Fire Department Deployment
and Organizational Analysis
April 16, 2024
CITY OF REDONDO BEACH
CITY COUNCIL BRIEFING
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2 • Impressed with the quality of services
• Many programs operating to best practices
• Focus is on safety for the public and the responders
• Response times are excellent
• The City is committed to the right services at the right cost • The City has positive, but different choices regarding the provision of fire services:
– Maintain, and evolve as needed, a City-operated department – Contract for fire services from the Los Angeles County Fire District Capstone Observations
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3 • Review of relevant City and Fire District documentation • Stakeholder listening interviews
• Comprehensive incident data statistical analysis
• Mapping of service demand / travel time analysis
• Cost and Services Analysis of Fire District Proposal
• The study offers
– 33 specific findings
– 7 actionable recommendations
How the Study Was Conducted
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4 • No federal or state laws or regulations in the U.S. mandating fire service staffing levels, response performance, or
outcomes
– If fire services are provided, state and federal safety regulations apply
• Level of fire service provided is a local policy decision – Communities have the level of service they can afford or which they choose to fund
– Level of service provided may not be the level of service desired Policy Choices
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5 • The goal of fire service deployment is to deliver desired outcomes • Typical urban community desired outcomes:
– Prevent death and/or permanent impairment from medical emergencies where possible
– Confine building fires to the room or compartment of origin • Delivering desired outcomes depends on adequate staffing, apparatus type, and response time
Outcome Goals Drive Fire Service Deployment
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6 • Fire service deployment is essentially about the speed and weight of response
– Speed refers to single neighborhood-based first responders to mitigate routine-tomoderate emergencies for the outcome desired – Weight refers to multiple-unit responses (First Alarm) needed to control more serious emergencies for the outcome desired
• Specialty units are deployed in addition to / in lieu of engines, ambulances, and ladder trucks to mitigate special hazards, such as
– Hazardous material release/spill
– Technical rescue
– Marine fire rescue EMS
Deployment Strategies
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77 Risk Assessment / Standard of Cover
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8 • Identify/quantify key values at
risk
• Evaluate hazards
• Determine probability of a
hazard occurrence
• Identify probable impact severity
of a hazard occurrence
• Determine overall risk by hazard
and station district
– Based on probability of
occurrence and probable impact
severity
Risk Assessment Summary
Hazard
Planning Zone
Station 1 Station 2 Station 3
Building Fire Moderate Moderate Low
Medical Emergency Moderate Moderate Moderate
Hazardous Material Low Low Low
Technical Rescue Moderate Moderate Moderate
Marine Incident Low Low Moderate
9 Response Performance to Fire/EMS Incidents (RY 22/23) Response
Component
Best Practice
90th Percentile
Performance
Performance
Versus Best
Practice and
Time Reference Citygate
Call Processing / Dispatch 1:30
0:64 Critical
Citygate
NFPA 1:25 - 0:05 sec
Crew Turnout 2:00
1:00
Citygate
NFPA 2:01 + 0:01 sec
First unit Travel 4:00
NFPA
Citygate
5:46 + 1:46 min
First unit Call-to-Arrival 7:30 Citygate 7:47 + 0:17 sec Effective Response Force
Call-to-Arrival
11:30 NFPA 12:56 + 1:27 sec
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10 Travel Time to Fire/EMS Calls (RY 22/23)
6:00 Minutes
4:00 Minutes
5:00 Minutes
11 Simultaneous Incidents
Number of
Simultaneous Incidents
Percent of
Occurrence
1 or more 34.13%
2 or more 7.22%
3 or more 1.08%
4 or more 0.20%
Marine Incident
Distribution Near
Station 3
Incident Map Incident Map within a 1.5 and 2.0-mile Radius of Station 2 within a 1.5- and
