Sabha, Tamer
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Yadi
Tuesday, September 15, 2026 10:15 AM
PublicComment-AutoResponse; PublicComnnent-AutoResponse Prior, ShannonPublic comment - Pasadena Public Safety Committee - 09/16/26 Public Comment - CPOC 07-09-26 Drone.pdf
[ ,i ] CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe. Report phish using the Phish Alert Button (PAB). For more information about the PAB view article "K30011474" on the DolT portal.
Hi,
Please include my public comment related to the Public Safety Committee Meeting item 2. for September 16, 2026 (drone policy).
It was not carried over from the Police Oversight Commission.
Thanks,
Yadi
(Attachment)-——— Forwarded message ———
From:Yadi -
Date:Thu,Jul9, 2026 at 8:29 AM
Subject: Public comment - Pasadena CPOC - 07/09/26
To: <cpoc(acityofpasadena.net>
Hi,
Please find attached my public comment for the July 9, 2026 Pasadena Community Police Oversight Commission meeting, agenda item 7. Drone Policy.
Thanks,
Yadi
(Attachments: 1)
1 7. PPD Drone Policy
In February 2026, the UC Berkeley Criminal Law & Justice Center presented the report “Drone as First Responder, Policy Review & Recommendations” to the Berkeley Police Accountability Board.
The report is attached.
________________________
Yadi
Pasadena Community Police Oversight Commission
July 9, 2026
7. PPD Drone Policy
DFR??
(Drone as First
Responder)
NO
NO
NO
UC BERKELEY CRIMINAL LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Drone as First Responder
Policy Review & Recommendations
Berkeley Police Accountability Board · February 2026
PRESENTED BY Imaan Maftah · CLJC
3. Empirical Evidence
4. Policy Gaps
5. Constitutional Risk
6. Recommendations
2. Methodology
1. Background & Objectives
SECTION 1
— Background & Objectives
Background & Objectives
1ST 1st AMENDMENT EQ RACIAL EQUITY
The Berkeley Police Department has proposed acquiring a Drone as First Responder (DFR) program. In response to this proposal, the Police Accountability Board (PAB) requested that the UC Berkeley Criminal Law & Justice Center conduct an independent policy review.
This presentation seeks to evaluate the Berkeley Police Department’s proposed Drones as First Responder use policies under Policy 611 and assesses the preliminary analytical framework developed by the Office of the Director of Police Accountability and shared with CLJC in an October 2025 memorandum: • Empirical Verification • Policy and Civil-Liberties Analysis • Transparency and Oversight Framework • Cost and Operational Modeling • Equity and Community Impact • Comparative Benchmarking Background
Objectives
https://unsplash.com/photos/turned-on-drone-rSFxBGpnluw SECTION 2 — Note on Methodology
Methodology
Empirical Effectiveness Analysis
Empirical Effectiveness Analysis was conducted to examine claims advanced by technology vendors and police departments, including performance assertions and data privacy guarantees, by drawing on publicly available crime statistics, drone deployment data, comparative jurisdictional analysis, and peer-reviewed literature Policy Analysis was undertaken to evaluate BPD’s proposed use policies, oversight structures, and documented cost frameworks through a comparative review of peer jurisdictions. The goal was to identify essential safeguards and enforceable provisions that must be in place should the City choose to move forward with approving a Drone as First Responder program.
Policy Analysis
Legal and Constitutional review focused on Fourth Amendment search limitations, First Amendment protected-activities, California privacy law (Art. I, § 1), AB 481 requirements, and CalECPA electronic surveillance provisions were undertaken to evaluate legal risk, case law, statutory interpretation, and municipal policy precedent. See Appendix A for detailed legal framework.
Legal and Constitutional Review
Limitations: The information in this presentation draws on publicly available data from peer jurisdictions, peer-reviewed scholarship and secondary analyses of department flight logs, and findings should be interpreted accordingly. Clearance rate comparisons are descriptive rather than causal. The observed divergence between high- and lowdrone deployment categories may reflect differences in crime type, reporting patterns, prosecutorial standards, or concurrent policy interventions, and cannot be attributed to drone deployment alone without controlled study design and case-level outcome data.
