City of Riverside
Regional Water Quality Control Plant
Security Assessment Study
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY
FINAL | January 2023
City of Riverside
Regional Water Quality Control Plant
Security Assessment Study
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY
FINAL | January 2023
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | i
pw://Carollo/Doc ume nts/CA/Riverside/201361-0000 00/03 Re ports and Studies/02 Deliverable s/Security A ssessment Study Report/SecurityAssessmentStudy Contents
Section 1 - Executive Summary 1
Section 2 - Introduction 3
2.1 Purpose 3
2.2 Team 3
Section 3 - Methodology 5
3.1 Report Organization 5
3.2 Security Approach 5
3.2.1 Increase the Effort Needed to Commit a Crime 5
3.2.2 Increase the Risk of Being Caught 6
3.2.3 Reduce the Reward Associated with Committing a Crime 7
3.3 Security Planning 7
3.3.1 Site Evaluation 8
Section 4 - Threat Profile 10
4.1 General 10
4.2 Design Basis Threat 10
4.3 Water and Wastewater Threats 11
4.3.1 Vulnerabilities and Other Challenges in the United States 11
4.3.2 Previou s Water and Wastewat er Sector Attacks 12
4.4 Crimes Against Persons/Property (CAP ) Index Statistical Evaluation 13
4.4.1 Crimecast Scoring 15
Section 5 - Findings 18
5.1 Benchmarking Security Measures Table 18
5.2 Best Practice Assessm ent Tables 26
5.3 Layer 1 - Site Perimeter Security 26
5.3.1 Layer 1 – Interim CCTV Solution 31
5.4 Layer 2 - Clear Zone Security 31
5.5 Layer 3 - Building Security 34
5.6 Layer 4 - Sitewide Security 38
5.7 Layer 5 - Operational Security 44
Section 6 - Recommendations and Next Steps 49
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Appendices
Appendix A Exterior Lighting Study
Appendix B Photo Library
Appendix C CCTV Unit Evaluation
Appendix D Security Projects Budgetary Estimate
T ables
Table ES.1 Security Proj ect Implementation Summary 2
Table 1 ANSI 57-10 Guidelines and Layers of Se curity Terminology 9 Table 2 Recent Attacks on Water and Wastewat er Syst ems 12 Table 3 RWQCP Crimecast Scores 16
Table 4 ANSI 57-10 Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix 19 Table 5 ANSI 57-10 Standard Benchmark Security Measures 20 Table 6 Layer 1 - Site Perim eter: Security Findings and Recommendations 27 Table 7 Layer 2 - Clear Zone: Security Findings and Recommendations 32 Table 8 Layer 3 - Buildings: Security Findings and Recommendations 35 Table 9 Layer 4 - Site Wid e: S ecurity Findings and Recommendations 39 Table 10 Layer 5 - Operational: Security Findings and Recommendations 45 Table 11 Security Assessm ent Recommendations 49
Table 12 Security Proj ect Implementation Summary 51
Figures
Figure 1 Security Planning Proc ess 8
Figure 2 RWQCP CAP Index Score 14
Figure 3 RWQCP One-Mile Radius CAP Index Map 14
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Abbreviations
ACS access control system
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ANSI 57-10 ANSI/ASCE/EWRI 57-10 Standard Guidelines for Physical Security of Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
AWWA American Water Works Association
CAP Crimes Against Persons/Property
Carollo Carollo Engineers, Inc.
CCTV closed-circuit television
CIP Capital Improvement Program
City City of Riverside
CPTED Criminal Prevention Through Environmental Design
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EWRI Environmental & Water Resources Institute
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTE full-time equivalent
IDS intrusion detection system
IEDs improvised explosive devices
IIDs ignition interlock devices
MCC motor control center
RWQCP Regional Water Quality Control Plant
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
TM technical memorandum
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Section 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The City of Riverside (City) has experienced increased criminal activity at its Regional Water Quality Control Plant (RWQCP) over the last several years, including breaking and entering, theft, simple assault, and vandalism. These inciden ts have become a significant safety threat and concern to plant staff and operations. The purpose of this report is to assess the existing level of security at the RWQCP and provide recommendations for future Capital Improvement Program (CIP) projects to close the gap between the current and desired security conditions.
Members of the assessment team visited the RWQCP on July 13, 2022 and August 17, 2022 to evaluate the RWQCP’s existing security measures and gather information related to the security planning process. These site evaluations were completed using the concept of layered security to assess the RWQCP’s perimeter (Layer 1), clear zone (Layer 2), building (Layer 3), sitewide (Layer 4), and operational (Layer 5) security. Information collected during these site visits, discussions with RWQCP personnel, and analysis of the threat environment were used to assess the RWQCP’s current level of security and compare it to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)/Environmental & Water Resources Institute (EWRI) 57-10 Standard Guidelines for Physical Security of Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (ANSI 57-10) and industry best practices for physical, electronic, and operational security.
The RWQCP meets or partially meets many components of ANSI 57-10 and general security best practices, including components of perimeter fencing, physical equipment protection, door locking, and backup power. However, there are several security measures that the RWQCP should address to fully meet the standards and improve plant operations safety including the addition of alarm assessment, intrusion detection, system monitoring, security specific closed-circuit television ( CCTV), and updated security policies and procedures. A detailed discussion of existing conditions at the RWQCP relative to ANSI 57 -10 and security best practices is provided in Section 5 for each level of security.
The security assessment generated a list of recommendations to address identified deficiencies and improve the overall security profile of the RWQCP. The complete list of recommendations is presented in Section 6 of this report and includes a reference to the applicable ANSI 57 -10 guideline, as well as the relative priority, and estimated implementation cost of each recommendation. The recommendations were organized into seven security projects based on the scope and priority of each item .
Table ES.1 includes a planning level cost overview and recommended implementation schedule for each security project. In general, projects recommended for short -term implementation include high priority or low cost work items that can significantly improve the RWQCP security profile. An itemized breakdown of the costs associated with each recommendation and project is included in Appendix D. Note that these planning level costs represent high-level budgetary estimates based on Carollo Engineers, Inc. (Carollo’s) understanding of the design effort and SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 2
implementation costs required at the project location. The preliminary costs will be further refined based on the ultimate project details and market conditions during the design phase of each project.
The anticipated cost to implement all of the security projects and recommendations is $3,994,500. This cost includes 1 year of interim mobile CCTV units , as recommended later in this study and detailed further within Appendix C . This number will change based on the actual mobile CCTV usage timeframe (pending implementation of Project 2). Project implementation can be completed in phases over several years to improve the security profile at the RWQCP and assist in meeting ANSI 57-10 guidelines and best practice recommendations. The projects listed in Table ES.1 have been presented based on their proposed implementation timeline. As noted above, the interim security improvements project is recommended for immediate implementation until a permanent CCTV perimeter protection system can be installed as part of Project 2.
Table ES.1 Security Project Implementation Summary
Implementation
Schedule Project Project
Cost(1)(2)
Present Interim Security Improvements – Mobile CCTV $254,500(3) 2023 Project 7 - Miscellaneous Electrical Security Upgrades $20,000 2023 Project 5 - Security Policy and Procedures $50,000 2023-2024 Project 2 - CCTV Perimeter Protection $2,340,000 2024 -20 25 Project 4 - Access Control and Intrusion Detection $790,000 2025 Project 1 - Plant Fencing and CPTED Improvements $220,000 2025 Project 3 - Internal Surveillance/IDS with Video $200,000 2025 Project 6 - Miscellaneous Physical Security Upgrades $120,000 TOTAL $3,994,500(4)
Notes:
(1) Costs are based on October 2022 market conditions and include the following: 30 percent contingency, 9.5 percent taxes, 30 percent Engineering/Admin Fees, 18 percent Contractor’s Overhead and Profit. E scalation to mid-point of construction has not been included.
(2) The project costs were rounded up to the nearest $10,000. (3) Approximate cost for interim CCTV solution is for one year of mobile CCTV units, based on a monthly operating cost of $21,210 as provided by ECAMSECURE. Actual cost could be less or more depending on completion of Project 2, which will supersede the interim mobile CCTV solution. Refer to Appendix C for more details. (4) As noted above, total implementation costs include 1 year of interim mobile CCTV units. This number will change based on actual mobile CCTV timeframe (pending implementation of Project 2).
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Section 2
INTRODUCTION
The RWQCP is owned and operated by the City Public Works Department Sewer Division and is located on approximately 100 acres of land adjacent to the Santa Ana River in Riverside, California. The plant is a critical asset as it treats all of the wastewater flow generated within the City (equivalent to an average of 27 million gallons per day). Therefore, the facility requires a high level of protection.
Over the last several years, the City has experienced an increased number of break -ins and thefts at the RWQCP site, particularly at night. The presence of unauthorized individuals on plant grounds is a significant safety and liability concern for plant staff and operations . To address these concerns, the City hired Carollo to develop a comprehensive security assessment designed to identify and reduce the security risks associated with the facility.
2.1 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to assess the existing level of security at the RWQCP and provide recommendations for future CIP projects to close the gap between the current and desired security conditions. This assessment includes an evaluation of the RWQCP threat environment, followed by a review of the current site security controls. Current conditions were then measured against ANSI/ASCE/EWRI 57 -10 Standard Guidelines for Physical Security of Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (ANSI 57 -10). This guideline is an ASCE standard which has been developed with the support o f the American Water Works Association (AWWA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assist utilities in achieving a level of security commensurate with threats to the sector. The current conditions were also evaluated against industry best practices for physical, electronic, and operational security .
2.2 Te am
The security assessment team consisted of individuals from Carollo and the City. The Carollo team provided expertise in wastewater engineering, security planning and design, and risk management. Members of the City played a crucial role in contributing institutional knowledge and local experience associated with their system throughout the assessment process. The teams were comprised of the following individuals:
• City team:
- Edward Filadelfia: Deputy Public Works Director - Wastewater System. - Ernest Marquez: Principal Engineer.
- Elaine Radke: Senior Engineer.
- John Koenig: Safety Officer.
- Robert Eland: Operations Manager.
- Bryan Padilla: Chief Plant Operator.
- Brent Keaster: Maintenance Manager.
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• Carollo team:
- Graham Juby: Principal-in-Charge.
- Dave Sobeck: Project Manager.
- George Whitten: Assistant Project Manager/Project Engineer . - Kim Shust: Security Engineer.
- John Saunders: Security Subject Matter Expert.
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Section 3
METHODOLOGY
This section summarizes the methodology used to perform the security assessment.
3.1 Report Organization
Evaluation of an organization's security profile requires a comprehensive understanding of security best practices and the overall security goals of that organization. The methodology used to complete the RWQCP security assessment is detailed in the steps below :
• Evaluation of the RWQCP threat environment (who or what the threat is, what the objectives or goals of an attacker are, and what tactics can be expected) . • Benchmarking of the RWQCP site against the security recommendations outlined in ANSI 57-10.
• Detailed assessment of the existing RWQCP security profile, including :
- A discussion of security best practices for each security element. - An assessment of each security element as it relates to the RWQCP site and City organization.
- A review of the ANSI 57-10 guidelines.
- A comparison against industry best practices for physical, electronic, and operational security.
- A prioritized list of recommendations to address the perceived security vulnerability, including a high-level cost for each set of recommendations.
3.2 Security Approach
All security must be purposeful and have well -defined objectives. In its simplest form, security is intended to achieve three fundamental objectives:
1. Increase the level of effort needed to commit a crime.
2. Increase the risk that a criminal will be caught .
3. Reduce the rewards a criminal receives from committing a crime.
The mitigation recommendations outlined within this r eport were developed with these objectives in mind. The objectives are further defined in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Increase the Effort Needed to Commit a Crime
Work ratio is the relationship between effort and reward. If the relative cost or required eff ort to execute an attack is too high ( i.e., high work ratio), the attacker will likely look elsewhere to commit the crime. In this context, work ratio is essentially a level of deterrence. There are several ways that a security program can make this ratio unmanageable or undesirable for an attacker .
Physical impediments such as high -level security locks, pry-guards on doors, wire mesh between sheetrock layers, security-screened windows and vents, welded hinges, and high walls/fences can serve to harden a target. While these security efforts may be supplemented by electronic SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 6
devices for monitoring and detection, they can and should stand on their own as highly effective security measures. In addition, guard services are often an essential tool in a security profile. To escape detection during a crime, an intruder must avoid other individuals on the site - including security personnel.
3.2.2 Increase the Risk of Being Caught
Although there are obvious exceptions, an attacker typically does not want to get caught while committing a criminal act. If the attacker is aware of an increased risk of being caught, they are more likely to be deterred from committing that act. A variety of strategies can be employed to increase the risk of being caught .
CPTED is a strategy that relies on maximizing sight lines at a facility and minimizing hiding places for criminals. The use of CCTV systems is also a very effective method of raising the risk of being caught. A CCTV system can provid e extremely useful information to monitoring and response personnel when a security breach occurs. Rapid and informed response is fundamental to raising the risk level for criminals.
Another tool for increasing the risk of being caught is adequate site lighting . Site lighting can also serve to improve general staff safety. With this in mind, members of the assessment team visited the RWQCP site on August 17, 2022 to collect light intensity data. The data was designed to identify supplementary lighting needs to s upport plant operations and staff safety. The findings of the study are provided in Appendix A and are integrated into the results and recommendations provided in Section 5.
Badging or other identification procedures can also serve as a deterrent to crimin als. The objective of a badging program is to make it obvious who is authorized to be on site and who is not, and to make those who are not authorized stand out.
Finally, guard services can also provide a visible deterrent to help prevent criminal activit y, as well as the ability to quickly respond to any intrusions. However, such a service can be extremely costly – ranging from $150K - $250K annually for a single full-time equivalent (FTE) – and is not always within the financial means of a utility. While having a guard on site can provide a deterrent effect, that deterrent is typically only manifested in areas that the guard is seen. A site as large as the RWQCP cannot be effectively patrolled by a single guard and potential intruders would be able to determine where the guard is at any time and circumvent their patrols.
The ideal security approach includes a combination of guard service and perimeter and interior detection. This allows the electronic component of security (typically the CCTV system) to identify breaches and provide information to the guards to respond. This local guard response will always be quicker than an off -site (police or otherwise) response protocol. However, as this approach is not always viable due to the associated costs, the ne xt best option is an effective perimeter protection system, integrated with an effective interior protection system, with detailed monitoring and response protocols based on the information that is provided by these systems. While the capital costs for thi s approach can be higher, the level of security provided is extensive and annual operating costs are far less than associated with a full-time guard service.
Ultimately, the single best tool to raise the risk to a criminal is awareness training for on -site personnel. The development of response and monitoring protocols are part of the recommendations detailed in the report.
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3.2.3 Reduce the Reward Associated with Committing a Crime An attacker has a specific goal in mind. If the value of a n attacker’s target is reduced, such that the attacker's goal cannot be obtained, it could deter the attacker. Staff should work to reduce obvious targets, such as a computer beside a window or an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition.
