Administrative Report N.3 — Redondo Beach City Council, August 6, 2024

Administrative
Report
N.3., File # 24-1314 Meeting Date: 8/6/2024
To: MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
From: ELEANOR MANZANO, CITY CLERK
TITLE

DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION TO PROVIDE DIRECTION TO STAFF RELATING TO

OPTIONS RELATING TO INSTANT RUNOFF METHODS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO

CONSIDERING CALLING ELECTION TO CONSIDER PLACING A MEASURE FOR A CHARTER AMENDMENT ARTICLE 18, ELECTIONS, SECTION 18.4, MAJORITY VOTE; INSTANT RUNOFF ELECTION, AND TO DISCUSS DRAFT ORDINANCE AMENDING THE CITY’S MUNICIPAL CODE RELATED TO INSTANT RUNOFF MODEL AND/OR PROVIDE STAFF DIRECTION.

ADOPT BY TITLE ONLY RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068, A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY

COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, CALIFORNIA, CALLING AND GIVING NOTICE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION TO BE HELD ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2024, TO CONSOLIDATE WITH THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY STATEWIDE ELECTION, AND

ORDERING THE SUBMISSION TO THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE CITY OF A MEASURE RELATING TO CHARTER AMENDMENT ARTICLE XVIII ELECTIONS SECTION 18.4, MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF ELECTION, AND SETTING PROCEDURAL DETAILS.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The City Council on July 30, 2024, provided staff direction to agendize an item for the City Council to present and discuss options relating to Instant Runoff Methods, consider calling an election to add a measure amending the Charter, Article 18, Elections, Section 18.4, Majority Vote: Instant Runoff Election, and/or to discuss draft ordinance, and provide direction to staff.

A few important matters to keep in mind are the following:

As posted on the Secretary of State’s (“SOS”) website, per California Elections Code Section 19202, “that no voting system may be purchased or used in a California election” until approved by SOS.

There are specific regulations regarding technology in California Elections Code Section 19209. The SOS’s website has a listing of approved voting technologies <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/certification-and-approval/voting-systems-approved-usecalifornia>.

The City Attorney’s Office, per the City Council’s discussion and direction at the meeting on July 30, 2024, prepared three options, as attachments, to amend the Charter, for City Council consideration.

The City Council on July 30, 2024, provided staff direction to agendize an item for the City Council to present and discuss options relating to Instant Runoff Methods, consider calling an election to add a

Page 1 of 3 ends

1 N.3., File # 24-1314 Meeting Date: 8/6/2024
measure amending the Charter, Article 18, Elections, Section 18.4, Majority Vote: Instant Runoff Election, and/or to discuss draft ordinance, and provide direction to staff.

A few important matters to keep in mind are the following:

Article XVIII ELECTIONS Section 18.4

18.4 Majority Vote: Instant Runoff.

Option I - To delay the Instant Runoff date to 2035; or Option II - To revert back to conducting traditional runoff election; or Option III - For Plurality for all elected officers.

To complete the resolution for the Article XVIII the City Council must:
· Select an option; and
· Create “Whereas”; and
· Review Section 1, the ballot question and Exhibit A; and · Section 10, authorize author(s); and
· Section 15, recommend three choices for the letter designation.

Note: Arguments are due by August 16, 2024 at 5:00 p.m., Rebuttals and Impartial Analysis are due August 26, 2024 at 5:00 p.m., to be submitted to the City Clerk. To request fillable official forms for Arguments and/or Rebuttals, you must contact the City Clerk.

It is recommended that the City Council direct the City Clerk to provide which order this ballot measure within any other measures that have been called and placed on the ballot for November 5, 2024.

BACKGROUND
The City of Redondo Beach held its General Municipal Election on March 7, 2023, conducted by AllMail Ballot. The electorate successfully voted, by an overwhelming 76.67%, for Measure CA5. The ballot measure amended Charter Section 18.4, “Majority Vote; Instant Run Off Election” which replaced runoff elections for the Elected Offices of the City with an instant run off voting system.

COORDINATION
This report was prepared in coordination with the City Attorney’s Office.

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2 N.3., File # 24-1314 Meeting Date: 8/6/2024

FISCAL IMPACT
The cost for the Ballot Measures were allocated in the FY Budget 2024-2025 in the amount of $250K.

However, in order to add this proposed measure which will require additional pages, an additional amount of $20,000 will need to be allocated in the future. There would also be a higher cost due to the additional new voters and the higher voter participation as a result of the Presidential election.

As a reminder, these are estimated cost and these may increase or decrease based on the actual cost submitted by the Los Angeles County following the Election.

SUBMITTED BY:

Eleanor Manzano, City Clerk

ATTACHMENTS
· 2408-068 Resolution - Calling Charter Amendment - Article XVIII, Section 18.4 · Option I - Proposed Measure - IRV
· Option II - Proposed Measure - Return to traditional runoffs · Option III - Proposed Measure - Plurality for all elected offices · California Elections Code 19202 and 19209 - Certification of Voting Equipment · Proposed Draft Ordinance - Instant Runoff
· Administrative Report from CCM 7/30/2024
· RCV Case - San Francisco, Dudum v. Arntz

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3 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 1
RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068

A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF REDONDO BEACH,

CALIFORNIA, CALLING AND GIVING NOTICE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION TO BE HELD ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2024, TO

CONSOLIDATE WITH THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY STATEWIDE ELECTION,

AND ORDERING THE SUBMISSION TO THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE

CITY OF A MEASURE RELATING TO CHARTER AMENDMENT ARTICLE XVIII ELECTIONS SECTION 18.4, MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF ELECTION, AND SETTING PROCEDURAL DETAILS.

WHEREAS, ____________________________________________________; and WHEREAS,____________________________________________________; and WHEREAS, pursuant to authority provided by Sections 1415(a)(2)(A) and 9222 of the California Elections Code, the City Council of the City of Redondo Beach submits to the voters proposed amendments to the City Charter Article XVIII, Elections, Section 18.4, Majority Vote: Instant Runoff Election; and
WHEREAS, the City Council is authorized and directed by statute to submit the proposed charter amendments to the voters.

NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, CALIFORNIA, DOES RESOLVE, DECLARE, DETERMINE AND ORDER AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1: That pursuant to the California Constitution, Article XI and the Government Code, Title 4, Division 2, Chapter 2 (commencing at section 34450) and the Election Code Division 9, Chapter 3, Article 3 (commencing at section 9255) of the State of California, that the City Council, pursuant to its right and authority, does hereby order submitted to the voters at a Special Municipal Election, consolidated with the LA County Statewide General Election on November 5, 2024, for the purpose of submitting the following proposed charter amendment:

Option I:

PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT. Shall Article XVIII Elections pertaining to Section 18.4, Majority Vote: Instant runoff election to delay starting date from 2025 to 2035?
YES
NO
Option II:

PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT. Shall Article XVIII Elections pertaining to Section 18.4, Majority Vote: Instant runoff election to revert back to conduct runoff elections?
YES
NO
4 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 2
Option III:

PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT. Shall Article XVIII Elections pertaining to Section 18.4, Majority Vote: Instant runoff election be removed and become a plurality vote?
YES
NO
SECTION 2. That the text of the proposed Charter amendment to be submitted to the voters is attached as Exhibit “A”.

SECTION 3. That the vote requirement for the measure to pass is a majority (50%+1) of the votes cast.

SECTION 4. That the ballots to be used at the election shall be in form and content as required by law.

SECTION 5. That the City Clerk/Elections Official is authorized, instructed and directed to coordinate with the County of Los Angeles Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk to procure and furnish any and all official ballots, notices, printed matter and all supplies, equipment and paraphernalia that may be necessary in order to properly and lawfully conduct the election.

SECTION 6. That the polls/vote centers for the election shall be open at 7:00 a.m. of the day of the election and shall remain open continuously from that time until 8:00 p.m. of the same day when the polls/vote centers shall be closed, pursuant to Election Code Section 10242, except as provided in Sections 14212, 14401 of the Elections Code of the State of California.

SECTION 7. That in all particulars not recited in this resolution, the election shall be held and conducted as provided by law for holding municipal elections.

SECTION 8. That notice of the time and place of holding the election is given and the City Clerk is authorized, instructed, and directed to give further or additional notice of the election, in time, form and manner as required by law.

SECTION 9. Pursuant to Section 9282(b) of the California Elections Code, the City Council, or any member or members of a legislative body authorized by the City Council, or any individual voter who is eligible to vote on the measure, or bona fide association of citizens, or any combination of voters and associations may file a written argument for or against a city measure.

SECTION 10. That pursuant to the above the City Council does authorize the following member(s) of its body: ____________for, _____________for, ______________ for, to file written arguments In Favor of City measure as specified above not exceeding 300 words, accompanied by the printed name(s) and signature(s) of the author(s) submitting it, in accordance with Article 4, Chapter 3, Division 9 of the Elections Code of the State of California. The arguments may be changed or withdrawn 5 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 3
until Friday, August 16, 2024 by 5:00 p.m., after which no arguments for or against the City measure may be submitted to the City Clerk.

SECTION 11. The arguments shall be filed with the City Clerk/Elections Official, signed, with the printed name(s) and signature(s) of the author(s) submitting it, or if submitted on behalf of an organization, the name of the organization, and the printed name and signature of at least one of its principal officers who is the author of the argument. The arguments shall be accompanied by the Form of Statement To Be Filed By Author(s) of Argument.

SECTION 12. That based on the time reasonably necessary to prepare and print the arguments and sample ballots and to permit the ten-calendar-day public examination period, the Los Angeles County Registrar Records/County Clerk has authorized Friday, August 16, 2024 by 5:00 p.m., as the date after which no arguments for or against a City measure may be submitted to the City Clerk/Elections Official for printing and distribution to the voters.

SECTION 13. That if more than one argument for or against the measures is submitted to the City Clerk/Elections Official within the time prescribed, pursuant to Section 9287 of the California Elections Code, City Clerk/Elections Official shall select, pursuant to Section 6, one of the arguments in favor and one of the arguments against the Measure for printing and distribution to the voters.

SECTION 14. That the City Clerk/Elections Official shall give preference and priority, in the order named, to the arguments of the following:
(a) The City Council, or member(s) or members of the body authorized by the City Council.
(b) The individual voter, or bona fide association of citizens, or combination of voters and associations, who are the bona fide sponsors or proponents of the measure.
(c) Bona fide associations of citizens.
(d) Individual voters who are eligible to vote on the measure.

SECTION 15. That pursuant to Section 9285(a)(1) of the California Elections Code, after the City Clerk/Elections Official has selected the arguments for and against each measure which will be printed and distributed to the voters, the Election Official shall send a copy of the argument in favor of each measure to the authors of the argument against each measure, and a copy of the argument against each measure to the authors of the argument in favor of each measure.

SECTION 16. That pursuant to Section 9285(a)(2) of the California Elections Code that author or a majority of the authors of an argument relating to a city measure may prepare and submit a rebuttal argument or may authorize in writing any other person or persons to prepare, submit, or sign the rebuttal argument. 6 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 4
SECTION 17. That pursuant to Section 9285(a)(3) of the California Elections Code rebuttal arguments may not exceed 250 words.