2.0-mile Radius of
Station 2
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17 • The current two fire station locations deliver 4:00-minute first-unit travel time coverage to the most densely populated areas of the City • The two fire stations deliver 5:00-minute first-unit travel time coverage to 93 percent of the City’s public streets. In Citygate’s experience, this is excellent coverage and one that many other communities can only strive for • There is not a high enough annual incident demand with excessive travel times well north of Station 2 near the City limits to justify a fire station in the far north City. As the mapping measures show, these areas could also receive mutual aid support from either County fire station just north and northeast of the City limits • The count of near or on-the-water incidents in King Harbor per year is low and, given the records available, an exact count and information regarding severity is not possible. City management of King operations is spread over multiple city agencies
Deployment Summary
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18 • Adopt outcome-driven, complete response time measures • Utilize the data in this study to decide if a fourth fire station in the far north City is the best investment, or consider moving the second engine from Fire Station 2 to Station 3 in the harbor
• If the second engine was moved from Station 2 to Station 3 in the harbor, that staffing would be combined with the two-person boat crew to provide improved on-the-water response. The combined team would also cross-staff a Paramedic squad. These two units would provide a substantial service improvement on the water and landside in the City east of the harbor
• The City would be well-served to conduct an in-depth assessment regarding using contractors to provide typical private-sector boater services in all three basins and study how to cross-staff a hybrid police and fire response team on one first responder boat
Deployment Recommendations
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1919
Headquarters Services Review
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20 • Lack of technical clerical support staff/capacity
• Lack of analytical staff/capacity to provide data analysis and training record certifications
• Two of the three fire stations are more than 60 years old • All three fire stations lack conformance with current Building Code, ADA, and NFPA standards, and two of the stations were built before the Essential Services Buildings Seismic Safety Act of 1986 • Fire Stations 1 and 2 sleeping, locker room, and restroom facilities have received minor retrofitted changes for gender inclusion and privacy. They should be completely upgraded to current standards.
Key Findings
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21 • The City and Department should consider funding one FTE Administrative Assistant to provide additional needed clerical support for the Administrative Division
• The City should find an alternative location with adequate workspace for the combined Department administrative
staff
• The City should consider prioritizing the existing fire stations for substantial remodel or replacement in its
Capital Improvement Plan
Headquarters Programs Recommendations
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2222
Contracting Fire Services Review
23 • Contracting for fire services is common and beneficial • There is no question that the quality, depth, and type of services meets the City’s needs
• There are cost and small service differences
• Either choice before the City offers best-practices-based services
• The Council can consider not only short- or long-term costs, but long-term responsibility and local choice as both the City and the District evolve
• Contracting can and does provide explicit local control via specific measurable provisions in a contract
Key Findings
24 Staffing Comparison Numbers
Station
Number Address City Resources City Minimum Daily Staffing District
Proposed
Resources
District
Mininum
Staffing
1 401 South
Broadway Ave.
Engine 61
Truck 61
Rescue 61
Batt. Chief 61
3 4
2 1
Engine
Quint Ladder
Rescue Squad
Shared Batt.
Chief
3 4
2 1
2 2400 Grant
Ave.
