Station 3 meets the NFPA standard for total response time for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 3 can arrive at the location in 7 minutes, 21 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 976 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 3.9% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
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Figure 218: Station 3 Incident Exceptions (Long Response)
Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 3 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 3 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 3’s district is very high. Station 3 meets most of the reliability-improving parameters.
Figure 219: Station 3 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 3 90% 85% 87% 88% 87% 88% 89% 88% 4.7 7
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Hazard Evaluation
Station 3 covers a dense urban-residential zone in Riverside, California, bounded by Grand Avenue to the west, Arlington Avenue to the east, Magnolia Avenue to the south, and Elinor Road to the north. This area, encompassing approximately 4.7 square miles, includes a mix of commercial corridors (e.g., Jurupa Avenue), residential neighborhoods, and adjacent hilly terrain. The red boundary outlines the primary first-due territory, serving a population of ~15,000–25,000 with diverse occupancies. Station 3's specialization in technical rescues (part of California Task Force 6 Urban Search and Rescue) and hazardous materials response highlights the area's significant all-hazards risk profile, as detailed using the provided legend.
Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly Hazards (150 Occupancies): Scattered throughout, with concentrations near Jurupa Avenue, Arizona Avenue, and Hoover Street. These include church schools (12), schools (elementary: 55, middle: 13, high: 17), a university/college (25), a special school (34), and school support (1), indicating high-occupancy public gathering sites. High occupant loads (500–1,000+ during events) pose evacuation and panic risks, especially in schools or churches. Structural collapse or fire spread (e.g., from electrical faults) could lead to mass casualty incidents, requiring Station 3’s US&R expertise.
• Commercial Hazards (430 Occupancies): Dense clusters around Station 3, along Jurupa Avenue, and near Magnolia Avenue. Mercantile facilities (145) dominate, with additional parking garages (2), indicating the presence of retail stores, malls, and storage areas (91). High fire loads from goods and the storage of potentially hazardous materials (HazMat) (e.g., fuels, chemicals) increase the risks of ignition and explosion. Narrow streets may hinder apparatus access, with evacuation challenges for 200–500 occupants per site.
• Medical and Senior Care Hazards are concentrated centrally near Station 3 and along Central Avenue. Medical facilities (108) and senior care (2) suggest hospitals, clinics, and assisted living centers. Vulnerable populations (elderly, patients) face heightened risks from fires, power outages, or oxygen-related incidents. High EMS demand and specialized rescue needs align with Station 3’s capabilities.
• Day Care, Finance, Government, Hotel, and Industrial Hazards ▪ Day Care (3): Scattered near residential zones (e.g., Sierra Street). Small-scale but critical, with evacuation challenges for young children.
▪ Finance (5): Green Dollar Sign Icon: Near Jurupa Avenue. Office fires from electrical or arson risks, with moderate occupancy (50–100).
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▪ Government (3): Near Arizona Avenue. Public records or utilities are vulnerable to fire, requiring rapid suppression.
▪ Hotel (6): Orange Bed Icon: Along Magnolia Avenue. Transient occupants (100–300) and vertical fire spread risks.
▪ Industrial (2): Near Dewey Avenue. Hazmat risks (e.g., chemicals) and high fire loads, tying into Station 3’s HazMat role.
▪ Multi-Family Hazards (166 Occupancies): Widespread, with clusters near Oakwood Place and Pachappa Drive. These are likely apartments and multi-unit dwellings. Dense living conditions (200-400 occupants) increase fire spread and evacuation challenges, especially in older structures lacking sprinklers.
▪ Church-Affiliated Hazards (2): Near Hoover Street. Moderate occupancy (100–300) with potential for rapid fire growth during services.
▪ Wildfire and Environmental Hazards Terrain-Driven eastern and northern edges (near Elinor Road and Fairview Avenue) show gray-shaded hills, indicating wildland-urban interface with brush fuel. Seasonal wildfires could spread into urban zones, with hillside homes at risk during Santa Ana winds. FHSZ compliance (e.g., defensible space) mitigates but does not eliminate threats.
Station 3’s response area is a "high-density urban core with interface risks," dominated by assembly (150), commercial (430), and multi-family (166) occupancies, totaling 911 identified hazards. The central concentration around Station 3 suggests a focus on urban structural and medical risks, with HazMat and US&R needs from industrial and high-occupancy sites. Challenges include access in dense grids, high EMS/rescue demand, and wildfire interface threats from the periphery. In a significant event (e.g., a commercial fire with collapse), prioritization would target assembly and medical clusters, leveraging Station 3’s specialized capabilities and mutual aid to alleviate resource strain.
This visualization supports strategic planning by quantifying response demands, helping prioritize training for assembly evacuations or industrial spills.
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Figure 220: Station 3 Hazards/Occupancies
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 3, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to 0.5 miles.
Figure 221: Station 3 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
Key features include large buildings by square footage. • 52,441 sq. ft.: Green Icon (1 Building) Location: Positioned centrally, near the intersection of Magnolia Avenue and Central Avenue. Likely a mid-sized commercial or institutional structure, such as a small office complex or community center. With moderate occupancy (100–200 people), this building poses a low to moderate fire risk. Its central location allows for quick response from Station 3, but access could be hindered by surrounding residential streets.
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• 52,442–69,357 sq. ft.: Light Green Icons (2 Buildings): One near Magnolia Avenue and Central Avenue, another slightly north towards Jurupa Avenue. These could include larger retail stores, warehouses, or administrative offices. Occupancy may range from 200–400, with potential fire hazards posed by stored goods or equipment. Proximity to Station 3 supports a rapid initial response, although dense traffic may delay access during peak hours. • 69,358–91,299 sq. ft.: Yellow Icon (1 Building) Location: Located centrally, near the intersection of Arizona Avenue and Central Avenue. Likely a significant retail center, warehouse, or institutional facility (e.g., a school or medical office). Occupancy could exceed 400–500, increasing evacuation and fire-spread risks. The central location is advantageous, but mutual aid may be needed for large-scale incidents.
• 91,300–93,546 sq. ft.: Orange Icon (1 Building) Location: Positioned near the northern boundary, close to Laramie Road. Possibly a large commercial building, such as a big-box store or distribution center. High occupancy (500–700) and fire load suggest significant potential incidents. The northern location may delay response due to the distance from Station 3, especially in hilly terrain.
• 93,547–102,153 sq. ft.: Red Icons (2 Buildings): One near Magnolia Avenue and Central Avenue, another slightly east toward Arlington Avenue. These are the largest structures, likely major warehouses, retail complexes, or industrial facilities. Occupancy may reach 700-1,000+, with extreme fire loads and potential hazardous material (HazMat) risks (e.g., flammable goods). The proximity of the southern building to Station 3 aids response, but the eastern one may require coordination with Station 1.
Larger buildings (91,300-102,153 sq. ft.) have high fuel loads (e.g., goods and machinery), which increase fire intensity and duration. Older structures may lack modern fire suppression systems.
Buildings over 69,358 sq. ft. may host 400-1,000+ occupants, necessitating complex evacuation plans, particularly in retail or industrial settings. Dense street grids and potential traffic near central hubs (e.g., Magnolia Avenue) could impede apparatus movement. The northern and eastern buildings’ locations near hills or boundaries may complicate access during peak times or wildfires. The largest buildings may store hazardous materials, aligning with Station 3’s HazMat role.
Station 3’s central position ensures a relatively quick initial response to most large buildings, but the spread across the area may require aid from Stations 1, 4, 5, 9, and 10 for significant events.
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Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 3’s area.
Figure 222: Station 3 Multi-Story Buildings
Identified Tall Buildings
• 3 Stories—Yellow Icons (119 Buildings): Widely distributed across the response area, with concentrations along Jurupa Avenue, Central Avenue, and Magnolia Avenue. These are primarily low-rise residential apartments, small office buildings, or commercial storefronts with upper floors, typical of the urban core near Station 3. With moderate occupancy (50–200 people per building), fire risks include the potential for vertical spread through stairwells or shared walls. The high number (119) could strain resources during widespread incidents, though evacuation remains manageable with coordinated planning.
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• 4 Stories—Light Blue Icons (17 Buildings): Scattered centrally, particularly near Arizona Avenue and Central Avenue, close to Station 3. Likely mid-rise apartments or office complexes with increased density. Occupancy ranges from 200–400, posing challenges for smoke ventilation and phased evacuations. Proximity to the station enables a quick response (within 4–6 minutes), but older buildings may lack sprinklers, thereby heightening the risk of fire spread. • 5 Stories—Dark Blue Icons (6 Buildings): Concentrated in the central and eastern sections, near De Anza Drive and Arlington Avenue. These could include higher-density apartments, small hotels, or institutional structures such as medical offices.With 400–600 occupants, these structures present moderate risks for interior firefighting and rescue operations. The eastern placement near hilly terrain may complicate ladder access during emergencies. • 6 Stories—Orange Icons (2 Buildings): Positioned in the northeastern part, near Laramie Road and the boundary with Station 4. Likely significant residential or commercial high-rises, such as condos or mid-sized office towers. Occupancy could exceed 600, necessitating advanced evacuation tactics and potentially requiring aerial operations. The distance from Station 3 may slightly extend response times, necessitating aid.
• 7–10 Stories—Green Icons (2 Buildings): One central near Station 3 (along Central Avenue), another in the western section near Dewey Avenue. These are taller mid-rise structures, potentially office buildings or residential buildings, with 800–1,200 occupants. They pose high risks for vertical fire propagation and structural stability. The central building benefits from rapid access, while the western one could face delays due to traffic on Jurupa Avenue.
Taller buildings (5–10 stories) are particularly vulnerable to rapid upward fire travel, especially in pre- 1990s constructions without adequate compartmentalization. The 119 three-story buildings amplify cumulative urban fire load risks. Higher-story buildings require specialized plans, including stairwell pressurization and rooftop access for over 600 people. Nearby assembly and commercial occupancies (e.g., schools, retail establishments) increase the complexity of mass evacuation. Dense grid streets and proximity to hills (e.g., near Pachappa Drive) may impede apparatus during peak hours or wildfires.
Rail lines and central avenues, such as Arlington, add transportation hazards.
Alignment with Station 3’s Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) and HazMat roles suggests potential chemical storage in taller commercial sites, complicating responses.
Station 3’s central location enables a rapid initial response (within 4–6 minutes for most buildings, according to CFAI standards), with coordination from Stations 1, 4, 5, 9, and 10 for taller or peripheral structures.
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Station 3’s response area features 146 tall buildings, dominated by 3-story structures (119), with escalating risks in the 4–6 (25 total) and 7–10 story (2) categories. The northeastern 6-story and central 7–10 story buildings represent peak challenges due to height and occupancy, integrated with the area's high-density commercial and institutional hazards. Station 3’s expertise in technical rescues and HazMat positions it well, but mutual aid and pre-incident planning are vital for multi-building scenarios.
ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 3’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are displayed in the following figure.
Figure 223: Station 3 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, the entire tall building load is covered by aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter.
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Effective Response Force
The first due response area for Station 3, outlined in red in the following figure, covers a dense urban- residential zone in Riverside, California, bounded by Grand Avenue, Arlington Avenue, Magnolia Avenue, and Elsinore Road. This area serves a population of approximately 15,000 to 25,000. It includes a mix of commercial corridors (e.g., Jurupa Avenue), residential neighborhoods, and hilly terrain, reflecting a high-density urban core with interface risks. ERF is assessed within the CFAI CRA- SOC framework, which evaluates the department's ability to deliver adequate personnel within specified response time objectives (typically 4–6 minutes for the first unit and 8–12 minutes for complete alarm assignment) to mitigate identified hazards.
Figure 224: Station 3 ERF at 8 Minutes
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• CFAI CRA-SOC Context: Represents a baseline response for low to moderate risk incidents (e.g., single-family residential fires or medical calls). With 10–19 personnel, this meets initial suppression or EMS needs but falls short of the CFAI-recommended 15–20 for full alarm assignments in multi-unit or commercial fires, suggesting reliance on mutual aid from Stations 1, 4, or 5.
30–39 Staff Delivered–Green Zone Location: Largest portion, centered around Station 3 and extending along Central Avenue and Arizona Avenue. This zone indicates the highest staffing level, covering the densest population and infrastructure, including key assembly (e.g., schools) and commercial occupancies. Meets or exceeds CFAI recommendations for high-risk incidents (e.g., large commercial fires, multi-casualty events, or wildland-urban interface fires), requiring 20–30+ personnel. This level supports rapid intervention, rescue, and containment, aligning with Riverside’s urban density and Station 3’s specialized roles. The green zone (30–39 staff) likely achieves CFAI’s 90th percentile goal (e.g., 6–8 minutes for first unit, 10–12 minutes for full alarm) due to proximity to Station 3.
• Risk Assessment: The CRA identifies risks such as residential fires, commercial hazards (e.g., warehouses along Jurupa Avenue), institutional vulnerabilities (e.g., schools, medical facilities), and wildfire threats from the northern hills. The graduated staffing reflects a tiered strategy, with higher levels in high-risk zones to address critical infrastructure.
The 30–39 staff in the green zone support CFAI’s two-in, two-out rule (4 personnel for interior firefighting) and additional resources for command, rescue, and support. Staff in the 10–19 zone may limit initial action, requiring a staged deployment or backup from adjacent stations. The green zone’s dominance indicates robust coverage near Station 3. Still, the orange zone’s proximity to hilly terrain highlights access challenges during floods or wildfires, a key CRA factor in Riverside.
The ERF for Station 3’s area ranges from 30–39 (light green) to 40–56 (green) personnel, with the majority (green zone) capable of delivering a robust response to high-risk incidents within CFAI SOC timeframes. This tiered staffing reflects a CRA-informed approach, prioritizing the central urban core while addressing peripheral challenges. However, mutual aid is critical for the lower-staffed orange zone during large-scale events.
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STATION 4
Incident Evaluation
Station 4 is situated in the northeastern corner of Riverside and, as such, has a moderate population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map only shows the counts for the Station 4 area; however, other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 4 apparatus could potentially be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 225: Station 4 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 4 responded to 28,042 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 4 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 20,886 times. This averages out to a reliability of 75%. This indicates that, due to the station's placement near several high-efficiency roadways, such as Highway 60, which bisects the district, response reliability is relatively high.
Station 4 can meet NFPA standards for total response time for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 4 can arrive at the location in 7 minutes, 39 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance. In fact, Station 4 recorded the best total response times in the entire city.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There were 2,125 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 7.6% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
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Figure 226: Station 4 Incident Exceptions (Long Response)
Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 4 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 3 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 4’s district is very high. Station 4 meets most of the reliability-improving parameters.
Figure 227: Station 4 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 4 81% 74% 75% 74% 72% 72% 74% 75% 6.8 4
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Hazard Evaluation
Fire Station 4 covers a dense urban-commercial zone in downtown Riverside, California, bounded by Columbia Avenue to the north, Spruce Street to the east, 3rd Street to the south, and Le Conte Road to the west. This area, approximately 1–2 square miles in size, features a high concentration of mixed-use developments, educational institutions, and industrial pockets, serving a population of roughly 20,000–30,000. The gray-shaded hills on the eastern and southern edges indicate areas of high risk at the wildland-urban interface. Station 4's role in all-hazards response, including potential support for downtown high-rises and mutual aid, underscores the area's elevated structural, occupancy, and wildfire hazards.
Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly Hazards (176 Occupancies): Dense clusters around Station 4, along Main Street and 3rd Street, with extensions toward university areas. Includes elementary schools (57), middle schools (25), high schools (49), special schools (24), school support services (3), universities/colleges (49), day care centers (2), and commercial assembly sites. High occupant loads (500–2,000+ during classes or events) pose significant evacuation and panic risks, particularly in schools or college facilities. Fire spread from electrical issues or overcrowding could result in mass casualties, demanding rapid triage and rescue operations. • Commercial Hazards (341 Occupancies): Concentrated in the central downtown core near Station 4, along Columbia Avenue and Spruce Street. Dominated by mercantile facilities (148) and storage (183), including retail strips, warehouses, and parking garages (9). Elevated fire loads from inventory (e.g., flammable goods) and high foot traffic (200–1,000 occupants) increase the potential for explosions or rapid spread. Access bottlenecks in pedestrian-heavy zones could delay apparatus, with HazMat risks from stored chemicals. • Multi-Family Hazards (677 Occupancies): Widespread residential pockets, clustered near Sedgwick Avenue and Watkins Drive. Apartments and multi-unit dwellings throughout the area.
Dense housing (300–600 occupants per complex) heightens fire propagation via shared walls or balconies, especially in older structures. Evacuation challenges in vertical buildings align with the risks in downtown high-rises.
• Industrial Hazards (60 Occupancies): Scattered in the southwestern industrial zones near Kansas Avenue and Le Conte Road. Factories and manufacturing sites, including energy infrastructure (5). High HazMat exposure (e.g., chemicals, fuels) and risks of structural collapse from heavy machinery. A release or fire could spread to nearby residential areas, requiring specialized containment and decontamination measures.
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• Medical and Hotel Hazards: Central clusters near Main Street and 3rd Street. Medical facilities (25), such as clinics and hotels (8) for transient lodging. Vulnerable groups (patients, tourists) face amplified risks from mobility issues or unfamiliarity during evacuations. Oxygen fires in medical sites or crowded hotel lobbies could escalate quickly. • Finance, Government, and Day Care Hazards
▪ Finance (1)–Isolated near downtown core. Low-volume but high-value targets for arson, with moderate occupancy (50–100).
▪ Government (3)–Near administrative areas along Columbia Avenue. Critical infrastructure (e.g., offices) is vulnerable to utility failures or targeted incidents. ▪ Day Care (2)–Near school clusters. High vulnerability in young children requires a specialized pediatric response.
• Educational and Affiliated Hazards
▪ School-Elementary (57)–Widespread near residential zones. Daily high occupancy (300– 800 students) with lockdown needs.
▪ Admin-School (3)–Gray Building Icon: Central administrative hubs. Support facilities with records at risk from fire or intrusion.
• Wildfire and Environmental Hazards Terrain-Driven Risks: Eastern boundary near Spruce Street shows gray-shaded hills (e.g., 1,940 ft. elevation), indicating moderate to high Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) per 2025 CAL FIRE updates using climate modeling. Urban-wildland interface allows ember spotting into downtown during Santa Ana winds, threatening multi-family and commercial structures. Riverside's FHSZ mandates (e.g., defensible space) apply, but density amplifies spread potential.
Station 4’s response area embodies a "high-density downtown urban core with interface threats," totaling over 1,500 identified occupancies, led by multi-family (677), assembly (176), and commercial (341) hazards. The central focus around Station 4 emphasizes structural fires, high-occupancy evacuations, and hazardous materials (HazMat) incidents from industrial sites, as well as wildfire risks from surrounding hills. Challenges include traffic congestion on Main Street, resource strain from EMS calls (~70% of responses), and coordination for high-rises. In a major event (e.g., a commercial fire with collapse), prioritization would target assembly/educational clusters, utilizing Station 4’s all- hazards capabilities, mutual aid, and updated emergency maps to enhance resilience.
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Figure 228: Station 4 Hazards/Occupancies
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 4, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to 0.5 miles. Station 4's response area, which covers a dense urban-commercial zone in downtown Riverside, California, bounded by Columbia Avenue to the north, Spruce Street to the east, 3rd Street to the south, and Le Conte Avenue to the west. This area, approximately 6.8 square miles in size, serves a population of 20,000–30,000 and features a mix of high-rise buildings, educational institutions, and industrial areas. Large buildings (over 50,000 sq. ft.) are color-coded by size.
Figure 229: Station 4 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
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Identified Large Buildings
• 50,272–51,708 sq. ft.–Green Icon (5 Buildings): Distributed evenly throughout the district. Likely mid-sized commercial structures, such as small office buildings or retail centers. An occupancy of 100-200 suggests a low to moderate fire risk. Proximity to Station 4 ensures rapid response, but dense pedestrian traffic could hinder access.
• 51,709–67,720 sq. ft.–Light Green Icons (12 Buildings): Scattered along Iowa Avenue and West of Chicago Ave. Possibly larger retail stores, warehouses, or institutional facilities. An occupancy of 200-400 indicates moderate fire load risks from goods or equipment. Station 4’s central location facilitates a rapid initial response, although traffic congestion may delay its full deployment.
• 67,271–83,462 sq. ft.–Yellow Icon (8 Buildings): Concentrated in the north near Marlboro and Atlanta Avenues, there are individual buildings along Linden Street and Kansas Avenue. Likely significant retail complexes or educational/administrative buildings. Occupancy of 400–500 poses evacuation and fire spread challenges. Dispersed placement hinders response, but mutual aid may be needed for large-scale incidents.
• 83,463–122,686 sq. ft.–Orange Icon (8 Buildings): Positioned in the northern industrial zone near Marlboro Ave, with individual buildings dispersed along Hwy 60, and south of W Linden St.
Possibly a large warehouse or industrial facility. High occupancy is possible (500–700), and the fire load suggests a significant incident potential. The distance from Station 4 and the dispersion of these facilities may extend response times, especially in traffic-heavy areas. • 122,687–214,323 sq. ft.–Red Icons (4 Buildings): One near Station 4, two in the North near Marlboro Ave, and another along Kansas Ave. These are the largest structures, likely major warehouses, retail complexes, or mixed-use developments. Occupancy may reach 700–1,000+, with extreme fire loads and potential hazardous material (HazMat) risks (e.g., flammable goods).
Proximity to Station 4 for the central building aids response, but the eastern and northern ones may require coordination with Station 3 or Station 6.
Larger buildings (122,687–214,323 sq. ft.) carry high fuel loads (e.g., inventory, machinery), increasing fire intensity. Older downtown structures may lack modern suppression systems. Buildings exceeding 100,000 sq. ft. may accommodate 400–1,000+ occupants, necessitating complex evacuation plans, particularly in retail or mixed-use settings. The largest buildings (red icons) may store hazardous materials, aligning with Station 4’s all-hazards role.
Station 4’s central position ensures a relatively quick initial response (within 4–6 minutes for most buildings, per CFAI standards), with mutual aid from Stations 1, 6, and 14 for significant events.
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Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are taken into consideration to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 4’s area.
Figure 230: Station 4 Multi-Story Buildings
Identified Tall Buildings
• 3 Stories–Yellow Icons (251 Buildings): Widely distributed, with concentrations along Marlboro Avenue, Chicago Avenue, and Kansas Avenue. Primarily, low-rise apartments, small office buildings, or commercial storefronts, and possibly, multi-story warehouses. Moderate occupancy (50–200 per building) with risks of vertical fire spread via stairwells. The high number (251) could strain resources during multiple incidents, though evacuation is generally manageable.
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• 4 Stories–Light Blue Icons (45 Buildings): Concentrated to the southeast, at the end of University street, east of I215, and abutting the edge of the south district boundary. Likely mid- rise apartments or office complexes with increased density. This concentration is consistent with the University of California, Riverside campus. Occupancy ranges from 200–400, posing challenges for smoke ventilation and phased evacuations. Proximity to I-215 enables a rapid response (within 4–6 minutes), but older buildings may lack sprinklers, thereby increasing the risk of fire spread.
• 5 Stories–Dark Blue Icons (27 Buildings): Concentrated in the southeastern sections, near Linden Avenue and the edge of the district. There are standalone buildings in the west and north ends of the area. These could include higher-density apartments, small hotels, or institutional structures such as university buildings. The buildings may also be larger warehouse or manufacturing facilities. With 400–600 occupants, these facilities present moderate risks for interior firefighting and rescue operations. The eastern placement near hilly terrain may complicate ladder access.
• 6 Stories–Orange Icons (11 Buildings): Positioned along I-215 and in the southeast, on the University of California, Riverside campus. Likely significant educational or commercial high- rises, such as condos (student housing) or office towers. The occupancy target hazard figure above shows these concentrations as “industrial,” so storage or manufacturing is possible.
Occupancy could exceed 600, necessitating advanced evacuation tactics and potentially requiring aerial operations. A central location facilitates response, but mutual aid may be necessary for extended incidents.
• 7–10 Stories–Green Icons (9 Buildings): All of which are located along University Avenue. These are taller mid-rise structures, potentially classroom, dormitory, office buildings, or mixed-use developments. With 800-1,200 occupants, they pose significant risks of vertical fire propagation and structural instability. Proximity to Station 4 and Interstate 215 supports rapid initial action, though traffic congestion could delay full deployment.
Tall buildings (5–10 stories) are prone to rapid upward fire spread, especially in pre-1990 downtown structures without compartmentation. The 142 three-story buildings add cumulative urban fire load risks. Buildings above five stories require specialized plans, including stairwell pressurization and rooftop access for 600+ people. The eastern hills near the Box Springs Wildlife Reserve add wildfire ember risks, complicating access during high-wind events.
Station 4’s central position ensures a rapid initial response (within 4–6 minutes for most buildings, according to CFAI standards), with coordination from Stations 1, 6, and 14 for taller or peripheral structures. Station 4’s all-hazards expertise positions it well, but mutual aid and pre-incident planning are vital for multi-building or high-rise scenarios.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 4’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are displayed in the following figure.
Figure 231: Station 4 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, most of the tall buildings west of I-215 are covered by aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The exception is that the southern portion of the district contains the taller towers, and most of the University campus is beyond the 2.5-mile travel distance from Stations 1 and 13. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 1.
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Effective Response Force
The following figure depicts the first due response area for Station 4, outlined in red, which covers a dense urban-commercial zone in Southeast of downtown Riverside, California. Marlboro Avenue bounds the area to the north, Interstate 215 to the east, Martin Luther King Blvd to the south, and Kansas Avenue to the west. This area, approximately 6.8 square miles in size, serves a population of roughly 20,000 to 30,000 and features a mix of high-rise buildings, educational institutions, residential, and industrial areas. The eastern edges are marked by gray-shaded hills, indicating risks associated with the wildland-urban interface. The ERF is assessed within the CFAI CRA-SOC framework, which evaluates staffing delivery within specified response time objectives (typically 4–6 minutes for the first unit and 8–12 minutes for full alarm assignment) to address identified hazards.
Figure 232: Station 4 ERF at 8 Minutes
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Staff Delivery Zones
• 10–19 Staff Delivered–Orange Zone Location: Peripheral areas, particularly the eastern edge near Watkins Drive. This zone indicates a lower staffing level, likely covering boundary-adjacent or less-dense areas with moderate risk. These zones are likely insignificant, containing little to no fire load.
