RBFD Assessment Report and Appendices FINAL — Redondo Beach City Council, April 19, 2022

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE

REDONDO BEACH FIRE

DEPARTMENT
Prepared by:

Interim Fire Chief/Police Chief Keith Kauffman
Retired (LAFD) Chief Deputy Joe Castro

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………….02
FOREWORD BY THE INTERIM CHIEF………………………………………………......……..04 FOREWORD BY CHIEF CASTRO………………………………………………..………………...06 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY………………………………………………………...………..07
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………...……………………………………………………….09

1. CITY LEADERSHIP………………………………………………………….……………….….10

2. RBFD MEMBERS…………………………………………………………….………………...14

3. THE COMMUNITY………………………………………………………….………...……...19

4. PRIORITY MATRIX…………………………………………………………….…………...….23

5. LEADERSHIP, VISION, REORGANIZATION: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH….24

6. EFFICIENCY AND THE SERVICE DEPLOYMENT MODEL………………….......36

7. RESPONSE TIMES…………………………………….………………………………….......52

8. TRAINING………………………….………………………………………………………...……60

9. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT………………………………………………………..…..63

10. COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT…………………....66

11. POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY………………………….………70

12. PREVENTION………………………………………………………………….………………...73

13. HARBOR PATROL…………………………..………………………………………………....76

14. OTHER OBSERVATIONS………………………..…………………………………………..87
CONCLUSION……………………………………………….…………………………………………….91
APPENDICES…………………………………………………………………….………………..………93

INTRODUCTION
Following the retirement of the Fire Chief, a study to assess the RBFD was directed by City Management. The goal of this assessment is to:

1. Determine the current state of the RBFD and provide recommendations for improvements and efficiencies.

2. Research, survey and interview City leaders and community stakeholders to document their perspectives and expectations of the RBFD.

3. Identify a benchmark of fire department related operations that City leadership can use to evaluate services of the RBFD, any future studies of the LA County Fire Department, or any local regionalization with other fire departments.

4. Utilize the assessment’s document to assist the City of Redondo Beach in determining the most desirable qualifications and skill sets for the next Fire Chief.

5. Serve as a transition document for the new Fire Chief.

To complete the assessment objectively, Redondo Beach Police Chief Keith Kauffman was appointed as Interim Fire Chief to replace the recently retired Fire Chief. Chief Kauffman immediately began the search for a subject matter expert (SME). After speaking to a few different candidates, he was eventually referred to Joe Castro, a retired Chief Deputy of Emergency Operations for the Los Angeles Fire Department. After a couple of interviews, it was determined that Joe Castro had over thirty eight years of experience with 15 of those at the chief officer level. Chief Castro is a nationally recognized instructor and SME, as well as a highly respected leader in the fire and emergency medical service (EMS) who specializes in strategic, tactical, and operational leadership and advanced emergency management. Chief Castro was the chairperson for the LA Area Fire Chiefs Operations committee and developed the LAFD’s “FireStat” process for a data-driven review of all areas of emergency operations. It should be noted that in addition to his stellar reputation and impressive qualifications, he is a resident of Redondo Beach and expressed a genuine interest in assisting Chief Kauffman with the completion of this assessment to help insure the best possible outcomes for the future of Fire and EMS in the City. Chief Joe Castro was hired as a part-time Program Coordinator on March 27th, 2021, and work on the project began.

In the United States there are no federal or state government requirements for a minimum level of fire services. It remains a local choice for each community to consider and fund as it deems necessary. While there are several formal accreditation and standards of coverage systems that suggest an approach to fire resource deployments and organizations, there is not a one-size fits all prescriptive formula, thus allowing for local determination. Within this approach (either comprehensive or informal) each agency can match local needs (risks and expectations) with the costs of various levels of service. In an informed public policy debate, a governing body or council essentially “purchases” the fire and emergency medical service levels the community expects, needs and can afford.
2 It is also important to remember, the body of regulations for the Fire service provides that if fire service is provided, it must be done with the safety of the firefighters and citizens in mind.

These Standards are primarily documented in the National Fire Protection Association Standards (NFPA), and under California State Law. In certain aspects of the Fire service including prevention and inspections, the agency having jurisdiction (AHJ) is mandated by law to report certain levels of compliance, however, as stated earlier, there are no mandatory federal or state regulations directing level of service, fire service response times, or outcomes. It is against this backdrop that the assessment of the Redondo Beach Fire Department was conducted. 3 FOREWORD BY THE INTERIM FIRE CHIEF
It has been an absolute honor to serve as the Interim Fire Chief throughout the course of this assessment. My passion for public safety, current position as the Police Chief, and long-time resident of Redondo Beach, puts me in a unique position to conduct an unbiased and objective assessment of the RBFD. I would even argue that my unique perspective has afforded me the opportunity to ask some hard questions and examine processes that may be regularly overlooked. I want to personally thank retired Chief Deputy Joe Castro of the Los Angeles Fire Department who eagerly accepted the offer to assist me with the assessment. Although recently retired after over 38 years with the LAFD, Chief Castro elected to continue his service, but this time in Redondo Beach, where he is very proud to reside. Chief Castro is a nationally recognized subject matter expert in the field, and his contributions and executive level insight will prove instrumental in the future of the RBFD.

The solid character and unwavering commitment of the members of the RBFD is immediately clear. We have incredible people and the City should be very proud of the professionalism, compassion, and technical capabilities of the RBFD. There is no doubt we have an excellent fire department. The problem, as I have discovered, is the City and community don’t really know what they do. The nature of the fire service in general and the culture in RBFD are more closed off and guarded than I, our community and our City leadership would like to see. Having spent nearly 28 years in law enforcement, and 6 years as Police Chief here in Redondo Beach, I still didn’t really know much about what the fire department really does or is capable of doing. The members of the RBFD understand this but both City leadership and the community are still left in the dark. In my brief term as Interim Fire Chief, immediate changes have been implemented as seen through this report. My hope is that this assessment provides a blueprint to help further open the doors of the fire department and the culture, and provides a clear path for better communication with City leadership and engagement with the community, ultimately resulting in facilitating a better value to the residents. My eyes have been opened to a new world and I’ve been humbled by the chance to work with these consummate professionals who are vital to our community.

Throughout this process, I have continually reminded myself not to compare the fire department (FD) to the police department (PD). However, because of my access to Chief Castro and my new relationships with neighboring Fire Chiefs, I have been able to validate some of my questions and concerns and see many of the best practices in the fire service that have been implemented in other locations. In this assessment, I limit those comparisons but I will take some liberty in making a few important observations from my outside perspective.

When I started in the post Rodney King era of policing in Los Angeles County, it was an “us versus them” culture. Doors were closed, information to the public about processes and procedures were held as sacred, and we policed reactively, responding as we wanted to, not really concerning ourselves with the expectations of the community or city leadership. This attitude and repeated mantra of “because we are the police” was often a typical response or 4 justification to scrutiny. In policing we have learned many things the hard way. Today’s best practices in policing are the exact opposite and I am willing to debate anyone that does not believe that openness, communication, proactivity, agility, innovation and true community engagement are the keys to a successful law enforcement deployment model. We have learned to tell our own story early and often, no longer relying on the media to tell it for us. We have learned that real discussion and relationship building in the community is best done before the crisis and not during or after it.

During my tenure as Interim Fire Chief an issue I’ve seen with the Fire service, both in general, and specifically in Redondo, is that these hard lessons have yet to be learned. Fire services and the RBFD have used the self-imposed role of "consequence manager only" creating a reactive environment and culture that is a barrier to engagement, innovation and change. Scrutiny may not be on emergency responses, but I’m clearly seeing that local scrutiny of the fire department is afoot, mostly because of an uncertainty of the return on investment. During recent fiscal and cultural uncertainty, one might expect councils would focus on police budgets. Yet, those police agencies that have put in the work and made the relationships, are being staunchly defended by their citizens and those that have not, are being defunded. There is a clearly defined value that goes beyond any cost analysis. In many communities, this tangible value provided by law enforcement is very visible and rooted in mutual respect with community stakeholders in constant communication and contact with their police departments. For the first time, at least in my career, the attention is potentially shifting in many of our communities, to Fire.

Heroic events like 9/11, annual major California wildfires, and the fact that the nature of the fire service is helping people in need, has made it much easier for Fire to rest on their laurels, never really being questioned by the community, City leadership or forced into change by legislation.

While law enforcement is proactive, I see Fire culture sitting back, relying on systems, methods and traditions built on reacting to fires when the data clearly shows that is a very small part of what they actually do. I know it will be challenged, and it should, but my opinion is the Fire service and RBFD should take some cues from law enforcement and begin to act now before a situation or event causes a level of societal scrutiny, forcing the FD into a reactive response rather than a calculated proactive implementation of greater efficiency that could begin today.

You will never be able to convince me that it is a good idea to roll two paramedics in a rescue rig, one captain, one engineer and one firefighter-paramedic in an engine (or even worse a ladder truck), and two contractacted emergency medical technicians (EMTs) in an ambulance to a basic life saving (BLS) call for someone with a minor injury. Yet here in Redondo, we do this about 15 times a day rather than questioning the decades old system and seeking best practices and potentially new operational efficiencies. I, and others, believe there is a better way, but what worries me is the reluctance and courage to try it. Fire unions have codified these old systems, schedules and minimum staffing models into MOUs, thus hardening the walls around any chance for change. I will call on the next Fire Chief to possess unwavering and decisive leadership skills coupled with the willingness and guts to question current systems and view our Department’s future potential through a lens that is not clouded by tradition. The Redondo Beach community deserves this.
5 FOREWORD BY LAFD CHIEF DEPUTY CASTRO (RET.)
I would like to thank Interim Fire Chief Keith Kauffman for his leadership and partnership in this endeavor. He is the epitome of a contemporary public safety executive: extremely competent, innovative, receptive to the community and elected officials, listens to subordinates, and courageous.

It has been a distinct honor to assist in the assessment of the Redondo Beach Fire Department.

Our mission was to conduct an objective evaluation of the current state of the RBFD. The goal of this report is to offer suggestions which will position the department for future success and thus enable them to provide a premium-level of public service to the citizens of Redondo Beach for decades to come.

A reflective look shows just how much the fire and emergency services have evolved in the last two decades. From the equipment in use, new applications in technology, changes in the workforce, use of social media, the speed of information, and the shift and increase in the calls responded to -- all have made for a dramatic difference as southern California Fire Departments have transformed into the 21st century fire-EMS and emergency services. A recent national report identified these forces impacting all professional fire departments over the next 20 years; Inclusiveness, Re-Identification, Culture, Robust use of data, Health & Wellness, Partnerships, Sustainability, and Technology. Additionally, the report found most of the nation's fire departments are slow to respond to the speed of their changing and evolving missions. Of course, any organization that experiences significant change must understand their capacity to digest such change in a manner that benefits the unique community they serve. The “art” will be for the RBFD to celebrate their rich heritage of fire and EMS service, but also fully embrace and recognize that services provided have evolved and will continue to experience significant changes for the next 20 years.

Getting to know the members of the RBFD has been a source of great joy to me both professionally (as a former career firefighter) and personally (as a lifetime South Bay resident and current Redondo Beach resident). Almost without exception, I found all members to be resolute public servants and committed professionals. One of the limitations of a report that offers suggestions for improvement is that the report rarely focuses on the many good things an organization is doing. Rest assured, the RBFD is a very good fire department. Having taught fire leadership in 48 of our states, identifying any department as “good” is not something I take lightly. As a resident, I feel safe and protected.
6 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The ultimate goal of any emergency service delivery system is to provide sufficient resources (personnel, apparatus, and equipment) to the scene of an emergency in time to take effective action to minimize the impacts of the emergency. This need applies to fires, medical emergencies, and any other emergency situation to which the fire department responds.

Obtaining and understanding the desires and expectations of the community, its stakeholders, and the City’s leadership is an important, yet often overlooked, first step. The RBFD should be committed to incorporating the needs and expectations of both the residents and policy makers in the service delivery planning process. This means that to complete the assessment thoroughly, there are three main stakeholder groups of interest to focus on:

1. City Leadership - to include the Mayor, and the elected members of the City Council, City Manager, Assistant City Manager and the City Attorney

2. The RBFD Members - to include all sworn and civilian personnel

3. The Community - to include community stakeholders, business owners, families, the School District, and a City-wide survey
In addition to the broader study of the RBFD, a focused assessment of the RBFD Harbor Patrol (out of Fire Station 3) was conducted using the same principals. Because the Harbor is a unique micro-community within Redondo Beach with special interests, needs, and emergency responses, the same three pronged approach was taken. From the City Leadership perspective we added members of the Harbor Commission to the stakeholder group, from the Harbor Community we added boaters, marina and yacht club leadership, and from the RBFD we spoke with the members assigned to the Harbor, Fire Station 3.

Using the information gained through interviews and surveys in this three tiered approach, we have developed priorities and concerns (also referred to as future performance goals) for many of the services RBFD provides. These priorities were established by reviewing the content of the interviews and surveys as explained by the different tiers and giving particular attention to those things that were brought forward by a majority of people in one particular tier, or more importantly when the priority or concern was highlighted in two, or sometimes in all three stakeholder groups.

For increased objectivity, the priority areas were developed independently by each of the authors, after detailed review of the interviews. Each of the stakeholder groups had consistent themes based on concerns and expectations that helped to develop the Priority Matrix (see page 23). Priorities or concerns, raised by the stakeholders that didn’t rise to the level frequency to be included in the matrix, can be found in the Other Observations (section 14 on page 87).
7 Once the priority areas were established, we compiled data where applicable on various aspects of the RBFD to provide decision makers with the hard facts rather than anecdotal stories. The priority areas and complimenting data further define the quality and quantity of service expected by City leadership, and the community, and consistently pursued by the Redondo Beach Fire Department.
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The following abbreviated list of recommendations are meant as an executive snapshot and are general in nature. Each of the recommendations are described in more detail in the body of this report.
● Select the new Fire Chief with the following skill sets: strong and participatory leadership, Southern California fire department knowledge, operational and training expertise, administrative ability, emergency management experience, receptive to innovation and change, experience and willingness to engage with elected officials and members of the public and business community
● Develop a new mission/vision and strategic plan for the next three years ● Reorganize the ancillary administrative duties and potentially the schedules of all chief officers to better accomplish the priorities identified in this report ● Develop a proactive system to increase diversity within the RBFD ● Hire additional administrative/clerical staff
● Update all administrative policies/directives/manuals ● Establish department-wide standard operating guidelines for all tactical operations ● Have RBFD continually monitor/evaluate/measure and improve how long it takes to arrive on-scene when called to an emergency
● Have the RBFD take the lead in the City’s emergency management continuum ● Develop a robust community relations/public information program ● Explore EMS dispatch protocols and the service delivery model for better efficiency and work-load relief
● Redefine the Harbor Patrol’s mission and deploy accordingly ● Implement a fire explorer/cadet program
● Leverage community volunteers for various emergency and non-emergency functions ● Explore cooperative agreements with neighboring south bay cities to share executive personnel, logistical and resources/facilities
● Analysis required to plan for future infrastructure costs and needs ● Develop a system to realize grant funding opportunities ● Realize more local and regional training opportunities for RBFD members ● Encourage RBFD members participation in the CAL OES ROSS system as single resource & Incident Management Team participants
● Evaluate statistical data of current company-based fire prevention policies. Determine ways to streamline and reduce workload on fire/ems resources.

The blueprint for the future of the RBFD is found in the pages that follow. Each RBFD member gave honest input, and their voices are highlighted throughout the report. The next Fire Chief will undoubtedly investigate and develop his or her own vision for the future of the RBFD.

Hopefully, with the information contained within the assessment, the voices of our City’s leadership and our community will be heard and included as part of that vision moving forward. 9 1. CITY LEADERSHIP
During the interviews with City Leadership, we inquired about their expectations for Fire and EMS service in the City. The respondents were open to provide insight on their personal experiences with the RBFD from the perspective of a city management position or as an elected official. It was also important to gain information on what they know or hear about from their constituents in each district and also their personal perspective as a resident of the City.

Although stakeholders were invited to provide input broadly, specific questions posed can be found in Appendix 3. After compiling the responses from each of the interviews, the listed priority areas were consistently brought to our attention:
**NOTE: Statements and quotations provided during interviews and surveys are merely a basis for the creation of priority areas to focus on. They should not be considered factual unless proven by further investigation, data, and evidence.

Priority #1 - Response Times
RBFD arrives at the scene of an emergency as quickly as possible “The number one thing is that they get there as quickly as possible.” “Fast response times are very important.”
“The Chief should be evaluating the response times against the national standards.” “How do we compare locally?”
“Response times appear to be good, I don’t really hear any complaints.” “Can’t we have Fire rigs out and about so they can respond quicker?” “District 5 is maybe not served well.”
“I’ve had fantastic experiences and fast response times with paramedics.” “I think we can have a better, enhanced delivery.”
“Are there any performance goals?
“I never hear any complaints from the citizens.”
Priority #2 - Training
That the members of the RBFD are well trained and well equipped “The members need to be highly trained.”
“Firefighting Skill is very important.”
“They should be properly trained and have the tools to do their job well.” “The FD did not codify standard operating procedures for the decrease in personnel on the ladder truck. They can get there, but can they act?”
“Well equipped and trained is the most important thing” “We should have a dedicated training officer.”
“I worry about an earthquake, tsunami or festival.”
“Without a consistent training officer, every individual captain has people train on the way things should be done.”
“We need realistic and accountable training models to combat stagnation.” 10 “We should have SWAT medics, hazmat training, and a dedicated training officer.” “I just want what is good for the fire fighters. They should have everything they need.” Priority #3 - Leadership
RBFD should have solid and proactive leadership
“I want to see proactive management looking for outside opportunities.” “I shouldn’t be going to the FD with ideas. They should be bringing them to us.” “Things haven’t changed in the RBFD.”
“I expect innovation.”
“The leadership has not been running a quality service.” “They need clearly defined rules and regulations and standard operating procedures.” “Are we moving forward or are we stagnant?”
Priority #4 - Policies, Procedures, Accountability
Standard Operating Guidelines, Department Policies, Operations Manual, Rules and Regulations should be updated and completed
“Some of them are more interested in their side jobs and taking off months at a time.” “We have to examine their model and rules for deployment.” “I’ve got big issues with the Harbor Patrol.”
“Aren’t their policies from like the 1950’s?”
“It seems like every personnel issue in the department comes out of the Harbor.” “The residents have no idea how bad it is.”
“The place really seems to run like a fraternity.”
Priority #5 - Efficiency and Costs
That the RBFD is efficiently organized, managed and cost effective “I don’t support the 24-hour shift model for division chiefs.” “I like the idea of an administrative merger with Manhattan and El Segundo.” “They say they need another fire station.”
“The inspection program is a disaster.”
“Our residents feel the over-response. How many firefighters show up?” “I get complaints about the ladder truck rolling to routine medical calls.” “Why do we need so many trucks for each call?”
“We need to have a smarter organization.”
“They have great customer service with the businesses.” “I want them to be on top of emerging EMS trends.”
“I don’t know if the fire stations are located properly.” “We need to look at every organizational option, I have not seen one option that works.” “It seems that consolidating some resources with the other cities could create better efficiency.” “How to organize the best fire department without going to the County.” “I don’t want to lose our fire department, but I want to explore the County's options for efficiency.”
11 “The current mutual aid agreements with surrounding agencies and the County give a big bang for the buck.”
“I would like to explore the benefits of a shared public safety model with Police and Fire” “This is not a cost reduction exercise, but I want to make sure we’re cost effective.” “Cost is very important.”
“Overtime is out of control.”
“There are MOU issues with respect to overtime.”
“We need a modern fire department.”
“This is not about cost. We need to give them what they need.” “I want to see a better service for a lower cost.”
“We (the City) should be working with the lifeguards in the Harbor” “Our FD does not do a good job of cost recovery.”
“They don’t write grants.”
“The FD does not use ICS (incident command system) well and there is a ton of money missed in cost recovery.”
“I want to know that they are fiscally responsible.”
“The County offers some things that we don’t.”
“There are major deficiencies in their staffing levels and overtime costs.” “Cost is very important. Especially PERS costs.”
“We have aging facilities that must be addressed.”
Priority #6- Emergency Management
RBFD takes the lead in the City for Emergency Management and Planning in the City
“No Emergency Management oversight.”
“During the pandemic I was not as confident with the FD as I was with the PD. I felt like the Fire Chief had checked out.”
“The FD just outright failed at COVID.”
“Emergency management? This is a failure of the FD and also a failure of the City.” “The RBFD was silent during the entire COVID crisis.”
“The inspection program has problems.”
“CERT (community emergency response team) is very important but I don’t think much is happening with it.”
Priority #7 - Communication and Engagement
RBFD communicates and engages with the community and city leadership “We have very limited communication with the Fire Chief.” “I want to know about the big calls.”
“There should be better communication with the FD and other city departments.” “I see the County getting more involved in the community like with Junior Lifeguards.” “They need to have a stake in community engagement.”
“Outreach is very important.”
“I have not been invited into the Fire stations and I have very limited communication.” 12 “Their outreach is terrible.”
“Community outreach could be a little better.”
“Do things worthwhile in the community.”
“Redondo does outreach pretty well: CERT, station tours, community events, community relief foundation.”
“I perceive a lack of collaboration with the City.”
“Is the department progressive on community outreach? No.” “They are more interested in protecting the legacy of their MOU than thinking about what’s in the best interest of the residents.”
“The community doesn’t know them.”
“I was invited to train with them in 2009.”
“I only really have communication with the Union.”
13 2. RBFD MEMBERS
We interviewed every member of the RBFD and some more than once. They were free to express anything of concern at the department including their perspective on the things and services that the FD does very well. Interview topics covered the levels of service provided, job satisfaction, future challenges and areas for improvement (topics covered are illustrated in Appendix 3) Members with specific operational or technical concerns were directed to interview with Chief Castro. The interviewees were very open, receptive, and honest throughout the process and the following priority areas were abundantly clear:
**NOTE: Statements and quotations provided during interviews and surveys are merely a basis for the creation of priority areas to focus on. They should not be considered factual unless proven by further investigation, data, and evidence.