BOTTOM LINE
CLJC Recommends Against DFR Procurement
X
NO EMPIRICAL BASIS
Claims of staffing efficiencies, de-escalation
and safety are not supported by peerjurisdiction evidence and peer-reviewed literature.
SFPD data shows that crime categories with
high drone deployment underperformed by
85.7pp compared to the control group.
!
CONSTITUTIONAL RISK
Potential for significant 1st and 4th
Amendment exposure. Mission creep
documented in many peer jurisdictions.
Policy language alone insufficient—restrictions
must be built into procurement.
?
CRITICAL POLICY GAPS
In December, 2025, the FCC added all foreignproduced drones to its Covered List under the FY2025 NDAA, creating supply chain and
lifecycle uncertainty for BPD's proposed DJI
fleet.
BPD's Impact Statement contains no reference
to the FCC ruling, omits Flock sanctuary law
exposure, and fails to project LTE
infrastructure, data storage, fleet
replacement, or the operational risks the
Covered List ruling creates for long-term
hardware commitments. Fiscal disclosure is
materially incomplete.
SECTION 3 — EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
BPD Claims: Limits of the Available Evidence Thus Far
BPD / BPA Claim Evidence Status Key Finding
Faster Response Times ✓ SUPPORTED Drones arrive 3-5 min faster. Chula Vista: 74% arrive before ground units.
Enhanced Situational Awareness MODERATE Useful in high-risk scenarios. Limited to specific emergencies; raises routine privacy risk.
Improved Crime Clearance ✗ NO EVIDENCE SFPD quasi-experiment: High-drone crimes improved 10pp post-deployment vs. 67.3pp for control group.
Crime/Violence Reduction ✗ NO EVIDENCE No peer-reviewed study demonstrates causal link between drone use & reduced crime rates.
De-escalation & Use of Force ANECDOTAL ONLY Single-incident examples. No empirical data. Denver STAR program shows strong outcomes.
Cost Effectiveness UNVERIFIED No independent audit. Chula Vista's salary-absorption model collapsed. BPD's model mirrors it.
EMPIRICAL DATA — PEER JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
SFPD Drone Deployment vs. Crime Clearance Rates (2023–2025) HIGH DRONE DEPLOYMENT (Treatment Group) LOW/NO DRONE DEPLOYMENT (Control Group) KEY FINDING: High-drone crime categories showed mean acceleration of -85.7pp vs. +29.7pp for low-drone categories — a 115.4pp gap. This is descriptive, not causal, but warrants further investigation before deployment.
Crime Pre-Drone
23→24
Post-Drone
24→25 Acceleration
Robbery +12.1% +1.2% -10.9pp
Assault +264.0% -1.1% -265.1pp
Burglary +11.1% +30.0% +18.9pp
Mean +95.7% +10.0% -85.7pp
Crime Pre-Drone
23→24
Post-Drone
24→25 Acceleration
Rape +17.2% +30.6% +13.4pp
HIT-Inv Srv +19.4% +31.0% +11.6pp
Arson -14.8% +198.9% +213.7pp
Larceny +128.6% +8.7% -119.8pp
Mean +37.6% +67.3% +29.7pp
SECTION 4 — POLICY & FISCAL GAPS
What BPD's Impact Statement Omits
✓ DISCLOSED COSTS
Initial Hardware (Avata 2 + Matrice 4T) $44,500
DFR Lease — Year 1 $100,000
Dock Installation $15,000
Training (12 pilots) $72,000
Annual DFR Lease + Radar (ongoing) $277,000/yr
✗ NOT DISCLOSED / OMITTED
Connectivity / LTE Infrastructure Not quantified
Axon Evidence.com Data Storage Not accounted/omitted
Fleet Replacement (Year 3–4) Not projected
NDAA/FCC Compliance Transition (3 of 4 DJI models added to FCC Covered List Dec 2025) Not quantified
Sanctuary Law Exposure via Flock Platform Not assessed
NDAA Compliance Changes: Three of BPD's four proposed drone models (DJI Avata 2, Matrice 4T, Matrice 4TD) were added to the FCC Covered List in December 2025. BPD's Impact Statement fails to reference this ruling. Within the disclosed 3-year hardware lifespan, these units may face operational and fiscal restrictions requiring premature NDAA-compliant replacement at significantly higher cost.
