with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). PPD states that it had started sharing ALPR data with HSI four months earlier to help "restrict the flow of funding that supports criminal enterprises." PPD stopped sharing license plate info when it realized HSI was affiliated with ICE.

PPD was actively sharing data with /GE's home agency at the same time that it was assuring the Public Safety Committee that it won't share data with ICE. Apparently the "robust policies and procedures" did not include looking up what other federal agencies an entity is affiliated with before sharing data.

PPD promises to "review the matter in detail to ensure that no inadvertent contacts are made with ICE through which they might gain access to City information through some back door or information sharing program." Meanwhile, PPD continues sharing ALPR data with the CA Joint Regional Intelligence Center (Norwalk "Fusion Center"), which partners with the Department of Homeland Security (home agency of ICE and CBP) and shares information widely with federal law enforcement agencies.

January 2022
PPD requests $165,000 to purchase 11 fixed ALPR cameras. The Police Department's Agenda Report does not mention the PPD's sharing of ALPR data with Homeland Security Investigations in 2020. Following discussion (and extensive public and written comments against the purchase), City Council unanimously approves the request.

May2023
Pasadena Police Department is among the departments violating state law on ALPR data sharing. An investigation by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) reveals that many CA police departments are sharing records containing detailed data from ALPRs to out-of-state agencies. The ACLU, along with other organizations, sends demand letters telling these police departments to stop.

July 2023
PPD asks for over $630,000 to lease and install additional ALPR cameras. The report does not mention the PPD's sharing of ALPR data with Homeland Security Investigations (in violation of state law) in 2020 or the EFF's investigation and ACLU demand letter from 2 months earlier. The PP D's request is approved unanimously.

January 2024
In a letter to CA Attorney General Rob Bonta, the ACLU and EFF list the Pasadena Police Department as one of the agencies that has either refused to stop sharing ALPR information with other states' agencies or has failed to respond to their requests.

May2025
PPD requests approval to lease an additional $34,000 worth of ALPR cameras and support hardware. The PP D's Agenda Report does not include information on any of the previous data sharing (which was in violation of state law) with federal and out-of-state agencies referenced above. Privacy experts object. The request is approved.

August 2025
2 PPD's ALPR administrator assures the Community Police Oversight Commission that the department only shares data with local and in-state agencies. He does not include any information on the previous data sharing violations with federal and out-of-state agencies referenced above or mention the vast volume of documented evidence that federal and out-of-state agencies are getting unauthorized access to ALPR data in CA and other states with similar laws.

October 2025
CA Attorney Rob Bonta files a lawsuit against the City of EL Cajon Police Department over its refusal "to comply with state law prohibiting the sharing of license plate data with federal and out-of-state Law enforcement agencies."The lawsuit states that the ElCajon has "knowingly and repeatedly" violated CA law by sharing ALPR data with 26 different states. E( Cajon has access to Pasadena PD'sALPRdata.

January 2026
A news release dated Jan. 30 from the Mountain View CA Police Department states, "From August to November 2024, several federal law enforcement agencies accessed Mountain View's Flock Safety ALPR system for one camera via a 'nationwide' search setting that was turned on by Flock Safety. This setting was enabled without MVPD's permission or knowledge." Mountain View turns soon joins a growing number of CA cities and counties cancelling their contracts with Flock Safety.

A March PPD presentation will referto this serious security issue as a "vendor-identified issue".

February 2026
Several members of City Council raise concerns about the security of Pasadena's ALPR data. Chief hlarris assures City Council (and the public) that PPD does not share information with federal or out-of-state agencies, hie does not mention any information about the previous data sharing (in violation of state law) with federal and out-of-state agencies referenced above.

March 2026
The PPD's report on "Ftock Safety Automated License Plate Reader Overview and Data Sharing" includes no information about the Department's previous data sharing with federal and out-of- state agencies referenced above. The euphemistically phrased "vendor-identified issue" was actually weaknesses/ftaws in the Flock network system and architecture that allowed out-of-state and federal agencies to access CA ALPR data in violation of state law. The report also makes no mention of the many cities and counties across the country that have cancelled or not renewed their Flock contracts in 2025 and 2026 because of unauthorized data access and public concerns about privacy and surveillance. The PPD officer is accompanied by a representative from Flock Safety, apparently without prior notice to Committee members. The meeting ends early (due to loss of quorum) and without completing the discussion.

April 2026
The meeting is canceled, presumably due to a lack of quorum.

Just this brief overview raises serious concerns about the soundness and reliability of PPD assurances about data privacy and security.

Sincerely,
HumairaAfzal
Pasadena-District 7
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3 Sabha, Tamer
From:

Sent:

To:
humaira afzal
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 1 :43 PM
Sabha, Tamer; Gao, Beilei; Diaz, Eligio
Subject: Public comment part 3 on Agenda item 3 (Flock) Public Safety mtg 5/20/2026 Attachments: 2026 03 18 updated South Pasadena police ALPR policy.pdf; Pasadena Police ALPR Policy manual.pdf
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I am resending my email from March since the discussion ended abruptly and the item is on the agenda again.

There are no updates for this email since the ALPR section of the official Pasadena Police Policy Manual has not been updated.

Humaira
Pasadena - District 7
------- Forwarded Mesf"'�e ------­
From: humaira afzal
Date: On Tuesday, March 17th, 2026 at 6:04 PM
Subject: Email 3 on Public Safety Committee item 4 (3/18/26) Flock To: [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <smad [email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>
This is email #3 of 3 emails on Item 4 - Flock
Members of the Public Safety Committee,
It is difficult to take Pasadena Police Department's assurances about the security and privacy of the data from the city's Flock automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras seriously when the department has not even updated the ALPR section of the Pasadena Police Department Policy Manual to reflect major changes in equipment used, the amount of data collected, or California state law. At the 2026 February 23 City Council meeting, Chief Harris assured Council (and the public) that the PPD has "done an exhaustive review to make sure that we are abiding by the laws and policies and to ensure that our information is not being shared." Clearly that exhaustive review did not include checking to see if the Policy Manual section on ALPRs is accurate.

According to PPD Policy Manual (2025/10/13 edition) section 106.1, "the manual is a statement of the current policies, rules and guidelines of this department," but the section on ALPRs (Policy 462) was obviously written when the PPD used mobile, vehicle-attached ALPRs and therefore does not reflect changes in equipment types (from mobile to fixed ALPRs) or the exponential increase in the amount of data collected. There are multiple indications that the policy was written for the old equipment. For example, section 462.4 references "ALPR-equipped cars" and 462.5 notes that "data will be transferred from vehicles." It is very significant to note that the older mobile ALP Rs scanned substantially fewer license plates and collected far less data because the camera scanning capacity was limited by the movement and time on the road of the vehicles to which they were attached. However, the fixed ALPRs (which PPD has had since at least early 2022) collect 1 data 365/24/7 and record the plate and vehicle characteristics for every single vehicle travelling through an intersection. According to the E[QC\<JiaHssM.ency_PQna[,lQr...PP.D., Flock brand fixed ALPRs record vehicle data over 950,000 times every month; in the 30 days prior to March 15, Pasadena's Flock ALPRs recorded vehicle data 985,057 times. The exponential increase in the amount of data collected by the fixed ALPRs should have triggered a complete rewrite of the ALPR section of the PPD Policy Manual.

The Policy Manual - which is supposed to be the statement of current policies, rules, and guidelines - also differs substantially from information that PPD has provided in recent years and includes glaring contradictions between stated policy and written policy.

Examples of contradictions between stated policy and written policy

1. Electronic sun/eillance as a use. According to the PlPD^s_3/18^2026_presentation ALPRs are not used for "sur/eillance of individuals," but 462.3 in the manual lists "electronic surveillance" as a use forALPR technology. (The distinction between surveilling vehicles and surveilling individuals is meaningless since PPD can almost instantly connect vehicles to their owners and other household members.)

2. Independent contractor access to ALPRs and their data. PPD has repeatedly stated that only authorized and trained PPD personnel have access to the ALPR data, but 462.3.1 (a) references "independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information."

3. Volunteer operators ofALPRs. 462.4.1 describes operations by volunteer operators.

This is obviously an outdated section since the PPD no longer operates ALPR equipped vehicles. It is troubling that privacy protections were so lax in the past that volunteers were allowed to operate ALPR equipment, and that there is still language in the policy permitting volunteers to access ALPR equipment.

4. Retention of ALPR data for 2 years. According to the PPD 3/18/2026 and previous presentations, data is retained for 30 days unless saved as evidence for a case. 462.5 states that "All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for a minimum of two years in accordance with the City's established records retention schedule." This is a reference to the older, mobile ALPRs. There is no mention of a 30 day (or any other) retention period for data from the fixed ALPRs.

5. ALPR data can be used for non-criminal investiciation actions. PPD emphasizes the use ofALPRs for criminal investigations but, according to 462.6, data can also be accessed for department-related civil or administrative action. 462.7 references the process for handling "requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies." No information is provided on what these civil or administrative actions or non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies would be, and this opens the door to a much wider range of queries and correlating privacy and data security concerns.

6. Procedure for release ofALPR data with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies has no explicit restriction on sharina with federal or out-of-state departments.

According to PPD presentations, data is not shared with out-of-state agencies or with federal investigative agencies. However, there is no explicit prohibition to this in the written ALPR policy, nor are relevant CA laws referenced. 462.7 states that "the ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes." 462.3 lists "homeland security" as a use for ALPR data! ICE and CBP are both part of the federal Department of Homeland Security.

The PPD Policy Manual section on ALPRs also provides no information on the use of data from Pasadena Parking Division's ALPR cameras. According to the PaiMng..DMs\QnflQ^cyMaQua[ item 3, ALPR data may "be shared with the Pasadena Police Department in accordance with their ALPR policy," but it is unclear what part of the outdated written policy applies to PPD use of Parking Division data. Item 7 of the Parking Division policy also states that their ALPR data "maybe released to other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official Law enforcement 2 purposes." There is no explicit exclusion from sharing Parking Division ALPR data with out-of-state orfederal agencies.

The South Pasadena Police Department recently updated their ALPR policy (attached) to reflect current SPPD practices and the guidance of the Attorney General and California state law. New provisions, procedures and safeguards were also added to further protect privacy and the security of the data.

Having such an outdated and inaccurate policy section on ALPRs in the Pasadena Police Department Policy Manual is unacceptable and unprofessional. Considering the many valid concerns about privacy and security of the ALPR data, the PPD written policy should also be much more detailed and thorough. It's hard to trust the privacy and security of ALPR data to a department that does not even keep written policy up to date to reflect current practices, equipment, or law. I have additional issues with the Flock ALPRs that I will share separately.

Sincerely,
hlumaira Afzal
Pasadena-District 7
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DATE:

FROM:

PREPARED BY:

SUBJECT:

City Council
Agenda ReportITEM NO. 20
March 18, 2026
Todd Hileman, City Manager
Derek Elmore, Chief of Police
Roxanne Diaz, City Attorney
Davit Ghazaryan, Management Analyst
Andrew DuBois, Police Sergeant

CONSIDERATION TO DISCUSS AN UPDATED INFORMATIONAL

REPORT ON THE CITY'S CONTRACTS WITH FLOCK GROUP
INC., FOR THE AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER (ALPR)

SYSTEM, THE SOUTH PASADENA POLICE DEPARTMENT'S

UPDATED ALPR POLICY AND PROVIDE DIRECTION REGARDING

CONTRACT OPTIONS FOR THE ALPR SYSTEM
Recommendation
It is recommended that the City Council review and discuss this updated informational report on the City's contracts with Flock Group Inc. dba Flock Safety and provide direction on next steps in relation to the Automated License Plate Reader system program and City's contracts with Flock Safety.

Executive Summary
At the February 18, 2026, City Council meeting, the City Council received a presentation and report regarding the South Pasadena Police Department's (SPPD) use of the Flock Safety Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system. Concerns were brought forward regarding the Flock ALPR system related to data retention, data sharing and the aggregation of data.

Staff was directed to review these issues as well as the contract and provide an update to the City Council. The report is to inform the Council about the exact expiration dates for both Flock Safety contracts (the 2022 and 2024 agreements), provide an update regarding UASI 2021 grant funds that were used to lease the ALPR equipment in relation to the 2024 agreements, provide contract termination projections for both contracts and present SPPD's newly updated ALPR policy for City Council's review.

Background
Beginning in 2013, SPPD implemented mobile, or vehicle mounted ALPR technology. In support of expanding this capability, the City's Adopted Budget for Fiscal Year 2022 -23 included a $30,000 appropriation to implement and fully migrate to a stationary ALPR system.

In November 2022, the Police Department partnered with Flock Safety as part of a regional initiative to enhance crime prevention through strategic technology investments utilizing the Department's General Funds.
284
On November 16, 2022, the City Council approved a two-year agreement with Flock Safety for the installation of 13 stationary ALPR cameras. To fund the first year's installation and operational expenses of $30,000, an additional $ 9,550 was appropriated from the City's General Funds to the Police Department's Contract Services account to cover the full cost of installation and annual operations.

On February 14, 2024, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 2021 grant enabled the Police Department to expand its ALPR network by adding 14 cameras to the existing system, raising the total to 27 cameras. UASI is a reimbursement-based grant and there is a multiyear lag between grant approval and the actual disbursement of funds. Following the grant award, in which Flock Safety was designated as a pre-approved sole- source vendor, the Department efficiently implemented the expansion to further enhance its public safety and investigative capabilities.