• 20–29 Staff Delivered–Yellow Zone Location: Central and Eastern sections, including areas along I-215 and eastward. This zone includes portions of the building concentration on the University campus. This zone reflects a moderate staffing level, encompassing the core downtown commercial and residential districts. Aligns with a standard response for moderate risk incidents (e.g., small commercial fires or multi-family dwellings). The 20–29 staff support initial attack, life safety operations, and basic command, but may require reinforcement for high- hazard sites (e.g., high-rises or HazMat), leveraging Station 4’s all-hazards capabilities. • 30–39 Staff Delivered–Green Zone Location: Largest portion, centered around Station 4 and extending along I-215 west. This zone indicates the highest staffing level, covering the densest population and infrastructure, including key assembly (e.g., some university buildings) and commercial occupancies. Meets or exceeds CFAI recommendations for high-risk incidents (e.g., large commercial fires, multi-casualty events, or wildland-urban interface fires), requiring 20–30+ personnel. This level supports rapid intervention, rescue, and containment, aligning with Riverside’s downtown density and Station 4’s strategic role. The green zone (30–39 staff) likely achieves CFAI’s 90th percentile goal (e.g., 6–8 minutes for first unit, 10–12 minutes for full alarm) due to proximity to Station 4. The orange zone (10–19 staff) may exceed 10 minutes in peripheral areas near hills or industrial zones, necessitating pre-plans or mutual aid.
The CRA identifies risks such as high-rise fires, commercial hazards (e.g., warehouses along Marlboro Avenue), institutional vulnerabilities (e.g., schools, universities), and wildfire threats from the eastern hills. The graduated staffing reflects a tiered strategy, with higher levels in high-risk downtown zones to address critical infrastructure.
The 30–39 staff in the green zone support CFAI’s two-in, two-out rule (4 personnel for interior firefighting) and additional resources for command, rescue, and support. Staff in the 10–19 zone may limit initial action, requiring staged deployment or backup from adjacent stations.
The green zone’s dominance indicates robust coverage near Station 4. Still, the orange zone’s proximity to hilly terrain and industrial areas highlights access challenges during wildfires or HazMat incidents, a key CRA factor in Riverside.
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STATION 5
Incident Evaluation
Station 5 is situated in the northern section of Riverside and, as such, has a moderate population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map only shows the counts for the Station 5 area; however, other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 5 apparatus could potentially be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 233: Station 5 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 5 responded to 31,149 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 5 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 27,047 times. This averages out to a reliability of 87%. This indicates that, due to the station's placement near several high-efficiency roadways, such as Highway 91, which borders the district, response reliability is relatively high.
Station 5 can manage an excellent total response time for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 5 can arrive at the location in 7 minutes, 46 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 3,121 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 10.0% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
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Figure 234: Station 5 Incident Exceptions (Long Response)
Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 5 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 5 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 5’s district is very high. Station 5 meets some of the reliability-improving parameters. The area's size, the number of units, and staffing are limiting factors. Riverside Airport is in the district and does not appear to be a source of total response exceptions.
Figure 235: Station 5 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 5 92% 86% 85% 85% 86% 87% 87% 87% 12.4 5
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Hazard Evaluation
Station 5 covers a mixed urban-residential and commercial zone, bounded by Arlington Avenue to the east, Philbin Avenue to the north, Magnolia Avenue to the south, and extending westward toward the Santa Ana River and Mount Rubidoux. This area, approximately 12.5 square miles, is the second largest, and serves a population of ~15,000–25,000 and includes dense neighborhoods, commercial corridors (e.g., along Colorado Avenue), and adjacent hilly terrain (e.g., near Rubidoux). The red boundary outlines the primary first-due territory, with purple-shaded zones likely indicating Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) as per CAL FIRE's 2025 updates, which emphasize wildfire risks in the wildland- urban interface. Station 5's all-hazards role, including support for technical rescues and hazardous materials, aligns with the area's diverse risks.
Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly Hazards (187 Occupancies): Scattered throughout, with concentrations near Colorado Avenue, Sierra Street, and school clusters. Includes elementary schools (100), middle schools (13), high schools (40), pre-schools (6), special schools (8), school support (2), university/college (20), church-affiliated schools (6), and day care (4). High occupancy loads (300–800+ during school hours or events) pose evacuation and panic risks, especially in educational facilities. Fire spread from electrical faults or overcrowding could lead to mass casualties, requiring rapid triage and lockdown protocols. • Commercial Hazards (340 Occupancies): Dense clusters along Magnolia Avenue, Colorado Avenue, and near the station. Dominated by mercantile facilities (243) and storage (187), including retail stores, warehouses, and parking garages (48). Elevated fire loads from goods and high foot traffic (200–500 occupants) increase the potential for explosion or rapid spread. Access issues in commercial strips could delay apparatus, with HazMat risks posed by stored chemicals at storage sites.
• Multi-Family Hazards (443 Occupancies): Widespread residential pockets, clustered near Philbin Avenue and Sunnyside Drive. Apartments and multi-unit dwellings throughout the area.
Dense housing (200–400 occupants per complex) heightens fire propagation via shared walls, especially in older structures. Evacuation challenges in multi-story units align with the area's tall building risks.
• Industrial Hazards (92 Occupancies): Scattered in the western industrial zones near the river and Tyler Street. These are likely factories and manufacturing sites, characterized by high HazMat exposure (e.g., chemicals and fuels) and the risk of structural collapse from heavy machinery. A release could impact nearby residential areas, tying into Station 5’s all-hazards mitigation.
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• Medical and Senior Care Hazards: Central clusters near the station and along Magnolia Avenue.
Medical facilities (41) and senior care (15), including clinics and assisted living facilities.
Vulnerable populations (elderly, patients) face heightened risks due to mobility issues during fires or power outages. High EMS demand (~60–70% of calls) strains resources. • Finance, Government, and Hotel Hazards
▪ Finance (2)–Near commercial corridors. Moderate occupancy (50–100) with risks of arson in office settings.
▪ Government (5) Near administrative areas. Critical infrastructure is vulnerable to utility failures.
▪ Hotel (4)–Along major avenues. Transient occupants (100–300) and vertical fire spread risks.
• School Administration and Affiliated Hazards
▪ School Administration (1)–Central hub, records, and support facilities at risk from fire. ▪ Church Affiliated School (6)–Near residential zones. Moderate occupancy (100–200) with event-based surges.
• Wildfire and Environmental Hazards Terrain-Driven Risks: Western and northern edges near Mount Rubidoux show gray-shaded hills, indicating high FHSZ per 2025 CAL FIRE updates using climate modeling. The urban-wildland interface allows embers to enter neighborhoods during Santa Ana winds, threatening multi-family and commercial structures. Riverside's FHSZ mandates (e.g., defensible space) apply, but density amplifies threats.
Station 5’s response area is a "high-density urban interface zone," with over 1,200 identified occupancies, led by multi-family (443), commercial (340), many of which are located at Riverside Airport, and assembly (187) hazards. The station's central concentration highlights structural fires and medical/EMS risks, as well as HazMat from industrial sites and wildfire threats from the Rubidoux Hills.
Challenges include access in dense grids, an airport with a terminal building, high call volumes, and resource strain during multi-hazard events (e.g., wind-driven fires). In a major incident (e.g., a commercial fire with wildfire spotting), prioritization would target assembly/school clusters, leverage Station 5’s capabilities and support from Stations 3 and 4, and update all-hazards maps to enhance resilience.
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Figure 236: Station 5 Hazards/Occupancies
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 5, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to ¾ miles and includes nearby station (10) for context.
The figure illustrates Station 5's response area, outlined in red, which covers a mixed urban-residential and commercial zone in Riverside, California. Arlington Avenue bounds the area to the east, Philbin Avenue to the north, Magnolia Avenue to the south, and extends westward toward the Santa Ana River and Mount Rubidoux. This area, approximately 12.4 square miles, serves a population of roughly 15,000 to 25,000 and includes dense neighborhoods, commercial corridors (e.g., Colorado Avenue), and adjacent hilly terrain. Large buildings (> 50,000 sq. ft.) are color-coded based on size ranges.
Figure 237: Station 5 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
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Identified Large Buildings
• 52,288 -57,916 sq. ft.–Green Icon (3 Buildings): Dispersed throughout Station 5’s district. Likely mid-sized commercial structures, such as retail stores or small office buildings. An occupancy of 100-200 suggests a low to moderate fire risk. Proximity to Station 5 ensures rapid response, but traffic on Magnolia Avenue could delay access.
• 52,917–69,225 sq. ft.–Light Green Icons (6 Buildings): Scattered along Colorado Avenue and near Philbin Avenue. Possibly larger retail centers, warehouses, or institutional facilities. An occupancy of 200-400 indicates moderate fire load risks from goods or equipment. Station 5’s central location facilitates a quick initial response, although dense residential streets may complicate apparatus movement.
• 69,226–101,190 sq. ft.–Yellow Icon (5 Buildings): Located near Monroe and Arlington Avenue, with three located north of Riverside Municipal Airport. Likely significant retail complexes or educational buildings. Occupancy of 400–500 poses evacuation and fire spread challenges.
Central placement aids response, but mutual aid may be needed for large-scale incidents. • 101,141–149,350 sq. ft.–Orange Icon (7 Buildings): Positioned in the western industrial zone near the Santa Ana River. Possibly a large warehouse or industrial facility. High occupancy (500– 700) and fire load suggest significant incident potential. Distance from Station 5 may extend response times, especially near the river’s access constraints, and proximity to the Roubidoux hills raises the possibility of wildfire impingement.
• 149,351–240,022 sq. ft.–Red Icons (1 Building): One near Jurupa Avenue. These are the largest structures, likely major warehouses or mixed-use developments. Occupancy may reach 700– 1,000+, with extreme fire loads and potential hazardous material (HazMat) risks (e.g., flammable goods). Proximity to Station 5 for the northern building may require coordination with Station 3.
Larger buildings (91,300–102,153 sq. ft.) carry high fuel loads (e.g., inventory and machinery), which increase fire intensity. Older structures may lack modern suppression systems. Buildings exceeding 69,225sq. ft. may accommodate 400–1,000+ occupants, necessitating complex evacuation plans, particularly in retail or mixed-use settings. Dense residential streets and heavy traffic on Colorado Avenue and Magnolia Avenue could impede the movement of the apparatus. The western industrial building near the river adds access delays due to terrain. The largest buildings (red icons) may store hazardous materials, aligning with Station 5’s all-hazards role.
Station 5’s central position ensures a relatively quick initial response (within 4–6 minutes for most buildings, according to CFAI standards), with assistance from Stations 3 and 4 for significant events.
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Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are taken into consideration to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 5’s area.
Figure 238: Station 5 Multi-Story Buildings
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Identified Tall Buildings
• 3 Stories–Yellow Icons (333 Buildings): Widely distributed, with concentrations along Magnolia Avenue, Colorado Avenue, and Madison Street. Primarily, low-rise apartments, small office buildings, or commercial storefronts with upper floors are standard in the urban core. Moderate occupancy (50-200 per building) with risks of vertical fire spread via stairwells. The high number (153) could strain resources during multiple incidents, though evacuation is generally manageable.
• 4 Stories–Light Blue Icons (34 Buildings): Scattered, mostly near Jurupa Avenue northwest of the airport. Likely mid-rise apartments or office complexes with increased density. Occupancy ranges from 200 to 400, posing challenges for smoke ventilation and phased evacuations.
Proximity to Station 5 enables a rapid response (within 4–6 minutes), but older buildings may lack sprinklers, thereby increasing the risk of fire spread. • 5 Stories–Dark Blue Icons (8 Buildings): Concentrated in the central and eastern sections, near Colorado Avenue and Arlington Avenue. These could be higher-density apartments, small hotels, or institutional structures. With 400–600 occupants, these facilities present moderate risks for interior firefighting and rescue operations. The eastern placement near hilly terrain may complicate ladder access.
• 6 Stories–Orange Icons (2 Buildings): Positioned near Magnolia Avenue and Tyler Street. Likely significant residential or commercial mid-rises, such as condos or retail complexes. Occupancy could exceed 600, necessitating advanced evacuation tactics and potentially requiring aerial operations. A central location facilitates response, but mutual aid may be necessary for extended incidents.
Taller buildings (5–10 stories) are prone to rapid upward fire travel, especially in pre-1990s structures without compartmentalization. The 333 three-story buildings add cumulative urban fire load risks.
Buildings above five stories require specialized plans, including stairwell pressurization and rooftop access for 600+ people. Nearby assembly occupancies (e.g., schools) increase the complexity of mass evacuation. Dense residential streets and traffic on Colorado Avenue and Magnolia Avenue may impede access to the apparatus. The western hills near Rubidoux add wildfire ember risks, complicating access during high-wind events. The commercial and industrial mix (e.g., warehouses) aligns with Station 5’s all-hazards role, suggesting potential chemical storage hazards.
Station 5’s central position ensures a rapid initial response (within 4–6 minutes for most buildings, according to CFAI standards), with coordination from Stations 3 and 4 for taller or peripheral structures.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 5’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed.
Figure 239: Station 5 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, most of the tall building load is partially covered by aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The exception is that the northern portion of the district, particularly along Jarupa Avenue, contains some of the taller buildings. Even though these buildings are more than
2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Stations 1, 2, or Station 3.
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Effective Response Force
The following map depicts the First Due Area for Station 5’s Effective Response Force. In the CFAI's CRA-SOC process, the ERF represents the minimum concentration of firefighting and emergency resources (e.g., personnel, apparatus, and equipment) required to achieve the desired tactical objectives for incident types such as structure fires or medical emergencies. It ensures reliable deployment based on risk levels, station distribution, and historical call data. The map visualizes ERF staffing specifically as the "Staff Delivered" metric, which quantifies the number of personnel that can be delivered to areas within the first due zone. This is a key performance indicator for evaluating coverage adequacy, reliability, and concentration in accordance with CFAI standards. The ERF staffing is color-coded by ranges of staff delivered, indicating resource density across the zone.
Figure 240: Station 5 ERF at 8 Minutes
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Staff Delivered Range
• White 0–9 Low ERF concentration; areas with insufficient initial staffing, potentially requiring mutual aid or extended response times for higher-risk incidents. Low ERF Areas (White, 0–9 staff): Primarily in the far northern and western outskirts, including open or undeveloped land (e.g., near the red boundary). These gaps highlight potential vulnerabilities in low-density but expansive terrain, where CRA might recommend mitigation measures such as additional apparatus or risk-reduction programs.
• Light Orange 10–19 Moderate ERF; adequate for low-acuity calls but may need reinforcement for complex fires or rescues. Primarily located on the northwestern fringe, but adjacent to the Roubidoux hills, which may present wildland risk challenges. • Medium Orange/Yellow 20–29 Good ERF buildup; supports core tactical objectives like fire suppression or victim extrication with minimal delays. Moderate ERF Areas (Orange/Yellow, 10– 29 staff): Found in peripheral zones, including northwestern hills and southern edges near highways. These may represent transitional risk areas where turnout times or travel distances slightly dilute staffing.
• Light Green 30–39 Strong ERF; high reliability for most urban incidents, aligning with CFAI benchmarks for effective suppression.
• Dark Green 40–56 Optimal ERF; maximum staffing delivery, ideal for high-risk zones with dense populations or commercial structures. High ERF Areas (Dark/Light Green, 30–56 staff):
Concentrated around Station 5's core (central urban grid) and extending eastward into residential neighborhoods. This suggests a robust initial response capability in high-call-volume districts, ensuring CFAI-compliant outcomes, such as life safety and property protection.
The zone spans approximately 12.4 square miles, with rail lines (brown) and freeways (red) influencing access. Approximately 90% of the mapped area achieves moderate to optimal ERF (10+ staff), supporting an effective response to urban fires in accordance with CFAI standards. However, low-ERF pockets could inform SOC updates, such as enhanced staffing during peak hours.
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STATION 6
Incident Evaluation
Station 6 is situated in the north-eastern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. At just 7 square miles, Station 6’s district contains many of the large square footage buildings. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map only shows the counts for the Station 6 area; however, other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 6 apparatus could potentially be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 241: Station 6 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 6 responded to 12,266 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 6 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 9,026 times. This averages out to a reliability of 74%. This indicates that, due to the station's placement near several high-efficiency roadways, such as Highway 60 and Interstate 215, which divides the district, response reliability is moderately high.
Station 6 slightly misses the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated to arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 6 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 7 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 1,995 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 16.0% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 242: Station 6 Incident Exceptions (Long Response)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 6 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 6 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 6’s district is high.
Station 6 meets some of the reliability-improving parameters. The area's size, the number of units, and staffing are the limiting factors. The denser urban areas along Main Street appear to be a source of greater total response exceptions.
Figure 243: Station 6 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 6 82% 72% 70% 71% 72% 76% 74% 74% 7 4
Hazard Evaluation
This zone encompasses a compact urban-industrial corridor in central Riverside, California, bounded by the Santa Ana River to the south, Iowa Avenue to the east, and extending northward toward the San Bernardino Freeway (I-215) and SR-60. The area spans approximately 7 square miles and features a mix of residential, commercial, and heavy industrial development, with elevations up to 1,940 feet in the northern hills. Station 6 is centrally located near the intersection of Orange Street and Columbia Avenue, surrounded by dense occupancies that indicate a high-hazard urban environment requiring robust all-hazards response capabilities.
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Figure 244: Station 6 Hazards/Occupancies
Icons represent specific occupancy types according to International Fire Code (IFC) classifications, with numbers indicating the total count within the response area. Distribution is uneven: industrial hazards cluster in the east (near Iowa Avenue), commercial/mercantile activities are concentrated in the central grid, and assembly/multi-family housing is located in the northwest, near the station.
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Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly (63) High life-safety risk; venues like theaters, churches, or event spaces with large occupant loads (> 50 people). Clustered in the northwest near schools/universities, posing mass evacuation challenges during fires or active threats.
• Commercial (522) Highest volume; office buildings, retail strips, and mixed-use structures.
Widespread across the central zone, with moderate fire load but high economic impact; risks include business interruptions and exposure to fires at adjacent sites. • Government (1) Low count but critical; likely a municipal office. Minimal fire risk but high consequence for service disruptions; located centrally, potentially requiring specialized response for secure facilities.
• Industrial (57) Elevated hazard; factories, warehouses, and manufacturing with flammable liquids/solids. Concentrated southeast near rail lines, raising concerns for HazMat spills, explosions, or toxic plumes affecting downwind residential areas. • Medical Facility (6) High vulnerability; hospitals/clinics with non-ambulatory patients. Scattered in commercial zones, demanding rapid ALS transport and defensible space planning to protect vulnerable populations.
• Mercantile (94) Moderate risk; stores and markets with high public traffic. Dense in central streets (e.g., along University Avenue), susceptible to panic during incidents; fire loads from displays/inventory could accelerate spread.
• Multi-Family (133) Significant residential risk; apartments/condos with > 3 units. Prevalent in western/northern edges near the river, vulnerable to vertical fire spread and delayed egress in older structures.
• School-Elementary (23): Widespread in residential pockets; daily high occupancy amplifies risks during school hours, requiring child-specific evacuation protocols. • University/College (1): Adjacent to industrial zones; large transient population increases complexity for crowd management and medical surges. Specific High-Risk Features such as Educational Institutions (High Assembly Overlap): School (1): Likely a high school or admin building; poses extreme life-safety hazard due to children/teachers (hundreds of occupants). • Parking Garage (4): Multi-level structures with vehicle fuels; fire risks from confined spaces and ventilation issues.
• Storage (301): A vast count suggests warehousing near industries; high fuel loads and access challenges could lead to prolonged incidents.
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The zone's proximity to freeways (I-215, SR-60) and the Santa Ana River introduces flood/brush fire risks, while northern hills (Grand Terrace) add access delays for elevated industrial sites. City boundaries limit aid options in some directions.
Hazards are evaluated based on occupancy types, their potential for fire, life safety, or environmental risks, as well as their spatial distribution and proximity to other hazards. Station 6's zone presents a high overall hazard profile due to the predominance of commercial and industrial occupancies, which account for the majority of sites and pose elevated risks for large-scale fires, hazardous materials releases, and structural collapses. The area encompasses 1,051 total mapped occupancies, with a focus on high-value, high-occupancy structures located near transportation corridors (e.g., freeways and rail lines), thereby increasing vulnerability to multi-casualty incidents or cascading emergencies.
Key risks include rapid fire spread in multi-family dwellings, toxic exposures from industrial sites, and evacuation challenges in assembly venues. Approximately 60% of the zone is dominated by moderate- to-high-hazard occupancies (commercial, industrial, and mercantile), necessitating prioritized mitigation measures, including enhanced inspections, pre-incident planning, and mutual aid readiness. Low-hazard areas (e.g., open spaces near the river) are minimal, covering less than 10% of the zone.
This hazard density underscores the need for Station 6 to maintain an ERF of 20–30 staff members for initial alarms, aligned with departmental SOC goals, with a focus on HazMat and technical rescue capabilities. The 2023 CRA-SOC document highlights similar urban-industrial risks citywide and recommends annual hazard abatement and public education to reduce vulnerabilities. Compared to Station 6's more residential focus (as determined by prior analysis), Station 6 faces greater industrial/commercial threats, potentially requiring specialized apparatus, such as those at nearby stations, for optimal coverage.
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 6, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to 1 miles, and includes surrounding stations (1, 4, 9, and 14) for context.
The large buildings are categorized by square footage ranges, with colors indicating relative size and potential hazard levels. The total count (53) and distribution suggest a moderate to high concentration of significant structures, particularly in the eastern industrial corridor and central urban grid. These buildings pose elevated fire risks due to their size, occupancy potential, and complexity, necessitating robust initial response forces (ERF) and specialized tactics. Station 6’s response area encompasses some of the city's most significant buildings.
Figure 245: Station 6 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
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The square footage breakdown is as follows:
• 55,392–81,900 (20)–Green: Smallest large buildings; likely warehouses, office complexes, or multi-family units. Moderate fire load; risks include delayed evacuation and exposure to adjacent structures, concentrated near Iowa Avenue and central streets. • 81,901–111,886 (14)–Light Green: Mid-range structures; potentially retail centers, schools, or industrial facilities. Increased occupancy and fuel load; hazards include rapid fire spread and structural collapse. Scattered across the zone, with clusters near Station 6. • 111,887–174,035 (9)–Yellow: Larger commercial or industrial sites; e.g., big-box stores or manufacturing plants. High fire load and economic impact; risks include hazardous materials and prolonged suppression needs, predominantly in the eastern industrial area. • 174,036–306,211 (7)–Orange: Significant structures; likely distribution centers or mixed-use complexes. Very high fire load and occupancy; challenges include access, water supply, and multi-company response. Located east of Iowa Avenue.
• 306,212–493,936 (2)–Red: Largest buildings; possibly mega-warehouses (Walmart Distribution Center). Extreme fire load and complexity pose risks of catastrophic loss, requiring mutual aid and advanced pre-planning. Positioned in the northeast corner near Highgrove.
The highest density of large buildings (yellow, orange, red) is in the eastern portion of the zone, particularly near Iowa Avenue and extending toward Highgrove, indicating an industrial/commercial hub. This area, comprising 18 buildings (34% of the total) in the 111,887–493,936 sq. ft. range, represents the most significant hazard due to the potential for large-scale fires or hazardous material (HazMat) incidents. East of Station 6 and I-215, north, the green and light green buildings (34 total, 64%) suggest a mix of residential (multi-family) and commercial occupancies. These pose moderate risks but benefit from proximity to the station, which could potentially reduce response times.
The two red buildings (306,212–493,936 sq. ft.) in the northeast, near the 1,940-ft elevation, indicate isolated megastructures, likely warehouses. Access challenges due to terrain and distance from Station 6 (over 0.75 miles) increase vulnerability, necessitating the allocation of additional resources to mitigate these risks.
The zone spans about 7 square miles, with large buildings distributed in one area. Approximately 66% (35 buildings) fall within the lower two ranges (55,392–111,886 sq. ft.), which are manageable with a standard ERF, while 34% (18 buildings) are in higher ranges and require enhanced planning and mutual aid.
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Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 6’s area.
Figure 246: Station 6 Multi-Story Buildings
The figure highlights multi-story buildings in the response area of Station 6, located near the intersection of Orange Street and Main Street, adjacent to the Santa Ana River. Tall buildings are defined as those with six or more stories, marked in orange. Below is an assessment of the buildings by story range.
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Building Assessment by Story Range
• 3 Stories (Yellow, 406 total): Widespread across the response area, particularly in residential neighborhoods and along secondary streets. Primarily residential (e.g., apartment complexes, townhouses) and small commercial buildings (e.g., shops, offices). Their high number suggests a dense urban residential zone, with potential risks from fire spread in closely packed structures or cooking-related incidents—moderate risk due to volume; evacuation and access challenges are also present in densely populated areas.
• 4 Stories (Light Blue, 29 total): Scattered, with concentrations along Main Street and near University Avenue. Likely mixed-use buildings with ground-floor retail and upper-floor apartments, or mid-rise office buildings. Some may serve as student housing near the university area, increasing the risk due to height, which requires ladder trucks for upper-floor access.
Higher occupancy in mixed-use or student housing could complicate evacuations. • 5 Stories (Dark Blue, 3 total): Rare, located near the eastern edge toward University Avenue.
Possibly university-related facilities (e.g., dormitories, academic buildings) or upscale apartments. Their limited number suggests specialized development. Low frequency but high risk per building due to height and potential occupancy density; specialized response needed. • 6 Stories (Orange, 16 total): Concentrated along Main Street and extending toward Iowa Avenue and University Avenue, forming the downtown and university-adjacent core. Downtown (Main Street): Likely commercial office towers, historic hotels, or mixed-use developments with retail and residential units. These could house businesses, government offices, or luxury condos. • University Area (Near University Avenue): Potentially student housing, university administrative buildings, or modern apartment complexes catering to faculty and students.
The highest risk category due to height and potential high occupancy. Requires advanced fire suppression (e.g., aerial platforms) and coordinated evacuation plans, especially in mixed-use or densely populated structures.
Downtown concentration suggests economic and population centers, increasing vulnerability to fire- related disruptions. University proximity increases risks associated with student behavior (e.g., electrical hazards, overcrowding).
Station 6’s location is strategic for rapid response. Still, the mix of uses and building heights necessitates robust pre-planning for high-rise incidents, including water supply, access routes, and evacuation coordination.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 6’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed:
Figure 247: Station 6 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, most of the tall building load is not covered by the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The northeastern and eastern portions of the district contain many taller buildings outside of the 2.5-mile coverage area. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 1 or 3.
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Effective Response Force
The ERF refers to the personnel, apparatus, and resources deployed to address incidents within acceptable timeframes, tailored to the community’s risk profile. The following figure provides a detailed view of the first due area and staff delivery, enabling an assessment of the ERF.
Figure 248: Station 6 ERF at 8 Minutes
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Staff Delivered (Color
-
Coded Zones)
• 0 (White): Areas with no staff delivered, likely outside the immediate response boundary or unserved regions, relying on mutual aid.
• 1–9 Staff Delivered (Orange): Peripheral zones with low staff (e.g., near the river or eastern hills), indicating longer response times or secondary coverage. • 10–19 Staff Delivered (Light Orange): The majority of the response area, covering residential and mixed-use, and large building zones, suggests a moderate ERF for standard incidents. • 20–29 Staff Delivered (Yellow): Central areas around Station 6, indicating a stronger ERF for higher-risk zones like downtown with six-story buildings. • 30–39 Staff Delivered (Green): The immediate vicinity of Station 6, representing the highest staff density for rapid initial response to critical incidents. There is also a small concentration of staff near the intersection of Hwy 60 and I-215, the southeastern corner.