Sanctuary Law Risk: ACLU investigations document Flock's default agreements may permit data sharing even when agencies opt out. Oakland PD — prohibited by CA law from sharing with federal agencies — allowed federal-marked data access through Flock in 2025. BPD's proposal does not address vendor data access, third-party access, footage storage location, or warrant-compelled disclosure protocols.
Comparable Program: Chula Vista's salary-absorption model failed — City Council approved $1.5M annual investment. BPD's proposed model mirrors the same structure which may prove to be unsustainable in the long-term.
SECTION 4 — USE POLICY ANALYSIS
Policy 611 Strengths & Critical Remaining Gaps
✓ POLICY 611 STRENGTHS (Exceeds Peer Jurisdictions)
Narrow Scope
11 enumerated emergency uses only; no BPD personnel operate drones City Manager Approval Chain
Watch Commander → Chief → City Manager required for each use 60-Day Data Purge
Non-evidentiary footage deleted within 60 days
14-Day Transparency Portal
Each deployment published within 14 days
Explicit Prohibitions
Race, religion, sex, gender identity, economic status, disability targeting banned ✗ CRITICAL GAPS — Must Be Addressed Before Council Vote No Outcome Metrics
Policy 611 does not contain effectiveness benchmarks. No success thresholds or pilot evaluation protocol.
No Vendor Data Controls
Policy 709 does not specify vendor data access restrictions, Flock API sharing rules, or federal agency prohibitions.
No Audio Prohibition
No explicit ban on microphone or audio activation. Could expose the department to suppression risk and potential civil liability under PC §637.2 No Sanctuary Compliance
BMC 13.90 protections not embedded in vendor contract requirements.
No Equity Safeguards
No per-census-tract deployment caps, no demographic flight logging, no disparate impact review.
Mission Creep Precedent: SF flew 78% of drone missions for property crimes (not emergencies) and flew drones at public events (Pride, Dolores Hill Bomb skateboarding event). Las Vegas plans to expand to 24/7 operations in 2026. Policy language alone has proven insufficient.
SECTION 5 — CONSTITUTIONAL & EQUITY RISK
Why These Risks Are Not Hypothetical
1ST 1st AMENDMENT
2017: Alameda & Contra Costa Sheriff's flew
drones over peaceful protests in Berkeley and
Richmond
Departments have classified protest surveillance
as 'public safety' to circumvent warrant
requirements and public record requests
Berkeley must categorically prohibit deployment
at assemblies, not merely restrict it
4TH 4th AMENDMENT
Kyllo v. United States: advanced sensors
(thermal) into homes = search requiring warrant
Carpenter v. United States: sustained tracking of
movements = unconstitutional without warrant
Policy 611's vague authorization language may
create litigation risk
EQ RACIAL EQUITY
SFPD: Drone flights concentrated in Tenderloin,
Mission, SoMa, Bayview — highest minority &
low-income areas
Strong spatial overlap between racialized
neighborhoods and drone deployments
Berkeley lacks any equity monitoring or per-tract
deployment cap in proposed policy
Bottom Line: Berkeley faces potential legal exposure.
ODPA MEMO RESPONSE
Addressing the PAB's Five Key Focus Areas
1 Empirical Verification Unsubstantiated
Clearance improvement, safety and staffing efficiency claims lack peer-reviewed support. SFPD quasi-experiment trends negative for high-deployment crime categories.
2 Policy & Civil Liberties Major Gaps
No audio prohibition, no Flock vendor controls, no sanctuary protections embedded in Policy 709. Protections must be codified in policy. 3 Transparency & Oversight Partially Addressed
Policy 611 14-day portal and 60-day purge exceed peer standards. But no case-level data reporting framework, no demographic logging, no independent audit mechanism.
4 Cost & Operational Modeling Materially Incomplete
BPD discloses ~$277K/yr but omits cellular/LTE infrastructure, Axon storage, fleet replacement, and NDAA compliance costs. Independent CBA required before Council vote.