Analysis
The City has 27 ALPR fixed cameras strategically placed at key ingress and egress points throughout the City. The ALPR cameras continuously scan and record images of vehicle license plates, including the license plate number, images of vehicles and its characteristics (i.e. color and make), along with the date, time, and GPS location when a vehicle drives through the area where the fixed ALPR camera is located. The vehicle license plate number is automatically cross-referenced with law enforcement databases and the Department of Motor Vehicles. This enables the identification of vehicles that may be stolen or associated with criminal investigations or missing person alerts The ALPR cameras are designed to capture still images of vehicles, meaning that the cameras cannot and do not follow the vehicle as it travels through the City, unless of course the vehicle passes through the area where another fixed ALPR camera is located.

The City of South Pasadena is a subrecipient of the UASI grant through the mayor's office of the City of Los Angeles. In advance of Staff's presentation of the ALPR program on the July 16, 2025, City Council meeting, staff contacted the City's UASI representatives to verify whether the funds used to lease the ALPR equipment in 2024 would need to be repaid if the contract with Flock is terminated and the equipment is returned to Flock. The grant specialists at the City of Los Angeles mayor's office stated that the funds would need to be repaid, however they requested that we contact them if an actual decision regarding termination was to be made. According to the representatives, repayment was dependent on the specific case, the reasons for returning the equipment and they stated this would mark the first time that a subrecipient would be returning equipment purchased or leased with UASI funds.

On February 18, 2026, City Council meeting, the Council directed staff to confirm the grant repayment provisions with the UASI representatives. Accordingly, the City had a virtual meeting with the UASI grant specialists on March 3, 2026. The representatives stated that no UASI funds would need to be returned in this case because the equipment was leased and the grant performance period was fulfilled. Therefore, if the City decided to terminate its second contract with Flock and return the 14 additional ALPR cameras leased in 2024, the grant funds did not need to be repaid. This contract was initially set to auto-renew on 03/19/2026 for 24 months but staff was able to have Flock hold off on processing the renewal and was granted an informal extension of 30 days to seek directions from the Council.

Thus, if the City chooses to terminate its 2024 contract with Flock and notifies the company by 04/19/2026, it will only need to pay the camera removal/termination of convenience fee which 285
is $500 per camera and totals $7,000.00 for this contract.

Per the City Manager's suggestion and the City Council's directive, staff was instructed to explore other ALPR providers within the next 6 months and present suggestions in relation to the possibility of incorporating a hybrid model (keeping Flock Safety and adding another ALPR vendor) and present potential alternative vendors on the City Council meeting of August 19, 2026. In the meantime, staff was requested to present options regarding potential termination fees in association with both Flock contracts.

Option A:

The City would cancel the second contract for 14 cameras, due to expire on 03/19/2026, without having to renew it and pay $7,000 for the removal of cameras The City would continue with the first contract for 13 cameras for the next 5 months, while exploring potential vendors and researching the feasibility of incorporating a hybrid ALPR system consisting of two ALPR vendors
Costs:
$7,000 - Camera Removal Fee -14 cameras
$39,000 -Annual Contract Payment- 13 cameras (to be invoiced in April, 2026) Option B:

The City would keep the original 2022 contract of 13 cameras for 1 year The City would keep the second 2024 contract of 14 cameras for the next 5 months, while exploring and vetting alternative ALPR providers
Costs:
$39,000 -Annual Contract Payment- 13 cameras (to be invoiced in April, 2026) • $42,000 - Annual Contract Payment - 14 cameras (to be invoiced in March, 2026) Option C:
• The City would cancel both contracts and not have an ALPR system for the next 5 months while SPPD is conducting research and is able to provide a list of potential alternative vendors Costs:
• $6,500 - Camera Removal Fee -13 cameras
• $7,000 - Camera Removal Fee -14 cameras
Updated ALPR Policy
Per the City Council's directive from the February 18, 2026, meeting, SPPD has updated its ALPR Policy (Attachment No. 1 ). The updated ALPR Policy reflects current SPPD practice as well as updates the policy to reflect the guidance of the Attorney General as well as compliance with Senate Bill 54, which prohibits law enforcement from using their resources for immigration enforcement. New provisions have been added regarding prohibited uses of the ALPR System as well as detailed safeguards with respect to the use of the ALPR System, including annual training and monthly audits. Last, a new procedure has been included with 286
respect to sharing ALPR data with other California law enforcement agencies including the requirement of a data sharing agreement.

Fiscal Impact
After reviewing both contracts and as confirmed with Flock Safety, staff verified that both contracts contain identical provisions concerning early termination and reimbursement for unused service periods.

Currently, the 2022 contract is set to be renewed for another 2-year period on 03/30/2027, with an annual contract cost of $39,000.

The 2024 contract is set to be renewed on 04/19/2026, unless canceled by the City, with an annual contract cost of $42,000 annually.

If the City chooses to cancel either of the contracts during the contract term, Flock will provide a pro-rated reimbursement unused service and the City will be responsible for a removal fee of $500 per camera. Please see Attachment No. 2 for a more detailed breakdown of potential termination costs.

Attachment:

Attachment No 1 - Updated South Pasadena Police Department Police 429 Automated License Plate Reader ALPR System
Attachment No. 2 - Termination Costs
287
Attachment No. 1
Updated South Pasadena Police Department Policy 429: Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) System(s)
429.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This policy provides guidance for capturing, storing, and using digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Systems. ALPR technology supports public safety by identifying stolen vehicles, wanted persons, and missing individuals, and assisting criminal investigations. The South Pasadena Police Department (SPPD) is committed to protecting privacy and civil liberties and ensuring compliance with SB 34 (Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq.) and SB 54 (Government Code § 7284 et seq.).
429.2 DEFINITIONS
"ALPR Administrator" means a sworn officer of the South Pasadena Police Department that is designated by the Chief of Police as set forth in Section 429.3.1. The ALPR Administrator is responsible for the implementation of this Policy. "ALPR Data" or "Data" means the data gathered through the use of an ALPR System.

Data includes the recorded images. All ALPR Data collected within South Pasadena is the exclusive property of the City of South Pasadena.
"ALPR System" means a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more fixed cameras, combined with computer algorithms, to record, read and convert images of vehicle license plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. The cameras do not record any sound. 429.3 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR System enables automated detection of license plates. The SPPD uses the ALPR System to convert vehicle license plate data for official law enforcement purposes. ALPR System equipment installation, maintenance, ALPR Data retention, and access is managed by the assigned ALPR Administrator. The ALPR Administrator may assign members under his or her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR System, who shall oversees daily operations of the ALPR System, including the Data.
429.3.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Chief of Police will designate and assign a sworn officer of the SPPD , who has the minimum rank of Sergeant, to serve as the ALPR Administrator. The ALPR Administrator is responsible for the implementation of this Policy, including monitoring the ALPR System(s) for compliance with State and Federal laws. The ALPR Administrator is authorized to assign members under his or her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR System.
288
The ALPR Administrator shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of State and Federal laws and Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes but is not limited to Civil Code § 1798.90.51 and Civil Code § 1798.90.53.
a. A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.
b. Training requirements for authorized users.
c. A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws. d. Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.
e. The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation. f. Working with the ALPR vendor(s) and the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction ofALPR data in compliance Department policy. g. Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the SPPD website.

1. Ensuring the ALPR Transparency Portal to share usage statistics and audit results is posted and accessible to the public.
429.3.2 ALPR SYSTEM USERS
Only authorized SPPD personnel may access the ALPR System and ALPR Data for an authorized purpose. Access is granted based on job function and operational need, and only after the completion of SPPD approved training and upon the approval of the ALPR Administrator or Chief of Police. Each user shall have individual credentials for access and use of the ALPR System and ALPR Data. The ALPR Administrator shall maintain a list of SPPD authorized users. The ALPR Administrator shall revoke the credentials for any user that has left SPPD.
429.4 OPERATIONS
ALPR Data collected from the ALPR System is the property of the City of South Pasadena. SPPD personnel shall only access and use the ALPR System for official and legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes consistent with this Policy and any applicable laws, including California Civil Code 1798.90.5 et. seq. (as amended from time to time).

Use of the ALPR System and ALPR Data is restricted to the purposes outlined below.

1. The use ofALPR System and ALPR Data is restricted to official law enforcement business only, with access granted to those with both lawful authority and a specific investigative purpose.

2. ALPR Data may be used to identify stolen or wanted vehicles, wanted persons and missing individuals and for legitimate law enforcement or public safety 2 289
purposes such as but not limited to, criminal investigations, active warrants, missing persons investigations, suspect interdiction, and the recovery of stolen property.

3. When possible, Officers must verify an ALPR alert through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action. Once a vehicle alert is received, SPPD personnel shall visually confirm that the license plate from the ALPR system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle.

4. If an alert is received on an incorrect letter or number on a license plate, SPPD personnel shall correct the number received on the hit for accurate information if the correct information is available. (Civil Code § 1798.90.51 (b)(2)(F)). 429.4.1 COMPLIANCE WITH CIVIL CODE 1798.90.52
For each search inquiry, SPPD shall maintain a record of access to the ALPR Data which shall include the following:

1. The date and time the information is accessed.

2. The license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR System.

3. The username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated.

4. The purpose for accessing the information.
429.4.2 PROHIBITED USES
The following uses oftheALPR System and/orALPR Data are prohibited:

1. To use or allow others to use the ALPR System, including its equipment, orALPR Data for any unauthorized purpose (See, Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

2. To use the ALPR System or Data for the purpose of engaging in immigration enforcement. This includes sharing ALPR Data with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Border Patrol, or any other law enforcement agency for the purpose of enforcing immigration laws, as required by California Government Code 7284.6 (California Values Act-SB 54). As set forth in the California Values Act, no local resources or data may be used to assist federal immigration authorities.

3. To use the ALPR System or Data to track or identify individuals or groups seeking or providing reproductive health services.

4. To use the ALPR System or Data for surveillance of individuals exercising their right to protest or assemble or for the purpose or intended effect of unlawfully infringing upon any other First Amendment rights of any person or group. 3 290

5. To use the ALPR System or Data in a discriminatory manner and/or to target a person or group's protected characteristics, including race, color, religion, gender, gender identity, political affiliation, national origin, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other legally protected classification of any person or group.

6. To use the ALPR System or Data to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

7. To use the ALPR System or Data, including any hot lists, for any personal purpose.

8. To indiscriminately view Data without investigative or administrative need.

9. To allow the use of the ALPR System or share ALPR Data with any private entities or out-of-state or federal agencies, including out-of-state and federal law enforcement agencies, including any federal task forces.

10.To sell anyALPR Data obtained or received by SPPD.

Nothing in this Policy, including the provisions of this section, is intended to create an independent right of action in any person or group.
429.5. DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The ALPR Administrator is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention ofALPR Data.

1. All non-hitALPR Data will be deleted after 30 days from the date is was collected unless theALPR data has been downloaded and is being used as evidence in a criminal investigation.

2. All other ALPR Data determined to be evidence or is reasonable to believe it will become evidence in a criminal action, shall be downloaded from theALPR System and stored in SPPD's secured records management system. Unless, the Data is determined to be evidence attached to a specific criminal investigation, the ALPR Data shall be deleted after one year from the date the Data has been downloaded.

3. When ALPR Data is retained as evidence as part of an investigation, the Data shall be kept as part of the case file in SPPD's secured records management system.

4. Nothing herein shall preclude SPPD from maintaining anyALPR Data if it is subject to a lawful warrant, subpoena, court order, litigation hold, discovery request or other lawful action that requires the production of such Data in compliance with applicable laws.

These provisions are in addition to the ALPR System vendor's policy wherein ALPR Data is stored for 30 days, however the vendor deletes such Data on a rolling 30 day basis.
4 291
429.6 ACCOUNTABILITY AN D SAFEGUARDS
All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The SPPD will observe the following safeguards regarding access to, and use of the ALPR System including ALPR Data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
a. Data shall not be shared with federal or out-of-state agencies without a federal or California court-issued search warrant or order.
b. No default access to out-of-state or national databases is permitted on the third- party vendor platform. In-state, agency-to-agency sharing must be manually authorized by the Chief of Police or the ALPR Administrator. c. SPPD authorized users must provide a specific reason for every search. This includes providing under the ALPR System drop-down menu the mandatory "offense type" and reason for the search, and a specific case number for audit purposes. Generic terms such as "investigation" are strictly prohibited. d. Access to the ALPR System must utilize dual-factor authentication or equivalent security measures to prevent unauthorized data breaches. e. Data will only be shared with local agencies that have acknowledged and signed an interagency agreement mandating compliance with SPPD's terms and conditions, including a specific acknowledgement prohibiting the user from sharing SPPD data with unauthorized third parties as set forth in this Policy.

Before sharing data with another California agency, the requesting agency must provide a written "Authorized Purpose" statement and sign a data-sharing agreement affirming they will not share the data further with federal or out-of- state entities.
f. The ALPR Administrator shall conduct a monthly audit of the ALPR System to ensure proper oversight into the use of the system and adherence to this Policy, including compliance with applicable privacy laws (Civil Civil Code § 1798.90.51 (b)(2)(C)). The audit will include review of system usage and data sharing agreements to confirm compliance and identify any unauthorized access and/or usage.
g. The ALPR Administrators shall advise the Chief of Police of their findings from the monthly audits.
h. SPPD will maintain a public ALPR Transparency Portal to share usage statistics and audit results.