CFAI CRA-SOC standards typically require an ERF to arrive within 4–8 minutes for 90% of incidents. The 30–39 staff zone around Station 6 provides immediate coverage, while 20–29 staff in the core ensure coverage for high-rise risks. The 10–19 and 1–9 zones indicate potential exceedance of this target, necessitating assistance from Stations 1 and 4.
The CRA identifies risks associated with the 16 six-story buildings (commercial, mixed-use, and student housing) and the 406 three-story buildings (residential/commercial). The ERF’s tiered staffing aligns with these risks, with higher deployment (20–39) in the urban core where high-occupancy or high-value properties dominate.
The ERF includes Station 6’s primary units (e.g., engine, ladder truck) and support from adjacent stations (1, 4), as indicated by red symbols and blue response boundaries. The 30–39 staff level likely includes a four-person crew with advanced life support (ALS) capabilities, while 20–29 and 10–19 levels provide scalable reinforcement.
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STATION 7
Incident Evaluation
Station 7 is situated in the north-western section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map only shows the counts for the Station 7 area; however, other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 7 apparatus could potentially be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 249: Station 7 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 7 responded to 19,907 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 7 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 13,331 times. This averages out to a reliability of 67%. This indicates that, due to the station's remote location away from high-efficiency roadways, response reliability is the second-lowest in the department.
Station 7 can just meet an NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 7 can arrive at the location in 7 minutes, 54 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the eight-minute total response NFPA standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 1,633 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 20.1% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 250: Station 7 Incident Exceptions (Long Response)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 7 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 7 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 7’s district is high.
Station 7 meets some of the reliability-improving parameters. The area's size, the number of units, and staffing are the limiting factors. Response reliability declined considerably during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Figure 251: Station 7 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 7 81% 65% 67% 62% 62% 67% 67% 67% 10 4
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Hazard Evaluation
The map for Station 7 in the following figure, located in the Arlanza neighborhood, details the distribution of various occupancies within its response area. Using the legend for icon identification, the map highlights a diverse range of hazard types and occupancies, reflecting a suburban environment with a mix of risks. The red boundary delineates the first due area, encompassing approximately 10 square miles in area, with a dense concentration of icons indicating potential hazards.
Figure 252: Station 7 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly (125): With 125 assembly occupancies (e.g., churches, community centers), this is a significant hazard due to large gatherings. Risks include crowd-related incidents, panic during evacuations, or the spread of fire in older wooden structures, especially during events. • Commercial (258): The 258 commercial sites (e.g., shops, offices) suggest a busy retail and service area along Cypress and Tyler Avenues. Hazards include fire risks from electrical faults, cooking equipment, or flammable goods, with potential for rapid fire spread in strip malls. • Day Care (1): A single day care indicates a low-frequency but high-vulnerability hazard, requiring swift evacuation and pediatric medical response in emergencies like fires or lockdowns. • Finance (1): One finance occupancy (e.g., bank) poses a moderate risk, with potential for armed incidents or fire hazards from electrical systems, though its isolated presence limits overall impact.
• Government (1): A single government building (e.g., office or post office) may involve critical infrastructure risks, such as hazardous material storage or high-occupancy evacuations during crises.
• Hotel (2): Two hotels indicate transient population risks, with hazards like cooking fires, blocked exits, or medical emergencies among guests, requiring rapid response and coordination. • Industrial (35): The 35 industrial sites (e.g., warehouses, auto shops) along the periphery pose significant HazMat and fire risks, including chemical spills, explosions, or large-scale conflagrations due to stored materials.
• Medical Facility (10): Ten medical facilities (e.g., clinics) heighten EMS demands, with risks of patient evacuation during power outages, fires, or infectious outbreaks. • Mercantile (107): The 107 mercantile occupancies (e.g., retail stores) add to commercial fire risks, with potential for rapid fire growth due to merchandise and customer presence. • Multi-Family (376): The 376 multi-family units (e.g., apartments, condos) represent the highest occupancy density, posing risks of fire spread, complicated evacuations, and high casualty potential in wood-frame buildings. There is a very high concentration of these occupancies along Rutlidge Avenue near Arlington Ave.
• Parking Garage (4): Four parking garages increase vehicle fire and entrapment risks, particularly with gasoline or battery hazards, requiring specialized rescue operations.
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• Schools (158):
▪ School-Elementary (91): Ninety-one elementary schools indicate a large student population, with hazards like fire drills, bus accidents, or structural failures needing rapid, child-focused responses.
▪ School-High (28): Twenty-eight high schools add teenage occupancy risks, including behavioral incidents, sports-related injuries, or larger-scale evacuations. ▪ School-Middle (30): Thirty middle schools contribute to youth-related hazards, similar to high schools but with varying infrastructure age and occupancy. ▪ School-Pre (3): Three pre-schools heighten vulnerability, requiring specialized evacuation and medical care for young children.
▪ Special School (6): Six special schools suggest occupants with disabilities, increasing complexity for evacuations and medical responses during emergencies. • Senior Care (3): Three senior care facilities pose high-risk scenarios, with elderly evacuation challenges, medical fragility, and potential for rapid health deterioration in crises. • Storage (122): The 122 storage facilities (e.g., self-storage units) present fire hazards from stored combustibles, with risks of prolonged suppression due to inaccessible interiors.
Station 7’s response area exhibits a high hazard density due to the extensive range and number of occupancies (1,155 total). The predominant risks stem from high occupancy and evacuation challenges. Multi-family (376), schools (152 across various levels), and assembly (125) occupancies create significant life safety concerns, especially in densely packed Arlanza, where rapid evacuation may be hindered by narrow streets or traffic congestion.
Commercial (258), industrial (35), mercantile (107), and storage (122) sites increase the fire load and the potential for hazardous-material incidents, particularly near industrial zones along the eastern boundary. Vulnerable populations, including daycare centers, preschools, special schools, and senior care facilities, require tailored emergency plans for children and older adults, which amplifies the complexity of the response. Proximity to hills (e.g., 1,510 ft. elevation) and the Santa Ana River (inferred from nearby maps) suggest moderate wildfire and flood risks, though mitigated by urban development.
The concentration of hazards, especially multi-family and school occupancies, necessitates a robust ERF, with Station 7 strategically placed to address these risks. The diversity and volume of occupancies indicate a need for pre-incident planning.
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 7, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to 1 miles, and includes surrounding stations (2, 5, and 8) for context.
Figure 253: Station 7 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
The following is an assessment of the large buildings, broken out by square footage range.
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Large Buildings by Square Footage Range
• 51,930–54,382 SQFT (Green, 2 buildings): Two buildings are marked in green, located near the central area around Cypress Avenue and Philbin Avenue. Likely mid-sized commercial structures such as supermarkets, community centers, or medical clinics. These could serve residents with retail or healthcare services, given Arlanza's suburban character. Moderate fire load from merchandise or equipment, with evacuation challenges for 50,000+ occupants. Requires standard engine response but may require ladder support for upper floors if the building is multi- story.
• 54,383–57,098 SQFT (Light Green, 1 building): One building in light green, situated near the intersection of Cypress Avenue and Mitchell Avenue. Possibly a larger retail store (e.g., a big-box store like Walmart) or a warehouse distribution center. The size suggests a single-purpose facility designed to cater to regional needs, with a higher fire risk due to stored goods or inventory, and a potential for rapid spread. Evacuation complexity increases with large crowds, necessitating robust initial response and HazMat planning.
• 57,099–94,765 SQFT (Yellow, 1 building): One yellow-marked building, located toward the eastern edge near Arlington Avenue. Could be an industrial facility, an office complex, or an educational institution (e.g., a school or a community college annex). The size supports a multi- use or specialized function. Moderate to high risk depending on use—industrial sites pose HazMat threats, while schools increase occupancy vulnerability. Requires coordinated response for evacuation or suppression.
• 94,766–127,925 SQFT (Orange, 3 buildings): Three orange-marked buildings, clustered near Philbin Avenue and extending toward the northeastern boundary. Likely industrial warehouses, large retail centers (e.g., Home Depot), or multi-tenant office buildings. The concentration suggests a commercial/industrial hub, with a significant fire load and potential for large-scale evacuations. Industrial use increases HazMat risks (e.g., chemicals, fuels), while retail introduces crowd management challenges, necessitating the use of aerial ladders and mutual aid.
• 127,926–591,198 SQFT (Red, 1 building): One red-marked building, prominently located near the center-east of the response area, close to Station 7. Likely a central distribution center or a large manufacturing plant. The substantial square footage suggests a critical infrastructure or high- traffic site—the highest risk category due to size and potential occupancy. Fire suppression requires specialized equipment (e.g., aerial platforms), prolonged response times, and significant mutual aid and support. Hazmat or structural collapse risks are elevated, especially in industrial contexts.
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The response area features a gradient of risk, with the single 127,926–591,198 sq. ft. building posing the most significant challenge due to its size, potential high occupancy, and critical function. The three buildings, ranging from 94,766–127,925 sq. ft., form a moderate-to-high risk cluster, while the smaller ranges (51,930–94,765 sq. ft.) indicate widespread moderate risks across residential and commercial zones.
Based on prior occupancy data (e.g., 376 multi-family units, 35 industrial sites), large buildings are likely to include warehouses, retail, and institutional uses, which increase fire load, hazardous materials (HazMat) risks, and evacuation demands. Proximity to hills (elevation 1,510 ft) and the Santa Ana River suggests an increased risk of wildfires and flooding.
Station 7’s central location is strategic for rapid response, but the distances, road network, diversity, and size of large buildings necessitate pre-planning for high-rise or large-area incidents. The ERF must include ladder trucks, HazMat units, and mutual aid from Stations 2, 5, 8, and 12 to address peak hazards.
Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 7’s area.
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Figure 254: Station 7 Multi-Story Buildings
Station 7’s service areas is primarily low- to mid-rise in scale, with the tall buildings (3+ stories) concentrated along commercial corridors such as Cypress Avenue and Mitchell Avenue. The map highlights 180 multi-story buildings, indicating a moderate density of vertical development that could pose risks in fire scenarios due to the potential for rapid fire spread, evacuation challenges, and access limitations in a suburban layout with some hilly topography. From a community risk assessment (CRA) perspective, these buildings represent a targeted risk profile for the fire department.
The Arlanza area has a diverse population, including families and low-income households. It is proximate to institutions such as California Baptist University (CBU) and Riverside City College, which increases vulnerability to high-occupancy residential and educational structures.
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Key risks include:
• Fire spread potential: older multi-story residential buildings may have outdated fire suppression systems, while commercial strips may involve hazardous materials (e.g., retail storage). • Evacuation and access: Hilly terrain and narrow streets (e.g., near Van Buren Avenue) could hinder apparatus response times, especially for upper floors. • Occupancy loads: High daytime populations in commercial/educational sites amplify life-safety risks during business hours.
• Mitigation needs: RFD should prioritize pre-incident planning for these sites, such as hydrant mapping, aerial access points, and community education on vertical evacuation.
Building use is based on the area's zoning (predominantly residential and commercial mixed-use), visible clustering on the map (e.g., yellow icons along Cypress and Mitchell Avenues), and local development patterns. Arlanza features suburban apartment complexes, strip malls, and university- adjacent housing, with fewer high-rises than downtown Riverside. Below is a breakdown by story range from the legend, including estimated uses and CRA implications.
Story Range
• 3 Stories (160) Yellow Icons; most abundant, clustered along Cypress Ave and side streets) Primarily low-rise apartment complexes and multi-family housing (e.g., similar to Cypress Springs Apartments at 7850 Cypress Ave, a 3-story affordable family complex with 101 units).
Some may include small commercial ground floors, such as duplex/triplex conversions, or motels near Tyler Street. Highest volume risk due to sheer number; focuses on residential fire safety for families and low-income residents. Risks include cooking-related fires and child safety; CRA would emphasize smoke alarm programs and mutual aid for simultaneous incidents— moderate evacuation challenges on three floors.
• 4 Stories (16) Blue Icons; scattered near Mitchell Ave and commercial nodes) Mid-rise student housing or extended-stay apartments, likely tied to nearby California Baptist University (e.g., analogous to University Village Towers near UCR, but adapted to Arlanza's profile). Possible office conversions or boutique hotels along retail strips. Elevated occupancy risk from transient populations (students/transients), increasing false alarms, and alcohol-related incidents. CRA highlights the need for dorm-style drills and integration with university emergency plans; better suppression systems, assumed in newer builds, reduce the risk of spread.
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• 5 Stories (2) Dark Blue Icons; limited, possibly near university edges or Van Buren Blvd) University-affiliated dormitories or senior living facilities, given proximity to CBU and Riverside's aging population. Could include a small hotel or medical office building for community services.
Low count but high per-building risk due to vulnerable occupants (e.g., elderly or students with mobility issues). CRA prioritizes life-safety upgrades, such as sprinklers and stairwell pressurization; the potential for mass casualties in a single event necessitates specialized training.
• 7–10 Stories (1) Green Icon; standout near central response area, possibly along Cypress or near hills) A landmark mid-rise, similar to a county office building, regional medical clinic, or the tallest local apartment tower (e.g., comparable to The Exchange at Riverside's 3-story scale but scaled up; in Arlanza, likely a public-service high-rise, such as a social services hub).
Critical high-risk asset; the tallest in area amplifies wind-driven fire spread and helicopter access needs. RFD should consider the area for annual inspections, seismic retrofits, and command post pre- planning.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 7’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed.
Figure 255: Station 7 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in this figure, not all of the tall building load is covered by the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The exception is that the western portion of the district contains some taller buildings (mostly three-story). Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 2.
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Effective Response Force
The effective response force depicted in the following Station 7 map reflects the staffing and resource distribution within its first-due area. The map uses a color-coded gradient to illustrate the ERF delivered, based on the number of personnel available to respond to incidents.
Figure 256: Station 7 ERF at 8 Minutes
• White (0 staff delivered): Areas with no effective response force, likely outside the primary service boundary or in unpopulated terrain (e.g., northern hills or riverbed zones). • Pink (1–9 staff): Regions with minimal staffing, concentrated in the hilly northern and western fringes of Station 7's area. This suggests longer response times or reliance on mutual aid due to geographic challenges.
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• Orange (10–19 staff): Moderate staffing zones, extending from the pink areas toward the central and southern parts, indicating improved coverage but still below optimal levels for complex incidents.
• Yellow (20–29 staff): The core residential and commercial areas around Station 7 (e.g., near Cypress Avenue and Mitchell Avenue) show this level, suggesting a baseline response force adequate for routine calls like residential fires or medical emergencies. • Light Green (30–39 staff): The southeastern and eastern edges, including near institutional sites, indicate the highest staffing density, likely reflecting higher risk or demand (e.g., proximity to California Baptist University or multi-story buildings).
The gradient from white to light green suggests a tiered response model, with Station 7 prioritizing densely populated and high-risk zones (yellow to green) while peripheral areas (pink to white) may face delays. RFD’s critical task analysis calls for 19 staff for a moderate structure fire. This will not be easy to attain in the western sections of this district.
The CRA component aligns staffing with community risks in the yellow zones, where 20–29 staff can handle initial suppression and rescue. The 30–39 staff areas likely account for elevated risks, such as university-related incidents or mass casualty events.
CFAI standards target a 4- to 6-minute response time for the first-due unit and an 8- to 12-minute response time for full alarm assignment. Station 7 meets this requirement for central areas but may struggle in the pink zones, necessitating pre-plans or additional resources.
The presence of 10–19 staff in transitional zones indicates a buffer for mutual aid or second-alarm responses, while 30–39 staff in green zones suggests readiness for significant incidents, aligning with CFAI's focus on scalable response.
Station 7's effective response force is strongest in populated, risk-heavy areas, supporting CFAI's risk- based deployment. However, the low-staffed pink zones highlight potential vulnerabilities in rugged terrain or during peak demand, where CRA might recommend enhanced staffing or apparatus repositioning.
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STATION 8
Incident Evaluation
Station 8 is situated in the western section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map only shows the counts for the Station 8 area; however, other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 8 apparatus could potentially be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 257: Station 8 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 8 responded to 25,040 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 8 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 15,761 times. This averages out to a reliability of 63%. This indicates that, due to the station's remote placement away from high-efficiency roadways, response reliability is the lowest in the department. This has remained consistent over the years, with the lowest level ever (58%) occurring during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Station 8 fails to meet the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated to arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 8 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 14 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 3,408 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 13.6% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 258: Station 8 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 8 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 8 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 8’s district is high.
Station 8 meets some of the reliability-improving parameters. The area's size, the number of units, and staffing are the limiting factors. Response reliability declined considerably during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Figure 259: Station 8 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 8 78% 62% 62% 58% 58% 65% 60% 63% 10.3 4
Hazard Evaluation
The following figure depicts the response area for Station 8 covering a roughly 1.6-mile by 1.6-mile Suburban zone within the city boundaries. The area is bordered by the city boundary (black square outline) and features hilly terrain with elevation changes (e.g., 492 ft. and 1,510 ft. contours in gray). It primarily consists of residential streets, commercial corridors, and institutional sites. The distribution shows a high concentration of commercial and assembly occupancies, posing significant risks for fire spread, evacuation challenges, and resource demands during incidents.
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Figure 260: Station 8 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Hazard Types and Distribution
The map identifies the following hazard types by icon and count, with their approximate spatial distribution relative to Station 8:
• Assembly (157): Heavily clustered in central and eastern commercial zones, often near major avenues like Indiana Ave and Tyler St; high-risk for large gatherings and rapid fire involvement. • Commercial (284): Most prevalent type, densely packed along arterials (e.g., Arlington Ave, Market St, and Main St corridors); forms continuous strips that could accelerate fire propagation in retail/dining areas.
• Day Care (9): Scattered in residential pockets, particularly south and west of the station; vulnerable populations (children) increase urgency for rapid response. • Finance (4): Limited to isolated spots in commercial hubs, e.g., near banking clusters on University Ave.
• Government (2): Minimal; one near the station core and another in the northwest institutional area.
• Hotel (9): Concentrated in the southeastern quadrant along travel routes like La Sierra Ave; transient occupancy heightens escape and smoke control needs. • Industrial (19): Grouped in the southwestern industrial pocket (e.g., near Valley Dr), with potential for hazardous materials and large-scale fires. • Medical Facility (35:) Distributed across the area, with clusters in the north (e.g., near hospitals on Cypress Ave) and central zones; critical for life-safety due to patient mobility issues. • Mercantile (106): Abundant in shopping districts along east-west streets like Philbin Ave; overlaps with commercial, raising inventory fire load concerns. • Multi-Family (415): Dominant residential hazard, widespread in apartment complexes throughout (e.g., dense blocks south of the station); high population density amplifies evacuation and exposure risks.
• Parking Garage (7): Few, mainly in commercial cores (e.g., near Station 8); vehicle fuels pose secondary fire hazards.
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• Schools (166):
▪ Church-Affiliated schools (2) are isolated in the western residential area. ▪ School–Elementary (109) Numerous in family-oriented neighborhoods, especially central and southern sections (e.g., near Campbell Ave); daytime occupancy of children demands specialized response tactics.
▪ School–High (30) Clustered in the northeastern educational corridor (e.g., near University/College icons).
▪ School–Support (3) Sparse, supporting high schools in the east. ▪ University/College (22) Concentrated in the northeast (e.g., along University Ave), with a large student population, increasing assembly-like risks. • Senior Care (3): Limited to care facilities in quieter residential zones, e.g., the west side; mobility-impaired residents elevate vulnerability.
• Storage (99): Prevalent in peripheral zones (e.g., south and east edges near railroads); high fuel loads from contents could sustain prolonged incidents.
This response area presents a high-hazard suburban environment dominated by dense commercial (284), mercantile (106), and multi-family residential (415) occupancies, which together account for over 800 sites, more than half of all mapped hazards. These create interconnected risks, such as fire spreading from one building to another in strip malls or apartments, particularly along key roads like Indiana Avenue and Tyler Street. Vulnerable populations are prominent, with 157 assembly venues, 109 elementary schools, 35 medical facilities, and 22 universities/colleges, totaling over 300 life- safety-critical sites. Industrial (19) and storage (99) areas in the southwest and south pose potential threats from chemical or combustible materials. At the same time, the hilly topography could complicate access and water supply during multi-alarm fires. The station's central location provides good coverage within a 1.6-mile radius, but the sheer volume (~1,300 occupancies) suggests elevated response demands, especially for simultaneous or wind-driven events.
Strategic priorities likely include pre-planning for commercial strips, school routes, and medical corridors to mitigate cascading failures. No extreme wildfire interfaces are evident within the district boundary, but adjacent hills (shaded gray) may influence smoke patterns or secondary exposures.
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 8, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to ¾ of a mile, and includes surrounding stations (7 and 12) for context.
The map highlights large buildings (> 50,000 square feet) within the response area of Station 8. These buildings are color-coded by size ranges according to the legend, with counts indicating their frequency. The region spans approximately 10.3 square miles, a suburban landscape with hilly terrain (e.g., 492 ft elevation contour. The presence of large buildings suggests significant community risks, including fire load, evacuation challenges, and resource demands. Based on their size, location, and the broader occupancy context from the prior map, speculative uses can be inferred.
Figure 261: Station 8 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
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Large Buildings by Square Footage Range
• 53,976–56,302–Green (2) Educational Facilities (e.g., High Schools) Consistent with 30 high schools and 109 elementary schools in the area; possibly located in the northeastern educational corridor. Risks involve large student populations (hundreds per building), daytime peak occupancy, and complex evacuation due to multiple floors or wings. • 56,302–59,698–Light Green (1) Medical Facility (e.g., Hospital Wing) Aligns with 35 medical facilities; could be a specialized unit or outpatient center near Cypress Ave. Risks include vulnerable patients, oxygen/fuel hazards, and critical infrastructure needs (e.g., power backup). • 59,698–64,647–Yellow (1) University/College Building. Matches 22 university/college sites in the northeast; likely an academic or administrative hall. Risks include high student density, research labs with chemicals, and extended operational hours.
• 64,648–91,142–Orange (3) Multi-Family Residential (e.g., Apartment Complexes) Correlates with 415 multi-family units; large complexes near residential blocks (e.g., south of Station 8). Risks include high resident density (hundreds per building), vertical fire spread, and limited egress points.
• 91,143–139,710–Red (11) Industrial/Warehouse (e.g., Distribution Centers) Matches 19 industrial and 99 storage sites, especially in the southwest (near Valley Dr). Likely used for manufacturing or logistics. Risks include hazardous materials, large combustible storage, and potential for prolonged, intense fires that require heavy resources.
• Total Large Buildings: 9 structures exceed 50,000 sq. ft., with a significant concentration in the 91,143–139,710 sq. ft. range (1 building), indicating a heavy industrial presence. This suggests that the area has a robust economic base, but also faces elevated fire and safety risks.
Industrial/warehouse buildings (red) dominate the southwestern quadrant, near hilly terrain that could complicate access. Educational and medical facilities (green/light green/yellow) are likely centralized in the north and east, near population centers. Multi-family and commercial buildings are dispersed, overlapping residential and commercial zones.
Industrial warehouses (91,143–139,710 sq. ft.) pose the greatest fire load due to the storage of goods or materials, potentially requiring multi-alarm responses. Commercial retail (53,976–56,302 sq. ft.) adds secondary exposure risks along arterials. Educational (53,976–59,698 sq. ft.) and medical facilities (56,302–59,698 sq. ft.) house vulnerable populations, necessitating rapid evacuation plans and specialized rescue operations. Multi-family units (64,648–91,142 sq. ft.) increase residential exposure with potential for high casualty counts. Hilly terrain and dense street networks may delay response times, especially for large industrial sites. Proximity to Station 8 (a central location) helps mitigate this, but simultaneous incidents could still strain it.
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Pre-incident planning should focus on industrial fire suppression (e.g., water supply, HazMat protocols), school evacuation drills, and residential fire safety education. Coordination with adjacent stations (7, 12) is critical for mutual aid during large-scale events.
This assessment highlights a diverse hazard profile, with industrial buildings presenting the most significant fire challenge, while educational, medical, and residential structures amplify life-safety concerns.
Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 8’s area.
Figure 262: Station 8 Multi-Story Buildings
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The map depicts the response area of Station 8, covering a suburban zone with hilly terrain. The legend identifies multi-story buildings by story height, with color-coded markers indicating their distribution.
Tall buildings are defined as those with three or more stories, posing increased risks due to vertical fire spread, evacuation challenges, and structural complexity. Based on their location and the prior context of occupancy types (e.g., multi-family, commercial), speculative uses can be inferred for community risk assessment.
Story Range
• 3 Stories–Yellow (1119) Multi-Family Residential (e.g., Apartments): Most common, scattered across residential blocks (e.g., south and east of Station 8). Likely 3-story apartment complexes with 415 multi-family units. Risks include high resident density (dozens per building), limited egress, and potential for fire spread between floors.
• 4 Stories–Light Blue (41) Multi-Family Residential or Hotels: Concentrated in denser residential zones; could include mid-rise apartments or the nine hotels. Risks include increased evacuation time, smoke management challenges, and the potential for stranded occupants on upper floors. • 5 Stories–Blue (3) Medical Facilities or Office Buildings: Rare, possibly near the 35 medical facilities or commercial hubs (e.g., along Indiana Ave). It could be clinics or administrative offices. Risks include vulnerable patients/staff, critical infrastructure (e.g., power, HVAC), and complex rescue operations.
• 6 Stories–Orange (3) Commercial or University Buildings: Isolated in commercial corridors or near the 22 university/college sites (northeast). Likely retail centers or academic halls. Risks include high occupancy during business hours, large fire loads (e.g., merchandise, labs), and extended suppression needs.
• 7–10 Stories–Green (3) High-Rise Apartments or Commercial Towers: Sparse, potentially in central or eastern zones near major roads (e.g., Tyler St). Could be luxury apartments or office towers from the 284 commercial sites. Risks include significant vertical fire spread, reliance on elevators, and demand for aerial apparatus that exceeds the immediate reach of Station 8.
A total of 1,169 structures with three or more stories, with the vast majority (1,119) being three-story buildings, indicating a predominantly mid-rise residential area. Higher stories (5–10) are rare but critical due to their height and complexity. Three-story buildings are widely dispersed, reflecting the dominance of the 415 multi-family units. Four-to-six-story buildings cluster in denser urban areas, while 7–10-story buildings are typically located near key infrastructure (e.g., commercial strips or educational zones). Hilly terrain (shaded gray) may hinder access to some sites.
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The high count of 3-story buildings (1,119) suggests a widespread risk of floor-to-floor fire propagation, especially in multi-family units. Higher buildings (7–10 stories) pose challenges for aerial ladder reach, with truck coverage from Station 2 (yellow/green areas) critical for the eastern edge. Multi-family residences (3–6 stories) house hundreds of residents, increasing evacuation demands and exposure to smoke inhalation. Medical or office buildings (5–6 stories) often house vulnerable populations or experience dense daytime occupancy, requiring specialized response tactics.