3.3 Security Planning
The security planning process can be summarized as follows:
1. What is being protected?
a. This is an assessment of an organization's assets, and how important each asset is in achieving the organization’s mission.
2. What (or who) are we protecting against?
a. This is an analysis of the threats facing an organization, ranging from local level threats to international terrorist level threats . This report addresses t he potential attacker's goals, threat vectors, and tactics relative to the RWQCP’s assets.
3. How is protection provided?
a. This is an analysis and review of the physical, electronic, and operational security measures currently in place to protect assets.
4. What is the gap?
a. Analysis of the first three questions will demonstrate th e vulnerabilities in the current security profile. This report includes discussion s of the best practices and standards to apply to the RWQCP security program. Security planning addresses how to close the gap that is identified in answering these questions .
Figure 1 illustrates the security planning process in its entirety, including identification of critical assets, assessment of threats, evaluation of existing security processes, and analysis of gaps. The resulting plan provides a blueprint to use in developing and implementing an effective security strategy.
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Figure 1 Security Planning Process
3.3.1 Site Evaluation
Site visits were completed on July 13 th, 2022 to evaluate the RWQCP’s existing security measures and gather information on the four security planning questions noted above. A site evaluation uses the lens of layered security to achieve the most comprehensive results. The concept of layered security is widely accepted within the physical and cybersecurity industries. The intent of a security program is to deter, detect, delay, and respond to troublesome events. An effective security program will establish concentric layers of security that mu st be overcome prior to an attacker causing undesired consequences.
• Layer 1 (L1) includes the perimeter of the site.
• Layer 2 (L2) includes the clear zone between the perimeter and any buildings. This layer also includes hatches, pump/lift stations, and outdoor equipment. • Layer 3 (L3) includes the building envelope, including doors, gates, walls, and windows. • Layer 4 (L4) includes the interior of buildings, as well as sitewide security. Sitewide security consists of controls or elements which can and should be viewed in a more holistic manner, since they are relevant throughout the site. • Layer 5 (L5) includes the various security related policies and procedures that should be evident within an organization. These procedures include how visitors and contractor s are handled, security awareness training, and background checks. Most of the Layer 5 features are not included in ANSI 57-10 but are often the most effective way to rapidly enhance the security profile of an organization and gain the most benefit from implementation of the previous four layers of security.
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The approach outlined above is consistent with the ANSI 57 -10 assessment approach. While ANSI 57-10 does not specifically mention layers, the recommendations use specific terms that directly correspond to the layers of security, as illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1 ANSI 57-10 Guidelines and Layers of Security Terminology ANSI 57-10 Guideline Reference Language Layer Reference Fencing Perimeter and Walls Layer 1
Gates Layer 1
Site Areas Layer 2
Facility Entrances Layer 1
Bollards and Vehicle Barriers Layers 1 & 2
Exterior Surfaces Layer 2
Outdoor Security Lighting Layers 1 & 2
Signage Layers 1 & 2
Electronic Security Systems All Layers
Access Control Systems (ACS) All Layers
CCTV Systems All Layers
Security Controls and Wiring All Layers
Building Elements Layer 3
Hatches, Vaults, and Vents Layers 2 & 3
Online Water Quality Monitoring Layer 4
Operator Devices Layer 4
Chemical Fill Line Locking Layer 4
Manholes Layer 2
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Section 4
THREAT PROFILE
4.1 General
This section outlines possible threats to the RWQCP. The following foundational elements are key to achieving a better understanding of these potential threats.
First and foremost, a threat is rarely, if ever, truly identifiable. The ways an intruder might damage a facility (i.e., vulnerabilities) and the methods to counteract those vulnerabilities effectively (i.e., security programs) can be assessed with a high degree of accuracy. However, it is very difficult to know with complete accuracy when, where, how, and if an attack will occur .
Second, individuals outside the water and wastewater sector typically have little knowledge of the most viable targets within a water or wastewater facility. Whereas most attackers would not be able to distinguish between a water and a wastewater facility, or between a critical asset and a non-critical asset, an industry or organization insider would have specific knowledge of targets and techniques. Consequently, it is important to consider that an insider, or an attacker colluding with an insider, would provide a more specific, more viable, and potentially more s ignificant threat to the facility.
The information outlined in the following sections is based on site specific data, industry intelligence, and information provided by employees and facility management with knowledge of operations and experience in security situations.
4.2 Design Basis Threat
The ANSI 57-10 Standard references the Design Basis Threat to help identify specific types of adversaries, including their motivation, available equipment, and weapons. The approach was originally developed shortly after September 11, 2001 when most of the nation’s security efforts were focused on preventing international terrorism. It is possible that this led to an overly conservative approach to security by essentially designing security to prevent the worst poss ible malevolent attacker - an international terrorist team with access to extensive equipment and weapons.
The reality is that the possibility of such an attack is small, with an estimated likelihood of 10 -6 per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Consequently, using the Design Basis Threat worst-case methodology could lead to identification of security recommendations that may not be commensurate with the real issues facing a facility.
More recent industry efforts have focused instead on preventing the worst reasonable case. The recommendations provided in this study consider security best practices, as applied to the most likely threats to the RWQCP facility.
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4.3 Water and Wastewater Threats
Properly treating wastewater is vital for preventing disease and protecting the environment. The 16,000 publicly owned wastewater systems in the U nited States play a critical role in protecting the health of over 75 percent of the country’s population. From a security perspective, t he water and wastewater sectors are treated similarly by the EPA and the DHS.
Water and wastewater systems are vulnerable to both manmade and natural threats, including earthquakes, flood, droughts, malevolent attacks, contamination, and cyber-attacks. Any incident that negatively affects the wastewater system would have far-reaching public health, economic, environmental, and psychological impacts. Loss of these critical services could result in significant consequences to the national or regional econom y. Assessing the security and risk of such systems is critically important.
The most prominent attacks on wastewater systems include:
• Service disruptions or loss of an asset from malevolent attacks such as terrorism, theft, sabotage, or vandalism.
• Breaches in cybersecurity.
• Introduction of chemicals or other foreign matter that affect the treatment process and limit the ability to effectively treat wastewater.
• Sabotage of equipment such as pumps and valves, which could lead to long-term disruptions to system flow and treatment .
The wastewater sector is complex, composed of infrastructure of varying sizes and types of ownership. The sector has unique risks that drive sector security and resilience activities, including various threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.
In addition, many attackers are unable to differentiate between water and wastewater facilities, leading to similar consequences in terms of human loss and impacts. As a result, emergency response planning is essential to the sector to ensure continuity of operations and to sustain public health and environmental protection.
4.3.1 Vulnerabilities and Other Challenges in the United States As previously noted, an attack on a wastewater system can take a variety of forms due to the complexity of the processes involved.
Wastewater treatment plants: In most cases, the wastewater treatment plant constitutes the last barrier between effective control of wastewater and damage to the environment. Often this is also the last place that a utility can continuous ly control the chemical and physical characteristics of the collected and treated wastewater.
Lift stations: These facilities are often constructed in locations with limited space and can benefit significantly from even a moderate level of physical security. Lift stations can be located in more remote areas and are sometimes widely dispersed, often resulting in inadequate security systems and associated monitoring . In the event of a lift station failure, caused by a force main break, power outage, or pump failure, wastewater may collect in the lift station wet well and back up into the collection system. This can result in environmental damage as well as danger to human health.
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Collection system : The collection system is generally the most vulnerable part of a wastewater system given the general lack of security or monitoring. As a result, the most likely scenario for an attack on the wastewater system is damage the collection system, which can cause sewer overflows within the utility.
4.3.2 Previous Water and Wastewater Sector Attacks
The water and wastewater sectors have seen an increasing number of attacks in recent years.
Table 2 provides a list of recent incidents . Most recently in July 2022, an unauthorized individual, currently designated as a possible saboteur, illegally gained acce ss to a wastewater facility in Southern California and attempted to cause a major spill that would have flooded the plant and created a massive hazard to public health. The DHS intelligence report on this matter adjudged it to be a “… deliberative, targeted effort to sabotage the facility rather than just an act of random vandalism.” The person tailgated into the site (entering after an employee opened the gate) and proceeded to break into several buildings unprotected by security technology or strong physi cal security elements. The individual was able to cut electrical lines, access and manipulate pumps and valves, and turn off some processes. This attack could have had much larger consequences, if not for the alert actions of employees on site. It also demonstrates that such an attack can happen to any organization and that each facility must take actions to prevent such an occurrence.
Table 2 Recent Attacks on Water and Wastewater Systems
Year Incident Report
2002
In Rome, Italy, four men of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat were arrested in possession of chemicals, false papers, and detailed plans for the water supply network in the zone of the Embassy of the United States. 2002 Two Al-Qaeda agents were arrested in Denver with plans to poison water resources. 2004
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and t he DHS issued a bulletin warning that terrorists were trying to recruit employees from water treatment plants as part of a drinking water poisoning project.
2006 A water tank in Tring, England was deliberately contaminated with herbicide. 2006 Strychnine (a pesticide) was intentionally released into a Danish artificial lake. 2007 In China, 201 people died from using water intentionally contaminated with fluoroacetamide (a pesticide).
2008 In Varney, Virginia, a man was arrested in possession of two vials of cyanide intended to poison the water supply system.
2008 The water supply system of a Burmese refugee camp in Thailand (with a population of 30,000) was intentionally poisoned with herbicide.
2009 In the Philippines, the Frente Moro de Liberación Islámica (MILF) poisoned sources of water used by government soldiers and the population.
2010
In England, two neo-Nazis (a father and son) were convicted of several counts of terrorism, including castor-making and conspiracy with Serbian Nazis to poison water resources used by Muslims.
2011 Documents seized during Operation Neptune Spear (which led to the death of Osama bin Laden) revealed plans for poisoning US water resources. 2011 In Spain (La Línea de la Concepción, Cadiz), a conspiracy to poison water resources in response to the death of Osama bin Laden was thwarted.
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Year Incident Report
2012 In Australia, two 5,000-liter drinking water tanks were deliberately poisoned with Diuron (an herbicide).
2012 In Afghanistan, hundreds of girls in a school fell ill after deliberate poisoning of the water supply system.
2019
A former employee of the Post Rock Water District in Kansas was able to remotely access one of the Post Rock Water District computers to shut down potable water treatment and disinfecting systems.
2021 The City of Oldsmar, Florida suffered a cyberattack during which the attacker attempted to poi son th e drinking water with toxic amounts of sodium hydroxide. 2021
Multiple ransomware and remote access attacks targeting water utilities information technology systems including California (3x), Maryland, Maine, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Florida.
2022 Southern California Wastewater Treatment Plant illegally entered with an attempt to create spillage and environmental and process damage.
2023
Sabotage of transformer equipment (by way of shooting) at several substations in Moore County, North Carolina leading to mass blackouts affecting neighboring utilities.
4.4 Crimes Against Persons/Property (CAP) Index Statistical Evaluation The Crimes Against Persons/Property (CAP) Index is another tool that can be applied to criminal risk analysis. The CAP methodology provides an analysis and likelihood forecast of a particular location’s risk of exposure to crime. The analysis is not just a reflection of crime rates for a particular area - it also considers a wide range of demographic characteristics that dispose an area to criminal activity. The data reflects the relationship between crime and social disorganization.
The CAP Index model evaluates approximately 150 demographic variables, as well as numerous sources of historical reported crime. Some of the demographic variables accounted for by the model include:
• Population data.
• Housing data.
• Rental data.
• Population mobility.
• Economic data.
• Education data.
• Transience data.
• Marital status.
• Employment rates.
• Transportation methods.
• Travel time to work.
The CAP Index report uses Crimecast scores, which contextualize a location’s crime risk in relation to the rest of the country. Scores can range from 0 to 2 ,000 and represent a relative probability, with 0 representing the lowest crime risk, 100 representing average crime risk, and 2,000 representing the highest crime risk. For example, a national score of 100 signifies a crime SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 14
risk in a given location is equal to the national average, a score of 600 indicates a crime risk six times higher than the national average, and a score of 25 denotes a crime risk a quarter of the national average.
Crimecast scores are normally reported for seven types of crimes: homicide, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, breaking and entering, theft, and motor vehicle the ft. Based on discussions with RWQCP personnel, simple assault and vandalism were also included in the evaluation since they are of notable concern. The Index provides a score for overall CAP, using the scores for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft; and an overall CAP Index, which is a weighted average of the homicide, sexual assault, and robbery scores (leaning heavily towards the robbery criteria). The three types of crimes used for the CAP Index number are those that pose the greatest danger to individuals in an operational environment.
In the CAP Index model, the score for each census tract is calculated based on characteristics that are internal to that tract, with no influence fro m other nearby tracts .
The CAP Index report includes a three-mile radius map that displays CAP Index scores for the area surrounding the facility, indicated by census tract. For the purposes of this assessment, the one-mile radius map for the RWQCP facility was used. The one-mile view more directly reflects the immediate risk and is less influenced by crime that takes place a greater distance from the facility.
The CAP Index report also provides address-specific data, utilizing block level data on the legal inhabitants surrounding the address and the level of social disorganization. The data is then rolled up into the census tract boundary for ease of viewing.
The CAP Index score and the one-mile radius CAP index map for the RWQCP site are provided in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively.
Figure 2 RWQCP CAP Index Score
Figure 3 RWQCP One-Mile Radius CAP Index Map
The national CAP Index score for the RWQCP is reported as 280. This indicates that violent crime in the immediate area is almost three times the national average.
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The color coding included as part of the CAP Index makes it easy to assess the risk in an area.
Green areas represent the lowest risk (below the national average), yellow areas represent moderate risk, and th e various shades of red and darker red indicate increased risk.
It is apparent that the higher crime areas to the south and west are affecting the potential risk at the RWQCP. It is important to understand that crime has an element of mobility - if police focus on high crime areas, making a strong show of force in th e area west of the RWQCP, it would not be unusual for the current crime in that area to drift to locations where there is less law enforcement presence.
4.4.1 Crimecast Scoring
The CAP Index report also provides a set of Crimecast scores that are specific to a site, and represent the site’s overall risk. This set of scores is not simply equal to the set of scores for the census tract in which the site is located. It is a weighted average of scores for tracts within a given radius of the site. The CAP Index model uses a radius threshold analysis to determine a site’s overall risk, i.e. the site-specific Crimecast scores .
Because an address specific score is related to weighted tracts around the area, it is possible for a site to be located in a census tract with low crime risk but have an overall site crime risk that is much higher.
The Crimecast scores for the RWQCP are provided in Table 3. The national scores provide the site's risk in comparison to all 50 states and the District of Columbia broken down by crime category, while the California Scores compare the site to state averages and the Riverside County Scores compare them to County averages. Past, current, and projected risk scores are also provided to support trend analysis.