Unauthorized access or sharing ofALPR data is a violation of SPPD policy and may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination, and subject the violator to civil and criminal penalties.
429.7 POLICY
The policy of the SPPD is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public. All data and images gathered by the ALPR System are for the official use of the SPPD and 5 292
owned by the city of South Pasadena. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.
429.8 TRAINING
The Training Sergeant shall ensure that all SPPD personnel receive SPPD-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system. a. No SPPD personnel shall access theALPR System, including the Data, without completing SPPD-approved training that specifically covers privacy rights, state law compliance (SB 34 and SB 54), and the technical operation of the ALPR System. (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). b. SPPD authorized users shall receive the training described herein prior to having access to the ALPR System and thereafter on an annual basis. c. The ALPR Administrator shall keep training logs to ensure adherence to these provisions.
d. Access to the ALPR System will be automatically suspended for any accounts inactive for 12 months. All users must undergo annual policy review and recertification.
429.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures in compliance with SPPD policy, Civil Code § 1798.90.55, and a signed interagency agreement:

The law enforcement agency's request for access to SPPD's ALPR data shall include:
a. The name of the agency.
b. The name of the person requesting.
c. The offense type
d. The case number associated with the request
The request is reviewed by the ALPR Administrator and approved before the request is fulfilled. The approval request and logging of search queries will be maintained in the ALPR System for audit purposes.

Requests forALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies (Public Records Act requests) will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
429.9.1 THIRD PARTY SHARING - CALIFORNIA PUBLIC AGENCIES In accordance with Civil Code Section 1798.90.55(b) and California Department of Justice Bulletin 2023-DLE-06, SPPD may share its ALPR Data with another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. A public agency, however, is limited 6 293
to California state or local agencies, including law enforcement agencies (collectively "California Agency or Agencies"). This occurs through a third-party vendor hosting platform.

Accordingly, SPPD shall only share ALPR Data with other California Agencies that have executed an interagency data sharing agreement with SPPD ("Data Sharing Agreement"). Any California Agency that requests access to SPPD ALPR Data must submit a request to the ALPR Administrator, which shall include an "authorized purpose" statement as to why the California Agency seeks access to ensure access is for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

If approved by the Chief of Police or ALPR Administrator, the California Agency shall be required to execute SPPD's Data Sharing Agreement. The Data Sharing Agreement shall require compliance with all applicable California laws with respect to the Data, including that the California Agency shall not share Data with private entities or out-of- state or federal agencies, including out-of-state and federal law enforcement agencies, in accordance with Senate Bill 34. The Data Sharing Agreement shall also require compliance with the prohibited uses provisions of this Policy. SPPD shall reserve the right to restrict or revoke access for noncompliance.

A copy of the Data Sharing Agreement shall be retained by the ALPR Administrator. 429.9 ALIGNMENT WITH STATE LAW
This Policy 429 aligns with Civil Code Section 1798.90.5, et. seq., with the guidance promulgated from the California Attorney General, as set forth in Bulletin 2023-DLE-06 (California Automated License Plate Reader Data Guidance) and Bulletin 2023-01-CJIS (Updated California Values Act's Database Guidance).
7 294
Attachment No. 2
Flock Safety Inc. Contracts: Termination Projections
The tables below provide a breakdown of one-time early termination costs and reimbursement amounts based on potential cancellation dates:
2022 Contract (General Fund - 13 cameras) - Renewal Date - 03/30/2027 Termination Costs
Termination of convenience fee
(camera removal fee)
$500
Total
Contract Term Fee/annually \ $39,000
$6,500(500x13)
Amount to be refunded for
unused service (pro-rated per
day)
$106.85
Potential contract termination
date: 05/1/2026 06/1/2026 07/1/2026 08/1/2026 09/1/2026 Amount to be refunded for
unused service, if contract is
terminated: $35,581.05 $32,267.70 $29,063.20 $25,750.85 $22,438.50 2024 Contract (UASI 2021-
(extended to 04/19/2026)
Termination Costs
14 cameras) - Original Renewal Date - 03/19/2026
Termination of convenience fee
(camera removal fee)
$500
Total
Contract Term Fee/annually \ $42,000
$7,000(500x14)
Amount to be refunded for
unused service (pro-rated per
day)
$115.07
Potential contract termination
date: 05/1/2026 06/1/2026 07/1/2026 08/1/2026 09/1/2026 Amount to be refunded for
unused service, if contract is
extended and terminated at a
later date:
$37,052.54 $33,485.37 $30,033.27 $26,466.10 $22,898.93
295
Policy
462
Pasadena Police Department
Policy Manual
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
462.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. 462.2 POLICY
The policy of the Pasadena Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review. 462.3 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Pasadena Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

All installation and maintenance ofALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Executive Administrator of the Strategic Services Division. The Executive Administrator of the Strategic Services will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. 462.3.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Executive Administrator of the Strategic Services Division shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.
(b) Training requirements for authorized users.
(c) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws. (d) Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code §1798.90.52.
(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation. (f) Working with the City's Department of Information Technology (Dolt) and the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction ofALPR data.

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456
Pasadena Police Department
Policy Manual
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
(g) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the department's website.
462.4 OPERATIONS
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. (b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using anALPR.
(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.
(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(e) No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so.
(f) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.
462.4.1 VOLUNTEER OPERATORS OF ALPR
(a) Selected CAPP Volunteers will be authorized to drive and use an ALPR equipped volunteer vehicle for information gathering purposes only.

1. ALPR certified volunteers will be selected by the Volunteer Coordinator and approved by the Chief of Police or his/her designee.

2. ALPR certified volunteers will be trained regarding the use and procedures associated with driving the vehicle equipped with an ALPR.

3. Volunteers are not to access any information other than the normal scanning operation of the ALPR.
462.5 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Executive Administrator of the Strategic Services is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures.

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457
Pasadena Police Department
Policy Manual
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for a minimum of two years in accordance with the City's established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data will be purged. Any ALPR data related to evidence in a criminal or civil action or data that is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.
462.6 ACCOUNTABILITY
All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means.

The Pasadena Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52). (b) Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(c) ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy. 462.7 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law by emailing the internal pd_cau group. Requests must be made utilizing a government recognized email account. Agencies requesting ALPR data shall include the following in thier request:
(a) The agency makes an email request for the ALPR data that includes:

1. The name of the agency.

2. The name of the person requesting.

3. The intended purpose of obtaining the information and case number. (b) The request should be reviewed by the Technical Services Administrator or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled. (c) The approved request is retained on file.

Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55). 462.8 TRAINING
The Training Coordinator should ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
\
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458
Pasadena Police Department
Policy Manual
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
462.9 REFERENCE
See PPD Procedure Manual 462p.

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459
Sabha, Tamer
From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Subject:

Attachments:

Nick Rabb
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 2:02 PM
Sabha, Tamer
Rivas, Jessica; Hampton, Tyron; Madison, Steve; Jones, Justin Written Comment for 5/20 Meeting Agenda Item 3
5-20_public-safety_rabb-written.pdf
^
You don't often get email from. Learn why this is important [ t ] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. For more information about the Phish Alert Button view article "KB0011474" on the DolT portal.

Dear Public Safety Committee,
I'd like to submit this letter as written correspondence regarding Item 3 of the agenda for tonight's meeting.

Thankyouforyour consideration. I look forward to the discussion tonight.

Best,
NickBabb
Pronouns: he/hsm/his
1 Public Comment on Agenda Item 3
Pasadena Public Safety Committee Meeting
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
Nicholas Rabb
Pasadena
Thank you members of the Committee, for considering this item.

My name is Nicholas Rabb, I am a resident in District 2, and researcher at Cal State LA with a PhD in computer and cognitive science focused on society and technology.

I want to first clearly say that Flock Safety is a deeply flawed technology that poses a threat to Pasadena.

Despite PPD's assurances of privacy via Flock disabling out-of-state access to California's Flock network, these data protections are insufficient. There are many more ways our data can get to federal agencies like ICE.

As some Council members have acknowledged, any Flock user within California could simply search Pasadena and personally tip off ICE. But even more frightening is that the ACLU ofMA found that Flock's default user agreement with police "gives the company the right to share data with federal and local agencies for 'investigative purposes' even if a local department chooses to restrict data to its own officers." This all renders their internal audit far too narrow and frankly misleading.

I have to say, I'm personally disappointed that PPD is arguing so hard for Flock while ignoring residents.

At the March Public Safety Committee meeting, residents decried Flock. A week later at the community meeting about ICE, the police chief dismissed concerns about Flock. The April Public Safety Committee meeting was canceled when we were looking forward to voicing our concerns a third time.

I can't understand PPD's ardent commitment to Flock, to the point of bringing a sales rep to a municipal meeting. If public safety is truly their aim, they should be very concerned about Flock's data sharing with ICE. If they exist to help the community, they should listen to the community.

When I was completing my PhD in Boston, I actually taught a course on surveillance technologies for two years. What I told my students is that surveillance tech never seems dangerous until it's used against you - until someone decides you're worth watching and policing. Today, those "dangerous groups" are poor people. Black people, Muslims, immigrants. Soon enough it will be someone else.

We are in a dangerous political environment where new Al-driven surveillance tech is reported nearly every week. It's extremely profitable and useful for authoritarian politics.

For this first step with Flock, I urge the Committee to heed the dangers and take a stance against Flock.

Stanley, Jay. "Flock Can Share Driver-Surveillance Data Even When Police Departments Opt Oiit, And Other Flock Developments." ACLU News & Commentary. 10/24/25.
<https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-massachusetts-and-updates> Disable and take down Flock cameras around Pasadena to protect residents from being tracked and targeted. Do not renew the contract with Flock. Do not just replace Flock with some other ALPR.And instead use the time and money to invest in community-based safety infrastructure that does not rely on surveillance technologies.

We have a real opportunity here to protect our city by not succumbing to tempting arguments about safety through surveillance - a false premise. Instead, please be critical and help build a Pasadena where we keep each other safe.

Thank you for your time.

Sabha, Tamer
From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Blossom Wright •
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 2:31 PM
Sabha, Tamer
Comment for Public Safety Committee Meeting 5-20-26 Agenda Item 3 [ I ] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. For more information about the Phish Alert Button view article "KB0011474" on the DolT portal.

Dear Members of the Public Safety Committee
I was really disturbed to find out last year that Flock cameras were installed across Pasadena. And even more so when I realized some had been installed near my home in District One last summer. I try to stay informed and participate in my community and I wondered how I could have been completely unaware of these cameras being installed right up the street? This kind of surveillance is a massive invasion of privacy on Pasadena citizens - how could we have been left out of any decision making around this? I have previewed the slides for the presentation that Pasadena Police is giving tonight. Frankly, their Flock audit is meaningless because they are sharing their dataset with other agencies in California, including districts that have known to cooperate with DHS and ICE. Pasadena Citizen's personal data should not be collected and exploited. It is actually endangering us all to have this dataset exist. hlow many cameras tracked your movements on the way to City h-1all tonight? This is unacceptable.

Mass indiscriminate surveillance of citizens is not making any of us safer.

If we want to protect every member of our community we need to :

1. Immediately disable and remove all FLock cameras in Pasadena.

2. Commit to cancettingthe Flock contract in September.

3. Do not replace Flock with another ALPR vendor.

4. Commit to funding community-based safety initiatives not corporate based programs that exploit our citizen's data and destroy our right to privacy.

Thankyou,
Blossom Wright
Aurore Blossom Wright
1 Sabha, Tamer
From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Devin Fance <[email protected]>
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 2:40 PM
Sabha, Tanner
Flock out of Pasadena - Please and thank you!
[ I.] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you toowthe content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. For more infornnation about the Phish Alert Button view article "KB0011474" on the DolT portal.

M T Sabha,
i urge Pasadena City Council to put safety over surveillance and cut ties with Flock.

Flock ALPR cameras are being used for indiscriminate surveillance, tracking and targeting of countless individuals. While Flock, law enforcement and city government tout the benefits of automated license plate readers for public safety, in reality it endangers everyone - in particular immigrants and their families, peopie of coior, people seeking sensitive healthcare, and the many exercising civii liberties like free speech.

Flock's indiscriminate surveillance is in conflict with constitutional protections and numerous civil liberties groups such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation arguing that the technology infringes on Americans' right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Despite repeated attempts from Flock to reform their system, it is apparent ALPR is problematic, insecure and can have devastating consequences for innocent individuals. Academics, researchers and experts overwheimingly agree that there's a lack of evidence linking flock to crime reduction rates.

There is overwhelming evidence of abuse and misuse ofALPR systems across the country - and Pasadena's ALPR systems are no exception. Pasadena was notified that it was sharing ALPR information across the country, the city lacked ALPR data retention restrictions, and many residents have expressed privacy concerns over the years. Despite this, Pasadena Police says Flock is a "useful tool" - yes, it is useful in diverting resources that would otherwise go towards community oriented public safety solutions that don't infringe on our civil liberties.
1 Pasadena should join dozens of cities across the country who have ended their contracts with Flock, removed cameras and rejected any ALPR replacements such as Los A!tos Hills, Mountain View, Santa Clara County, Santa Cruz, and others.

Pasadena, choose your constituents. Restore trust, restore accountability and uphold our constitutional rights. End all ties with Fiock now.