Priority #1- Training
Increase the amount, quality, quantity and organization of operational training “My biggest complaint is that we do not train enough.”
“We’re really great at EMS, but we don’t prepare and train our members nearly enough for fires and other emergencies.”
“Our training breeds inconsistency.”
“We don’t have enough fires to keep our skills proficient, and we also don’t train enough to compensate for lack of activity.”
“There must be a continuity of training.”
“We need a department training officer.” (high frequency response) “We do way too much busy work, and not nearly enough training.” “Quality training depends upon the station and shift you work, it’s not organized, and not uniform department wide.”
“We choose prevention over training.”
“Why do I have to be trained as a captain by only one Division Chief? What if I don’t agree with that leadership style and I’d like to learn from others?” “Why do we have to pay out of pocket to attend leadership classes?” “We need more avenues for growth. We are not allowed to be a ‘single function resource’ to gain expertise.” (high frequency response)
“This department does not do a lot of leadership training. We have to do that training on our own time and hope that it is reimbursed.”
“The thing that keeps me up at night is an active shooter. Why aren’t we training with the police department on this?” (high frequency response)
“We just need time, sets, and repetition.”
“I’m terrified of a school shooting or active shooter. We need TACMED (tactical medicine or integration with a SWAT Team).”
14 Priority #2 - Policies, Procedures, Accountability
Standard Operating Guidelines, Department Policies, Operations Manual, Rules and Regulations all updated and completed
“We do not have uniformed standard operating guidelines department wide. It’s different from shift to shift and Captain to Captain.”
“Our manuals and operational books haven’t been updated in many years. They’ve been replaced by a series of memorandums and letters that don’t make any sense.” “Hopefully Lexipol will take care of the mess our department books are in.” “We need to hold members accountable, but can’t do that because our policies are not updated or written down.”
“We don’t have much knowledge on FFBRA (firefighter Bill of Rights Act).” “There is no real punitive discipline.”
“We don’t train supervisors how to handle personnel matters.” “If we had rules, regulations, and standardized procedures, this could be a premier Fire agency.” “Members need to be held accountable for their behavior and lack of operational skill.” “We don’t really have a discipline system.”
“To be honest, I’m not really sure about how to handle personnel issues.” “There have been lots of personnel issues in the Harbor. There is too much freedom and some don’t take it seriously enough.”
“In the past, some chiefs were just out to get people.” “Training is needed in the discipline process.”
“Department admin must take ownership of problems, and problem employees.” “Things get swept under the rug.” (high frequency response) “Chiefs take no action and there is little accountability at the captain level.” “We don’t have a department safety officer that is responsible for safety concerns.” “We need a document to guide us in terms of the department's overall direction.” Priority #3 - Leadership, Vision, Reorganization
Solid visionary leadership to reorganize and provide continuity between all three platoons

FIRE CHIEF
“The former Fire Chief was hired by a different city manager to maintain the status quo.

Expectations have now changed with new city management.” “The former Fire Chief was ‘absentee’ in his last year.” “He was disconnected from the crews.”
“The DC’s need to know what the goals and expectations are.” “We just never really saw him.”
“He just gave everything to (one division chief).”
“We can be the very best, but we need clear expectations from the top.” “We need a doer.”
15 “We need someone to set the vision.”
“We need a strong Chief that will keep the division chiefs in line.” “It would be helpful to have updated core values, department goals and objectives. It’s important that everyone has a say in developing these, not just one guy.” “It would be nice if we had one unifying mission.”
“We need the right type of leadership to get the guys out there.” “We need a strategic plan.”

DIVISION CHIEFS
“Too many hens in the hen house. We feel the tension between Chiefs.” “Everything is run by one guy on one platoon. The other two platoons are on their own.” “Restore the Deputy Chief and reduce the Division Chief (DC) to BC’s (Battalion Chiefs).” “The captains have autonomy, but only depending on which DC they work for.” “A visiting DC to a shift is an outsider.”

CAPTAINS
“We used to have empowerment, but not so much anymore.” “I see some real inconsistency in the captains. Some are relaxed.” “Autonomy varies from Captain to Captain and shift to shift.” “Let the Captains do their job. We don’t need a DC on every call.” “Our job is defined by tasks, not leadership.”
“We don’t need a DC on basic calls.”

FIREFIGHTER-PARAMEDIC
“I do not feel consistency between shifts.”
“It’s almost like we have three different departments. Each Platoon is very different from the other.”
“We should explore a ‘shift bid’ system.” (high frequency response) “The three-man truck is understaffed and dangerous.”
“Why haven’t we really hired in ten years?”
“The union negotiated away our fourth person on the truck.” “We have three separate departments; three shifts.” (high frequency response) “Ideas don’t really start at the bottom.”
“Guys are handcuffed. They want to do more.”
ADMIN
“We are falling down administratively.”
“We’ve gone from five admin staff to 1.5.”
“The DC’s do all of the admin work.”

IN GENERAL
“There should be better communication.”
“Too much red tape here. Everything has to be vetted.” (high frequency response) “How can we be better organized with what we have?”
16 “We need the right type of leadership to get the guys out there.” “Our normal doctor we see for orthopedic injuries is usually the one that cares about our mental health and recognizes when there is a problem.”
“Supervisors don’t recognize the signs when employees are having problems.” “We need a peer support unit.” (high frequency response) “We have a great culture and treat each other well.”
“The department needs some bragging rights.”
“I’ve watched the slow decline. We’ve had the same staffing since the 70’s.” Priority #4 - Fire Prevention
Reduce the amount of fire company-based fire prevention inspections “Fire prevention is important, but we do so much of it. It takes away from our ability to do other things.”
“Fire Prevention takes a higher priority than training.” “I know Fire Prevention brings in revenue to the city, and it is important, but we are buried in it.” “We used to have inspectors do a lot of the fire prevention inspections, now it’s nearly all up to the firefighters.”
“We choose prevention over training.”
“Fire prevention is a mess.”
Priority #5 - Efficiency
Maintain the highest standard of EMS but look for deployment efficiency “We have a very high level of patient care and customer service.” “I’d like to see us shift to a community paramedicine model.” (high frequency response) “Our service levels are above and beyond and always have been.” “Proper staffing on the floor is the greatest single thing we can do to improve service.” “Response times could be cut down if we would stop using this ‘response package’.” “We over-respond to everything.” (high frequency response) “Put a fire engine on the Northrop property.”
“Lack of staffing is our biggest problem.”
“The rescue can’t cancel the response of the engine.”
“We don’t have tiered dispatch and are so far behind the curve.” “Get rid of an engine and add a rescue.”
Priority #6 - Engagement
Greatly increase community engagement with outreach and events “We used to do a lot more community outreach before COVID. We’ve gotten away from that.” “We need to be more visible in the community.”
“We don’t participate enough in community events. Before COVID, we had a big role in the Beachlife festival. That was one of the best things we ever did.” “I don’t think the community knows what we do.”
“The community has no idea what we do.”
17 “We need more engagement to help gain interest in the FD.” “The Council and the public don’t know what we do.” (high frequency response) “City hall and the elected officials have very little understanding of what we actually do.” 18 3. COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS
Discovering the community’s expectations of their public safety agencies is paramount. To gain their perspective and insight we interviewed key stakeholders that represent families, the school district, businesses, commissioners, and some of our engaged and active community members. In order to broaden our outreach, we contracted with ZenCity, a data gathering and surveying company, who currently works closely with the police department to constantly monitor community concerns as well as the levels of trust and safety felt by the residents. A survey tool was sent out over social media platforms to residents and also provided via a link and QR code on the City website. The Mayor and Council were all provided with the link to send to their constituents. The survey questions and the results can be found in Appendix 2. As a result of our work with the community, the following priority areas were abundantly clear:
**NOTE: Statements and quotations provided during interviews and surveys are merely a basis for the creation of priority areas to focus on. They should not be considered factual unless proven by further investigation, data, and evidence.

Priority #1- Response Times
That the RBFD arrives at the scene of an emergency as quickly as possible “The most important thing is that they get there fast when we call 911.” “When we call, take it seriously.”
“We should meet NFPA standards, or at least be accountable to reaching the standards through formal audits of response times.”
“Let’s add local response times of other FDs into a report so that we can see how we compare.” “Has anyone studied if there is a lowering of response times based on all the traffic calming measures being placed in the City?”
“We should exceed national response times.”
Priority #2 - Efficiency
That the RBFD is efficiently organized and responds efficiently “I see that huge truck on basic medical calls. Is that the best use of our resources?” “That truck has a pretty big footprint. There must be better standards for our resources.” “I see an over-reliance on mutual aid in the City. It’s fine during slow times but we would be challenged during busy times.”
“We should look to form some automatic aid agreements, especially in the north end.” “There should be an analysis on the workload, transports, and recovering costs for transports.” “It seemed like the last chief was politically motivated and making decisions more on politics than true public safety.”
19 Priority #3- Emergency Management
That the RBFD take the lead in the City for Emergency Management and Planning
“There has not been much planning. How do we evacuate the Harbor during a tsunami?” “I’m worried about the active shooter, earthquakes, and the pandemic. They should be educating and preparing the community.”
“Who has the lead during a disaster is what is important.” “I was on the Disaster Council during the pandemic, but to be honest, I can’t remember if the fire department was even on there.”
“During COVID, I didn’t hear a thing from the FD. Big opportunity missed.” Priority #4 - Engagement
Actively communicate and engage the community, providing training, education and outreach
“(A division chief) reached out one time and wanted to get the fire department involved, but nothing ever really came of it.”
“They need to get on the radar.”
“The firefighters should be in the schools, kind of like a school resource officer from the police department.”
“I don’t see or hear much about them. There should be a stronger presence when there isn’t a problem.”
“They should have a presence amongst our youth.”
“When people see a fire truck, they think there is a problem and someone is hurt. If they were more proactive, maybe they’d realize it’s not someone hurt.” “Because I don’t see them much, I don’t really know what they do.” “I’d like to see them humanize and personalize the badge.” “They should have a junior fire academy.”
“Get out and do CPR training.”
“Make some relationship deposits.”
“Does the FD even show up to diverse community events? People need to know and see if there is a place for them in the FD.”
“Tell people what you do.”
“Why was it the PD and not the FD teaching first aid in all of the schools?” “We must have a way to attract new talent to the FD.”
“The next Chief must reflect the values of the community. Even if they don’t live here, they must be in the community, in our schools, in our churches.”
“We need someone that is relatable to the community, that can envision where we will be in 3-5 years.”
“The FD lacks diversity. This goes back to a values issue. We can do better.” Priority #5 - Prevention
Provide greater value while doing prevention and inspections 20 “I think they are very good on the prevention side. I actually like the inspections and the process.”
“I’d love to see some training for our restaurants. It would be great to see them interact with staff and be able to ask them questions about safety.”
“The FD is absent from development decisions.”
“I would like to see more input from the FD early on projects. This is much more important than inspections after the fact.”
ZenCity EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Details of the entire ZenCity survey on the RBFD can be found in Appendix 2. An executive summary of the data is as follows:
21 General Summary
Relatively low awareness to the fire department, especially among women, young and Non-white respondents 1
Very high sentiment - the fire department is perceived as having an important role in the community and residents are satisfied with the department’s response. Lower levels of satisfaction among Female, young and resident living in the 90278 area 2 3 Fire suppression and EMS were rated as the most important roles of the fire department. Evaluation of fire suppression was somewhat lower and therefore is the major service to focus on
Overall, very positive evaluation of services (86% - 98% satisfaction). 5 Additional insights:
4 Ø Familiarity is positively associated with sentiment, especially for women.

Ø Diversity is important for 60% of residents, especially for the younger generation.

Ø Meeting the National Industry Standards and having paramedic training for Firefighters was important to the majority of residents Figure 3.1: ZenCity Survey Executive Summary 22

PRIORITY MATRIX GRAPH
By examining the various priority areas mentioned most frequently by City leadership, the RBFD members and the community, it became apparent that some of the priorities or goals were important to all three stakeholder groups. All categories were a priority for two or more of the groups as can be seen in Figure 4.1 below.

It should be noted that just because you don’t see an ‘X’ in a priority area for a particular group, doesn’t mean that it wasn’t mentioned or that it is not important for that group, but rather that it was not commented on frequently enough to become one of the narrowed down goals for that group. For example, Departmental Reorganization and Leadership inside the fire department is obviously important to our community, but they wouldn’t necessarily know the inner workings of the FD, so their responses would be categorized under other topics like Efficiency or Communication and Engagement. Another great example would be that the RBFD members are obviously concerned about their response times, but because they do a good job in this area and rarely get complaints, it doesn’t come up as a leading topic of discussion for that group.

Figure 4.1 Identified stakeholders priorities
There is no doubt however that when it comes to the priorities of efficiency and service delivery and levels of communication and engagement, all groups unequivocally cited these as important priority areas. Areas highlighted by each tier, when unanimously consistent across the board, provide a clear insight and opportunity for immediate action.

This assessment should serve as the bridge between past gaps in communication that led to the creation of these priority areas. These priorities serve as the structure for the topic area discussion and we will now dive into each area and outline a series of recommendations that provide a clear and succinct set of action items for the future fire service in Redondo Beach. 23 4. LEADERSHIP, VISION, REORGANIZATION:

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Currently the RBFD’s executive/management branch consists of one Fire Chief, three Division Chiefs (DC), one full time Administrative Analyst and one part time Office Assistant.

FIRE CHIEF
The Fire Chief is an at-will employee and works “regular business” hours on a 9/80 schedule consistent with City management and City Hall. As described by the RBFD members, City leaders, and community, there was a disconnect in communication and face to face interactions with the Fire Chief. After interviewing every member of the FD, it was stated almost 100% of the time that their Chief was a very nice man, but was not a visible leader and had minimal interactions with the members of the agency. Some noted that he preferred to work behind the scenes and was just never given credit for the many things he did for the organization. His style was referred to as “old school” and those close to him said his loyalty to the City and the profession was profound. Some members expressed that he was not willing to fight for what they needed, be the face of the department in the community, or tout, acknowledge and communicate their many successes. Alternate perspectives claim that his genuine humility kept him out of the limelight. Whatever the case may be, a diminished physical presence was described as one of the reasons that the community and City leadership have a limited knowledge of what the RBFD does.

All of the ranks at the FD were frustrated with a common refrain heard from the Chief upon the proposal of an idea or change; “That has to be vetted.” Any leader would admit that when seated at the top of any organization, the lens through which decisions are made has a wide view that includes what is good for the whole agency and the community or customers that they serve. Therefore, ‘vetting’ ideas or any change is warranted. In the case of the RBFD however, this phrase was perceived as a tactic to avoid action on any creative ideas, change or innovation.

Some staff members commented that the Fire Chief “never went across the hallway” (there is a hallway that separates the executive offices from the fire station). Many of the rank and file members said that the Fire Chief rarely visited the fire stations and rarely showed up at the larger emergencies. It was interesting that at least one Division Chief, when asked about the duties and responsibilities of the Fire Chief, described him as a “City Hall Fire Chief,” meaning (presumably) that most of his time was spent at City Hall. Not only would this concept be illogical for a small fire department like the RBFD, it does not align with the interviews of the elected officials from City Hall who had little to no interaction with him.

With the Fire Chief being the only sworn executive that works regular business hours, the onus of developing the strategy and executing the managerial functions rests solely with that 24 position. It appears that inattention to executive leadership resulted in “best effort” actions by the three Division Chiefs, each taking on work separately and without coordination, to the best of their skills and abilities, with predictable results.

If we had to point out one single thing that was discovered in our research that has held the RBFD back and stagnated forward progress, it would be based on the imbalance between the three Division Chiefs. Through our interviews we discovered that the RBFD does not have a department vision, or a call to action of who they are and where they are headed. There are no defined goals or a 3 or 5 year strategic plan. Even though there is a written Mission Statement, nobody really knows it and there are not any sort of standardized operating procedures, guidelines, or even policies that truly codify the mission. Without defined expectations, the Division Chiefs were left on their own accord. Unfortunately, nearly everyone agrees that the RBFD is broken up into three different fire departments, or three different shifts (described below), with three different leaders with differing amounts of power, setting three different sets of expectations. This friction and somewhat of a power struggle, colors most of the important issues in the department and unfortunately casts a negative shadow on the personnel. During interactions with our neighboring fire departments, it appears that imbalance between division chiefs and their three separate shifts (details to follow) is a systemic problem at smaller municipal fire departments.