SECTION 18. That pursuant to Section 9285(a)(4) of the California Elections Code rebuttal arguments relating to a city measure shall be filed with the Elections Official no later than 10 days after the final filing date for primary arguments, the Election Official has fixed August 26, 2024 by 5:00 p.m. The rebuttal argument shall be accompanied by the Form of Statement To Be Filed By Author(s) of Argument.

SECTION 19. That rebuttal arguments shall be filed with the City Clerk/Elections Official, signed, with the printed name(s) and signature(s) of the author(s) submitting it, or if submitted on behalf of an organization, the name of the organization and the printed name and signature of at least one of its principal officers.

SECTION 20. That pursuant to Section 9285(a)(5) of the California Elections Code all rebuttals may not be signed by more than five persons and shall be printed in the same manner as a primary argument and shall immediately follow the primary argument which it seeks to rebut.

SECTION 21. The City Clerk/Elections Official shall transmit a copy of the measure to the City Attorney.
a. The City Attorney shall prepare an impartial analysis of the measure not exceeding 500 words showing the effect of the measure on the existing law and the operation of the measure.
b. The analysis shall include a statement indicating whether the measure was placed on the ballot by a petition signed by the requisite number of voters or by the governing body of the city.
c. In the event the entire text of the measure is not printed on the ballot, nor in the voter information portion of the voter information guide, there shall be printed immediately below the impartial analysis, in no less than 10-point type, the following: “The above statement is an impartial analysis of Ordinance or Measure __. If you desire a copy of the ordinance or measure, please call the Elections Official’s office at (310) 318-0656 and a copy will be mailed at no cost to you.”
d. The impartial analysis shall be filed with the City Clerk/Elections Official by Friday, August 26, 2024 by 5:00 p.m.

SECTION 22. That the City Council approves the letter designations of “__”, “__”, and “__” as the first, second, and third choice, respectively for the submission to the Los Angeles County Clerk/Registrar Recorder for identification of the ballot measure. 7 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 5
SECTION 23. That the City Clerk shall certify to the passage and adoption of this resolution and enter it into the Book of Original Resolutions.

PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED this 6th day of August, 2024. ________________________________
James A. Light, Mayor
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ATTEST:
________________________________ ________________________________ Michael W. Webb, City Attorney Eleanor Manzano, CMC, City Clerk 8 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 6

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) ss

CITY OF REDONDO BEACH )
I, Eleanor Manzano, City Clerk of the City of Redondo Beach, California, do hereby certify that Resolution No. CC-2408-068 was passed and adopted by the City Council of the City of Redondo Beach, California, at a regular meeting of said City Council held on the 6th day of August, 2024, and thereafter signed and approved by the Mayor and attested by the City Clerk, and that said resolution was adopted by the following vote:

AYES:

NOES:

ABSENT:

ABSTAIN:
_________________________________
Eleanor Manzano, CMC
City Clerk
9 RESOLUTION NO. CC-2408-068
CALLING ARTICLE XVIII – ELECTIONS 18.4 – MAJORITY VOTE: INSTANT RUNOFF PAGE NO. 7
EXHIBIT “A”
10 OPTION I
PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT MEASURE ___

A. Except as provided in this Section with regard to runoff elections, a majority (more than half), of the votes cast for all candidates for each City elective office is required for the election of the candidate to such office. In the event no candidate for an elective office receives a majority of the votes cast for all candidates for such office, the two (2) candidates receiving the highest numbers of votes cast for any such office shall thereby qualify as candidates for such office at a runoff election to be held not later than seventy (70) days after such election. In the event that any person qualifies pursuant to law to become a write-in candidate for such office at the runoff election, the candidate who receives a plurality of all the votes cast for such office in the runoff election shall be elected.

B. Beginning with the March 2035 General Election, Tthe City Council must by ordinance provide for an instant runoff voting system in the elections of each city elective office listed in Article VI, Article VIII, and Article X. A majority (more than half), of the votes cast for all candidates, or a majority of the operative votes on continuing ballots in subsequent rounds, is required for the election of a candidate to each such office as determined by an instant runoff voting system process detailed in the ordinance the council must enact.

CB. Notwithstanding the foregoing, members of the Board of Education shall continue to be elected by a plurality of votes cast.
*18.4—as added by election 11-4-80; as amended by election 11-6-84, 3-7-95 and 3-7-23. 11 OPTION II
PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT MEASURE ___

A. Except as provided in this Section with regard to runoff elections, aExcept as provided in this Section with regard to runoff elections, a The City Council must by ordinance provide for an instant runoff voting system in the elections of each city elective office listed in Article VI, Article VIII, and Article X. A majority (more than half), of the votes cast for all candidates or a majority of the operative votes on continuing ballots in subsequent rounds, is required for the election of a candidate to each such office as determined by an instant runoff voting system process detailed in the ordinance the council must enact. for each City elective office is required for the election of the candidate to such office. In the event no candidate for an elective office receives a majority of the votes cast for all candidates for such office, the two (2) candidates receiving the highest numbers of votes cast for any such office shall thereby qualify as candidates for such office at a runoff election to be held not later than seventy (70) days after such election. In the event that any person qualifies pursuant to law to become a write-in candidate for such office at the runoff election, the candidate who receives a plurality of all the votes cast for such office in the runoff election shall be elected.

THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF REDONDO BEACH CALIFORNIA, HEREBY AMEND SECTION 18.4 OF ARTICLE XVIII OF THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF REDONDO BEACH TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(NOTE: New provisions or language added to the existing charter section are shown in BOLDFACE type; words and figures deleted from the existing charter section are shown in strikeout type.)
Sec. 18.2. Procedure, elections code. All elections held under this Charter shall be held and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Elections Code of the State of California as the same now exists or may hereafter be amended, for the holding of elections in general law cities unless such provisions are in conflict with the provisions of this Charter or unless an ordinance providing for the manner of holding and conducting elections is adopted by the City Council. The person who receives a plurality of the votes cast for any office is elected to that office.

Sec. 18.4. Majority vote: Instant runoff election.

A. The City Council must by ordinance provide for an instant runoff voting system in the elections of each city elective office listed in Article VI, Article VIII, and Article X. A majority (more than half), of the votes cast for all candidates, or a majority of the operative votes on continuing ballots in subsequent rounds, is required for the election of a candidate to each such office as determined by an instant runoff voting system process detailed in the ordinance the council must enact.

B. Notwithstanding the foregoing, members of the Board of Education shall continue to be elected by a plurality of votes cast.
*18.4—as added by election 11-4-80; as amended by election 11-6-84, 3-7-95 and 3-7-23. 13 CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS CODE
SECTION 19202 AND 19209
19202.
(a) Except as authorized by Section 19209, a voting system, in whole or in part, shall not be used unless it has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State prior to any election at which it is to be used.
(b) A voting system that has been tested and approved for use in all elections by the Secretary of State before January 1, 2014, shall be deemed certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State and may be used in an election subject to any conditions placed on the use of the voting system by the Secretary of State before January 1, 2014, including conditions imposed in the reapproval documents issued by the Secretary of State in 2007 and 2008 following the Top-to-Bottom Review, and its subsequent revisions. The voting systems described in this subdivision shall remain subject to review and decertification by the Secretary of State at any time pursuant to Section 19232.
(c) A vendor or county, upon obtaining federal qualification on or before April 28, 2016, may request approval of the voting system from the Secretary of State based on the examination and review requirements in place before January 1, 2014.
(d) A jurisdiction shall not purchase or contract for a voting system unless it has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State.
(e) Notwithstanding subdivision (d), a local jurisdiction may contract and pay for the following:
(1) Research and development of a new voting system that has not been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State and uses only nonproprietary software and firmware with disclosed source code, except for unmodified commercial off-the-shelf software and firmware, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 19209. (2) Manufacture of the minimum number of voting system units reasonably necessary for either of the following purposes:
(A) To test and seek certification or conditional approval of the voting system pursuant to Sections 19210 to 19214, inclusive.
(B) To test and demonstrate the capabilities of the voting system in a pilot program pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of, and subdivision (c) of, Section 19209. (Amended by Stats. 2016, Ch. 422, Sec. 81. (AB 2911) Effective January 1, 2017.) 14 CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS CODE
SECTION 19202 AND 19209
19209.
(a) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) “Commercial off-the-shelf” means mass-produced, readily available hardware devices, including card readers, printers, or personal computers, and their firmware or software products, including operating systems, programming language compilers, or database management systems.
(2) “Incorrect in part” means a full manual tally of the votes cast on the pilot system would reveal rates of error in the pilot system tally that, if extrapolated to the entire contest, would alter the electoral outcome.
(3) “Partial risk-limiting audit” means a procedure that guarantees a large minimum chance of a full manual tally of the votes cast on the pilot system if the electoral outcome is incorrect in part.
(4) “Risk-limiting audit” means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for the audited contest. (b) The governing board, without formally adopting a voting system, may provide for the experimental use of the voting system in a pilot program held in one or more precincts at a single election or, in the case of a special election, the special primary election and the special general election, if the voting system complies with either of the following:
(1) The voting system is certified or conditionally approved prior to its experimental use. (2) The voting system meets all of the following requirements:
(A) Uses only software and firmware with disclosed source code, except for unmodified commercial off-the-shelf software and firmware.
(B) Meets the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 19101. (C) Meets the requirements of the regulations adopted by the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision (g).
(D) Implements risk-limiting audits.
(c) A voting system that meets all of the requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) need not be certified or conditionally approved prior to its experimental use in a pilot program if the number of voting system units deployed in the pilot program is limited to the number necessary to test and demonstrate the capabilities of the voting system in a limited number of precincts or locations, including a prudent number of reserve units to ensure that sufficient working units will be available to conduct the pilot program. In no event shall the number of voting system units exceed 50 percent of the estimated number of units that would be required for full deployment of the voting system at every polling place and early voting site in a statewide election throughout the jurisdiction. Capabilities that may be taken into account in determining the number of voting system units reasonably necessary to test and demonstrate the capabilities of the voting system include, but are not limited to, all of the following:
(1) The capability of the voting system to accommodate voting in all languages in which the jurisdiction is required to provide ballots under applicable state and federal laws. 15 CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS CODE
SECTION 19202 AND 19209
(2) The capability of the voting system to accommodate voting by persons with a broad range of physical and cognitive disabilities, as required by applicable state and federal laws. (3) The current and projected number of voting-eligible individuals in the jurisdiction. (4) The geography and distribution of the population in the jurisdiction. (d) No later than nine months before the election at which the pilot program of a voting system is proposed to be conducted, the governing board shall submit to the Secretary of State a plan for the pilot program. The Secretary of State shall approve or reject the plan no later than three months after receipt of the plan.
(e) The votes cast on a voting system during a pilot program pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be subject to risk-limiting audits.
(1) For each contest conducted entirely on the pilot voting system, the jurisdiction conducting the pilot program shall conduct a risk-limiting audit with at least a 90-percent chance of requiring a full manual tally of the contest whenever a full manual tally would show an outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the pilot voting system. (2) For each contest conducted partially on the pilot voting system, the jurisdiction conducting the pilot program shall conduct a partial risk-limiting audit of the portion of the contest in which the voters cast their votes on the pilot voting system, with at least a 90-percent chance of requiring a full manual tally of all votes cast using the pilot voting system whenever the outcome is incorrect in part.
(3) (A) If a risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of all of the ballots cast in the contest, then the contest outcome according to that manual tally shall become the official result.
(B) If a partial risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of the ballots cast using the pilot voting system, the vote counts according to that manual tally shall replace the vote counts reported by the pilot voting system for the purpose of determining the official contest results.
(4) Risk-limiting audit procedures shall comply with all other requirements in regulations adopted by the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision (g). (f) Upon completion of the pilot program, the governing board shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of any defect, fault, or failure of the hardware, software, or firmware of the voting system or a part of the voting system.
(g) A voting system pilot program shall not be conducted in a legally binding election without the prior approval of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish regulations governing voting system pilot programs.
(Added by renumbering Section 19211 by Stats. 2013, Ch. 602, Sec. 24. (SB 360) Effective January 1, 2014.)
16 ORDINANCE NO. ****-24
REPEALING SECTION 2-2.202 OF TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 AND ADDING SECTIONS 2-2.401 THROUGH 2-2.410 OF ARTICLE 4, TO TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2 OF RBMC PROVIDING FOR INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING PAGE 1
ORDINANCE NO. XXXX-24