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Table 3 RWQCP Crimecast Scores
United States California Riverside County
Past
2010
Current
2022
Projected
2027
Past
2010
Current
2022
Projected
2027
Past
2010
Current
2022
Projected
2027
Cap Index Score 352 280 282 259 216 220 237 201 197
Crimes Against Persons 323 281 260 244 223 208 198 175 160 Homicide 180 218 227 179 224 230 148 180 175
Sexual Assault 378 328 274 304 332 288 191 207 174
Robbery 353 278 287 252 201 209 255 205 205
Aggravated Assault 306 282 252 234 227 205 178 162 144
Crimes Against Property 418 294 289 332 252 253 257 206 202 Burglary 308 218 219 278 211 215 190 164 165
Larceny 422 291 281 348 263 259 276 217 211
Motor Vehicle Theft 636 530 535 359 303 317 292 251 246 Crimes of Concern at RWQCP
Assault 384 319 251 298 300 240 179 177 144
Vandalism 375 233 195 352 258 221 214 168 144
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The results in Table 3 confirm that crime is a serious concern at the RWQCP. There are no crimes or collection of criminal activities that score lower than the associated average at the county, state, or national levels. This is a clear indication that the facility, its personnel, and its physical assets are at risk from malevolent actors.
While crime is currently above average, this activity does appear to be trending down . The CAP category in Riverside County has dropped by over 10 percent since 2010, and it is projected to drop another 6.5 percent in the next five years. Similarly, CAP have dropped 11 percent since 2010, and are projected to hold stable for the next five years (2027). While these trends indicate positive progress, burglary, one of the primary concerns at the RWQCP site, has grown by
6.5 percent since 2010.
Overall, the data indicates that the RWQCP is susceptible to malevolent attackers and needs to take strong and effective measures to address these risks, especially given the potential consequences of a criminal intrusion.
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Section 5
FINDINGS
This section presents the findings of the security assessment, based on the methodology presented in Section 3 and the threat profile presented in Section 4. The results are presented for each layer of security, as described in Section 3.3.1, relative to m eeting both the ANSI 57 -10 Standard guidelines and industry best practices for physical, electronic, and operational security measures.
The following subsections are organized by security layers 1 through 5 to match security best practices. The ANSI 57-10 Standard is used to supplement the best practices analysis, serving as the benchmark for each respective security measure. Security measures are organized into various categories, and sub-categories, as detailed within this section of the study. The following sections provide a more detailed description of the benchmarking metrics, and how they apply to each of the individual security layer recommendation tables.
5.1 Benchmarking Security Measures Tabl e
The ANSI 57-10 benchmarking metric table, Table 5, matches the ANSI Standard text, with some minor additions. Each of the table elements are defined below :
• “ID#” - This column assigns each security measure a unique identification number.
These numbers are important, as they are referenced within the specific recommendation tables for each security layer. Each security category within a security layer is comprised of several of these security measures. • “Security Measure” - This column identifies each ANSI 57 -10 defined security measure. • “System Objective " - This column identifies whether the purpose of a given security measure is to delay or detect an intruder.
• “Vandals, Criminal, Saboteur, Insider” - These colu mns identify the design basis threat for each security measure, i.e., which type of threat the given security measure applies to, and whether that measure can delay/detect a basic or enhanced level of that threat.
Refer to the design basis threat matrix in Table 4 for details on what constitutes each threat.
• “Finding” - This column provides a high-level commentary on the RWQCP security profile through the lens of each security measure. A color legend precedes the benchmarking table and helps define the green, yellow, red, and blue colors used. Note that the yellow cells (partially meets) often indicate a situation where the security measure is fully implemented in some parts of the plant, but not in others. In many cases, the measure may not be required in those other applications.
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Table 4 ANSI 57-10 Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix Characteristic Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider
Objective Damage, deface, or destroy
targets of opportunity Theft of valuable assets
Disruption, destruction, or
contamination; destroy public
confidence in utility/governmental
agency
Property damage, theft,
disruption, destruction, or
contamination
Motivation Thrill, dare, grudge Financial gain, grudge Political, doctrinal, or religious causes, grudge
Revenge, financial gain, politica l
cause, collusion with outsider
Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Base Enhanced Planning/
system
knowledge
Little or
none Possible Little,
opportunistic Definite Definite Definite
Limited
access to
equipment,
facilities,
SCADA, or
networks
Extensive access
to equipment,
facilities, SCADA,
networks, and
security systems;
greater system
knowledge
Weapons None None Unlikely Knives, hand
guns, or rifles
Knives or hand
guns, toxic
materials
Automatic and semi-
automatic weapons,
toxic materials
Unlikely
Knives, hand
guns, or rifles,
toxic materials
Tools and
implements of
destruction
Readily
available
hand tools
or
equipment
available at
the facility,
spray paint
Basic hand tools
(e.g., pliers,
wire cutters,
hammers,
crowbars),
baseball bats, or
firecrackers.
Hand tools or
readily
available
tools or
equipment at
the facility
(as needed)
Sophistica te d
hand and/or
power tools
Basic hand
tools (e.g.,
pliers, wire
cutters,
hammers,
crowbars)
Unlimited variety of
hand, power, and
thermal tools
(including tools such
as cutting torches,
contaminant agents,
IEDs and IIDs)
Tools or
equipment
available at
the facility.
Tools or
equipment
available at the
facility.
Contaminants None Possible None None Probable Probable Possible Possible Asset Damage Minimal Possible Minimal Possible Possible Significant Significant Significant Injuries None Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Fatalities None Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Possible Abbreviations: IE Ds - improvised explosive devices; IIDs - ignition interlock devices; SCADA - supervisory control and data acquisition.
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Table 5 ANSI 57-10 Standard Benchmark Security Measures Color Legend:
Fully meets ANSI 57-10 benchmarks and security best practices Partially meets ANSI 57-10 benchmarks and security best practices Does not meet ANSI 57-10 benchmarks and security best practices Measure is not applicable to this facility
ID# Security Measures
System
Objective Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider Finding
Delay Detect Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d 1 Basic perimeter fence Meets
2 Enhanced climb resistant fence Partially Meets
3 Prevent tunneling Does Not
Meet
4 Bollards/barriers preventing vehicle
access N/A
5 Perimeter IDS Does Not
Meet
6 Keyed gates Meets
7 ACS gates Partially
Meets
8 Intercom/remote for visitors Meets
9 Sally port for delivery N/A
10 Guardhouse/manned entry N/A
11 Perimeter lighting Partially
Meets
12 Gate area lighting Partially
Meets
13 Hardened openings N/A
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ID# Security Measures
System
Objective Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider Finding
Delay Detect Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d 14 Visitor sign in checkpoint Meets
15 Warning signs every 50’ Partially
Meets
16 Motion lighting Does Not
Meet
17 Clear zone from perimeter Partially
Meets
18 Parking 30’ from key areas Meets
19 Internal fencing layer Does Not
Meet
20 Enhanced internal fencing Does Not
Meet
21 IDS on internal fence N/A
22 Tunnel resistant internal fence N/A
23 Bollards at critical exterior
equipment Partially
Meets
24 Vehicle barriers at second fence N/A
25 ACS on second fence N/A
26 Exterior transformers with cage or
barrier Partially
Meets
27 Generators locked cage or barrier Meets 28 MCC protected barriers Meets
29 IDS on chemical storage and feed
areas Does Not
Meet
30 CPTED/Landscaping/Obstruct ions Partially Meets
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ID# Security Measures
System
Objective Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider Finding
Delay Detect Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d 31 Manholes locked with security
fastener Meets
32 IDS on manholes Does Not
Meet
33 Limit signage identifying critical
assets Does Not
Meet
34 Locking caps for valve operator
covers Does Not
Meet
35 Vault hatches locked with shrouds Partially Meets
36 Vault hatches double door with
shrouds
Does Not
Meet
37 Vault hatches locked with shrouds
with IDS Does Not
Meet
38 Tamper resistant hinges Does Not
Meet
39 Key locked doors Meets
40 Exterior doors alarmed Does Not
Meet
41 ACS on doors Does Not
Meet
42 Automatic locking critical doors with
ACS
Does Not
Meet
43 Lobby mantrap Partially
Meets
44 Visitor waiting area Meets
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ID# Security Measures
System
Objective Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider Finding
Delay Detect Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d 45 Blast resistant doors Does Not
Meet
46 Vehicle barriers protect vehicle door N/A 47 Break resistant windows Does Not
Meet
48 Blast resistant windows Does Not
Meet
49 GB at windows Does Not
Meet
50 Interior IDS Does Not
Meet
51 Barriers on skylights N/A
52 IDS on skylights N/A
53 Locked roof hatches Meets
54 IDS on roof hatches Does Not
Meet
55 Roof access ladders protected Partially Meets
56 Roof access ladders with IDS Does Not Meet
57 Indoor transformer with cage N/A
58 Indoor generator with cage N/A
59 Indoor MCC with cage Partially
Meets
60 Chemical fill lines locked Meets
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ID# Security Measures
System
Objective Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider Finding
Delay Detect Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d 61 Chemical fill lines locked with IDS Does Not Meet
62 Indoor chemical storage and feed
locked Meets
63 Indoor chemical storage and feed
locked with IDS Does Not
Meet
Water Quality Monitoring
64 Online water quality monitoring Meets
CCTV Alarm Assessment
65 CCTV assessment - exterior doors Does Not Meet
66 CCTV assessment - hatches and
vaults Does Not
Meet
67 CCTV assessment - main gate Does Not
Meet
68 CCTV assessment - main entrance
door Does Not
Meet
69 CCTV assessment - general
surveillance Partially
Meets
70 CCTV assessment - interior critical
areas Does Not
Meet
Power and Wiring Systems
71 Electrical panels locked Partially Meets
72 Backup power to security
components Meets
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ID# Security Measures
System
Objective Vandal Criminal Saboteur Insider Finding
Delay Detect Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d Base Enhance d 73 Wiring in conduit Meets
74 Redundant wiring paths Does Not
Meet
75 Supervised security wiring Meets
76 Redundant critical utilities Meets
SCADA - Physical Security
77 Locked programmable logic
controller/RTU enclosures Meets
78 Tamper switches on enclosures Does Not Meet
79 Instrumentation wiring in conduit Meets Abbreviations: IDS - intrusion detection system; MCC - motor control center.
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5.2 Best Practice Assessment Tables
The following sub-sections are divided into the five different security layers, as detailed previously. A best practice assessment table is included for each layer, aligning closely to the metrics identified in the ANSI 57-10 Standard benchmarking table . Each best pract ice assessment table includes the following:
• An overview of the applicable security best practices. • A discussion of the existing conditions at the RWQCP. • A reference to the ANSI 57-10 security measure that aligns with the given security layer category.
• Recommendations to address the vulnerabilities.
• Implementation priority.
Adhering to best practices is essential for effective and defensible security decision making and ensuring future site improvements contribute to a safer and more secure working environm ent.
Specific best practices are shown in italics with supporting information shown in non -italics.
Note that best practices are not specifications , i.e., they are not intended to provide specifics regarding design and installation. The intent of these pra ctices is to ensure consistency in the application of mitigation measures across the organization.
5.3 Layer 1 - Site Perimeter Security
Layer 1 security comprises the outer site perimeter of the plant, including fencing and gates on the perimeter, devices to prevent vehicle forced access, and vegetation or structures on or adjacent to the perimeter that may provide or prevent access. Layer 1 also includes the various security technologies deployed on the plant perimeter. These measures are the first line of defense, and security controls implemented here can serve multiple functions, including deterrence, delay, and detection.
Table 6 includes a detailed discussion of the Layer 1 security measures, including existing RWQCP conditions, a comparison to security best practices and the ANSI 57 -10 guidelines, and recommendations to reduce risk. Site visit photographs are provided in Appendix B.
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Table 6 Layer 1 - Site Perimeter: Security Findings and Recommendations Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Layer 1 - Physical
Perimeter
Fencing
• All perimeter fences and walls should be a minimum of eight feet in height (from the insecure side). Chain link fence should be equipped with three strands of barbed
wire on top. Non chain link fence should be equipped
with an anti-climb system. Where acceptable by local
practices, razor wire is superior to and should be used in lieu of barbed wire. Other detection and assessment
tools should be used in conjunction with perimeter
barriers, as appropriate for the level of risk.
• A barrier is often used as the first line of defense in protecting a facility, and thus, is a critical element of the initial security layer. Chain-link fence is the most
common of these barriers due to its durability and
relatively low cost. However, the use of fencing or walls is, at best, a deterrent to casual intruders and a short delay to serious intruders. A fence or wall alone should in no way be considered an effective security mechanism.
A determined intruder will easily circumvent most fence barriers, chain-link or otherwise. The use of detection and assessment tools, such as fence alarming and CCTV,
enhances the barrier function to provide a useful security countermeasure. Any building having public access that
also makes up part of the perimeter requires additional attention/ hardening.
• Access through the perimeter does not always occur at a fence or gate. At a wastewater plant, access is often
possible via a water channel or culvert that runs under the fence. Where such conditions exist, the culvert or
channel must be blocked or otherwise protected from
unauthorized entry.
• Perimeter fencing at the RWQCP is one of
the strongest existing security elements.
• A majority of the plant is surrounded by
wrought iron Impasse II fencing that is at
least 8-feet high on the insecure side. This
fencing is new and in excellent condition.
• Fencing near the septic drop off area in the
northeast portion of the plant does not
meet the standard. It is a chain-link fence
approximately 6-feet tall. There is barbed
wire and, in some cases, razor wire topper
on this fence. The fence is not grounded
and can be easily pulled up to allow access
underneath.
• The west perimeter includes area equipped
with an interior chain-link fence, creating a
secondary barrier. This fence was installed
prior to the current wrought iron fence
installation and can be easily circumvented
once inside the main perimeter, providing
no real value. There are several areas of
disrepair in this fence and it is not necessary
for site security.
• An area on the west site perimeter has
evidence of erosion or individuals
penetrating under the Impasse fence. It
represents a security concern wherever the
ground can be eroded away or easily
tunneled.
• There are no culverts or other access points
to the site.
• ID#1 - The Impasse fencing provides an
effective delay mechanism against potential
intruders. The chain link fence in the northeast
plant area does not meet best practices. As
indicated in the best practices discussion,
fencing alone will not prevent incursions.
• ID#2 - The wrought iron fence meets the
definition of an enhanced climb resistant
fence. The chain link fence to the east does
not.
• ID#3 - The existing fencing does not prevent
tunneling. The perceived threat at this plant
does not justify the cost of installing a 12-2 4 ”
concrete base/footer for the fence at this ti me
.
However, installing the footer in selected areas
susceptible to erosion may be beneficial.
• ID#4 - There are no bollards preventing vehicle
access around the perimeter. This is not
perceived to be an issue as the threat review
does not indicate a need for bollards around
the entire perimeter.
• ID#13 - There are no culverts that require
protection.
• ID#19 to 22, 24, 25 - There is no requirement
for internal fencing at this facility.
• R1 - Improve fencing in the northeast area of
the plant. The improvements would ideally be
consistent with the Impasse fencing installed
throughout the remainder of the site.