This mantra of having three distinct departments runs deep in the agency, everyone knows it, and everyone mentions it. This was exacerbated by what was described to us as a void in leadership that was ultimately filled by one Division Chief who worked hard to try to fill the leadership gap in the agency and was therefore seen by the agency as the ‘de facto Chief’ of the organization. Fast forward a few years using this formula, frustration continued to build, with further imbalance and resentment in the Division Chief ranks, both for the Fire Chief who failed to address the issue, and between each other. Unfortunately, history has repeated itself through multiple sets of Division Chiefs over multiple years and the imbalance and infighting has become the cultural norm. All the way down to the lowest and least tenured ranks in the organization they will say, “we feel the tension between the Chiefs” or “unless you are on one particular shift you won’t be able to get anything done.” Most of what we discovered with respect to the imbalance and ensuing power struggle between the Division Chiefs should not be attributed to them personally, as they were just filling the void and left on their own accord without defined direction or expectations.

Because the agency was so outwardly frustrated with the imbalance, we investigated further and it was discovered that the former Chief had in fact directed one DC to assume the role of the lead DC, somewhat like filling the non-existent position of Assistant Chief. This was done for succession planning, because of this DC’s administrative experience, and because the former Chief was planning to retire. The act of putting someone on point to run the agency is fine, but unfortunately, this was never communicated to the other DCs or the rest of the agency. The result is an unfortunate situation where one DC believes he is doing the right thing by assuming additional responsibilities as directed, and the rest of the agency sees these additional actions as someone who is overstepping his position and rank.
25 Based on the many interviews with City leadership, we also discovered a lack of communication from the Fire Chief. With elected officials, there seemed to be a greater level of communication between the Redondo Beach Firefighter Association (RBFA) members than with the Chief himself. Some City leaders wanted to see new ideas and innovations come from the Chief and the department, yet they felt as if they themselves were the ones asking questions and bringing ideas forward. Elected officials said that there were no regular briefings or updates on major department activities. At the beginning of the pandemic crisis one elected official described the Fire Chief’s (and RBFD) leadership as “silent and non-existent.” Overall, the general consensus was that City leadership was left in the dark regarding the fire department and any of the valuable information they did get was coming directly from the members themselves.

From the community’s perspective, they don’t really know the Chief and rarely saw him. Even during times of great concern like the COVID-19 pandemic, they mentioned that an opportunity was missed by the fire department. Our community is yearning for further engagement by the fire department. They want to see them in our schools, teaching first aid and CPR. They want to interact with them during inspections and not just get a bill. They want them involved in the culture of Redondo Beach and they want a Chief that is relatable to that culture. They want youth programs and additional information on this incredible public safety career. This chart from the ZenCity survey answers the question, “What role do you think the fire department should play in the community?”
Figure 5.1 ZenCity survey responses on desired role of RBFD in the community 26 It is interesting to see that Community Engagement and Education are seen by the community as two of the top five responses, even rated higher than medical aid which we know represents 70% of the department’s calls.

The Fire Service is what we call a “team sport.” Public safety agencies must relay and help one another without question for the safety of their communities. This requires a culture of inclusion in the bigger picture. Neighboring agencies say they felt and saw regional support at the Division Chief level, but not necessarily from the Chief. He was not known as a leader locally, or in the region. Many of these things will be detailed in other sections, but we would be remiss in highlighting that all of the things cited here start and end with the Chief.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Set a department vision and do department specific strategic planning with defined objectives.

2. Focus on providing value to the community. Explore what you can do rather than focusing on just what you have to do.

3. Set expectations for the executive level command and balance their work and influence and hold them accountable to their operational area.

4. Never condone infighting at the executive level and require them to work as a team.

5. Visibly lead the agency from within and outside the walls of the department.

6. Identify leaders and future leaders in the FD and mentor and prepare them to lead the department.

7. Be the face of the department in the community. Spend time and be relatable to all of the community stakeholders, micro-communities and special interest groups. Know what their expectations are and foster an environment that shows the community and city leadership what the agency does and is capable of.

8. Communicate often with City leadership. Make them a part of the organization.

9. Be the department’s best cheerleader and advocate. Share successes and fight for the things that will make the community safer.

10. Actively participate in the Fire Service leadership both locally, regionally, and even nationally, opening up the agency to additional growth opportunities.

DIVISION CHIEFS (DC)
Each of the three Division Chiefs are committed to the department, and steadfast in their own way, to its improvement. They are generally well liked by the immediate subordinates on their platoon, but not necessarily on the other platoons where members stated “a visiting DC to a shift is an outsider.” Two of the Division Chiefs have been observed working a significant number of hours outside of their normal platoon duty schedule to accomplish and contanstantly catch up on some of their ancillary administrative duties. In fact, one of them works nearly 7 days a week. Each of the Division Chiefs are committed professionals willing to do whatever is necessary to accomplish their jobs.
27 The three Division Chiefs work the department’s 24-hour platoon duty schedule which is arranged in a 48/96 configuration (48 hours “on'' and a 96 hour “off” format). The rest of the Captains, save for one, and the Engineers and the Firefighter-Paramedics (FFPM) are on the same 48/96 schedule, broken into three platoons: A shift, B shift, and C shift. To clarify, a DC on ‘A shift’ would start work at 8:00 AM on a Sunday, and go off shift at 8:00 AM on Tuesday. After being off for four days, they would return to work that next Saturday and go home on Monday.

Week three of the deployment would then start on Friday and end on Sunday morning, and so on, following this six day or 48 on, 96 off cycle. We noticed rather immediately that this sort of schedule for all of the Chief level executives of the department is very inefficient and causes dysfunction. Take the work scenario above and assume that we need one of the three DCs to attend an important meeting on a Wednesday or Thursday. One of three things will happen:
they will come in on a day off to attend the meeting, we will have to schedule the meeting over three weeks out, or whoever is working that day will just handle it.

Each of the DCs are responsible for supervising the line-functions of the department consistent with their individual platoons. There are five Captains on duty every shift, at the Department’s 3 fire stations. These Captains provide direct oversight of the department’s rank and file at emergencies and all other non-emergency duties and responsibilities. Additionally, each of the Division Chiefs have assigned ancillary administrative responsibilities that are defined as follows:

Division Chief – 1, A Shift Division Chief – 2, B Shift Division Chief – 3, C Shift Operations Prevention / Fire Marshall EMS & Special Services Figure 5.2: RBFD Shift Master Calendar
28 This very simple fact about the schedules worked by the DCs should paint a clearer picture of how this contributes to the “three separate departments” scenario. If you are a Division Chief, you are either at work all the time doing all of the things under your purview, both operational, administratively, or even clerical, or another chief that is working that day will just have to take up the slack. As soon as the slack is taken up, the imbalance of work and perceived power begins. To be fair, at least two of the DCs will attest to the fact that the 48/96 platoon schedule provides the best work/life balance for them and their families, but we assert that this is only accurate when those DCs are sticking to that schedule and aren’t constantly forced into the station on their days off. Good public safety agencies have learned to concern themselves with the wellness of their employees, paying particular attention to fatigue and the negative impacts it can have on decision making and having a balanced personal life. What often goes unaddressed, is having the same level of concerns for Chief Executives of these agencies. This is a major concern.

One of the negative side effects of this is that the reality of the division of work is unequal amongst the three. Rather than a logical 33% 33% 33% split, it is perceived by the members to be more like a 60% 30% 10%. Most members of the department will say that one DC has actually become the de facto Fire Chief, and 100% of what occurs in the organization must go through that DC. As described in the aforementioned section, some of this added responsibility was actually given to one DC without telling the rest of the agency. The actual stated work assignments or titles given to the DCs should represent a 33% 33% 33% split, but we are here to discuss the reality of what we have discovered. Based on the amount of time the DCs are working beyond their scheduled platoon shifts, there is a gross imbalance, and the metrics used to evaluate a chief’s effectiveness or performance should not include how often they must work outside of their normal deployment days.

We heard many instances of the job title “DC of Operations” essentially being redefined to include most everything happening in the agency, because as the saying goes within the walls, “everything is part of Operations.” Without clear communication, the imbalance causes agency confusion at all levels. We don’t believe this uneven division of work was completely legislated by the previous Fire Chief. This entire issue may have just been a natural evolution of circumstance or an unintended consequence that became more and more prevalent the closer the Fire Chief got to his retirement. Any student of leadership knows that when leadership ceases to exist, someone will have to fill the void. Another more critical notion of thought is that one’s leadership is best defined in its absence. Meaning, looking at how an agency or group functions after the departure of a leader is a good measurement of the former leader’s effectiveness.

The uneven workload, purposeful or unintended, has resulted in an uneven division of power in the DC ranks. This was either condoned, or naturally created by necessity because at least one DC figured that it was actually his responsibility to run the agency. We’ve heard many different versions for the cause, but what is important in this analysis is that this phenomena has created the agency’s biggest problem.
29 It also became immediately clear that because the department no longer has adequate civilian administrative staff, many of the daily responsibilities have fallen on the DCs. Examples would be the Operations DC ordering uniforms and equipment, the Prevention DC spending hours on clerical billing issues, or the EMS DC completing the details of regular audits of supplies.

Having three DCs assigned to 48/96 hour shifts provides for a 24/7 response to major fires, rescues, or multiple casualty incidents. The culture and decades-old system in the RBFD is that the DC, because of the current schedule, is now always available to respond and this is 100% true. When they are needed, they are needed. For perspective, this chart shows exactly how many times a DC responded to calls each year:
*Reports run for 12 month period beginning July e.g. 07/08/2020-07/07/2021 ** BC61 - apparatus manned by Battalion Chief/DC
Figure: 5.3 RBPD Annual Division Chief Response Rate
Taking the latest data from the chart above (7/08/2020 - 7/07/2021), a Division Chief responded to calls 321 times in a year, or less than one a day. A close analysis of the data was done to determine which of those 321 responses*** was actually required based on the following call types run through RB Dispatch:

Figure: 5.4 Standard Division Chief Level Response Call Types That analysis tells us that the DC’s responded 321 times but were actually required on 78 calls. There were 7273 calls from 7/08/2020 - 7/07/2021. DC’s responded to 4% (4.41%) of total calls and were only required on 1% (1.07%).
30 We will make the argument however, that with five Captains (front line supervisors) on at all times, the DCs may not be needed on a 24/7 basis. Our RBFD Captains are more than capable of attending to command and control of a significant incident until such time as a Battalion Chief from a neighboring city or one of our own on-call Division Chiefs are to arrive at the scene.

When DCs self-dispatch on calls they justify it as quality control and support, but from the perspective of the captains and crews, it is seen as micromanagement and a lack of trust. DCs are really needed for command and control when it involves multi-company coordination.

Putting the DCs on 40-hour work weeks and on-call for emergency response during the evening would be controversial inside the agency and the intent of the language in the RBFA MOU would have to be analyzed (see below). However, the infrequency of the large-scale emergencies in the City and need for a 24/7 DC, must be carefully weighed against the City’s needs and the Fire Chief’s need to run a modern day fire department. Industry standards, even in busy areas, is that one Battalion Chief can cover 6 to 12 stations over a geographical area the size of the entire South Bay.

It should be noted that the 24-hour availability of a DC to respond to calls is currently tied to the MOU between the RB Firefighters Association and the City:

1.06 In addition to the 18 suppression personnel minimum on each shift, the parties agree to one Redondo Beach Fire Department Chief Level Officer available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to immediately respond, with the initial dispatch, to any emergency within the City.

Depending on the intent of that MOU language, one could argue that with today’s technology, a DC could be at home (if within a defined radius) in an ‘on-call’ status and still “immediately respond with the initial dispatch, to any emergency within the City.” Bureau Commanders, Police Captains, and the Police Chief, currently receive real time text alerts from dispatch on calls that reach a certain level of significance and merely respond from home when needed.

We would describe the current workload of the DCs as “high” based on the current set up of the agency, but we found that the content of that work causing it to be high, may not be the best use of a chief executive officer. This is caused by their primary function of being a daily platoon commander that is reactionary to the radio or what is generally occurring that day like training or a vaccination clinic. Because they do not have any administrative civilian support, they are constantly dealing with the minutiae of their commands, rarely spending adequate time doing chief-level leadership in the agency. An executive level chief should be spending much of their time looking forward into the future, planning, preparing for trends and getting out ahead of potential issues. Because this was not being done by anyone in the organization, stagnation set in, and important organizational aspects like hiring, the management of time off and overtime, budgeting, community engagement, training, grant writing, innovation, operational efficiencies, policies and procedures, wellness, emergency management, and countless other things fell by the wayside. By flipping the job responsibilities and focus of the DCs, many, if not all of the agency’s concerns would be addressed.
31 When a DC is on duty, it is clear that they see their first responsibility as listening to the radio and monitoring the calls that go out. Through the data, it was determined that about 109 calls per year out of 7128 total calls (5-year averages) or 1.5% actually require a DC to respond to the scene. Another way to look at this is that a DC is actually required to respond to 109 calls per year or one call every 3.3 days.

Because of the Fire industry’s (and RBFD’s) high level of importance given to the Incident Command System (ICS) and a very rank specific hierarchy at emergencies (unlike law enforcement), when DCs self-dispatch to calls when their crews do not consider it necessary, the message received in the organization is that the DC is now in charge and that front line supervision is not trusted. There are new models that could be employed that break from the ICS model and provide greater efficiencies. One such idea will be addressed later, the Tri-City Concept allowing multiple cities, experiencing similar challenges, to share resources including but not limited to DCs.

An unfortunate phenomena was discovered related to ideas and progress that don’t seem to take hold because what is constantly said is, “the City won’t let us do that” or “the City won’t support that” or “the City won’t fund that” or some other similar phrase pitting the City against the agency. We heard this countless times during our interviews and Interim Chief Kauffman heard it consistently during the budgeting process. Our opinion is that this ethos is believed inside the RBFD, but erroneous. We have discovered that “the City” has not been made aware of what the issues are and nor have the needs of the agency been adequately communicated, or backed up with sufficient data. Simple things and technologies that will save more lives in the City have not been acted upon based on this false, yet perceived lack of support. Examples would be the funding of additional Auto Pulse CPR devices, or Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) training for dispatchers. To our knowledge, City leadership was never given the data, explained the benefits, or even approached for the funding, yet it was said unequivocally that “the City won’t support it.” In fact, the City did support those things once they were apprised of the information and allowed the chance to ask questions and to fund them. We understand that the implementation of these programs and equipment is a lot of work, but that is what we believe our chief executives should be focused on rather than the next radio call.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Work as one team. Collaborate but clearly differentiate responsibilities.

12. Regardless of schedule, focus forward or “forward and around the corner.”

13. Work with the Chief and push to provide the information needed by City leaders to make decisions about special programs, budget, or future concerns and issues that will move the agency forward and provide better value in the community.

14. Consider splitting the 48 hour shift between two of the platoons. For example, one DC could work the A/B shift, one the B/C, and one the C/A. This would break up the leadership and increase continuity.
32 15. A. Run a pilot program placing all Division Chiefs on a standard 40-hour work week, possibly covering the weekends with a rotating on-call nighttime status; OR
B. Maintain the DCs on the 48/96 schedule but change the division names and reorganize the duties to the fit the department’s priorities (see example); and Maintain the DCs on the 48/96 schedule but clearly regulate their work hours to include sleep, meals/breaks, training and administrative hours as shown; 33 OR
C. Participate in a multi-city pilot program with a shared DC or battalion chief that will cover the on-scene emergency needs of the participating cities. Then put the other two DCs on a standard 40-hour work week and define their administrative responsibilities; (Preferred; see further details in Tri-City Concept).

16. Rotate Divisions or responsibilities approximately every two years to broaden experience, promote equity in the rank, and give the members different leaders.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
The mission of the Redondo Beach Fire Department is to “serve the community by protecting life, property, and the environment through prevention, education and emergency services.” Emergency response resources are commonly considered the key assets in meeting the goals of the RBFD’s mission statement, but an equally important asset in the Fire Department operational structure is the Agency’s administrative staff, but currently better described as a lack of staffing and resources.

Prior to the 2009 recession and resulting budget cuts, the Fire Department administrative support team consisted of (6) employees: (4) full time positions – an Executive Assistant to the Fire Chief, Administrative Specialist – Fire Prevention/Special Services, Administrative Specialist – Operations/Harbor, and Administrative Analyst, and (2) part time clerical positions at Fire Station 1 (FS1) and Fire Station 3 (FS3) to support the public access counters.

The current fire department administrative staff consists of (2) full time administrative personnel – one Administrative Analyst and one Administrative Specialist, and (1) part time position handling payroll. These members are responsible for duties including, but not limited to: public reception, inquiries, and assistance; budget management; records management in the categories of recruitment, staffing, training, and medical reports; payroll submission; document preparation; agency voicemail and email routing; and additional support duties, as required by each of the RBFD organizational divisions. As a result of the reduction in administrative support 34 personnel, the Fire Chief and Division Chiefs are required to perform many administrative functions that were previously assigned to support personnel.

It is inefficient to run the agency with the current staffing of administrative personnel. Chief Kauffman constantly relied on police department administrative resources for added assistance in his role as Interim Fire Chief when it came to day-to-day scheduling, hiring, billing, grant writing, training, and countless other things that came up. Funding saved by decreased administrative staffing to the assist the Chief (e.g. an executive assistant), to assist the Division Chiefs (e.g. another administrative analyst or office manager), and to assist in State required inspections (e.g. full or part time inspectors), has greatly hindered efficiency and caused people in highly paid positions like the Chief and DCs to spend far too much time on the minutiae instead of focusing forward and running a premier fire agency.

The three staffing recommendations below are the bare minimum required for the fire department to function effectively through the coming years and to assist the department through any transitional period. There will be discussion later in the report of creative staffing solutions but they will be complementary to, not instead of, the recommendations below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17. Immediately hire additional administrative staff. Refer to City of Redondo Beach Proposed Budget FY2021-22, Decision Package #32 and Budget Response Report #24 of the FY2021-22 Fiscal Year Budget (Appendix 5 and 6).

18. Hire full-time or some part-time civilian fire inspectors to free up the sworn crews from the current amount of time they spend on state required inspections. Refer to Decision Package #32 (Appendix 6) and Budget Response Report #23 of the FY2021-22 Fiscal Year Budget (Appendix 5).

19. Create an internship program and/or a Fire Explorer program to help assist with additional administrative needs while at the same time providing an additional way for the community to find a path into the FD.
35 6. EFFICIENCY AND

THE SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL
The RBFD has a complement of 59 sworn members broken down into the following positions:
● (1) Fire Chief
● (3) Division Chiefs
● (13) Fire Captains
● (3) Deputy Harbor Master/Boat Captains
● (12) Fire Engineers
● (24) Firefighter/Paramedics
● (3) Harbor Patrol Officer
_____________
(59)
The RB Firefighters Association’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Appendix 10) with the City calls for the minimum staffing of 18 suppression personnel plus 1 Division Chief on each of the 3 shifts. Therefore, 57 sworn personnel are assigned to shift work, and the remaining Fire Chief and a Fire Captain assigned to Prevention are the only other remaining sworn personnel.

