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As of: March 9, 2023 9:09 PM Z
McLean v. City of Alexandria
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division May 5, 2015, Decided; May 5, 2015, Filed
1:14cv1398 (JCC/IDD)
Reporter
106 F. Supp. 3d 736 *; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826 **
SCOTT MCLEAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALEXANDRIA,
Defendant.
Prior History: McLean v. City of Alexandria, 86 F.
Supp. 3d 475, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11981 (E.D. Va.,
Feb. 2, 2015)
Core Terms
Ordinance, commercial speech, moot, nominal
damages, parking, regulation, village, repealed,
summary judgment motion, material fact, aesthetics,
injunctive relief, displaying, summary judgment, city
street, pedestrian, traffic, motion to dismiss,
intermediate, undisputed, purposes, genuine
Counsel: [**1] For Scott McLean, Plaintiff: Jason Brett Torchinsky, Shawn Toomey Sheehy, LEAD
ATTORNEYS, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak PLLC,
Warrenton, VA.
For City Of Alexandria, Defendant: Christopher P.
Spera, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the City Attorney,
Alexandria, VA; Travis Sands MacRae, City Attorney's
Office - City of Alexandria, Alexandria, VA.
Judges: James C. Cacheris, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
Opinion by: James C. Cacheris
Opinion
[*737] MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of
Alexandria's ("the City's") Renewed Motion to Dismiss
[Dkt. 37], and Plaintiff Scott McLean's ("McLean's")
Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 47]. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part the City's Renewed Motion to Dismiss and grant McLean's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Background
McLean claims section 10-4-13(a) of the City's Code of
Ordinances ("the Ordinance")--which prohibits parking a vehicle upon any City street for the purpose of
displaying the vehicle for sale--is an unconstitutional content-based restriction of his First Amendment right to commercial speech. (Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶¶ 28-32.) The
Court previously denied the City's motion to dismiss,
holding the case was not moot after the City temporarily suspended enforcement [**2] of the Ordinance pending
City [*738] Council review. (Mem. Op. [Dkt. 32]; Order
[Dkt. 33].) After public comment and a period of review, on March 14, 2015, the City Council repealed the
Ordinance.
Two motions are now pending before the Court. First,
the City renews its motion to dismiss and argues again
that the case is now moot because the City Council has
repealed the Ordinance. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt.
37]; Def.'s Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 38].) McLean opposes
this motion and contends the case is not moot because
he still seeks nominal damages to redress the City's
prior suppression of his First Amendment right to
commercial speech, despite the recent repeal of the
Ordinance. (Pl.'s Opp'n [Dkt. 50].) Second, McLean
moves for summary judgment and argues he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 47]; Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 48].) The City
opposes Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. (Def.'s Opp'n [Dkt. 52].) The Court will address each motion in turn.
II. Motion to Dismiss
The City moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and contends that the
City's repeal of the Ordinance rendered this matter
moot. The sole issue before the Court in resolving this motion is whether the City's [**3] rescission of the law at issue moots this litigation. The Court finds that in this instance, repealing the Ordinance partially moots the
relief McLean seeks, and thus will grant the City's
motion to dismiss in part.
In filing this lawsuit, McLean seeks declaratory,
injunctive, and nominal relief. (See Compl. at 9.)
McLean concedes that any injunctive, or prospective
relief, was rendered "unnecessary" after the City
repealed the Ordinance. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 2.) In other
words, McLean's request for injunctive relief became
moot. See Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d
112, 116 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding "statutory changes that discontinue a challenged practice are usually enough to render [Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief] moot, even if the legislature possesses the power to reenact the
statute after the lawsuit is dismissed.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit
has recognized a distinction in the mootness doctrine
between cases seeking injunctive relief and cases
seeking compensatory or nominal damages to vindicate
First Amendment violations. See Rock For Life-UMBC v.
Hrabowski, 411 F. App'x 541, 550 (4th Cir. 2010).