However an improved chain link installation,
along with appropriate intrusion detection
measures, would also be effective and less
costly.
• R2 - Provide a concrete barrier under the fence
in areas where erosion is allowing entry
underneath.
• R1 - Medium
priority.
• R2 - High priority.
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Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Gates
• Wherever possible, sliding gates should be used in lieu of swing gates. The crash rating of gates should be based
on a detailed threat assessment. The gate area should
include a turnaround for vehicles that prevents entry into controlled areas.
• Gates are a critical element of the perimeter, and
typically a weak point for entry. One of the major issues with gates is the strength of the gate when hit by a
vehicle. Swing gates that join in the middle of the road provide minimal protection from this type of attack. The center point where the gates meet is the weakest area,
and a vehicle attacking this point can easily breach the gate. The use of a sliding or rolling gate mitigates this weak point, establishing the quality of the gate material itself as the major factor in its ability to withstand an attack.
• At many industrial facilities, it is not unusual for large trucks to deliver materials (i.e. chemicals, sludge
hauling, etc.). On occasion, these trucks may be directed to the wrong facility, or are denied entry for various
reasons. It is important that the gate area provides the ability for these trucks to turn around without having to enter the site. Securing the perimeter and then allowing unauthorized persons and vehicles on-site, intentionally, would compromise security efforts.
• The main gate at RWQCP meets best
practices. The gate is a wrought iron
powered sliding gate that is a minimum of
eight feet in height. The controls for the
gate are located inside the secure area. The
gate is equipped with ACS, CCTV, and an
intercom, and can be remotely operated by
administrative or operational personnel
within the plant.
• Other gates around the perimeter are
manual and match the wrought iron
fencing. The gates are padlocked and never
left open. They are not equipped with
intrusion detection devices, and CCTV is
limited for some gates.
• There is currently no gate that separates the
septic drop off area from the main plant.
Although access to that area is controlled at
the main entry, there is no way to stop
someone from moving from this area to the
process areas.
• ID#6 -Gates are either access controlled or
properly keyed.
• ID#8 - The main gate and the septic drop off
area gate include Airphone int erc oms, which
connect to the main reception area. The gates
can be opened remotely once contact is made.
• ID#9 - The gate areas do not include sally
ports (i.e., no protected points of entry into a
secure location). This represents a large
potential expense that would not notably
enhance security against perceived threats.
• ID#10 - There is no guardhouse at the main
gate. This represents a large expense that
would not notably enhance security against
perceived threats.
• ID#12 - The main gate area and the north gate
(near the stormwater pond) are well lit. Other
gated areas, which are rarely used, are not
typically well lit. Refer to Appendix A for more
detail.
• R3 - Add fencing and a gate to prevent the
ability to move from a public area (septic drop
off) to a controlled area (plant process areas).
• R3 - High priority.
CPTED
• CPTED principles should be consistently applied to all security design, including:
− Natural Surveillance - keeping areas well lit,
eliminating hiding spots, removing obscuring
vegetation, using CCTV where no natural sight lines
exist.
− Natural Access Control - reducing straight-line access routes using barriers, curbs, and landscaping to direct vehicles.
− Territorial Reinforcement - creating a sense of
ownership by clearly identifying
public/controlled/restricted zones using signs,
barriers, access control, visitor/employee badging,
and lighting.
− Maintenance - ensuring areas are well maintained,
indicating constant presence and vigilance.
• There is some level of perimeter lighting at
the site. The main gate area is well lit, as is
the north perimeter, which includes new
lights inside of the fence line. Refer to
Appendix A for recommendations
associated with additional lighting.
• There are areas along the perimeter,
notably the south side and near the
southwest gate, where vegetation and
other material facilitates access to the site.
In the southwest corner of the site, just
beyond the fence, but well hidden in the
trees, there is someone living in a tent.
Under the current conditions, that
individual would be able to easily enter the
site undetected.
• ID#11 - Lighting along the perimeter in areas
where personnel travel at night is sufficient.
However, current conditions are not
appropriate for security. Other technologies
(thermal, infra-red) can preclude the need for
visible lighting in most cases.
• R4 - Clear all vegetation from the fence line,
creating a clear zone that inhibits both access
and hiding places.
• R5 - Work with neighboring businesses t o limit
the amount of material stacked against the
fence line.
• R4/R5 - Low to
medium priority.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 29
Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Signs
• Signs should be used to enforce the CPTED concept of
territoriality. Ideally, signs should be placed at 50-foot intervals around the perimeter.
• The concept of territoriality involves the use of indicator s to establish ownership or control. These types of
indicators perform two functions:
− Warn off casual criminals.
− Provide a psychological notice that “you are being
watched”.
• Signs should not provide excessive information to
intruders, but must provide necessary information to
first responders.
• There are ample signs at the main gate
area. Signage is not in place every 50-feet
on the perimeter, but rather at areas near
gates and entrance points.
• ID#15 - Signage does not meet the standard of
every 50-feet. However, the problems that the
RWQCP is facing would likely not be alleviated
by more signs. It is readily apparent that this is
a private, secure facility. If the fencing is not
preventing intruders, signs likely will not
either. However, the issue of liability may be
relevant to additional signage - is the
organization doing enough to prevent a
potential lawsuit if someone were to enter the
site and injure themselves?
• ID#33 - Building signs indicate associated
processes. See Layer 3 - Buildings for
recommendations.
• R6 - Discuss liability concerns with internal
City risk group to determine if additional
signage is warranted.
• R6 - Low priority.
Lighting
• Lighting should be utilized to accomplish multiple goals. − Support the CPTED concept of territoriality.
− Create a deterrent to potential intruders.
− Provide a level of comfort for staff.
− Complement CCTV systems, as necessary.
• Refer to Appendix A for more detail. There
is currently no Layer 1 motion lighting
installed to complement CCTV systems.
The use of thermal or other technologies
would preclude the need for visible light.
• ID#16 - Although t he site is currently not
meeting the ANSI 57-10 guidelines, the use of
other technologies can provide the security
benefits that drive installation of motion
lighting. While motion lighting to deter,
detect, and assist CCTV surveillance is useful, it
is often flawed, as lights can fail or not activate
in time to achieve their purpose.
• To support plant operations and staff safety,
new lighting should be installed at the west
perimeter (HM-7, HM-8, and HM-9). To
support facility security, new lighting should
also be installed at the Storage Area (HM-11).
Refer to Appendix A for more detail.
• N/A.
Layer 1 - Electronic
Intrusion
Detection
• The entirety of the perimeter at an industrial facility should be alarmed. The intent of the alarming is to
identify when a breach of the perimeter occurs. Where
possible, alarming should include a corridor exterior to the facility perimeter itself to identify potential
breaches.
• Effective perimeter alarming can be achieved using
various technologies. These include on fence cable
systems, ground buried sensors, volumetric (
microwave)
beams, optical beams, and intelligent video alarming.
Each method has its own benefits and challenges, and
the correct technology will depend on many local
factors, including cost.
• Layer 1 of the RWQCP currently has no
perimeter IDS. There are cameras that can
be used for this purpose, but they do not
cover the entire perimeter. The City is
currently testing several mobile cameras on
the north perimeter to determine
feasibility.
• The site is equipped with numerous
cameras, connected to a Genetec VMS (a
high-end video platform). The Genetec
VMS, and associated cameras, are capable
of providing significant security utility, in
addition to their current process functions.
• ID#5 - There is no perimeter IDS. • R7 - Install a CCTV system to provide perimeter protection, utilizing a combination
of thermal and pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras.
The thermal cameras would primarily be
located along the perimeter, although in some
areas they could be placed on buildings. The
PTZ cameras would be tasked to the thermal
cameras and provide secondary alarming and
alarm assessment. The existing Genetec
system is capable of the above performance
integration. Implementation can be phased -
ensuring the appropriate platforms are
specified - adding devices as time and budgets
allow. The priority is the north fence line,
which has experienced the most issues to
date. As an interim measure until the City can
design and implement the recommended
permanent CCTV system solution, the City
should continue to employ (and potentially
expand the use of) the ECAMSECURE mobile
units to meet the immediate security needs of
the RWQCP. Refer to the CCTV Evaluation
Tech Memo provided in Appendix C.
• R7 - High priority -
add intrusion
detection to th e
north fence line.
• R7 - High priority -
utilize existing
equipment to
provide alarming
at main gate.
• R7 - Medium
priority - add
intrusion detection
to the remaining
perimeter.
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Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Alarm
Assessment
• Alarms on the perimeter require monitoring personnel or systems to evaluate the alarm and determine
appropriate response.
• Understanding the causes of an alarm will support
appropriate response. It is critical that personnel tasked with alarm response have as much accurate information
available to them as possible. This is both a safety and a security concern.
• There are currently no alarms within L ay er 1
(i.e., there is no assessment capability). The
plant control room is staffed and could
provide necessary assessment capabilities
(given the correct tools). In addition, as
some of the CCTV is currently monitored by
the City off site, there is an expectation that
assessment could occur there. Refer to
Section 5.4 for additional discussion on
system monitoring.
• ID#65 through 70 -There is currently no
consistent alarming or monitoring on site, and
therefore no assessment of alarm conditions.
• R8 - Ensure that, as alarms are added to the
perimeter (See: Layer 1 - Intrusion Detection),
complementary assessment capabilities are
provided to assess these alarms. Assessments
can be performed on site by RWQCP staff, off
site by the City, or remotely (iPad, laptop)
through a process which sends alarms to on
call RWQCP personnel. Refer to Section 5.4 for
additional recommendations related to
system monitoring.
• R8 - High priority.
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5.3.1 Layer 1 – Interim CCTV Solution
As part of this effort, a separate CCTV Evaluation was completed to help the City determine the value of extending the rental period of their ECAMSECURE mobile CCTV units, pending a permanent CCTV/perimeter security solution at the RWQCP . The technical memorandum (TM) is included in Appendix C.
The primary finding of the CCTV evaluation was that the optimum long-term solution includes the provision of appropriate perimeter security at the RWQCP , which will include installation of permanent technology to guard the fence line and other critical areas of the facility . However, as an interim measure until the City can design and implement the recommended permanent solution, the City should continue to employ (and potentially expand the use of) the ECAMSECURE mobile units to meet the immediate security needs of the RWQCP. The units should be equipped with thermal devices, which will provide a more efficient and cost -effective way to combat intrusions along the perimeter (versus visible light cameras). Depending on available budget, the installation can be phased to address the most problematic areas of the perimeter first. See Appendix C for additional details.
5.4 Layer 2 - Clear Zone Security
Layer 2 security comprises the clear zone of the plant, i.e., the area between the perimeter and any internal structures. Generally, this area is more difficult to surveille and alarm, as there are often very wide areas of unused space. Use of CCTV and CPTED techniques are often the most effective controls for this Layer. Layer 2 security controls are used primarily as detection factors.
Table 7 includes a detailed discussion of the Layer 2 security measures, including existing RWQCP conditions, a comparison to security best practices and the ANSI 57-10 guidelines, and recommendations to reduce risk. Site visit photographs are provided in Appendix B.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 32
Table 7 Layer 2 - Clear Zone: Security Findings and Recommendations Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Layer 2 - Physical
CPTED
• CPTED principles should be consistently applied
to all security design including:
− Natural Surveillance - keeping areas well lit,
eliminating hiding spots, removing obscuring
vegetation, and using CCTV where no natural
sight lines exist.
− Natural Access Control - reducing straight-line
access routes using barriers, curbs, and
landscaping to direct vehicles.
− Territorial Reinforcement - creating a sense of
ownership by clearly identifying
public/controlled/restricted zones using signs,
barriers, access control, visitor/employee
badging, and lighting.
− Maintenance - ensuring that areas are well
maintained, indicating constant presence and
vigilance.
• There are several areas along the plant perimeter
that provide site access and hiding places for
intruders. Most notable are portions of the south
fence line. In addition, an adjacent business on t he
south side has scaffolding along the perimeter
that rises above the RWQCP fence and provides a
platform for illegal entry.
• Inside the plant perimeter, natural surveillance
requirements are met. Maintenance is mostly
effective, and the site does not invite intrusions
due to lack of care.
• CPTED identifies value in locating parking areas
away from key process areas. This guideline is
met, as the main parking area is separate from any
process. However, this does not preclude a vehicle
from moving around the site.
• Each building has a sign noting its function. This
provides knowledgeable intruders with a road
map of where to go to cause the most damage.
• ID#17 - Other than the items noted wit hin t he
Layer 1 recommendations, the plant clear zone
meets standard requirements.
• ID#18 - Parking areas are separated from process
buildings.
• ID#30 - There are no major obstructions created
by landscaping within the plant.
• ID#33 - Plant buildings all have signs indicating
which process is inside.
• R9 - Remove vegetation, as indicated in R4. Work
with neighboring businesses to reduce the
opportunity for access on the south fence.
• R10 - Over time, replace signs on buildings with a
numbering system known to staff only. In an
emergency, responders can be directed to
“Building 4” rather than “Headworks”.
• R9 - Medium
priority.
• R10 - Low
priority.
Equipment
• Exposed critical process equipment should be
protected by bollards or other barriers. These
bollards are intended to provide protection
against malevolent actors and vehicles
legitimately on site.
• External equipment, such as exposed cabinets,
manholes, and generators should be properly
secured and protected using physical (locks,
bollards, fencing) and electronic (IDS) means.
• The level of recommended equipment protectio n
is dependent on the value of the equipment and
the perceived risk to it. Manholes can be secured
using a security bolt requiring a specific tool.
Ladders to tank roofs can be effectively secured
using physical barriers and locks. All external
equipment should be under surveillance in a
properly designed environment, presenting
opportunities for effective intrusion detection.
• Existing generators are located outdoors and
protected by bollards. They are key locked and, in
some cases, can be viewed with existing video
devices. However, the generators are not alarmed.
MCC equipment is located inside buildings t hat
are typically locked via key only. There are
cabinets or small lockers housing equipment that
are not well secured.
• Access to tank ladders are secured with a cap and
lock. In some cases, these locks are ineffective as
the cap has been pulled aside.
• Manholes at the site are secured. Manholes are
not equipped with IDS.
• ID#23, 26 - Bollards are installed in multiple areas
(generators, other). However some transformers
are not protected with either cage or bollard.
• ID#27 - Generators are well protected.
• ID#28 - MCC equipment is protected, inside
buildings.
• ID#31 - Manholes are locked with a security tool.
• ID#32 - Manholes are not equipped with IDS.
Given the threat environment, this approach
would not provide enough benefit to warrant th e
cost.
• R11 - Review key electrical equipment locations
(exterior) and add bollards as necessary.
− Most equipment is well protected and there is
minimal traffic near the exposed equipment.
Bollards in this case are intended to prevent an
accident more than to prevent an attack.
• R11 - Low
priority.