SWORN STAFFING AND THE MOU
To have an understanding the service delivery model for both fire suppression and emergency medical service (EMS), one must understand the how the below stated MOU with the City codifies daily personnel numbers:

SECTION 1 - FIRE DEPARTMENT SUPPRESSION MINIMUM STAFFING Effective the first full pay period of July 2020 through the expiration of this Agreement:

1.01 Fire Department Suppression Minimum Staffing: Shall mean the number of Fire Department positions authorized. The predetermined number of fire suppression personnel on each shift is 18 personnel minimum. At the conclusion of this Agreement, the predetermined number of fire suppression personnel on each shift will be 19 personnel minimum.

1.02 Minimum staffing for a Fire Department Engine company shall be three personnel: one Fire Captain, one Fire Engineer, and one Firefighter/Paramedic.

1.03 Minimum staffing for a Fire Department Truck company shall be three personnel: one Fire Captain, one Fire Engineer and one Firefighter Paramedic. At the conclusion of this Agreement, minimum staffing for a Fire Department Truck company shall be four personnel: one Fire Captain, one Fire Engineer, one Firefighter Paramedic and one Firefighter. In the event the City's 36 one remaining Firefighter as of July 1, 2020 returns to work during the term of the Agreement, the City will utilize him as additional staffing above the 18 person minimum).

1.04 Minimum staffing for a Fire Department Paramedic Rescue shall be two personnel: two Firefighter/Paramedics. RBFAMOU July 1, 2020 - June 30, 2024 36 RE0S0\038\9340000. v 1-7 /29/20

1.05 Minimum staffing for a Fire Department Harbor Patrol Boat/Harbor Patrol Squad shall be two personnel: one Deputy Harbor Master/Boat Captain and one Harbor Patrol Officer.

You will see in the paragraphs that follow, that there are numerous ways to create new efficiencies and save hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars, but nearly everything about the service delivery model is tied to the MOU in some way. The rigidity of the schedule, 24 or 48 hour overtime coverage, and a complement of personnel equal to the required number for minimum staffing is costing the City millions in overtime. We additionally discovered that some of the sections in the MOU are potentially creating other unintended consequences that will be discussed later. For perspective, at 2:00am on any given day, there are about 6-7 sworn police officers (supervision included) working. At that same hour, there are 19 sworn firefighters (supervision included).

During the 2020 negotiations between the RBFA and the City, it was agreed that there would be a reduction in the complement of 6 firefighters in exchange for 3 firefighter-paramedics. The outcome of this reduced staffing on the ladder truck from 4 personnel, to 3. One less person on the truck for three shifts is equal to the net 3 person reduction, which reduces mandated costs associated with overtime. This ‘ladder truck’ issue will be discussed further in other sections, but from this, there is actually now another potential unintended consequence involving staffing that could negatively affect the perception of the department. It should be noted that hiring only firefighter-paramedics can enhance service capability and streamlines recruiting.

However, by losing the firefighter positions and converting them to firefighter-paramedics, the size of the applicant pool is drastically decreased.

SWORN STAFFING BUDGET AND EXPENSES
Minimum staffing requirements in the MOU also have a tremendous impact on the personnel budget/overtime, forcing the replacement of all suppression personnel, including the DCs, for a full 24 hours, or 48 if the entire shift is vacated.
37 * All data taken from Opengov.com https://redondobeachca.com/ Figure 6.1: RPFD FY 2018-19 Actual Personnel Expenses
There are a few minor exceptions to the minimum staffing rules, but anytime someone is on sick leave, family sick leave, vacation leave, compensatory time, administrative leave, holiday, or injured on duty (IOD), they are replaced on overtime. More importantly, failure to maintain 100% staffing in the FD means that every day a position is held vacant it is filled 100% of the time with overtime. When overtime is equal to half of full time salaries, something is drastically wrong.

We would argue against the old adage of it being cheaper to hire people on overtime rather than fill vacant positions. First, the agency was experiencing an extreme amount of ‘burnout’ and morale issues because personnel were almost constantly being mandated to work the unfilled overtime to meet the minimum staffing requirements. The wellness of the staff is far more important than their opportunity to work overtime shifts. The lack of employee wellness programs in the FD was mentioned so frequently, Interim Chief Kauffman arranged for immediate peer support team training by the PD’s psychologist. Running 10 positions short for extended periods of times quickly becomes unhealthy and even dangerous for public safety personnel forced to make life or death decisions. Employee wellness must be prioritized above overtime.

Even at full staffing, there will almost always be someone that is out on leave due to an injury or otherwise. Having a complement equal to the exact number that must be minimally staffed per the MOU wreaks havoc on the department’s overtime. Another potentially indefensible position for the City occurs if the community questions the salary of a line level firefighter making an additional $200,000 in overtime or the perception of them making more than the City Manager, year over year.
38 Here are the FD’s overtime costs over the past 5 Fiscal Years:

Figure 6.2: RBFD Overtime Costs Over Five Year Period
On average, approximately $146,000 of the above numbers are reimbursed each year, mostly through the State for mutual aid response to wildland fires. In a later section, you will see some egregious examples of overtime in the Harbor where $438,000 was spent to support only 6 personnel.

Secondly, the true costs of running the agency were blurred when money from personnel cost savings, not used to cover overtime, became the actual means of payment for important programs, contracts, equipment, and standard maintenance and operations line items. This was mostly corrected by the City in the FY2021-22 budget process, but a failure to do so would have caused a glaring deficit once the cost savings were wiped away by filling all of the vacant positions.

SWORN STAFFING RESPONSE TYPES
The RB Dispatch receives approximately 7200 calls for the fire department per year broken into the following call types:
* Harbor Patrol was not actively reporting their self assigned activity to Dispatch until 2018 Figure 6.3: Breakdown of Fire Department Call Types
39 The topic of efficiency came up often during interviews with every stakeholder group. From the perspective of the City’s leaders, they lacked confidence in the department’s executive leadership team’s ability to provide an unbiased and ongoing analysis of operational efficiencies, because whenever questioned, the responses would include things like, “The County’s EMS rules are very complicated” or “our response models are out of our control.” There was a general concern from City leadership that the RBFD was over-responding to calls and using certain apparatus like the Ladder Truck on medical calls. In fact, many of the Fire Department members told us that they over-respond to everything. This was also a recurring concern we heard from the community both during interviews and through the survey.

Part of this problem is not unique to RBFD, but rather systemic throughout much of the fire service with respect to EMS response and is deeply rooted in tradition. An honest and tenured fire executive will tell you that many fire departments today still use a 100-year old response model based on responding to fires, when 70% of the actual work is a medical-based response.

Figure 6.4: RBFD Calls for Service (Active Fire, Medical and Other Call Types) There are many factors that complicate this system. However, the less popular yet honest answer is that there are cheaper, and more efficient EMS deployment models used by some of our larger neighboring departments like LA City and Long Beach. Those cities seem to do a much better job of managing an efficient response rather than taking a rigid one-size fits all approach. But, to understand all of this, you must understand the rules and the history. 40 SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL
The California Fire Service is the primary provider of pre-hospital emergency medical care throughout the state. For over 40 years, fire agencies (city fire departments and fire districts) around the State of California have voluntarily and diligently provided dependable emergency medical services to California’s residents and visitors. In a time before organized emergency medical services (EMS) even existed, the fire service stood at the vanguard of caring for California’s sick and injured in the prehospital setting.

The Redondo Beach Fire Department staffs two 24-hour “Rescues” (truck chassis with utility bed), one at each of their main fire stations. All fire companies have a paramedic assigned and thus, have Advanced Life Support (ALS) Assessment status. The marine fire station (Fire Station 3) has two paramedics assigned and in addition to the fire boat, they have a land vehicle with response capability (SUV), with a very limited dispatch area (see Harbor Patrol section). Dr. Sam Stratton currently serves as the medical director for RBFD, overseeing all administrative EMS policies and procedures.

The RBFD does not “transport” patients to the hospital. The City is legally obligated to contract for ambulance transports through an open bidding system through the Los Angeles County Local Emergency Medical Service Authority (LEMSA). The City has not had transport rights for many years. In 2016, the City of Redondo Beach tried but lost out to McCormick Ambulance company, and they were awarded the Exclusive Operating Agreement (EOA) to provide transportation services. The bidding process occurs every 10 years, so the RBFD will have to wait until 2026 to bid on the contract again. However, the outsourcing of ambulance services is used by a number of smaller departments for a variety of reasons and can prove to be an efficient and cost effective approach to transport:

1. When resources are taxed because of high call volume, backfilling additional ambulances (“staging” ambulances closer to Redondo Beach) becomes their responsibility as per contract.

2. Ambulance personnel, when hospitals are at or near capacity, must wait with the patient until a bed becomes available (this is referred to as “wall time”). Again, it is then McCormick’s responsibility to provide additional ambulances to the RBFD operational area.

3. Private ambulance companies frequently provide a similar level of service for less money per transport due to;
a. Their members are not “cross trained” and do not participate in firefighting and other FD emergency operations, thus commanding significantly less salary based on the EMS response.
b. Their members usually do not work the FD’s 24-hour platoon duty schedule, thus cutting down on overtime costs and allowing for staffing flexibility. c. They do not have significant infrastructure costs of maintaining large fire stations. 41 Our analysis of the EMS service the RBFD provides to the citizens of Redondo Beach revealed:
· The members of the RBFD take a great deal of pride in providing an exceptional level of prehospital care to the citizens and consider this the thing they do best. · The EMS vocation is viewed by nearly all members as a crucial part of their emergency operational duties.
· Members feel they have exceptional training and in addition to Advanced Life Support (ALS) and Basic Life Support (BLS) training, the leadership of RBFD has set a noteworthy example in establishing a high standard for “bedside manner” and empathy towards those in need. · EMS is not treated as a secondary duty in RBFD when compared to other firefighting operational responsibilities, EMS is also a priority.
· All calls for EMS service receive a dispatch of a “rescue” and the closest available fire resource responds, a dispatch algorithm that exceeds most local fire departments’ dispatching protocol. This “one-size fits all” style of dispatch can be viewed as either a premium level of service, or an inefficient utilization of resources. We must remember that here in Redondo Beach, as is the case with most Southern California fire agencies, personnel are really dual purpose, serving both as firefighters for fire suppression, and paramedics for EMS calls. In many other parts of the country, service deployment is bifurcated between Fire and EMS and there are essentially two different agencies providing two different services.

The advantages of the current RBFD dual function type deployment system are:
a. There is a Captain on scene for every EMS call (and the resulting judgment experience of a supervisor / senior officer).
b. Funding is not required to train dispatchers to a higher level and have adequate staffing to be able to stay on the phone while assessing medical calls and providing medical advice to callers in need.
c. More personnel are always on-scene in the event they’re needed for manpower on complex calls, or calls that require the efforts of more than two personnel. d. Scene security and safety is enhanced.
e. Paramedics can do both EMS and fire suppression.

The disadvantages to the current system are:
a. More apparatus dispatched means more wear and tear on the apparatus. b. Potential unavailability of rescues and fire apparatus due to them already being assigned to a medical incident.
42 c. More units dispatched reduces the available time for RBFD members to train, maintain apparatus & fire stations, etc.
d. Dispatchers must receive enhanced training and have adequate staffing and there are associated costs.
e. RBFD members may feel micromanaged and their decision judgment learning can be muted (because a Captain is always there to make the decisions). f. Staffing of all of the fire stations is based on a minimum of 5 sworn personnel responding to every medical call.

What is very important to note here is that the RBFD’s current EMS response model provides premier level and exceptional service to the community. Our citizens love our fire department and they generate very little to no complaints. Chief Castro and our own firefighter paramedics, many of whom have worked at other departments, will tell you that without question our customer service levels for EMS are exceptional. It is also evident from the community survey that satisfaction levels with the RBFD are extremely high (See Appendix 2).

Based on the aforementioned advantages and disadvantages, the fire department and the City should analyze this further and ask the question if the current service delivery model is sustainable given the current budgeted complement. We should also pilot a more cost effective response model with fewer personnel and see if it can be deployed with the same level of service to meet the community’s expectations. Any change to the current deployment model should be done with the oversight of Medical Director Dr. Sam Stratton and quality assurance measures firmly in place. With new technology currently used by the PD, every single response by the FD could be rated and commented on by the caller. With good leadership, updated rules and regulations, and accountability, we believe that the answer is yes, there are more cost effective deployment models, but the key to opening up the efficiency, while maintaining or enhancing quality, is the implementation of ‘Tiered Dispatching.’

TIERED DISPATCHING
Today in Redondo Beach, when a medically related 911 call comes into dispatch, our current run sheets (dispatch guide on who to send; see Appendix 8) call for two paramedics in a Rescue, plus one of the fire engines or ladder truck, depending on the location of the call. That engine or truck will have one fire Captain (front line supervisor), one Engineer (driver and pump operator), and one additional firefighter-paramedic. When the call requires transport, they will be met at the scene by two emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from the private contracted ambulance company.

The EMS response standards from the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) and from the LA County Local Emergency Medical Services Agency (LEMSA) break medical calls down into basic 43 life saving (BLS) and advanced life saving (ALS) depending on the severity of the call. In Redondo, approximately 60% of our medical calls are BLS or non-transports. Therefore, the first step in creating future operational efficiencies in the fire department, is to have our dispatch call takers train and become certified in Emergency Medical Dispatching (EMD). This was brought to Council and funded in this FY2021-22 budget, and the new Administrative Manager at the police department who supervises dispatch, is well versed in the process and has the certification herself. Once up and running, the dispatcher can make a determination on the level of response necessary based on the call, and the agency can alter the run sheets and respond accordingly, creating a much more efficient use of our personnel. This could free up other apparatus to respond for their intended use and offer up an opportunity to re-examine how all of our resources are deployed at the three stations. There is an opportunity in the future to hire EMTs and/or even use police officers who are currently certified EMTs to respond to BLS calls, deploying straight from the field. A thorough analysis of this could prove to drastically reduce response times by deploying from the field rather than a fire station, and this has the potential to save the City millions of dollars if the entire system was changed and staffing and schedules matched the need. Hypothetically, a new deployment model with EMTs in the field using smaller, more economical vehicles or even motorcycles, could drastically reduce response times and costs to BLS calls.

To determine how many of the RBFD’s medical calls are ALS or BLS, we received detailed data from the department’s contracted Nurse Educator, Emily Brown. *2021 represents Quarter 1 data provided by Nurse Educator Emily Brown Figure 6.5: Breakdown of Medical Call Types
The non-transports category consist of approximately 95% BLS calls and about 5% that are ALS calls where the patient was not transported against medical advice, or AMA’s. Therefore, about 40% of EMS calls require an ALS response and 60% are BLS. 44 Figure 6.6 Breakdown of Medical Call Types Non-transport/BLS and ALS It should be noted that there is a difference in the total number of medical calls as reported by Dispatch through the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system, and these call numbers compiled through internal patient tracking systems. That is because many fire calls get canceled for various reasons while paramedics are enroute, patients will decline treatment, or CAD system errors and duplications can occur. The average number of medical calls over the past 5 years was 4961 according to CAD data and 4289 over the past 3 years according to patient records.

Figure 6.7: Medical Call Type Three Year Trends
45 What is clear in the data is that BLS calls are increasing and ALS calls are decreasing. The RBFD does not currently utilize tiered dispatching, and besides the contract ambulance company or EMT trained police officers in the field, they do not have other certified first responders besides paramedics. Hypothetically, if the RBFD had those positions and a tiered dispatch system, 60% of their medical calls wouldn’t even require paramedics and according to NFPA 1710 standards (Appendix 7), ALS calls require two paramedics and two members trained at the BLS level. This means that it is possible to handle 70% of what the RBFD does without the use of large fire apparatus.

Under our current EMS delivery model, when a paramedic rescue responds to a call that they determine is a BLS call once on scene, the current procedure is to continue rolling the engine or truck. The justification is that we need to have a supervisor (fire Captain) at every call, and the Captain is on the Engine. In fact, current operating procedures do not even allow the paramedics on the rescue to cancel the engine’s response, even when they know they are not needed. Sending a million dollar apparatus to a basic medical call just because there is a supervisor on the apparatus is a pretty egregious use of City resources if the additional personnel on that engine or truck are not even needed. ALS response rules are much more cumbersome and have changed over the years from specific patient symptoms or defined medical emergencies, to “provider impressions” that allow for trained paramedics to make ALS assessments based on fluid and changing circumstances like a patient’s deterioration. In no way are we suggesting reducing personnel on major medical incidents, but rather, the data shows that the current delivery model could be drastically adjusted for most of what the RBFD responds to.

To complicate matters further, Redondo uses what they refer to as a “response package.” This term, although not standard in the industry, means that the rescue will almost always respond with the engine or truck in ‘one package’ to medical calls. This was mentioned in numerous interviews with line level FFPMs and verified while riding with the crews. The justification for the “response package” is said to be the safety and expediency of travel while enroute to calls, especially on major thoroughfares during peak traffic. Exceptions are made when there is an extended delay at the station with personnel getting to the engine or truck. This process can delay initial response from the station by 5 seconds up to approximately 30 seconds. Most members agree that the Captains will allow the rescue and engine or truck to split up if the delay is more than 30 seconds, but none of this was located in a written policy. Of concern with respect to the assessment is that the RBFD is prioritizing the perceived benefits of a combined response over an expedient response to the emergency. This was not determined to be a best practice in the industry.

RESOURCES FOR NORTH REDONDO
There is an ongoing and frequently cited issue with the RBFD response from Fire Station 2 (FS2) to the north end of the City. During fire-related calls that prompt mutual aid from Manhattan Beach to the west, or the LA County Fire Department to the northeast, we were advised that 46 agencies beat our resources to calls most of the time, especially on calls in or around the 405 freeway, or during peak traffic times. The common solution that we heard was creating a new fire station on the Northrop property and staging a rescue and an engine at that location. To examine this stated justification, we pulled all calls north of Artesia Blvd for the past four years:
* North of Artesia , Redondo Beach (Area 624)
Figure 6.8: RBFD Call Types North of Artesia (Active Fire/Medical) On a four year average, we currently experience 1325 calls north of Artesia Blvd. 1288 of those calls are medical and 37 are active fires and other related fire calls. Fire-related calls were less than 4% of total calls North of Artesia. With the current service delivery model sending engines with every rescue, we can see how this is frustrating for the crews. With the data however, a new question arises: How would a change in EMS service delivery change the potential need of having another set of resources in the north end of the City? Figure 6.9 RBFD Breakdown of Call Type North of Artesia 47 Based on this data, it would seem more prudent to shore up the EMS side of the deployment model first before considering building a new fire station. If the RBFD implements tiered dispatching, adds a rescue, or other EMT level resources, a new analysis should be done on how this changes response times north of Artesia. Revamping the deployment model would decrease the Unit-Hour Utilization (UHU) of the fire apparatus at FS2 (refer to UHU analysis on page 57). That analysis may warrant moving one of the engines to a station further north, but making that determination now based on the frequency of use because of the model, does not make sense.

A PUBLIC SAFETY AGENCY CONCEPT
This assessment was not intended to explore the creation of a Public Safety agency with a combined police and fire department, but there is no doubt that further efficiencies and cost savings can be realized by use of shared resources. An example of a fully integrated public safety agency can be found in the City of Sunnyvale, CA https://sunnyvale.ca.gov/government/safety/default.htm . This endeavor would need to be an assessment of its own, and will take time to create the right environment, to fund and fully resource. In the short-term, it is the finding of this report that a full-time Fire Chief will be needed and dedicated to fully address the current and immediate issues of the fire department as outlined. However, because of the unique position of the authors, we have seen some potential benefits that could be integrated rather quickly and simply, especially on the administrative side of both agencies. Some of the benefits suggest that a future exploration of a public-safety agency would serve the City well.

