Attachment
C
____________________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
TO: Public Safety Committee
FROM: Latoya Patillo, Chair, Community Police Oversight Commission RE: Community Police Oversight Commission Review / Recommendations for PPD’s Energy Assisted Breaching Policy
DATE: September 16, 2026
Purpose
The purpose of this memo is to provide the Public Safety Committee and City Council with an overview of the Community Police Oversight Commission's (CPOC) review process and recommendations regarding the Pasadena Police Department’s (PPD) Energy Assisted Breaching (EAB) policy.
This memo summarizes the review process the Commission used, the community priorities and recommendations developed through that process, and PPD’s response.
Because purchase decisions fall outside the CPOC’s authority, this memo does not make any recommendation regarding whether EAB technology should be acquired or deployed.
Background
Section 2.60.110 of the Pasadena Municipal Code stipulates that a key function of the CPOC is to provide input on police department policy. Consistent with that responsibility, the CPOC adopted a structured process for reviewing policies related to new and emerging law enforcement technology or equipment.
This process is initiated when PPD notifies the CPOC of equipment or technology it intends to procure, or when the CPOC independently identifies an item for review. Once initiated, the CPOC Chair may form a temporary ad hoc committee to conduct research and develop recommended community priorities to be addressed by the relevant policy.
These draft priorities are then presented to the full Commission for discussion and consideration.
After the Commission adopts the priorities, they are transmitted to PPD for consideration during policy development. PPD then drafts a proposed policy and presents it to the Commission, which may approve it or offer recommended revisions. A memo summarizing the Commission’s action—whether approval or recommended revisions—is subsequently forwarded to the City Council.
As an advisory body, the CPOC does not have authority to require PPD to adopt its recommendations. PPD may accept or decline any recommendation in whole or in part.
The City Council, either directly or through its Public Safety Committee, may also evaluate and provide input on community concerns and policy issues.
PPD recently expressed interest in procuring Energy Assisted Breaching (EAB) technology. Under the CPOC’s review process, an Ad Hoc Committee was convened to develop community priorities regarding PPD’s potential acquisition and use of EAB. The Commission adopted the Committee’s recommendations at its June 11, 2026, meeting and submitted them to PPD. PPD presented its response and draft EAB policy at the August 13, 2026, meeting, and the Commission voted to approve the draft policy.
Community Priority Development Process
The Ad Hoc Committee, in consultation with Independent Police Auditor Teresa Magula, reviewed policies from other jurisdictions, analyzed relevant legal frameworks, and examined best practices and emerging standards related to EAB. This included review of National Tactical Officer’s Association standards, nationwide special team / SWAT standards, guidance from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and findings from civil rights and civil liberties organizations. The Committee also considered pending state legislation, Senate Bill 937, which concerns the use of flash bangs and explosive devices; while the bill does not specifically regulate or directly reference energetic-assisted breaching, it was included for consideration because it reflects broader legislative scrutiny of explosive tools in law enforcement operations, which may inform policy development and oversight in this adjacent area.
The Committee’s discussions centered on balancing legitimate public safety needs with the imperative for clear limitations, strong safety protocols, transparency, and accountability measures that reflect community expectations, as we currently understand them.
Because energetic-assisted breaching tools are classified as “military equipment” under California Government Code § 7070 et seq. (AB 481), any potential acquisition by the PPD would be subject to the statute’s enhanced transparency, oversight, and approval requirements. These include preparation of a detailed military equipment use policy, public notice, a dedicated community engagement process (typically including a publicly noticed town hall or similar forum), and ultimately formal consideration and approval by the City Council at a public meeting. In light of these mandated, multi-layered opportunities for public input and deliberation, the Committee determined that conducting a separate survey or additional standalone outreach at this stage was not necessary, as the AB 481 process itself is designed to ensure robust community awareness, participation, and policy scrutiny prior to any procurement decision. 2 The committee developed a set of recommendations organized into seven community priority areas (the full listing is included as Attachment A):
1. Safety and Operational Planning
2. Purpose and Use Limitations
3. Training
4. Privacy and Civil Liberties
5. Authorization and Documentation
6. Evaluation and Accountability
7. Equity and Community Impact
At its June 11 meeting, the CPOC reviewed the Ad Hoc recommended community priorities for the EAB policy and, after substantive discussion, voted unanimously (9–0, with two commissioners absent) to adopt them.
Pasadena Police Department Response
At the August 13, 2026, CPOC meeting, PPD presented its proposed EAB policy along with a detailed response to the Commission’s recommendations. PPD agreed with and incorporated the majority of the CPOC’s seven recommendations. However, the department expressed disagreement with certain elements under the “Privacy and Civil Liberties” category and did not agree with the recommendations under “Equity and Community Impact.”
The presentation gave Commissioners an opportunity to discuss these areas of disagreement directly with the department. The Commission appreciates PPD’s willingness to engage in this collaborative process and to offer detailed explanations of how community priorities were addressed during policy development.
Following this discussion, the Commission voted (7–0, with one abstention, two absences, and one vacancy) to approve PPD’s draft EAB policy. 3 Attachment A
Community Priorities for Energy Assisted Breaching Technology Policy EAB involves the use of explosive and non-explosive materials to create an opening in a door, window, wall, or other physical barrier in order to gain entry. This is distinguished from other methods law enforcement might use to gain entry, such as mechanical breaching. This document details the community’s priorities regarding authorized uses, limitations, and documentation procedures to ensure safety, accountability, and compliance with applicable laws and department protocols.