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
REDONDO BEACH, CALIFORNIA, REPEAL TITLE 2,
CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 (NOTICES OF
RUNOFF ELECTIONS) AND ADDING ARTICLE 4 TO
MUNICIPAL CODE TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, TO PROVIDE FOR

INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING
WHEREAS, on March 7, 2023, the voters of the City of Redondo Beach adopted Measure CA5, an amendment to the City Charter of the City of Redondo Beach, replacing runoff elections for elections for elective offices of the City with ranked choice voting, also known as instant runoff voting; and
WHEREAS, CA5 amended Charter section 18.4 which now includes the following language: “The City Council must by ordinance provide for an instant runoff voting system in the elections of each city elective office listed in Article VI, Article VIII, and Article X. A majority (more than half), of the votes cast for all candidates, or a majority of the operative votes on continuing ballots in subsequent rounds, is required for the election of a candidate to each such office as determined by an instant runoff voting system process detailed in the ordinance the council must enact”; and
WHEREAS, this ordinance is intended to implement the direction of section

18.4 of the Charter.

NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, CALIFORNIA, DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF CODE SECTIONS. Section 2-2.202 of Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 2, Section 2-2.202 of the Redondo Beach Municipal Code is hereby repealed.

SECTION 2. AMENDMENT OF CODE. Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 4 is hereby added to the Redondo Beach Municipal Code and shall read as follows:
“Section 1. Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 4 is hereby added to the Redondo Beach Municipal Code as follows:

ARTICLE 4 – ELECTIONS – INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING
2-2.401 Definitions
2-2.402 General Provisions
2-2.403 Ballot
2-2.404 Tabulation
2-2.405 Ties
17 ORDINANCE NO. ****-24
REPEALING SECTION 2-2.202 OF TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 AND ADDING SECTIONS 2-2.401 THROUGH 2-2.410 OF ARTICLE 4, TO TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2 OF RBMC PROVIDING FOR INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING PAGE 2
2-2.406 Skipped Rankings
2-2.407 Undervotes, Overvotes and Exhausted Ballots
2-2.408 Reports
2-2.409 Continuing the Tally to Two Candidates
2-2.410 Manual Tally
2-2.401 Definitions.

A. “Choice” means an indication on a ballot of a voter’s assigned ranking of candidates (i.e. first choice, second choice, third choice, etc.) for any single office according to the voter’s preference.

B. "Continuing ballot" shall mean a ballot that counts towards a continuing candidate.

C. "Continuing candidate" shall mean a candidate that has not been eliminated.

D. “Exhausted ballot” means any ballot that cannot be advanced because no further continuing candidates are ranked on that ballot.

E. "Majority of votes" shall mean more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast on continuing ballots.

F. “Next ranked” means the highest ranked choice for a continuing candidate.

G. “Overvote” means any ballot with more than one candidate indicated for the same ranking.

H. "Ranked choice voting" shall mean an election system in which voters rank the candidates for office in order of preference, and the ballots are counted in rounds that, in the case of a single-winner election, simulate a series of runoffs until one candidate receives a majority of votes. Also known as “instant runoff voting.” I. “Round of counting” or “round” means a step in the counting process during which votes for all continuing candidates are tabulated for the purpose of determining whether a candidate has achieved a majority of the votes cast for a particular office, and, absent a majority, which candidate or candidates must be eliminated. No round of counting or elimination of candidates can occur before all eligible ballots are received by the City Clerk.

J. “Skipped ranking” means a ballot contains a higher ranking with no candidate indicated, and contains a lower ranking with a candidate indicated.

K. “Undervote” means any ballot that has no candidates indicated at any ranking.

L. “Unofficial Election Night Report” means an initial unofficial report regarding the results of ballots received by the City Clerk before election day. This does not constitute a round of counting and no candidates will be eliminated based on the report.

M. “Vote” means a ballot choice that is counted toward the election of a candidate. During each round of counting, each continuing ballot contains one vote. All first choices are votes and lower ranked choices are potential runoff votes that may, in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, be credited to and become votes for a candidate.

N. “Voting equipment” means all ballots and/or voting devices, vote tabulating systems and/or similar or related systems to be used in the conduct of the City's election, 18 ORDINANCE NO. ****-24
REPEALING SECTION 2-2.202 OF TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 AND ADDING SECTIONS 2-2.401 THROUGH 2-2.410 OF ARTICLE 4, TO TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2 OF RBMC PROVIDING FOR INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING PAGE 3
including but not limited to paper ballot systems, optical scan systems, and direct recording electronic systems.
2-2.402 General Provisions.

A. Ranked choice voting elections in the elections of each city elective office listed in Article VI, Article VIII, and Article X shall be conducted according to the procedures in this section.

B. Ranked choice voting shall commence with the 2025 General Municipal Election.
2-2.403 Ballot.

A. The ranked choice voting ballot shall allow voters to rank six choices.

B. The ballot shall not interfere with a voter's ability to rank a write-in candidate.

C. Instructions provided to voters shall conform substantially to the following specifications, but may be modified based on ballot design and voting equipment used:
“Vote by ranking candidates in your order of choice. You may rank as many or as few candidates as you choose. Select a different candidate for each ranking. Select only one candidate in each ranking. Ranking more candidates will not hurt your higher ranked candidates. Do not skip rankings.”
2-2.404 Tabulation.

The ballots shall be counted in rounds.

A. In the first round, every ballot shall count as a vote towards the first choice candidate.

B. After any round, if any candidate receives a majority of votes from the continuing ballots, that candidate shall be declared the winner.

C. If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate receiving the fewest number of votes shall be eliminated.

D. Every ballot counting towards the eliminated candidate shall be advanced to the next-ranked continuing candidate. All the continuing ballots for all continuing candidates shall be counted again in a new round.
2-2.405 Ties.

In the event that two or more candidates tie for the fewest number of votes, the candidate to eliminate shall be chosen by lot.

If there are only two candidates in the final round and they are tied, the winner will be the candidate who received the higher number of votes in round one. 2-2.406 Skipped Rankings.

In the first or any round, in the event that any ballot reaches a ranking with no candidate indicated, that ballot shall immediately be advanced to the next ranking. 2-2.407 Undervotes, Overvotes, and Exhausted Ballots.

After each round, any ballot that is not continuing is either an undervote, overvote, or 19 ORDINANCE NO. ****-24
REPEALING SECTION 2-2.202 OF TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 AND ADDING SECTIONS 2-2.401 THROUGH 2-2.410 OF ARTICLE 4, TO TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2 OF RBMC PROVIDING FOR INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING PAGE 4
exhausted ballot. Any ballot that has been declared an undervote, overvote, or exhausted shall remain so and shall not count towards any candidate in that round or in subsequent rounds.
2-2.408 Reports.

The following reports shall be produced for public review.

A. The "summary report" for a contest shall mean a report that lists the candidate vote totals in each round, and the cumulative numbers of undervotes, overvotes, and exhausted ballots in each round.

B. The "ballot image report" for a contest shall mean a report that lists, for each ballot, the candidate or candidates indicated at each ranking, the precinct of the ballot, and whether the ballot was cast by a vote-by-mail ballot. In the report, the ballots shall be listed in an order that does not permit the order in which they were cast in each precinct to be reconstructed.

C. The "comprehensive report" for a contest shall mean a report that lists the vote totals in the summary report by precinct. The report shall list, for each round, the number of ballots cast in each precinct that:

1. were tallied as votes for each candidate in that round,

2. have been declared undervotes,

3. have been declared overvotes, cumulatively for all previous rounds and inclusive of the reported round of tabulation, and

4. have been declared exhausted cumulatively for all previous rounds and inclusive of the reported round of tabulation.

D. Mode and manner of release. Preliminary versions of the summary report and ballot image report shall be made available as soon as possible after the commencement of the canvass of votes cast. The summary report, ballot image report, comprehensive report, and preliminary versions of the summary report and ballot image report shall be made available to the public during the canvass via the Internet and by other means. The ballot image report and preliminary versions of the ballot image report shall be made available in a plain text electronic format. In any case, preliminary versions of these reports shall be made available to the public prior to the commencement of the manual tally.
2-2.409 Continuing the Tally to Two Candidates.

If a winner is declared when there are three or more continuing candidates (including the winner), and if the vote tabulating system allows for it, additional rounds of tallying shall occur until there are only two candidates left for reporting purposes only. 2-2.410 Manual Tally.

A. A preliminary version of the comprehensive report shall be made available to the public prior to the selection of precincts for the public one percent manual tally, as provided by state law.

B. After each round of the manual tally, the second and third choice votes shall be assigned based of the candidate totals in the summary round-by-round report for 20 ORDINANCE NO. ****-24
REPEALING SECTION 2-2.202 OF TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 AND ADDING SECTIONS 2-2.401 THROUGH 2-2.410 OF ARTICLE 4, TO TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2 OF RBMC PROVIDING FOR INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING PAGE 5
the entire contest.

SECTION 3. INCONSISTENT PROVISIONS. Any provisions of the Redondo Beach Municipal Code, or appendices thereto, or any other ordinances of the City inconsistent herewith, to the extent of such inconsistencies and no further, are hereby repealed.

SECTION 4. SEVERABILITY. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of the Ordinance. The City Council hereby declares that it would have passed this Ordinance and each section, subsection, sentence, clause, and phrase thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, subsections, sentences, clauses, or phrases be declared invalid or unconstitutional.

SECTION 5. PUBLICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE. This Ordinance shall be published by one insertion in the official newspaper of said city, and same shall go into effect and be in full force and operation from thirty (30) days after its final passage and adoption.