Engine 62
Engine 64
Rescue 62
3 3
2 Engine
Eliminated
Rescue Squad
3 -
2 3 280 Marina
Way
Squad 63
Harbor Boat 63
2 **
Shared PAU
Squad &
Baywatch
2 Total Daily Response Staffing – City Limits 20 17
Adjoining Fire Stations Outside North City 2 Engines 6
Total District In/Nearby City 22
** Cross-staffed as needed by on-duty personnel based on incident type Click to edit Master title style
25 • The District’s proposal eliminates an engine company and shares three positions for the Battalion Chief and Harbor Patrol function. Thus, of the 17 positions in the contract, a total of 14 are dedicated inside City limits • The District has adjacent fire stations outside the City that would respond into the City
• The Battalion Chief serving the City would be provided from an adjacent District fire station
• The District’s Baywatch Redondo, serving out of Fire Station 3, would be shared with the City and provide a Rescue Boat Captain and a Paramedic Ocean Lifeguard Specialist
• Fire prevention services for the City will be provided out of the District’s office in nearby Carson. The City’s fire prevention staff of 2.5 full-time employees might be transitioned into the District. The District is only charging the City for 1.75 fire prevention staff. When capacity is needed beyond that, the District can distribute the workload to its prevention staff
Deployment Differences
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26 Cost Comparison
Component
Current Fire
Department
Budget
Fire
Department
Budget
After
Contract
Difference
(Savings) /
Cost
Base Budget 23,184,042 20,274,822 (2,909,220)
YEAR ONE
Net cost without the City reducing an engine in its own services and all other leave behind adjustments that must be added to the District’s contract cost
23,184,042 27,962,079 4,778,037
ONGOING TEN-YEAR COST AFTER STARTUP COSTS STOP
Year-four cost in present value dollars after startup costs are paid 23,184,042 24,566,135 Year-four through year-ten costs after startup 162,288,294 171,962,945 9,674,651 Three-year cost difference + remaining seven years 4,146,279 13,820,930 Click to edit Master title style
27 • The City is to be commended for dealing with its unfunded pension liability and financing it at better terms. Further, it is a best practice to place these costs into each department’s budget.
However, many cities do not do this, and the District would not have been expected to look for it
• This possibly means that early, informal conversations with the District about a contract cost comparison were not fully informed between the parties
City Leave-Behind Cost Obligations
Component
Current Fire
Department
Budget
Fire
Department
Budget after
Contract
Difference
(Savings) /
Cost
Debt payment tied to existing Lease Revenue Bonds (LRBs) for 2021 pension obligation payoff or other fire services debt not absorbed by County Fire through 2049
- 3,301,399 3,301,399
CalPERS pension unfunded accrued liability cost after 2021 payoff of liability with 2021 Lease Revenue Bonds (LRBs) - 373,000 373,000 Total 3,674,399 3,674,399
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28 Just setting aside the pension obligation results in the County proposal being $765,179 more expensive than the City’s costs while providing 3-dedicated and 2-shared fewer positions inside the city limits
Cost Comparison Without Pension Obligation
Component
Current Fire
Department
Budget
County Fire Difference
(Savings)
Current budget 23,184,042 20,274,822 (2,909,220)
Combined Position Obligation 3,674,399 0 0
Fire Budget Without Obligation 19,509,643 20,274,822 765,179 Click to edit Master title style
29 • The District’s staffing plan is slightly fewer inside the City limits but supported by nearby District stations and
Baywatch resources
• The District’s fire prevention offers comparable services • City savings from the District’s contract cost are negated by it being unable to reduce all its Fire Department
budget, due mostly to legacy unfunded pension liability cost payments
Key Contracting Findings
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30 • The City has received an implementable contract-for-fire-services proposal from the District • There are other policy choices for the City Council to consider other than the bottom-line cost • Contracting eliminates the City’s entire burden of managing fire services, freeing up City Hall capacity for other civic issues. The District provides an immense, integrated team to serve the City
• The City has a strong fire department that does not need a major overhaul • The City also has maximum control over the design and cost of its fire services • It is impossible for any model to forecast City and District personnel costs many years into the future
• If the City’s fire costs perspective were to “set aside” the pension liability payments from this analysis, the District contract costs are more expensive, for less staff inside the city • Based on these intangibles in addition to the bottom-line, General Fund fiscal impact, the City has two capable, but different, fire service provision options before it.
Concluding Observations
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3131
Next Steps
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32 • Near-Term
– Review and absorb the content, findings, and recommendations of this report
– Adopt response performance goals as recommended
– In lieu of a fourth fire station in the far north City, consider moving the second fire engine from Station 2 to Station 3 in King Harbor • Long-Term
– Consider streamlining King Harbor general and public safety management – Consider adding one FTE clerical support to the Administrative Division – Add fire station renewal or replacement to the City’s long-term Capital Improvement Plan
– Monitor response performance against adopted goals
City Operated Fire Department Next Steps
Questions and Discussion