Sharing resources and skills-sets across departments in the City could improve efficiencies and value in a cost-effective way and can be implemented relatively quickly. The RBFD currently lacks the administrative personnel for constant recruitment and hiring. With some minor adjustments, this can be accomplished with a solid agency collaboration. By using current PD administrative resources, Chief Kauffman was able to assist in the expedient hiring of 10 new firefighter-paramedics. The PD’s administrative analyst also wrote and secured a Homeland Security grant for Fire for active shooter response equipment while working on PD grants. A second grant for 2022 has also been submitted.

The police department has currently been coordinating with fire personnel during all of our ongoing community engagement efforts and rolling out to events together. There is value when the community sees a unified public safety team, and the constant contact between the agencies increases communication that could result in future efficiencies. For example, the Beachlife Festival operational planning has become far more efficient. Of particular note this year was not only the planning, but the use of a unified command post occupied by a Division Chief and a Police Captain from the Special Operations Bureau. PD and FD shared a radio channel and used a dedicated dispatcher to deploy the PD and FD teams at the festival, enabling the first responders to know what their counterparts were doing and where. Paramedics and 48 police officers were strategically staged during crowd surges for a quicker response to incidents.

Situational awareness for the FD was increased with the shared use of PD technology such as drones and live feeds from various cameras around the venue. This type of collaboration creates an incredible value for the attendees and increases public safety’s contribution to the safety and success of the event. Knowing that this festival will occur twice a year for at least 8 more years, and factoring in all of the other special events in the City, this type of combined public safety response is of great service to our residents and visitors.

The PD’s internal affairs Sergeant conducted 4 Fire Department personnel investigations during the course of the assessment, providing a new level of accountability and process. We have shared the use of the PD’s psychologist and recently completed joint peer support training. This will hopefully result in the agencies assisting each other when we have members in time of need. Chief Kauffman’s executive assistant has been invaluable in coordinating the increase in workload due to the split job functions. The notion of deploying paramedics to work with SWAT team EMTs is currently in discussions. Arson Investigators rode with police officers, and Harbor Patrol officers teamed up with the PD’s Maritime Enforcement Unit on the boats on the 4th of July. These are just a few of the new collaborations and efficiencies created within the last six months that have a tremendous impact on public safety in the City.

Moving the concept of a true public safety agency in the City of Redondo Beach forward will take a far deeper analysis, but even with use of sworn personnel, the PD currently has 8 certified EMTs that could be considered in a tiered and novel EMS deployment model. Because of the FD’s shift structure, reactive response, and use of fire apparatus that almost always comes from a fire station, PD resources arrive at the scene of emergencies much quicker than their FD counterparts.

Looking at alternative response protocols may also improve response times in the industry and at RBFD. A comparison of RBFD with RBPD response times, looking at both agencies highest priority calls shows the following:
*Code 3 and equivalent calls for RBFD and RBFD were analyzed by RB Dispatch FD Call Codes: MEDAID, VEHACC, RESMAJ, 1ALARM, 2ALARM, 3ALARM, WATRES, BFIRE, ROCRES,

FVHACC, VFIRE, TFIRE
PD Call Codes: 901T,SHOTS,187,UNTRB,211,245,459
Figure 6.10: RBFD and RBPD Response Times to Priority Calls 49 Figure 6.11: RBFD and RBPD Response Rates
Average difference between RBFD and RBPD response times for these priority calls in 2020 was 1:00min.

As described by the community’s number one priority of response times, the question should be asked and the analysis should be done on the effect that PD resources in the field responding to BLS calls would ultimately have on response times and costs. These types of major reductions in response times could also be accomplished by having EMT level FD personnel or paramedics working on 8 to 12-hour shifts and deploying from the field rather than from the fire station.

The elephant in the room, not just here in Redondo Beach but nearly everywhere, is the MOU that solidifies minimum staffing and the 48/96 shift schedule. Having an honest discussion about costs, efficiencies and deployment models while ignoring the MOU is an act of futility.

This is not a popular statement, but it is an undisputed fact that the current multiple station model based on a long history of responding to fires with large apparatus, is not the most efficient use of FD resources whose primary function and call load is based on medical emergencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Pilot a program sending rescues to certain EMS calls (especially known BLS) without engines. Have quality assurance measures in place for evaluation of effectiveness.

21. Complete EMD training for all dispatchers or add EMD trained ‘call takers’ in dispatch.

22. Implement tiered dispatching response to EMS calls based on ALS and BLS calls.

23. Conduct a detailed analysis of the benefits of hiring our own EMTs. 50 24. Before committing to bidding on transport rights again in 2026, conduct a thorough analysis on costs and efficiencies.

25. Evaluate abandoning the “Response Package” to increase response times and efficiency.

26. Cancel additional units when they are not needed at the scene of a medical call.

27. Explore better utilization of the paramedic resources at Station 3 converting current assessment status to a full Rescue to support the increasing EMS call load and create a newly defined response area (further in info in Response Times and Harbor Patrol sections).

28. Whether on a larger scale, or based on current personnel in both agencies, explore the more formal creation of a Public Safety agency or at a minimum, look to standardize shared administrative resources.
51 7. RESPONSE TIMES
Based on over 7,400 calls last year received and dispatched to Fire, the average response time for the RBFD is 5:07 minutes. In the fire service, response times are broken down into the following: how long it takes to answer the 911 call, the time the call is dispatched, “turn out time” (or the time is takes the crews to don PPE, enter the rigs, and leave the station), travel time, and time of arrival. For purposes of this assessment, response times will be defined as from the time a call is dispatched to the units, until the first unit arrives on scene. This is because we have a dual purpose dispatch center which takes 911 calls for both police and fire and this report analyzed when the call was split and sent to Fire. The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) Standard 1710 sets response time standards at 5 minutes for EMS calls and 5 minutes and 20 seconds for fire calls.
https://www.firehouse.com/operations-training/article/21125439/nfpa-standards-significant-nf pa-1710-revised. A detailed explanation of NFPA 1710 can be found in Appendix 7.

Taking a more detailed look at 2020 response times, canceled calls, on-scene responses and major outliers were removed from the data set leaving 6,254 data points that were considered as part of this analysis. As illustrated below, you can see that the RBFD does a good job with response times with an average response time of 5:16 minutes.

Figure 7.1: NFPA Standards 1710 Performance Objectives and RBFD Response Times While analyzing the data over the past few years we noticed that turnout times appeared to be longer during nighttime hours than during the day, so we broke the data down even further.

Figure 7.2: Breakdown of RBFD Turnout Times by Time
52 *Total Averages include FD turnout times for ALL call types Figure 7.3: Breakdown of RBFD Turnout Times by Time and Call Type With an average turnout time of 1:15, there is some minor room for improvement. We would expect nighttime turnout times to be higher because the crews are generally sleeping when the calls come in. With an average 46 second difference between day and night, the Division Chiefs and Captains should focus on improving turnout times during the night. Generally, it should take longer to “turnout” for a fire and the NFPA recognizes this. What we found however, is that turnout times for EMS calls from 0000 - 0700 hours were on average 13 seconds slower than for fire calls. This should be the focus for future improvement and the best results in overall response times. Other visual measures like large digital countdown clocks in the stations can help crews have a better sense of how quickly they are getting out of quarters.

During the stakeholder interviews and via surveys, response times were really the top priority of the community and one of the main concerns of City leadership. We often heard, “the most important thing about the fire department is that they get there quickly if I have to call 911.” In general, there are few complaints about response times for the FD, but one of the points we learned is that City leadership would like us to reach and maintain national standards, but what is also important is how the RBFD compares to neighboring local fire departments and/or other departments with like populations, call loads, and geography. Based on community and City leadership expectations, the FD should be consistently monitoring response times and looking for improvements. To do this properly in the future, will require systematic data collection and analysis of clean data sets and having crews be diligent in the ways they report their enroute times and arrivals times with dispatch.

COLLISIONS
A factor that warrants analysis when looking at overall response times is what the fire industry refers to as “collisions.” This is basically when a fire department resource from another station or another city is sent to assist with, or cover because no apparatus from that station is available.

This graph shows the amount of times RBFD units were sent to another RBFD station due to a “collision.”
53 **Covid-19 Anomaly
Figure 7.4: Count of RBFD Resources Sent into Area in the City This information can be looked at a few different ways. In the first chart, about 1000 times a year, the RBFD is moving resources from one station to another to handle calls. This is because 70% of the total calls are medical, and there are only two rescue units in the City. When one is busy on a call or following the contract ambulance to the hospital, the other rescue will have to handle calls in that area. Based on the current one-size fits all deployment model, the department is always sending engines or trucks to back up the paramedic rescue, causing even more “collisions.” This information will be important later when we look at the use of our resources at Station 3 in the Harbor. So, one way to look at this is that if there are that many collisions every year, we should be evaluating why and making a determination if additional resources should be added. During members' interviews, we would often hear, “add another rescue” or “change an engine to a rescue.” Simply stated, 70% of the calls the RBFD respond to are medical, yet only 33.3% of their apparatus (FS1 and FS2) are paramedic rescues.

COLLISIONS AND AUTOMATIC AID / MUTUAL AID
The Fire service does an excellent job of sharing resources through mutual aid and automatic aid. Whether it is at the scene of a major wildland fire, or for basic coverage, these agreements are of incredible value to our communities. The way it works locally is that when a fire station does not have a resource or apparatus available in the city to send to a call, outside resources will be automatically dispatched. For Redondo, this could be from Torrance, Manhattan or El Segundo, or from LA County fire stations in PVE, Hermosa, or Lawndale. 54 **Covid-19 Anomaly
Figure 7.5: Count of Incidents Outside Agencies sent Resources to RBFD Area Refer to Appendix 8 for the automatic aid dispatch run sheets. These agreements are of great value to the residents of all of these cities, because instead of waiting for a City resource to clear, they will automatically be sent a neighboring resource. For example, on a first alarm fire, 4 engines will automatically be dispatched to the scene. Mutual aid is a bit more infrequent but occurs when one station needs the resources of another for various reasons which could include specialized training or equipment like Haz Mat, an arson investigator, or extended coverage due to staffing issues. The need to invoke automatic or mutual aid 340 times (4 year average) a year, or basically about once a day, is cause for concern. The system works fine, but to use it, there are three different dispatch centers, and there are delays that occur because of the transferring of calls. If this scenario was happening in the police department on the daily, resources would be adjusted immediately into the field. The FD would respond that they don’t have additional resources to move, and that may be true based on the current deployment model, but this is yet another reason to move to tiered dispatching and only send the appropriate amount of resources to each call.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITY LEVELS
Since we have examined EMS responses, we will now look at some of the other fire related calls.

Looking at the data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), we can determine how many fire related calls were actual reportable fires. For the past 5 years, the RBFD has responded to an average of 114.4 reportable fires each year. Reportable fires are 1.6% of the total calls for the past 5 years. In 2020, reportable fires were 1.3% of fire department calls for service.
55 7.6: RBFD Fire (All Types) Response Activity Levels - Five Year Average Figure 7.7: Five Year Breakdown of RBFD Fire (All Types) Response Activity Levels In no way is this data being used to suggest any reduction in current levels of fire resources.

Whether there are 5 structure fires a year or 60, the adequate number of resources must be available and sent. However, as demands on EMS increase and reportable fires decrease, the RBFD must constantly examine how efficiently they are responding to the needs of the community. Public safety leaders also know that the less frequently high risk incidents occur, the more liability the City could be exposed to when our personnel have to respond if mistakes are made or best practices are not followed. These high risk, low frequency events, like fires, must be trained on constantly to make up for the lack of exposure the firefighters have to actual events. There is no substitution other than realistic training that will provide the experience, confidence, and muscle memory (or repetitions) required for proficiency. As you will see in the Training section below, the RBFD members know this, understand it, and want more training and standardized operating procedures with respect to responding to active fires.

ALARM BELLS RESPONSE
There are 527 alarm bells calls on average per year and nearly all of them are false alarms. The RBFD sends an engine code-3 (lights and sirens) to all alarm calls. Further analysis should be conducted and we should consider using Torrance’s model of only responding Code-2 (no lights and sirens) unless other circumstances exist. This is especially true when dispatch or one of the 56 units has a responsible party on the phone telling us that it is a false alarm. The Captain on the Engine should always reserve the right to roll code-3 to alarms at critical locations or based on unusual circumstances. Our current computer aided dispatch system (CAD) does not track which alarm bells calls actually result in a fire, but anecdotally, we know that it is extremely rare. To pull this data, we would have to make a change to the CAD system.

APPARATUS ACTIVITY LEVELS
A review of RBFD resource response activity numbers revealed the following activity by apparatus over a five year period:

Figure 7.8: RBFD All Apparatus Response Breakdown
It is very important to break down the emergency response activity levels of each apparatus to determine if the data reveals anything that could be used to help response times or create greater efficiencies. Right away you can see that Rescue 61 (R61) and Rescue 62 (R62) are rolling disproportionately to the rest because 70% of the calls are EMS related. Breaking this down even further, we can start to get a sense of how often each apparatus is being used each day.
57 The total number of responses and average number of responses, for a 24-hour day, in 2020, as well as the average annual response rates over a 5-year period, for each of RBFD front-line resources are as follows:

Figure 7.9: Average Yearly and Daily Response Rate of RBFD Apparatus There are a variety of reasons to analyze incident response data. We would assume one of the initial tasks of the new Fire Chief would be to conduct an in-depth analysis of all response numbers. Only through a comprehensive analysis can it be determined if field resources are overworked and thus, if more fire/EMS resources are required. Further, an in-depth analysis of response data could point to more effective deployment models in the type of resources (adding two rescues in place of an engine as an example).

Both Fire Station 1 and Fire Station 2 physical structures are aging and antiquated. A separate study of all of the City’s public safety facilities and their locations is warranted. A detailed review of response numbers would provide empirical data to justify the location and size of any new or additional stations in the future.

There exists a method and formula for fire departments to determine workload. It’s commonly referred to as “Unit-Hour Utilization” (UHU). This is listed as a percentage in the likelihood of a particular station (or resource) being involved in an incident at any given hour. This percentage considers not only the number of incidents, but also the average duration of each incident type.

What should be the maximum utilization of a firefighting resource? It’s vital to keep in mind that during the daytime hours of a 24-hour working shift, firefighters have many ancillary (but required) responsibilities, some of which are; apparatus maintenance, fire station maintenance, administrative paperwork, community relations, public education, event participation, hydrant testing, fire prevention inspections, training, physical fitness training, meal breaks, etc. Most standard of cover consultants have determined that anything over 30% UHU, all of the aforementioned ancillary duties will suffer, particularly training. Another industry accepted rule of thumb is that a detailed UHU analysis should be conducted when certain apparatus are running about 12 calls a day. As you can see by the data above, UHU in Redondo Beach does not appear to be anywhere near that number.
58 Keeping in mind that our data review is insufficient to determine an exact UHU percentage for RBFD units, it appears (based upon our informal review of the data) that they are not remotely close to the 30% threshold. This hypothesis is further collaborated by the current EMS dispatch policy that requires all calls for service receive a rescue and a fire resource. A change in that policy for the lowest level EMS runs would not reduce the number of total incidents, but would reduce the number of unit responses, further lowering the UHU percentage. Note that total unit responses in Figure 7.8 are close to 14,000.

There are additional elements of response data that merit analysis like first alarm effectiveness.

The best representation of first alarm effectiveness is contained in the “Travel Time” component of NFPA’s 1710 standard. This data component, along with “Turnout Time” (how long it takes firefighters to get out of quarters once an alarm is received) are metrics that should be continually measured in a public-facing document. It’s only through a constant analysis of this data can fire officials ensure that their members are performing to the highest standard, and that resources are properly deployed and located. This is especially noteworthy because nearly every member from the community and elected officials elaborated that how fast RBFD responds to emergencies was their number 1 concern. In 2020, first alarm effectiveness was at 4:45 minutes which is an excellent response time that the City and the RBFD should be proud of.

RECOMMENDATIONS

29. Create an automated dashboard for the executive team so that response times, turnout times, and first alarm effectiveness are constantly monitored.

30. Install digital countdown clocks at all stations so that crews have a constant visual sense of their turnout times.

31. Focus on improving nighttime turnout times for EMS related calls.

32. Utilize data from collisions, incident response numbers by apparatus, and average response rates of resources to consider the addition of a Rescue or conversion of another apparatus to a Rescue.

33. Analyze Automatic Aid agreements with Manhattan Beach, Torrance and LA County and see if further response efficiencies can be gained by possibly dropping certain borders.

34. Further examine our response to Alarm Bells calls and consider the Code-2 only model used by the City of Torrance.

35. Revisit many of the recommendations in the Efficiency section that would positively affect response times.
59 8. TRAINING
The number one concern of the members of the RBFD is their training. Most of the interviews revealed that the cause for their inconsistency and deficiency in training was a direct result of the loss of their “Training Officer” position that was staffed by a Fire Captain. This position was eliminated nearly a decade ago and was responsible for planning and administering consistent training across the entire organization. Unlike the police service, firefighter fire suppression training is not really regulated by a state agency, consistent standards are not set, and mandated reporting is non-existent. This is another area where it makes sense for the RBFD to adapt and create those systems and mitigate liability.

The complexity of firefighting has been amplified over the past decade with better science and better technologies. Asking any agency to have one single person to be the subject matter expert on everything would be futile. There is no doubt that someone in the RBFD needs to be 100% responsible for ensuring fire suppression response quality and consistent training across all of the shifts, but we believe that could be accomplished with a full-time and somewhat experienced administrative position focused on the organization, deployment, and accounting for all of the department’s training. Oversight of this position could be the responsibility of a DC. The loss of a “Training Officer” position at the FD should not become a reason for a failure to train and train consistently. The RBFD must adjust resources now and address this.

The RBFD does train, and they train quite frequently while on duty. Much of this training is very applicable to the current job functions, but the real issue is the inconsistency of training between the three shifts. There is currently no standardization of the training, the training only occurs on duty between calls, and the department has not scheduled or set aside particular days for consistent monthly training or even quarterly or yearly training. The reason for this is that nobody in the organization has had the sole responsibility for ensuring that everyone trains adequately. In a City where there is a very low frequency of high risk events, experience often takes years or even a career to develop, further amplifying the need to train.

It should also be noted that deficiencies in departmental training were only seen on the firefighting discipline and not on the EMS side of the house. Paramedics in California are required to participate in a minimum of 48 hours of continuing education every two years in order to maintain their license and LA County EMS Agency (LEMSA) accreditation. Because of this, the FD contracts with the UCLA Center for Prehospital Care for a Nurse Educator that provides monthly instruction of continuing education. A recurring Beach Cities Health District (BCHD) grant of $23,000 combined with the recent funding by Council for an additional $15,000, covers the costs of the nurse educator and continuing education. Fire department personnel feel that they are well trained in their EMS skills and delivery.