PASSED, APPROVED AND ADOPTED this ___ day of August, 2024. _______________________________
James A. Light, Mayor
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ATTEST:
________________________________ ________________________________ Michael W. Webb, City Attorney Eleanor Manzano, CMC, City Clerk 21 ORDINANCE NO. ****-24
REPEALING SECTION 2-2.202 OF TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2, ARTICLE 2, SECTION 2-2.202 AND ADDING SECTIONS 2-2.401 THROUGH 2-2.410 OF ARTICLE 4, TO TITLE 2, CHAPTER 2 OF RBMC PROVIDING FOR INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING PAGE 6

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) ss

CITY OF REDONDO BEACH )
I, Eleanor Manzano, City Clerk of the City of Redondo Beach, California, do hereby certify that Ordinance No. O- was introduced at a regular meeting of the City Council held on the ______________, 2024, and approved and adopted by the City Council of the City of Redondo Beach, California, at a regular meeting of said City Council held on the _________________, 2024, and there after signed and approved by the Mayor and attested by the City Clerk, and that said Ordinance was adopted by the following vote:

AYES:

NOES:

ABSENT:

ABSTAIN:
_________________________________
Eleanor Manzano, CMC
City Clerk
22 Administrative
Report
N.3., File # 24-0523 Meeting Date: 7/30/2024
To: MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
From: ELEANOR MANZANO, CITY CLERK
TITLE

DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ACTION TO PROVIDE DIRECTION TO STAFF RELATING TO THE DRAFT ORDINANCE AMENDING THE CITY’S MUNICIPAL CODE RELATED TO RANKED CHOICE VOTING AS AN INSTANT RUNOFF MODEL.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The City Clerk and City Attorney’s Office jointly presented to the City Council at its Regular Meeting on January 23, 2024, and sought direction relating to implementing Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and to prepare an ordinance detailing the process and present the item to Council in April 2024.

Ranked Choice Voting is a method that allows voters to rank candidates on the ballot in order of preference and the ballots are tabulated (counted) in rounds that simulate a series of runoffs until a candidate receives 50% plus 1, and therefore is determined to be the winner. RCV is also known and referred to as “instant runoff voting.” RCV only applies to City Offices candidates, and does not include Redondo Beach Unified School District Members of the Board of Education.

This proposed draft ordinance will repeal Redondo Beach Municipal Code (“RBMC”) Section 2-2.202 <https://ecode360.com/42642408> of Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 2, Section 2-2.202 (Administration - Elections, Notice of runoff elections) and then amend Title 2, Chapter, 2, by adding Article 4 (Administration - Elections, Instant Runoff Voting).

A proposed draft ordinance has been prepared for your review, input, and to provide direction to staff in the areas listed below.

1. Maximum Ranking Number of Candidates due to HART equipment limitation at this time is 6.

Select the total number of rankings with no more than 6.

Note: The City of Berkeley, which has been conducting RCV Elections since 2010, initially had a maximum of 3 and increased the number to 5 in 2022. They use Dominion equipment which now has a maximum of 10 rankings.

2. Write-In Candidate
Select the total number of ballot write-in with no more than 6.

Note: The number selected should be consistent with the Maximum Ranking Number of

Page 1 of 3 ends

23 N.3., File # 24-0523 Meeting Date: 7/30/2024
Candidates (No. 1 Above).

Other points of interests on the proposed draft ordinance include the items listed below. · Skipped Ranking occurs during any of the following:

When a voter skips ranking a candidate; and
When a voter includes a non-qualified write-in candidate.

For example, a ballot contains rankings for a second-choice candidate, third choice candidate, fourth choice candidate, but skips (did not select) a candidate for their first choice. Assuming that the voter’s second choice is a continuing candidate, the ballot shall be transferred to the voter’s second choice. · Undervote Ballot is when a voter has not voted for a candidate indicated at any ranking, will be declared an undervote, the ballot becomes exhausted and does not continue in the series. · Overvote and Exhausted Ballots is when a voter has voted for more than 1 candidate in a ranking (round), because they overvoted, the ballot becomes exhausted (invalid) and does not continue in the series.
· Ties In the event that two or more candidates tie for the fewest number of votes, the candidate to eliminate shall be chosen by lot.

If there are only two candidates in the final round and they are tied, the winner will be the candidate who received the higher number of votes in round one. · Unofficial Election Night Report - On Election Day, the City Clerk will conduct unofficial count of all ballots received by the City Clerk prior to election day. This will not constitute a “round” of county and no candidates will be eliminated based on the report. On Final Day, the City Clerk will conduct all rounds of ranking until reaching the final two candidates; and will then provide Final Report(s).

In conducting research to prepare this ordinance, City Clerk staff contacted various sources to receive input, discuss best practices, and consider concerns relating to RCV. Staff contacted the following, City of Berkeley City Clerk, County of Humboldt Registrar of Voters, and HART representative. Based on staff research, these are the areas that vary from the different cities that have conducted/will conduct RCV and require City Council direction.

Furthermore, as a status update, the City Clerk’s Office has been researching and will present a Voter Education and Outreach Plan to the City Council in August 2024.

Additionally, this City will be the first to conduct RCV in the County of Los Angeles, serving as a model to other cities in the Southern California area.

Page 2 of 3 ends

24 N.3., File # 24-0523 Meeting Date: 7/30/2024
ballot measure amended Charter Section 18.4, “Majority Vote; Instant Run Off Election” which replaced runoff elections for the Elected Offices of the City with an instant run off voting system.

At the last Regular City Council Meeting on April 2, 2024, the City Council directed the City Attorney to prepare an ordinance amending the City’s Municipal Code to implement a voting method in March 2025 related to an instant runoff voting system, which on January 23, 2024, the City Council approved to move forward with RCV.

COORDINATION
This report was prepared in coordination with the City Attorney’s Office.

FISCAL IMPACT
There is minimal fiscal impact associated with this item.

SUBMITTED BY:

Eleanor Manzano, City Clerk

ATTACHMENTS
· Proposed Draft Ordinance
· RCV Case - San Francisco, Dudum v. Arntz

Page 3 of 3 ends

25 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
DUDUM v. ARNTZ
No. 10-17198.
• View Case
640 F.3d 1098 (2011)
Ron DUDUM; Matthew Sheridan; Elizabeth Murphy; Katherine Webster; Marina Franco; Dennis Flynn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John ARNTZ, Director of Elections of the City and County of San Francisco; City and County of San Francisco, a municipal corporation; San Francisco Department of Elections; San Francisco Elections Commission, Defendants-Appellees.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 15, 2011.

Filed May 20, 2011.

Attorney(s) appearing for the Case
James R. Parrinello , Christopher E. Skinnell , Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor, LLP, San Rafael, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Therese M. Stewart , Chief Deputy City Attorney, and Jonathan Givner , Andrew Shen , and Mollie Lee , Deputy City Attorneys, San Francisco, CA, for the defendants-appellees.

Before: RICHARD A. PAEZ, MARSHA S. BERZON, and CARLOS T. BEA, Circuit Judges. 26 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
Facts
San Francisco sought to improve upon the electoral system it employed in some municipal elections.

Originally, San Francisco implemented a runoff election system. This system's flaws included the prevalence of strategic voting and wasted ballots. To resolve these issues, San Francisco amended its city charter. Thus, a restricted instant-runoff voting (IRV) system supplanted the prior runoff election system. Under this system, voters could select a maximum of three candidates in a single round of voting. Voters would rank these selections from most to least favorable. A series of tabulations would follow, resulting in the removal of inadequate candidates. This process would persist until the candidate with a majority of votes remained. Dudum (plaintiff) brought suit, alleging that this impinged on equal protection. Dudum appealed from the district court's ruling, which favored San Francisco's IRV system.
27 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098 | Casetext Search + Citator

OPINION
BERZON, Circuit Judge:

In 1873, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, better known by his pen name, Lewis Carroll, spotted what he took to be an "extraordinary injustice": using simple plurality voting to determine the winners of elections. Dodgson, celebrated for his whimsical classics Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, was also a mathematician who developed election systems — meaning, simply, methods for translating preferences, or votes, into winners of elections. Dodgson disliked simple plurality voting because, in fields with several candidates, it can elect a candidate who receives the most first-place votes but is strongly disfavored by a majority of the electorate. Dodgson's innovative election systems were designed to remedy that limitation, and are still praised today because they tend to elect candidates with widespread electoral support.

See Charles L. Dodgson, A Discussion of the Various Methods of Procedure in Conducting Elections (1873), reprinted in 3 THE PAMPHLETS OF LEWIS CARROLL 33, 35 (Francine F.

Abeles Charlie Lovett eds., 2001).

See, e.g., Francine F. Abeles, Introduction to the Political Pamphlets and Letters, in 3 THE PAMPHLETS OF LEWIS CARROLL, supra, at 1, 21 22; Douglas J. Amy, BEHIND THE BALLOT BOX 187-89 (2000); Samuel Merrill, MAKING MULT1CANDIDATE ELECTIONS MORE DEMOCRATIC 70 (1988).

While Dodgson preferred his systems to simple plurality voting, he recognized that his innovations were themselves imperfect. In a letter accompanying one of his pamphlets, Dodgson lamented: "A really scientific method for arriving at the result which is, on the whole, most satisfactory to a body of electors, seems to be still a desideratum." See Charles L. Dodgson, Circular Accompanying A Method of Taking Votes on More Than Two Issues (1877), reprinted in 3 THE PAMPHLETS OF LEWIS CARROLL, supra, at 59, 59 (emphasis omitted).

Over a century later, Dodgson's wish remains unfulfilled. No perfect election system has been devised. Nonetheless, some governmental entities continue to experiment with innovative methods for electing candidates. At issue here is one such system, used by San Francisco for the election of certain city officials.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2002, San Francisco voters approved a ballot measure, Proposition A, amending the City Charter to adopt a new electoral system for certain municipal elections. Before adoption of Proposition A, most city officials were selected in a two-round election: The city first held a general election. Then, unless one candidate won an outright majority in the first-round election, the two candidates who had garnered the most votes faced each other in a runoff election.

Proposition A implemented instant runoff voting ("IRV") to replace the two-round runoff election system for the following city offices: Mayor, Sheriff, District Attorney, City Attorney, Treasurer, 28 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
Assessor-Recorder, Public Defender, and members of the Board of Supervisors. See S.F.

CHARTER § 13.102(b).

San Francisco Charter § 13.102, which codifies Proposition A, refers to the City's voting system as both "instant runoff" voting and "ranked-choice" voting. See S.F. CHARTER § 13.102.

Election experts also sometimes call this form of voting the "alternative vote system." See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, et al., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1095 (2d ed. 2002). We refer to the City's system using the initialism for instant runoff voting, although, as will become clear, the label is somewhat misleading.

IRV allows voters to rank, in order of preference, candidates for a single office. The Department of Elections (the "Department") then tabulates the voters' preferences as follows: First, all firstchoice rankings indicated on the ballots are counted. If a candidate wins a majority of these firstchoice votes, he wins the election. Id. § 13.102(c). If not, the candidate who received the fewest first-choice votes is "eliminated," meaning that that candidate cannot win the election. The second-choice votes on the ballots that had selected the eliminated candidate are then distributed to those voters' second-choice candidates. Some candidates' vote totals, as a result, now reflect a combination of first- and second-choice votes. Id. If all candidates ranked by a voter are eliminated, that voters' ballot is "exhausted," meaning that it is not recounted as the tabulation continues. Id. § 13.102(a). As long as no candidate receives a majority of the votes from the "continuing" ballots — that is, the nonexhausted ballots — the process of eliminating candidates, transferring preferences, and "exhausting" ballots repeats. A candidate is declared elected when he receives a majority of the operative votes on the "continuing" ballots. Id. §

13.102(d).