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Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Intrusion
Detection
• Layer 2 areas should provide maximum
opportunity to detect trespassers. Routes to and
from critical assets through the clear zone should
be surveyed where possible.
• In many facility attacks, the clear zone is where an
intruder will be visible for the longest period.
Additional assessment can occur within this zone
after a perimeter breach. Typically, video
surveillance is the most appropriate way to
generate alarms in this layer.
• An internal perimeter fence with intrusion
detection is generally used in very high security
environments.
• No IDS exists within the plant ’s clear zone. This
includes chemical storage and feed areas,
although those areas can be viewed by CCTV to
some extent. Effective implementation of CCTV
throughout the site will allow all key areas to be
properly alarmed. These areas can be identified
either directly or as part of a prioritization
workshop.
• ID#25 -There is no secondary fence requiring
alarms, nor is there a need for one.
• ID#29 - There is no IDS for the chemical feed and
storage area.
• ID#32 - There is no IDS on manholes.
• R12 - Develop a video design strategy that
leverages existing platforms and equipment and
provides a comprehensive video surveillance and
alarming approach for the entire site. This
includes the perimeter, clear zone, and internal
alarming.
• There are numerous cameras throughout the
plant and an excellent video platform in place
(Genetec) that can be leveraged to provide the
necessary alarming.
• R12 - High
priority.
Alarm
Assessment
• Alarms in this layer require a methodology to
allow monitoring personnel or systems to evalua te
the alarm and determine appropriate response.
• Understanding the causes of an alarm will support
appropriate response. It is critical that personnel
tasked with alarm response have as much
accurate information available to them as
possible. This is both a safety and a security
concern.
• The plant has no alarms in Layer 2. Appropriate
use of video would address this gap.
• ID#59 - Some existing cameras currently view
Layer 2 areas and could be used to support
alarming and alarm assessment.
• R13 - As alarming capability is added to Layer 2 via
video or other means, provide assessment
capability as described in Layer 1 - Alarm
Assessment.
− Alarming and alarm assessment using existing
and future video capabilities should be a very
high priority moving forward.
• R13 - High
priority.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 34
5.5 Layer 3 - Building Security
Layer 3 security comprises the security controls deployed at the envelope of the building and represents controls that are both physical (strong doors and locks, protected windows) and electronic (access control, CCTV, intrusio n detection). These controls are not associated solely with doors and windows, but also the roof, attached vaults, and any other portion of the building that could provide access. Layer 3 controls also serve multiple functions (deterrence, delay, detection) and in many cases can help determine an appropriate response methodology.
Table 8 provides a detailed discussion of Layer 3 security measures, including ex isting RWQCP conditions, a comparison to security best practices and the ANSI 57-10 guidelines, and recommendations to reduce risk. Site visit photographs are provided in Appendix B.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 35
Table 8 Layer 3 - Buildings: Security Findings and Recommendations Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Layer 3 - Physical
Doors/Locks/Hinges
• Exterior doors for buildings holding critical assets
should have the following:
− Mechanical locks with Medeco IC or similar
removeable core for doors without access control.
− Hinges to buildings housing critical assets should be security hinges requiring a special tool to remove,
should be located on the secure side of the door, and
should be tamper resistant.
• All plant doors are equipped with lock and key.
• There is no intrusion detection in place for
perimeter doors.
• Process building doors are metal in metal
frames and secure.
• There are a variety of astragals used across the
site, from a full astragal to a smaller astragal
covering only the lock set.
• Hinges are typically installed on the outside of
doors and are not purposefully t amper
resistant.
• Doors are not blast resistant.
• ID#38 - Hinges are not tamper
resistant.
• ID#39 - All process area doors are
properly keyed. Some are left open
for operations in the daytime.
• R14 - Provide security hinges for all doors.
- There is only marginal risk reduction
associated with this effort.
• R14 - Low
priority.
Windows/Openings
• Any vent larger than 96 sq. in. must be secured by a
grill. The grill should have no less than a 2" screen, and
0.192" diameter wire. 16.5 mm anti-penetration film
should be provided where there is a threat of a
projectile. Window coverings or blinds should be
installed on ground floors or roof access floors.
• Where a building could be attacked with a vehicle,
appropriate physical measures should be in place, such
as bollards, planters, or other barrier material.
• Access points to roofs (usually a ladder or stairs) should be secured from unauthorized access.
• Most of the process buildings do not have
windows. The Admin/Lab building windows
are not protected in any way (i.e. with
glassbreak detection, film, or other
shatterproof material). The Maintenance
Building has accessible windows that are not
protected. The remaining process buildings
rarely have glass or unprotected openings.
• There is no apparent requirement for barriers
in front of buildings. The guideline for this
element is to protect against an elevated (well
equipped, well-armed) saboteur. Such an
attacker would have multiple options beyond
crashing a vehicle into a building.
• Ladders are equipped with cages to prevent
access. However, some are not locked or have
been damaged.
• There are no glass skylights in any buildings
that require physical protection.
• ID#46 - Protection from vehicle
attack is not necessary.
• ID#47, 48, 49 - Windows and
openings are not well protected.
• ID#51 - There are no skylights.
• ID#53 - Roof hatches are locked.
• ID#55 - Ladders have cages to
prevent access. However, some are
not locked or have been damaged.
• R15 - Add glassbreaks.
− This is the most cost-effective approach t o
address this gap. Adding window bars is not
warranted given the threat environment
and past incident history.
• R16 - Repair the ladders that currently do not
inhibit unauthorized access.
• R15 - Medium
priority.
• R16 - Medium
priority.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 36
Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Exterior Equipment
• All exterior critical equipment should be protected.
Protection can be physical (locks, chains, etc.) or
electronic (CCTV, IDS). However, a combination of both
is ideal.
• At an industrial facility, critical areas include anything vital to process, as well as areas where dangerous
materials are stored.
• Ground vaults and hatches are locked in all
cases. Shrouds covering the locks were
typically not present, except in rare cases.
• ID#34 - There are no locks on valve
caps.
• ID#35 - While hatches are locked,
there are no shrouds protecting the
lock.
• ID#36 - Vault hatches with double
doors are not shrouded.
• ID#57 - There are no indoor
transformers requiring cages.
• ID#58 - There are no indoor
generators requiring cages.
• ID#59 - Indoor MCCs are not caged,
but they are protected by the building
itself. These buildings are well built
and not easily susceptible to attack.
As this requirement speaks to an
elevated type of attack, adding cages
is not a high priority given the other
necessary security improvements.
• ID#60 - Chemical fill lines are locked.
• ID#62 - Indoor chemical storage
areas are secured.
• N/A.
− ID#34 and #36 are intended to delay a
saboteur or a well-prepared and equipped
vandal. These security measures would
provide some delay, but other noted
security deficiencies, most notably the
inability to deter or detect entry to the site,
are far more critical. The fact that these
equipment areas are locked meets the
primary intent of the guideline.
• N/A.
Separation
• Buildings should be divided into security zones, typically public, controlled, or restricted. Each zone should be
secured by lockable doors, including access control.
Zone separation areas should be in view of CCTV.
• Public areas do not imply the public has full access to these areas - in an industrial facility the public area would represent any areas where visitors or contractors first interface with reception or other personnel.
Controlled areas should require escort for any non-
employee and should be separated for employees based
on job requirements. Restricted areas are those which
only a person with specific credentials would be able to access, e.g., control rooms, electrical rooms,
communications closets, and server rooms.
• Most of the process buildings have only one
room. Generally, if an individual is permitted to
access one part of the process area, they are
likely permitted in remainder of that building.
• The Admin Building contains multiple rooms,
including a waiting area for visitors separated
by glass doors (although these doors are
typically open during the day). There is no
security within the building that would inhibit
an intruder from moving to controlled or
restricted spaces.
• The Server Room and the Control Room are
not controlled or protected in any manner.
These should be considered high security areas
that merit additional security.
• ID#43 - The lobby area could be used
as a mantrap with the application of
ACS. It is not appropriately secured at
this time.
• ID#44 - See above. The visitor
waiting area and lobby can be used
effectively to meet this guideline with
the application of technology.
• R17 - Create separation within the Admin
Building by adding ACS to the doors separating
the common area from the interior.
• R18 - Add ACS to the server room door. Add
ACS to the Control Room door.
• R17 - Medium
priority.
• R18 - High
priority.
Access Controls
• Each building should have at minimum of one entry
door equipped with automated access control (card
reader, alarm contact, request to exit, door position
switch). Where possible, all perimeter doors should be
part of the ACS.
• Currently, there is very limited use of ACS on
site. Only the Admin/Lab Building is equipped
with card readers, connected to a Honeywell
control panel.
• ID#41 - Most doors, including critical
areas such as the Server Room and
the Control Room, are not equipped
with ACS.
• ID#42 - There is no auto locking of
doors.
• Refer to Table 9 for sitewide access control
recommendations.
− Implement at critical areas first to prioritize
the addition of access control.
• Refer to Table 9
for sitewide
access control
priorities.
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Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority CCTV
• Cameras should be available to view all entry/exit points from buildings. Use of PTZ cameras integrated with the
ACS is preferable (assuming the existence of an ACS).
• There are 33 existing cameras in use at the
plant, connected to a Genetec VMS. A m ajo rity
of the cameras are Avigilon. Both Avigilon and
Genetec are high end systems with significant
capabilities. However, they are not currently
programmed to provide alarming information
and assessment to local staff. Essentially, they
are view only, controlled elsewhere by the
City. To meet or exceed the guideline
recommendation for assessment and
alarming, the existing cameras would need to
be re-tasked to add that function (in addition
to their current process functions). Additional
cameras would also be required.
• References ID#65-70 are generally
relevant to this item and are
addressed in the sitewide CCTV
section below (Table 9).
• Refer to Table 9 for sitewide CCTV
recommendations.
• Refer to Table 9
for sitewide
CCTV priorities.
Intrusion Detection
• All perimeter entry points (doors, overhead doors, roof hatches, windows) should be equipped with IDS. The
IDS requirement can be met using video, alarm
contacts, passive infra-red detectors, glassbreaks, or
other technologies.
• There is no intrusion detection currently in
place at the facility.
• ID#37, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50, 54, 56 -
There are no intrusion detection
devices on building doors, windows,
or internal areas.
• ID#52 - There are no skylights
requiring IDS.
• ID#63 - There is no IDS associated
with chemical storage areas.
• R19 - Add IDS to building perimeter entry/exit
points. This can be accomplished via actual
intrusion contacts, or the expanded use of
video. Include any roof hatches in this effort.
• R19 - Medium
priority.
Internal Alarms
• Key areas within any building should be equipped with intrusion alarming. Key assets within that building
should be equipped with video surveillance and
alarming.
• Key areas include assets critical to the mission of the organization, as well as the separation areas noted
above between public/controlled/restricted spaces.
Alarms can be driven by several technologies, including video, alarm contacts, passive infra-red detection, and acoustic sensors. The technology selected should reflect specific area needs and capabilities.
• None of the buildings currently include interna l
alarms or video surveillance.
• ID#49, 50, 52, 54, 56 - Refer to
Table 9 for sitewide intrusion
detection references
• Refer to Table 9 for sitewide intrusion
detection recommendations.
• Refer to
Table 9 for
sitewide
intrusion
detection
priorities.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 38
5.6 Layer 4 - Sitewide Security
Layer 4 security comprises sitewide security measures and includes tools applicable to all security layers within the RWQCP facility. For example, while the placement of cameras is relevant to the first three layers, it would be redundant to discuss the use of CCTV platforms for assessment and monitoring at each layer. Instead, this discussion is included as part of Layer 4.
As noted in Section 3.2.2, guard services can also provide a visible deterrent to help prevent criminal activity, as well as the ability to quickly respond to any intrusions. However, such a service can be extremely costly – especially at a large site like the RWQCP.
The next best option is an effective perimeter protection system, integrated with an effective interior protection system, with detailed monitoring and response protocols based on the information that is provided by these systems (as recommended in the oth er layers). While the capital costs for this approach can be high er, the level of security provided is extensive and annual operating costs are far less than associated with a full -time guard service. Consequently, while a guard service may provide interim value until the recommended systems are implemented, it is not considered a long -term solution for the facility.
As described in Section 5.3.2, implementing a mobile CCTV solution is another interim measure that can provide value until a long -term perimeter security system is in place. In comparing the use of a guard service to the use of mobile CCTV units as an interim security solution, the mobile CCTV units are the recommended solution. While a combination of both guard services and CCTV is the most effective security approach, there is a substantial cost to having both guards and CCTV coverage. The best compromise is to install a CCTV system with thermal imaging, as it can provide an effective means to providing wide site coverage and creating intrusio n detection alarms without the need for physical site presence. Additionally, the site’s current guard service has had limited success due to high on -going costs and limited site coverage .
Table 9 provides a detailed discussion of the Layer 4 security measures, including existing RWQCP conditions, a comparison to security best practices and the ANSI 57-10 guidelines, and recommendations to reduce risk. Site visit photographs are provided in Appendix B.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 39
Table 9 Layer 4 - Site Wide: Security Findings and Recommendations Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority System
Monitoring
• Adequately trained personnel should monitor security systems around the clock. Ideally, system monitoring should be performed simultaneously on-site and off-site by either organization personnel or contracted personnel at an off-site location designated for security operations.
• Effective monitoring of the security system is one of the most critical elements of the entire security plan. Without an effective monitoring component, the entire system can easily be compromised and thus rendered useless. Unmonitored alarms lead to a lack of response, which in turn leads to a lack of system confidence. Sporadic or complete lack of monitoring can lead to an event being discovered after it is too late to intervene or limit damage. • A security system loses an appreciable level of capability if it is not monitored correctly. Real-time monitoring of the system provides an organization wit h the ability to detect an intrusion, assess it promptly and properly, and respond to it in an appropriate and immediate fashion. In a real-time monitoring approach, monitoring personnel are advised of a breach in the security profile, use tools to assess the breach, and then send contract security or other appropriate personnel to respond. If the assessment indicates a false or nuisance alarm, it can be ignored.
• Monitoring should also be undertaken for investigative purposes. The ACS provides a wealth of information that should be utilized to its full extent. As an example, the system pinpoints occasions when a cardholder uses an access card to attempt to access a restricted area. If this event occurs one time it could be happenstance, but if the event occurs multiple times it could indica te a serious problem. Only with proper monitoring and auditing of the system can a pattern of inappropriate card usage be detected.
• At larger, manned sites, simultaneous monitoring by on-site and off-site personnel should be considered to provide redundancy. There are distinct advantages of both on-site and off-site monitoring that, when combined, provide maximum security benefits. Both on-site and off-site monitoring stations should be capable of monitoring all security system components.
Personnel that are tasked with security functions are far more alert, efficient, and productive when using a fully equipped monitoring station. Monitoring personnel should have a console dedicated to security monitoring and should not have other duties that preclude effective and constant vigilance (i.e., wastewater treatment operation ).