The hilly terrain and dense street grid may result in delayed response times. Truck coverage from Station 2 extends to the east; however, gaps may exist in the southwest, necessitating mutual aid from Stations 7 or 12.
RFD should focus on residential fire safety education (e.g., sprinklers, egress planning) for buildings with 3-4 stories. Pre-plan high-rise sites (7–10 stories) for aerial operations and ensure coordination with adjacent stations for large incidents. Regular drills for medical and commercial evacuations are advisable.
This assessment highlights a high volume of mid-rise residential risks, with rare but significant high-rise hazards requiring enhanced response capabilities.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 8’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed.
Figure 263: Station 8 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, a few of the tall building loads are covered by the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The western portion of the district contains many taller buildings (the bulk of which are 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7-story) that fall outside the 2.5-mile coverage zone. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 2.
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Effective Response Force
The map for Station 8 illustrates this through color-coded zones indicating the staff response force delivered, measured by personnel availability. Station 8, centrally located within its red-outlined first- due area, serves a varied urban landscape with hilly terrain and adjacent stations (7 and 12), suggesting a need for robust coverage to handle diverse hazards (e.g., multi-story buildings, commercial zones).
Figure 264: Station 8 ERF at 8 Minutes
• White (0 Staff): Only roadless, wilderness areas are marked white, indicating a complete lack of coverage within the first-due area.
• Pink (1–9 Staff): Small pockets, particularly in the hilly northwestern section, suggest limited staffing capacity. This likely reflects challenging terrain or low-density residential zones where response may be stretched thin.
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• Orange (10–19 Staff): Scattered patches, especially in the northwest and along the western boundary, indicate moderate staffing levels. These areas may include multi-story residential or industrial sites that require additional resources beyond the initial response. • Yellow (20–29 Staff): The majority of the first-due area is shaded yellow, centered around Station
8. This suggests a baseline effective response force of 20–29 staff, which is adequate for typical incidents (e.g., single-family fires, small commercial calls), but potentially insufficient for larger or simultaneous events, given the presence of 1,169 multi-story buildings and 20 large structures (> 50,000 sq. ft.).
• Light Green (30–39 Staff): Limited to a small eastern section near the boundary with Station 12’s coverage, this indicates enhanced staffing, possibly due to overlap or higher-risk zones (e.g., commercial corridors or truck coverage from Station 2).
The CRA identifies key risks from prior maps, including 284 commercial, 415 multi-family, and 157 assembly occupancies, as well as 20 large buildings and 1,169 multi-story structures. The yellow- dominated staffing (20–29) aligns with a moderate risk profile but may fall short for high-hazard scenarios (e.g., industrial fires, mass evacuations) that require 30 or more staff.
CFAI SOC requires sufficient personnel for initial attack, ventilation, rescue, and command within acceptable timeframes (typically 4–6 minutes for urban areas). The 20–29 staff range suggests capability for standard responses but may necessitate mutual aid (e.g., from Stations 7 or 12) for complex incidents, especially in pink/orange zones. Pink (1–9) and orange (10–19) areas indicate potential gaps, particularly in hilly northwest regions where access may be delayed. Light green (30–39) zones suggest strategic reinforcement, likely planned for high-density or critical infrastructure areas.
The map implies a tiered response model, with Station 8 as the primary responder and adjacent stations providing backup. The effective force must account for daily staffing fluctuations may reduce the number of available personnel compared to daytime hours. A 20–29-staff force is likely sufficient for 80–90% of incidents (e.g., residential fires, medical calls), but the high volume of multi-story and large buildings suggests a need for 30–39 staff for worst-case scenarios (e.g., high-rise fires, mass casualty events).
Identified mitigation strategies include enhancing staffing in pink/orange zones through repositioning or additional units. Pre-plan for mutual aid triggers (e.g., > 29 staff required) and ensure aerial apparatus availability for 7-to 10-story buildings.
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STATION 9
Incident Evaluation
Station 9 is situated in the southeastern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. Station 9’s first due area, along with Station 3’s location, are the only two stations that do not intercept the city border. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map shows only the counts for the Station 9 area; other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 9 apparatus could be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 265: Station 9 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 9 responded to 6,187 incidents. This is the lowest incident count of all station districts. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 9 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 5,013 times.
This averages out to a reliability of 81%. This indicates that, due to the station's remote placement away from high-efficiency roadways, response reliability is lower, but still acceptable.
Station 9 has not met the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 9 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes and 25 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 1,565 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 23.3% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 266: Station 9 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 9 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 9 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 9’s district is very high. Station 9 meets most of the reliability-improving parameters.
Figure 267: Station 9 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 9 89% 82% 82% 78% 78% 80% 81% 81% 10.6 4
Hazard Evaluation
The following figure illustrates the response area for Station 9, covering a roughly 10.6-square-mile suburban-urban zone in northeastern Riverside, within the city's boundaries (black outline). The terrain features moderate elevation changes, with shaded hills in the east (near Sycamore Canyon), residential neighborhoods, and commercial strips along arterials such as Central Avenue and Alessandro Boulevard. Hazard types are represented by color-coded icons with counts in parentheses, totaling approximately 370 occupancies. The area exhibits a balanced mix of residential multi-family housing and educational facilities, with notable industrial and storage risks located near the eastern boundary. These risks may be potentially exacerbated by adjacent wildland-urban interface (WUI) zones in Sycamore Canyon, a well-known high-hazard area for medical emergencies and vegetation fires.
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Figure 268: Station 9 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly (43) Clustered in the central and southern zones near Central Ave; likely community centers or event venues, posing evacuation risks during gatherings. • Commercial (28) Concentrated along western arterials (e.g., Arlington Ave); strip malls and businesses that could facilitate rapid fire spread in retail corridors. • Day Care (2) Isolated in residential pockets south of the station; small-scale facilities with vulnerable child populations requiring priority response. • Government (2) Minimal; one near the station and another in the northwest institutional area, potentially administrative buildings with public access. • Industrial (24) Grouped in the eastern quadrant near Alessandro Blvd and hills; manufacturing sites with potential hazardous materials, heightening spill/fire risks near WUI. • Medical Facility (4) Scattered, with clusters in the north (e.g., near Central Ave); clinics or care centers are critical for patient safety and medical resource demands. • Mercantile (18) Abundant in shopping areas along eastern roads (e.g., Alessandro Blvd); retail outlets overlap commercial zones, increasing inventory fire loads. • Multi-Family (108) Dominant type, widespread in apartment complexes throughout residential blocks (e.g., south and west); high population density amplifies exposure risks. These appear in three distinct clusters: one in the northwest of Arlington Avenue, one just south of Arlington Avenue near Alessandro Blvd., and the third, surrounding Station 9. • Parking Garage (1) Single site in the central commercial hub; vehicle fuels pose secondary ignition and exposure hazards.
• Schools (60)
▪ Church Affiliated (1) Isolated in the western residential area; community gathering spot with potential for assembly-like events.
▪ School (General) (4) Distributed in family neighborhoods, especially central, broad educational sites with daytime occupancy.
▪ School–Elementary (49) Numerous in southern and western suburbs (e.g., near Le Conte Dr); high child density demands rapid, coordinated evacuations. ▪ School–High (4) Clustered in the northeastern educational corridor, larger teen populations increase life-safety complexities.
▪ Special School (2) Sparse, likely specialized facilities (e.g., for disabilities) in quieter zones; vulnerable students elevate urgency.
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• Storage (44) Prevalent in peripheral eastern areas near industrial clusters; high combustible contents could sustain large-scale fires, especially with wind exposure from canyons.
This response area represents a moderate-to-high hazard suburban environment with a strong emphasis on residential (108 multi-family) and educational (59 schools total) occupancies, accounting for over 85% of the sites and posing significant life-safety risks due to population density (e.g., children in schools, families in apartments). Commercial/mercantile (46 combined) and assembly (43) sites along key roads, such as Central Avenue, create interconnected urban risks for fire propagation in business districts. Industrial (24) and storage (44) hazards in the east introduce material and fuel load threats, compounded by proximity to Sycamore Canyon's wildland areas, where dry vegetation and access challenges could escalate brush fires into structure exposures. Medical facilities (4) and day cares (2) highlight vulnerable groups needing specialized tactics. Station 9's central location provides coverage at the 1-mile scale, but the volume (~370 occupancies) and terrain suggest a need for quick mutual aid, particularly for eastern industrial/WUI incidents. Strategic focus should include school evacuation pre-plans, residential fire prevention, and canyon patrol resources to address seasonal fire risks. No extreme high-rise or mega-facility hazards are evident, but cumulative residential density could strain resources during multi-unit or wind-driven events.
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 9, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map. The map covers a region bounded by the city boundary, with a scale of 0 to 1 mile, and includes surrounding stations (13 and 14) for context.
Figure 269: Station 9 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
Square Footage Range
• > 50,384–53,871–Dark Green (2) Commercial Retail (e.g., Big-Box Stores), Likely located along Central Ave or Alessandro Blvd, aligning with 28 commercial and 18 mercantile sites. Risks include high occupancy, large fuel loads (inventory), and potential rapid fire spread in open retail spaces.
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• 53,872–62,773–Green (2) Multi-Family Residential (e.g., Apartment Complexes): Consistent with 108 multi-family units; possibly mid-rise complexes in residential pockets (e.g., near Arlington Ave). Risks involve high resident density (dozens per building), limited egress, and vertical fire spread.
• 62,774–74,209–Yellow (1) Educational Facility (e.g., High School): Matches 4 high schools and 49 elementary schools; likely in the northeastern educational corridor. Risks include large student populations (hundreds), daytime peak occupancy, and complex evacuation needs. • 74,210–110,493–Orange (1) Industrial/Warehouse (e.g., Distribution Center): Correlates with 24 industrial and 44 storage sites; possibly near eastern hills (e.g., Sycamore Canyon). Risks include hazardous materials, large combustible storage, and potential for prolonged fires near the wildland-urban interface (WUI).
• 110,494–229,415–Red (1) Major Commercial or Institutional (e.g., Shopping Mall or Hospital):
Rare, potentially a significant hub along Central Ave or near medical facilities (4 sites). It could be a regional mall or a large healthcare complex. Risks include massive occupancy, critical infrastructure, and the potential for multi-alarm fires.
Seven structures exceed 50,000 sq. ft., with a balanced distribution across commercial, residential, educational, industrial, and institutional uses. The single 110,494–229,415 sq. ft. building stands out as a high-priority risk. This is highly probable to be the Mission Grove Shopping Center (Mall).
Commercial/retail (dark green) buildings, as well as multi-family (green) buildings, are likely scattered across central and western residential-commercial zones. The educational facility (yellow) may be located in the northeast. At the same time, the industrial site (orange) and the central building (red) are located to the east, near the industrial/storage clusters and Sycamore Canyon.
The industrial warehouse (74,210–110,493 sq. ft.) and central building (110,494–229,415 sq. ft.) pose the highest fire loads due to the storage of goods or complex infrastructure, with WUI proximity increasing exposure risks. Commercial retail (50,000–53,871 sq. ft.) adds secondary fire propagation potential along arterials.
Multi-family residences (53,872–62,773 sq. ft.) and the educational facility (62,774–74,209 sq. ft.) house vulnerable populations (residents, students), requiring rapid evacuation and rescue operations.
The central building could involve hundreds during peak use, amplifying life-safety demands.
Hilly terrain in the east may delay access to industrial and major sites. Station 9’s central location aids coverage, but mutual aid from Stations 14 or 11 may be needed for large incidents, especially near the eastern boundary.
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RFD should:
• Pre-plan for industrial fire suppression (e.g., water supply, HazMat) and WUI patrols. • Conduct evacuation drills for schools and multi-family units. • Ensure robust mutual aid for the major building, which may require specialized resources (e.g., aerial units).
This assessment reveals a moderate hazard profile, characterized by diverse large buildings, with the eastern industrial/major site posing the greatest challenge. At the same time, residential and educational structures heighten life-safety concerns.
Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 9’s area.
Figure 270: Station 9 Multi-Story Buildings
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The figure depicts the response area for Station 9, covering a roughly 1-mile by 1.5-mile suburban- urban zone in northeastern Riverside, California, within the city boundaries (black square outline). The terrain includes moderate hills, with adjacent stations (1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14) providing overlapping coverage. Tall buildings are identified by story height using color-coded markers, with counts indicating their frequency. Based on their distribution and the prior context of occupancy types (e.g., 108 multi- family, 49 elementary schools), speculative uses can be inferred for community risk assessment.
Story
Range
• 3 Stories–Yellow (746) Multi-Family Residential (e.g., Apartments). Most common, widely scattered across residential blocks (e.g., near Arlington Ave and Central Ave). Likely 3-story apartment complexes with 108 multi-family units. Risks include high resident density (dozens per building), limited egress, and potential floor-to-floor fire spread. • 4 Stories–Light Blue (24) Multi-Family Residential or Hotels Concentrated in denser residential zones; could include mid-rise apartments or the four medical facilities repurposed for housing.
Risks include increased evacuation time, smoke management challenges, and the potential for stranded occupants on upper floors.
• 5 Stories–Blue–(2) Medical Facilities or Office Buildings, Rare, possibly near the four medical facilities or commercial hubs (e.g., along Central Ave). It could be clinics or administrative offices. Risks include vulnerable patients/staff, critical infrastructure (e.g., power, HVAC), and complex rescue operations.
• 7–10 Stories–Green (1) High-Rise Apartments or Commercial Towers, Sparse, likely in central or eastern zones near major roads (e.g., Alessandro Blvd). Could be luxury apartments or office buildings from the 28 commercial sites. Risks include significant vertical fire spread, reliance on elevators, and demand for aerial apparatus that exceeds the immediate reach of Station 9.
There are 773 structures with three or more stories, with the vast majority (746) being 3-story buildings, indicating a predominantly mid-rise residential area. Higher stories (5–10) are less common but critical due to their height and complexity. Three-story buildings are densely distributed across the central and western residential zones. 4–5 story buildings cluster in denser pockets, possibly near Central Avenue, while 7–10 story buildings are likely located near key infrastructure (e.g., commercial strips or the eastern hills). The high count of 3-story buildings (746) suggests widespread risk of floor-to-floor fire propagation, especially in multi-family units. Higher buildings (7–10 stories) pose challenges for aerial ladder reach, requiring mutual aid from adjacent stations (e.g., 14 or 11). Multi-family residences (3–5 stories) house hundreds of residents, increasing evacuation demands and exposure to smoke inhalation. Medical or office buildings (5 stories) often house vulnerable populations or experience dense daytime occupancy, necessitating specialized response tactics.
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Hilly terrain in the east and north may delay access to some sites. Station 9’s central location provides coverage within a 1-mile radius, but the volume of tall buildings suggests potential strain on resources during simultaneous incidents.
RFD should:
• Focus on residential fire safety education (e.g., sprinklers, egress planning) for buildings with three to four stories.
• Pre-plan high-rise sites (7–10 stories) for aerial operations and ensure coordination with adjacent stations for large-scale events.
• Conduct regular drills for medical and commercial evacuations.
This assessment highlights a high volume of mid-rise residential risks, with rare but significant high-rise hazards requiring enhanced response capabilities, particularly in the eastern and central zones.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 9’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed.
Figure 271: Station 9 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, a few of the tall building load is covered by the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The district contains many taller buildings (mostly 3-story) that fall outside the 2.5 mile coverage area. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 1, 3, or 13.
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Effective Response Force
Station 9, centrally located within its red-outlined first-due area, serves a suburban landscape with hilly terrain and adjacent stations (e.g., Station 14), suggesting a need for adequate coverage to handle the diverse hazards identified in prior maps (e.g., 108 multi-family dwellings, 49 elementary schools, seven large buildings).
Figure 272: Station 9 ERF at 8 Minutes
The map uses a color gradient to represent the staff response force delivered, based on the legend:
• White (0 Staff): No areas are marked white, indicating no complete lack of coverage within the first-due area.
• Pink (1–9 Staff): Small isolated pockets, primarily in the southwestern and western hilly sections, suggest limited staffing capacity. These areas likely reflect low-density or hard-to-access zones where response may be constrained.
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• Orange (10–19 Staff): Significant portions, especially in the central and southern zones around Station 9, indicate a moderate staffing level. This coverage aligns with residential and multi-story building clusters (746 3-story buildings), adequate for initial response but potentially insufficient for larger incidents. This staffing level indicates that minimal staff contribution is coming from Station 13 due to poor road network connectivity.
• Yellow (20–29 Staff): A substantial central area, including the immediate vicinity of Station 9, shows a baseline effective force of 20–29 staff. This suggests a capacity to handle typical incidents (e.g., single-family fires, small commercial calls), but may be stretched by the 773 tall buildings and 7 large structures.
• Light Green (30–39 Staff): Larger patches in the northern and western sections indicate enhanced staffing, possibly due to higher-risk zones or overlap with adjacent stations (e.g., 3, 10). This area covers the large clusters of multi-family occupancies, which are likely the source of increased service requests.
• Dark Green (40–56 Staff): Limited to the northwestern corner, this suggests the highest staffing concentration, potentially near critical infrastructure or overlapping coverage areas.
The CRA identifies key risks, including 108 multi-family units, 49 elementary schools, 7 large buildings (exceeding 50,000 sq. ft.), and 773 multi-story structures. The predominant staff range of 20–29 (yellow) aligns with a moderate risk profile but may fall short for high-hazard scenarios (e.g., industrial fires, mass evacuations), which require 30–56 staff, as indicated in the green zones.
CFAI SOC requires sufficient personnel for initial attack, ventilation, rescue, and command within acceptable timeframes (typically 4–6 minutes for suburban areas). The 10–19 staff (orange) and 20–29 staff (yellow) ranges suggest a capability for standard responses, but gaps in the pink zones and the need for 40–56 staff in the dark green areas indicate a reliance on mutual aid for complex incidents.
The pink (1–9) areas in the southwest and east highlight potential gaps, likely due to hilly terrain or distance from Station 9. Dark green (40–56) zones suggest strategic reinforcement, possibly planned for high-density or critical sites.
The tiered staffing model, with Station 9 as the primary responder and adjacent stations (e.g., 14) providing backup accounts for daily fluctuations. A 20–29 staff force covers most routine incidents, but the high volume of multi-story (783) and large buildings (7) suggests a need for 30–56 staff for worst- case scenarios (e.g., high-rise fires, mass casualty events), especially in pink/orange zones.
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Mitigation strategies include enhancing staffing in pink (1–9) and orange (10–19) zones through repositioning or additional units. Pre-plan for mutual aid triggers (> 29 staff needed) and ensure aerial apparatus availability for 7–10 story buildings (11 sites). Coordinate with Station 14 for eastern coverage.
The 1-mile radius suggests good initial response times; however, hilly terrain and traffic congestion could extend this, necessitating a robust road network analysis in accordance with CFAI standards.
In summary, Station 9’s effective response force, predominantly 10–29 staff with peaks at 40–56, meets baseline SOC requirements for suburban risks but may be strained by the area’s tall and large buildings.
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STATION 10
Incident Evaluation
Station 10 is situated in the southern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The Riverside Fire Training facility and Emergency Operations Center are located in this district. This is the largest of all Riverside fire districts at 16.3 square miles.
The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map shows only the counts for the Station 10 area; other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 10 apparatus could be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 273: Station 10 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 10 responded to 13,370 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 10 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 8,933 times. This averages out to a reliability of 67%. This indicates that Station 10 may be used as a second due resource more often than usual; response reliability is lower, but this should be a strategic goal to improve. Other parameters, such as staffing and proximity to a central road corridor (SR-91), seem to contradict the reliability parameters.
Station 10 cannot meet the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 10 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 33 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard and took even longer than the 90th percentile. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 1,499 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 11.2% of all responses (emergency and non- emergency). It is likely, as shown in this figure, that low call volume and poor access to the east- southeast portions of the district have resulted in an elevated number of total response exceptions in that area.
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Figure 274: Station 10 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 10 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 10 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 10’s district is very high. Station 10 ties Station 7 for the second-least reliable Station district at 67%. Station 10 has to cover more than twice the average response area with the same staff as other stations.
Figure 275: Station 10 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 10 80% 65% 65% 62% 63% 67% 67% 67% 16.3 4
Hazard Evaluation
Station 10 has a variety of occupancy types that represent hazards requiring either a special response modification, elevated training, or staff assignment. The following figure depicts the response area for Station 10, covering a roughly 16.3-square-mile urban/suburban zone in southern Riverside, within the city boundaries (black outline). The terrain is relatively flat, with minor elevation changes near Van Buren Boulevard, and features a mix of residential neighborhoods, commercial districts along arterials like Indiana Avenue and Cleveland Avenue, and industrial pockets. Hazard types are represented by color-coded icons with counts in parentheses, totaling approximately 460 occupancies. The area exhibits a high concentration of commercial and multi-family residential sites, with significant storage and assembly risks, potentially influenced by proximity to transportation corridors (e.g., rail lines) that could introduce hazardous material incidents.
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Figure 276: Station 10 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Hazard Types and Distribution
• Assembly (46): Clustered in the northern and western zones near commercial strips (e.g., along Indiana Ave); likely theaters, gyms, or event spaces posing high evacuation risks during peak occupancy.
• Commercial (132): Most prevalent, densely packed along east-west arterials (e.g., Cleveland Ave, Victoria Ave); continuous retail/office corridors vulnerable to rapid fire spread and business interruptions.
• Day Care (5): Scattered in residential areas south of the station; small facilities with child populations requiring immediate life-safety priorities. • Government (9): Distributed across central and eastern zones; administrative buildings with public access, potentially including offices or civic centers. • Industrial (28): Grouped in the southeastern quadrant near Van Buren Blvd, manufacturing sites with potential for chemical releases or large-scale fires. • Medical Facility (10): Concentrated in the north (e.g., near hospitals on Adams St); healthcare centers are critical for patient mobility and medical gas hazards. • Mercantile (26): Abundant in shopping districts along western roads (e.g., Main St); retail stores overlap commercial areas, increasing combustible inventory loads. • Multi-Family (129): Widespread in apartment complexes throughout residential blocks (e.g., east and south); high density amplifies population exposure and evacuation challenges. There is one very prominent cluster near Victoria Avenue and Munroe Avenue. This cluster may indicate that individual dwelling units were surveyed as an occupancy. • Parking Garage (2): Isolated in commercial cores (e.g., near Cleveland Ave); vehicle concentrations pose fuel fire and exposure risks.
• Schools (37):
▪ Church Affiliated (2): Sparse in western residential pockets; community sites with occasional assembly use.
▪ School–Elementary (35): Numerous in family-oriented neighborhoods, especially central and southern sections; daytime child occupancy demands rapid response and drills. • Storage (66): Prevalent in peripheral eastern and southern areas (e.g., near rail lines); high fuel loads from contents could lead to prolonged incidents.
Station 10 itself provides an immediate response base, offering rapid access to the heaviest concentration of occupancies.
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This response area presents a high-hazard urban environment dominated by commercial (132), multi- family residential (129), and storage (66) occupancies, which together account for over 90% of sites and estimated over 320 structures—indicating dense population and economic activity with elevated risks for fire propagation, evacuations, and resource demands. Assembly (46) and mercantile (26) venues along key arterials, such as Indiana and Cleveland Aves, create interconnected gathering and retail risks. Meanwhile, industrial (28) and storage clusters in the southeast pose potential hazardous- material threats, which may be exacerbated by nearby rail transport. Vulnerable populations are evident in medical facilities (10), day cares (5), and schools (35), totaling over 50 life-safety-critical sites. Station 10's central location supports efficient coverage within the 1.6-mile scale, but the volume (~360 occupancies) suggests high call volumes, particularly for commercial strip fires or multi- unit residential incidents. Strategic priorities include pre-planning for storage/rail exposures, school evacuation routes, and medical corridors to prevent cascading failures. Adjacent wildland-urban interface near hills (shaded gray) may add seasonal brush fire threats, though the core area is urban- focused.
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Large Buildings
The following figure, the map for large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) around Station 10, highlights significant structures within its response area, located at the center of the map.
Figure 277: Station 10 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
Square Footage Range
The map depicts the response area for Station 10 (red fire station icon, located in the northern section of the district). The terrain is relatively flat, with minor elevation changes, and is surrounded by adjacent stations (e.g., 2, 3, 5, 9, and 11). Large buildings (over 50,000 square feet) are color-coded by size range, as indicated in the legend, with counts indicating their frequency. Based on their distribution and the prior context of occupancy types (e.g., 132 commercial, 129 multi-family), speculative uses can be inferred for community risk assessment.
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Square Footage Range
• 51,413–56,976 Dark Green (4): Located Northwest near Adams St & Jefferson, One is the fire training center, Two scattered west of Victoria Ave. These locations could be Wholesale nurseries/greenhouses (e.g., T&R Nursery complex), Small tilt-up industrial (light manufacturing or contractor yards), a possible church or private school annex. The risk profile includes a moderate fire load (vegetation, fertilizers, equipment), low daytime occupancy, and high fuel load and ember production near the wildland interface.
• 56,977–66,527 Light Green (6): Located in a cluster near Jefferson & Adams, one of which could be the EOC building. One near Irving St, several along the Victoria Ave corridor. Possible uses:
▪ One confirmed: Emerald Grove Care/EGC–60-bed congregate living (seniors/memory care) ▪ Mid-size apartment complexes (3–4 story garden style) ▪ Jefferson Elementary School (or similar public school) ▪ Possible charter school or religious education building High life-safety risk–vulnerable populations (children + functionally impaired seniors). Fixed mobility issues and high EMS call volume. Most are sprinklered but still drive upgraded alarms and 2nd-alarm responses for fire events.
• 66,528–120,597 Yellow (4): Locations include, near Jefferson Avenue & Victoria Avenue, two in an industrial pocket near Hermosa Drive, Possible Uses:
▪ One South, possibly a corporate yard
▪ Large auto dealership service/parts buildings (Riverside Auto Center) ▪ Tilt-up warehouses (contractor storage, distribution) ▪ Possible big-box retail or gym
Moderate-to-high property risk; high fire flow (3,000–5,000 gpm). Daytime occupancy 100–300.
Hazardous processes (paint booths, tire storage, forklifts). • 120,598–185,814 Orange (3): Locations include one very close to Station 10 (Jefferson corridor), one near City Corporate Yard, and finally, one on Victoria Avenue commercial strip. Potential uses include:
▪ City of Riverside Corporate Yard/Fleet Maintenance (confirmed nearby) ▪ Large grocery anchor or home-improvement store
▪ Multi-tenant industrial (food processing or foam manufacturing) M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 458
High risk–critical city infrastructure + high daily occupancy (200–600). Significant exposure to Station 10 itself (defend-in-place implications). Usually sprinklered but require defensive master- stream operations early.