Two or more candidates can be "eliminated" at the same time if the total number of votes they receive is less than the number of votes received by the next-lowest ranked candidate. See S.F.

CHARTER § 13.102(e).

San Francisco's Charter provides that IRV ballots are to allow voters to rank a number of candidates equal to the total number of candidates running in an election. Id. § 13.102(b). For instance, if ten candidates are running for mayor, then voters are to be able to rank all ten of them. But the Charter also provides that if the voting system or equipment used by the Department cannot "feasibly accommodate" ranking that many choices, the Director of Elections can limit the number of candidates voters may rank to no fewer than three. Id. We refer to this variant as "restricted IRV."
As it has turned out, in all of the City's IRV elections since Proposition A passed, the Department has restricted the number of rankings on each ballot to three. San Francisco maintains, and the plaintiffs, several San Francisco voters (collectively "Dudum"), do not dispute, that this choice is one of necessity: The voting machines currently in use are not equipped to tabulate unlimited rankings; cost and logistical concerns make accommodating the unlimited option untenable; and providing a ballot on which voters may rank every candidate in a large field could result in confusion, voter error, and inaccuracies in vote calculation.

The Department makes publicly available on its website tables showing the election results for the City's past IRV elections. These tables tally the total ballots cast in each election; provide synopses of vote distribution during the tabulation process and of the final votes attributed to each candidate; and show the numbers of ballots "exhausted" as the tabulations 29 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
proceeded. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco Dep't of Elections Website, Elections Archives by Year, available at http://www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx?page= 1671 (last visited May 12, 2011). These tables provide helpful illustrations of how restricted IRV has worked in practice.

In an order filed simultaneously with this opinion, we grant Dudum's request for judicial notice of the City's official election results as posted on the Department's website. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) (allowing a court to take judicial notice of a fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of official information posted on a governmental website, the accuracy of which was undisputed); United States v. Camp, 723 F.2d 741, 744 n. ** (9th Cir. 1984) (taking judicial notice of a verifiable public record).

Dudum filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief against San Francisco and its election officials (collectively "San Francisco" or "the City"). Principally, Dudum maintains that when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the restricted IRV system precludes some groups of voters from participating to the same extent as others. That argument is premised on an analogy: It would be unconstitutional, Dudum asserts, to prevent qualified voters from casting ballots in a runoff election; "exhausting" the ballot of a voter who would have ranked more than three candidates if allowed to do so, Dudum contends, is no different. Dudum also points out that the City's Charter declares that "exhausted" ballots are " not counted in further stages of the tabulation," S.F. CHARTER § 13.102(a) (emphasis added), and argues that not including the votes of certain voters in the later tabulation stages once all three of their chosen candidates have been eliminated is similar to disenfranchisement of those voters, and so unconstitutional.

In support of those arguments, Dudum points to several recent elections in which significant numbers of ballots were "exhausted" before tabulation was completed, sometimes in numbers greater than the final margin of victory. Dudum maintains that as a result of the mandatory "exhaustion" feature and its impact, the restricted IRV system violates the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He requests declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the City from using the system in future elections.

Dudum challenges only the three-candidate limitation, including the corollary to that limitation that ballots are treated as "exhausted" when three ranked candidates on a ballot are eliminated.

Ballots can also be "exhausted" for tabulation purposes under unrestricted IRV. For instance, in both systems, ballots can be "exhausted" when a voter chooses to rank fewer candidates than the system permits and the ranked candidates are eliminated. Likewise, a ballot is "exhausted" if a vote of a given rank would otherwise be attributed to a candidate, but the voter indicated that same rank for more than one candidate. See S.F. CHARTER § 13.102(a).

The parties stipulated that several thousand votes have been "exhausted" in each of various elections between 2004 and 2008. For example, in the 2004 supervisorial elections for District Five, 16.2% of all ballots cast were "exhausted" as a result of the elimination of the three candidates ranked on those ballots. The City suggests that the 2004 District Five race was an outlier, pointing to the 2008 supervisorial race for District Nine and the 2006 supervisorial race for District Six. In those races, only 3.4% and 0.2% of ballots were "exhausted" as a result of the elimination of all the candidates ranked on the ballots. 30 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
Dudum again points to the 2004 race for District 5 Supervisor, in which 22 candidates were on the ballot and the winner was determined in the 19th stage of tabulations. By that stage, 37.44% of ballots cast had been "exhausted." Of those, voters had exercised all three available choices on 16.2% of the ballots. Because the margin of victory in that election was only 311 votes, the argument goes, those involuntarily "exhausted" ballots may have affected the outcome had they not been limited to the three ranks and so not been "exhausted" before the tabulation was complete.

Agreeing that material facts are not in dispute, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims. Dudum appealed.

DISCUSSION A. Overview
"Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections." Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). As a way of "structuring elections," San Francisco's IRV system is fairly innovative in the context of American elections, yet has a historied pedigree.

First developed in the 1870s by W.R. Ware, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, instant runoff (or "ranked-choice" or "alternative vote") systems have been used in the United States and elsewhere at various times since then. See Issacharoff, supra, at 1095; Jeffrey C. O'Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not Necessarily Count, 2006 MICH.

ST. L. REV. 327, 334. Australia, Ireland, and London use IRV for certain elections, see Issacharoff, supra, at 1095, and several U.S. cities use versions of the restricted IRV system at issue here, including Oakland and Berkeley, California, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, among others. See CHARTER OF THE CITY OF OAKLAND, § 1105(k)(1); BERKELEY MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.14.030(A); MINNEAPOLIS MUNICIPAL CODE § 167.30.

Like all electoral systems, including widely-used systems such as plurality voting and two-round runoff elections, IRV offers a "package[] of potential advantages and disadvantages." Issacharoff, supra, at 1089. Dodgson's disappointed "desideratum" observation, made in 1877, remains true. To this day, "there is no such thing as the perfect electoral system." David M.

Farrell, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 47 (2001).

For instance, in the familiar simple plurality system, sometimes called "first-past-the-post" elections, voters chose one candidate, and the winner is the candidate with the most votes. See id. at 19. Plurality voting is widely used in the United States for single-office elections, including races for mayors and governors. See Amy, supra, at 142.

Plurality voting has the benefit of simplicity: It is easy for voters to use, and also easy for voters to understand how their votes are tabulated and the winning candidate determined. Id. at 143.

Plurality voting also avoids the expense and burden of holding a runoff election. Id.

But the system has less auspicious features as well. In contests with several candidates, it privileges candidates with a robust and organized core of support, even if they are strongly disapproved of by most of the electorate. Id. at 144; Farrell, supra, at 21-26. Likewise, plurality voting allows a candidate to win with a small minority of the total votes cast when many candidates are on the ballot. Amy, supra, at 144; Farrell, supra, at 26. 31 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
ELECTIONS – RANK CHOICE VOTING CASE
A two-round runoff system, sometimes called a "double-ballot" election, see Peter C.

Fishburn, Social Choice and Plurality-like Electoral Systems, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 193, 195 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1986), similarly has both significant strengths and trouble-some weaknesses. In such a system, long used in many local elections and in some state races, voters select a single candidate in the first round of voting, much like plurality voting. If no candidate receives a majority of the vote, a second round of voting is held, in which voters choose between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the first round. See Amy, supra, at 147. Two-round runoff systems result in the election of candidates with majority support of those voters who turn out for the second election. Id. at 148.

The two-round runoff system is distinct from, yet similar to, party primaries, in which political parties select a nominee to run in a general election. See generally Cal. Democratic Party v.

Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-82, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (discussing state regulation of party primary systems).

That majority support, however, is misleading in some respects. When the second- and thirdplace candidates, or second-, third-, and fourth-place candidates, are relatively close in a firstround election, a runoff scheme can arbitrarily eliminate a candidate who might otherwise have won the election at the runoff stage. Id. at 150. Also, an elected candidate will likely receive support from voters who strongly preferred candidates eliminated in the first-round election, as voters may choose between the two candidates left standing on a "lesser of two evils" basis.

And, of course, the system requires the expense and burden of holding two separate elections, id. at 149, and results in two different, albeit overlapping, electorate pools, the relative sizes of which can be affected by the choice of dates for the runoff round. Id. at 149-50.

For example, in San Francisco's 2010 supervisorial election for District 10, the top five candidates received the following percentages of all first-choice votes: Lynette Sweet, 12.07%; Tony Kelly, 11.80%; Malia Cohen, 11.78%; Marlene Tran, 11.51%; and Steve Moss, 11.06%.

Cohen received only 5 fewer first-rank votes than Kelly. But, in a two-round run-off system, Cohen would not have proceeded to the runoff election. As it turned out, Cohen won the election under the City's IRV system, because she garnered more second-and third-choice votes than any other candidate. See City and County of S.F. Dep't of Elections Website, Official Ranked-Choice Results Rep., Nov. 2, 2010 Consolidated Statewide Direct Primary Election, Bd. of Supervisors, Dist. 10, available at http://www. sfelections.org/results/20101102/data/dl O. html (last visited May 12, 2011) [hereinafter 2010 Election Results].

Unrestricted and restricted IRV systems eliminate the need for a separate runoff and ordinarily will result in the election of a candidate with more wide-spread support than would simple plurality voting. See id. at 55; Farrell, supra, at 65. IRV systems also tend to produce fewer votes cast only for losing candidates — in academic parlance, "wasted votes" — than does straight plurality voting, because votes that would otherwise be cast for losing candidates can be redistributed to candidates with a chance of winning. Likewise, IRV systems "allow[] the voters more say over who they want to represent them: if it is not to be their first choice, then they can choose a second." Farrell, supra, at 65.

See Amy, supra, at 16 ("Wasted votes are votes that do not elect someone. If your candidate loses, you have cast a wasted vote.").
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Under restricted or unrestricted IRV, a candidate who did not receive the most number of firstchoice votes can be elected. Whether that feature is a disadvantage or an advantage is, of course, debatable. Where, for instance, there is no candidate with a majority, and the vote spread between the top plurality candidates is small, the more nuanced IRV systems can be seen as better tests of the depth of voter support for each candidate than a simple first-past-thepost plurality system. Additionally, while both IRV systems allow voters to rank their preferences, neither system allows voters to reconsider their choices after seeing which candidates have a chance of winning. In other words, voters must submit their preferences before polls close, and, even though they might have chosen differently with more specific information about other voters' selections, they are not provided an opportunity to revise their choices. See Farrell, supra, at 173. A two-round runoff system, in contrast, provides voters that opportunity through a new round of balloting in a runoff election. Finally, both IRV systems are unfamiliar to many voters, and so some voters might not entirely understand how their votes will affect the election. See Amy, supra, at 156.