Devin Fance
Pasadena, California 91101
2 Sabha, Tamer
From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Steven Lang <[email protected]>
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 2:43 PM
Sabha, Tamer
Flock out of Pasadena
[ I ] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button. For more information about the Phish Alert Button view article "KB0011474" on the DolT portal.

M T Sabha,
I urge Pasadena City CounciS to put safety over surveillance and cut ties with Flock.

Flock ALPR cameras are being used for indiscriminate surveillance, tracking and targeting of countless individuals. While Flock, law enforcement and city government tout the benefits of automated license plate readers for public safety, in reality it endangers everyone - in particular immigrants and their families, people of color, people seeking sensitive healthcare, and the many exercising civil liberties like free speech.

Flock's indiscriminate surveillance is in conflict with constitutional protections and numerous civil liberties groups such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation arguing that the technology infringes on Americans' right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Despite repeated attempts from Flock to reform their system, it is apparent ALPR is problematic, insecure and can have devastating consequences for innocent individuals. Academics, researchers and experts overwhelmingly agree that there's a lack of evidence linking flock to crime reduction rates.

There is overwhelming evidence of abuse and misuse of ALPR systems across the country - and Pasadena's ALPR systems are no exception. Pasadena was notified that it was sharing ALPR information across the country, the city lacked ALPR data retention restrictions, and many residents have expressed privacy concerns over the years. Despite this, Pasadena Police says Fiock is a "usefui tool" - yes, it is useful in diverting resources that would otherwise go towards community oriented public safety solutions that don't infringe on our civil liberties.
1 Pasadena should join dozens of cities across the country who have ended their contracts with Flock, removed cameras and rejected any ALPR replacements such as Los Altos Hills, Mountain View, Santa Clara County, Santa Cruz, and others.

Pasadena, choose your constituents. Restore trust, restore accountability and uphold our constitutiona! rights. End all ties with Flock now.

Steven Lang
Pasadena, California 91101
2 Sabha, Tamer
From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Attachments:

I- Pasadena Public Comment
Wednesday, May 20, 2026 3:13 PM
Diaz, Eligio; Gao, Beilei; Sabha, Tamer
Agenda item 3 Flock - public safety committee
transparency portal is not transparent.pdf
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Please include this email and the attached document as part of correspondence for item 3 (Flock) on the agenda for the 5/20/2026 Public Safety Committee meeting.

Dear Members of the Public Safety Committee,
I was happy to see that you will be discussing the use of Flock cameras in Pasadena. I've been very concerned about the use of these cameras in my neighborhood so, after a lot of searching on the city website, I finally found the Flock Transparency Portal for Pasadena PD. I was very disappointed to discover that the term "transparency" doesn't exactly apply. I was primarily interested in seeing the reasons for Flock searches, and discovered that the information under "Reason" on the .csv document that I downloaded was pretty meaningless because only a small percentage of the reasons provide any meaningful information for a regular resident. I've attached a copy of the spreadsheet that I downloaded and highlighted most of the entries that were less than transparent. There's a lot of bright yellow.

Here are some of the most common "reasons" listed:
a case number -115 entries
investigation ~ 50 entries
suspect or target vehicle (multiple variations) - 50 entries wanted or wanted person - 27 entries
These kinds of reasons do not provide any meaningful information about how the Pasadena Police Department is using the Flock cameras.

I have reviewed the PPD Flock report that is included in the agenda, and I have no way to correlate the info "Pasadena ALPR Searches 2026 Top Reasons" with what is provided via the Pasadena PD Flock Transparency Portal because the reasons in the portal doc are essentially meaningless. This is not a way to build trust with community members.

I also want to know how many times other agencies have searched out system and what their reasons were. How do we know that an officer in another police department didn't use the system to stalk someone? How do we know that an officer in El Cajon didn't use the system to look up info on the household member of an undocumented member of our community?
The more I learn about Flock cameras and look at info provided, the more concerned I become. The system is anything but transparent. I very much support ending the use of the Flock cameras in Pasadena.