• 185,815–618,498 Red (1): Location, one large single building northeast, near Victoria Avenue and Monroe Avenue/industrial zone. This could be the Carpenter company warehouse for construction materials. Almost certainly a major distribution warehouse or the Maximum risk target hazard–potential for 8,000–12,000 gpm fire flow, large-volume hazmat (fuels, chlorine, transformers), and community-wide impact if lost (water/sewer operations). Drives automatic mutual-aid and 3rd-alarm response on confirmed fire.
Eighteen structures exceed 50,000 sq. ft., with a balanced mix across commercial, residential, educational, industrial, and institutional uses. The 185,815–618,498 sq. ft. range (1 building) stands out as a high-priority risk. Commercial/retail (dark green) buildings, as well as multi-family (green) buildings, are likely scattered across central and northern commercial-residential zones. Educational facilities (yellow) may be located in the southern or central areas. At the same time, industrial sites (orange) and significant buildings (red) are likely to be located in the north, near industrial/storage clusters and rail lines.
Station 10’s large buildings might include vulnerable populations (schools + senior care). There may also be critical city infrastructure (Corporate Yard, Public Works). The most concerning buildings are high-fire-load industrial/warehouse storage and commercial big-box/auto center occupancies with moderate life hazard but very high water demand.
Most of these buildings are within 4–6 minutes of Station 10 at best travel times. Still, several sit in pockets with only one or two access routes (railroad, Gage Canal, or congested arterials), making second-due units from Station 3 or 9 critical for effective initial operations.
The flat terrain aids access, but dense urban layout and rail crossings may delay response. Station 10’s central location supports coverage, but mutual aid from Stations 2, 5, or 3 may be needed for large north/northwestern incidents.
RFD should:
• Pre-plan for industrial fire suppression (e.g., water supply, HazMat) and rail exposure risks. • Conduct evacuation drills for schools and multi-family units. • Ensure robust mutual aid for major buildings, which may require specialized resources (e.g., aerial units).
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This assessment highlights a high hazard profile, characterized by a diverse array of large buildings.
Northern industrial/major sites pose the most significant challenge, while residential and educational structures heighten life-safety concerns.
Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 10’s area.
Figure 278: Station 10 Multi-Story Buildings
The preceding figure depicts the response area for Station 10. Tall buildings are identified by story height using color-coded markers, as indicated in the legend, with counts indicating their frequency.
Based on their distribution and the prior context of occupancy types (e.g., 129 multi-family, 132 commercial), speculative uses can be inferred for community risk assessment.
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Story Range:
• 3 Stories–Yellow (608) Multi-Family Residential (e.g., Apartments): Most common, widely scattered across residential blocks (e.g., east and south of Station 10). Likely 3-story apartment complexes with 129 multi-family units. Risks include high resident density (dozens per building), limited egress, and potential floor-to-floor fire spread. • 4 Stories–Light Blue (34) Multi-Family Residential or Hotels: Concentrated in denser residential zones; could include mid-rise apartments or a few of the 10 medical facilities repurposed for housing. Risks include increased evacuation time, challenges with smoke management, and the potential for stranded occupants on upper floors. One of these tall buildings is likely the Carpenter Company's large warehouse/manufacturing facility. • 5 Stories–Blue (1): This building could be related to the automotive industry. The building sits on the west side of Adams Street, just north of the railroad and south of SR-91. • 7–10 Stories–Green (1): Automotive-related business like Car-Max, likely clustered with like businesses in northern zones near major roads (e.g., Jefferson Street). Risks include significant vertical fire spread, vehicle involvement, reliance on elevators, and demand for aerial apparatus that exceeds Station 10’s immediate reach.
There are 644 structures with three or more stories, with the vast majority (608) being 3-story buildings, indicating a predominantly mid-rise residential area. Higher stories (5–10) are rare but critical due to their height and complexity. Three-story buildings are densely distributed across the central, eastern, and southern residential zones. 4–6 story buildings cluster in denser urban pockets (e.g., near Indiana Avenue), while 7–10 story buildings are likely near key commercial infrastructure (e.g., Jefferson Street).
The high count of 3-story buildings (608) suggests widespread risk of floor-to-floor fire propagation, especially in multi-family units. Higher buildings (7–10 stories) pose challenges for aerial ladder reach, requiring mutual aid from adjacent stations (e.g., 2, 3, 5, or 9). Multi-family residences (3–5 stories) house hundreds of residents, increasing evacuation demands and exposure to smoke inhalation, particularly during daytime hours (e.g., 09:00 AM). Medical or office buildings (5–6 stories) that serve vulnerable populations or have dense occupancy require specialized tactics.
The flat terrain facilitates access, but dense street networks and traffic (e.g., morning rush hour) may delay responses. Station 10’s central location supports coverage within the 16.3-square mile area, but the volume of tall buildings suggests potential resource strain.
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RFD should:
• Focus on residential fire safety education (e.g., sprinklers, egress planning) for buildings with three to four stories.
• Pre-plan high-rise sites (5–10 stories) for aerial operations and ensure coordination with adjacent stations for large-scale events.
• Conduct daytime evacuation drills for medical and commercial occupancies.
ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 10’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed.
Figure 279: Station 10 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
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As shown in the previous figure, most residential 3-story buildings face south–southeast, is not covered by the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The district contains many taller buildings (mostly 3-story) that fall outside the 2.5-mile coverage area. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 2 or 3.
Effective Response Force
The effective response force refers to the staffing and resource deployment capability required to address the range of risks within a fire station's first-due area. The map for Station 10 illustrates this through color-coded zones, indicating the staff response force delivered, measured in terms of personnel availability. Station 10, centrally located within its red-outlined first-due area, serves a dense urban landscape with flat terrain and adjacent stations (e.g., Stations 2, 3, 5, and 9), suggesting a need for robust coverage to handle the identified hazards.
Figure 280: Station 10 ERF at 8 Minutes
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Effective Response Force
• White (0 Staff): No areas are marked white, indicating no complete lack of coverage within the first-due area.
• Pink (1–9 Staff): Small isolated pockets, primarily in the southeastern, east, and southern corners, suggest limited staffing capacity. These areas likely reflect low-density or peripheral zones where response may be stretched.
• Orange (10–19 Staff): Significant portions, especially in the eastern and southern zones, indicate a moderate staffing level. This coverage aligns with multi-story residential and commercial clusters (1,123 3-story buildings, 132 commercial buildings), which are adequate for initial response but may be insufficient for larger incidents.
• Yellow (20–29 Staff): The majority of the first-due area, centered around Station 10, shows a baseline effective force of 20–29 staff. This suggests the capability for handling typical incidents (e.g., single-family fires, small commercial calls) but may be strained by the 1,183 tall buildings and 16 large structures (> 50,000 sq. ft.) during peak hours. • Light Green (30–39 Staff): Larger patches in the northern and northeastern sections indicate enhanced staffing, possibly due to higher-risk commercial corridors or overlap with adjacent stations (e.g.,2,5, and 9).
• Dark Green (40–56 Staff): Limited to the central-north area near major arterials, this suggests the highest staffing concentration, likely planned for critical infrastructure or high-density zones.
This reflects the contribution of Stations 3 and 9 in this area, with the enhanced access of SR-91.
The CRA identifies key risks, including 129 multi-family units, 132 commercial sites, 35 elementary schools, 16 large buildings, and 639 multi-story structures. The predominant 20–29 staff range (yellow) aligns with a moderate-to-high risk profile but may fall short in peak-hour scenarios (e.g., industrial fires, mass evacuations), which require 30–56 staff, as indicated in the green zones.
CFAI SOC requires sufficient personnel for initial attack, ventilation, rescue, and command within acceptable timeframes (typically 4–6 minutes for urban areas). The 10–19 staff (orange) and 20–29 staff (yellow) ranges suggest a capability for standard responses, but gaps in the pink zones and the need for 40–56 staff in the dark green areas indicate a reliance on mutual aid for complex incidents, especially during daytime traffic.
Pink (1–9) areas in the southeast and south highlight potential gaps, possibly due to distance or lower priority zones. Most of these areas are inaccessible by road and may not have buildings. Dark green (40–56) zones suggest strategic reinforcement, likely near commercial hubs or transportation corridors (e.g., rail lines).
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A staff force of 20–29 covers most routine incidents, but the high volume of multi-story buildings (639) and large buildings (16) suggests a need for 30–56 staff for worst-case scenarios (e.g., high-rise fires, mass casualty events), especially in pink/orange zones during peak hours.
Strategic mitigation involves enhancing staffing in pink (1–9) and orange (10–19) zones through repositioning or additional units. Pre-plan for mutual aid triggers (> 29 staff needed) and ensure aerial apparatus availability for 7–10 story buildings (4 sites). Coordinate with Stations 3 and 9 for coverage in the southeastern region.
In summary, Station 10’s effective response force, predominantly comprising 10–29 staff with peaks at 40–56, meets baseline SOC requirements for urban risks but may be strained by the area’s dense, tall, and large building profile during peak hours, requiring strategic enhancements and mutual aid coordination.
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STATION 11
Incident Evaluation
Station 11 is situated in the southern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure displays the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map shows only the counts for the Station 11 area; other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 11 apparatus could be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 281: Station 11 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 11 responded to 10,830 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 11 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 9,011 times. This averages out to a reliability of 83%. This indicates that, even though the station is located in a remote area away from high- efficiency roadways, response reliability remains high.
Station 11 fell short of the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 11 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 30 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the eight-minute total response NFPA standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 1,154 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 10.3% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 282: Station 11 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 11 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 11 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 11’s district is very high. Station 11 has few of the reliability-improving parameters.
Figure 283: Station 11 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 11 88% 83% 85% 81% 80% 81% 85% 83% 8.3 4
Hazard Evaluation
Station 11 has a variety of occupancy types that represent hazards requiring either a special response modification, elevated training, or staff assignment. The following figure depicts the response area of Station 11. Station 11 is centrally located within this area, near the intersection of major roads, including Alessandro Boulevard and Wood Street. The response area covers approximately 8.3 square miles. It encompasses a mix of suburban neighborhoods, commercial zones, and light industrial pockets, with varied terrain that includes hilly sections to the north and east. Hazards are represented by icons clustered throughout the area, with higher concentrations along major corridors, such as Alessandro Boulevard, Van Buren Avenue, and the southern boundary near Mariposa Avenue. Overall, the area features a moderate to high density of occupancy hazards, dominated by assembly and commercial sites, interspersed with residential and institutional uses. This suggests a diverse risk profile requiring versatile firefighting capabilities, with potential for high-traffic incidents in commercial zones and evacuation challenges in multi-family residential areas.
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Figure 284: Station 11 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly (59 sites): Indicating places like theaters, restaurants, or event venues with high occupant loads. These are densely clustered in the central and eastern sections, particularly along Alessandro Blvd and near the station, forming potential hotspots for crowd-related emergencies. A notable concentration appears southeast of the station, near commercial strips. • Commercial (52 sites): Retail, offices, or businesses, posing risks from fire spread in connected structures. These are widespread but focused on the north-central and southern zones, with linear groupings along Trautwein Road and the western boundary. Proximity to assembly sites amplifies combined risks in mixed-use areas.
• Multi-Family Residential (13 sites): Apartment buildings or condos, vulnerable to rapid fire propagation and large-scale evacuations. Scattered throughout residential neighborhoods, with clusters in the southwest (near Iowa Ave) and northeast (along the boundary). These are less dense than commercial hazards, but they represent significant life-safety concerns in suburban areas.
• Day Care (4 sites): Childcare facilities, heightening vulnerability due to young occupants.
Limited in number, they are situated in residential areas, with one located near the station's south side and others on the west and east fringes.
• Finance (3 sites): Banks or financial offices, typically low hazard but with secure structures.
Sparsely distributed in the central commercial core.
• Government (2 sites): Public administration buildings. Minimal presence, one in the northwest near the boundary and another centrally.
• Industrial (2 sites): Factories or warehouses, potential for hazardous materials incidents.
Isolated in the north, near hilly terrain along the western edge. • Mercantile (55 sites): Stores or markets with storage risks. Concentrating on commercial strips east of the station.
• Medical Facilities (10 sites): Critical infrastructure like clinics or laboratories. Dotted across the area, with emphasis on the northern and eastern boundaries. • Schools (163)
▪ School-Elementary (75 sites): Primary schools, high-risk for pediatric evacuations. Grouped in the southeast residential zones.
▪ School-Middle (25 Sites): usually a smaller student population ▪ School-High (63 sites): Secondary schools, with larger footprints. One prominent site is located south of the station, and others are situated in the east.
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• Storage-Medium (25 sites): Warehouses or mid-sized storage, fire load concerns. Heavily concentrated in the industrial-transition zones along the southern and western boundaries, near Iowa Ave and Roberts Rd.
The core around Station 11 (within 0.5 miles) has overlapping assembly, commercial, and mercantile hazards, suggesting urban commercial districts with elevated flashover risks. Response times here would be shortest, but the incident scale could be significant.
Northern hills host fewer but more isolated industrial and storage sites, potentially complicating access. Southern and eastern residential areas feature multi-family and school clusters, increasing vulnerability during peak hours.
With 59 assembly and 52 commercial sites in a compact 1-square-mile area, the hazard load is intense, comparable to a bustling suburban commercial hub. Residential (multi-family) and educational sites add layers of life-safety priorities, while low counts in industrial/government indicate limited heavy-process risks.
Large Buildings
The following figure highlights large buildings (greater than 50,000 sq. ft.) within the response area of Station 11. These buildings are categorized by square footage ranges, with specific counts and locations provided. Based on their distribution and the surrounding context, a community risk assessment can speculate on potential uses, considering factors such as proximity to residential areas, commercial corridors, and infrastructure.
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Figure 285: Station 11 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
Square Footage Range
• 53,157–62,629 sq. ft. (3 buildings, green icons): These mid-sized, large buildings are scattered across the area. One is located centrally near Station 11, another in the northwest near Roberts Rd, and the third in the southeast near Orange Terrace Pkwy. Given their size and placement near residential and mixed-use zones, they could serve as community centers, large retail stores (e.g., supermarkets), or multi-tenant office buildings. The central location suggests a public or commercial hub. At the same time, the peripheral sites might support local retail or administrative functions, posing moderate fire risks due to occupant density and potential storage.
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• 62,630–99,102 sq. ft. (2 buildings, yellow icons): These larger structures are positioned in the central-southern part of the response area, near 1,778 ft and Wood St. Their size and location along a developed corridor imply uses such as big-box retail stores (e.g., department stores or warehouses), educational facilities (e.g., a school or college building), or light industrial operations. The proximity to residential neighborhoods suggests a community-serving purpose, with higher fire hazards resulting from the storage of merchandise or equipment, necessitating robust sprinkler systems and well-maintained access routes. Probably big-box retail (e.g., Target, Walmart) or educational buildings (e.g., high school). These carry risks from flammable goods or large student populations, with potential for rapid fire growth if unsuppressed. • 99,103–144,825 sq. ft. (1 building, red icon): The most prominent building is located in the northeast, near the boundary with Station 13. Its significant size suggests a major facility, potentially a regional shopping center, distribution warehouse, or institutional complex (e.g., hospital or government office). Further research reveals that this facility is listed as an assembly occupancy, possibly a religious gathering center. The isolated location, situated near hilly terrain, could complicate emergency access. At the same time, the scale implies substantial fire load risks from extensive storage, electrical systems, or high occupant loads during peak hours. This poses the highest risk due to extensive fire load, evacuation challenges, complex layouts, and possible hazardous materials, necessitating specialized response strategies.
The presence of six large buildings, totaling over 500,000 sq. ft., indicates a moderate-to-high community risk due to potential fire spread, evacuation challenges, and resource demands. The central concentration near Station 11 enables rapid response, but the northeast outlier may strain coverage, particularly in terrain-obstructed areas.
Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are taken into consideration to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 11’s area.
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Figure 286: Station 11 Multi-Story Buildings
The map highlights multi-story buildings within the response area of Station 11. These buildings are categorized by the number of stories, with specific counts provided for each. Based on their distribution and surrounding context, a community risk assessment can speculate on potential uses, considering factors such as proximity to residential areas, commercial corridors, and infrastructure.
The legend provides the following breakdown:
• 3 Stories (273 buildings, yellow): These are the most numerous, scattered densely across the response area, particularly in residential neighborhoods like those near Orange Terrace Parkway, Wood Street, and the central zone around Station 11. Their prevalence suggests uses such as multi-family residential units (e.g., apartments or condos), small office buildings, or mixed-use structures with retail on the ground floor. The high count indicates a significant life-safety risk due to potential evacuation challenges, with fire spread risks in closely packed residential blocks.
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• 4 Stories (10 buildings, blue): These taller structures are less common, located in the central and southern parts, including near 1778 ft and Dauchy St. Their size and placement along developed streets suggest uses like mid-rise office buildings, hotels, or larger apartment complexes. The limited number reduces overall risk but increases per-building hazard due to higher occupant loads and complex layouts, requiring enhanced firefighting access and egress planning.
• 5 Stories (5 buildings, light blue): These are sparsely distributed, with notable instances in the southeast near Orange Terrace Parkway and the southwest near Iowa Avenue. Potential uses include upscale residential towers, small hospitals, or institutional buildings (e.g., community centers). Their height poses risks of prolonged evacuation times and vertical fire spread, necessitating aerial firefighting capabilities and robust sprinkler systems to mitigate these risks. • 6 Stories (2 buildings, orange): The tallest in the area, located near the central zone, close to Station 11, and in the northeast near the boundary. These could serve as high-rise apartments, office towers, or specialized facilities (e.g., medical clinics). The low count limits the widespread risk, but each building presents significant challenges due to height, potential for smoke accumulation, and limited escape routes, requiring advanced response strategies.
The presence of 290 multi-story buildings, with a dominant 3-story category, indicates a moderate community risk, primarily driven by the high density of residential structures. The taller 4–6-story buildings create localized high-risk zones due to increased height, occupant density, and structural complexity. Central proximity to Station 11 facilitates rapid response, but the dispersed layout across a roughly 1-mile radius may strain resources during simultaneous incidents.
Dense 3-story residential zones require the widespread installation of smoke detectors and clear egress paths. Taller buildings (4–6 stories) require regular high-rise drills, updated fire codes, and enhanced water supply infrastructure. The central location of the 6-story buildings near Station 11 is advantageous, but the northeast outlier may need mutual aid support. Station 11 is the only district outside any 2.5-mile ISO coverage area. Since this district is so far from an aerial apparatus, it may be prudent to consider upgrading to a Quint type apparatus. It is, however, highly likely that aerial apparatus from Stations 1, 3, or 13 could arrive within 7 minutes.
This assessment highlights a predominantly residential, multi-story landscape with escalating risks in taller buildings, underscoring the need for tailored fire prevention and response strategies.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
The following figure shows the effect of ISO ladder coverage on the tall buildings in Station 11’s area.
Sources of the nearest ladder resources are also displayed in the following figure:
Figure 287: Station 11 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
As shown in the previous figure, all of the tall building load is entirely outside of the coverage of the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. Station 13, along Allesandro Boulevard, is the only station that nears the ISO coverage range, but falls short of covering any of district 11. The district contains many taller buildings (mostly 3-story) that fall outside the 2.5 Mile coverage area. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from any of Stations 1, 3, or 13.
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Effective Response Force
The effective response force refers to the staffing and resources available to respond to emergencies within a specified time frame, ensuring adequate coverage and safety for the community. The map for Station 11's study area provides a visual representation of the first due station and the ERF. The first due station is Station 11, designated as the primary responding station within the red boundary, covering the entire study area. This indicates that Station 11 is responsible for the initial response to all incidents within this jurisdiction. The area, which spans approximately 8.3 square miles and encompasses residential neighborhoods, commercial corridors, and hilly terrain.
Figure 288: Station 11 ERF at 8 Minutes
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Color coding indicates the staffing levels delivered 1–9 staff (light orange). This covers the majority of the study area, particularly the central and eastern residential zones around Station 11. In CFAI CRA- SOC terms, this implies a baseline response force capable of handling low-to-moderate risk incidents (e.g., medical calls, small fires) with minimal staffing requirements. However, this level may be insufficient for high-risk scenarios (e.g., multi-story fires or mass casualty events), potentially requiring mutual aid or additional resources.
Effective Response Force:
• White (0 Staff): No areas are marked white, indicating no complete lack of coverage within the first-due area.
• Pink (1–9 Staff): Small isolated pockets, primarily in the southeastern and northwestern corners, suggest limited staffing capacity. These areas likely reflect low-density or peripheral zones where response may be stretched. Substantial portions of Station 11’s response area are only reachable by 1–9 staff in 8 minutes.
• Darker orange (10–19 Staff): This applies to specific pockets, notably in the northwest and southeast corners near the boundary. These areas are likely to include higher-risk zones (e.g., commercial strips or multi-family residences), where increased staffing is deemed necessary for effective initial attack or containment. This aligns with CFAI standards for scaling response based on risk assessment, ensuring adequate personnel for complex incidents.
The variation in staffing levels reflects a community risk assessment identifying differential hazards.
The 1–9 staff zones suggest lower risk (e.g., single-family homes), while 10–19 staff areas indicate higher risk (e.g., commercial or multi-story buildings), consistent with CRA principles of tailoring resources to hazard density.
The compact size of the study area (within 1 mile) supports rapid response times from Station 11, a key CFAI metric. However, the hilly terrain in the northwest may delay access, necessitating higher staffing in those zones to compensate.
The map suggests a strategic deployment model in which Station 11’s resources are distributed to achieve balanced coverage. The 10–19 staff zones identify pre-identified critical areas, aligning with CFAI’s emphasis on deploying an effective response force to mitigate risks efficiently. However, Riverside’s critical tasking analysis for a moderate-level structure fire requires three engines, one truck, a Rescue, and a Chief officer, totaling 19 staff. This analysis suggests that this level of response is not attainable in most parts of the district.
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The effective response force appears adequate for routine calls across most of the area. Still, the limited higher-staffing zones (10–19) may indicate potential gaps in addressing simultaneous or large- scale incidents. This could prompt recommendations for enhanced staffing, mutual aid agreements, or additional stations (e.g., Station 9 or 13) to meet CFAI standards for reliability and redundancy. The number of staff required to complete critical tasks during a moderate-level structure fire event is unlikely to be met.
Strategic mitigation steps include adding a second unit and more staffing to enhance the ability to achieve critical tasks.
In summary, the effective response force for Station 11’s study area is inadequate and should be a strategic planning priority.
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STATION 12
Incident Evaluation
Station 12 is situated in the far southwestern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map shows only the counts for the Station 12 area; other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 12 apparatus could be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 289: Station 12 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 12 responded to 17,009 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 12 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 12,775 times. This averages out to a reliability of 75%. This indicates that, even though the station is located in a remote area away from high-efficiency roadways, response reliability remains high.
Station 12 did not meet NFPA total response time standards for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 12 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 18 seconds. This exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the eight-minute total response NFPA standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 2,170 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 12.7% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 290: Station 12 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 12 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 12 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 12’s district is high. Station 12 meets some of the reliability-improving parameters.
Figure 291: Station 12 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 12 80% 75% 74% 72% 74% 74% 76% 75% 6.5 4
Hazard Evaluation
Station 12 has a variety of occupancy types that represent hazards requiring either a special response modification, elevated training, or staff assignment. The following figure depicts the response area for Station 12. Station 12 is centrally positioned near Indiana Ave and Abbotsford Drive, within a densely developed urban zone featuring a mix of commercial strips, residential neighborhoods, and institutional sites, with hilly terrain to the north and east (e.g., near Arlington Mountain). Hazards are indicated by icons clustered along major corridors, such as Indiana Ave, Tyler St, and the southern boundary near McAllister Pkwy. The area exhibits a high density of occupancy hazards, primarily comprising commercial and residential properties, with notable institutional and storage facilities also present. This configuration suggests an intensive urban risk profile, with elevated potential for high- occupant incidents in commercial districts, evacuation complexities in multi-family areas, and access challenges in elevated terrains.
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Figure 292: Station 12 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly (89 sites): The highest volume hazard, representing venues like theaters, restaurants, or community halls with substantial crowd capacities. These are heavily concentrated in the central commercial core around Station 12 and along Tyler St, forming dense clusters that could lead to mass casualty risks during peak hours. A secondary grouping appears in the southeast near Indiana Ave.
• Commercial (156 sites): The most abundant hazard, including retail, offices, and businesses prone to rapid fire spread in interconnected buildings. Widespread across the entire area, with linear alignments along major roads (e.g., Indiana Ave, Van Buren Blvd), particularly dense in the north-central and southern zones. This dominance underscores high economic and life-safety stakes in business districts.
• Finance (3 sites): Banks or financial institutions, generally low-hazard but with secure enclosures. Sparsely placed in the central commercial hub near the station. • Government (3 sites): Public buildings like offices or civic centers. Limited distribution: one centrally near Station 12, others in the northwest and southeast. • Hospital (1 site): A critical care facility, marked prominently in the central area near Tyler St. Its singular presence elevates life-safety priorities, demanding specialized medical and evacuation responses.
• Hotel (17 sites): Lodging facilities, vulnerable to transient occupant risks. Clustered in the central and eastern commercial strips, with a notable group along Sierra Ave. • Medical Facility (25 sites): Clinics or healthcare centers, posing risks from patient mobility issues. Dotted throughout residential and commercial areas, with concentrations in the south near McAllister Pkwy and central zones.
• Mercantile (110 sites): Stores and markets with storage and display hazards. Abundant in commercial corridors, especially east and south of the station, overlapping with assembly sites for compounded risks.
• Multi-Family Residential (111 sites): Apartments or condos, susceptible to vertical fire spread and significant evacuations. Prevalent in suburban pockets, with heavy clustering in the southwest (near Citrus Heights Dr) and northeast residential blocks. • Multi-Family Garage (4 sites): Attached parking structures for residential complexes. Located adjacent to multi-family sites in the southwest and central areas.
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• Schools:
▪ School-Elementary (8 sites): Primary schools, high-risk for child evacuations. Grouped in residential neighborhoods to the east and south.
▪ School-High (2 sites): Secondary schools with larger populations. One is located in the northwest near the boundary, and another is centrally positioned. ▪ School-Middle (1 site): A single middle school, positioned in the eastern residential zone. • Storage (72 sites): Warehouses or storage units, with significant fire load potential.
Concentrating in transitional industrial zones along the western and southern boundaries. • Transport (1 site): Likely a transit hub or vehicle depot, isolated in the central area. • High-Density Zones: The epicenter around Station 12 (within 0.5 miles) features overlapping commercial, mercantile, assembly, and hotel icons, indicating a vibrant downtown-like commercial district with acute risks from simultaneous or cascading incidents.
Southwestern hills near 1,355 ft host fewer hazards but include isolated storage and assembly sites, where terrain could hinder access to apparatus. Southern and eastern residential expanses emphasize multi-family and school clusters, heightening daytime vulnerabilities.