• System monitoring is current ly one
of the most critical security issues
that the City should address. While
there are over 30 cameras on site,
they are not locally controlled or
monitored for alarms. The devices
and platforms in place for video are
capable of alarming, alarm
assessment, surveillance, and
investigation - the key functions of
any effective video system. Unless
the current approach to system
monitoring is modified, the systems
in place and those recommended in
this document will not provide full
security value.
• System monitoring is not restricted
to video monitoring. While there are
currently no intrusion devices on site
and very little access control, these
systems, once implemented, will
require monitoring as well. The
recommendations herein address
methods to do so effectively and
within the resource capabilities of
the City.
• ID#65-70 - As noted, there is currently
no consistent alarming or monitoring
on site, and therefore no assessment of
alarm conditions.
• R20 - Provide exception-based
monitoring for all security syst ems,
existing and future. Exception based
monitoring includes business rules
regarding which events or alarms
merit assessment and response. This
enables operators to only scrutinize
video or other system feeds if a
problem has been detected and
requires human intervention to solve.
This is a core technology that
facilitates greater efficiency and
reliability in how Control Rooms or
Security Operations Centers work.
When an event occurs, programming
allows the event to pop up on a
previously unused black screen,
drawing attention to the alarm either
visually or audibly. At this point, the
operator recognizes that an undesired
event (alarm) has occurred, and an
assessment and response protocol
must be invoked.
• R20 - High
priority.
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Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Alarm
Assessment
• Tools should be provided to allow all alarms to be properly assessed. Alarms to be assessed are those created by the access system, intrusion system, and the video system. In industrial plants, alarms can also be generated from process alarms via SCADA.
• Without proper assessment, no coherent response can be generated. Safety of responding personnel is also a critical component of the assessment capability. Most often, effective assessment is provided using CCTV. • Alarm assessment is limited to
SCADA alarms, which are not part of
this security evaluation
. There are no
other alarms being generated at the
plant. Existing video systems are
capable of alarming.
• There is currently no IDS and limited
access control in place.
• At the time of this study, the City
was testing three mobile cameras as
part of a temporary demonstration
project. These cameras, placed at
key points along the perimeter, are
monitored off site by a third party.
Events occurring within the field of
view of these units are reported to
the RWQCP for response.
• ID#65 through 70 - See the System
Monitoring section of this table
(above).
• See System Monitoring
Recommendations above. CCTV is the
most useful assessment tool
available. Once any system begins
alarming, CCTV should be utilized to
assess the alarm to determine an
appropriate response. As security
systems are further developed at the
site, integration of systems will allow
an automated alarm assessment
capability.
• See priority above
regarding
monitoring.
Alarm Response
• All alarms should be responded to.
• Response is based on the assessment of the alarm. Operational personnel should not typically be responding to alarms if the alarm has not been assessed. Police or third-party contractors should be tasked with response to verified alarms. On-site staff should not be tasked with alarm response without effective and reliable alarm assessment in place. • SCADA alarms are addressed by
plant personnel.
• There are no security alarms in place
to require response.
• Alarm response is not noted in the
guidelines.
• R21 - Alarm response protocols must
be developed as part of the
Operational Security component of
the security program.
− Most necessary equipment is
currently in place to facilitate
response. The City should develop
protocols via a paper and
workshop exercise.
• R21 - High
priority.
ACS Platform
• The ACS is often the managing component of the entire security system. All perimeter access points should be equipped with a card access system to control entry and egress. Each building or structure, including high priority areas within buildings, should be equipped with card access at one entry point (at a minimum). Other perimeter doors should be alarm/exit only if no access is intended at the location. High priority assets should be protected with an ACS requiring a card and an additional verification measure, such as a personal identification number or biometrics.
• A threat assessment and asset prioritization process will help identify the buildings and areas within a building that require access control. • An ACS provides a wealth of information that relates to both safety and security. The system should be able to provide reports that can be used as an investigative tool. The following conditions, all of which can be determined via the software, should always be investigated:
− Propped doors.
− Cards read in unauthorized areas.
− Card read at unauthorized times.
− Compliance with entry/exit procedures at gates.
• Compliance with entry/exit procedures relates to personnel properly carding into the site. For example, when carpooling, often only the driver will read their card to gain entry. This creates both security and safety issues, as it is difficult to determine who is on site.
• There is limited access control at the
RWQCP site. The Admin/Lab
building is equipped with
card reader
entry. The main gate and the
alternative entry (via the septic area)
are also equipped with card readers.
The readers are operating on a
Honeywell platform.
• The main gate area also includes exit
readers, which are currently not
used. Exit is provided via a ground
loop. This approach, while common,
creates a vulnerability that allows
easy and uncontrolled or
unauthorized exit for intruders.
• ID#7 - The main gate has access
control, but the other site entries do
not. However, the other entry points
are not commonly used. The main gate
also has exit readers which are not
used.
• ID#25 - There is no second fence that
requires access control.
• ID#41 - Without widespread use of an
ACS, most areas do not have controlled
entry.
• ID#42 - Without widespread use of an
ACS, most areas do not have
automated door locking.
• R22 - Generate a strategy to provide a
full ACS over time. This can be
initiated by selecting the platform (or
expanding the existing Honeywell
platform, which is a viable option)
followed by a prioritization of areas to
be controlled. Over a period of several
years, doors and areas can be added
to the system as funds become
available. This can be a medium-term
project, taking 2-5 years, or a short-
term project if funds are available.
• R23 - Activate and use the exit
readers. This can be programmed to
function at certain times. For
example, during shift change hours,
the system could allow exit via ground
loop, per the current approach. After
hours, the system could be
automatically switched to require an
exit read.
• R22/R23 - High
priority.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 41
Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority • Card access systems provide access via authentication (e.g., an access card) and authorization, where a given card is accepted. Authorization links authenticate individuals to specific buildings or areas to which they are entitled to have access and do so by establishing rules for each controlled access point. The authorization process is managed by the access system administrator and management.
• Authenticity can be provided via three factors:
− What you have (a card, a key).
− What you know (a personal identification number).
− Who you are (biometrics).
• The more factors required, the better the security. However, there is a need to balance security requirements with operational efficiency. Typically, using an access card as single factor authentication is sufficient security. However, for high priority assets, multiple factor authentications should be used. • Card access should not be used solely to replace keys. The technology should be leveraged in the manner described above. All card access doors must also include alarm contacts, electrified locks, request-to-exits, and door position indicators.
CCTV and VMS
Platform
• CCTV should be used for alarming, assessment, surveillance, and investigation. The entire length of the perimeter, clear zones, and high priority assets should be monitored by video surveillance. A combination of PTZ and fixed cameras should be used to provide the best possible coverage.
The system should have a sophisticated digital video management system capable of geographic information system integration, camera control, video distribution, analysis, sensor integration, and alarm notification. • The CCTV component of the security profile should be viewed as a system that is greater than the sum of its parts. It is important not to consider the cameras separate from the digital video management system, nor the reverse.
• Video systems can track activity in their field of view with several different technologies and can trigger alarms when an activity occurs. CCTV cameras should also be used to provide assessment when another detection system creates an alarm. Cameras should be capable of filling a general surveillance role and be used for pre-programmed tours of the complex, when not responding to alarms. Finally, the system should provide a high degree of investigative capability. If video footage is required as evidence, stored video should be easy to retrieve and have assurances that it was not tampered with. • A CCTV system should include a combination of PTZ and fixed cameras. PTZ cameras should be used for overview and alarm assessment, while fixed cameras (including visible light, infrared, and thermal) should be responsible for alarm assessment, general surveillance, and, in some cases, alarm detection. Specific selection criteria for cameras should reflect the criticality of the site, and the environmental conditions that might make thermal or infrared cameras more useful.
• There are currently over 30 cameras
on site. The cameras are not utilized
in a primary security function and are
not tasked with alarming or alarm
assessment. The existing system is
not fully utilized.
• Existing cameras are not integrated
to other security systems.
• Existing cameras are available to
view the gate area, but typically not
the various building entry and exit
points.
• ID#5 - Perimeter IDS can be
accomplished with video. However, no
IDS is in place at this time.
• ID#29 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS of external
equipment.
• ID#32 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
external equipment.
• ID#65 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
external building doors.
• ID#66 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
hatches and vaults.
• ID#67 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
main gates.
• ID#68 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
the main door to Admin/Lab Building.
• ID#69 - There is no use of video to
provide increased general surveillance
capability.
• ID#70 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
critical internal areas.
• R24 - Develop a video surveillance
protocol that includes:
− Video alarming.
− Fields of view including all building
entry points.
− Full perimeter coverage including
the use of thermal, fixed, and PTZ
cameras, as appropriate.
− Internal CCTV for critical areas
(e.g., Server Room).
− Development of exception-based
monitoring.
− Full integration to other security
systems as they are rolled out.
− Alarm assessment protocol.
− Alarm response protocol.
• R24 - High
priority.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 42
Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority Intrusion
Alarming
Platform
• The perimeter should be equipped with an IDS. All entry points into buildings and structures, including windows and roof hatches, as well as high priority areas within buildings, should be monitored using contacts, motion detection, and/or glass break technology.
• There are several ways to protect a site perimeter including sensors on fences, sensors in the ground, or optical/microwave beams. CCTV analytics, including the use of thermal imaging systems, are a very viable approach in areas with very long perimeters or difficult weather environments. Perimeter detection using video can be designed to protect the exterior perimeter, interior perimeter, or both.
• Intrusion detection is also utilized on and in buildings. For operations buildings, while access control is typically provided on some doors through an integrated IDS, exit only doors should also have an IDS component to identify forced or held open situations. Other rooms within a building should also include IDS depending on the threat assessment. These rooms might include mechanical or electrical rooms, communications closets, and tool storage areas.
• There are no IDS or associated
alarms in place at the plant.
• ID#5 - Perimeter IDS can be
accomplished with video. No IDS is in
place at this time.
• ID#21 - There is no internal fence that
requires support.
• ID#29 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS of external
equipment.
• ID#32 - There is no use of video to
protect/provide IDS and assessment of
external equipment.
• ID#37 - There is no use of IDS for
assessment of vaults.
• ID#50 - There is no use of IDS to
protect assets internal to buildings.
• ID#54 - There is no use of IDS on roof
hatches.
• ID#56 - There is no use of IDS on roof
ladders.
• ID#61 - There is no use of IDS on
chemical fill areas.
• ID#78 - There is no use of IDS (tamper
switches) on SCADA equipment
enclosures.
• R25 - Develop and implement an IDS
that combines access control doors,
video alarming, and specific intrusion
devices to protect:
− Entry doors to all buildings.
− Separation points between public
and controlled and controlled and
restricted areas.
− Areas within each building where
critical assets are held or where
personnel might require security.
These might include Server
Rooms, Control Rooms, Reception
areas, and electrical rooms.
• Note that many intrusion
requirements identified in the ANSI
57-10 Standard can be addressed with
the use of video, as described above.
All access-controlled doors shou ld
also inherently include intrusion
detection.
• R25 – High
priority.
System
Integration
• Electronic security systems should be designed and installed with consideration for the ultimate goals of the system. Security systems should be integrated seamlessly with each other, allowing a simple and effective user understanding and response to critical situations identified by the systems. • Integration is a central tenet of modern security design. Proper integration provides the end user with greatly enhanced security capabilities, leading to a much higher level of comfort for personnel that are protected by the system.
In addition, effective integration reduces training costs, limits maintenance costs, enhances the ability to quickly troubleshoot a system, and provides a more effective security response from personnel.
• Integration is the interaction and sharing of information, features, and functionality between systems and people to perform a system function effectively and efficiently. Strong integration reduces the amount of interaction required between technology and people, which has two key benefits: (1) freeing up personnel to perform other functions, and (2) reducing possible points of system failure.
• Conventional security contracting methods typically result in several systems from different vendors, each supplying different components of the system.
While this is often inevitable, it can create extra training, installation, and maintenance costs for the owner. Developing an integrated system platform design is the preferred alternative. The methodology behind an integrated platform is based on the ability to have differing system components functioning as one, and reporting through the same interface to an operator. • There are no systems in place, i.e., no
system integration.
• The guidelines do not address security
system integration.
• R26 – Ensure that the design of all
security systems includes/requires
integration that supports a coherent
communication at a software level
between systems, such that an alarm
generated in one system will generate
an assessment in other systems
automatically.
• The integrated system should also
automatically contact the appropriate
personnel via multiple
methodologies.
• R26 - Medium
priority.
• Integration is
accomplished
after other
recommended
systems are
implemented.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 43
Security
Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority • An integrated platform approach provides several advantages to the user.
There is an increase in system functionally and reduction in training costs, as the operator is only required to learn one interface for operating multiple systems (e.g., CCTV, IDS, ACS, fire, HVAC, etc.). The process of training or re- training a single system is significantly easier and less costly than specialized training on each of the monitored systems.
• By implementing an integrated approach, monitoring personnel can use a single workstation, versus the need for multiple computers and workstations for separate systems. This saves both the cost of the extra computers, GUIs, and peripheral devices, and the space required by equipment, which could be used to meet other operational needs.
Power
Resilience/Secur
ity
• Electronic security systems should be designed and installed with an appropriate level of power and backup.
• Each individual panel or discrete device should be equipped with battery backup with a minimum 4 hours of storage capacity. Computers and other software services should be provided with an uninterrupted power supply in the event of main building power failure. All systems should be connected to either a secondary power feed/circuit (if available) or backup generator.
Wiring to all devices should be in conduit and redundant wiring paths are preferred, if available. Security devices should be supervised and there should be an automatic notification on loss of a device.
• All electrical panels should be locked and accessible only to authorized personnel. This is both a safety and security measure.
• Data should be backed up based on the needs of the organization. The backup should include system set up, as well as the necessary amount of generated information (e.g., access events, video) required by the Owner or legislation. Backups should be regular and automated, not relying on an individual to remember to perform them. The security backup should be included as part of a regular information technology backup schedule. • Although systems within the plant
are limited (very little ACS, no IDS,
underutilized CCTV/VMS),
tho se th a t
are in place include high quality
platforms. Wiring to all devices is in
conduit and end devices are
supervised, as desired. Although
control panels for security are
located in
locked rooms, they are not
provided with tamper switches.
• Electrical panels are not typically
locked, although they are located in
buildings that should be locked. This
approach does not meet standard
guidelines.
• Power to the site is redundant. There
are six generators available to
address different areas of the plant.
The generators are tested regularly.
• ID#71 - Panels are not locked.
However, many are located in locked
buildings.
• ID#72 - Security devices are part of
plant systems equipped wit h backup
generator power. Uninterrupted power
supply is available for all software
related to security.
• ID#73 - All wiring is in conduit.
• ID#74 - There is no need for redundant
wiring paths for the existing limited
security installation. Redundant wiring
should be considered as part of future
security system installations.
• ID#75 - Security devices are
supervised.
• ID#76 - Resilient power is provided via
generators.
• R27 - Ensure that all exterior panels
include, at a minimum, a lock and
chain or padlock.