Sincerely,
Tariq
1 Pasadena 91106
Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
2 id userId searchDate networkCountreason caseNumber
bd1be0ca-16b0-4e5f-a541-58f15ef81b9a*** 2026-04-22T08:04:40.533Z1 243PA2026-32632 d84a1644-8700-49e2-a3c8-952b03fc800a*** 2026-04-22T18:15:34.839Z395 243PA2026-32632 593f3894-ed28-4d70-86be-e49330c70969*** 2026-04-22T21:54:17.246Z395 243PA2026-32632 8e06a6df-cb33-451a-8f66-7d58b6e71ed0*** 2026-04-20T15:01:39.580Z1 417PA2026-38602 0b69f42d-ad96-4270-bbd3-3023823069c6*** 2026-05-13T18:57:07.630Z1 45926-38944 884d7257-dfff-474c-b35a-d6f19f245e3c*** 2026-05-13T19:07:55.397Z1 45926-38944 8392e0d0-4d7d-4044-a6df-d49d06dd9ac3*** 2026-04-29T19:18:21.111Z482 2840526-28405 c8d750d9-3168-4096-9521-e11b699c4d74*** 2026-04-29T20:57:01.153Z482 2840526-28405 465baa4f-7184-4fbd-86ae-f7e664f669f3*** 2026-04-29T22:18:58.212Z482 2840526-28405 cd232274-d845-44db-a990-943b308d7b0d*** 2026-05-06T19:10:51.613Z481 2840526-28405 5a9b04a1-9f1f-427d-90af-9c1c40471ef9*** 2026-05-09T04:23:08.560Z481 2840526-28405 a758f6ae-1d55-4ab9-b932-e3f211687deb*** 2026-05-09T05:49:11.345Z481 2840526-28405 8324d221-0c15-4657-956a-b63d58a1ce62*** 2026-04-23T18:03:52.772Z395026-01957-0384-092 lasd btfv susp 026-01957-0384-092 lasd 1b7faf30-7089-48ef-a229-52c545624270*** 2026-05-06T17:46:42.348Z4812026-29381 - res burg check from nor cal2026-29381 a5ef4014-1ac1-4eca-bd38-2f1fd2bde098*** 2026-04-20T20:16:00.604Z3972026-29381 res burg chcek 2026-29381 d17c5647-c1a7-48c7-96ea-d5afac61cf3d*** 2026-04-23T22:37:04.925Z3952026-30627 cat convert plate 2026-30627 94636bc1-89cf-40e1-bb1d-e499f3765149*** 2026-05-15T13:44:19.719Z482245 ATTEMPT VEHICLE PA2026-39260 add63041-1d49-434a-8ac5-714ce92145f2*** 2026-05-18T02:39:00.865Z1 245 ATTEMPT VEHICLE PA2026-39260 c7c03285-1eeb-4eaa-b9ed-850f59859284*** 2026-05-18T08:28:38.502Z1 245 ATTEMPT VEHICLE PA2026-39260 031dfccd-e59d-418d-b7a6-c49c5b4adb85*** 2026-05-15T03:50:59.383Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 fff1a6f6-7bca-4f1b-b7de-156e38f49cbe*** 2026-05-15T04:25:02.083Z1 245 suspect PA2026-39260 992333c6-8f85-49ab-8f8c-d226ed599397*** 2026-05-15T07:04:58.199Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 f68d76cb-4775-49d4-bf7c-45714d8a3967*** 2026-05-16T06:15:07.008Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 3f752d26-d381-4607-aa11-638f5f3d8e6e*** 2026-05-17T04:19:30.485Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 287142eb-f1b1-4614-97d8-fc22617c48df*** 2026-05-17T05:53:03.349Z1 245 suspect PA2026-39260 a6161ed2-7397-4b1b-8bd7-8d03c632083f*** 2026-05-17T06:02:33.951Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 8c5f6c13-946f-4be4-bae6-5603f4a12a77*** 2026-05-17T07:04:26.121Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 bd8dd5bb-0667-4b1f-b0fd-4b666f4b5ea4*** 2026-05-17T08:00:51.046Z445245 suspect PA2026-39260 5209fa3f-0fe9-4486-aec5-48a9bde130a5*** 2026-04-23T23:03:10.885Z37126-0030-07 26-0030-07 e4a630d1-649c-414e-a0f1-05f5784b7077*** 2026-05-02T05:30:09.460Z44626-0030-07 PA2026-28405 ea95471d-43d9-475a-9e4f-7ec4f4c4809a*** 2026-05-03T18:09:13.773Z44626-0030-07 PA2026-28405 6e1d3fe4-fb0a-40a2-997f-7189d9a4f4e8*** 2026-05-03T21:48:46.437Z44626-0030-07 PA2026-28405 c91c0d3c-915d-4d34-9931-5d2c839cb836*** 2026-05-04T22:28:18.302Z44626-0030-07 PA2026-28405 44f4ce27-1b94-4aa1-b53b-9a63684a19fb*** 2026-05-05T22:20:46.085Z44526-0030-07 PA2026-28405 b535a90c-b96a-4a6b-a29c-0b071b7c003f*** 2026-05-06T01:35:33.101Z44526-0030-07 PA2026-28405 93eacf86-7130-44fa-affb-431cca04d421*** 2026-05-07T14:11:13.481Z44526-0030-07 PA2026-28405 0a7183ae-d0d7-4fb6-9949-e0f3f721cbca*** 2026-05-08T17:52:21.613Z44526-0030-07 26-0030-07 d3634137-46f8-4501-b22f-907651205534*** 2026-05-09T05:09:16.081Z44526-0030-07 26-0030-07 2d58ead3-2543-452b-81e3-73e18903e57a*** 2026-05-15T18:57:27.553Z44526-0030-07 26-0030-07 0a2eaa75-f2f0-4197-8e49-dc5518b5c267*** 2026-05-18T16:41:24.381Z44526-0030-07 26-0030-07 e19c4696-72a8-4921-9616-430ff756ab6d*** 2026-04-22T20:08:16.266Z1 26-1849 - Santa Rosa PD - suspect check26-1849 - Santa Rosa PD 279aae0e-c133-42b2-b467-92a20b04c158*** 2026-04-30T16:53:18.679Z44526-28405 26-28405 b7f8f0d4-2e64-4e7c-8a7b-99ddaf8e80c8*** 2026-05-01T14:40:15.584Z44526-28405 Investigation 1e0b9894-d66a-4fef-9a60-5a459e4ffbed*** 2026-05-02T04:02:31.422Z44526-28405 26-28405 599cafc7-2cb0-407c-9686-35e93ee383e6*** 2026-05-02T05:13:45.088Z44526-28405 26-28405 c87ea69f-6ef6-4815-b9d2-da1451080cbd*** 2026-05-08T18:26:39.526Z48126-28405 PA26-28405 c5e839bd-21ba-462c-86fa-834ffa1330fc*** 2026-05-08T22:11:40.450Z1 26-37545 26-37545 cca0e8b1-78cf-4fef-a483-43b2f2927ec9*** 2026-04-30T03:16:30.261Z44526-42805 28405 d70b1bfd-4e21-4720-aa03-6cf3f25e6218*** 2026-04-30T14:52:25.177Z44526-42805 28405 8e1f0b12-ca61-4bb1-8825-6bce098aae96*** 2026-04-30T15:25:32.197Z44526-42805 28405 82e5fa7c-f820-4a80-bb97-e498623f6844*** 2026-04-30T16:10:42.750Z44526-42805 28405 e54b6dc2-5a3a-43e6-96f3-24852f54ad05*** 2026-05-02T07:27:54.614Z44526-42805 26-28405 1bab8e7e-9566-4515-9ee1-450286a7c264*** 2026-05-02T08:05:21.036Z44526-42805 26-28405 558939ff-4bfe-4025-8ff8-90286ad6ee40*** 2026-05-18T18:14:41.770Z48126-8716 - ocsd aoi veh check 26-8716 - ocsd aoi a3c54ace-9974-4bc4-a562-2a557c766932*** 2026-04-28T21:57:02.663Z44526-9295 26-28405 0e2cbbb4-2491-47b5-bcbc-f12c9aa6a731*** 2026-04-27T05:26:38.710Z638459 veh sus pa2026-33864 a8956205-f8a2-4830-9d19-c027af38554c*** 2026-05-10T16:59:11.282Z445459r PA2026-38087 4470cdd9-45c2-4e21-a52c-81b4b244bc84*** 2026-05-10T17:00:17.615Z445459r PA2026-38087 deaf1054-29f4-4fb4-9710-c5f7ba84b82d*** 2026-04-20T23:58:50.633Z1 487-1 26-31866 9152c144-dc17-4b23-9e22-cd43a55aa518*** 2026-04-22T16:24:17.128Z1 901thr 26-32545 4a57fd6f-6800-49ed-8852-78c7c0ff061e*** 2026-04-23T22:00:13.494Z1 accident pa2026-33038 ed75d486-7032-442c-b903-f55bb56b02e7*** 2026-04-23T23:08:21.579Z1 accident pa2026-33038 556a0774-ae7e-422b-bd5d-2b0c69b07ce5*** 2026-04-20T23:09:48.806Z1 Arson 26-20881 6cb3f688-ea55-4eb3-a1a2-e83f527739c5*** 2026-05-14T19:06:06.379Z481arson 26040760 42771ca0-4b74-4920-9900-b2afabc6bdcc*** 2026-05-18T23:36:04.140Z481arson 41353 8ef33bdb-58cd-4ffb-8b42-9c84e6ce3b51*** 2026-04-27T00:24:08.701Z1 Attempting to locate vehicle involved in theftPA2026-33860 a1f7c5cc-aa7a-44fc-a642-ceff877eb8fe*** 2026-05-19T00:53:45.617Z1 Brandished firearm Pa2026-40578 0905d609-a1b5-4b88-857e-18715221afbe*** 2026-05-19T01:02:20.305Z1 Brandished firearm Pa2026-40578 9ed12a2d-e02a-459e-8341-efc21ce51857*** 2026-04-24T15:35:40.519Z1 burg from lapd 26079809 bdb92a6d-16da-4e13-931e-ce717dff75b2*** 2026-05-13T07:58:10.853Z1 Burglary PA2026-38844 411326fe-6b6f-4f9b-8caa-8cbfe064884c*** 2026-05-18T21:48:41.138Z481Burglary Investigation - Info from WitnessPA2026-25206 df08a004-b8f7-4ab6-a1a3-2cfac41671eb*** 2026-05-15T09:37:46.042Z1 Call for service Pa2026-39497 e15d475c-e3ce-43b7-90d2-a68ca004108d*** 2026-05-15T10:03:54.631Z482Call for service Pa2026-39497 17d3c1b1-944d-48a8-9068-7f87f2a36189*** 2026-05-04T03:03:24.963Z483casing 211 veh pa26-36069 cb103ab0-ef5b-4b00-adf1-33f412ab3337*** 2026-05-19T00:39:46.430Z481City council meeting 2025-36557 05022002-556c-4db1-9199-6a6a2bbfd462*** 2026-04-24T01:24:26.520Z371Coke sales 2584377 cbdb1131-966d-4f5f-aebc-23a3e2ae4686*** 2026-04-24T03:34:35.849Z371Coke sales 2584377 c91df256-26d6-40bb-bef0-2d3f5ae8eaf0*** 2026-04-25T05:30:13.715Z371Coke sales 2584377 c755d380-600b-40b4-a73c-9159f1059218*** 2026-05-05T19:52:32.627Z482coke sales 25-84377 83da9de5-3dc5-4085-87c7-e7e6326b2554*** 2026-04-22T01:07:04.489Z371Coke sales invest 2584377 6709380a-47e2-4ee7-8e16-822f4d62f4fd*** 2026-04-24T13:34:43.687Z371Coke sales invest 2584377 7471fecb-ad02-48d8-8c3b-00ef7b291b51*** 2026-04-28T17:57:38.132Z445Coke sales invest 2584377 52c100a3-c235-427c-8f32-79d16b7ed23c*** 2026-04-28T18:00:14.361Z445Coke sales invest 2584377 7f295b38-2eec-478d-b33d-46b612ee7cc7*** 2026-05-07T18:15:59.526Z444Coke sales invest 2584377 e4a69559-e7b1-425a-88d7-22297d46c3ce*** 2026-05-07T19:48:37.877Z444Coke sales invest 2584377 3d9538ba-0dec-4e0b-804d-315fe9eda686*** 2026-04-23T16:31:44.957Z639Destruction/Damage/Vandalism of Property - Vehicle Identification2026-024 2199ada6-5379-4ae1-bf2e-e87304fed65c*** 2026-04-21T18:52:08.144Z397domestic violence 2026-32353 8e837895-bed1-47ac-a6a9-86b4789c066c*** 2026-04-21T19:24:24.326Z1 domestic violence 2026-32353 23a81453-1030-4819-87aa-3ac70b7e3036*** 2026-04-20T06:36:21.736Z1 dui pursuit pa26-32090 47d92561-f5b8-472a-96a9-c43adeb5c2e5*** 2026-04-20T03:20:03.743Z397dui/pursuit pa26-32062 2b46ae1f-1d55-49df-ad14-0b203255443f*** 2026-04-20T04:19:58.621Z397dui/pursuit pa26-32062 4edaea8b-78b9-4ddb-acae-32a7dda0f4a3*** 2026-04-21T04:31:48.902Z371DV Pa24-32353 0c5eef93-68c3-4657-bf1d-b5d411953012*** 2026-04-21T04:50:06.910Z1 dv sus veh pa26-32353 2b104be1-085a-4764-bbe3-e5993c6b5011*** 2026-04-21T05:00:25.273Z397dv sus veh pa26-32353 9c27a92b-5d66-4882-b5e2-52ae3bfce8ff*** 2026-04-20T03:14:45.527Z1 Evaded pursuit PA2026-32062 9cc3fe74-273d-4a87-9fb8-8fef10aedaef*** 2026-04-23T14:58:48.814Z1 Evaded pursuit PA2026-32062 9f495eca-1c99-4e33-a54f-f00f7e85bd70*** 2026-05-08T15:25:22.441Z1 Evaded pursuit PA2026-32062 7669e800-6446-4083-af6b-ae835c8eee62*** 2026-05-19T20:41:23.603Z481fleeing 26-40817 3da7ee24-0bc3-49d8-af30-09bda54e57a2*** 2026-05-19T21:00:24.401Z481fleeing 26-40817 7deb9a9b-ebe3-4f33-8716-90a96a55be27*** 2026-04-29T22:52:17.760Z482follow up 26-28405 a72991d5-95b6-4bbe-a30b-77faa15a7a7a*** 2026-05-10T02:31:02.548Z445Grand Theft PA2026-37925 cbce6d32-40fa-4743-ba28-45ebe09428ec*** 2026-05-16T17:02:11.596Z1 grand theft auto PA2026-39894 639621be-ff2f-454f-8766-bd5912f3cfc7*** 2026-05-09T21:08:55.748Z482grand theft investigation Pa2026-37850 29608d78-f111-432b-91a4-5a7ca1a6854d*** 2026-04-27T15:41:30.685Z371Gta Pa2026-34069 920c9331-436a-4c85-8150-2d7f4da172f1*** 2026-04-27T18:03:32.547Z371Gta Pa2026-34086 542ca59f-4b6f-4886-b187-b1c0f914a544*** 2026-04-27T19:00:52.963Z371Gta Pa2026-33964 fd669cd6-6f60-4867-97a9-6610a078bf69*** 2026-05-01T20:20:46.712Z483gta pa26-35344 5992c8c1-9db6-4216-9b0a-6d1510a1a0a1*** 2026-05-02T16:30:20.665Z483GTA pa2026-35617 357c11be-478d-4121-afe8-a7e0f03750b8*** 2026-05-03T21:38:35.333Z1 GTA PA2026-35973 ef0dccfd-2172-42ef-a567-754dfe778fcf*** 