5 Equity & Community Impact Not Addressed
No per-census-tract deployment caps. No demographic flight logging. SFPD data shows predictable disparate impact pattern Berkeley should anticipate and prevent.
SECTION 6 — RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PAB
CLJC's Staged Recommendation for Council Consideration
PRIMARY: Recommend the City Council REJECT BPD's DFR proposal in its current form. The primary public safety justification is not supported by evidence. Constitutional and fiscal risks are unmitigated. Current and projected fiscal models remain incomplete.
CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION (regardless of any other decision): Categorically prohibit interior drone procurement (drones capable of entering enclosed structures) under any circumstances.
IF COUNCIL DECLINES TO REJECT — Condition Authorization on 3 Mandatory Pre-Deployment Stages:
STAGE 1
Mandatory Risk Assessment
• Independent (non-vendor) constitutional
exposure analysis
• Disparate impact modeling using SFPD
deployment patterns
• Full lifecycle cost disclosure including
NDAA/FCC compliance costs
STAGE 2
Bounded 12-Month Pilot
• Tier 1 emergencies ONLY (violent crime,
fires, SAR) — no property crime
• City-controlled data storage; zero vendor
access; third-party access controls;
automatic sunset
• Per-tract deployment caps + demographic
logging required
STAGE 3
Pre-Defined Success Metrics
• Council must adopt binding thresholds BY
ORDINANCE before pilot launches
• Metrics: response time, warrant
compliance, equity distribution, cost vs.
alternatives
• Data architecture built into procurement
requirements from day one
UC BERKELEY CRIMINAL LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Summary: What the PAB Should Request From
BPD
01 Independent cost-benefit analysis accounting for NDAA/FCC compliance costs, LTE infrastructure, and Flock sanctuary law exposure 02 Supplemental disclosure on FCC Covered List ruling for DJI Avata 2, Matrice 4T, and Matrice 4TD — with replacement cost estimates for NDAA-compliant alternatives
03 Vendor contract provisions explicitly prohibiting data access by Flock/Axon, with termination clauses tied to sanctuary law violations 04 Binding success metrics adopted by ordinance BEFORE any pilot authorization, with data architecture requirements built into procurement specs
05 Per-census-tract deployment caps and mandatory demographic flight logging to enable disparate impact monitoring under Berkeley's anti-discrimination policies
UC BERKELEY CRIMINAL LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Works Cited
Berkeley Police Department. Policy 611: Unmanned Aircraft Systems. City of Berkeley. [Primary policy document — cited directly from text provided.] Berkeley Police Department. Policy 709: Automated License Plate Readers. City of Berkeley. [Primary policy document.] FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. Covered List Update: Foreign-Produced UAS and UAS Critical Components. Federal Communications Commission, December 22, 2025.
FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1709. Pub. L. No. 118-31 (2024).
California Penal Code §§ 632, 637.2. California Legislature SF Gazetteer. "SFPD Quietly Deployed Drones at Outside Lands, Pride, and the Dolores Hill Bomb." sf.gazetteer.co, 2024. https://sf.gazetteer.co/sfpd-quietly-deployed-drones-at-outside-lands-pride-and-thedolores-hill-bomb San Francisco Police Department. "Real-Time Investigation Center." sanfranciscopolice.org. https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/news/san-francisco-police-department-real-time-investigation San Francisco Standard. "SFPD Let Georgia, Texas Cops Illegally Search City Surveillance Data on Behalf of ICE." sfstandard.com, September 8, 2025. https://sfstandard.com/2025/09/08/sfpd-flock-alpr-ice-datasharing/ CBS 8 San Diego. "Chula Vista Model for Police Use of Drones Amid Privacy Concerns." cbs8.com, 2024. https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/investigations/police-drones-chula-vista/509-31530372-818d-4f40- bafb-35f086249bee
FOX5 Vegas. "Gateways to the Sky: Las Vegas Police Announce Next Phase of Drone Program." fox5vegas.com, September 11, 2025. https://www.fox5vegas.com/2025/09/11/gateways-sky-las-vegas-policeannounce-next-phase-drone-program/