An unfortunate byproduct of the lack of consistent fire suppression training (other than EMS) is that many of the members pay for their own outside training on their days off. With certain types of training some of the firefighters will be shift adjusted or given paid time off to train, but 60 in some extreme examples, we found firefighters paying for training on their own, on their own time, and the training was actually a prerequisite for promotion. Leadership training was specifically noted as being deficient. Any training that is a requirement for promotion should be available to everyone, and funded by the City. Thankfully, this was partially remedied in the FY2021-22 budget with additional funding approved by Council. The current MOU has a training reimbursement for association members, but under the following conditions:

SECTION 9 - TUITION REIMBURSEMENT

9.01 Employees shall be eligible to receive up to a maximum of $1,500 per fiscal year for tuition reimbursement, up to a maximum total of $20,000 for the employees covered by this agreement, for job-related or college-level courses that are part of the employee's program towards a college or university degree (AA, BA, BS, MS, MA). Such courses must be approved in advance by the Fire Chief.

We attribute the cause of the inconsistent training to be directly related to the imbalance of the shifts run by the DCs that was detailed in the Leadership and Executive Branch section. This, coupled with a lack of administrative staff to coordinate, organize and account for the needs of the organization is at the root of the problem. This is amplified even more because the agency has not had a reliable policy manual or detailed standardized operating procedures and you get people saying, “our training breeds inconsistency.”

SINGLE FUNCTION RESOURCE
The RBFD, like every fire department in the state, is part of a statewide coordinated mutual aid response system that is governed by Cal OES (Office of Emergency Services). This system breaks the state into regions, counties, and areas. Redondo Beach falls under the control of Los Angeles County, then Area G, for both police and fire. Contribution of our City resources for use at the state level is most commonly realized during the annual wildland fire season, but it should be noted that should a disaster occur locally in the South Bay, most likely in the form of an earthquake, tsunami, or civil unrest, that same Cal OES system would be diverting resources to us.

What is often overlooked and very important to note in the training segment of this assessment, is that when RBFD deploys strike teams into other areas, we are reimbursed at a rate of 100% of the costs, including the backfill of our personnel. The experience gained by RBPD personnel and shared with the rest of the department, is a direct benefit to both the agency and the community. To expand on this experience in real life training, the RBFD should be committed to and support the use of what is referred to as a “single function resource.” Similar to a strike team, or a group of personnel being deployed into the system, a single function resource is just that, but only encompassing the singular scope of one person, or subject matter expert (SME), that is deployed for a specific function. For example, Redondo Beach could have a trained and excellent fire press information officer (PIO). This SME could be deployed outside the City, and the City reimbursed, while the SME gains invaluable experience 61 in the field that they would not get otherwise. This was mentioned numerous times by personnel and would make the RBFD an even more desirable destination, supporting both the advancement of individual careers, and greatly increasing public safety for our citizens. If the department invests in the advanced specialized training for personnel, they should be expected to be the SME responsible for training for the rest of the department on the current best practices and lessons learned.

REGIONAL TRAINING
El Camino College runs the local fire academy and they currently have an operational training facility in the City of Inglewood. Funding has been secured and construction is beginning on a brand new facility on the El Camino campus that should be operational by late 2022 or early 2023. Our personnel and at least one DC teach various aspects of the academy and the benefits this offers the RBFD are indisputable. Active participation in the Regional Training Group and efforts to support the new facility and its programs are of vital concern to personnel and therefore the safety of our citizens. Live fire training environments and the frequency that fire department personnel can participate will pay dividends to public safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS

36. The training issue is large enough and important enough to become the primary responsibility of a Division Chief. Their job duties and titles should be immediately adjusted and one of them should become the DC over Training.

37. Consider creating an administrative position for personnel and training that mirrors the police department position and would not only coordinate training under the direction of DC, but also be responsible for hiring and the maintenance of personnel records.

38. Develop a series of annually completed and recurring training on basic core competencies and high risk / low frequency events.

39. Invest in training specific personnel to become subject matter experts (SMEs) and certified in the various aspects of firefighting. These SMEs would be tasked with updating and planning departmental training on the skillsets most important and consistent with the threats in the City.

40. Fund all training required for promotion and prioritize leadership training.

41. Allow personnel to be deployed as “single function resources” in the Cal OES mutual aid system.

42. Continue and strengthen the fire department’s relationships with the Regional Training Group and the El Camino Fire Academy.
62 9. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Emergency Management 101; To some it’s a process. To others it’s a discipline. In analyzing the relatively low levels of crisis threat to the City of Redondo Beach, the process concept seems most applicable. This process, under the elected and appointed leadership of the City, is where communities manage complex emergencies and disasters. While not occurring frequently, it is the ability of a city to manage these events that separate Emergency Management from the traditional response organizations of Law and Fire. These two organizations (frequently along with Public Works) remain the subject matter experts in their fields. But, they rarely work daily and as teams in dealing with complex events. The emergency management continuum is broken down into 4 “phases”:

Figure 9.1: Emergency Management Continuum
It is only through a concerted and collective effort of the entire City family, adhering to all four phases of the emergency management continuum, can any modern city declare themselves ready for a crisis. The City has an inescapable obligation to meet the needs of the disaster survivors and the response personnel all the way through the recovery phase of a crisis. It remains imperative that all members of the City family are trained and understand their role in a crisis. We are 20 years removed from the attacks of 9/11, and public expectations are that the City of Redondo Beach is prepared and ready.

Emergency Management with respect to the fire department’s involvement in the City, should be an area of crucial concern, but unfortunately this must honestly be described mostly as a failure and a missed opportunity. Many of author Chief Castro’s initial questions and investigation of the FD were surrounding the role that the FD played in emergency management, planning, and training of the City and its leadership. Some larger cities will employ an emergency manager that works directly for the City Manager or Mayor (in a strong Mayor form of government). However, when those positions are not employed, the fire department will generally, and should take the lead, as most major disasters would fall under their purview and their training and command of the nationally recognized Incident Command System (ICS) places them at the forefront of coordinating a response. 63 During stakeholder interviews and surveys, it was crystal clear that City leadership lacked confidence in the RBFD to coordinate a major disaster response and that the FD had failed to implement codified planning and training of department staff and City leadership in the case of a disaster. The City does have an updated and fully functioning emergency operations center in our main library, and during the last five years it has been activated proactively for major events like the 4th of July, the Superbowl 10k run, Beachlife, or most recently during the uncertainty at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Public safety executives recognize that emergency management is a perishable skill. Coupled with the rotation of department heads and newly elected city officials, the need to plan and train becomes more crucial.

We learned that the FD currently has the responsibility of Emergency Management and it is specifically assigned to the DC of Special Services, but because of the issues described in the Leadership section, the DC does not have the bandwidth to complete the task properly. Under the same umbrella of Emergency Management, this DC is also tasked with the Community Emergency Response Team, commonly referred to as CERT. We heard from community stakeholders that the FD was basically silent during the pandemic and one pointed out that they had missed a huge opportunity to lead this community in a time of need. Every elected official worries about the potential for a large-scale event and would appreciate some additional planning, table-top exercises, and codified procedures.

A great place to start would be by committing to training City leadership and department heads through Texas A&M Engineering Extension Services (TEEX). The first class is Crisis Leadership and Decision Making Skills for Elected Officials (MGT-340; 4 hours). The second is the Senior Officials Workshop for All-Hazards Preparedness (MGT-312; 8 hours). Both of these programs are 100% grant funded and would be provided here in Redondo Beach free of charge.

Besides the aspects of planning and training for department heads and electeds, the education of our community on what they can and should do during these events is also highly desired.

Our School District and Harbor commissioners both had concerns and think that greater collaboration and attention should be given to emergency management led by the fire department. We spoke with one person who participated in the City’s Disaster Council during the pandemic and they said, “I was on the disaster council during the pandemic, but to be honest, I can’t remember if the fire department was even on there.” It was clear that our community and City leadership want to see the FD take the primary leadership role in Emergency Management. At the line level, this would take form in the education, planning, and training of our community.

RECOMMENDATIONS

43. A. Create a job classification for Emergency Manager that works under the City Manager, or partner with a neighboring agency to share and split the costs for an Emergency Manager; OR
64 B. Prioritize Emergency Management at the Fire Chief and Division Chief level in the department, possibly tasking a DC over Training to include the City’s Emergency Management or having the Fire Chief directly responsible; OR C. Consider hiring a Senior Management Analyst to assist the Fire Chief or Division Chief in the coordination of the City’s Emergency Management and report to the City Manager (preferred).

44. Utilize TEEX training to come into the City and conduct customized annual table top exercises on emergency operations. Possibly coordinate this effort as a closed session during strategic planning.

45. Educate and train the community on disaster response.

46. Re-activate and invigorate the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program. 65 10. COMMUNICATION AND

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
As one of the most frequently cited deficiencies recognized by the RBFD members themselves, City leadership, and the community, immediate attention must be given to finding new and consistent ways to engage the community. In furtherance of what was stated in Chief Kaufman’s foreword, sitting back and resting on one’s laurels because of a belief that everyone loves us, is a horrible strategy. The RBFD and fire service in general must take a few pages out of the law enforcement playbook and never sit idly by, taking what we believe to be inherent support for granted. The authors will not deny their particular bias and passion for community engagement, but take comfort in writing this section as residents of Redondo Beach.

The RBFD must become more agile, more flexible, and commit to being there, even when there is not a problem. Using the traditional refrain of, “we don’t have the manpower” or “we didn’t hire overtime” or “we can’t pull a rescue or engine out of service” will not cut it. The community desires, and City leadership wants to see the RBFD out there, proactively engaging and promoting public safety. The RBFD must make connections, build relationships, take the lead on education, and truly show this community their ongoing commitment to service. As one can see by the quotations in the above sections, whether warranted or not, there is a perception of selfishness rather than selflessness on behalf of the RBFD. This is obviously in direct contradiction to what wearing the badge stands for. The RBFD should consider pushing the notion of looking for new ways to provide additional value in the community. Value in this sense means, going above and beyond to focus on those things that you can do, rather than only concentrating on what you have to do. This is the difference between being a proactive engager and a reactive consequence manager.

We discovered that the RBFD does a lot of things in the community that go unnoticed. Fire department personnel do some forms of community paramedicine (defined in detail below) although not via a department-wide or documented program. This happens with some of our Captains and paramedic crews that continually assist families with ongoing medical needs, or even families with disabled children that tend to respond well to the uniform. Chief Kauffman has seen fire department personnel teach CPR and first aid with extreme compassion, host vaccination clinics, and many of the crews willingly show up to community events. The FD also has an incredible “community relief fund” that they have set up and use to temporarily put people up in hotels if they have been displaced by a fire. The perception of a lack of engagement however, comes from the humble culture of the men and women in the fire service, a lack of a good cheerleader or advocate for these things they do beyond the radio call, and general inconsistency throughout the agency for the importance of community engagement. Community engagement should be considered to be a consistent part of the organization’s culture.
66 Ironically, more community engagement will provide the avenue to make what is currently happening known to more people. Nobody really knows or understands the wide breadth of services and capabilities the RBFD has. No matter which direction the City goes in the future for fire services, those services should be judged by value and not just costs. The citizens of Redondo Beach should be saying that it is our fire department, and those are our firefighters and paramedics rather than referring to them as the fire department or the firefighters.

Building and maintaining relationships through constant community engagement is hard work, and probably won’t be at the top of the list of the things that the crews want to do, especially when it is asked to be done purposely during the normal course of daily duties. That work however, needs to be done now when there is not a problem or an emergency. When there is a problem, or even a looming scrutiny on FD, it might be too late.

The use of Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) may be an excellent way to document the many success and life-saving scenarios that the community and City leadership do not know about. Templates from the PD for policies regarding privacy, retention and use could be easily modified during the meet and confer process. BWCs would not only increase awareness about the awesome capabilities of RBFD paramedics, but it could also serve to decrease the City's liability exposure.

Proven community engagement programs like CERT, Explorers, citizen academies, internships, volunteer positions, reserve programs, community engagement boards, or even the creation of an RBFD Foundation would be excellent potential outlets for our community to become directly involved in the FD. Developing a volunteer core could be a win-win for the City and community, engaging citizens in the fire department and also staffing and serving as back-up to regular fire department personnel at community engagement activities and assisting in many administrative functions. For example, if on-duty fire crews were teaching CPR to a private community group, but had to leave to handle a call, their civilian counterparts working with them could continue the training until they return.

Relationships should be built with diverse groups, local churches etc., so that valuable interactions become the basis for strong community engagement and may have additional benefits such as creating avenues for diverse demographics to see themselves working for the department (will be discussed further in a later section). During the ZenCity survey when asked, “What is the most crucial aspect for the Redondo Beach Fire Department to improve?”, we see the following response data:
67 Figure 10.1: ZenCity Survey Responses on RBFD Areas for Improvement

COMMUNITY PARAMEDICINE
Many fire departments are doing what is called the “community paramedicine model.” The community paramedicine model is well placed to facilitate greater integration between paramedic services and health, aged and social services. This form of community engagement incorporates proactive participation and inclusiveness and could greatly serve some of our most vulnerable residents like the elderly and homeless population.

A community paramedicine model would allow paramedics and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) to operate in expanded roles by assisting with public health and primary healthcare and preventive services to specifically identified populations in the community. The program could 68 identify particular underserved populations or specific patients that would normally not have access to healthcare or who over-tax FD resources with multiple calls. This is a proactive approach to service delivery and could provide great value to some residents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

47. Create an organizational transformation of the culture and commit to real community engagement.

48. Involve the community and its stakeholders in the operations of the FD through programs like CERT, Explorers, Citizen Academies, engagement boards, educational campaigns, Foundations, hiring, and promotions.

49. Develop a culture that is agile and flexible with the ability to adjust quickly to any community concern.

50. Constantly survey the community to measure their levels of trust and ability to document safety concerns (e.g. ZenCity / ELUCD).

51. Promote engagement with diverse groups to better demonstrate a sense of inclusiveness and a willingness to have a department reflective of the community it serves.

52. Consider the use of Body Worn Cameras to document the many successes of RBFD.

53. Develop a civilian volunteer core that can serve at community engagement activities.

54. Explore the community paramedicine model.
69 11. POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND

ACCOUNTABILITY
The area of policies, procedures and accountability in the Fire Department’s operations has been grossly neglected, unfortunately causing unnecessary liability exposure to the City.

Whether having codified policies and procedures was just never seen as important in the agency, or they lacked administrative support or the administrative time based on the DC platoon schedule, the results have been extremely detrimental. From the City Attorney’s perspective, the current and active policy and procedure manual for the Fire Department goes back to a 1956 version that was ratified by Council:
2-4.01 Rules and regulations adopted.

The rules and regulations prepared and approved by the Redondo Beach Fire Department and submitted by C. E. Sneary, Fire Chief, to the Council on January 3, 1956, entitled “City of Redondo Beach Fire Department Rules and Regulations”, dated January 3, 1956, consisting of twenty-one (21) pages, be and the same are hereby approved and adopted for the purpose of providing a guide on questions or problems which may arise in such organization and general rules covering the obligations and duties of members of said Fire Department.

The duties and responsibilities of Battalion Chief of the Redondo Beach Fire Department, submitted by H. V. Harrison, Fire Chief, on March 11, 1965, are hereby added to the “City of Redondo Beach Fire Department Rules and Regulations”. (§ 1, Ord. 1521, as amended by § 2, Ord. 1873 c.s., eff. April 14, 1965)
In the past six decades since Redondo Beach City Council ratified the existing RBFD policy manual, there have been new policy manual sections created, a plethora of administrative directives that came out to the department in form of memorandums, and various other forms of rules, procedures, or new best practices. There was no overhaul or official revision of the 1956 policy manual that was accepted by Council as required by the MOU. All of this led to a lack of accountability both because of a lack of official rules and the lack of written procedures on how two properly conduct personnel investigations consistent with the Firefighters Bill of Rights Act (FFBRA) and current labor law. This also spilled over into poor training documentation and probationer documentation. Before the recent hiring of 10 new firefighter-paramedics, all training forms, documentation of testing, and daily performance reports were updated and put into use. This was an emergency fix to limit the City’s liability, but further examination should be given to the documentation of probationers and how that documentation relates to the ongoing annual evaluation of employees.

Thankfully, the fix is already underway and it started with the most current memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Firefighters Association and the City, when it was agreed the Association and department would implement the standardized policy and procedure manual, known as Lexipol.
70 SECTION 12 - FIRE DEPARTMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS 12.01 The City and the Association have agreed to use Lexipol as the guide for updated Fire Department Rules, Regulations, Operations and Procedures Manual policies and agree that the policy sections and subject matters listed in Exhibit B are not included in the Department's Manual.

During the FY2021-22 budget, the Council funded the costs of the ongoing maintenance agreement to keep the updating of the Lexipol policy and the training of personnel going into the future. The City has retained our labor attorney to assist with the meet and confer process as well as the implementation of the policy. The first tier of policies is currently being worked on and with continued diligence by the RBFD, the DC’s and our labor attorney, we expect to have full policy implementation by the end of the fiscal year.

During our interviews with members, it was clear that there is an overarching feeling of little accountability for problem employees, or at a minimum, very inconsistent handling of personnel issues. We heard from many members that “There is no real punitive discipline” and “We don’t train supervisors how to handle personnel matters”, or “If we had rules, regulations, and standardized procedures, this could be a premier Fire agency.” From the City side, we heard that the perception was that the FD was “run like a fraternity.” During the time of this assessment and up until the time that the recommendations of the assessment have been implemented, our labor attorney has helped create a temporary system that uses modified PD forms and the PD’s Professionals Standards (Internal Affairs) Sergeant, to conduct FD personnel investigations that could result in punitive discipline. On September 21st of this year, mandatory training was conducted for all supervisors (Captain and above) on the policies and procedures covering personnel complaints, administrative procedures, and the discipline process. The training was long overdue and well received by FD supervision. Additional training sessions are now in the works.

Once policies and procedures are in place, leadership training should become a priority for the agency to empower supervisors to hold personnel to account. Holding fire department personnel accountable can be a difficult and sensitive task for Fire Captains and Division Chiefs because they essentially live with one another and there is little movement between the three shifts or the three stations. With respect to Station 3 in the Harbor, when asked who their immediate boss is, we got mixed messages or the default answer of “whoever is the DC” on that day (details to follow in the Harbor Patrol section). Members said things like“Why do we have to pay out of pocket to attend leadership classes?” and “This department does not do a lot of leadership training. We have to do that training on our own time and hope that it is reimbursed.” All forms and processes for personnel investigations and accountability are also now in place. As detailed in the aforementioned public safety agency section, shared use of the PDs internal affairs investigator for FD personnel issues that could result in discipline, should remain firmly in place. The fair and consistent handling of these issues is of vital importance to overall accountability and morale.
71 During the recent processes for the hiring of new firefighter-paramedics and the promotional process for Engineer and Captain, it did appear that leadership was not one of the most important factors. The processes and culture looked at leadership, but did not place it first.

Technical skill and ability to get along well in the firehouse seemed to be weighed as equally important, or even more important than leadership and accountability. Mitigations to the processes were immediately enacted to curtail this, but the future Fire Chief should pay particular attention to this.