2026-05-03T21:50:22.246Z483gta pa26-35973 ef29b34b-84f1-4b05-97a3-edc205df1627*** 2026-05-03T22:13:50.148Z483gta pa26-35973 18807c75-dec4-4405-b4db-7a0ec66bf450*** 2026-05-03T23:03:06.232Z1 GTA PA2026-35973 22bc1cb7-2d4d-4c4d-aa95-4a25b57928f3*** 2026-05-03T23:06:53.563Z483gta pa26-35973 972fd692-d614-401b-b181-c690b04b0635*** 2026-05-04T00:51:24.770Z483gta pa26-35973 54f48eb7-4398-4990-abcd-9105598f3c56*** 2026-05-04T01:42:45.382Z483gta pa26-35973 2c9f5db6-ed6a-4385-a522-f3bb2941fbe4*** 2026-05-04T02:53:21.241Z483gta pa26-35973 e4b3eeb5-d5d3-45c0-9c46-d8ea7b767a59*** 2026-05-04T05:18:23.211Z483gtA pa26-36111 fa08caf1-a9c5-4d9a-aa90-25fecc6afde6*** 2026-05-12T20:12:40.721Z483GTA 26- 1b82f907-d1a3-4e48-8345-ac2803d04d98*** 2026-05-15T22:31:45.496Z483GTA 26-39667 0d21b0cd-b972-49dd-ad8f-d89cbc1f7315*** 2026-05-15T23:21:40.981Z483GTA 26-39667 0c313075-51a9-4cb4-b508-3db57e7c2002*** 2026-05-18T18:57:23.546Z483gta 26-40478 04f6d890-2d67-44de-83e0-d14b953321a8*** 2026-05-18T19:12:26.337Z445Gta Pa26-40255 259c4d9a-772d-4d70-ac87-3c2820baaf2f*** 2026-05-19T01:24:03.046Z445GTA PA2026-40580 e5eeb820-b740-46a5-98d4-8a9b94f17568*** 2026-05-18T21:23:10.458Z444GTA Investigation 26-40478 7a5a0fbc-4ad1-44eb-977a-1eeea3418245*** 2026-05-18T21:18:38.634Z444GTA Investigatoion PA2026-40255 966ac031-1b5a-48f8-bd38-b1ff62346c62*** 2026-05-01T20:23:46.043Z483GTA vehicle PA2026-35344 1315e174-1d00-4709-8b60-561ddb530387*** 2026-04-28T17:01:18.107Z1 hit and run PA2026-34392 2fddc727-8a40-480e-b2bc-bbc7a7344382*** 2026-05-04T17:42:25.610Z483hit and run pa2026-36197 b8de03d3-2dc5-4a9e-bce6-6031cb470384*** 2026-05-04T17:43:07.758Z446hit and run PA2026-36197 671aea1c-3148-4d14-b11e-b2e5807c6665*** 2026-05-11T14:51:09.205Z482hit and run pa2026-38305 f3b45560-d794-4f03-9c03-65d7c1099031*** 2026-05-12T03:58:35.989Z482hit and run pa26-38501 814614f2-cd53-489e-afdb-a72debaa556a*** 2026-05-13T23:14:55.117Z483HIT AND RUN 26-39029 91ba33a2-b62f-4d72-a961-e899a8691b3a*** 2026-05-15T13:20:39.803Z482hit and run pa26-38501 22ce2953-a181-43f6-b4a5-7f2a11c59494*** 2026-05-15T17:03:57.406Z482HIT AND RUN PA26-39543 4ec36c80-b133-43d1-bba9-dcdbca4b5c00*** 2026-05-15T17:04:37.238Z482hit and run 26-39654 ff69b746-6d9f-468b-a043-7cf1758b2cc2*** 2026-05-16T01:58:40.394Z1 hit and run 26-39654 24b5fce5-3d54-4920-b570-e3ad15505b02*** 2026-05-18T01:19:00.748Z1 hit and run 26-39654 be82dad2-432a-4574-8e8c-93a95a04b005*** 2026-05-08T18:44:06.956Z481Hit and Run investigation PA2026-37435 ae38715e-d768-4ff1-823c-d47589ddf9ce*** 2026-05-08T19:07:06.945Z1 Hit and Run investigation PA2026-37435 5e08a15e-ae2b-4b67-8002-ebf06ed807b3*** 2026-04-30T14:27:31.980Z1 Homicide Invest. locate witness 15017526 5aa1b613-c6c0-4141-b953-4edc12532f43*** 2026-05-14T23:40:21.865Z1 ID sus veh 2026-38944 ef3d7b6e-b0fd-457c-a71b-81d10d501862*** 2026-04-25T04:35:21.470Z371Inv 26-25850 ed5ac646-1d9a-490b-bf40-0a752bbb744e*** 2026-05-08T09:49:09.289Z482inv PA 26- 37372 16ef4288-611f-4b5d-b3aa-6f2a1d601008*** 2026-05-08T12:14:40.932Z482inv PA 26- 37372 09d8fd4c-1895-4d03-8c95-97e4a1d54e02*** 2026-05-07T20:49:51.689Z1 Invesigation PA2026-37212 3aa75095-eff2-492a-a916-b898b710f4c3*** 2026-05-14T19:09:12.019Z482Invesigation Pa2026-39273 d140ff1e-4fc1-4d60-8220-c4d27ccf8827*** 2026-05-14T23:04:45.224Z482Invesigation Pa2026-39273 cd321dc0-9c8f-4026-b45e-9bf016cc24d1*** 2026-04-20T18:35:19.250Z397investigation 26-24145 747b0fd2-8c25-4928-9af6-e460dc9e6db6*** 2026-04-21T21:36:18.253Z1 Investigation PA2026-31183 f9774fcd-9a62-46e8-ab0d-c3792b002e73*** 2026-04-22T00:51:38.776Z371Investigation 26-259663 4592901f-5cf4-488e-b511-0a89f515c111*** 2026-04-22T01:20:46.476Z371Investigation 25-25963 16ce8e0f-9868-4b44-a3e2-57b83af1c5a9*** 2026-04-22T17:05:18.455Z371Investigation 25-25963 fd9e2382-ef99-4a95-bfaa-cfc24ab60023*** 2026-04-22T18:18:24.019Z1 Investigation PA2026-31183 3df05a5a-2776-4074-aa92-0da0208c09bd*** 2026-04-22T23:06:29.948Z1 Investigation PA2026-28459 37e09366-2910-4f0a-800e-ae391b5e2774*** 2026-04-22T23:48:11.292Z371Investigation 25-25963 ccc58326-347f-4d00-868d-471727c1ced7*** 2026-04-23T03:49:25.814Z371Investigation 26-24759 bb5e1b33-fef4-4103-b348-6ae0bdf95f27*** 2026-04-23T04:36:58.004Z371Investigation 25-25963 34918700-ece8-43e4-aa7f-349671899c1e*** 2026-04-24T13:57:44.792Z371Investigation 26-25963 fe4040dc-90ed-4ab5-be1e-28b49d931292*** 2026-04-27T03:51:56.635Z1 investigation pa26-33964 0c6cfaf4-e569-4aab-aeb0-42a55d72d816*** 2026-04-27T21:30:23.197Z1 investigation pa2026-33938 4d0aefc0-8e79-4964-8303-6aee70359bdd*** 2026-04-27T21:41:44.652Z1 investigation 2026-33007 ed10a7c9-6faf-4767-b54a-f948ee7f878c*** 2026-04-27T22:00:27.791Z1 investigation pa2026-33938 7ff33aa7-9602-4f0b-8f57-ac6dd671dbb1*** 2026-04-27T22:15:31.296Z395investigation 2026-33007 60e30c60-2d86-40b6-8166-22675c4eb169*** 2026-04-28T13:32:08.885Z395Investigation PA2026-31706 07f1817a-d73e-4b1b-997c-9e2488c39f14*** 2026-04-29T18:45:22.437Z445Investigation 26-32577 5823cb65-4b8b-4e80-9396-e95dfe8f81e8*** 2026-05-01T18:25:54.906Z482investigation 26-30469 9eb33335-ef0f-4ac5-bf5d-4392f367fef8*** 2026-05-01T20:21:45.425Z482investigation 26-35344 7bfaedd4-118c-4cbe-a5e5-bcc25b0c25cc*** 2026-05-02T03:05:09.723Z636Investigation 26-28405 18fb8e69-6d64-44ad-abbc-fbf090414517*** 2026-05-02T05:23:53.609Z636Investigation 26-28405 a0a2bf69-b2b2-4c61-9c58-ae5395c6087b*** 2026-05-02T06:00:36.311Z482Investigation 26-28405 e1729730-844b-426a-a248-19305bca3862*** 2026-05-03T20:27:42.970Z1 Investigation PA2026-35973 98383504-7684-4fc6-8b46-144da7c8b30e*** 2026-05-03T21:19:00.346Z482Investigation 26-28405 3f4db200-da24-41f3-85df-68d11499c2e9*** 2026-05-03T21:28:24.398Z1 Investigation PA2026-35973 042ac14d-3ee5-4803-bb39-92ca23513d37*** 2026-05-10T06:33:00.751Z1 Investigation Pa26-37997 5ab6fa46-3728-4037-b9a2-77825ab8b500*** 2026-05-11T14:26:05.609Z481investigation 26-12678 4b0efafc-cc48-450d-9002-7ce860a5d0a3*** 2026-05-12T19:41:36.214Z444Investigation 26-31118 01674df4-2043-44c5-8317-ccf0f5445624*** 2026-05-12T20:52:00.064Z444Investigation 26-31118 3524b118-f251-4e84-9f12-42ea5bc03deb*** 2026-05-12T21:12:21.824Z444Investigation 26-31118 0dde4e49-9634-4e95-9331-af189f8aa691*** 2026-05-13T17:54:22.255Z444Investigation 26-24759 a1cbf48f-23b8-4316-a958-0c11efa79dd2*** 2026-05-13T18:33:24.874Z481Investigation PA2026-38748 be0dbc8a-e4c2-4a7d-bb18-a3cadbe6744b*** 2026-05-13T20:37:28.357Z444Investigation 26-24759 9d2a681f-71c8-455c-9cc4-1cc6facc845f*** 2026-05-13T22:47:49.715Z444Investigation 26-24759 5ee0f259-f7c4-430d-b796-30755fea5964*** 2026-05-14T02:01:03.136Z1 Investigation PA 2026-39063 115fb636-2d56-457c-b042-7ff3b894106a*** 2026-05-14T02:40:22.070Z444Investigation 26-315995 b684391e-752a-4dcd-bd3e-eab39f9dfc09*** 2026-05-14T05:15:16.910Z445Investigation PA 2026-39063 7eee8978-bb3c-4221-a589-af20dd3a6f16*** 2026-05-14T17:04:52.908Z481Investigation 2026-519824 63c8a12f-193e-43f0-95f1-43bbf1abad29*** 2026-05-14T21:00:17.931Z1 Investigation 26-24769 2b6185b7-5981-4644-8df0-2f6dc74a5874*** 2026-05-15T20:30:20.885Z444Investigation 26-26563 1b6303d4-78c2-4875-af79-23d3acdd45e4*** 2026-05-15T21:17:03.131Z444Investigation 26-26563 273a11c8-3d52-40b2-8d74-46756ea00460*** 2026-05-18T23:06:57.085Z481Investigation PA2026-38748 82666511-91e5-41f9-8c31-a9d0ae093d08*** 2026-04-28T18:09:03.757Z1 Investigation 26-28405 26-28405 de79def7-b9d5-4370-89d5-e98136513e23*** 2026-05-01T03:24:03.126Z483INVS PA26-35122 014430e3-6699-4da5-b61f-fd3dd90f7e13*** 2026-05-01T04:05:06.751Z1 INVS PA26-35122 91c361b5-2923-4109-bbc1-a21d8f904479*** 2026-05-02T10:27:18.825Z483invs pa2026-35122 fc69f5f9-e682-4b8f-8dd2-e5aabdbc159c*** 2026-05-08T22:25:56.508Z444Locate suspect vehicle 2026-37542 493e89d0-e30c-4f09-9dec-4e9395987b35*** 2026-05-08T23:00:13.886Z444Locate suspect vehicle 2026-37542 e7b1270d-4889-4961-b0bf-aaadbfc7d66f*** 2026-05-09T21:59:35.183Z444Locate suspect vehicle 2026-37870 c77b6324-dd34-4fdb-b759-809fdedd547e*** 2026-05-09T22:31:23.322Z1 Locate suspect vehicle 2026-37870 3fcf4141-c399-4e05-a986-7c709be55019*** 2026-05-09T23:07:53.370Z444Locate suspect vehicle 2026-37870 8d1ca32e-7938-4441-8fcd-1d0ef068239a*** 2026-05-10T02:08:43.580Z444Locate suspect vehicle Pa26-19955 2e2d97ba-13a8-4d42-9490-b7acc08ef28c*** 2026-05-10T03:13:14.457Z1 Locate suspect vehicle Pa26-19955 13a013a0-f078-4c21-bf89-1f3fcfe6d785*** 2026-05-10T04:09:28.131Z1 Locate suspect vehicle Pa26-19955 e0fa4c0a-3db1-4c5f-a78c-9d1a5bf3c706*** 2026-05-10T06:10:29.510Z1 Locate suspect vehicle Pa26-19955 dd429722-e782-4cc0-90b6-5670c7134c5f*** 2026-05-14T03:07:14.351Z444Locate suspect vehicle 2026-39081 6bd64290-1e84-4211-afa0-32de15b039b6*** 2026-05-14T04:56:38.099Z1 Locate suspect vehicle Pa26-19955 039fc50a-3f6c-40ce-8c73-9949cecce16a*** 2026-05-15T17:06:55.495Z1 Locate suspect vehicle 2026-39543 d343615a-5606-486f-9983-1c54b3599afa*** 2026-04-27T22:33:21.900Z1 locating 26-31399 f82ff8dc-03da-4f48-9124-d1bb5531c9d3*** 2026-04-20T20:42:34.810Z397missing 2026-11607 92ee1fdf-6cdc-4711-ad42-caccea3a10c2*** 2026-04-25T09:49:26.102Z371Missing PA2026-33511 27b82971-bd2e-4c0c-afb6-206db75e7e16*** 2026-04-25T10:01:07.023Z1 Missing PA2026-33511 576016da-be5a-4326-879b-c97077ef2e7f*** 2026-04-21T04:25:53.616Z397Missing person’s vehicle PA2026-32329 fc1a0294-74f1-4f22-8a47-cf02fb802576*** 2026-04-30T22:01:56.306Z482narco investgiation 26-24759 89e0fd64-e00b-4042-943c-826c96929884*** 2026-04-22T00:31:07.483Z371Narcotics 26-00915 2c574c81-53b4-45d1-90cc-84dfdc0b681a*** 2026-04-22T01:20:12.671Z371Narcotics 26-00915 2c74e50f-e98c-447e-ac15-eaffefe9d3ba*** 2026-04-22T20:46:37.987Z371Narcotics 26-009915 129d50c3-9752-4720-9ef7-f39e4d1326bd*** 2026-04-22T21:52:06.932Z371Narcotics 26-00915 b78b9971-9167-4b4e-80a0-c271f6c2ecad*** 2026-04-24T00:08:26.489Z371Narcotics 26-32577 b0aee4f4-963c-4dae-93f8-88994bd1c048*** 2026-04-24T15:01:26.425Z371Narcotics 26-32577 e6261ff4-bcc7-41e7-bc05-eeae3faaec1e*** 2026-04-27T22:39:40.004Z371Narcotics 26-32577 77aacfad-182b-45a4-ad6f-719f96043a7a*** 2026-04-28T00:26:07.196Z371Narcotics 26-32577 dbb0ad1e-e1be-4603-bd8b-c91f712198c2*** 2026-04-28T21:21:32.030Z1 Narcotics 26-32577 6a1131a7-cfe4-480d-877b-845dc136d362*** 2026-05-06T18:18:27.651Z444Narcotics 26-32577 b9f4c112-4548-4d2b-8802-cbf00b49a3b7*** 2026-05-07T03:29:43.455Z444Narcotics 