• R27 - High
priority.
Water Quality
Monitoring
• Water Quality Monitoring is driven by legislation and reporting requirements.
It is incumbent on the operator to fully meet the requirements of their operating license.
• Regular and 24-hour sampling occurs
at the RWQCP. Samples are
collected from various locations
across the plant and taken to the lab
on site for processing. In addition,
tegular readings are taken for
turbidity and pH. The plant is fully
meeting regulatory obligation
relative to water quality monitoring.
• ID#64 – The plant fully meets the
respective ANSI 57-10 Standard
guideline.
• None. • N/A.
SCADA Physical
Security
• All SCADA equipment should be secured using physical and electronic measures. Panels/enclosures should be locked and equipped with t amper switches. Servers should be locked in a server room and monitored with ACS and CCTV.
• Enclosures on site are locked but do
not have tamper switches. Most
enclosures are located inside locked
buildings. The server room is not a
secure environment, relying solely on
a keyed lock for protection.
• ID#77 - Enclosures are locked, and/or
in locked rooms.
• ID#78 - There are no tamper switches
on SCADA enclosures.
• ID#79 - All wiring is in conduit.
• R28 - Add tamper switches to SCADA
enclosures. This is also a
recommendation addressed within
the IDS section.
• R28 - High
priority.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 44
5.7 Layer 5 - Operational Security
Layer 5 security includes the operational security efforts needed to best support the security profile generated through implementation of the first four layers. For example, the benefits of implementing a costly ACS or CCTV system cannot be fully realized without effective management of documented policies and procedures, such as system administration, training, auditing, monitoring, and change control documentation . There must also be an organizational approach associated with how visitors and contractors are managed/controlled, how keys are handled, and numerous other procedures that affect security at the site.
Operational security is frequently the most overlooked aspect of security planning within an organization. Very often, proper procedures and training are the most cost-effective security tool available to make a facility safe and secure. Implementing effective practices usually has very little capital cost and provides high returns.
Table 10 includes a detailed discussion of the Layer 5 security measures, including existing RWQCP conditions, a comparison to best practices, and recommendations to reduce risk. While operational security features are not included in the ANSI 57-10 Standard, the best practices within Table 10 are included for reference as the City enhances the security profile of the RWQCP.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 45
Table 10 Layer 5 - Operational: Security Findings and Recommendations Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority
Security Policy
• The organization should have a documented security policy that is approved by executive management, readily available to all employees, and subject to periodic review and revision by executive management. Revisions to the document should be published, communicated, and distributed to all employees, accompanied by a revision checklist. The policy should provide authority to the appropriate personnel to develop, amend, review, and enforce security procedures in multiple domains. These domains are indicated below:
− Corporate security policy is the high-level plan by which senior management expresses its commitment, delegates responsibility, establishes standards, and sanctions certain activities to protect the organization and its assets from harm. − The policy should demonstrate a commitment to future security within the organization by indicating the need to implement a long-term security master plan, with the goal of providing a safe and secure environment that protects both the people and assets of the organization.
• There is currently no existing
security policy.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R29 - Develop and roll out
Security Policy per Best Practices.
• R29 - High priority.
• Development of security
policy and procedures can be
accomplished quickly at
reasonably low cost and will
provide extensive benefits.
Security
Procedures
• Security procedures describe the functionally relevant security activities to be undertaken by employees in their day-to-day work. They are instrumental in guiding employee behavior with respect to personal safety and security and in providing them with the information, tools, and support needed to act appropriately in the event of a threat. Some security procedures would have organization-wide application, while others would be site- or department- specific. All procedures that are in use should be available to all employees. Typically, this can be accomplished via an internal website. • The organization should have documented procedures governing the subjects outlined below. These procedures are detailed, step-by-step actions to achieve a certain task. They should explain clearly how policy guidelines will be implemented in the operating environment.
• There are minimal existing
security procedures.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - Develop and roll out
Security Procedures per Best
Practices.
• R30 - High priority.
• Development of security
policy and procedures can be
accomplished quickly at
reasonably low cost and will
provide extensive benefits.
Background
Checks
• Background checks should be performed on all employees, regular contractors, and vendors to reduce the risk of hiring or allowing access to a potentially dangerous persons.
• Criminal record background checks should include a combination of local, state, national, and international checks, depending on the position and access of the applicant. In addition, persons in positions of trust should also have checks performed relative to credit, fraud, and education. It is not unusual for persons to misrepresent themselves when trying to obtain a new position. This is very often a difficult issue for Human Resources personnel. Despite best efforts, employers do not always know exactly who they are hiring. As employer liability continues to increase for incidents that occur within the workplace, information obtained on personnel is vital for both safety and security.
• Basic background checks are
performed on new
employees only.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively,
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
Photo ID Badging
• Facility staff should be able to readily identify other staff, contractors, or visitors via photo ID badging. Employees and contractors issued badges should be subject to background checks and be required to sign an acknowledgement of the conditions of use to obtain the badge. Contractor badges should have an automatic expiration date.
• Whenever a badge is provided to either an employee or a contractor, the receiver should be required to sign an acknowledgement of the conditions of use associated with the badge - including matters such as not loaning the badge, reporting it when lost or stolen, and using it only for authorized purposes. • Badging is enforced to
support the limited existing
ACS. Photo ID badging for
identification is not used.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• It is not uncommon for
organizations of this size to
not use photo IDs.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 46
Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority
Contractor
Controls
• Contractors should be issued badges with an automatic expiration date. They should be subject to background checks to receive their badges and be required to sign an acknowledgement of the conditions of use associated with the badge. • Contractors are not issued
badges with a defined
expiration date.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
Visitor Controls
• All visitors must be qualified before entering the site. All visitors must sign in and leave appropriate identification at the sign in. Visitors should not be allowed unescorted on the site.
• Visitors arrive at the main
gate and must speak via
intercom to either reception
or the Control Room, who
can provide entry. Visitors
then are expected to sign in
at the Reception area in the
Admin/Lab Building.
However, there is no real
control over this procedure.
Once allowed into the gate,
the visitor could conceivably
move about the site
unencumbered. Visitors do
not leave identification at
sign in.
• ID#14 - Visitors sign in. • R30 - Develop a written procedure regarding visitors and contractors,
as part of the overall Security
Procedures document. The
procedure should include ensur ing
that visitor identification is
checked.
• R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
• Refers to all policy/procedure
development.
Key Control
• All keys and access cards that allow perimeter entry or access to restricted or critical areas should be controlled and stored in a secure manner. Keys should be issued only to those persons who can be entrusted with them and who have a legitimate and on- going need to access secure venues. Before an effective key control program can be established, every key to every lock used to protect a facility must be accounted for.
Once an effective key control program has been instituted, positive control of all keys must be maintained.
• Key issue records, key control cabinets, key inventory audits, and master key control are necessary ingredients in an effective key control program. Key and access card control can be maintained in several ways. The least efficient but most common method is the key log, typically a pen-and-paper exercise whereby all keys are centrally stored and signed out on an as-needed basis. The required personnel resources associated with this met hod generally make it the first gap in the security system. Specifically, it is too time consuming to expect key control to be maintained in this way. Instead, there are automated systems that can control access to keys and access cards and maintain tight control.
• Similarly, issuing long-term use keys and access cards to new employees must be regulated and properly logged. As with ID badges, all recipients of keys and access cards must fully understand their appropriate use, that duplication is prohibited, and sign an acknowledgement of the terms and conditions associated with their use. • The site currently has
effective key control, based
on an Assa-Abloy system
with Grand Master hierarchy.
Keys are signed out to
individuals, with the approval
of their manger, for the term
of their employment. Spare
keys and vehicle keys are
kept in a lock box and tightly
controlled by the key
manager. A sign out is
required to provide non-
permanent keys to
individuals.
• The exception to the above
statement is golf carts. They
use a shared key and a golf
cart was recently stolen and
driven off the site. The golf
cart keys were with the carts
and unlocked.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R31 - Ensure all keys, including
golf cart keys, are always secured.
• R31 - High priority.
• This is a low cost and very
simple effort to implement.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 47
Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority
Incident Reporting
• An organization should have a system available for proper and effective reporting and tracking of various types of incidents at the facility. • A proper incident reporting system that is easy to use and readily available should increase the likelihood of employees reporting matters that directly or indirectly affect the safety and security of the site. Incident reports allow the user to note trends in security matters on the site, and to possibly anticipate and thus prevent similar events.
• There is no formal automated
incident reporting for
security.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
Change Control
• Change control procedures pertaining to the automated security systems should be developed and documented.
• Change control is an integral part of any business process. Relative to security systems, any changes to cards, locks, cameras, or alarms should require managerial approval. There must also be an audit trail of these requests and approvals. Once the manager requests the change, the appropriate administrator should provide the required cards or changes. Change control should also include an audit process. • Changes to the physical system should be requested in writing and documented. This includes minor changes, such as changing the time that the intrusion system disarms. • When changes to the system are made, it is important to communicate them to the users.
• There is no existing formal
change control at th e site.
This is primarily because the
security systems are very
limited. As they are further
developed, a change control
apparatus will be required.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
Preventative
Maintenance
• All electronic systems, including security systems, should have regularly scheduled preventative maintenance programs. The owner should require detailed reporting of the program.
• A security system is composed of electronic and mechanical parts, each with a mean time to repair that must be observed. Failure of any one system component can compromise the entire system and the security of everyone and everything that it protects. An electronic security system that is not maintained on a regular basis will soon fall into disrepair and will not provide the functionality it is designed for, ultimately costing the organization significant capital outlay. • Maintenance should be performed on a scheduled basis. Performing maintenance twice per year is typically sufficient to maintain the types of systems being recommended for this facility. The maintenance would include matters such as cleaning and adjusting cameras, testing preset locations on PTZ cameras, and fine- tuning and recalibrating fence alarms. A full preventative maintenance package should be detailed in the final specifications for the system. The system integrator should be capable of providing this twice-yearly program. However, site personnel could be trained to provide the required maintenance as well. The critical issue is to ensure that, no matter who is responsible, maintenance is performed on a schedule and maintenance records are kept on file.
• Currently, existing security
devices are not part of a
preventative maintenance
program.
Repairs/programming
adjustments are made on an
as needed basis. For the
limited systems currently in
place, this approach is
sufficient. As more complex
systems are introduced,
t h ere
will be a need for a more
defined preventative
maintenance program.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
Security
Awareness
Training
• Regular training sessions should be delivered in various formats to ensure that the staff are aware of their security responsibilities and are equipped with the proper information to meet these responsibilities.
• An important component of any successful security plan is ensuring those involved in the plan understand that security is everyone’s responsibility. A security practitioner can design the perfect system at the perfect price, but if the users see these measures as an inconvenience rather than a benefit, they can and will compromise the system.
Therefore, training and awareness are vital components of the security profile of a facility.
• There is no security
awareness training on a
regular or organized basis,
which has resulted in issues
such as tailgating at the main
gate (i.e., when a legitimate
vehicle entry is made, but the
driver does not wait for the
gate to close behind them to
prevent unauthorized
vehicles from following).
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 48
Security Category Best Practice Existing Condition ANSI 57-10 Security Measure Reference Recommendation Priority
Performance
Measurement
• All elements of the security program should be audited regularly against a baseline performance. This applies to physical, electronic, and operational/procedural security. • There is no performance
measurement system in
place. As security at the site is
further developed, such an
system will be required.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
Lock Up
• Building perimeter doors should be locked at the end of the business day. If possible, doors should be capable of auto-locking via the ACS. The roving patrol guard should always rattle-check doors. Individual office doors should be the responsibility of the user.
• Employees are expected to
lock doors and they are
generally checked at night
(although there is no formal
process). During the day,
numerous doors are left open
for convenience. Addition of
an ACS would reduce this
vulnerability.
• There is no ANSI 57-10
reference for this
operational security
element. Alternatively, this
evaluation reviewed
adherence to Best
Practices.
• R30 - See Security Procedures. • R30 - See Security
Procedures, above.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 49
Section 6
RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The recommendations provided in Section 5 for each layer of security have been organized into a total of seven security projects based on the scope and priority of each recommendation. Project implementation can be completed in phases over several years to improve the security profile at the RWQCP to meet ANSI 57-10 guidelines and best practice recommendations. Table 11 summarizes the recommendations included within each of the proposed security projects. The “R” number in the left hand column refers to the recommendation presented in the tables in Section 5.
Table 11 Security Assessment Recommendations
No. Recommendation Detail Reference Priority
Interim Security Improvements – Mobile CCTV
R7
Employ ECAMSECURE mobile units to meet immediate
security needs. Refer to Section 5.6 and Appendix C for more details on implementation. Project 2, below,
supersedes this interim solution when complete.
Table 6 - Intrusion
Detection High
Project 1 - Plant Fencing and CPTED Improvements
R1 Improve fencing in northeast. Table 6 - Perimeter
Fencing Medium
R2 Provide concrete barrier under fencing in several areas. Table 6 - Perimeter Fencing High
R3 Add fencing/gate near septic drop area. Table 6 - Gates High R4 Clear vegetation along perimeter fence. Table 6 - CPTED Medium R5 Clear (exterior) materials along perimeter fence. Table 6 - CPTED Medium R9 Clear vegetation. Table 7 - CPTED Medium
Project 2 - CCTV Perim eter Protection
R7 Add perimeter protection using CCTV (thermal and
visible).
Table 6 - Intrusion
Detection High
R8 Provide alarm assessment capability on perimeter. Table 6 - Alarm Assessment High
R20 Add system-wide monitoring capability via exception- based monitoring.
Table 9 - System
Monitoring High
R24
Develop and implement comprehensive CCTV platform
to address surveillance, alarming, alarm assessment,
and investigative capabilities site wide.
Table 9 - CCTV and
VMS Platform High
Project 3 - Internal Surveillance/IDS with Video
R12 Add CCTV intrusion detection for Layer 2. Table 7 - Intrusion Detection High
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 50
No. Recommendation Detail Reference Priority
R13 Provide alarm assessment capability for Layer 2. Table 7 - Alarm Assessment High
Project 4 - Access Control and Intrusion Detection
R15 Add internal glassbreaks on windows. Table 8 -
Windows/Openings Medium
R17 Add ACS within the Admin Building to separate the
common area from the interior. Table 8 - Separation Medium R18 Add ACS to Server Room and Control Room. Table 8 - Separation High R19 Add IDS to building perimeter points. Table 8 - Intrusion Detection Medium
R22 Provide platform to expand ACS to encompass all
critical buildings and structures.
Table 9 - ACS
Platform High
R25
Develop and implement comprehensive IDS program
for all layers. Utilize CCTV where appropriate to limit duplication of cost and effort.
Table 9 - Intrusion
Alarming Platform High
R26 Ensure integration of all security systems as they are built out.