To illustrate: In San Francisco's 2010 supervisorial election for District 2, Janet Reilly won the highest percentage of all the first-choice votes (41.08%), and Mark Farrell received the second highest percentage of those votes (40.26%). Farrell ultimately won the election, because he received more second-choice votes in the second (and final) calculation stage than did Reilly. See 2010 Election Results, Bd. of Supervisors, Dist. 2, available at http://www.sfelections.org/results/20101102/data/d2.html (last visited May 12, 2011). In other instances, the plurality winner after the first stage will eventually be elected. For example, in the 2010 supervisorial election for District 6, Jane Kim received the highest percentage of all firstchoice votes (31.40%) and was eventually elected, after twelve stages of calculation. See 2010 Election Results, Bd. of Supervisors, Dist. 6, available at http://www.sfelections.org/results/20101102/data/d6.html (last visited May 12, 2011).

A voting system called "Condorcet" voting addresses a related problem. In Condorcet voting, each voter ranks his candidate preferences, and the winner is determined by considering all pairwise contests between candidates. "For example, for three candidates (A, B, and C), there are three pairwise contests (A-B, A-C, and B-C). The winner is the candidate who wins all of her pairwise contests." O'Neill, supra, at 335. Like IRV, Condorcet voting does not require two elections, and academics tend to like it because it selects candidates who are highly rated by the majority of voters. But it has problems as well: It allows for the election of a candidate with few first-place votes. Moreover, when there are more than two candidates, the system can fail to produce a winning candidate (e.g., A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A). See Amy, supra, at 188-89; Merrill, supra, at 15; O'Neill, supra, at 337-38 337 n. 64.

Moreover, all voting systems in elections with more than two candidates can be manipulated through strategic voting. See Farrell, supra, at 171-74; Fishburn, supra, at 198; O'Neill, supra, at 340-41. In a plurality voting scheme, a voter might choose a candidate who is not his first-choice preference, but who he believes has a realistic chance of winning. In a two-round runoff system, a voter might cast a vote in the first-stage election for a weak candidate, so that his actual firstchoice candidate will face that weak candidate in the runoff. See Fishburn, supra, at 199. The risk of strategic voting exists in IRV but is less severe than in plurality voting or the first stage of a runoff election: Voters are more free to vote their true preferences, because they face less of a threat of having their votes entirely "wasted" on unsuccessful candidates. See Amy, supra, at 52; Merrill, supra, at 105; O'Neill, supra, at 340.
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In sum, restricted IRV, like every election system, offers a menu of benefits and limitations. But that observation does not mean it is a constitutionally acceptable system, so we now turn to Dudum's constitutional objections to the City's restricted IRV system.

B. The Burden on Voters
Restrictions on voting can burden equal protection rights as well as "interwoven strands of `liberty`" protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments — namely, "`the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.`" Anderson v.

Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (quoting Williams v.

Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)). At the same time, and even though "voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure," "States retain the power to regulate their own elections." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (internal quotations omitted). As our short review has indicated, each available election system, "`whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects — at least to some degree — the individual's right to vote.`" Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564).

Recognizing the need of States and municipalities "to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently," id., we apply a "flexible standard" when considering constitutional challenges to election regulations:

A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights." Id. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564). When the burdens on voting imposed by the government are "severe," strict scrutiny applies, and the "regulation must be `narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.`" Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). But voting regulations are rarely subjected to strict scrutiny. See Lemons v.

Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). We have repeatedly upheld as "`not severe' restrictions that are generally applicable, even-handed, politically neutral, and . . . protect the reliability and integrity of the election process." Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). Where non-severe, "[l]esser burdens" on voting are at stake, we apply "less exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (internal quotations omitted); see also Caruso v. Yamhill County ex rel. Cnty. Comm'r, 422 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 2005).

Dudum does not suggest separate analyses for his First Amendment, Due Process, or Equal Protection claims. The Supreme Court has addressed such claims collectively using a single analytic framework. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1564 ("[W]e base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 34 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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Amendment."); LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (using "a single basic mode of analysis" for such claims). We do the same here.

We have already explained some of the structural limitations inherent in restricted IRV. For instance, voters are unable to reconsider their choices after seeing which candidates have a chance of winning, and some voters might be unfamiliar with the system. Dudum does not, however, challenge those inherent features of the City's IRV system. Instead, Dudum concentrates on challenging the three-rank restriction aspect of San Francisco's system. We consider below the characteristics of restricted IRV Dudum does challenge, to determine the degree to which those features burden voters' constitutional rights, if at all, and if so, whether the burdens are so severe as to trigger strict scrutiny.

1. Dudum first contends that the treatment accorded "exhausted" ballots as the vote tabulation proceeds under the City's restricted IRV scheme is akin to prohibiting certain voters from voting in an election, and so imposes a severe, or at least a serious, burden on voters' constitutional rights. To support that characterization, Dudum points out that IRV replaced a two-round runoff system, and that explanations of how IRV works often analogize the successive vote calculation steps to a series of elections. For instance, the supervisors who supported adoption of Proposition A stated in their official ballot argument that "[t]he `instant' runoff works much like December's `delayed' runoff."
But the analogy is just that — an analogy. Upon examination, the analogy is off the mark in describing the real impacts of restricted IRV on voters' opportunities to cast ballots.

In actuality, all voters participating in a restricted IRV election are afforded a single and equal opportunity to express their preferences for three candidates; voters can use all three preferences, or fewer if they choose. Most notably, once the polls close and calculations begin, no new votes are cast. To determine the winner of the election based on that single set of votes cast, restricted IRV uses an algorithm. The ballots, each representing three or fewer preferences, are the initial inputs; the sequence of calculations mandated by restricted IRV is used to arrive at a single output — one winning candidate. The series of calculations required by the algorithm to produce the winning candidate are simply steps of a single tabulation, not separate rounds of voting.

An algorithm is "any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output. An algorithm is thus a sequence of computational steps that transform the input into the output." Thomas H.

Cormen, et al., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (2d ed. 2002); see also 1 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 266 (15th ed. 2007) (defining algorithm as a "systematic mathematical procedure that produces — in a finite number of steps — the answer to a question or the solution of a problem").

In contrast, a two-round runoff system involves at least two rounds of voting, or inputs, explaining why it is sometimes referred to as a "double-ballot" election. See Fishburn, supra, at 195. For instance, in a two-round runoff system, even if a voter's chosen candidate in the first round successfully proceeds to the runoff election, that voter is still afforded an opportunity in the runoff election to select a different candidate, or not to vote at all. In a restricted IRV system, in contrast, if that voter chooses a successful candidate in one round, he is not afforded the 35 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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opportunity to switch his vote to a different candidate as the tabulation progresses. That is so because restricted IRV considers only one round of inputs, i.e., votes.

Restricted IRV, of course, can be used in place of a two-round runoff election, which is what occurred in San Francisco and explains why the city supervisors compared the two. But restricted IRV does not replicate a two-round runoff system because, as we just explained, in two-round runoffs, voters cast ballots twice — that is, make and record their choices twice — whereas IRV allows only one chance to vote.

Dudum's contention that restricted IRV threatens to exclude some voters from voting is therefore incorrect. The contention sidesteps the basic fact that there is only one round of voting in restricted IRV.

Aside from his two-round analogy, Dudum points to several cases in which qualified individuals were denied an opportunity to vote on certain issues and the resulting burden on the right to vote was treated as significant. But because restricted IRV involves only one round of voting, those cases are inapplicable here.

Partnoy v. Shelley, 277 F.Supp.2d 1064 (S.D.Cal. 2003), for example, concerned a requirement that, unless voters voted either "yes" or "no" on the recall of a governor, their votes on any successor candidates for governor would not be counted. Id. at 1071. The defendants argued that the recall and the successor issues were part of one compound question, and no one was prevented from voting on that one question. The court disagreed, reasoning that the voters were faced with two separate questions and holding that it would be a severe burden to force voters to choose between either voting on an issue upon which they did not want to vote or having their votes for a gubernatorial successor not counted. Id. at 1074-75. The court held the requirement unconstitutional, because it concluded that the state failed to advance narrowlytailored compelling interests to justify it. Id. at 1079.

Assuming it was correctly decided — which we do not determine — Partnoy is not instructive here. In that case there were two questions before the voters: Should the governor be recalled? If so, who should succeed him? Those two questions were conceptually separate; a voter could wish to express a view on only one of the questions, or have a strategic reason to vote on one but not the other. In contrast, voters in the San Francisco elections are asked to cast a vote on one issue: Who should be elected to the particular office? Nor is Ayers-Schaffner v. DiStefano, 37 F.3d 726 (1st Cir. 1994) — again, assuming without deciding that we would decide it the same way as did the First Circuit — at all instructive. In that case, after concluding that an election was defective, the state ordered a second curative election but limited participation to people who had voted in the original balloting. Id. at 727. The court held that the state's restriction imposed a severe burden on the excluded voters' right to vote, id. at 728, and, as the state failed to advance compelling interests justifying the limitation, it was unconstitutional. Id. at 730.

The problem in Ayers-Schaffner was that otherwise eligible voters were not allowed to vote in a determinative election. Here, to reiterate, voters who participate in the restricted IRV system are not excluded from any election or opportunity to vote, so no comparable burden is imposed on voting rights.
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Finally, Dudum notes that in two-round runoff elections, some jurisdictions use an IRV-like system to tabulate the votes from certain absentee ballots. See ARK. CODE § 7-5-406; S.C.

CODE § 7-15-405. According to Dudum, IRV must be equivalent to a series of elections, because in those jurisdictions absentee voters have votes counted using an IRV-like approach in more than one election.

This example is not particularly relevant, as it concerns a hybrid system which, unlike the San Francisco IRV scheme, does treat groups of voters differently with regard both to numbers of ballots cast and to the method of tabulating the ballots. The hybrid system, in effect, adds together apples and oranges: Absentee voters, a small subset of the electorate, must rank their choices among a large pool of candidates on a single ballot; in-person voters, in contrast, cast two ballots, and in the runoff round choose between only two candidates. The hybrid system is one of convenience given the time delays. But it is a less-than-perfect way for the absentee voters to participate in the second-round runoff election — albeit better than not participating at all.

If anything, properly understood, Dudum's example highlights that IRV is not equivalent to tworound runoff elections: In the hybrid system, each in-person voter has the opportunity to vote differently in the runoff, even if he voted in the first-round for a candidate who continues to the second round; in contrast, an absentee voter who voted for a candidate who makes the runoff has his vote automatically cast again for that candidate, even if he would now prefer the other candidate. In other words, the absentee voter is not afforded the same opportunity as in-person voters to reassess his preferences in the runoff election; the in-person voter votes twice using two ballots, but the absentee voter votes once using a single ballot. Pure IRV systems, like the City's, do not involve any such differential treatment of voters. All voters can rank up to three choices on a single ballot, cast those ballots at the same time, and have their preferences calculated in the same manner.

We, of course, express no views on the constitutionality of this hybrid election system.

In sum, the City's restricted IRV system is not analogous to limitations on voting in successive elections, because in San Francisco's system, no voter is denied an opportunity to cast a ballot at the same time and with the same degree of choice among candidates available to other voters. Neither Dudum's analogies nor the cases he relies upon persuade us that the City's election system imposes any serious burdens on voters' constitutional rights by providing unequal opportunities to cast ballots.