26-32577 9beb5b89-e11e-463d-9593-1dfccb9be371*** 2026-05-12T23:55:32.445Z444Narcotics 26-32577 f655706f-e682-4911-a78e-42eecef3fb09*** 2026-05-13T17:24:20.471Z444Narcotics 26-32577 889f2d36-6d21-4bff-a670-050edbc95ac7*** 2026-05-13T18:39:44.638Z444Narcotics 26-32577 02e546d9-de7c-4b24-bfe6-315ab894ee60*** 2026-05-13T19:01:39.391Z444Narcotics 26-32577 73faa9a6-8a22-4833-95d9-d293da88a05d*** 2026-05-13T20:30:27.394Z444Narcotics 26-32577 7a3053be-03d9-4c57-91e1-95e3fba821f3*** 2026-05-14T21:03:14.627Z444Narcotics 26-32577 a43fb7d4-3ff0-4dbd-8693-748c903f3502*** 2026-05-09T03:21:33.466Z481NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION pa26-19955 bcb0ab05-5d96-4b05-ab9b-7e41c2d12d30*** 2026-05-09T04:00:25.254Z481NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION pa26-19955 e749f9d9-927e-4958-b956-7f937b304cbf*** 2026-05-09T05:34:04.624Z481NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION pa26-19955 0c9bb85b-c0ac-4c9f-b828-712ed6c3350e*** 2026-04-24T03:40:05.636Z395narcotics sales 26-32577 27616524-bee1-4c7a-ae65-d91398abda96*** 2026-05-08T21:10:34.936Z481narcotics sales 26-32577 929c8f03-d46a-4fe3-9c96-ab11a5a35f99*** 2026-04-23T20:54:50.455Z395on going investigation 26-32577 8b2f05ed-86fe-4d50-a51d-325d557dd113*** 2026-05-05T22:28:25.875Z481on going investigation 26-32577 d62fdc2b-e27a-44be-835c-ee1c1882dc66*** 2026-05-07T19:43:35.451Z481on going investigation 26-32577 6aeed142-5416-43b7-ad90-957b0374eca7*** 2026-05-07T21:05:28.246Z481on going investigation 25-36791 9252ce10-cb5d-4ac8-98da-5f2db902eec1*** 2026-05-08T18:47:50.336Z481on going investigation 25-36791 e214bed6-e9de-4bb4-8ba1-b4f9d04909b0*** 2026-05-19T17:11:56.005Z481on going investigation 25-36791 04e38099-077c-41ef-b4a5-3377fcc01b9e*** 2026-04-28T02:06:22.439Z638PA 2026-34208 PA 2026-34208 35c8fb61-a19e-4e9e-ae1d-4572f88784b5*** 2026-04-22T08:02:41.017Z371PA2025-92399 PA2026-32632 f4a3fb76-9ac9-4be0-a1e5-31684147be59*** 2026-05-09T00:55:03.544Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 b765db4d-529c-48a6-87e5-834f4ae986be*** 2026-05-09T01:01:26.841Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 734fbb50-3459-4913-b860-627c2908f81a*** 2026-05-09T03:09:52.723Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 97d09b2b-e73b-4b19-860b-f4eb7f1d3164*** 2026-05-09T04:08:29.287Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 4160af3a-882b-40e4-bddc-6d61058ec772*** 2026-05-09T05:00:56.800Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 f3c8aa0e-4230-4bee-88f9-aabe5aafc91f*** 2026-05-09T06:00:40.498Z482Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 186a3970-a5f7-489f-8671-9c87741e3974*** 2026-05-09T07:12:42.133Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 0622c786-9712-4f9d-b4dd-a7a4ae2a79b4*** 2026-05-09T14:13:25.061Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 3ad2a320-15e5-4f69-a7dd-ce2ed486d934*** 2026-05-09T20:15:49.460Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 c857e2f6-6d40-484a-996f-276c8ea7a9db*** 2026-05-11T06:03:12.398Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 ee37c0e5-e4cb-41f7-8fc9-f1f30d04e707*** 2026-05-11T21:43:16.525Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 0a11c4ac-ca25-49fd-a41e-b39839d924d2*** 2026-05-13T00:22:30.973Z1 Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 70300f18-8e1e-45ca-a319-276af5a3d7e9*** 2026-05-13T05:47:05.315Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 f2bab864-8132-4922-943a-533b939c313d*** 2026-05-14T04:53:30.842Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 508d2f85-27e4-47ef-b945-8a96fc0aa35a*** 2026-05-14T17:31:57.596Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 4374e7e8-0bcc-4fd7-bf7a-c79b5ac53597*** 2026-05-14T18:46:19.114Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 99d8fa62-ddf4-4994-91b4-68791c93a3d9*** 2026-05-14T19:20:26.530Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 32f343f6-565a-45f5-a069-bdac5fc1ff7f*** 2026-05-14T20:15:18.775Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 cb2d6706-5787-45b6-a41b-d8047af51f71*** 2026-05-14T21:15:52.852Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 6c107993-47c4-4b1b-9600-b8ec3566ee03*** 2026-05-15T03:19:12.387Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 bb6c69c4-976b-4617-a9eb-632beb9e4664*** 2026-05-15T18:14:48.060Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 0e22ef39-8359-483b-8ede-227fff862948*** 2026-05-15T19:15:22.314Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 33e7a7d4-47c4-4ed5-92d5-d62f20de07e5*** 2026-05-15T20:27:15.189Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 0b974c58-b88d-4582-9cc2-79cbd4dfc35c*** 2026-05-15T22:08:06.304Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 5426b890-ad21-4334-ab04-0ad6247765b4*** 2026-05-15T23:14:06.834Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 d7e9667d-0c00-43a9-b772-82207bb2bdb5*** 2026-05-16T01:35:04.367Z445Pa2026-13438 Pa2026-13438 39bc250e-c360-411f-83dc-d341b101f99c*** 2026-05-17T16:39:15.302Z445Pa2026-13439 Pa2026-13438 bad3442d-0317-4d4d-bde9-c1897c9eeab6*** 2026-05-18T16:19:25.511Z445Pa2026-13440 Pa2026-13438 20ba44ad-fe72-4267-80db-0a2fc41a2222*** 2026-05-18T22:07:16.091Z445Pa2026-13441 Pa2026-36368 fc1b7894-f2bd-471f-9030-f9baf66ed6ab*** 2026-05-18T23:46:06.896Z482Pa2026-13442 Pa2026-36368 e7990d0c-0274-452e-b25f-fafc785f15dd*** 2026-05-19T00:10:48.595Z445Pa2026-13443 Pa2026-36368 5f9bc7cb-afff-4d1e-a677-52ae683c34a0*** 2026-05-19T17:16:06.894Z445Pa2026-13444 Pa2026-13438 815860f4-01ab-4ae5-8a9a-2106a7bcfe73*** 2026-05-19T19:28:00.942Z445Pa2026-13445 Pa2026-13438 27a41470-9aa0-4de9-85ac-2732d9ec081a*** 2026-04-28T22:38:35.842Z482PA2026-15689 Pa2026-15689 2c32b97f-906b-4b03-ab88-03bc533bd8a6*** 2026-05-05T21:07:24.178Z446PA2026-19955 PA2026-19955 6343aba2-acb0-4763-9796-a4798520dec7*** 2026-05-06T00:17:00.757Z445PA2026-19956 PA2026-19955 ec6cbd8e-e778-46d9-935c-c75dba5fd66c*** 2026-05-09T00:25:32.351Z445PA2026-19957 PA2026-19955 583bab18-d089-44aa-9fd7-2f0162613bdb*** 2026-05-09T04:04:08.589Z445PA2026-19958 PA2026-19955 e9240560-4968-428d-91bf-8c46b043eb87*** 2026-05-09T06:12:57.296Z445PA2026-19959 PA2026-19955 f2786b35-b7ea-4a9a-856d-c1cc3bd44b84*** 2026-05-11T06:44:24.494Z1 PA2026-19960 PA2026-19955 146c0a75-76fd-4a5f-9fe2-759dbfa7669b*** 2026-05-14T19:49:53.389Z445PA2026-19961 PA2026-19955 32ae120f-e4a1-460d-a680-fd493752c1d2*** 2026-04-23T23:38:27.482Z371Pa2026-2570 Pa2026-2570 d163ac59-2895-4d50-b461-8e6f0b00aa44*** 2026-05-04T22:28:01.170Z446Pa2026-2571 Pa2026-2570 23b0c9ae-2925-4d0b-99e0-bb1f9466f847*** 2026-05-07T23:05:06.113Z445Pa2026-2572 Pa2026-28404 e82fd05d-8165-4f0c-b405-22ae12c58316*** 2026-05-09T04:58:51.108Z1 pa2026-28405 pa2026-28405 9a195e99-a48f-4b16-bfb7-85a60ca10395*** 2026-05-09T05:13:20.643Z481pa2026-28406 pa2026-28405 9756cae4-90ab-4a02-ada1-c3aa86dae660*** 2026-05-09T06:17:17.036Z481pa2026-28407 pa2026-28405 33ea72bc-46a4-46e9-b0bb-04e995f7ef8d*** 2026-04-24T03:34:12.323Z638PA2026-33126 Pa2026-33126 b988d2e9-0f23-4b28-9ffe-8f55ff29f8f2*** 2026-04-25T01:37:21.004Z371PA2026-33405 PA2026-33405 f7659438-cea7-4c0d-8098-d6fd4bbc84c0*** 2026-04-25T02:41:45.085Z1 PA2026-33423 PA2026-33423 0ee4aac7-d9f5-4819-a56f-63d9c852069e*** 2026-05-15T18:50:03.492Z481pa2026-34156 pa2026-34156 9b838f69-7aa3-40c4-bcab-af1d7827e8c0*** 2026-04-29T18:28:48.538Z1 PA2026-34711 PA2026-34771 48c6b030-1437-44a5-9300-dfdaaee64ea0*** 2026-04-29T18:31:33.774Z482PA2026-34711 CVC 20002 PA2026-34711 2593114e-5278-4710-ac10-a98823d46076*** 2026-05-02T20:00:50.311Z1 Pa2026-35668 PA2026-35668 8f642336-a044-481e-ac78-0ed942691a70*** 2026-05-03T02:53:55.562Z483PA2026-35707 PA2026-35707 5fd699d3-d71c-4301-b539-98f30375fe48*** 2026-05-03T10:27:59.618Z483PA2026-35889 PA2026-35889 761090be-71a1-446c-8d23-cc44f659c4eb*** 2026-05-13T23:29:25.908Z482PA2026-36939 PA2026-36939 fd9edd1a-c9d6-4a4d-ab00-b129ac26ddd1*** 2026-05-14T19:41:17.246Z482PA2026-36940 PA2026-36939 c165cd40-2601-4498-a6d4-8dba8e42e1b0*** 2026-05-14T20:16:14.421Z1 PA2026-36941 PA2026-36939 d751bc4e-8297-4f1c-9943-215632f44ba8*** 2026-05-14T21:09:19.887Z482PA2026-36942 PA2026-36939 6c0e4474-b5b4-4e58-b200-403c2bd44a0b*** 2026-05-14T22:12:23.808Z482PA2026-36943 PA2026-36939 dd735f00-aed1-4bb4-8bbc-8d44e886978d*** 2026-05-14T23:00:36.149Z482PA2026-36944 PA2026-36939 3c819ef1-d7bb-4e09-a88d-17cca64e4dcc*** 2026-05-15T00:32:26.890Z482PA2026-36945 PA2026-36939 e50cac07-c28f-4ab8-9008-b5eebb136659*** 2026-05-08T09:34:37.432Z1 Pa2026-37372 PA2026-37372 30d25a5d-87d8-4a2f-8fa6-bd008b69679b*** 2026-05-08T19:06:43.882Z481PA2026-37435 CVC 20002 PA2026-37435 bdc6475e-2794-4705-ae27-58e872aa8de0*** 2026-05-12T07:26:07.425Z482PA2026-38494 PA2026-38494 d864abad-5495-4e3b-a067-7b1f31b9667f*** 2026-05-16T16:47:40.211Z482PA2026-39860 PA2026-39860 015f20ad-fade-488b-af86-f856a4c825ba*** 2026-05-16T19:16:45.993Z482PA2026-39936 PA2026-39936 d6cdc222-2361-4668-a621-9995efcf53ae*** 2026-05-17T01:57:54.473Z1 PA2026-40017 PA2026-40017 664175f6-383e-4d13-88de-dca21b5cb071*** 2026-05-17T04:43:15.614Z482PA2026-40017 PA2026-40017 51af8241-5c91-48f9-9e5d-bb0e3832313e*** 2026-05-01T14:31:34.075Z446PA2026-9525 PA2026-9525 c4256694-8d84-4ec7-b62c-bc6f5c80701b*** 2026-05-02T01:09:41.590Z1 PA2026-9525 PA2026-9525 e0d2f52f-14b3-42ea-97b0-ea78587b8b8e*** 2026-05-19T20:21:01.713Z445Pa2026-9525 Pa2026-453 aaa6e800-d5c9-4da4-b243-bc9fb4f56ccc*** 2026-05-19T21:00:08.989Z445Pa2026-9525 Pa2026-453 9ab89aa0-03ce-4bbc-a3e7-49d21ca1ff1a*** 2026-05-15T22:57:31.968Z481PA26-28405 26-28405 2881e3cc-f48e-42ba-923f-cb0b9bb57b91*** 2026-05-15T23:30:32.133Z481PA26-28405 26-28405 09c0bb9e-7b9d-4ab5-8c73-0be19c6b2547*** 2026-04-21T07:22:43.055Z1 pa26-32353 pa26-32353 ea025be8-a689-4807-ac7a-866a405bd29d*** 2026-05-05T04:11:08.246Z1 PA26-36433 PA26-36433 e8d773b5-93a2-485f-a81f-4417319699ee*** 2026-05-06T02:50:06.271Z1 PA26-36698 PA26-36698 879cf5eb-ef50-4cfc-88e6-e13a08f78d5b*** 2026-05-19T19:17:11.872Z481PA26-453 PA26-453 7ebf9aea-1678-4bf8-a2f3-06ea27cc942a*** 2026-05-19T20:17:25.937Z481PA26-453 PA26-453 cd4f7abc-3e15-49df-b4ab-de758e0397f6*** 2026-05-19T21:10:21.845Z481PA26-453 PA26-453 a7c637ab-55cb-4b23-b860-1762f7cc549b*** 2026-04-22T14:45:38.163Z1 PC 211 PA2026-32463 22f5368d-af0f-4148-8228-7ecbd2fee8f9*** 2026-04-22T15:13:27.318Z395PC 212 