1. Safety and Operational Planning
a. EAB shall be used only when reasonably necessary to achieve rapid entry to address an immediate safety risk and when reasonably available alternatives have been considered and determined to be ineffective, unsafe, or impracticable under the circumstances.
b. EAB use shall be consistent with use of force principles, including necessity and proportionality, taking into account blast effects, fragmentation, and secondary impacts.
c. Operational planning shall include:
i. identification of and incorporation into tactical planning of any known or reasonably anticipated occupants; and whether any of those occupants might be considered “vulnerable individuals” (persons who, due to age, physical or cognitive condition, or situational factors, may have a reduced ability to protect themselves from harm or respond safely during a tactical operation);
ii. assessment of fire hazards in the building or surrounding environs, hazardous materials, and structural risks; and
iii. development of a medical and fire response plan.
d. EAB shall be used only when the risk of imminent harm and threat to life outweighs the risk of injury to occupants, officers, bystanders, and surrounding structures. Additional precautions and reasonable alternatives should be considered when the risk of harm from EAB may be higher, for example:
i. near crowds, public gatherings, or demonstrations;
ii. where children or other vulnerable individuals are known to be present;
iii. in sensitive environments (e.g., multiunit housing, locations with known occupants not connected to the incident).
2. Purpose and Use Limitations
a. Each use of EAB shall have a clearly stated and documented purpose tied to a specific “high risk” operational objective.
b. Use of EAB shall be limited to circumstances involving a “high risk” situation, namely:
i. hostage rescue;
ii. barricaded or armed suspects presenting an immediate threat; or imminent threats to life or officer safety.
c. EAB shall NOT be used in any incidents without a clear and immediate safety concern. For example:
i. for routine warrant service;
ii. for immigration enforcement actions; or
iii. for generalized entry convenience
d. Policies shall clearly define what constitutes a “high risk” situation, such as the examples above, to ensure consistent and limited application. e. Policies shall define the conditions under which EAB may be used in mutual aid operations or at the request of outside agencies, including required approvals, role clarity, and documentation. Even in mutual aid, PPD should not use EAB absent a “high risk” situation.
3. Training
a. EAB shall be used only by personnel who have completed specialized training and certification.
b. The department should restrict EAB use to specific units or individuals who have additional training in “high risk” situations, i.e., Special Weapons and Tactics Teams.
c. Training shall include:
i. breaching methods and charge construction;
ii. scenario-based decision making, including when EAB is not appropriate;
iii. risk assessment for occupied and surrounding environments; and iv. coordination with fire and medical personnel.
d. The Department shall maintain records of training, certification, and recertification and ensure ongoing proficiency through periodic training requirements.
4. Privacy and Civil Liberties
a. EAB operations shall be conducted in a manner that minimizes unnecessary intrusion into private spaces beyond what is required to achieve a lawful objective.
b. Planning shall account for:
i. proximity of adjacent residences or units; and
ii. potential impact on uninvolved individuals.
c. EAB shall not be used in a manner that unnecessarily impacts individuals not connected to the operation.
d. Where feasible, entry methods and points shall be selected to reduce impact on neighboring units and uninvolved occupants.
5. Authorization and Documentation
a. EAB shall require explicit authorization from the SWAT commander, incident commander, or designee, who is trained in its use. b. Operational plans shall document the
i. authorizing supervisor;
ii. designated breacher;
iii. intended entry point; and
iv. tactical rationale, including assessment of a “high risk” situation. c. Each EAB deployment shall be documented in an after-action report. d. Documentation shall include:
i. the purpose and justification for EAB use;
ii. alternatives considered, assessment of vulnerable persons, and the basis for selecting EAB;
iii. the authorizing supervisor;
iv. a description of the deployment, including entry point and method; and
v. any injuries, fire incidents, or property damage.
e. The Department shall maintain a centralized record of all EAB uses, including both training and operational deployments.
f. The Department shall track and report each EAB deployment in a manner consistent with California law, including inclusion in military equipment reporting and governing body review.
g. Access to EAB related records shall be limited to authorized personnel and retained in accordance with applicable record retention requirements.
6. Evaluation and Accountability
a. The Department shall establish a formal review process for all EAB deployments to include:
i. compliance with policy use criteria;
ii. whether the use met necessity and proportionality standards; and iii. adherence to planning and safety requirements.
b. To the extent practicable, this review should be conducted by a supervisor who was not directly involved in the operation.
c. The review process should be available for review by the Independent Police Auditor (IPA).
d. The Department shall designate a responsible unit or supervisor to oversee:
i. policy compliance;
ii. training standards;
iii. documentation and audit functions;
iv. whether deployments remain consistent with defined high-risk thresholds; and
v. whether any policy, training, or procedural modifications are necessary.
e. The Department shall comply with all applicable California laws governing reporting and oversight of military equipment, including Assembly Bill 481 (AB 481).
f. There will be a community Town Hall to comply with AB481; that forum will also inform policy and practices.
g. The Department shall provide publicly available, periodic reporting to the CPOC and/or City Council summarizing:
i. the number and type of EAB deployments;
ii. general circumstances of use;
iii. compliance review findings; and
iv. any corrective actions taken.
7. Equity and Community Impact
a. The Department shall collect and periodically review data regarding EAB use to assess potential disparities or patterns in deployment. This review should include geographic distribution of deployments and the types of incidents in which EAB is used.
b. The Department should consider community impact, including property damage and impact on occupants and neighboring residents.