"Valero, however, is inapposite to a claim brought under § 1983 to recover damages--either compensatory or
nominal--resulting from a prior suppression of speech.
In this context, we [**4] have held that even permanent remedial measures will not moot the claim." Id. (citing Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of North
Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 429 n.4 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Henson v. Honor Comm. of the Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d
69, 72 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983)); Reyes v. City of Lynchburg, 300 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Here, in short, repealing the Ordinance does not moot
McLean's as-applied challenge to the Ordinance for
which he seeks nominal damages. McLean's facial
challenge to the now-repealed Ordinance and request
for injunctive relief are, however, moot. Rock For LifeUMBC, 411 F. App'x at 550-51 ("But while the plaintiff's cause of action for damages remains live, their claim
that the policy was facially unconstitutional is moot.").
Therefore, the Court will dismiss McLean's request for
injunctive relief and his facial challenge to the
Ordinance. The justiciable issue that remains is whether impermissible chilling of McLean's First Amendment
rights did in fact occur, and whether McLean is entitled to nominal damages as a result. Id.
[*739] III. Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Evans v.
Techs. Applications & Serv., Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958-59
(4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). In reviewing the
record on summary judgment, "the court must draw any
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant [and] determine whether the record [**5] taken as a
whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant." Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., 933 F.2d
1253, 1259 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made
and supported, the opposing party has the burden of
showing that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); see also Ray Commc'ns, Inc. v. Clear Channel
Commc'ns, Inc., 673 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating the opposing party must "come forward with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Specifically, in this Court on summary judgment, the
parties are required to list the undisputed, or disputed, material facts in their briefs. E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule 56(B). "In determining a motion for summary judgment,
the Court may assume that facts identified by the
moving party in its listing of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of
genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion." Id.
Indeed, "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's
assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court
may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the
motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
B. Undisputed Material Facts
The City has failed to identify a genuine issue of
material fact that must be decided at [**6] trial. In
accordance with the Local Rules, McLean lists the
undisputed material facts and supports those facts with citations to evidence in the record. (Pl.'s Mem. at 2-4.) In its opposition, the City does not properly address
106 F. Supp. 3d 736, *738; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, **2
McLean's assertions of fact, but instead cites only to two potential witnesses "who have signed interrogatories
stating that the [Ordinance] is designed to advance
pedestrian and vehicular safety." (Def.'s Opp'n at 2.)
Thus, for purposes of this motion for summary
judgment, the Court deems McLean's statement of facts
as undisputed and summarizes those facts below. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
In October of 2012, McLean received a citation from the City for parking his 2008 Chevrolet Malibu on a City
street for the purpose of displaying the vehicle for sale.
McLean paid the $40 fine and parked the vehicle for the purpose of displaying it for sale in the neighboring
jurisdiction of Arlington County until it was sold in
February of 2013.
Over one year later in 2014, McLean wanted to sell his
2007 Dodge Ram 1500 Pickup Truck, but instead of
parking it on a City street with a "For Sale" sign in the window, he filed this case seeking prospective injunctive relief and nominal damages for prior [**7] harm. Five
days after McLean filed this action, the City suspended enforcement of the Ordinance pending review by the
City Council. Between January of 2010 and October of
2014, the City issued over 700 citations for violations of [*740] the Ordinance, amounting to a cumulative total
of approximately $28,000 in fines.
It remains unknown why the Ordinance was originally
adopted in 1951, but the City "assumes, without
limitation, that the Ordinance was originally adopted for the general purposes of promoting traffic and pedestrian safety." (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 2 at 2.) The City speculates that the act of parking a car on a City street for purposes of displaying it for sale could constitute a threat to the public health, safety, or welfare because such an act
could potentially:
(1) cause pedestrians to enter into the roadway for
the non-traffic purposes of viewing for-sale signs or
otherwise inspecting the car in question, (2) distract
drivers' attention away from the roadway, (3) cause
drivers to slow down or stop in the roadway in order
to inspect the car or any provided contact
information, or (4) cause drivers to double-park in
the roadway and exit their own cars for the
purposes of inspecting the [**8] for-sale car or any
provided contact information.