PA2026-32463 75e9f361-8ba3-4222-88d1-bc147b9dc18d*** 2026-04-23T14:03:48.283Z1 PC 213 PA2026-32463 7fbedb92-b710-4dd5-9c96-b94007ff48e3*** 2026-04-23T15:34:58.677Z1 PC 214 PA2026-32463 8de6775f-8cc2-4e0b-b310-a6550c8ad828*** 2026-05-19T16:54:22.101Z1 PC 215 PA2026-39260 19ee5d07-3612-4c88-84ca-5bf0451f7cb3*** 2026-05-19T18:22:48.755Z1 PC 216 PA2026-39260 289148d6-3394-4b9f-9816-822c2568f23f*** 2026-05-19T19:57:12.269Z1 PC 217 PA2026-39260 e85a318d-7ef9-4c40-bb33-785fb2c5df9b*** 2026-05-19T20:31:10.748Z1 PC 218 PA2026-39260 d0fa290c-9635-44f3-9c60-6d6b5aa83212*** 2026-05-19T22:29:45.956Z481PC 219 PA2026-39260 7b6e69dd-b8a1-4dcf-a0e2-8322b3454eb2*** 2026-04-22T07:54:17.041Z1 pc 273.5 pa2026-32632 de8c96f8-889b-4aad-89da-c8b979d5facc*** 2026-04-22T09:14:53.450Z1 pc 273.5 pa2026-32632 d1a6c089-1d8b-43bc-8824-13a366ddec4a*** 2026-04-22T10:03:38.692Z395pc 273.5 pa2026-32632 a0798a74-e89f-4e75-a018-43c92734beee*** 2026-05-08T21:43:40.992Z482pos id pa26-37530 f84610ec-4e33-4290-b736-7b65b69cb747*** 2026-05-08T22:57:01.150Z482pos id pa26-37557 0784f015-81d6-40c4-a4b7-cd2048820480*** 2026-05-08T23:02:19.153Z482pos id pa26-37557 8fdabe6e-09db-4942-bf99-1d4c31982ae0*** 2026-05-09T22:51:10.753Z482pos id pa26-37557 7196c628-8d9a-42be-940b-dbb8db8c8885*** 2026-05-11T00:53:57.417Z482pos id pa26-37557 75b57cc2-30b2-4334-a77a-0b698908665f*** 2026-05-11T08:35:14.680Z482pos id pa26-37557 d17bb065-8e5f-4c17-b7df-4eca7dd1bf94*** 2026-05-17T01:59:12.660Z482pos id pa26-40017 712c6519-23c5-49a8-aceb-3087c8dcc45f*** 2026-05-17T02:00:54.129Z1 pos id pa26-40017 ab30a8af-1cef-4ce4-9d3e-13630d3d57a5*** 2026-05-18T08:33:39.258Z1 pos id pa26-40017 24a2ef25-bd5a-4fbc-bdfb-33396e74dbc9*** 2026-05-15T01:08:07.188Z1 Poss . Sus 26-39363 95ed34ad-2f27-4d3f-a7ce-42fa91279488*** 2026-05-17T06:08:41.748Z482Possible assault PA2026-40101 326a0252-d6f7-44f6-96d3-2fdac26743b5*** 2026-04-25T23:53:52.096Z1 Possible Suspect Vehicle PA 2026-33287 ca9449df-50ce-40f6-b9e6-567a88ead295*** 2026-05-04T08:46:26.979Z1 Reckless PA2026-36146 63906ebf-89bc-4cbd-9890-d1436b85b89d*** 2026-05-13T18:57:10.828Z482residential burglary 2026-38944 6744755a-2d3d-4513-91b0-5fcdb7948293*** 2026-05-13T19:00:16.831Z1 residential burglary 2026-38944 caff4c18-ab36-4ef3-b852-4feb330a4ac7*** 2026-04-28T00:52:18.748Z1 RMISS 26-34208 ec1aa5fa-179c-44db-bac9-a3e5905f2fa6*** 2026-04-26T21:13:06.431Z1 Search for possible vehice invovled PA2026-33860 d65d751a-3e30-4e16-9e1a-974be2003fb5*** 2026-04-22T00:36:09.463Z371Stolen 26-26578 82d7ecbd-f959-4ab5-b329-084d9b7f71fc*** 2026-05-01T20:19:00.716Z1 Stolen 35344 06d74452-ed7e-4cf2-834a-88a62413a738*** 2026-05-13T02:08:13.779Z1 Stolen plate Pa26-38765 0402c9cd-ce81-4967-bc29-db0c9f44ace6*** 2026-05-16T23:01:26.154Z628stolen plate PA2026-39933 0530bfc4-ec40-44da-bd2a-de91c8a7e413*** 2026-05-17T00:39:57.232Z1 stolen plate PA2026-39933 be689fef-2ad1-4193-97c2-d486efe3516d*** 2026-05-03T22:52:43.138Z484stolen veh 36008 86329030-f66e-41af-8902-6a8ecf8010e5*** 2026-05-13T23:36:19.064Z1 stolen veh 0 0f5c8768-4c8d-47d5-96f6-96b2d00ae557*** 2026-05-15T01:24:56.694Z481sus veh. ID 2026-38944 9d95d0c5-49a5-4501-b46c-fa0c648ebc64*** 2026-05-15T02:07:05.148Z481sus veh. ID 2026-38944 c5de3be7-0f8c-43f7-aae0-b0cde6a15324*** 2026-05-18T12:34:48.418Z1 Suspect id 26-39457 42fc8e0f-ef64-4ea3-bc37-e77cbce6ecba*** 2026-04-27T03:05:39.336Z1 Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-33964 29e7f9d5-5ed4-43b7-8299-052c93ea8211*** 2026-04-27T04:00:21.315Z1 Suspect vehicle PA 2026-33694 477dbd1d-c03a-49fd-8fd8-911e0bf8726c*** 2026-04-27T05:24:18.272Z1 Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-33964 834ddfa5-aaef-4d72-87c9-0dea6e6690ae*** 2026-05-03T02:52:03.860Z1 Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-35707 db403b81-41c5-4251-9905-3f6e4ce8c45a*** 2026-05-08T21:32:45.243Z1 Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-37530 5e8d13c4-7782-4597-8033-0afcba18ef51*** 2026-05-08T22:05:27.932Z444Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-37530 08ee6f21-7652-4fb6-96dd-e67cb9407416*** 2026-05-08T23:06:34.596Z1 Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-37545 d2d0095a-a655-4beb-b130-35a5ffa73f2b*** 2026-05-09T19:18:22.526Z1 Suspect vehicle Pa 2026-37545 0335b5dc-4a0d-495f-95ed-ca8e9dd8430c*** 2026-05-19T07:24:40.531Z482Suspect vehicle PA26-39260 121334e5-86c4-40fc-aa52-4287c3d6d718*** 2026-05-19T21:56:50.813Z482Suspect vehicle 2026-37513 a0aa8b96-4203-48da-b20a-c9d2e3fc2b9a*** 2026-04-27T04:51:28.177Z1 SUSPECT VEHICLE RELATED TO VEH 459/PURSUITPA2026-33964 2c2bd1ff-2fc4-4f3b-80d3-ac7e7e829b42*** 2026-04-27T05:15:25.230Z1 SUSPECT VEHICLE RELATED TO VEH 459/PURSUITPA2026-33964 84db4271-9d03-4e10-a85e-68c9b550ada6*** 2026-04-30T23:00:16.090Z482target Veh 26-101501 cf90577b-9b65-4648-86bd-b0548c9fe493*** 2026-05-05T17:37:23.154Z482target Veh 26-101501 328bea79-98e1-4bf1-a069-e492d94def88*** 2026-05-05T18:07:45.334Z630target Veh 26-101501 1a2d7c1c-cf28-4b42-83c3-a2c60cad5efb*** 2026-05-07T18:55:36.661Z481target Veh 26-36627 2604c864-7281-4573-912b-a1004614555c*** 2026-05-07T19:15:00.180Z481target Veh 26-36627 0e4d0782-917e-498c-809d-33313ad2dcf7*** 2026-04-29T20:41:47.075Z1 Theft PA2026-32437 ff37ba3b-59dc-4219-98fd-acc862fad125*** 2026-04-30T21:59:52.971Z1 Theft PA2026-32437 bd3c5d8f-7ce4-4657-b15a-0e44a80c2d38*** 2026-04-30T22:00:12.678Z483Theft PA2026-32437 e1823b98-4123-4a44-8f55-d983af48363c*** 2026-05-05T19:21:32.763Z1 Theft PA2026-32437 92c08593-4ac2-4710-8e1a-2c4fb637484e*** 2026-05-05T21:22:09.613Z483Theft PA2026-32437 dbfd1e1a-f29e-4e30-8654-a1d54f107f00*** 2026-05-17T02:30:04.810Z9 Theft PA2026-12678 9a60a1f2-f718-4430-a7e5-8c087f971b4e*** 2026-05-19T17:22:34.279Z482Theft PA2026-38909 55fdea8e-5e39-4385-aad4-a2baa3c07d26*** 2026-04-25T09:05:07.480Z371Traffic PA2026-33504 dc5d0a73-d8ae-4400-9cc9-80dc58fa81d5*** 2026-05-09T03:24:54.300Z1 Traffic Offesnse PA2026-37573 6d2650af-917e-4661-8288-0880062a23e6*** 2026-05-12T16:31:48.201Z482Vandalism PA2026-33621 d161a184-c880-4630-9293-78a6acb1b09e*** 2026-05-12T17:05:07.773Z1 Vandalism PA2026-33621 981c505e-c6fe-49f9-a95d-1dfd97d33690*** 2026-05-12T21:36:31.711Z1 Vandalism PA2026-33621 9fe77e2f-ba52-41c3-a5f4-f66b8fc21c38*** 2026-05-19T20:32:53.502Z481VC 2800 PA26-40817 5833f84f-30fb-44e8-b7e2-e769c4f7da13*** 2026-04-27T03:35:44.450Z1 vehicle burglary PA2025-90048 8cbbc179-b7d8-47b4-8b2d-20cd50abace4*** 2026-04-22T22:41:14.691Z395Vehicle Identification 2026-024 6cc13aa3-7e3a-4664-be8e-bb9d2aa5747e*** 2026-04-22T23:00:51.157Z395Vehicle Identification 2026-024 dc6dbf51-e39b-4ee2-9a06-7ff49f332ce7*** 2026-04-23T00:01:29.613Z1 Vehicle Identification 2026-024 d8b2bf4a-cbb3-4d0d-8263-3c77365c436d*** 2026-04-23T21:46:03.867Z395Vehicle Identification 2026-024 ea52f1e4-6e82-48c9-9bc5-f7c31a919378*** 2026-04-23T22:01:00.601Z1 Vehicle Identification 2026-024 15b6ee39-27ce-4822-9f4f-a9f4ab47eab2*** 2026-04-29T17:49:46.211Z482Vehicle Identification 2026-024 a03ac282-e695-431c-b38d-985fc29bbfd6*** 2026-05-14T18:45:22.185Z1 Vehicle Identification PA2026-39260 502df03a-1141-45cc-8fc3-52fc63a80451*** 2026-05-01T20:22:37.287Z1 Victim vehicle PA 2026-35344 f56dd8a9-75ba-4ebd-8281-88aebfdc13ae*** 2026-04-20T17:44:05.221Z397Wanted 26-29381 a216344d-70d5-4f5c-8f20-655de2e21ba1*** 2026-04-21T15:06:12.644Z372Wanted 11820146 169455b9-81a9-408d-9601-35badc439bb7*** 2026-04-21T18:38:52.383Z372Wanted 11946269 20ad2aaa-217b-4f00-8993-5b993a3cd445*** 2026-04-21T19:10:35.744Z372Wanted 11946269 029446c8-a161-4d49-a7d8-624bf12bb600*** 2026-04-21T20:24:55.675Z372Wanted 11946269 4819ce50-5aef-42cc-8560-198de0a667dd*** 2026-04-22T06:04:07.287Z371Wanted 26PDCF0034802 d695fc32-0951-4580-80b0-cc3d46755223*** 2026-04-22T15:44:25.519Z371Wanted 11820146 bfac110b-69ff-48f7-875c-41baeec00a4b*** 2026-04-22T16:17:15.434Z371Wanted 11820146 ed14aa6e-f93f-4c1d-ac5d-5d5049d18778*** 2026-04-22T17:34:23.464Z371Wanted 26-32463 0777047b-7313-4b0c-b949-c2ef5ef01458*** 2026-04-23T01:54:34.989Z371Wanted 26001884 NBPD 0760b8ad-9e4c-4f19-a44c-31b39c99a39f*** 2026-04-23T06:22:08.732Z371Wanted 26-32463 cf2bff4a-c064-4155-a3e2-d9c0fae18162*** 2026-04-27T21:37:59.614Z371Wanted 11828336 fb20ad4f-bdec-4a21-ac55-251b96da345a*** 2026-04-30T20:12:49.154Z445Wanted 11948425 6fd86807-f4ba-44e8-8025-a83a1c9f741b*** 2026-05-05T00:56:26.974Z482Wanted 2574470 1be39532-dda0-467d-bc80-bfd204a64dc1*** 2026-05-05T03:03:37.481Z445Wanted 2574470 49d1c30e-cb27-4a48-9571-27e850a99cab*** 2026-05-05T05:22:30.947Z445Wanted 2574470 e775c9e3-1da6-42bb-ae05-53702224697b*** 2026-05-06T21:19:29.491Z444Wanted 11941943 c4e4771e-c117-430d-9d40-3519e13ab7cc*** 2026-05-11T21:27:07.854Z444Wanted 11721097 88c1b196-37ee-4544-aa35-c07b8d46b674*** 2026-05-17T16:22:28.086Z1 Wanted 26-40162 93e718dc-b6f2-4a12-b073-624cab951c7e*** 2026-05-18T13:55:17.784Z444Wanted 11300334 633722ed-9bfa-464f-90e7-ff1162715ad7*** 2026-05-18T16:21:46.490Z444Wanted 11300334 9bddb912-7c5d-401a-99ec-d593d43ca574*** 2026-05-18T19:29:19.037Z444Wanted 11300344 1d804737-8ea2-4c22-bb68-4bdc98c41893*** 2026-05-19T03:48:52.239Z444Wanted 11300334 86cbea81-a58b-48ca-a13f-6c94a197aa27*** 2026-05-04T01:26:35.334Z1 Wanted Person PA2025-53878 36926e72-0945-4b15-9dc5-d7acbe260d43*** 2026-05-01T04:32:59.036Z1 Wanted Person PA2026-35166 c0e75fe4-fe1b-40eb-8afc-b0e2d1359d62*** 2026-05-02T01:52:35.984Z1 Wanted Person PA2025-92821 39f6547e-2a00-48d9-a161-e29116de4c7c*** 2026-05-02T05:51:06.305Z1 Wanted Person PA2026-35543 ea0c3a5c-0f4c-4dc1-b55a-b4a19613c483*** 2026-04-27T06:25:26.949Z371Weapon Law Violations PA2026-34017 92656fb4-f203-4be0-a197-37d9bfa320cf*** 2026-04-27T07:51:07.570Z371Weapon Law Violations PA2026-34017 8d00da7f-dd08-402c-988d-6ef220398d2c*** 2026-05-02T06:28:45.785Z1 Weapons PA2025-56887 e82d4aee-f427-4292-9d90-26b76596c538*** 2026-05-03T03:35:54.833Z1 Weapons PA2026-35795 adea9e83-1372-4f1f-a21f-ccc7a83de686*** 2026-05-03T04:00:16.790Z446Weapons PA2026-35795 e48eac76-dbd6-4a52-ab85-ea28669287b1*** 2026-05-09T03:20:03.650Z481weapons investigation pa2026-37528 7f1d2224-8df6-4606-8735-55b0ea21a5cf*** 2026-05-06T07:43:48.730Z481Weapons Violation PA 2026-36698 67de3761-91a2-46e0-82c5-bc54fac6dbda*** 2026-05-07T03:21:09.041Z1 Welfare check PA2026-37043 e6c049ad-b9a0-4e96-bcd5-22b5897d7413*** 2026-05-13T07:24:25.364Z1 Welfare check PA2026-37043