Many of the members said there were unwritten or cultural rules for discipline which they described as the DCs using personnel movement from shift to shift. Meaning, personnel were moved off of a shift as an easy and informal form of punishment. Whether or not the practice is real is less important than the fact that it is a perceived form of cultural discipline. This is aggravated by the fact that members are not allowed to “bid” or pick shifts and DCs do not rotate between the shifts. Management’s ability to move people around to balance out experience and leadership is crucial and allowing firefighters to bid or pick their shifts, even annually, may serve to reduce that practice. The balance between the preservation of seniority rights and management’s authority to balance out experience has been mitigated in the PD through the MOU process. New employees sign onto the department in a status called “as assigned” for a period of three years. During their probation and for the remainder of the three year stint, management places them in the right shift, or even assignment, that best serves the needs of the agency and therefore the community.

RECOMMENDATIONS

55. Consider making Policy / Procedure part of the job function of a DC of Administrative Services as described in the Leadership and Executive Branch Section.

56. Prioritize the full implementation of Lexipol.

57. Change City Ordinance 2-4.01 which set precedence for council’s approval of policies and procedures. This responsibility should be on the Fire Chief in conjunction with the City Attorney, Human Resources, and the City Manager.

58. Further examination should be given to the documentation of probationers and how it relates to the ongoing annual evaluation of employees.

59. Promote accountability and continually train all supervisors on the policies and procedures related to the discipline process, especially as case law changes with respect to personnel issues.

60. Utilize the PDs internal affairs investigator for all FD personnel matters that could result in punitive discipline.

61. Pay attention to leadership and accountability in the hiring and promotional processes.

62. Implement a shift bid process on a minimum of 2-year cycle and explore having an “as assigned” clause in the MOU for probationary employees. 72 12. FIRE PREVENTION
Over the past few years, or more specifically in 2018 when the City created a fee schedule and started to charge citizens for inspections, the Fire Prevention program and inspection process has become a point of contention between some in the community, City leadership, and the RBFD. Much of the information below has been well documented and was cut and pasted from recent staff reports to council, decision packages, and budget response reports. Additional information and the laws surrounding fire prevention can be found in Appendix 9.

The RBFD Fire Prevention Division has served the community since the late 1960’s providing fire inspections and plan review to the community. The primary goal of the Fire Prevention Division has been to reduce the number of fires in Redondo Beach and loss of life associated with those events. This is accomplished through the enforcement of the California Fire Code to new construction and the relevant sections to existing structures. The California Fire Code is developed from a universal building code and works to reduce the causes of fires as identified through data submitted by fire departments across the state and nation. These identified causes are then remediated through two primary strategies in the application of the California Fire Code:

1. Engineering the causes or risks of fires out of new structures. Fire Prevention accomplishes this through Fire Plan Check and confirming buildings are built to established standards.

2. Enforcing the applicable sections of the California Fire Code to existing structures through a Fire Inspection Program. The enforcement of Fire Code confirms that the community maintains fire protection systems, access and egress, and a multitude of components that have been identified through national data as the causes of fire loss.

The national Fire Prevention effort has been very successful at reducing the number of fires in the United States. The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) documented 1,065,000 structure fires in 1980 as compared to 481,500 in 2019 for the United States. This 54% reduction in the number of fires is primarily attributed to the two principal strategies listed above: engineering and enforcement of the Fire Code through Fire Inspections. During the annual Fire Inspections for Redondo Beach in 2020, 17% of the inspections generated a fire code violation. This is a significant improvement in Fire Code compliance from the start of the fee schedule in 2018 when 2,552 violations were located, or 56% of inspections generated a violation. The three most common Fire Code violations include Fire Extinguisher Maintenance, Fire Alarm Maintenance, and Extension Cord Use. These issues are required to be repaired by the responsible party within a reasonable period of time following the inspection.

The City of Redondo Beach is compelled by the California Fire Code and Health and Safety Code to complete Fire Inspections. The relevant sections of California Health and Safety code and California Fire Code (2019) are located in Appendix 9. The recent tragedy of The Ghost Fire in Oakland prompted the passing of SB 1205 to further elevate the accountability and responsibility to perform Fire Inspections. The California Health and Safety code sections 73 13146.2-13146.4 mandate the annual inspection of all multi-family dwellings (three units or more on a property including apartment/condominium complexes, hotels, motels, and lodging houses) and schools. SB 1205 mandates the reporting of the number of completed inspections to the governing body of the inspecting agency. Each year, the RBFD sends a Resolution to the council that meets this requirement and documents the rate of completion for mandated inspections.

The principal benefits of the Fire Inspection program for the residents and businesses of Redondo Beach include:
· Reducing the rate and magnitude of fires in the community. · An intervention that prevents one of the most dangerous events facing our community.
· Members of the community all conform to the same level of safety standards. · Firefighters becoming familiar with the layout of buildings during non-emergency conditions
The Fire Department has used several models to accomplish Fire Inspections during the fifty-year history of the program. A combination of dedicated sworn personnel, civilian inspectors, and line personnel worked to complete approximately 4,500 inspections annually. In 2017 budget constraints, a 34% (2010-2017) increase in emergency calls, and the inability to complete all of the required inspections prompted the City Council to adopt a fee schedule for Fire Inspections. This fee supported a reorganization of the Fire Prevention Division and permitted the Fire Department to hire additional personnel to help complete Fire Inspections.

One of the two requested civilian Fire Inspector positions was hired to replace some of the positions that were de-authorized during the economic downturn of 2008 and never restored.

Appendix 6 contains Budget Response Report (BRR) #6. This document provides an overview of the fee structure and how that fee compares to other cities. BRR#6 also proposed an alternative Fire Inspector pilot program that reduced the Fire Inspection fee by 50% for small businesses and three and four-unit townhome properties.

Fire Inspections are currently completed by a Deputy Fire Marshal, Fire Inspector (30%), and sworn line personnel (70%). Approximately 4,500 inspections are completed by 60 personnel on a digital platform (Streamline) that integrates third party billing (Fire Recovery USA) into an efficient, industry leading process. Fire Recovery collects on 97% of all Fire Inspection invoices.

Of the 11,860 invoices created from the inception of the Fire Inspection Fee in 2018 160 have gone to collections, or a 1.3% rate of sending invoices to collections. This represents approximately $300,000.00 in annual revenue.

Irrespective of whether there is a change to the fire inspection fee schedule or some of the infrequent billing errors that have caused problems, the thing that appears to be the cause of all issues with the inspection program is a lack of value. This ranges from the citizens in a three 74 unit complex that sees a member of the RBFD walking around for 20-30 seconds and then receiving a bill in the mail, to a 500 square foot business being charged the same fee as a big box retailer. We did however hear from a restaurateur that was impressed with the inspection program but would like even more engagement by the RBFD. Because the annual inspections are required by law, the RBFD should use this time and opportunity to engage, going above and beyond by educating and assisting residents and business owners with their many questions, creating value through proactive prevention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

63. Further explore changes to the fee schedule making it scalable to the actions taken by the RBFD.

64. Explore some type of Fire Inspector pilot program to be done by trained civilian personnel to lessen the load on sworn personnel and increase time that can be spent on inspections.

65. See Fire Prevention as the FD’s opportunity to be proactive, educate, and train people in the community, thus providing further value.
75 13. HARBOR PATROL – FIRE STATION 3
The Redondo Beach King Harbor is a beautiful and unique gem in the South Bay and southern California. This micro-community within the City is well known to many of the City’s recreational boaters, sailors, sport and commercial fishers, paddlers and patrons that frequent the lagoon or the many restaurants and bars around the pier. The area provides for many public safety challenges and concerns that warrant its own individual analysis apart from the rest of the assessment commissioned for the RBFD. To accomplish this, we took a similar approach and conducted additional interviews with multiple harbor commissioners (City leadership), all of the marina managers, representatives of some of the clubs, recreational boaters, and liveaboards (Community), and all of current Harbor Patrol (HP) personnel from the RBFD perspective. The Harbor patrol was a major topic raised both by City leadership and many if not most of the RBFD members we spoke to during the assessment interviews. The following is what we discovered:
**NOTE: Statements and quotations provided during interviews and surveys are merely a basis for the creation of priority areas to focus on. They should not be considered factual unless proven by further investigation, data, and evidence.

CITY LEADERSHIP / COMMISSIONERS INTERVIEWS:
“I’ve got big issues with the Harbor Patrol.”
“We should just be contracting with the County.”
“When the old stand alone ‘Harbor Patrol’ combined with the FD, we lost some services.” “There is no towboat company or service so we use Harbor Patrol.” “We need to make sure the Harbor Patrol is represented in City decisions in the Harbor.” “I would like to see more input from the FD early on projects. This is much more important than inspections after the fact.”
”There probably should be a Harbor Master.” (high frequency response) “We can do better with the Harbor. It’s an underutilized asset. A Harbor Master could do it.” “I see them patrol around, but there is no real engagement in the Harbor.” “Towing seems to be their primary function. We don’t have SeaTow (private boat tow service).” “I think we need a 24/7 presence.”
“They should be doing more boat inspections and having ‘safety days’ like the Coast Guard Auxiliary.”
“I’d like to see programs that hand out spill kits or do trade-ins for life jackets.” “Walk the docs and inspect every boat.”
“Accessibility is the most important thing.”
“They should patrol more often and we should have someone 24/7 (perspective of a commissioner that doesn’t realize they are there 24/7)” “I call the landline 310-318-0632 but nobody ever answers. I really don’t know what number to call to get a hold of them.”
76 KING HARBOR COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS:
“People don’t realize that besides boaters we have paddlers, anglers, spearos, yacht clubs, sailors and outriggers.”
“20 knot wind days are frequent and are problematic for our inexperienced boaters and sailors.” “We just can’t cut back on our level of service. I understand that the LA County Lifeguards are generally here, but we can’t count on them.”
“Towing boats saves lives.”
“They need to come to club meetings and talk to recreational boaters and the businesses.” “Any reduction in services will cause representatives of this community to come out en masse.” “The HP understands sailing, racing, and paddling and they service the specific needs of these communities.”
“You can’t put a price on getting a hold of people to take care of specific issues.” “When the Harbor Master position went from Pitzer (original HP) to Madrigal (past Fire Chief), it dropped off. We need a Harbor Master.”
“Their morale sucks.”
“We don’t need a Harbor Master from the FD, it should be from the PD. We need enforcement.” RBFD MEMBER INTERVIEWS:
“Station 3 is the most proactive fire station we have.” “There is no continuity of training.”
“The community and the politicians have no idea what we do.” “Even the rest of the FD doesn't know what happens in the Harbor.” “We should be exploring community paramedicine to use as preventative healthcare in the Harbor.”
“My expectations were much higher (working Harbor Patrol). It’s very disappointing.” “Why do we need a Captain for every boat officer?”
“90% of personnel issues are caused by 10% of the personnel in the Harbor.” “We should have a rescue swimmer program.”
“We have a high level of service down here.”
“We used to have empowerment, but not so much anymore.” “There is no true Harbor Master and the Chiefs don’t have the background.” “Our relationship with the Lifeguards is excellent.”
“We are continually missing out on grant opportunities.” “We lack an information management system to track all of the boats.” “We have ideas but can’t get things done because of the roadblocks.” “Our core mission is ocean rescue and boating safety.”
“We are kind of like Park Rangers.”
“We need someone like a Harbor Master to set the vision in the Harbor.” 77 BRIEF HISTORY
The Harbor Patrol has a long history of public safety in the City that has ranged from being part of the police department, the fire department, and an independent Harbor Patrol with a Harbor Master. In 1996, the Harbor Patrol was disbanded and rolled into the Fire Department. The Harbor Master became the job of the Fire Chief. One of the original Harbor Patrol officers with the peace officer certifications necessary, became a firefighter in the transition to the FD and remains today as a Boat Captain. He is the only one of the six that does not have a paramedic license. The former position of Sergeant in the police department was passed onto Sergeant in the Harbor Patrol, and then became a Captain in the fire department.

Harbor stakeholders say they noticed a marked change over the years since the transition to the Fire Department. Specifically, the model change to the FD has had the greatest impact on enforcement. Marina managers were quick to point out that today’s Harbor Patrol no longer has dive capabilities and they will not recover a sunken vessel as they did before which managers say happens annually, especially during heavy rains. The new norm is waiting sometimes up to two days for a private salvage company to respond, all the while contaminants from the engine and gas tanks pour into the Harbor. They want to see this service restored.

Although the FD personnel previously had peace officer certifications (Penal Code 832), and could carry firearms, they did little to no actual enforcement. The majority of their work was centered on boating safety and marine rescue. It was immediately determined that the City was greatly exposed to liability by having armed “Harbor Patrol Officers” who rarely if ever trained in police tactics and had no intermediate means of less than lethal force options. In 2017, a landmark case would once again change Harbor Patrol’s function.

The Redondo Beach City Attorney was following a case called the People v. Pennington for quite some time. Pennington had been arrested by the Santa Barbara Harbor Patrol for assault on a peace officer. The CA Supreme Court reversed Pennington’s prior conviction of misdemeanor battery of a peace officer, holding that the People failed to prove that the victim, a member of the City of Santa Barbara harbor patrol, was a “peace officer” within the meaning of Cal. Pen.

Code 243(b). The Court concluded that a harbor patrol officer must have the primary duty of law enforcement to be a peace officer; and (2) the People in this case did not prove that the primary duty of the harbor patrol officer battered by Defendant was law enforcement.

It was decided by City management and the City Attorney that the City was exposed to major liability having firefighters working as Harbor Patrol officers who were armed and whose primary job function and training was nowhere near 51% law enforcement related.

Enforcement was removed from the job function of the FD, the PD purchased a boat with restricted asset forfeiture funds and trained their assigned pier personnel on maritime enforcement.

Today, public safety response capability in the Harbor consists of a 24/7 FD Harbor Patrol boat staffed by two firefighters, 24/7 LA County Baywatch boat staffed by two lifeguards, and four 78 police officers who staff the PD boat mostly during seasonal daytime hours when they are not responding to other calls in the pier area.

PERSONNEL
The Harbor Patrol, or Fire Station 3, is staffed on a 24/7 basis by one Captain (officially called Deputy Harbor Master / Boat Captain) and one Firefighter-Paramedic (officially called Harbor Patrol Officer). Since there are 3 platoons and they work the RBFD 48/96 platoon duty schedule, this means there are a total of six personnel working in the Harbor; three Captains and three firefighter-paramedics. After the transition from a stand-alone Harbor Patrol to the FD, the special FD job classifications were created for Deputy Harbor Master / Boat Captain and Harbor Patrol Officer.

The MOU reads:

1.04 The Department has previously created a new classification entitled Harbor Patrol Officer assigned to this bargaining unit and subject to this memorandum of understanding (MOU) with base pay levels on exhibit A to this MOU the same as Fire Engineer and Fire Fighter/ Paramedic. No additional assignment pay shall be applicable.

The side letter signed December 17, 2013, titled "Harbor Patrol Sergeant Relief” is hereby replaced in full and is therefore null and void.

1.05 The classification of Deputy Harbor Master/Sergeant has previously been retitled Deputy Harbor Master/Boat Captain with base pay levels on exhibit A to this MOU the same as Fire Captain. No additional assignment pay shall be applicable. 11 .01 The Fire Chief may designate up to three employees to develop and maintain qualifications for Harbor Patrol Officer and these employees shall receive Qualification Bonus Pay of $75.00 per month.

The aforementioned classifications and the required specialized training associated with them have caused major recurring issues inside the department. By title alone, the personnel in the Harbor are seen as different, besides the fact that “Harbor Patrol Officer” has just been further defined by the CA Supreme Court and the City clearly doesn't meet the definition. We commonly heard that the HP personnel feel disconnected from the rest of the department and that their job function is highly misunderstood. The rest of the department holds a certain level of resentment for what they consider a very lax assignment with an extremely reduced workload. Years of this has created unhealthy silos that should be immediately dismantled. The FD should see the Harbor as a specialized response unit that provides additional career opportunities and we think the specialization, if kept with the FD, should be marketed and used to attract potential candidates to the department.
79 During discussions with the personnel, the Boat Captain position is largely that; the captain of a boat. The issue, as our research has identified, is that the Captain portion of the label should be coveted as a front line supervisor, not just just a boat operator. This is not to suggest that a Fire Captain is even needed in the unit, but that if a person holds that rank as they currently do, there must be a clear expectation that the Captain is the front line supervisor and not just the Captain of the boat. Based on past and recent personnel issues out of FS3, this is not the case.

Compounding the disconnect is the 3-shift platoon system and issues described at the beginning of the assessment that have put Station 3 and the Harbor Patrol a little further out of sight from a supervisory oversight perspective. Evidenced by the fact the personnel in the Harbor actually had inconsistent answers about who was actually their supervisor in charge of the Harbor. The anonymity of working at Station 3, with no real clear supervisory oversight over the unit, has resulted in far too many serious personnel investigations, yet the system was still left intact.

No matter what option is implemented in the Harbor, they need a clearly identified direct supervisor that oversees the entire operation, not one supervisor (Boat Captain) that oversees each Harbor patrol officer. The supervisory control is technically, by current definition but not necessarily by practice, far too great on a 1 : 1 ratio. The management level span of control (DC or higher) is far too little given that the dedicated Harbor Master (besides the title being given to the Fire Chief) position does not exist and nobody is really overseeing Station 3 and the operation of the Harbor Patrol.

Although the positions and minimum staffing levels are tied to the MOU, there appears to be mutual support from RBFA and members of all ranks to open the MOU and address all of the disparities that have caused so many issues over the years. One glaring example is in the promotional process for the positions. There are really only three HP officers at any given time that meet the qualifications to take and pass the HP specific portion of the promotional test for Deputy Harbor Master/Boat Captain. Rather than opening up the positions to the entire agency, and testing for Captain, the field is narrowed to three. Interim Chief Kauffman is currently dealing with two formal grievances brought by HP personnel that did not get promoted. Even worse, there are legitimate concerns from members about what they were actually supposed to prepare for in order to be successful in the promotional process.

There is no reason, we can think of, why these positions can’t be labeled the same as in the rest of the organization with Captains and Firefighter-paramedics, merely holding additional certifications and/or being paid an additional incentive. Someone that is selected for these positions could be trained after the fact, over a probationary period of time, rather than being required to possess such qualifications prior to appointment. To put it bluntly, the Harbor Patrol and Station 3, whether intentional or not, have created their own system and rules, completely separate from the rest of the organization that really only benefits the six personnel working at FS3.
80 WORKLOAD ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE DATA
A statistical analysis for every call that occurred in the Harbor over the past 5 years was conducted.

Figure 13.1: Total Harbor Patrol Calls, Call Rate and Five Year Average Because of the marked difference in daytime calls versus nighttime calls, this report breaks down the data into those categories so that they could be compared against each other and the totals. In these tables, 911 calls are those received into the dispatch center and broadcast to HP. Officer initiated calls are incidents put out over the radio into dispatch (mostly by HP monitoring marine radio VHF Channel 16), and finally telephone calls are landline calls into a station or dispatch.

Figure 13.2: Daytime Harbor Patrol Calls, Call Rate and Five Year Average 81 Figure 13.3: Nighttime Harbor Patrol Calls, Call Rate and Five Year Average This call data is very concerning when balanced against the expense and dedicated 24/7 resources. Based on this assessment and the information gathered, stakeholders want the same level of service, but the City should use this data to weigh the actual response numbers against the amount of resources and costs. During nighttime hours (7pm to 7am), on average Harbor Patrol officers initiate one call every 17.7 nights, and handle one call in total every 5.7 nights. On a total 5-year average for a 24-hour period (Figure 13.1), they get one 911 call every 9.3 days, initiate one call a day and annually respond to 1.8 calls per day.