With 156 commercial and 111 multi-family sites in a compact urban footprint, the hazard load is exceptionally high, exceeding typical suburban profiles and akin to a mixed-use city core. Institutional elements (e.g., hospitals, schools) add critical infrastructure layers, while low counts in heavy industrial or transportation settings suggest moderated, specialized risks.
The central station placement enables quick core responses, but the expansive boundary demands robust traffic control in commercial arteries and pre-incident planning for residential evacuations. Hilly peripheries may require greater attention to the wildland-urban interface, given Riverside's history of fires.
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Large Buildings
The following figure highlights large buildings (greater than 50,000 sq. ft.) within the response area of Station 12, delineated by a red city boundary line, which spans approximately 1 mile in scale. Station 12 is centrally located near Indiana Avenue and Tyler Street, surrounded by a mix of residential neighborhoods, commercial zones, and hilly terrain (e.g., an elevation of 1,355 ft). The buildings are categorized by square footage ranges, with specific counts provided. Based on their distribution and context, a community risk assessment can speculate on their potential uses. The legend provides the following breakdown:
Figure 293: Station 12 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
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Square Footage Range
• 51,549–200,000 sq. ft. (13 buildings, green): These mid-sized to large buildings are scattered across the area, with a notable concentration in the central and northern zones near Magnolia Ave and La Sierra Ave. Their prevalence suggests uses such as community centers, large retail stores (e.g., supermarkets), multi-tenant office buildings, or educational facilities (e.g., schools).
The widespread distribution suggests a community-serving role, with moderate fire risks associated with occupant density and storage, necessitating accessible water supplies and effective egress planning.
• 200,001–400,000 sq. ft. (2 buildings, light green): These larger structures are located in the northeast, near the boundary with Station 2. Their size and isolated placement imply uses such as big-box retail (e.g., Walmart, Home Depot), distribution warehouses, or institutional complexes (e.g., hospitals or universities). The proximity to commercial corridors suggests the presence of economic hubs, which are associated with higher fire hazards due to extensive merchandise or equipment, necessitating robust firebreaks and rapid response coordination.
One of these buildings is, in fact, the Kaiser Permanente hospital. • 600,001–800,000 sq. ft. (1 building, red icon): This is the largest building and is prominently marked in the northeast, near the intersection of Indiana Ave and Van Buren Blvd. Its significant size suggests a major facility, potentially a regional shopping mall, a large industrial warehouse, or a significant institutional structure (e.g., a medical center or a government complex). The isolated location and scale imply substantial fire load risks from storage, electrical systems, or high occupant loads, with potential access challenges due to terrain, requiring specialized response strategies. Further investigation reveals that this is the Galleria at Tyler, a major retail complex.
The presence of 16 large buildings, totaling over 1.5 million sq. ft., indicates a moderate-to-high community risk due to potential fire spread, evacuation challenges, and resource demands. The central location of Station 12 supports rapid response to the 13 mid-sized buildings. Still, the northeast outliers (especially the 600,001–800,000 sq. ft. structure) may stretch coverage, particularly given the hilly terrain that complicates access.
The dense mid-sized building cluster near Station 12 requires zoned fire prevention (e.g., hydrants, alarms), while the larger northeast buildings need enhanced access roads and pre-incident plans. The hilly terrain highlights the need for terrain-adapted apparatus and preparedness for the wildland-urban interface.
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Tall
Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 12’s area.
Figure 294: Station 12 Multi-Story Buildings
The figure highlights multi-story buildings within the response area of Station 12. The buildings are categorized by the number of stories, with specific counts provided for each category. Based on their distribution and surrounding context, a community risk assessment can speculate on their potential uses.
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Story Range:
• 3 Stories (288 buildings, yellow): These are the most numerous, densely scattered across the entire response area, particularly in residential neighborhoods near La Sierra Ave, Magnolia Ave, and the central zone around Station 12. Their prevalence suggests uses such as multi-family residential units (e.g., apartments or condos), small office buildings, or mixed-use structures with retail on the ground floor. The high count indicates a significant life-safety risk due to potential evacuation challenges and the risk of fire spread in closely packed residential blocks. • 4 Stories (26 buildings, Light blue): These taller structures are sparsely located, with one near the central area close to Station 12 and another in the southwest near Iowa Ave. Their placement along developed corridors suggests uses like mid-rise office buildings, hotels, or larger apartment complexes. The limited number reduces overall risk but increases per-building hazard due to higher occupant loads and complex layouts, requiring enhanced firefighting access. Of particular concern is the proximity of some of these structures to the western hills, elevating wildfire damage in the urban interface area.
• 5 Stories (2 buildings, dark blue): These are also rare, positioned in the central zone near Tyler St and the northeast near the boundary. Potential uses include residential towers, small hospitals, or institutional buildings (e.g., community centers). Their height poses risks of prolonged evacuation times and vertical fire spread, necessitating aerial firefighting capabilities and robust sprinkler systems to mitigate these risks.
• 6 Stories (1 building, orange): This taller building is located in the central area near Station 12. It could serve as a high-rise apartment building, office tower, or specialized facility (e.g., a medical clinic). Its singular presence presents a localized challenge due to height, potential for smoke accumulation, and limited escape routes, requiring advanced response strategies. • 7–10 Stories (3 buildings, green): These are the highest structures, clustered in the northeast near Tyler Avenue and Magnolia Avenue. Typical applications include high-rise apartments, office towers, or extensive facilities (e.g., hospitals or retail buildings). Each building poses a significant hazard due to height-related evacuation delays and structural fire loads, requiring specialized equipment (e.g., ladder trucks) and coordination with adjacent stations (e.g., Station 2).
The presence of 320 multi-story buildings, with a dominant 3-story category, indicates a moderate to high community risk, primarily driven by the high density of residential structures. The taller 4-to 10- story buildings create localized high-risk zones due to increased height, occupant density, and structural complexity. The central location of Station 12 facilitates rapid response, but the northeast outliers (especially those 7–10 stories high) may strain coverage, particularly given the hilly terrain that complicates access.
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Dense 3-story residential zones require widespread smoke detector installation and clear egress paths. Tall buildings (4–10 stories) require regular high-rise drills, updated fire codes, and enhanced water-supply infrastructure. The northeast cluster of 7-to 10-story buildings may require additional station support (e.g., Station 2) due to terrain and distance.
This assessment highlights a predominantly residential, multi-story landscape with escalating risks in taller structures, emphasizing the need for tailored fire prevention and response strategies.
ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
As shown in the following figure, some of the west side tall building loads are entirely outside of the coverage of the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The district contains many taller buildings (mostly 3-story) that fall outside the 2.5-mile coverage area. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 2.
Figure 295: Station 12 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
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Effective Response Force
The effective response force refers to the staffing and resources deployed to address emergencies within a specified time frame, ensuring adequate coverage and safety for the community. The map for Station 12's study area provides a visual representation of the first due station and ERF, which can be analyzed as follows. Station 12 is designated as the primary responding station within the red boundary, covering the entire study area, approximately 6.5 square miles in area. This indicates that Station 12 is responsible for initial response to all incidents within this jurisdiction, encompassing residential neighborhoods, commercial corridors, and varied terrain, including hilly sections.
Figure 296: Station 12 ERF at 8 Minutes
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Effective Response Force
• 1–9 Staff (light pink): This covers a small portion in the southwestern corner of the response area. In CFAI CRA-SOC terms, this suggests a minimal response force suitable for low-risk incidents (e.g., medical calls or minor fires). Still, it may be inadequate for more complex scenarios that require supplemental resources. Several of the taller buildings fall in this area. • 10–19 Staff (orange): This applies to a broader central and western section, including areas south of Station 12. This staffing level indicates a moderate response capacity, capable of handling mid-level risks (e.g., residential fires or minor commercial incidents), aligning with CFAI standards for balanced resource allocation based on assessed hazards. • 20–29 Staff (yellow): This dominates the majority of the area, particularly the eastern and northern zones. This suggests a robust response force designed for higher-risk incidents (e.g., multi-family fires, commercial conflagrations), reflecting a community risk assessment identifying significant hazard concentrations.
• 30–39 Staff (green): This is concentrated in the central-northeastern quadrant near Station 12.
This highest staffing level indicates a critical response capacity for major incidents (e.g., large- scale fires, hazardous-material events), consistent with CFAI’s emphasis on scaling resources to match the highest-risk profiles.
The graduated staffing levels (1–9 to 30–39) reflect a detailed community risk assessment, with the 30– 39 staff zone likely corresponding to areas with dense multi-story or large commercial buildings, as identified in prior maps. The 20–29 staff dominance suggests a broad high-risk baseline, while 10–19 and 1–9 staff areas indicate lower-risk residential or peripheral zones.
The compact size of the study area (within 0.6 miles) supports rapid response times from Station 12, a key CFAI metric. The central placement of higher staffing zones (30–39) enhances coverage for critical areas; however, the hilly terrain in the southwest may pose access challenges, necessitating adjustments to the lower staffing levels (1–9).
The map suggests a strategic deployment model in which Station 12’s resources are tiered to address varying risk levels. The 30–39 staff zone identifies pre-identified high-hazard areas, aligning with CFAI’s focus on deploying an effective response force to mitigate risks efficiently. The presence of adjacent stations (e.g., Stations 2 and 8) indicates potential mutual aid support for peak demand.
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The effective response force for Station 12’s study area is well-structured, with a strong emphasis on staff levels of 20–29 and 30–39, indicating preparation for significant incidents across most of the area.
The lower 1–9 and 10–19 staff zones in the periphery suggest potential resource gaps during simultaneous or large-scale events, which may require mutual aid or enhanced staffing plans to meet CFAI standards for reliability and redundancy. The western portions of this district present challenges in assembling a response force within 8 minutes. There are some target hazards (large and tall buildings) in the southwestern portions of the district, which are adjacent to what appears to be a Wildland Urban Interface zone. In light of these findings, AP Triton recommends increasing the unit count during daytime hours.
In summary, the effective response force for Station 12 is adequate for approximately 68% of the district area, reflecting a risk-based approach consistent with CFAI CRA-SOC standards, with coverage for high-risk zones and potential reliance on adjacent stations for peak scenarios. Several target hazards to the west pose a challenge to delivering enough staff to complete critical tasks during a moderate-level fire incident.
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STATION 13
Incident Evaluation
Station 13 is situated in the far eastern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map shows only the counts for the Station 13 area; other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 13 apparatus could be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 297: Station 13 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 13 responded to 6,357 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 13 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 5,000 times. This averages out to a reliability of 79%. This indicates that, even though the station is located in a remote area away from high- efficiency roadways, response reliability remains acceptable.
Station 13 is unlikely to meet the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Station 13 had the longest total response time of any station in Riverside. Ninety percent of the time, Station 13 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 59 seconds. Although this is the most extensive total response in the department, it exceeds the 8- minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 772 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 11.2% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
Figure 298: Station 13 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
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Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 13 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 13 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 13’s district is very high. Station 13 meets many of the reliability-improving parameters. The distance to the next closest station may directly affect the likelihood of using station 13 units more often, with consequent longer total response times.
Figure 299: Station 13 Reliability 2018–2024
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 13 82% 77% 78% 77% 77% 79% 79% 79% 5.9 4
Hazard Evaluation
Station 13 has a variety of occupancy types that represent hazards requiring either a special response modification, elevated training, or staff assignment. The following figure depicts the response area of Station 13, spanning approximately 5.9 square miles in area. Station 13 is centrally located near the intersection of Alessandro Blvd. and Gateway Dr., within a suburban-urban transition zone featuring residential developments, commercial strips, and hilly terrain to the north (e.g., near Sycamore Canyon). Hazards are represented by icons clustered along major corridors, such as Box Springs Road, Alessandro Boulevard, and the eastern boundary near University Avenue. The area exhibits a moderate-to-high density of occupancy hazards, dominated by commercial and multi-family residential sites, with significant storage and industrial elements. This suggests a suburban risk profile with potential for commercial fire spread, residential evacuation challenges, and wildland-urban interface (WUI) threats in the northern canyon areas, consistent with Riverside's history of fire hazards in Sycamore Canyon.
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Figure 300: Station 13 Hazards/Occupancies
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Key Hazard Types and Distribution
• Assembly (25 sites): Venues like theaters, restaurants, or community halls with high occupant loads. These are concentrated in the central and southeastern commercial zones near Gateway Dr and University Ave, posing risks for crowd-related emergencies during events. • Commercial (69 sites): Retail, offices, or businesses, vulnerable to interconnected fire spread.
Widespread across the area, with dense linear groupings along Alessandro Blvd and Box Springs Rd, particularly in the north-central and eastern sections, indicating high economic exposure. • Finance (1 site): A single bank or financial office, low-hazard but secure. Located centrally near the station.
• Government (1 site): One public administration building, minimally hazardous. Positioned in the southwestern residential fringe.
• Industrial (6 sites): Factories or light manufacturing facilities, with potential for hazardous material releases. Clustered in the northeastern industrial pocket near the boundary, near elevated terrain.
• Medical Facility (7 sites): Clinics or healthcare centers, with risks from patient vulnerabilities.
Scattered in residential and commercial areas, with a focus in the south near University Ave. • Mercantile (48 sites): Stores or markets with storage/display hazards. Abundant along commercial corridors east and south of the station, overlapping with assembly sites for amplified risks.
• Multi-Family Residential (67 sites): Apartments or condos, prone to vertical fire propagation and mass evacuations. Heavily concentrated in suburban neighborhoods to the west and south, including clusters near Northrop Dr and the boundary. There is a distinct cluster of multi-family occupancies on the north end of Sycamore Canyon Boulevard. • Storage (92 sites): Warehouses or storage units, high fire load potential. The most prevalent hazard is densely packed in the central and eastern zones near Gateway Dr and the I-215 freeway, suggesting significant suppression challenges.
The core around Station 13 (within 0.5 miles) shows overlapping commercial, mercantile, and storage icons, forming a busy suburban commercial hub with risks of rapid incident escalation. The medical facilities nearby heighten life-safety priorities.
Northern hills near Sycamore Canyon host fewer icons but include heavy multifamily concentrations, isolated industrial, and storage sites, where WUI interfaces could exacerbate wildfire threats. Western and southern residential areas feature multi-family clusters, increasing vulnerability during off-hours.
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With 69 commercial and 92 storage sites in a compact 1-square-mile area, the hazard load is intensive, blending suburban residential growth with commercial development. Low institutional counts (e.g., one finance, one government) indicate limited critical infrastructure risks, but storage dominance suggests high fuel load concerns.
The central station placement supports efficient responses to core hazards, but canyon terrain may delay access to northern sites, aligning with known high-hazard patrols in Sycamore Canyon. Pre-plans for storage fires and residential evacuations are essential, alongside WUI defensible space measures.
Large Buildings
The map highlights large buildings (greater than 50,000 sq. ft.) within the response area of Station 13.
Station 13 is centrally located near Alessandro Blvd and Gateway Dr, surrounded by a mix of suburban residential areas, commercial strips, and hilly terrain (e.g., Sycamore Canyon). The buildings are categorized by square-footage range, with specific counts provided. Based on their distribution and context, a community risk assessment can speculate on their potential uses. Station 13 is adjacent to some of the city's most significant buildings.
Figure 301: Station 13 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
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Square Footage Range
• 51,549–200,000 sq. ft. (31 buildings, green): These mid-sized to large buildings are distributed across the area, with concentrations in the central zone near Gateway Dr. and the eastern section along University Ave. Their placement suggests uses such as community centers, large retail stores (e.g., supermarkets), multi-tenant office buildings, or educational facilities (e.g., schools). The spread indicates a community-serving role, with moderate fire risks from occupant density and storage, requiring accessible water supplies and egress planning. A deeper look into what businesses are represented here yields the following list:
▪ These larger structures are located in the northeastern corner near the boundary with Station 14 and the southeast near Sycamore Canyon Boulevard and Eastridge Drive. Their size and position along commercial corridors imply uses such as big-box retail (e.g., Target, Home Depot), distribution warehouses, or institutional complexes (e.g., colleges or medical offices). The proximity to residential zones suggests the presence of economic hubs, which are associated with higher fire hazards due to extensive merchandise or equipment, necessitating robust firebreaks and rapid response coordination. Aligns with industrial listings near Box Springs Rd., Logistics Plus handles warehousing for various clients. High fire loads from stored goods; hazardous materials in food processing. • 200,001–400,000 sq. ft. (6 buildings, light green): Located on either side of Sycamore Canyon Boulevard, north and south of Eastridge Drive. These are mainly distribution warehouses for a variety of retail vendors.
• 400,001–600,000 sq. ft. (7 buildings, yellow): These large buildings are also located in the central area near Station 13, close to Sycamore Canyon Boulevard, and Eastridge Drive. The significant size suggests a major facility, potentially a large industrial warehouse, or a significant institutional structure (e.g., an educational or government complex). The central location implies substantial fire load risks from storage, electrical systems, or high occupant loads, with potential access challenges due to nearby terrain, requiring specialized response strategies. • 800,001–1,000,000 sq. ft. (1 building, orange icon): This is a huge building, in the northern central corridor. It is a large logistics and distribution center for the sporting goods retailer Big 5. ▪ Multi-tenant industrial complex (e.g., Erlanger Distribution Center or similar at 6688 Box Springs Blvd, ~800,000 sq. ft. aggregate, consumer electronics/giftware distribution). ▪ Fits large warehouse hubs; area supports logistics near I-215. Risks: Extended suppression times due to size; potential for rapid spread in undivided spaces. • 1,000,001–1,200,000 sq. ft. (1 building, red icon): This is the largest building in Station 13’s district, located at the end of Eastridge Avenue on the edge of Sycamore Canyon, which could be in the WUI zone.
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▪ This is actually three separate buildings that look interconnected. ▪ Grocery stores for part of the buildings to the south. ▪ JOA control systems, an industrial equipment/supplies distributor to the north.
Warehousing/logistics (e.g., for e-commerce and food) prevails in the east, driven by proximity to ports and freeways, while retail and restaurants cluster centrally. UCR influences western buildings with educational/research functions.
High-capacity storage buildings warrant enhanced sprinklers and HazMat response; retail areas need evacuation plans. The area's affluence supports community fire safety programs.
The presence of 46 large buildings indicates a moderate-to-high community risk due to potential fire spread, evacuation challenges, and resource demands. The central location of Station 13 supports rapid response to the eight mid-sized and one largest building. Still, the northeastern and southeastern outliers may stretch coverage, especially with hilly terrain complicating access in the north.
The dense mid-sized building cluster near Station 13 requires zoned fire prevention (e.g., hydrants, alarms), while the larger northeast and southeast buildings need enhanced access roads and pre- incident plans. The northern hilly terrain underscores the need for terrain-adapted apparatus and preparedness for the wildland-urban interface, given Sycamore Canyon’s fire history.
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Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are taken into consideration to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 13’s area.
Figure 302: Station 13 Multi-Story Buildings
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This figure shows Station 13 is located in the Sycamore Canyon area of a suburban and semi-rural district characterized by residential neighborhoods, canyons, and some commercial/industrial pockets. The map depicts the station's first-due response area as a roughly 3–4 square mile zone bordered by natural terrain (hills and a river), major roadways (including a freeway), and the city boundary. This area falls within a moderate to high fire hazard severity zone due to its proximity to wildland-urban interfaces, dry vegetation, and seasonal wildfire risks, as outlined in Riverside's 2023 Community Risk Assessment and Standards of Cover. The CRA emphasizes multi-story buildings as elevated risks because they complicate evacuation, require specialized ladder operations, and can strain water supplies during incidents—particularly in this district where response times average 5–7 minutes but can extend in canyon terrain.
The map highlights multi-story buildings using color-coded polygons based on story height, with counts in parentheses indicating the number of such structures. These are clustered, consisting of scattered yellow and light blue polygons in the northern and eastern residential zones (likely near Canyon Crest) and larger blue and dark blue polygons in the southwestern industrial/commercial sector near the station. Overall, the district has a modest density of tall buildings, with risks amplified by the area's mix of urban sprawl and wildland edges—where embers from wildfires could ignite structures. Speculations on uses are informed by the CRA's risk profiling (e.g., residential occupancies dominate life-safety risks, while commercial/industrial occupancies pose property and hazardous materials threats) and the map's visual context (e.g., rectangular blue clusters suggest warehouses, whereas clustered polygons suggest apartments). The following list summarizes the buildings by legend category, including risk assessments and speculated uses. Risks consider CRA factors like occupant load, access challenges (e.g., narrow canyon roads), and fire flow needs (e.g., multi-story structures require 1,500–3,000+ GPM per California Fire Code standards).
Story Range
• 3 Stories (205): Most abundant, appearing as small, dispersed yellow polygons primarily in the northern and eastern residential hillsides, forming dense clusters amid single-family homes. Low to moderate risk overall due to high volume but smaller scale; the primary concern is rapid fire spread in clustered wood-frame construction during wind-driven events. Evacuation challenges in hilly terrain can elevate life-safety risks, with CRA noting that 20–30% of district calls involve residential fires/medical emergencies. Primarily low-rise apartment complexes or townhome- style multi-family housing, serving as affordable workforce residences in this suburban area.
Some may include small mixed-use ground floors (e.g., retail or offices) near roadways.
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• 4 Stories (76): Moderate density, shown in light blue polygons clustered in the northeast near residential zones and scattered along eastern edges, often adjacent to yellow 3-story groups.
Moderate risk, as these represent a step-up in height requiring aerial operations; CRA identifies them as "medium-risk occupancies" for collapse potential and hose-line extension needs, mainly if clustered (e.g., 10+ in one block increases mutual aid demands). Proximity to freeways aids access but exposes to traffic-related HazMat incidents. Mid-rise residential apartments or condominium buildings are the standard in Riverside's Canyon Crest/Sycamore Canyon suburbs, catering to young families and UC Riverside students/affiliates—possibly including senior living facilities, given the area's demographics.
• 5 Stories (6): Sparse, with dark blue polygons in isolated spots, mainly in the southwest industrial pocket near the station and one outlier in the east. Elevated risk due to rarity but height; CRA flags 5+ story buildings for high water demand (up to 4,000 GPM) and ventilation challenges, with potential for 50+ occupants per structure. Wildfire ember intrusion is a key threat in this interface zone. Likely small office buildings or medical clinics (e.g., outpatient centers), given the district's service-oriented economy. The southwestern ones could be budget hotels or motels catering to travelers near I-215.
• 6 Stories (1): Single prominent dark orange polygon in the southwestern cluster, adjacent to large blue warehouse-like rectangles. High risk as a standalone tall structure; CRA prioritizes such buildings for pre-incident planning due to single-point failure potential (e.g., elevator rescues, roof collapses). Industrial adjacency increases the likelihood of combined fire/HazMat scenarios.
A mid-rise office tower or corporate headquarters, possibly tied to logistics firms (Riverside's proximity to ports)—alternatively, a student housing dorm for UC Riverside commuters. • 7–10 Stories (4): Rare green polygons, concentrated in the southwest near the station, appear as larger, elongated shapes amid blue industrial buildings, suggesting a semi-urban node. Very high risk; these tallest structures require specialized resources (e.g., trucks from Station 13), with CRA estimating 2–3x the response time for high-angle rescues. They amplify district-wide risks in multi-casualty events, especially with prevailing winds carrying smoke into residential areas.
High-rise office or commercial buildings, such as administrative centers for nearby warehouses/distribution hubs (e.g., Amazon or logistics ops in Riverside's industrial corridor). It could include a university-affiliated research facility, given the area's educational ties.
In summary, the district's tall buildings skew residential (3-4 stories) with a commercial tilt in the southwest, aligning with CRA data that shows 60% of risks from life-safety in housing versus 25% from property in business occupancies. Mitigation recommendations from the CRA include enhanced defensible space around clusters and annual inspections for high-rises to address wildfire-urban interface vulnerabilities. This profile suggests that Station 13's quint truck is well-positioned for ladder needs, but resource sharing with adjacent stations (e.g., 9 and 14) is critical during peak periods.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
As shown in the following figure, the entire Station 13 district, supplied with roads, is within the coverage of the aerial apparatus, meeting the required ISO parameter. The district contains many taller buildings (mostly 3-story) that fall outside the 2.5 Mile coverage area.
Figure 303: Station 13 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
Effective Response Force
The ERF represents the minimum number of on-scene firefighters required to achieve defined risk mitigation objectives for a given incident type within a jurisdiction's first-due response area. This is outlined in CFAI's SOC methodology, which emphasizes the distribution and concentration of resources to ensure safe and effective operations—typically aligning with NFPA 1710 benchmarks for initial full-alarm assignments (e.g., 15–24 personnel for single-family residential fires, scaling up for multi-story or high-hazard risks).
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Figure 304: Station 13 ERF at 8 Minutes
The ERF accounts for task completion (e.g., incident command, water supply, search/rescue, ventilation) while factoring in local risks, such as wildland-urban interfaces, population density, and apparatus capabilities. RFD’s 2023 CRA-SOC document applies to this model citywide, using GIS mapping to visualize ERF "staff delivered force" across districts, stratified by risk levels to guide resource deployment and accreditation (RFD achieved CFAI re-accreditation in 2024 through 2028).
The map provided for Station 13 (located in Sycamore Canyon, a suburban/residential district with industrial pockets and wildfire exposure) illustrates the first-due area's ERF under standard (effective) staffing conditions. The red boundary delineates the ~3–4 square mile zone, with overlaid color gradients representing staff-delivered ERF levels (firefighter count arriving within target response times, typically 5–7 minutes per RFD SOC). White areas indicate zero staff (unprotected gaps, often due to terrain or coverage overlaps). This visualization supports CRA goals by highlighting reliability— e.g., areas that require auto-aid from adjacent stations (12 or 14) during peak periods.
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Effective Response Force Staff Level
• 0 Staff–White: ~20–25% (scattered pockets in northern hills and eastern edges). No initial response coverage; high vulnerability in wildland-adjacent zones per CRA (e.g., ember risks from Santa Ana winds). Rely on mutual aid, increasing response times to 8–10+ minutes. • 1–9 Staff–Light Pink: ~50-60% (broad swaths in central residential clusters and along river/canyon edges) Basic initial attack capability (e.g., engine company of 3–4 for medical/vegetation fires); aligns with low-risk residential objectives but insufficient for multi- story incidents (205+ 3-story buildings in district). CRA notes this as a "yellow" risk for life safety in dense housing.
• 10–19 Staff–Light Orange ~15–20% (concentrated southwest near station and industrial zones) Meets moderate-risk benchmarks (e.g., complete engine + quint for commercial structure fires); supports tasks like ladder ops for 4–6 story buildings. Proximity to I-215 aids concentration, but CRA flags gaps during high-call volume (district averages 1,200–1,500 annual incidents).
The map does not depict levels at or above 20 staff, suggesting the district's baseline ERF caps below that threshold under standard deployment. It is possible to attain a 19-staff ERF in Station 13's district, but only under optimal conditions with resource concentration from beyond the first-due area—not as a sustained "effective" (standard) level, as per CFAI SOC principles. Here's the reasoning: RFD staffs all stations with frontline engine companies (typically 3–4 firefighters each, including a paramedic).