(Id. at 3.) The City also concedes that "it is possible to envision a scenario in which the act of displaying a car for sale on a city street could constitute a threat to the City's aesthetic interests." (Id. at 6.) The City is "not currently aware" of one traffic accident that was caused by a "For Sale" sign on a vehicle parked on a City
street. (Id. at 7.)
On March 14, 2015, the City repealed the Ordinance,
based at least in part on the recognition that "the
decades-old restriction against parking a vehicle in the right of way for the purposes of sale is no longer
necessary, given the significant changes in how used
vehicles are sold and the existing, content-neutral
controls already in place[] in many places in the City that already prevent a vehicle from being parking in the right of way for any purpose for an extended period of time." (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 3 at 2.)
C. Analysis
"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments have never
been thought to give absolute protection to every
individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases or
to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19, 91 S.
Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971). The First
Amendment does, however, protect various forms of
expression and speech from attempted government
regulation [**9] in varying degrees. Adventure
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Ky. Registry of Election Fin., 191 F.3d 429, 439 (4th Cir. 1999). Courts "apply the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content." Id. (quoting Turner
Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622,
642, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994))
(colloquially known as strict scrutiny for content-based government regulation). However, "the regulation of
commercial speech is subject to an intermediate degree
of scrutiny." Adventure Commc'ns, 191 F.3d at 439
(citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S. Ct.
2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980)).
Commercial speech is any "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62 ("Commercial
expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the
societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.") (citations omitted). "The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects commercial speech from
unwarranted governmental regulation." Id. (citing Va.
Pharmacy Bd. [*741] v. Va. Citizens Consumer
106 F. Supp. 3d 736, *739; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, **6
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-62, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976)). This protection is not as great as
protections afforded to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, however. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 563 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 56 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1978)
("The protection available for particular commercial
expression turns on the nature both of the expression
and of the governmental interest served by its
regulation."). In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
announced an intermediate [**10] scrutiny test to
determine the validity of government regulation of
commercial speech. 447 U.S. at 566.
First, "commercial messages . . . [must] accurately
inform the public about lawful activity." Id. at 563-64.
Second, if neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government "must assert a substantial
interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial
speech." Id. at 564. Third, "the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose." Id. And fourth, "if the governmental interest could be served as well by a
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the
excessive restrictions cannot survive." Id.
The City bears the burden of proving that the Ordinance survives intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.
See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625-26, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 132 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1995) ("That
burden. . . is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Court
finds that the Ordinance does not survive [**11]
intermediate scrutiny applicable to commercial speech,
the Court need not consider the more demanding
standard of strict scrutiny for the content-based nature of the restriction. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2653,
180 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2011)) ("[L]ike the Court in Sorrell, we need not determine whether strict scrutiny is
applicable here, given that, as detailed below, we too
hold that the challenged regulation fails under
intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson."). The Court now turns to each factor under Central Hudson.
In reaching the conclusion that the Ordinance
unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech, the
Court is guided by the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Pagan v.
Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766 (6th Cir. 2007). There, an
individual posted a "For Sale" sign on his vehicle and
left it parked on a public street in front of his residence in Glendale, Ohio. Id. at 769. A police officer notified the individual that he was in violation of a village ordinance1 that prohibited parking [*742] a vehicle on a public
street to display it for sale. Id. After attempting to resolve his dispute with the village to no avail, the individual filed suit alleging violation of his constitutional rights and challenging the village ordinance. Id. The parties agreed that the posting of "For Sale" signs on cars [**12] is
commercial speech protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 771. The issue before the Sixth Circuit was
whether the village established that the ordinance
"directly and materially advances its regulatory interests and . . . that it has drawn the restriction narrowly." Id.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the village and held that
the ordinance was an unconstitutional [**13] restriction of commercial speech, absent any evidence that the
village's interests of traffic and pedestrian safety and aesthetic concerns were advanced by the ordinance in a
direct and material way. Id. at 778. As evidence of the village's interests of safety and aesthetics, the village offered an affidavit from the police chief and asked the court to rely on "common sense" and "obviousness" for
why the regulation of speech was necessary. Id. at 773- 774. But the Sixth Circuit found that there was no actual or direct evidence in the record that the ordinance
promoted safety and aesthetics. Id. at 775. Instead, the Court noted that it was the village's "obligation to
provide something in support of its regulation" other
than conjecture from the police chief and its requested reliance on common sense and obviousness, holding
that "it seems no great burden to require [the village] to 1 "It shall be unlawful for any person to stand or park any vehicle, motorized or towed, upon any public street, road, or highway within the village or upon any unimproved privately owned area within the village for the purpose of: (A) Displaying it for sale, except that a homeowner may display a motor vehicle, motorized or towed, for sale only when owned and titled to said homeowner and/or a member of said household, and only when parked upon an improved driveway or apron upon the owner's private property; (B) Washing, maintaining or repairing such vehicle except repairs necessitated by
emergency; and (C) any advertising." Glendale Traffic Code §
76.06. The Court did determined that whether the conduct at issue was reached by subsection (A) or (C) was "not germane" to the resolution of his "as applied" First Amendment
challenge. 492 F.3d at 770 n.2.
106 F. Supp. 3d 736, *741; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, **9
come forward with some evidence of the threat or
particular concerns" that is alleviated by the ordinance.
Id. at 775, 778 (emphasis in original). The same is true here in the record now before the Court on summary
judgment.
First, there is no dispute that McLean's "For Sale" sign accurately informed the public about lawful activity.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64. Second,
assuming [**14] the City has a substantial interest in
promoting traffic and pedestrian safety and regulating
aesthetics, Id. at 564, the City ultimately fails to carry its burden under Central Hudson because there is no
evidence in the record that (1) the Ordinance directly
advanced this interest in safety and aesthetics, and (2) the Ordinance was not broader than necessary to
accomplish the City's goals. Id.
In a manner very similar to the village in Pagan, here, the City relies on sworn interrogatory responses from
the City's Transportation Director and the Traffic
Division Chief of the City's Department of Transportation stating that the Ordinance is designed to advance
pedestrian and vehicular safety. (Def.'s Opp'n at 2.)
Additionally, the City speculates as to why the
Ordinance was enacted in the first place, and
hypothesizes about various scenarios where displaying
a "For Sale" sign on a vehicle parked on a public street could constitute a threat to the public health, safety, or welfare. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 2 at 2.) But just like in Pagan, there is no direct evidence in the record to support the City's conclusion that the Ordinance directly advanced
the City's interests in safety and aesthetics. Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Indeed, [**15] the City is
"unaware" of even one traffic accident that has ever
been caused by conduct that violates the Ordinance.
(Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 2 at 7.) To meet its burden under the
third prong of Central Hudson, the City cannot rely on
assumptions, speculation, or conjecture. See Went For
It, 515 U.S. at 625-26; see also Pagan, 492 F.3d at 775-
78. Instead, it is the City's burden to prove that the
Ordinance addressed threats to safety and aesthetics
that were "real and that its [*743] restriction [did] in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 123 L. Ed. 2d 543
(1993). This, the City has failed to do.
Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that the
Ordinance was reasonably tailored to accomplish the
City's interests, as required under the final prong of
Central Hudson. 447 U.S. at 564. "[I]f there are
numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to
the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable." City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 123 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1993). Another district court addressing this very issue found a similar ordinance was broader than necessary to accomplish
the city's interests. See Burkow v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081-82 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
Indeed, in repealing the Ordinance, the City itself
recognized that "the decades-old restriction against
parking a vehicle in the right of way for the
purposes [**16] of sale is no longer necessary, given
the significant changes in how used vehicles are sold
and the existing, content-neutral controls already in
place[] in many places in the City that already prevent a vehicle from being parked in the right of way for any
purpose for an extended period of time." (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 3 at 2 (emphasis added).) The Court need not belabor
the point by addressing potential alternatives to the
Ordinance, as it has been repealed, and the City admits that less restrictive alternatives already exist.
Accordingly, the City has failed to meet its burden, and the Court finds that the Ordinance was an
unconstitutional restriction on McLean's right to
commercial speech under the First Amendment.
Without any material fact in dispute, the Court will enter judgment in McLean's favor and award nominal
damages. See Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of
N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 428-29 (4th Cir. 2007)
("[T]he City's application of an unconstitutional
ordinance . . . is redressable at least by nominal
damages.") (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266,
98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978); see also
Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d
1517, 1526-27 (10th Cir. 1992) ("If proven, a violation of First Amendment rights concerning freedom of
expression entitles plaintiff to at least nominal
damages.") (citations omitted). The City contends that
McLean is not entitled to nominal damages under Reyes
v. City of Lynchburg, 300 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2002). But there, the Fourth Circuit expressly [**17] recognized
that "[n]ominal damages may be available in a § 1983
case if a plaintiff was deprived of an absolute right yet did not suffer an actual injury." Id. at 453 (citing Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978)); see also Rock for Life-UMBC, 411 F. App'x
at 549 ("We have recognized that an actual chilling of
protected speech is a discrete infringement of First
Amendment rights that gives rise to a claim under §
1983 for at least nominal damages.") (citing Reyes, 300 F.3d at 453). And even though the Fourth Circuit
ultimately concluded that Reyes was not entitled to
106 F. Supp. 3d 736, *742; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, **13
nominal damages, it did so after deciding that his First Amendment argument had "no merit," and instead the
Court focused only on Reyes' due process argument
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reyes, 300 F.3d at
455 n.8 ("Reyes claims that his First Amendment right to free speech had been sufficiently child to constitute a violation. Under the facts of this case, we find no merit to this claim."). In the end, the Court determined that Reyes was "not deprived of any liberty interest [under
the Fourteenth Amendment] because the ordinance was
later held to be unconstitutional" and thus was not
entitled to nominal [*744] damages. Id. at 457. Here,
the Court has found that the Ordinance was an
unconstitutional restriction on McLean's right to
commercial speech under the First Amendment, and
therefore Reyes is not controlling. Accordingly, the
Court will award nominal damages for the chilling [**18] effect the unconstitutional Ordinance had on McLean's
First Amendment right to commercial speech. Covenant
Media, 493 F.3d at 428-29.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part the City's motion to dismiss and grant McLean's motion
for summary judgment.
An appropriate Order shall issue.
/s/ James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
May 5, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text
does not appear at this cite in F. Supp. 3d.]
[*none]
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant City of Alexandria's Renewed Motion to
Dismiss [Dkt. 37] is GRANTED IN PART;
(2) Plaintiff Scott McLean's request for injunctive relief and his facial challenge to the Ordinance are
DISMISSED AS MOOT;
(3) Plaintiff Scott McLean's Motion for Summary
Judgment [Dkt. 47] is GRANTED;
(4) The Clerk of Court shall: (a) enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Scott McLean against Defendant City of
Alexandria in the amount of $1.00; (b) forward copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion
to all counsel of record; and (c) strike this case from the roll of active cases and place it among the finished
causes.
This Order is FINAL. It is so ORDERED. [**19]
May 5, 2015
Alexandria, Virginia
/s/ James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
End of Document
106 F. Supp. 3d 736, *743; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826, **17