The data showed a very strange jump in the call numbers as highlighted in 2018. Investigation revealed that in 2018, the HP began broadcasting all self-initiated activity over the dispatch radio and those calls are subsequently now captured by data in the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system. Our research revealed that this was not really an increase in the HP’s workload in the Harbor, but rather just a new standardized practice of putting calls over the radio rather than just monitoring traffic on VHF marine channel 16 and responding.

Seasonal activity in the Harbor differs greatly during the summer months and also during weather events. HP sees both extremes. During a busy 4th of July weekend or on a major summer holiday, they are out proactively encouraging safety and responding to or initiating calls for much of the day. During weather events in the winter, they may never get a call. There is no denying however, that the one call may result in a heroic rescue response which otherwise would have resulted in loss of life. This fact cannot be denied and must factor into future decisions in the Harbor.

During interviews it was clearly determined that the clubs and recreational boating community are in strong support of having a 24/7, Fire Department run, Harbor Patrol. They are not as 82 interested in enforcement or police presence, and would prefer leaving the current model alone. Boat towing is seen as a service that would lead to grave emergencies if it was not done by the HP. It was often mentioned that SeaTow or a similar private service was not available in the Harbor. It was reiterated that many recreational boaters in the Harbor are very inexperienced and do not boat or sail frequently. Often, they will exit the Harbor, turn north, and be in a dire situation near the breakwall if they have a mechanical failure or operator error.

The marina managers however, see the HP under the Fire Department as hamstrung, somewhat ineffective and inattentive to their needs, and they believe that the Harbor needs continual law enforcement. They preferred the prior system with a stand-alone Harbor Patrol and dedicated enforcement. They want every boat inspected, and the community proactively engaged. They are not in favor of a Harbor Master unless the position is enforcement focused or assigned to the PD. They want to see more boater education in addition to the inspections, and officers out walking the docs looking for criminal activity, unusual things, or even just engaging with the boating community.

As directed by Council, Interim Chief Kauffman reached out to the Los Angeles County Fire Department, specifically Chief Fernando Boiteux, who oversees the Lifeguards and the Baywatch boats. While discussing models of potential shared services, it was made clear that the County was willing to entertain any and all options for shared services ranging from certain hours, certain days, or certain seasons, up to and including contracting with them for total services in the Harbor. As mentioned above, the LA County Lifeguards staff a two-person Baywatch boat that is stationed in the Harbor at the public safety docs. We monitored Harbor patrol activities and found that the current relationship between Baywatch and HP is excellent.

Both boats work together closely and back each other up most of the time when they are available. HP members warned that during the summer, Baywatch spends much of their time away from the Harbor, supporting lifeguards up and down LA County’s beaches. The authors caution that reliance on Baywatch during daytime hours, especially in the summer, could cause gaps in response capability.

When evaluating the response capabilities of the HP and/or the Lifeguards, it is important to understand that save for one Boat Captain, the City’s 5 other personnel are certified firefighter-paramedics, as opposed to the County’s Lifeguards/EMTs. HP is trained and equipped for advanced life saving (ALS) response, both on the water and landside. Their use landside however, has been historically restricted because they are what the industry calls an “assessment” unit, meaning they are paramedics, and carry drugs and other life saving equipment, but they do not carry advanced narcotics or antidysrhythmics for heart issues like the other two Rescues out of FS1 and FS2. This brings us back to the fact we have not had EMD trained dispatchers and a tiered dispatch system. The HP can go to a call and “assess” the incident. If it is a basic life saving (BLS) incident, they can take over care and handle the call.

However, if it is ALS, a rescue from another station must be dispatched, further stressing the larger response system and relationship between Station 3 and the rest of the organization. 83 The options to fix this are laid out in the Efficiency and Service Delivery section. The other option however, would be to make the HP a full ALS paramedic response and provide them with the additional narcotics. More than just adding an additional Pelican case of drugs, the challenge lies in the County’s and the DEA’s strict rules and auditing for storage, daily accounting, use, and expired rotation of the narcotics. With a change in oversight and supervision of the unit, a change in the HP’s response capability would add additional value to Redondo Beach. Coupled with the aforementioned details in the Response Times and the Efficiency and Service Delivery sections, we would recommend having HP respond landside as a fully capable third Rescue to assist the rest of the department with the increasing medical response call load. Without tiered dispatching, we must also address the challenges associated with waterside coverage when HP personnel are landside on calls or responding with patients to local hospitals, but that could be done with the County, or when the PD boat is out working.

Research through the City Attorney’s office revealed that although the County contributed to the construction of Fire Station 3, no contractual agreement existed or MOU was ever made defining the County’s use of the space. Currently, the two on-duty lifeguards use the bottom portion of the old station 3 as an office with a sleeping quarters and a bathroom facility, and also occupy the rooms on the first level of the new Station 3 building and have use of all of the amenities there. The County parks the Baywatch boat in a slip at the public safety docs. Based on the recent quote for the replacement of those docs, that boat slip is pretty expensive. Any option exercised by the City to include all or some of the County’s services, should be monetarily analyzed against the costs for their 24/7 use of these spaces. Chief Boiteux is aware of this and would also like to move forward with an MOU regardless of what direction is decided.

Here is a five year snapshot of the basic costs for Harbor Patrol:

Figure 13.4: RBFD Harbor Patrol Actual Expenses
Finally, City leaders must account for future changes that will inevitably come to the Harbor.

Commissioners, community stakeholders, and the Harbor Patrol are well aware of the increased demands on public safety currently afoot because of things like the Beachlife festivals, paddle boarders, and concerts on the pier and now on the water, just to name a few. If the City enters 84 into any new form of development through the Harbor Amenities plan, or merely adds a boat ramp or convenient dinghy dock, demands on public safety will increase. Decisions made today must account for the public safety response in the future. Of major concern is the age and constant maintenance issue with the primary FD boat (801). Any decision to continue with our own fire personnel must include the replacement of this boat.

Rather than numbered recommendations of which there are many, we see that the best approach to address Harbor Patrol is by presenting various options that could be selected on their own, or as a hybrid of two or more.

OPTION 1
Leave the current configuration of the Harbor Patrol as is.

OPTION 2
Further explore contracting with the LA County FD, Lifeguard Division, for Harbor response. This would have to include opening the MOU and addressing the language in Minimum Staffing (Section 1) and all language and classifications dealing with the HP personnel. Add a private boat towing service.

OPTION 3
Switch to a 12-hour (am) 7-day a week operation with potential seasonal deployment enhancements for holidays and special events, and; contract with the County for nighttime coverage in the Harbor with their two on-duty personnel and Baywatch boat stationed there.

Open and address Minimum Staffing in the MOU.

OPTION 4
Keep the 24-hour schedule (48/96). Open the MOU and remove the “Captain” (Deputy Harbor Master/Boat Captain) rank entirely and replace those three positions with firefighter-paramedics. These positions could be FFPM’s with additional training incentives, or reclassified as Boat Mates.

Have members deploy at FS 3 from 0800 until 2000 hours. At 2000 hours, members go to FS 2 (or FS 1) and staff an additional Rescue. If a significant incident requires Boat response, it can be handed by Lifeguards under contract, or members can be dispatched back to FS 3.

OPTION 5 (Preferred)
Remove the name Harbor Patrol from everything, open the MOU, and reclassify the positions to FFPM’s or Boat Mates as described in Option 4. Keep the 48/96 platoon deployment and staff with 2 FFPMs per shift (no captains). Have FS3 equipped with full ALS response capability both on the water and landside as an additional or third Rescue, using their current SUV assigned.

Redraw the landside Rescue response area to include the entire Harbor, Pier, and/or portions of District 1 and 2 based on a detailed 5 year EMS call analysis. Possibly, 190th to the north, PCH to the east, and Torrance Blvd to the south. Note: The FD does not dispatch by smaller 85 ‘reporting districts’ like the PD, so to retrieve data on how many medical calls would happen in this area, further analysis must be done by looking at the addresses on every street.

Make one of the DCs (if on a 40-hour week) or a Captain in the PD over the Pier area the Harbor Master.

CONCLUSION
Maintaining the status quo in the Harbor Patrol (Option 1) is consistent with community expectations of a premium level fire service deployment. However, given the real data and other factors in play, keeping in mind the need to maintain public safety infra-structure in the Harbor to respond to future growth in this area, it is the opinion of the authors that Option 5 is the preferred course of action.
86 14. OTHER OBSERVATIONS

DIVERSITY
The City is currently engaged in litigation where the Department’s alleged lack of diversity is a significant issue. Diversity in a modern fire department is more than just numbers. The resolve to create a culture and workforce that values diversity and inclusivity can only be accomplished with deliberate and purposive actions. There must be a concerted effort in the recruitment, hiring and retention of a diverse workforce. There should be goals established to meet that objective.

A renewed dedication to community engagement will allow the diverse population of Redondo Beach to talk, build relationships and potentially see themselves in this field. Many agencies in public safety rely on antiquated recruiting efforts that do not capture the attention of many potential candidates. One of the most powerful ways to increase application rates is to focus on “attracting” candidates rather than traditionally recruiting them. After all, the competition for candidates can be fierce amongst agencies. Without proper marketing and branding, decisions about which agency a candidate decides to apply with could come down to contractual numbers. Many would agree that the attraction to an agency would be greater if the candidate's decision to apply is based on the value the department provides, rather than the dollars they pay.

The RBFD is currently working on the creation of an Explorer post that would help build up a “farm team” of the community’s youth who could be mentored into the career. Purposely engaging the faith-based community, women’s groups and athletic programs, or historically black colleges is an excellent starting point. A cultural shift within the Fire Department towards standardized community engagement will create avenues that showcase the agency’s value and attract more candidates to the RBFD.

RECOMMENDATIONS

66. Increase recruiting efforts through engagement with diverse segments of the community, maintaining the firefighter-paramedic hiring requirements.

67. Start an Explorer, Cadet, Reserve or Intern program that would allow the Department to work with candidates from the community and sponsor them through paramedic school, avoiding the costs for salaries and overtime backfill.

TRI-CITY CONCEPT
During discussions between the city management and fire departments of Redondo Beach, Manhattan Beach, and El Segundo, it was suggested that one chief officer (DC or Battalion Chief) could be on duty for larger scale response purposes for all three fire departments. This 87 would place the span of control at 6 ½ fire stations, which is consistent with local, larger fire departments. Using our current level of chief officer manpower, this would result in two DC’s being placed on an administrative work schedule consistent with normal business hours and the Fire Chief. Presumably such a schedule results in less down time (meals, sleeping etc) than a platoon duty schedule, and is more receptive to the needs of the agency, the community and elected officials. It is recommended that this cooperative agreement between Manhattan Beach and El Segundo continue to be explored and discussed or even expanded to Torrance. It is not suggested that Redondo Beach would save any significant money by entering into an MOU and sharing chiefs, however, we would suggest that major gains in operational efficiencies would occur. Any increases in personnel efficiency could be directed towards fixing much of the dysfunction created by the current three DC system. There are still some significant issues to be worked out if this moves forward, and the main one is regarding staffing and our return on the investment. The RBFD is now 100% staffed and we have three chief level officers. At the time of this writing, Manhattan only has acting battalion chiefs, and El Segundo has one BC and one BC they brought in temporarily from the outside, and their other BC is now the Acting Fire Chief. This does not question the competence of these personnel, acting or otherwise, to respond to an emergency, but PERS rules limit acting assignments to six months, potentially causing frequent rotations at the command level. Those agencies are currently testing for those positions. It was interesting to note that during initial meetings with the neighboring Chiefs and their battalion chiefs (BC), everyone agreed that the current three BC or DC system at each department was redundant and not an effective use of chief-level executives.

This program could be piloted for a defined period of time by entering into an MOU with other cities. Further efficiencies and major cost savings could occur in subsequent phases by further defining the shared work and responsibilities of the other DCs, administrative staff, and response models. The Torrance Fire Department, who is currently the Area G coordinator for mutual aid, was not part of the initial Tri-City discussions, but we believe that they should be.

LADDER TRUCK
Beginning on July 1, 2020 with the new MoU between the City and the RBFA, the RBFD reduced their staffing on the Ladder Truck Company by removing one firefighter from the company (each shift). Previous staffing levels were; 1 Captain, 1 Engineer and 2 Firefighters. Truck Company operations are frequently complex and require the efforts of a coordinated and trained crew.

The nature of an escalating structure fire frequently requires the Captain to assume the duties of initial action Incident Commander (IC) or division or group supervisor within the incident command system. The Engineer’s engagement into the firefight is frequently delayed as he/she is spotting the apparatus for use of the aerial ladder, and securing said apparatus prior to joining the crew. So, by removing 1 firefighter from the company, they have effectively cut their initial “firefighting” manpower by 50%.
88 It also appears that RBFD standard operation guidelines for truck company operations were not changed to compensate for this reduction in manpower. This deficit would have a particularly negative impact in the initial stages of a multi-story residential fire where the truck company usually conducts vertical ventilation operations. These operations facilitate the interior fire attack team, reduce backdraft/flashover potential and significantly increase survivability for any trapped occupants. Under the current staffing model all of the alternative manpower options (using members from an engine company, or rescue) would, at best, result in a significant delay as compared to returning the staffing level back to 4 members.

Referring back to Unit-Hour Utilization, the ladder truck responded to 1640 calls in 2020. It should be noted that the reduction from 4 personnel to 3 has a significant impact on fire fighting, but very little impact when the truck is used to back up the rescue on medical calls which make up about 70% of the work.

LEAVE TIME
After discovering that the RBFD had spent over $3.7 million in overtime in FY2020-21, besides the unfilled vacancies which was previously described, we examined the procedures and processes for taking time off. The RBFA MOU has a detailed section on ‘shift swapping’ but nothing with respect to taking time off. Leave time scheduling rules can be found in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, but they are not necessarily followed. Leave time is discussed by the RBFD Staffing Committee, made up of a station Captain and members of the RBFA. We were rather shocked to discover that there are no real approvals for taking time off. The general practice is that the employee enters the time they want off in the ‘Telestaff’ system and if it takes it, they get the time off.

Here are a few of the important points that can be found in the rules:

Section 7.01 GENERAL RULES, LEAVE TIME SCHEDULING

7. A maximum of ten (10) persons shall be allowed to request leave time for any one shift. The mandatory list will be used if necessary when filing the first five (5) requests. The balance of requests (6-10) will be filled from the voluntary list only.

B. 48 Hours Leave Time Provision:

1. Not to exceed 4 consecutive shifts

2. Requests entered 48 hours in advance will utilize the mandatory list if necessary and when in compliance with A-1d.

3. Requests entered less than 48 hours may be filled from the voluntary list only.

Basically, as long as an employee puts in their request for time off more than 48 hours in advance, the Department and the ‘Telestaff’ rules will give the person the time off, open up the overtime, and then mandate someone to fill it, if it is not filled voluntarily. If the request was done in less than 48 hours, the system will open up the overtime but not mandate that 89 someone work the shift. As long as someone works the overtime, the employee gets the day off.

The practice of having a Division Chief sign off on leave time in excess of two consecutive ‘sets’ (96 hours), was abandoned under the former Chief. During a recent staff meeting, it was interesting to hear that rule changes were being discussed that would obviously impact working conditions and management’s need to run the organization.

Even when the department was running short of 10 sworn positions for an extended period of time, forcing mandated overtime with such frequency that the crews were getting burned out, there was still no change to the leave time rules. Even more disturbing, there does not appear to be any consideration to the amount of money in overtime that is spent, and it is definitely not a factor in determining if someone can take time off. An entire analysis could be done on all of the tricks, tips, unwritten rules, and methods involving time off and overtime in the fire department. What does not really exist is the role of Fire Department management to regulate time off to run the agency and use management rights to positively affect the wellness of the employees and provide some level of fiscal responsibility for the City.

RECOMMENDATIONS

68. Work with the RBFA to codify time off rules in the MOU that strike a better balance between the employee’s right to time off and running a fiscally responsible fire department that takes wellness into consideration.
90 CONCLUSION
The assessment has revealed a Redondo Beach Fire Department that is loved by the community it serves, but one that can improve awareness through better communication and engagement.

While community trust and sentiment is high, those feelings are not necessarily shared by City leadership who lacked confidence in the department’s ability to progress and provide added value to the citizens of Redondo Beach. From within the walls of the RBFD, we discovered incredibly dedicated public servants who believe the RBFD can be an absolute premier level department, but who are in need of vision, strategic planning and strong leadership to break free from some of the cultural norms that have caused stagnation and inaction.

Eight key priority areas were developed that represent the concerns and expectations of the stakeholder groups. Save for the appointment of the next Fire Chief, all of the pieces of the organizational puzzle are currently there. Other than glowing deficiencies in administrative personnel, the RBFD is now fully staffed. The arrangement of the sworn personnel, especially with respect to the Division Chiefs, does not provide the efficiency that City leadership expects and the community deserves, nor does the organization of personnel resources promote organizational continuity for the members. We did not unveil information or data showing the need to increase the sworn complement without first addressing changes to the service delivery model to increase efficiency with current personnel.

The next Fire Chief will need to break some of the historical cycles of infighting at the Division Chief level, set clear expectations and rearrange their schedules and job functions in order to support a clear vision for the organization. A failure to focus on this has created internal power struggles and the single biggest issue discovered that has stifled the forward progress of the agency. This has the RBFD currently stuck in the role of “consequence management,” handling issues as they come in daily, while failing to focus forward and even around the corner into the future. The result is that the service of the RBFD is often measured by costs instead of unique values offered to the City. We will never forget the way one brilliant firefighter summed it up when he said, “we just need some bragging rights.” The culture is currently risk averse and it is stopping innovation and the creation of value.

Service delivery currently meets or exceeds community expectations, but all stakeholders mention that the RBFD over responds to much of the daily call load. Streamlined service deployment through emergency medical dispatch (EMD) training and the creation of “tiered dispatching” will open up other suppression resources to countless possibilities and move the RBFD well into the future best practices of emergency medical service (EMS) innovation. To put it simply, the RBFD responds to medical calls 70% of the time and only has two paramedic rescue vehicles, all while staffing 4 large fire apparatus (3 engines and 1 ladder truck) that were built for the other 30% of calls, of which, about 1.3% actually result in reportable fires.

Placement of the word “Paramedic” on an engine or a truck, doesn’t solve the real problem.

Sending the right level of resources to the call type, especially EMS calls, could prove to be the single greatest efficiency gain the department has ever seen. 91 Changing the current culture will be difficult. Changing the service delivery models to match the actual call types will be difficult. Stepping away from tradition and breaking ranks with what other fire departments are doing will be difficult. Failure to do what is difficult, will hold the Redondo Beach Fire Department back from being the premier fire and EMS agency that this community deserves.
92 APPENDICES
Appendix 1: RBFD Assessment Recommendations
Appendix 2: Zen City Survey
Appendix 3: Stakeholder Survey Questions
Appendix 4: Pulse Survey
Appendix 5: Budget FY 21-22 Decision Package
Appendix 6: Budget FY 21-22 Budget Response Reports
Appendix 7: NFPA Standard 1710
Appendix 8: Dispatch Guide
Appendix 9: Fire Prevention Regulations
Appendix 10: MOU
RBFD Assessment Recommendations