2. Aside from characterizing San Francisco's restricted IRV system as a limitation on casting ballots, Dudum tries a second tack: He maintains that the tabulation scheme under San Francisco's system burdens voters' constitutional rights to vote by effectively discarding, rather than counting, the votes from "exhausted" ballots.

In support of this characterization, Dudum points to the text of two provisions in the San Francisco Charter: First, according to the Charter, voters whose ballots are "exhausted" do not have their ballots "counted in further stages of the tabulation." S.F. CHARTER § 13.102(a).

Second, a candidate wins the election when he receives "a majority of the votes from the continuing ballots," meaning the nonexhausted ballots. Id. § 13.102(c) (d) (emphasis added). 37 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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Dudum reads this text as meaning that "exhausted" ballots are discarded, and so not counted, in determining the election's ultimate outcome.

An examination of how restricted IRV works, however, indicates that the supposed inequity Dudum has identified is one of surface appearances and semantics, not substance. The algorithm used to determine the winner in an election conducted pursuant to the City's IRV system can be elaborated so that the outcome is mathematically identical, yet the features forming the basis of Dudum's characterization of the system as not counting some votes disappear. In essence, a more complete explication of the tabulation process demonstrates that "exhausted" ballots are counted in the election, they are simply counted as votes for losing candidates, just as if a voter had selected a losing candidate in a plurality or runoff election.

To illustrate, the tabulation scheme could be spelled out and recorded more fully than it is now as follows: When a candidate receives the fewest votes in a stage, any ballots that would otherwise be "exhausted" by that candidate's last-place finish could continue to be reflected as a vote for that candidate in subsequent rounds. Votes that the candidate received from ballots with second- or third-choice candidates remaining would still be transferred to the second- or third-choice candidates. In other words, even though last-place candidates could no longer mathematically win the election, and could not obtain further votes, one could clutter the tabulation process by showing their votes on the tabulation tables even after they had been proven incapable of prevailing. The winner could then be defined as the candidate who receives a plurality of the total votes cast (including votes cast for candidates mathematically eliminated in prior stages), as long as he also receives a majority of the votes cast for candidates who were not mathematically eliminated previously. As this example illustrates, the restricted IRV system does not necessarily produce a majority result; a plurality of the total votes cast can prevail, as the majority is only of the last stage of calculation, when many candidates have been mathematically eliminated. Cf. Merrill, supra, at 13 (characterizing IRV as a plurality system).

One might question why receiving a majority of the votes cast for non-eliminated candidates should be the triggering event ending the election. That is, why shouldn't the final step occur when all the recorded votes have been distributed in accord with the tabulation rules, with the winning candidate being the person with more votes than the other remaining candidate after the losers are eliminated and their votes redistributed? The answer is that, if a candidate receives a majority of the votes cast for non-eliminated candidates, it is mathematically impossible for that candidate to lose if the tabulation is extended until all ranked votes are distributed. To see why that is so, consider an election in which, after several IRV tabulations, 100 ballots containing votes for non-eliminated candidates remain.

Candidate A receives 51 of those votes. The votes attributable to him can be thought of as the numerator, and that number plus the remaining 49 votes (spread over the other non-eliminated candidates) the denominator. In later stages of tabulation, the votes counted in the denominator may be redistributed, but the denominator can never increase beyond 100 votes. Thus, even if no further votes are attributed to candidate A, he will always have at least 51 % of the votes cast for non-eliminated candidates. And, in fact, the denominator could very well decrease as candidates are mathematically eliminated, and last-ranked votes continue to be recounted for those eliminated candidates (rather than being redistributed to non-eliminated candidates and retained in the denominator). Of course, if the denominator decreases, or if more votes are distributed to candidate A, his majority position can only increase.

It is true that further rounds of tabulation might affect the ultimate vote distribution for non38 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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winning candidates. Imagine that candidates B, C, and D have 24, 13, and 12 votes respectively (totaling 49 votes) when candidate A receives his 51 votes. If, after candidate D is eliminated, every vote attributed to him is redistributed to candidate C, then candidate C will have one vote more (25 votes) than candidate B (24 votes). But no matter how the non-elected candidates are ranked, candidate A wins. Thus, there is no practical difference (in terms of who will be elected) between ending the tabulation when only two candidates remain or when any candidate receives a majority of the votes cast for non-eliminated candidates.

Moreover, in addition to maintaining a majority of the votes cast for non-eliminated candidates, candidate A will always have a plurality of the total votes cast: As we just explained, his 51 votes will always be more than any of the non-eliminated candidates. Likewise, each previously eliminated candidate at some point received the fewest votes in a stage, meaning, of course, fewer votes than candidate A. Moreover, the respective vote totals of each previously eliminated candidate can only decrease thereafter — they cannot obtain further votes, and some of the 1 stand 2nd-rank votes that were attributed to them likely will have been distributed to the 2ndand 3rd-choice candidates on those ballots.

Dudum does not dispute the legality of plurality systems. Rather, he presents simple plurality voting as a preferable alternative to restricted IRV. We are aware of no successful challenge to plurality voting generally. Cf. Edelstein v. City Cnty. of S.F., 29 Cal.4th 164, 183, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 56 P.3d 1029 (Cal. 2002) ("Plurality rule is not anathema to the federal or state Constitutions.").

This "show your work" alternative — to quote many high school teachers — is more cumbersome than San Francisco's actual tabulation regime, but it accomplishes precisely the same result. As pertinent to Dudum's challenge, the rephrasing makes explicit what is implicit in the current scheme: "Exhausted" ballots are counted in the election, they are just counted for losing candidates in the tally of total votes. In the terms used by election experts, these are "wasted" votes, not because they aren't counted, but because they were cast for candidates not ultimately elected. Notably, both IRV and restricted IRV tend to result in fewer entirely "wasted" votes than plurality voting, because voters whose first-choice candidate is eliminated may choose the winning candidate as their second- or third-choice pick. See Amy, supra, at 155.

A voter might regard as objectionable San Francisco's IRV system, even as thus more fully reticulated, because he would prefer to have his vote recorded in the final step of tabulation in favor of his first-choice candidate rather than his third-choice pick. Such an objection would have little force, as the election results reported by the City would reflect the first-choice vote up until the tabulation stage in which the designated candidate received the fewest votes and so could not prevail. Alternatively, a voter could decide to vote for only one candidate, and the ballot would be recorded as a vote for that candidate throughout the tabulation process and in the final election report.

All this is to say that "exhausted" ballots represent votes for losing candidates. "Exhausted" ballots are not disregarded in tabulating election results, and the result of not "counting" them is identical to counting them while explicitly recognizing that the system often produces a winner who attains a plurality, not a majority, of the total votes cast. Given this substantive equivalence, Dudum's objection that votes may not be "counted" at the determinative tabulation steps reflects only the Charter's current phrasing, not any actual burden on voting rights. 39 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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The only court to have addressed a similar argument has reached the same conclusion. At issue in McSweeney v. City of Cambridge, 422 Mass. 648, 665 N.E.2d 11 (1996), was an unrestricted form of preferential voting called the "single transferable vote." Rejecting the argument that voting rights were seriously burdened because "exhausted" ballots are not counted in the election, the court noted that "[exhausted ballots] too are read and counted; they just do not count toward the election of any of the nine successful candidates. Therefore it is no more accurate to say that these ballots are not counted than to say that the ballots designating a losing candidate in a two-person, winner-take-all race are not counted." Id. at 652, 665 N.E.2d 11; see also Moore v. Election Comm'rs of Cambridge, 309 Mass. 303, 319, 35 N.E.2d 222 (1941) (reaching the same conclusion), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in McSweeney, 422 Mass. at 653-54, 665 N.E.2d 11.

The "single transferable vote" system resembles IRV but it is used to elect multiple candidates to a representative body, whereas IRV is used to elect a single candidate to office. See Issacharoff, supra, at 1096.

McSweeney went on to decide the case on different grounds, but its reasoning on the counting argument mirrors our own.

In short, Dudum's contention that the City's system discards votes is incorrect. Instead, the system "counts" all the ballots, but the final tabulation recognizes that some of the ballots ranked only losing candidates. Like his inaccurate comparison of the algorithm used in restricted IRV to a series of elections, Dudum's "counting" argument reveals an at most minimal — and perhaps nonexistent — burden on voters' constitutional rights.

3. Dudum's final contention regarding the voting burden imposed by the restricted IRV system is that even if restricted IRV does not prevent some voters from voting (it doesn't, as we explain above), and even if all votes are counted (they are, for the reasons just given), San Francisco's restricted IRV system is nonetheless unconstitutional because it results in the dilution of certain votes. Specifically, Dudum maintains that "some voters — those who vote for continuing candidates — only have one vote counted in `the election'; other voters, however, have votes counted for three different candidates." Therefore, the argument goes, the City's IRV system violates the equal protection guarantee of "one person, one vote." See Bd. of Estimate of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989) (quoting Reynolds v.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)). At its core, Dudum's argument is that some voters are literally allowed more than one vote (i.e., they may cast votes for their first-, second-, and third-choice candidates), while others are not.

The "one person, one vote" cases involve instances in which citizens from heavily-populated districts select the same number of legislative representatives as voters from sparsely populated districts, with the result that their votes have less potential impact on the legislative process. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563, 84 S.Ct. 1362. To rectify that "dilution" problem, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require that the seats in state legislatures "must be apportioned on a population basis." Id. at 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362; see also Bd. of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 693, 109 S.Ct. 1433 (discussing cases).

Once again, Dudum's contention mis-characterizes the actual operation of San Francisco's restricted IRV system and so cannot prevail. In fact, the option to rank multiple preferences is 40 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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not the same as providing additional votes, or more heavily-weighted votes, relative to other votes cast. Each ballot is counted as no more than one vote at each tabulation step, whether representing the voters' first-choice candidate or the voters' second- or third-choice candidate, and each vote attributed to a candidate, whether a first-, second- or third-rank choice, is afforded the same mathematical weight in the election. The ability to rank multiple candidates simply provides a chance to have several preferences recorded and counted sequentially, not at once.

Several courts have rejected variants of Dudum's dilution argument. Most recently, Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 2009), was a challenge to an IRV scheme on the ground that voters whose first-choice candidates were eliminated were afforded multiple opportunities to affect the election. See id. at 690. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that votes for continuing candidates were counted throughout the process, and "in each round every voter's vote carrie[d] the same value." Id. at 693.

Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See McSweeney, 422 Mass. at 652, 665 N.E.2d 11 (noting, in the context of an unrestricted preferential voting scheme, that "it would be misleading to say that some ballots are counted two or more times. Although these ballots are examined two or more times, no ballot can help elect more than one candidate."); Stephenson v. Ann Arbor Bd. of Canvassers, No. 75-10166 AW (Mich. Cir.Ct. Nov. 1975) (same).

Dudum attempts to distinguish Minnesota Voters'?, rejection of the dilution claim by arguing that San Francisco's system is different than Minneapolis's, because the former restricts voters to choosing three candidates. Dudum's observation, however, either cuts against his dilution claim or exposes the dilution argument as just a rehash of his "not counting" argument.