Station 13 uniquely houses a rear-mount quint truck (aerial ladder/pump combo), also staffed at 3–4 personnel, enhancing high-rise response for the district's 287+ multi-story buildings. Initial dispatch (engine + quint) delivers ~6–8 staff members within 4–6 minutes, according to SOC travel-time analysis. RFD's daily on-duty strength is ~70 firefighters across two battalions (24-hour shifts), enabling rapid reinforcement. For a 19-staff ERF (e.g., for a 5+ story commercial fire or wildfire interface event), a full alarm could include: Station 13: Engine (4) + Quint (4) = 8 staff. Currently, this station is cross- staffed and only has four personnel available. Mutual/auto-aid: 2-3 additional engines (4 each) from nearby stations (e.g., 9 in La Sierra or 14 in Wood Streets) + Battalion Chief = 11–15 more staff. Total:
19+ achievable in 7–10 minutes, aligning with CRA benchmarks for medium-high risks (e.g., industrial warehouses near the station) would be challenging to attain. Most large fire-load buildings are outside the 19+ staff ERF zone.
The 2023 CRA document identifies Sycamore Canyon as a "moderate-risk" district (60% residential life- safety calls, 25% property/HazMat), with a baseline ERF of 6-12 staff to avoid overcommitment.
Attaining 19 routinely would strain city resources (e.g., during multi-incident days, common in wildfire season), potentially dropping reliability below 90% (CFAI threshold). Gaps in the 0–9 staff areas further complicate concentration.
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In summary, while the map shows that effective ERF peaks at 10–19 staff in core zones (adequate for most calls), full 19-staff attainment is viable through augmentation for escalated risks, supporting the RFD's accredited SOC. Ongoing CRA updates (e.g., 2024 wildfire mapping) recommend enhanced auto-aid protocols to sustain this.
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STATION 14
Incident Evaluation
Station 14 is situated in the far eastern section of Riverside and, as such, has a lower population density and incident rate compared to other stations in the city. The following figure describes the historical distribution of incident counts by 200-meter hexagon. This hexagon covers an area of approximately two football fields, including the end zones. The counts of the number of hexes by volume of incidents are in the legend of the map. This map shows only the counts for the Station 14 area; other stations are included for context, showing how often Station 14 apparatus could be engaged as second-arriving units.
Figure 305: Station 14 Incident Counts
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Between 2018 and 2024, Station 14 responded to 7,316 incidents. Of these incidents, from 2018 to 2024, a Station 14 assigned unit arrived first on the scene 5,630 times. This averages out to a reliability of 77%. This indicates that, even though the station is located in a remote area adjacent to a large highway (I-215), response reliability remains acceptable.
Station 14 does not meet the NFPA total response time standard for an incident, measured from the time a call is initiated until the arrival on scene. Ninety percent of the time, Station 14 can arrive at the location in 8 minutes, 21 seconds. Although this is the most extensive total response in the department, it exceeds the 8-minute target. Any incidents lasting more than 12 minutes, 10 seconds were deemed outliers and not evaluated for performance.
There are, however, other emergency incidents that did not meet the NFPA 8-minute total response standard. The following figure describes this history and performance. These incidents are clustered around the station location. There are 909 8-minute or greater total response time exceptions representing 12.3% of all responses (emergency and non-emergency).
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Figure 306: Station 14 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)
Station Response Reliability
The response reliability for Station 14 is shown in the following figure. The probability that a Station 14 resource would be the first to arrive at the scene of an emergency request in Station 14’s district is very high. Station 14 meets most of the reliability-improving parameters.
Figure 307: Station 14 Reliability
STATION 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average District Sq. Mi. Staff
Station 14 83% 78% 72% 75% 77% 77% 77% 77% 6.8 4
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Hazard Evaluation
Station 14 has a variety of occupancy types that represent hazards requiring either a special response modification, elevated training, or staff assignment.
Figure 308: Station 14 Hazards/Occupancies
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The previous figure shows the response area of Station 14, located in the Wood Street historic district (near Central Avenue and Canyon Crest Drive), which serves a compact first-due area of approximately
6.8 square miles. This zone encompasses a mix of older urban residential neighborhoods, commercial corridors, light industrial pockets, and hilly wildland-urban interface (WUI) edges along Sycamore Canyon and Box Springs Mountain. The district features a dense grid of streets in the central urban core transitioning to rugged terrain in the south and northeast, with the I-215 influencing access.
As part of the Riverside Fire Department's (RFD) 2023 Community Risk Assessment (CRA) and Standards of Cover (SOC), this district is classified as "high-density urban with moderate WUI exposure," contributing to ~1,800–2,000 annual incidents (60% medical, 20% structure fires, 15% vegetation). Hazards are amplified by aging wood-frame buildings (pre-1950s construction in Wood Streets), narrow streets limiting apparatus access, and seasonal wildfire risks from dry canyons— exacerbated by climate trends noted in RFD's 2024 wildfire annex. The map's sites (with counts from the legend) highlight key occupancies driving these risks, focusing on life-safety (high occupant loads in assemblies/schools), property loss (industrial/storage), and HazMat potential (energy infrastructure). The sites are clustered centrally around the station for quick response (e.g., within 2–3 minutes to core areas) but disperse eastward into higher-risk WUI zones. Below is a breakdown by legend category, including site descriptions, counts, map distributions, and CRA-aligned hazard assessments. Risks include fire flow demands (e.g., 1,500–2,500 GPM for commercial purposes), evacuation challenges, and mutual aid needs from adjacent stations (e.g., 13 in Sycamore Canyon).
Key Occupancy Types and Hazard Profiles
• Assembly (47): Dense cluster in central commercial strip along Central Avenue (e.g., near Iowa Ave intersection); scattered singles in residential pockets. High life-safety risk due to large occupancy loads (200–500+ per venue); CRA flags rapid fire spread in older theaters/churches (e.g., wood interiors). Evacuation bottlenecks on narrow streets could lead to multi-casualty events; primary calls involve overcrowding or electrical faults. • Commercial (38): Linear along main arterials (Central Ave, Iowa Ave); groups near rail lines in southeast. Moderate property/HazMat risk from retail/office strips; exposed to vehicle- pedestrian incidents and LP gas leaks. Aging structures increase the potential for collapse during fires; they support the district's tourism (historic downtown adjacency). • Day Care (2): Isolated in the northwest residential hills (near Le Conte Dr) and one central near the station. Elevated vulnerability for non-ambulatory occupants (infants/children); CRA prioritizes rapid EMS response, with risks from nap-time fires or blocked egress in single-story wood frames.
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• Energy Infrastructure (1): Southwest edge near rail/industrial transition (possibly a substation).
High HazMat/explosion risk; potential for widespread outages or arc flash incidents affecting 10,000+ residents. CRA notes integration with PG&E for pre-planning, with WUI exposure amplifying arc-over from vegetation contact.
• Finance (4): Central cluster along commercial corridors (e.g., banks on Central Ave). Low-to- moderate risk, focused on secure vaults complicating forcible entry; secondary threats from ATM vandalism or electrical overloads.
• Government (1): Central near station (likely a municipal office or post office). Moderate risk from public access and document storage; potential for civil unrest or biohazards in high-traffic lobbies.
• Hotel (1): Southeast near industrial (possibly budget motel off Iowa Ave). High transient occupant risk (50–100 guests); smoke alarm failures are common in older buildings, as per CRA data, which shows that 15% of district hotel calls involve CO poisoning. • Industrial (90): Heavy concentration in southeast industrial park (near rail and canyon edge); outliers along western boundary. Very high property/HazMat risk from manufacturing/warehousing (e.g., flammable liquids, dust explosions); the most significant cluster (20+ sites) poses a cascade-failure risk, straining water supplies. CRA identifies rail adjacency as the top district hazard, with potential for spillage and train derailment. • Medical Facility (6): Scattered in central residential/commercial (e.g., clinics on Central Ave); one in the northwest hills. Critical life-safety/EMS risk for vulnerable patients (bedridden, oxygen- dependent): power outages could cause ventilator failures. Supports an aging population (district median age 38).
• Multi-Family (335): Ubiquitous in residential grids (e.g., dense apartments in Wood Streets); heaviest in north-central hills. High volume drives frequent calls (e.g., cooking fires in 2–3 story wood-frame buildings); CRA notes overcrowding and balcony exposures as flashover accelerators, with WUI winds spreading embers into canyons. There is a very prominent cluster of these occupancy types along Via Paloma and Via Zapata near Sycamore Canyon. • Schools
▪ Special School (9): Central and eastern edges (e.g., near Watkins Dr); groups in residential zones. Similar to daycare, but for K–12/special education; busier during hours with 100–300 students. Risks include lockdown scenarios or hazardous materials (HazMat) from art/science labs.
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▪ University/College (1): Northeast near canyon (likely UC Riverside extension or community college outpost). Moderate risk with student housing ties; lab/lecture hall fires or alcohol- related incidents common, amplified by hillside access delays. • Storage (21): Mixed with industrial in the southeast; some standalone in residential (e.g., self- storage units). Moderate-to-high fire load risk (compressed combustibles); under-ventilated designs can lead to prolonged incidents, according to CRA.
In summary, the hazard profile is dominated by high-volume residential (multi-family) and assembly occupancies in the urban core, transitioning to industrial/storage threats in the southeast industrial node—creating a "layered risk" per RFD's SOC. The single energy infrastructure site underscores systemic vulnerabilities, while WUI terrain (hills/canyons) elevates all threats during Santa Ana winds.
Station 14's engine and reserve apparatus (including ATVs for canyon access) are optimized for this, but CRA recommends annual HazMat drills and enforcement of defensible space to mitigate wildfire exposure of 20–30%. Overall, the district's 500+ mapped occupancies reflect a balanced urban hazard landscape, with effective response reliant on an initial ERF of 6–12 staff.
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Large Buildings
The following figure highlights large buildings (greater than 50,000 sq. ft.) within this district as part of the RFD’s 2023 Community Risk Assessment and Strategic Plan. These structures are critical in the CRA due to their high fire load, water demand (e.g., 2,500–4,000 GPM per the California Fire Code), and potential for multi-casualty incidents, especially given the area's aging infrastructure and WUI exposure (as noted in RFD's 2024 wildfire annex). The district's ~1,800–2,000 annual incidents (60% medical, 20% structure fires) underscore the need for robust pre-planning, with Station 14's engine and reserve apparatus tailored to this profile. The map shows a sparse distribution of large buildings, concentrated near the station and along Central Avenue, with risks amplified by narrow streets and canyon adjacency.
Figure 309: Station 14 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft.
All of these buildings are within the Canyon Crest Towne Centre shopping mall.
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• 50,000 sq. ft. (Green–1): Southwest near Central Avenue, close to Station 14 and industrial transition zone. Moderate risk due to single-structure focus; high fire load (e.g., 50,000 sq. ft. requires ~2,500 GPM) and potential for rapid spread in non-sprinklered older builds. Proximity to station aids response (3–4 minutes), but WUI ember risk elevates seasonal threats. A likely candidate is a mid-sized retail store (e.g., a grocery store or department store like Target or Walmart) or a community center, serving the dense residential area along Central Avenue. It could also be a warehouse/distribution hub tied to local logistics. • 50,000–75,000 sq. ft. (Red–2): One near Station 14 (central) and one slightly east along Central Avenue, near commercial strip. Elevated risk from dual structures; increased water demand (up to 3,000 GPM each) and occupant load (100–300+ potential). Aging wood-frame construction in Wood Streets increases the potential for collapse, with the CRA noting that 15–20% of calls involve commercial fires. Canyon winds could spread embers to these sites. Probably commercial buildings such as a large office complex (e.g., insurance or government annex) or a big-box retail outlet (e.g., Ralphs). The eastern one might be a multi-tenant strip mall or a school/college facility (e.g., UC Riverside extension), given the area's educational ties.
The district contains only three large buildings (> 50,000 sq. ft.), reflecting a primarily residential and small commercial character with limited industrial-scale development. The CRA prioritizes these as "high-value property risks" due to their size and potential economic impact. Station 14's initial response (6-8 staff via engine and quint) is adequate for early suppression but requires mutual aid (e.g., from Station 4 or 13) for full engagement. The central location of two buildings near the station mitigates response time (4–5 minutes), but the eastern site's proximity to Sycamore Canyon increases wildfire vulnerability—especially during Santa Ana wind events (common September–October 2025).
Speculated uses lean toward commercial/retail (e.g., retail chains, offices) due to Central Avenue's commercial spine, with possible educational or institutional use (e.g., school) aligning with Riverside's demographic trends. Mitigation per CRA includes annual inspections for sprinklers and defensible space buffers, critical given the district's historic building stock and WUI interface.
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Tall Buildings
As part of this strategic analysis, the size and concentration of tall (> three-story) buildings are considered to determine the efficacy of apparatus deployment, planning, and training. The following figures describe the counts and sizes of these buildings in Station 14’s area.
Figure 310: Station 14 Multi-Story Buildings
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The previous figure shows Station 14, located in the Wood Streets area near Central Avenue and Iowa Avenue, which covers a first-due response area of approximately 2 to 3 square miles. The station blends historic urban residential zones, commercial corridors, and wildland-urban interface (WUI) edges along Sycamore Canyon. The map, part of the RFD’s 2023 Strategic Plan and Community Risk Assessment, identifies multi-story buildings (three or more stories) within this district using color- coded icons, reflecting their height in stories. These structures are significant in the CRA due to increased fire load, elevated water demand (e.g., 1,500–3,000 GPM for 3-6 stories, up to 4,000+ for 7– 10 stories per California Fire Code), and life-safety risks, particularly given the area's aging wood-frame construction and WUI exposure (noted in RFD's 2024 wildfire annex). The district handles ~1,800–2,000 annual incidents (60% medical, 20% structure fires), with Station 14's engine and quint apparatus designed for rapid response (4–5 minutes to core areas). Tall buildings are clustered near Central Avenue and scattered along residential hills, posing challenges due to narrow streets and canyon adjacency.
• 3 Stories (Yellow–464): Widespread across the district, densely packed in central residential zones (e.g., Wood Streets) and along Central Avenue; extends into northern hills near Le Conte Drive. Moderate risk due to high volume; primary life-safety concern from rapid fire spread in wood-frame apartments/townhomes, with CRA noting 15–20% of calls involve residential fires.
Narrow streets and WUI ember risk (Sycamore Canyon) complicate evacuation and access.
Predominantly low-rise apartment complexes or multi-family housing units, serving as affordable residences for the district's diverse population. Some may include mixed-use ground floors (e.g., small retail or offices) along commercial corridors.
• 4 Stories (Light Blue–42): Sparse, located in central areas near Station 14 and north of Central Avenue, often adjacent to 3-story clusters. Most of the 4-story buildings are in the northeast, near UCR’s campus. Moderate-to-high risk; height requires aerial operations (supported by Station 13's quint), with increased water demand (~2,000 GPM). CRA flags these as "medium-risk occupancies" due to potential collapse and hose-line extension needs, especially in older buildings. Likely mid-rise residential apartments or condominiums, catering to young families or UC Riverside affiliates. Possible inclusion of senior living facilities, given the area's aging demographic (median age ~38).
• 5 Stories (Dark Blue–7): Mostly clustered on the UCR campus to the northeast, with one outlier in the northern hills and to the west, along Central Avenue. Elevated risk due to height and rarity; demands high water flow (~2,500–3,000 GPM) and specialized ventilation. CRA highlights potential for 50+ occupants, with wildfire ember intrusion a key threat in WUI zones. Possibly small office buildings, medical clinics (e.g., outpatient centers), or budget hotels/motels near Central Avenue, supporting the district's commercial spine and transient population.
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• 6 Stories (Orange–6): Concentrated in the UCR area in the northeast section of the district. There is also a central commercial strip along Central Avenue near Station 14, which contains one 6- story building. High risk as standalone tall structures; requires ladder trucks and pre-incident planning per CRA, with dangers of elevator rescues or roof collapses. Industrial adjacency (e.g., southeast) adds HazMat potential. Likely mid-rise office towers or corporate headquarters, possibly tied to local businesses or logistics firms. It could also include student housing dorms for UC Riverside commuters.
• 7–10 Stories (Green–7): Rare, clustered in the northeast area near UCR’s campus. Very high risk; demands specialized resources (e.g., tiller trucks from mutual aid), with CRA estimating 2-3x response times for high-angle rescues. High occupant loads (100–300+) and smoke spread into residential areas are concerns. High-rise office or commercial buildings, such as administrative centers or university-affiliated research facilities. It could also be a large student housing complexes (e.g., apartments), given the education corridor's prominence.
The district contains 474 multi-story buildings, with a heavy concentration of 3-story structures (456), which pose significant residential life-safety risks, while taller buildings (4–10 stories) present commercial/property hazards. The CRA classifies this as a "moderate-to-high-risk" district, with 60% of incidents tied to housing and 25% to commercial occupancies. The central location of taller buildings near Station 14 supports rapid response (4–5 minutes), but WUI exposure along Sycamore Canyon heightens seasonal wildfire threats, particularly for 3–5-story residential clusters. Speculated uses align with Wood Street's historic urban character, dominated by multi-family housing, with commercial growth along Central Avenue suggesting offices, retail, or institutional uses (e.g., education/ healthcare) for 4-to 10-story buildings. Mitigation, as per the CRA, includes enhanced defensible space, sprinkler retrofits for older structures, and annual inspections, which are critical given the area's fire history and terrain challenges.
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ISO 2.5 Mile Aerial Coverage Assessment
As shown in the following figure, most tall building loads are entirely outside the coverage of the aerial apparatus within the required ISO parameter. The district contains many taller buildings (mostly 3- story) that fall outside the 2.5 Mile coverage area. Even though these buildings are more than 2.5 miles from an aerial apparatus, the entire district can be reached within 7 minutes from Station 1or 13.
Figure 311: Station 14 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage
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Effective Response Force
The ERF represents the minimum number of on-scene firefighters required to safely and effectively mitigate defined risk levels within a jurisdiction's first-due response area. This aligns with NFPA 1710 standards, which typically require 15–24 personnel for a full initial alarm (e.g., a residential structure fire), scaling with incident complexity (e.g., high-rise or wildland-urban interface [WUI] events). The ERF ensures task completion—such as incident command, water supply, search/rescue, and ventilation— while accounting for local risks, response times, and resource distribution. The Riverside Fire Department's 2023 CRA-SOC, updated in 2024, applies this model citywide, utilizing GIS mapping (as shown in the provided Station 14 map) to visualize the "staff delivered force" under effective staffing conditions, guiding resource allocation and supporting CFAI re-accreditation (2024–2028). The map for Station 14, located in the Wood Streets area near Central Avenue, depicts a ~3–4 square mile first-due area bounded by a red polygon. This district features a mix of historic residential neighborhoods, commercial corridors, and WUI edges along Sycamore Canyon, with ~1,800–2,000 annual incidents (60% medical, 20% structure fires, 15% vegetation). The ERF is color-coded to show staff levels delivered within target response times (typically 4–6 minutes per RFD SOC), reflecting reliability and concentration. The area’s hilly terrain, narrow streets, and WUI exposure (noted in the 2024 wildfire annex) challenge response, with Station 14’s engine and quint apparatus optimized for rapid deployment.
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Figure 312: Station 14 ERF at 8 Minutes
Effective Response Force Staff Level
• 0 Staff–White: ~5–10% (small pockets in areas not served by the road network). No initial coverage; high vulnerability to wildfire spread or isolated residential fires. Relies on mutual aid (e.g., Station 4 or 13), with response times extending to 8–10+ minutes, per CRA. • 1–9 Staff–Pink: ~10–15% (small pockets scattered along western and southern residential fringes) Basic initial attack capability (e.g., engine company of 3–4 for medical/vegetation fires); sufficient for low-risk calls but inadequate for multi-story (474+ buildings) or commercial incidents. CRA classifies this as a "yellow" risk for life safety in dense housing. • 10–19 Staff–Yellow: ~30–35% (central and eastern residential/commercial zones near Central Avenue). Meets moderate-risk benchmarks (e.g., engine + quint for structure fires); supports ladder ops for 3–5 story buildings (456+ 3-story units). Proximity to the station aids concentration, but high call volume (1,800+ incidents) strains reliability.
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• 20–29 Staff–Orange: ~10–20% Located in the far southeast residential area. Adequate for medium-high risks (e.g., commercial fires or WUI interfaces); aligns with complete alarm assignments (2 engines + quint + chief) for 6–10 story buildings (14 total). CRA notes 85–90% reliability here during normal operations.
• 30–39 Staff–Green: ~10–15% (core area immediately around Station 14 and along major roads). northeastern hills, and University of California, Riverside campus buildings). High capability for complex incidents (e.g., high-rise or industrial fires); supports 7–10 story structures (4 buildings) with mutual aid. CRA flags this as sufficient for 90% of escalated risks, though terrain delays response to outer zones.
• 40–56 Staff–Dark Green: ~5–10% (Near Canyon Crest and Country Club, and immediate vicinity). Maximum ERF for catastrophic events (e.g., multi-alarm fires or mass casualty); exceeds NFPA 1710 benchmarks for urban districts. Achievable with a citywide resource surge, but not sustained, per CRA.
The map shows a robust ERF gradient, peaking at 40–56 staff near Station 14, reflecting RFD’s capacity to concentrate resources in this high-density urban-WUI district. Baseline ERF of 10–19 staff covers most calls (e.g., residential fires with 456 3-story buildings), aligning with CRA’s “moderate-risk” classification (60% life-safety, 25% property). The 20–29 and 30–39 staff zones support escalated responses for taller structures (4–10 stories) and commercial hubs along Central Avenue, with the 30– 39 staff zone feasible via mutual aid from Stations 4 and 13 (5–7-minute reinforcement). The 40–56 staff level, while possible during major incidents (e.g., wildfires or industrial HazMat incidents), requires citywide mobilization (~70 on-duty firefighters across two battalions), which drops reliability below 90% during multi-incident peaks (typical in wildfire season).In summary, Station 14’s ERF profile supports CFAI SOC goals, with effective staffing ranging from 10–39 staff for 90% of risks, bolstered by proximity to resources. The CRA recommends enhanced WUI defensible space and auto-aid protocols to address staff gaps 0–9, ensuring sustained coverage.
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Section VI:
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A:
SURVEYS OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
To support the Riverside Fire Department’s Master Plan, AP Triton conducted two complementary surveys:
• A Community Survey, completed by 120 respondents (119 answered most questions, with minimal skip rates).
• An Internal Survey, completed by 90 personnel, with response counts varying slightly by question due to optional items.
Together, these surveys provide a clearer understanding of public expectations, perceptions of service quality, and internal perspectives on operational strengths and future needs. While each survey reflects the viewpoint of its respective audience, several themes align strongly and inform the department’s strategic direction.
Executive summaries of the survey results, including all quantitative data and a summary of open- ended responses, will be provided as supplementary documents to this report.
COMMUNITY SURVEY SUMMARY
Total Respondents: 120
Participation
The community survey received strong engagement, with 120 respondents answering most questions and very few skipping items. Responses reflected a diverse range of experiences and expectations.
Key Insights
High Satisfaction with Service Delivery
Residents consistently expressed confidence in the department’s professionalism, compassion, and emergency response performance. Many shared personal accounts demonstrating trust in RFD’s crews and appreciation for timely, effective service.
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Strong Appreciation for Community Presence
Respondents frequently highlighted positive experiences with community events, social media communication, and general visibility around the city.
Desire for Expanded Capacity
The most common improvement themes included:
• Additional fire stations and staffing to keep pace with population growth. • More wildfire mitigation activities, prevention programs, and brush management. • Continued investment in technology, equipment, and training. • Expanded EMS capabilities or alternative service delivery models.
Unmet Expectations
Most respondents indicated their expectations are being met; however, some respondents noted concerns that included:
• Response time variability in certain neighborhoods.
• Limited station coverage relative to city expansion.
• The need for more visible mitigation efforts in wildfire-prone zones. • Increased community engagement and prevention education.
Overall, the community expressed strong support for the department and a clear desire to see its capacity grow alongside Riverside.
INTERNAL SURVEY SUMMARY
Total Respondents: 90
Participation
The internal survey achieved broad participation across ranks and assignments. Most questions received 85–90 responses, reflecting meaningful input from the workforce.
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Key Insights
Commitment to Mission and Service Excellence
Personnel frequently emphasized pride in their work, strong team cohesion, and dedication to providing excellent service despite high operational demands.
Operational Strengths Identified by Staff
• Highly trained and professional crews.
• Strong teamwork and adaptability.
• Consistent commitment to training.
• Positive community interactions.
• Pride in service and departmental identity.
Areas Identified for Improvement
Common themes included:
• Staffing levels that do not reflect call volume or city growth. • Need for additional stations, units, and upgraded facilities. • Expanded training opportunities, including multi-company and specialized training. • Greater emphasis on leadership development and internal communication. • Facility and equipment modernization.
• Stronger physical and mental wellness supports.
Future Priorities
Personnel highlighted the need to strengthen:
• Wildland response capability.
• Data-driven deployment and technology use.
• EMS system efficiency and potential service model improvements. • Community outreach and risk reduction.
• Career development, succession planning, and internal support systems.
Collectively, internal responses reflect a highly dedicated workforce seeking structural support to sustain service quality and meet growing community expectations.
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COMBINED OBSERVATIONS ACROSS BOTH SURVEYS
1. Growth and Resource Alignment
Both surveys reinforced the need for:
• Additional fire stations and deploying units strategically. • Increased staffing to reduce workload stress and improve response reliability. • Facility modernization and equipment upgrades.
2. Training and Preparedness
Respondents across both groups emphasized:
• Continued investment in training.
• Expanded wildfire and WUI capacity.
• Broader community preparedness and prevention initiatives. • Access to modern tools, technology, and information systems.
3. Response Performance
While satisfaction remains high, concerns centered on:
• Response times in certain areas.
• Increasing call volume without corresponding expansion in resources.
4. Community Interaction and Visibility
Both audiences value:
• Ongoing community outreach.
• Education and prevention programs.
• Visibility within neighborhoods.
5. EMS System Considerations
Both surveys reflected interest in evaluating:
• The current EMS transport model.
• Opportunities for improved coordination and service delivery. • Potential benefits of enhanced internal EMS capabilities.
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APPENDIX
B
:
SAMPLE PERFORMANCE
BENCHMARK RESOLUTION
RESOLUTION NO. __
Series of 2025
RESOLUTION ADOPTING RIVERSIDE FIRE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON RESPONSE PERFORMANCE
OBJECTIVES
WHEREAS, the Riverside Fire Department (herein referred to as “RFD”) provides fire and non-fire- related emergency response to the City of Riverside and outlying boundaries through contract and mutual aid agreements; and
WHEREAS, industry standards based on NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, provide achievable standards for response to fire, EMS, hazardous materials, and other types of emergency incidents; and WHEREAS, the City of Riverside provides an effective emergency response force that must deliver reasonable total response times to properly mitigate emergency incidents; and WHEREAS, adopting formal performance standards for the Riverside Fire Department is essential to meeting current and future service demands; and
WHEREAS, low-level, moderate-level, high-level, and extreme-risk levels are defined as risk category measurements in which threats are measured by probability of occurrence, and hazard, danger, or loss is measured by consequence; and
WHEREAS, the following formal standard response performance benchmarks are hereby established as core goals for the Riverside Fire Department for responses within the boundaries of the City of Riverside.
Alarm Handling Times
1. For 90% (percentile) of all incident responses, alarm handling shall be 1 minute, 0 seconds (1:00).
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Turnout Time (Emergent Response)
1. For 90% (percentile) of all emergent responses, apparatus turnout time shall be 1 minute, 0 seconds (1:00) during day response (8:00 a.m.–10:00 p.m.) and 1 minute, 30 seconds (1:30) during night response (10:00 p.m.–8:00 a.m.).
Fire Suppression Benchmarks
1. For 90% (percentile) of all low-, moderate-, high-, and extreme-risk fire-related incidents, the total response time for the arrival of the first-due unit, staffed with a minimum of one officer and three firefighters, shall be:
a. 7 minutes, 0 seconds (7:00) during the day and 7 minutes, 30 seconds (7:30) at night.
b. The first-due arriving unit shall carry a minimum of 500 gallons of water and be capable of producing a 1,250-gallon-per-minute (GPM) pumping capacity. c. The first-due unit shall establish command, declare scene priorities, establish an uninterrupted water supply, perform lifesaving and property-saving interventions, and provide scene safety and accountability for RFD members and the public.
2. For 90% of moderate-risk fires, the minimum effective response force (ERF) staffing shall be 19 firefighters, with the total response time of the 6th unit being 17 minutes, 0 seconds (17:00) during the day and 17 minutes, 30 seconds (17:30) at night.
3. For 90% of high-risk fires, the minimum ERF staffing shall be 23 firefighters, with the total response time of the 7th unit being 19 minutes, 0 seconds (19:00) during the day and 19 minutes, 30 seconds (19:30) at night.
4. For 90% of extreme-risk fires, the minimum ERF staffing shall be 49 firefighters, with the total response time of the 18th unit being 41 minutes, 0 seconds (41:00) during the day and 41 minutes, 30 seconds (41:30) at night.
EMS Benchmarks
1. For 90% (percentile) of all ALS EMS-related incidents, the total response time for the arrival of the first-due unit, staffed with a minimum of two firefighters, shall be 7 minutes, 0 seconds (7:00) during the day and 7 minutes, 30 seconds (7:30) at night.
2. For 90% (percentile) of all BLS EMS-related incidents, the total response time for the arrival of the first-due unit, staffed with a minimum of two firefighters, shall be 16 minutes, 0 seconds (16:00) during the day and 16 minutes, 30 seconds (16:30) at night.
Rescue Benchmarks
1. For 90% of all low-, moderate-, and high-risk rescue-related incidents, the total response time for the arrival of the first-due unit, staffed with a minimum of one officer and three firefighters, shall be 7 minutes, 0 seconds (7:00) during the day and 7 minutes, 30 seconds (7:30) at night in all response zones within the City of Riverside.
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2. For 90% of moderate-risk rescue incidents, the minimum ERF staffing shall be eight firefighters, with the total response time of the 2nd unit being within 9 minutes, 0 seconds (9:00) during the day and 9 minutes, 30 seconds (9:30) at night. The ERF shall be capable of safely controlling the incident in accordance with adopted RFD standard operating and medical care standards.
3. For 90% of high-risk rescue incidents, the minimum ERF staffing shall be twelve firefighters, with the total response time of the 3rd unit being within 11 minutes, 0 seconds (11:00) during the day and 11 minutes, 30 seconds (11:30) at night, in all response zones within the City of Riverside.
Hazardous Materials Benchmarks
1. For 90% of all low-, moderate-, and high-risk hazardous materials-related incidents, the total response time for the arrival of the first-due unit, staffed with a minimum of one officer and three firefighters, shall be within 7 minutes, 0 seconds (7:00) during the day and 7 minutes, 30 seconds (7:30) at night in all response zones within the City of Riverside. The first-due unit shall be staffed with personnel trained to the minimum level of hazardous materials operations and equipped with air monitoring and commodity identification software or references.
2. For 90% of moderate-risk hazardous materials incidents, the minimum ERF staffing shall be eight firefighters, with the total response time of the 2nd unit being within 9 minutes, 0 seconds (9:00) during the day and 9 minutes, 30 seconds (9:30) at night in all response zones within the City of Riverside. The ERF shall be capable of safely controlling the incident in accordance with adopted RFD standard operating standards.
3. For 90% of high-risk hazardous materials incidents, the minimum ERF staffing shall be 14 firefighters, with the total response time of the 3rd unit being 11 minutes, 0 seconds (11:00) during the day and 11 minutes, 30 seconds (11:30) at night.
Wildland Fire Benchmarks
1. For 90% of all low-, moderate-, and high-risk wildland fire-related incidents, the total response time for the arrival of the first-due unit, staffed with a minimum of one officer and three firefighters, shall be within 7 minutes, 0 seconds (7:00) during the day and 7 minutes, 30 seconds (7:30) at night in all response zones within the City of Riverside.
2. For 90% of moderate-risk wildland fire incidents, the minimum ERF staffing shall be 13 firefighters, with the total response time of the 4th unit being within 13 minutes, 0 seconds (13:00) during the day and 13 minutes, 30 seconds (13:30) at night. The ERF shall be capable of safely controlling the incident in accordance with adopted RFD standard operating and medical care standards.
3. For 90% of high-risk wildland fire incidents, the minimum ERF staffing shall be 21 firefighters, with the total response time of the 6th unit being within 17 minutes, 0 seconds (17:00) during the day and 17 minutes, 30 seconds (17:30) at night, in all response zones within the City of Riverside.
M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 532
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA, THAT:
Section 1. The findings, conclusions, and statements of fact contained in the preamble are hereby adopted, ratified, and incorporated herein.
Section 2. It is the policy of the City of Riverside to establish and maintain internal controls and procedures to ensure that applicable standards are adopted in full or in part and followed with regard to the good order of the Fire Department. It is further the policy of the City of Riverside to receive benchmark performance versus actual performance comparisons annually from the Riverside Fire Department to ensure efforts are made to meet these industry-established standards.
Section 3. This Resolution shall take effect and be in force from and after its adoption.
M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 533
APPENDIX
C
:
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: RFD Organizational Chart (2025) .......................................................................................... 5 Figure 2: Riverside General Fund Revenue (in millions $) .................................................................... 9 Figure 3: Riverside General Fund Revenues by Category—FY 2025 .................................................... 10 Figure 4: Riverside General Fund Tax Revenue (in millions $) ............................................................. 11 Figure 5: Riverside General Fund Sales Tax Revenue ......................................................................... 11 Figure 6: Riverside General Fund Property Tax Revenue .................................................................... 12 Figure 7: Riverside General Fund Total Revenue vs. Tax Revenue ...................................................... 13 Figure 8: Riverside General Fund Expense (in millions $) ................................................................... 15 Figure 9: Riverside General Fund Allocations FY 2025 ....................................................................... 16 Figure 10: Riverside General Fund Personnel Expense ...................................................................... 17 Figure 11: FY 2026 Riverside General Fund ....................................................................................... 20 Figure 12: Riverside Fire Department Budget .................................................................................... 21 Figure 13: RFD Total Recurring vs. Non-Recurring Expenses ............................................................. 22 Figure 14: Riverside Fire Department Budget by Fund ....................................................................... 23 Figure 15: RFD Funding by Source Five-Year Average ........................................................................ 24 Figure 16: RFD Recurring Expenses .................................................................................................. 25 Figure 17: RFD Recurring Expenses by Subcategory .......................................................................... 26 Figure 18: RFD Personnel Expense ................................................................................................... 27 Figure 19: RFD Personnel Expense Trajectory ................................................................................... 29 Figure 20: RFD Personnel Expense by Fund ...................................................................................... 29 Figure 21: RFD Personnel Expense by Fund ...................................................................................... 30 Figure 22: RFD Non-Personnel Expense ........................................................................................... 31 Figure 23: RFD Non-Personnel Expense Trajectory ........................................................................... 33 Figure 24: RFD Debt Service Expense ............................................................................................... 34 Figure 25: RFD Debt Service Support by Fund ................................................................................... 34 Figure 26: RFD Net Charges From Others ......................................................................................... 35 Figure 27: RFD Non-Recurring Expenses .......................................................................................... 35 Figure 28: RFD Unfunded Capital Projects........................................................................................ 37 Figure 29: Organizational Chart ....................................................................................................... 46 Figure 30: Leadership Team—Program Responsibilities .................................................................... 47 Figure 31: RFD Administrative and Support Staff—Full Time Equivalent Count .................................. 48 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 534
Figure 32: Operations Staff—Full Time Equivalent Count .................................................................. 51 Figure 33: Minimum Daily Staffing .................................................................................................... 51 Figure 34: Operational Staffing & Allocation ..................................................................................... 52 Figure 35: Elements Used to Calculate Staffing Relief Factor ............................................................ 53 Figure 36: Staffing Relief Factor ....................................................................................................... 54 Figure 37: Fire Station Rating Criteria ............................................................................................... 58 Figure 38: Fire Station 1 ................................................................................................................... 59 Figure 39: Fire Station 2 ................................................................................................................... 60 Figure 40: Fire Station 3 ................................................................................................................... 61 Figure 41: Fire Station 4 ................................................................................................................... 62 Figure 42: Fire Station 5 ................................................................................................................... 63 Figure 43: Fire Station 6 ................................................................................................................... 64 Figure 44: Fire Station 7 ................................................................................................................... 65 Figure 45: Fire Station 8 ................................................................................................................... 66 Figure 46: Fire Station 9 ................................................................................................................... 67 Figure 47: Fire Station 10 ................................................................................................................. 68 Figure 48: Fire Station 11 ................................................................................................................. 69 Figure 49: Fire Station 12 ................................................................................................................. 70 Figure 50: Fire Station 13 ................................................................................................................. 71 Figure 51: Fire Station 14 ................................................................................................................. 72 Figure 52: Summary of RFD’s Fire Stations ....................................................................................... 73 Figure 53: Vehicle Condition Criteria ................................................................................................ 77 Figure 54: RFD Frontline Fire Apparatus ........................................................................................... 78 Figure 55: RFD Reserve Fire Apparatus ............................................................................................. 79 Figure 56: RFD Command & Support Vehicles .................................................................................. 79 Figure 57: Economic Theory of Vehicle Replacement ........................................................................ 81 Figure 58: Riverside County EMS Oversight ...................................................................................... 84 Figure 59: RFD EMS System Medication Utilization (July 2024–June 2025).......................................... 86 Figure 60: RFD EMS System Procedure Utilization (July 2024–June 2025) ........................................... 87 Figure 61: RFD EMS System Procedure Utilization (July 2024–June 2025) ........................................... 88 Figure 62: RFD EMS Response Capability ......................................................................................... 94 Figure 63: Top 90% Most Common RFD Provider Impressions (July 2024–June 2025) ......................... 95 Figure 64: EMS Incident Comparison 2022 and 2024 ........................................................................ 96 Figure 65: Comparison of the Number of Annual EMS Incidents ........................................................ 97 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 535
Figure 66: Top 15 Busiest Medic Units (July 2024–June 2025) ............................................................ 99 Figure 67: Top Six Patient Transport Destinations (July 2024–June 2025) ............................................ 99 Figure 68: Net Collections and Revenue Estimates .......................................................................... 101 Figure 69: Riverside City Payer Mix (2025) ........................................................................................ 105 Figure 70: Authorized Riverside City Rates ...................................................................................... 106 Figure 71: Transportation Reimbursement Calculation .................................................................... 106 Figure 72: Payer Mix Reimbursement .............................................................................................. 107 Figure 73: RFD Investigations/Arson Statistics (2023–2025 YTD) ...................................................... 111 Figure 74: Communications Center Telephone Call Summary ......................................................... 112 Figure 75: Communications Center Daily Staffing............................................................................ 112 Figure 76: HazMat Incidents (2021–2024) ........................................................................................ 115 Figure 77: HazMat Incidents by Hour and Day.................................................................................. 116 Figure 78: HazMat Incidents by Month ............................................................................................ 117 Figure 79: Technical Rescue Service Demand (2021–2024) .............................................................. 121 Figure 80: Technical Rescue Incidents by Hour and Day .................................................................. 122 Figure 81: Technical Rescue Incidents by Month (2021–2024) .......................................................... 123 Figure 82: CA-TF6 Utilization (2020–YTD 2025) ................................................................................ 124 Figure 83: Federal Grant Summary .................................................................................................. 126 Figure 84: OEM Position Funding Sources ....................................................................................... 126 Figure 85: General Training Competencies by RFD .......................................................................... 128 Figure 86: Individual Training Analysis (Hours) ................................................................................. 129 Figure 87: RFD Training Emphasis Comparison to Service Demand (2023–2024) .............................. 130 Figure 88: Balanced Training Program ............................................................................................. 131 Figure 89: Methodologies Utilized in Training ................................................................................... 134 Figure 90: Training Facilities & Resources ....................................................................................... 135 Figure 91: Population Estimates (2010–2024) .................................................................................. 144 Figure 92: Population Density ......................................................................................................... 145 Figure 93: Age-Related Risk ............................................................................................................ 147 Figure 94: Gender by Age ................................................................................................................ 148 Figure 95: Population with a Disability ............................................................................................. 149 Figure 96: Language Barriers .......................................................................................................... 150 Figure 97: Poverty Rate ................................................................................................................... 151 Figure 98: Median Household Income ............................................................................................. 152 Figure 99: Population without Health Insurance .............................................................................. 153 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 536
Figure 100: Education Levels .......................................................................................................... 154 Figure 101: Race & Ethnicity ........................................................................................................... 155 Figure 102: Owner- and Renter-Occupied Housing .......................................................................... 156 Figure 103: Age of Housing ............................................................................................................. 157 Figure 104: Housing Units per Building ............................................................................................ 158 Figure 105: Average Monthly High Temperatures (2011–2024) .......................................................... 160 Figure 106: Average Monthly Low Temperature (2011–2024) ............................................................ 160 Figure 107: National Weather Service Heat Index Chart ................................................................... 161 Figure 108: Average Monthly Wind Speeds (2011–2024) ................................................................... 162 Figure 109: Wind Rose .................................................................................................................... 163 Figure 110: Average Monthly Precipitation (2011–2024) ................................................................... 164 Figure 111: Drought Conditions (2011–2024) ................................................................................... 165 Figure 112: Fire Hazard Severity Zones ............................................................................................ 168 Figure 113: FEMA Flood Zones ........................................................................................................ 170 Figure 114: Flood Hazard: Dam Inundation Area .............................................................................. 171 Figure 115: Earthquake Fault Zones ................................................................................................ 173 Figure 116: Earthquake Liquefaction ............................................................................................... 174 Figure 117: Critical Facilities .......................................................................................................... 176 Figure 118: Hazardous Materials Locations ..................................................................................... 179 Figure 119: Major Roads of Riverside............................................................................................... 181 Figure 120: Riverside Area Road Network and Transit System .......................................................... 182 Figure 121: Riverside Municipal Airport ........................................................................................... 185 Figure 122: Riverside Railroad ........................................................................................................ 187 Figure 123: Dam Inundation Area .................................................................................................... 188 Figure 124: Water Line Locations .................................................................................................... 190 Figure 125: Waterways and Associated Bridges ............................................................................... 192 Figure 126: Governmental Buildings ............................................................................................... 194 Figure 127: Riverside City Land Use ................................................................................................ 196 Figure 128: School Locations .......................................................................................................... 198 Figure 129: School Logistics ........................................................................................................... 199 Figure 130: Alternative Schools....................................................................................................... 200 Figure 131: Universities .................................................................................................................. 201 Figure 132: Day Care Facilities ........................................................................................................ 202 Figure 133: Assembly Occupancies ................................................................................................ 203 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 537
Figure 134: Hospitals ..................................................................................................................... 205 Figure 135: Medical Care Facilities ................................................................................................. 206 Figure 136: Senior Care .................................................................................................................. 207 Figure 137: Multi-Family Housing Units ........................................................................................... 208 Figure 138: Buildings Three Stories or More ..................................................................................... 209 Figure 139: Buildings 50,000 Square Feet and Greater ..................................................................... 210 Figure 140: Three-Axis Risk Classification Process .......................................................................... 212 Figure 141: Probability or Likelihood of Occurrence ......................................................................... 213 Figure 142: Consequence to the Community................................................................................... 214 Figure 143: Impact on Operational Forces ....................................................................................... 214 Figure 144: Fire Response Risk Assessment .................................................................................... 215 Figure 145: Fire Three-Axis Risk Classifications ............................................................................... 215 Figure 146: EMS Response Risk Assessment ................................................................................... 216 Figure 147: EMS Three-Axis Risk Classifications .............................................................................. 216 Figure 148: Technical Rescue Response Risk Assessment ............................................................... 217 Figure 149: Technical Rescue Three-Axis Risk Classifications .......................................................... 217 Figure 150: Hazardous Materials Response Risk Assessment .......................................................... 218 Figure 151: Hazardous Materials Three-Axis Risk Classifications ..................................................... 218 Figure 152: Wildland Fires Response Risk Assessment .................................................................... 219 Figure 153: Wildland Fires 3-Axis Risk Classifications ...................................................................... 219 Figure 154: ARFF Response Risk Assessment .................................................................................. 220 Figure 155: ARFF Risk Classifications.............................................................................................. 220 Figure 156: RFD Property Loss ........................................................................................................ 221 Figure 157: Fires per 1,000 Population ............................................................................................ 222 Figure 158: Intentionally Set Fires (2020–2024) ................................................................................ 222 Figure 159: Each Time Segment in the Incident Lifecycle ................................................................. 227 Figure 160: Call Processing By Incident Grouping Classification (2018–2024) ................................... 229 Figure 161: Call Processing Time by Hour (2018–2024) .................................................................... 230 Figure 162: Turnout Time Performance by Call Class (2018–2024) ................................................... 231 Figure 163: Turnout Time vs Incident Performance (2018–2024) ....................................................... 232 Figure 164: Four-Minute Travel Time from All RFD Stations .............................................................. 233 Figure 165: Eight-Minute Travel Times from All RFD Stations ............................................................ 234 Figure 166: RFD Station Administrative Response Areas .................................................................. 235 Figure 167: Travel Times by Call Class (2018–2024) ......................................................................... 236 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 538
Figure 168: Travel Time Performance vs Incidents by Hour of the Day (2018–2024) ........................... 237 Figure 169: Effective Staff Response Force ...................................................................................... 238 Figure 170: Effective Response Force Assembly Times .................................................................... 239 Figure 171: Response Time Analysis ............................................................................................... 240 Figure 172: Response Time by Class (2018–2024) ............................................................................ 240 Figure 173: Response Time by Hour of the Day (2018–2024) ............................................................. 241 Figure 174: Data Analysis Overview ................................................................................................ 242 Figure 175: Total Response Time Performance (2018–2024) ............................................................ 243 Figure 176: Total Response Time vs Incidents by Hour (2018–2024) ................................................. 243 Figure 177: Station Performance for Total Response Time ............................................................... 244 Figure 178: Station Total Response Performance (2018–2024) ......................................................... 245 Figure 179: Performance by Ward ................................................................................................... 246 Figure 180: Time On Task Analysis .................................................................................................. 247 Figure 181: Time on Task Performance (2018–2024) ........................................................................ 247 Figure 182: Time on Task by Hour of the Day (2018–2024) ................................................................ 248 Figure 183: Committed Time Analysis ............................................................................................. 248 Figure 184: Committed Time by Call Class (2018–2024) .................................................................. 249 Figure 185: Committed Time by Hour of the Day (2018–2024) .......................................................... 250 Figure 186: Incident Concurrency (2018–2024) ................................................................................ 252 Figure 187: EMS Incident Concurrency (2018–2024) ........................................................................ 253 Figure 188: Unit Response Concurrency (2018–2024) ...................................................................... 254 Figure 189: Unit Hour Utilization (2018–2024) .................................................................................. 255 Figure 190: Population Trend Predictions ........................................................................................ 258 Figure 191: City of Riverside Incident Forecast ................................................................................ 261 Figure 192: Recommendation S-1 – Administrative Staffing Detail .................................................... 280 Figure 193: Recommendation S-2 – Operations Battalion Chief ....................................................... 281 Figure 194: Recommendation S-3 – Consistent Engine Staffing ........................................................ 281 Figure 195: Recommendation M-1 – EMS Division ........................................................................... 290 Figure 196: Recommendation L-1 – Fire Prevention Staffing ............................................................. 297 Figure 197: Recommendation L-2 – OEM Staffing ............................................................................ 298 Figure 198: Recommendation T-1 – Training Division ....................................................................... 311 Figure 199: RFD Comparison Incidents to Training........................................................................... 312 Figure 200: Riverside Fire Department Station Reliability ................................................................. 328 Figure 201: Station 1 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 329 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 539
Figure 202: Station 1 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 331 Figure 203: Station 1 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 331 Figure 204: Station 1 Geographic Distribution of Hazards/Occupancies ........................................... 333 Figure 205: Station 1 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 334 Figure 206: Station 1 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 336 Figure 207: Station 1 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 337 Figure 208: Station 1 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 338 Figure 209: Station 2 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 340 Figure 210: Station 2 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 342 Figure 211: Station 2 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 342 Figure 212: Station 2 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 345 Figure 213: Station 2 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 346 Figure 214: Station 2 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 348 Figure 215: Station 2 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 350 Figure 216: Station 2 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 351 Figure 217: Station 3 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 353 Figure 218: Station 3 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 355 Figure 219: Station 3 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 355 Figure 220: Station 3 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 358 Figure 221: Station 3 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 359 Figure 222: Station 3 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 361 Figure 223: Station 3 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 363 Figure 224: Station 3 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 364 Figure 225: Station 4 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 366 Figure 226: Station 4 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 368 Figure 227: Station 4 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 368 Figure 228: Station 4 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 371 Figure 229: Station 4 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 372 Figure 230: Station 4 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 374 Figure 231: Station 4 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 376 Figure 232: Station 4 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 377 Figure 233: Station 5 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 379 Figure 234: Station 5 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 381 Figure 235: Station 5 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 381 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 540
Figure 236: Station 5 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 384 Figure 237: Station 5 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 385 Figure 238: Station 5 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 387 Figure 239: Station 5 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 389 Figure 240: Station 5 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 390 Figure 241: Station 6 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 392 Figure 242: Station 6 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 393 Figure 243: Station 6 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 394 Figure 244: Station 6 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 395 Figure 245: Station 6 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 398 Figure 246: Station 6 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 400 Figure 247: Station 6 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 402 Figure 248: Station 6 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 403 Figure 249: Station 7 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 405 Figure 250: Station 7 Incident Exceptions (Long Response) .............................................................. 406 Figure 251: Station 7 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 407 Figure 252: Station 7 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 408 Figure 253: Station 7 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 411 Figure 254: Station 7 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 414 Figure 255: Station 7 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 417 Figure 256: Station 7 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 418 Figure 257: Station 8 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 420 Figure 258: Station 8 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024) ............................................ 421 Figure 259: Station 8 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 422 Figure 260: Station 8 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 423 Figure 261: Station 8 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 426 Figure 262: Station 8 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 428 Figure 263: Station 8 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 431 Figure 264: Station 8 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 432 Figure 265: Station 9 Incident Counts ............................................................................................. 434 Figure 266: Station 9 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024) ............................................ 435 Figure 267: Station 9 Reliability 2018–2024 ..................................................................................... 436 Figure 268: Station 9 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................... 437 Figure 269: Station 9 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ..................................................... 440 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 541
Figure 270: Station 9 Multi-Story Buildings ...................................................................................... 442 Figure 271: Station 9 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage .................................................. 445 Figure 272: Station 9 ERF at 8 Minutes............................................................................................. 446 Figure 273: Station 10 Incident Counts ............................................................................................ 449 Figure 274: Station 10 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)........................................... 451 Figure 275: Station 10 Reliability 2018–2024.................................................................................... 452 Figure 276: Station 10 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................. 453 Figure 277: Station 10 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ................................................... 456 Figure 278: Station 10 Multi-Story Buildings .................................................................................... 459 Figure 279: Station 10 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage ................................................ 461 Figure 280: Station 10 ERF at 8 Minutes ........................................................................................... 462 Figure 281: Station 11 Incident Counts ............................................................................................ 465 Figure 282: Station 11 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)........................................... 466 Figure 283: Station 11 Reliability 2018–2024.................................................................................... 467 Figure 284: Station 11 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................. 468 Figure 285: Station 11 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ................................................... 471 Figure 286: Station 11 Multi-Story Buildings .................................................................................... 473 Figure 287: Station 11 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage ................................................ 475 Figure 288: Station 11 ERF at 8 Minutes ........................................................................................... 476 Figure 289: Station 12 Incident Counts ............................................................................................ 479 Figure 290: Station 12 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)........................................... 480 Figure 291: Station 12 Reliability 2018–2024.................................................................................... 481 Figure 292: Station 12 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................. 482 Figure 293: Station 12 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ................................................... 485 Figure 294: Station 12 Multi-Story Buildings .................................................................................... 487 Figure 295: Station 12 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage ................................................ 489 Figure 296: Station 12 ERF at 8 Minutes ........................................................................................... 490 Figure 297: Station 13 Incident Counts ............................................................................................ 493 Figure 298: Station 13 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)........................................... 494 Figure 299: Station 13 Reliability 2018–2024.................................................................................... 495 Figure 300: Station 13 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................. 496 Figure 301: Station 13 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ................................................... 498 Figure 302: Station 13 Multi-Story Buildings .................................................................................... 501 Figure 303: Station 13 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage ................................................ 504 M A S T E R P L A N & C R A - S O C | C I T Y O F R I V E R S I D E F I R E D E P A R T M E N T 542
Figure 304: Station 13 ERF at 8 Minutes ........................................................................................... 505 Figure 305: Station 14 Incident Counts ............................................................................................ 508 Figure 306: Station 14 Incident Exceptions (Long Response 2018–2024)........................................... 510 Figure 307: Station 14 Reliability ..................................................................................................... 510 Figure 308: Station 14 Hazards/Occupancies .................................................................................. 511 Figure 309: Station 14 Large Buildings Greater than 50,000 Sq. Ft. ................................................... 515 Figure 310: Station 14 Multi-Story Buildings .................................................................................... 517 Figure 311: Station 14 Tall Buildings vs 2.5 Mile ISO Aerial Coverage ................................................ 520 Figure 312: Station 14 ERF at 8 Minutes ........................................................................................... 522