As the parties recognize, the Minneapolis election system actually does limit voters to ranking three candidates. But the court in Minnesota Voters did not address that limitation.

If the purported problem is that some voters have votes counted for more than one candidate as the tabulations progress (although never for more than one at any tabulation stage), then restricting the number of candidates voters can rank should reduce Dudum's dilution concerns, not exacerbate them. And insofar as Dudum's dilution argument shifts to a concern that the voters whose ballots become "exhausted" have their votes diluted because their votes do not "count" in the determinative calculation stages, we have already explained that that is so only because their candidates have no chance of prevailing. Any distinction between San Francisco's and Minnesota's systems (as considered in Minnesota Voters) therefore does not help Dudum's dilution claim.
* * *
Again, " every electoral law and regulation necessarily has some impact on the right to vote." Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). The City's restricted IRV scheme is no different. Like every electoral system, it offers an amalgam of advantages and disadvantages. The burdens Dudum identifies, however, are largely ephemeral, disappearing upon examination. The restricted IRV scheme does not provide disparate opportunities for any voter to cast additional ballots or votes. The appearance that some votes are not "counted" is just a product of how the algorithm operates for efficiency's sake; the result would be identical were the "exhaustion" feature eliminated, and the "exhausted" ballots recorded and counted throughout the process for what they are — votes for losing candidates. As the votes from 41 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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"exhausted" ballots are taken into account in the election, as much as "wasted" votes ever are, the practical burden on voters is no different than in other election systems. Finally, Dudum's vote dilution argument fails as well, because the ability to rank preferences sequentially does not affect the ultimate weight accorded any vote cast in the election.

We express no views on any characteristics of restricted IRV beyond those discussed.

Therefore, if the characteristics of the City's system Dudum has identified impose any burdens on the right to vote, they are minimal at best. For the sake of completeness, we shall assume some burden is imposed, however limited, and so consider whether the restricted IRV system serves governmental interests sufficient to justify that minimal at best burden under the flexible balancing analysis. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (holding that "any burden imposed" by the challenged regulation was "a very limited one," but nonetheless considering the governmental interests advanced); Lemons, 538 F.3d at 1104 (weighing the pertinent governmental interests, even though the burdens imposed were "minimal").

C. The Governmental Interests
Because restricted IRV does not impose severe burdens on voting rights, we do not apply strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364; Pest Comm. v. Miller, 626 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010). And here, the City's "important regulatory interests" are more than substantial enough to justify the minimal at best burdens imposed by the City's chosen system. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364; Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010).

1. Before addressing the City's proffered interests, we emphasize that the City is not required to show that its system is narrowly tailored — that is, is the one best tailored to achieve its purposes. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364. Latching onto a phrase from Anderson v. Celebrezze, Dudum contends otherwise, insisting that the governmental restrictions must be " necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights," 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (emphasis added). But later cases refute Dudum's reading of Anderson, making clear that when a challenged rule imposes only limited burdens on the right to vote, there is no requirement that the rule is the only or the best way to further the proffered interests. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365, 117 S.Ct. 1364 ("[B]ecause the burdens the [challenged] ban imposes on the party's associational rights are not severe, the State need not narrowly tailor the means it chooses to promote [its interests]."); Pest Comm., 626 F.3d at 1110 (holding that the district court correctly applied the flexible balancing test and "was not obliged to consider whether Nevada's system could or should be more narrowly tailored"); Caruso, 422 F.3d at 862 (same).

We note that a sliding-scale balancing analysis, rather than pre-set tiers of scrutiny, apply to challenges to voting regulations. Thus, there may be instances where a burden is not severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny review but is serious enough to require an assessment of whether alternative methods would advance the proffered governmental interests. Cf. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 n. 8, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
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Such respect for governmental choices in running elections has particular force where, as here, the challenge is to an electoral system, as opposed to a discrete election rule (e.g., voter ID laws, candidacy filing deadlines, or restrictions on what information can be included on ballots).

Discrete election rules generally further limited identifiable interests; a reviewing court can assess the likely effects of entirely eliminating the challenged rule. Cf. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (state prohibition on write-in voting); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (state early-filing deadline); Rubin, 308 F.3d at 1011 (regulation prohibiting a candidate from designating himself a "peace activist" on the election ballot). In contrast, the City must use some overall system for casting ballots, tabulating votes, and determining the outcome of elections. It cannot select a system that best serves all the multiplicity of interests implicated in an election, as no such system exists. Moreover, given the need to adopt some overall election system, we cannot as a practical matter assess the likely effects of eliminating one election system without considering what system would replace it, and what new burdens that replacement choice would likely impose.

Dudum challenges only the three-candidate limitation, not IRV generally. In light of that limited challenge, one would expect Dudum to argue that the interests advanced by the City in favor of the three-candidate restriction are inadequate. But Dudum does not contest those specific justifications. Instead, he argues that the interests advanced in favor of IRV generally can be served just as well by either a plurality system or a two-round runoff scheme. Dudum's logic seems to be that if the three-candidate limit imposes a burden on voting rights, and if the City maintains that it cannot eliminate that restriction, then restricted IRV should be compared to election systems whose constitutionality is not in question.

In the end, then, Dudum is effectively asking the court to choose between electoral systems (i.e., between restricted IRV, plurality voting, or two-round runoff elections). As explained, however, electoral systems serve diverse interests with various degrees of success. That is why, absent a truly serious burden on voting rights, "it is the job of democratically-elected representatives to weigh the pros and cons of various [election] systems." Weber, 347 F.3d at 1107.

2. The City advances several interests justifying the minimal at best burdens of which Dudum complains. Some of those interests concern the three-candidate restriction, and some support IRV as compared to the two-round runoff system it replaced.

First, the City adduces evidence that (1) the current voting machines cannot process ballots allowing unlimited ranking, and (2) permitting voters to rank more than three candidates might exceed the memory capacity of the machines now in use. The City maintains that the state certification necessary for new voting software or hardware or for redesigned ballots could take months or years, so allowing unlimited choices would disrupt the City's preparation for upcoming elections. Moreover, contends the City, (1) because some elections include many candidates, allowing unlimited rankings would require either extremely large, confusing ballots or multiple ballots for each voter; (2) multiple ballots could lead to calculation errors; and (3) in testing, voters regarded ballots offering four choices as confusing. Notably, Dudum introduced no evidence suggesting that San Francisco could conduct unrestricted elections without running into the problems identified, and does not now argue that the City's interests are inadequate to justify the three-candidate restriction.
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Assuming for the moment the constitutional validity of IRV systems generally, then, the threecandidate restriction furthers important interests in maintaining the orderly administration of San Francisco's elections and in avoiding voter confusion. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco Cnty.

Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225-26, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (noting that "protecting voters from confusion" is a "compelling governmental interest"); Lubin v.

Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974) ("[K]eeping . . . ballots within manageable, understandable limits is of the highest order," because "`laundry list' ballots discourage voter participation and confuse and frustrate those who do participate."); Bullock v.

Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) ("[T]he State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery [and] avoid voter confusion."); Pest Comm., 626 F.3d at 1107-08 (recognizing that avoiding voter confusion is an important state interest); Rubin, 308 F.3d at 1017 (acknowledging the "legitimate goal of achieving a straightforward, neutral, non-confusing ballot"). So, without more, Dudum's challenge to the three-candidate restriction fails.

Dudum objects that the interests the City now relies on were not advanced upon adoption of Proposition A and so are impermissible post hoc rationales. We are far from sure that the normal ability of litigants to advance arguments justifying their out-of-court behavior is suspended in election challenges where, as here, the burden imposed on voting is minimal at best. For instance, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, the Court expressly relied on a state interest admittedly not advanced in its briefs, but mentioned during oral argument, implying that the interest also was not advanced prior to the litigation (or else the Court presumably would have noted that fact). See 520 U.S. at 366 n. 10, 117 S.Ct. 1364.

In any event, the post hoc rationale point doesn't matter in this case, as the City's justifications for the three-candidate limit were set forth in the text of Proposition A itself. Proposition A explained that the Director of Elections may limit the number of choices a voter may rank if "the voting system, vote tabulation system or similar or related equipment used by the City and County cannot feasibly accommodate choices equal to the total number of candidates running for each office.'' S.F. CHARTER § 13.102(b). The interests in avoiding changes to the voting system and equipment that would be confusing or risk seriously disrupting the administration of elections are aspects of the "feasibly accommodate" concern identified in Proposition A, not post hoc rationales.

We could stop there, as Dudum purports to challenge only the three-rank restriction, not IRV generally. But even if we expand the comparative inquiry to other election systems, as Dudum would have us do, his challenge fares no better.

The City points to evidence that restricted IRV will save money compared to a two-round runoff system (the election system in place prior to IRV), as each runoff election costs the City between $1.5 million and $3 million. The interest in alleviating the costs and administrative burdens of conducting additional elections can be "a legitimate state objective" that also justifies the use of IRV, given the minimal at best burdens the system imposes on voters' constitutional rights to vote. See, e.g., Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. 849; Lemons, 538 F.3d at 1104 (holding that the minimal burden imposed by a state's system for verifying referendum petition signatures was justified by the "administrative burden" another system threatened to impose); Weber, 347 F.3d at 1106 (recognizing a state's interest in saving money).

Further, restricted IRV advances the City's legitimate interests in providing voters an opportunity to express nuanced voting preferences and electing candidates with strong plurality 44 DUDUM V. ARNTZ
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support. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (noting a state interest in "assur[ing] that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting"). Unlike a two-round runoff election, restricted IRV will not always produce a candidate with majority support. But restricted IRV also does not limit voters' choices to only two candidates, and so it allows voters to express a wider range of preferences.

Moreover, in practice, the ability to express more nuanced preferences means that candidates with greater plurality support (although not necessarily majority support) tend to be elected, as compared to a traditional plurality system. See McSweeney, 422 Mass. at 654, 665 N.E.2d 11 ("[A] preferential scheme, far from seeking to infringe on each citizen's equal franchise . . . seeks more accurately to reflect voter sentiment . . . [and] `to enlarge the possibility of a voter[] being represented therein by giving the voter an opportunity to express more than one preference among candidates.`" (quoting Moore, 309 Mass. at 331, 35 N.E.2d 222)).

In sum, we have no difficulty holding that these important governmental interests are more than sufficient to outweigh the extremely limited burdens — if any — that the restricted IRV features Dudum challenges impose upon San Francisco's voters.

CONCLUSION
If the aspects of the City's restricted IRV scheme Dudum challenges impose any burdens on voters' constitutional rights to vote, they are minimal at best. Moreover, the City has advanced valid, sufficiently-important interests to justify using its system. We, of course, express no views on the wisdom of using IRV, restricted IRV, or any other electoral method. There is no perfect election system, and our search for one would prove no more successful than a hunt for the mythical snark. Happily, we are not required to engage in any such endeavor. We hold only that Dudum has not established that the City's chosen system is unconstitutional.

See Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark: An Agony in Eight Fits (MacMillan Co. 1876).

AFFIRMED.
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Redondo Beach City CouncilAugust 6, 2024

Redondo Beach City Council
August 6, 2024