Table 9 - System
Integration Medium
Project 5 - Security Policy and Procedures
R21 Develop alarm response protocols. Table 9 - Alarm
Response High
R29 Develop and deliver Security Policy. Table 10 - Security Policy High
R30 Develop and deliver Security Procedures documentation for all aspects noted in Table 12. Table 10 - Multiple High R31 Ensure golf cart keys are properly secured. Table 10 - Key Control High
Project 6 - Miscellaneous Physical Security Upgrades
R6 Discuss adding signs to address potential liability
concerns. Table 6 - Signs Low
R10 Replace building signs. Table 7 - CPTED Low
R11 Add bollards at key electrical equipment (external). Table 7 - Equipment Low R14 Provide security hinges for all doors. Table 8 -
Doors/Locks/Hinges Low
R16 Repair access ladders. Table 8 -
Windows/Openings Medium
R27 Lock all exterior panels with chain and/or padlock. Table 9 - Power Resilience/Security High
Project 7 - Miscellaneous Electrical Security Upgrades
R23 Activate and use gate exit readers. Table 9 - ACS
Platform High
R28 Add tamper switches to all SCADA enclosures. Table 9 - SCADA Physical Security High
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 51
Table 12 includes a planning level cost overview and recommended implementation schedule for each security project. In general, projects recommended for short-term implementation include high priority or low cost work items that can significantly improve the RWQCP security profile.
Note that the suggested implementation schedule begins with Project 7 identified in Table 11.
An itemized breakdown of the costs included for each recommendation and project is included in Appendix D.
Note too that these planning level costs represent a high-level budgetary estimate based on Carollo’s understanding of the design effort and implementation costs required at the project location. Costs will need to be refined during the design phase of each project based on the ultimate design/installation and market conditions at the time of the project .
Carollo has no control over variances in the cost of labor, materials, equipment; nor services provided by others, contractor’s means and methods of executing the work or of determining prices, competitive bidding or market conditions, practices or bidding strategies. Carollo cannot and does not warrant or guarantee that proposals, bids or actual construction costs will not vary from the costs presented as shown.
The cost estimates represent a Class 5 budgetary estimate as defined by the AACE International.
Typical accuracy for Class 5 Estimates is expected to be in the range of -30 to +50 percent. It should be noted that pricing accuracy is time sensitive and, based on current market conditions, may degrade over relatively brief periods of time. Pricing updates should be made regularly to increase the overall reliability of the cost estimates.
Table 12 Security Project Implementat ion Summary
Implementation
Schedule Project Project
Cost(1)(2)
Present Interim Security Improvements – Mobile CCTV $254,500(3) 2023 Project 7 - Miscellaneous Electrical Security Upgrades $20,000 2023 Project 5 - Security Policy and Procedures $50,000 2023-2024 Project 2 - CCTV Perimeter Protection $2,340,000 2024 -20 25 Project 4 - Access Control and Intrusion Detection $790,000 2025 Project 1 - Plant Fencing and CPTED Improvements $220,000 2025 Project 3 - Internal Surveillance/IDS with Video $200,000 2025 Project 6 - Miscellaneous Physical Security Upgrades $120,000 TOTAL $3,994,500(4)
Notes:
(1) Costs are based on October 2022 market conditions and include the following: 30 percent contingency, 9.5 percent taxes, 30 percent Engineering/Admin Fees, 18 percent Contractor’s Overhead and Profit. E scalation to mid-point of construction has not been included.
(2) The project costs were rounded up to the nearest $10,000. (3) Approximate cost for interim CCTV solution is for one year of mobile CCTV units, based on a monthly operating cost of $21,210 as provided by ECAMSECURE. Actual cost could be less or more depending on completion of Project 2, which will supersede the interim mobile CCTV solution. Refer to Appendix C for more details. (4) As noted above, total implementation costs include 1 year of interim mobile CCTV units. This number will change based on actual mobile CCTV timeframe (pending implementation of Project 2).
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023
Appendix A
EXTERIOR LIGHTING STUDY
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EXTERIOR LIGHTING STUDY
Lighting is an important component of a facility’s security profile. Lighting in Layer 1 (perimeter) and Layer 2 (clear zone) can increase the chances of a criminal being caught and improve general staff safety or operations. Members of the assessment team visited the Regional Water Quality Control Plant (RWQCP) site on August 17, 2022, to collect light intensity data and identify supplementary lighting required to support plant operations and staff safety.
Lighting was evaluated from multiple perspectives:
• Security (deterrent, detection of intruders, adequate lighting to support closed-circuit television [CCTV]).
• Staff safety (ability to identify and address hazards). • Operations (visibility during evening operations) .
The results and recommendations from the assessment are provided in this appendix.
Methodology
The exterior lighting study was conducted in the evening when there was no sunlight available.
The intent of the study was to measure the amount of lighting provided by the existing RWQCP site lights. Lighting measurements were collected along the plant perimeter and at critical operation areas within the plant using a handheld Extech LT300 light meter. The Extech LT300 light meter utilizes a remote light sensor connected with a 12-inch coiled cable to measure light, with a range up to 40,000 footcandles (fc) (or 400,000 Lux). Readings for this project were taken in fc.
Generally, the lower the light reading, the less adequate light is available. Readings of .01 to .03 are virtual darkness to the naked eye. Readings up to about 1.0 are providing more and more visibility for safety purposes. Beyond 1.0 there is little difficu lty in presenting the human eye with ample information. However, this representation must consider the use of the visible light. If visible light is in place primarily as a safety or operational measure, the requirements are different than lighting for security or CCTV purposes. The quality of CCTV presently is such that there are no areas of the plant that could not receive adequate CCTV performance, even if that means the use of thermal imaging to reach this standard. See the CCTV memo for further detail on this subject.
Where the intent of the light is solely to assist in safety or operational assistance, a minimum of.05 fc should be considered. It is also important to note that lighting can be a useful crime deterrent. Levels above 1.0 fc can generally b e expected to act as something of a deterrent.
Results
The lighting measurements collected as part of the study are provided on Figure A.1. The Figure utilizes a base map generated by MWH as part of a lighting study completed for the RWQCP in 2014. All lighting measurements are presented in fc.
APPENDIX A | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | A-2
Color Legend:
Existing Site/Area Lighting (at the time of the MWH Study) Proposed Perimeter Security Lighting (from MWH Study) Project T-46 Site/Area Lighting Proposed High Mast (HM) Area Lighting (from MWH Study) Project T-46 Process (Switched) Lighting Light Measurements Collected August 17th, 2022
Figure A.1 RWQCP Site Lighting Measurements Collected 8/27/22
APPENDIX A | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | A-3
Other observations from the exterior lighting study include:
• The existing area lighting provides ample illumination in the areas where it exists. • The perimeter lights on the north ern boundary are effective. The darkest areas, with readings of 0.03, were midway between light posts . However, lighting in these areas was still adequate to support CCTV and other surveillance. There is no lighting installed on the south perimeter.
• High mast lighting was proposed in the MWH study to overcome challenges associated with steep slopes in areas of the site. The west side of the plant is not well lit. However, staff do not frequent those areas because there are no treatment processes in this area.
If the effective security measures detailed in the Security Assessment Study (including thermal and pan-tilt-zoom cameras) are installed, several of the proposed high mast lights may not be necessary. The high mast lighting areas are summarized below:
- HM-1 & HM-2: There is significant existing light in th ese areas. The addition of new lights in these locations is not critical.
- HM-3: This area is not well lit and does include several structures. The addition of a new high mast light in this location may be beneficial, but is not necessary if effective perimeter security, as described in the Security Assessment Study , is implemented.
- HM-4: This area is well lit and includes several structures. The addition of new lights in this location is not critical.
- HM-5 & HM-6: These areas include the drying beds, which are not frequented by staff, especially during the evening hours. The addition of new lights in these locations is not critical.
- HM-7 & HM -8: These areas are very dark and include significant debris that can be dangerous to staff. The addition of new lighting in these areas is recommended to support staff safety and operations.
- HM-9: This is a notable area of concern, having been the entry point for several site break-ins in the past. The addition of new lighting in this area is recommended to support staff safety and operations.
- HM-10: Lights have been added to this area, which provide excellent lighting north of the tanks. The addition of lighting to cover the slope south of the tanks would also be beneficial.
- HM-11: This area, where expensive equipment is stored, is poorly lit . The addition of new lighting in this area is recommended to protect plant assets. Providing lighting in locations HM-10, 11, and 13 may limit the need for thermal CCTV, leading to possible cost savings.
- HM-12: There is adequate existing lighting in this area to support operations. The addition of new lights in this location is not required/recommended. - HM-13: Ample lighting is available from the nearby entrance in this location. The addition of new lights in this area is not critical, although it may be beneficial to provide more lighting in the southeast corner , near the gate, if this area is of concern to staff.
APPENDIX A | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | A-4
Recommendations
Based on the results of the exterior lighting study, Carollo recommends the following improvements at the RWQCP to support security, staff safety, and operations. Note that several of the lighting recommendations should be evaluated in conjunction with the recommendations outlined in the Security Assessment Study.
• The existing lighting in most areas of the RWQCP is adequate to support operations and staff safety. Ample lighting is available at the site entrance and at critical processes, such as the digesters and clarifiers. There are several areas within the plant, particularly along the south perimeter, that are not well lit. However, not all of these locations require the installation of new lights, s ince these areas either include processes that do not require evening operations (e.g., drying beds) or can be effectively addressed through thermal or infrared cameras.
• To support plant operations and staff safety, new lighting should be installed at the following location within the RWQCP site:
- The west perimeter (HM -7, HM-8, and HM-9) – this area contains significant debris that can be dangerous to staff. In addition, the perimeter is a notable area of concern, having been the entry point for several previous site break-ins. Improved lighting here would assist as a deterrent, although it is not required to assist the detection function. The recommendation for thermal imaging will address the detection and assessment components. If ample visible light is a dded here, the recommendation for the use of thermal can be altered to low light CCTV in place of thermal.
• To support facility security, new lighting should be installed at the following location within the RWQCP site:
- Storage Area (HM -11) – this area contains expensive equipment that should be better protected. Visible light here would be a strong deterrent, especially as the area is relatively close to manned locations (as opposed to the dark areas on the west perimeter).
• As noted previously, site lighting should be closely coordinated with the Security Assessment Study, which recommends installation of CCTV throughout the plant site. In areas where lighting is needed to support staff safety or operations, the proposed lighting may be adequate to support CCTV and eliminate the need for more expensive, thermal CCTV. In other areas, staff may choose to install visible lighting .
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023
Appendix B
PHOTO LIBRARY
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PHOTO LIBRARY
Photo 1: Layer 1 - Main gate is well lit . There
have been concerns with tailgating as the exit
gate does not use the available card readers.
There is no sally port, however such a device is
unnecessary here.
Photo 2: Layer 1 - Good use of bollard to
protect the entry and intercom.
Photo 3: Layer 1 - The fencing on the south
side shown here is easily defeated by entering
via the nearby buildings, which are not owned
or controlled by RWQCP.
Photo 4: Layer 1 - Fence is defeated by
equipment piled outside it.
APPENDIX B | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | B-2
Photo 5: Layer 1 - CPTED concerns with
vegetation on perimeter. Allows entry, hiding
spots, and inhibits surveillance.
Photo 6: Layer 1 - CPTED concerns with
vegetation on perimeter. Allows entry, hiding
spots, and inhibits surveillance.
Photo 7: Layer 1 - CPTED and other concerns.
There is a person living in an uncontrolled area
of brush just outside the fence line in the
southwest. There is no surveillance or alarming
available.
Photo 8: Layer 1 - The main fence is effective
and meets best practices. The secondary fence
shown here is unnecessary.
APPENDIX B | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | B-3
Photo 9: Layer 1 - Padlocks on man gates are
not very strong and can be cut.
Photo 10: Layer 1 - Example of effective fence,
lighting, and signs on the north perimeter.
Photo 11: Layer 1 - Fencing around the east
perimeter does not match the very strong
fencing elsewhere. The razor wire helps,
however the fence itself is low (6 -ft) and can be
cut. There is no effective alarming in the area.
Photo 12: Layer 2 - Generators near the main
gate are properly enclosed.
APPENDIX B | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | B-4
Photo 13: Layer 2 - Tank ladder is insecure.
Photo 14: Layer 2 - Bollards protecting outdoor
critical equipment.
Photo 15: Layer 2 - Effective lighting at the
north generators.
Photo 16: Layer 2 - These transformers are
padlocked, although not caged. This is
effective.
APPENDIX B | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | B-5
Photo 17: Layer 3 - Typical process area door.
Metal in metal frame, however this door has no
astragal.
Photo 18: Layer 3 - Propped doors create risk.
Photo 19: Layer 3 - Doors to some critical areas
are left open to provide ventilation. This is a
vulnerability, and there is a reliance on human
interaction to ensure they are locked after
hours.
Photo 20: Layer 3 and Layer 5 - There are
numerous cameras on site that could be
effectively tasked to security purposes.
APPENDIX B | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | B-6
Photo 21: Layer 3 - These doors are an example
of strong physical security for entry points.
They are metal, in metal frames, and have a full
astragal.
Photo 22: Layer 3 - Windows and doors with
windows are too easily circumvented.
Photo 23: Layer 4 - Hatches were found to be
locked.
Photo 24: Layer 4 - There is surveillance
capability, but it is not being optimally
employed.
APPENDIX B | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | B-7
Photo 25: Layer 5 - Exterior accessible panels
should be locked.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023
Appendix C
CCTV UNIT EVALUATION
City of Riverside
Regional Water Quality Control Plant
Security Assessment Study
Technical Memorandum
CCTV UNIT EVALUATION
FINAL | January 2023
City of Riverside
Regional Water Quality Control Plant
Security Assessment Study
Technical Memorandum
CCTV UNIT EVALUATION
FINAL | January 2023
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | i
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Section 1 - Purpose 1
Section 2 - Current Temporary CCTV Installation 1
Section 3 - Thermal Imaging 2
Section 4 - Interim Term Solution 4
Section 5 - Summary 7
T ables
Table 1 Budgetary Estimate for the Recommended Interim Perimeter Security Solution 4
Figures
Figure 1 Locations of the Temporary CCTV Units 1
Figure 2 Example Thermal Unit Image 3
Figure 3 Infrared Versus Thermal Imag er 3
Figure 4 Visible Light Camera Versus Thermal Imager 3
Figure 5 Proposed Locations for Thermal Imaging CCTV Units 6
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 1
Section 1
PURPOSE
The City of Riverside’s (City) Regional Water Quality Control Plant (RWQCP) is equipped with a variety of fixed and pan-tilt-zoom closed-circuit television (CCTV) units that support process and other building access security functions. However, the existing units do not provide perimeter security for the facility.
The City is currently testing three CCTV rental units to supplement perimeter security and address security problems along sections of the plant perimeter. These units are on a 30 -day trial rental program from ECAMSECURE and are intended to provide a temporary solution for perimeter security. The purpose of this technical memorandum (TM) is to help the City determine the value of extending the rental period, pending a permanent CCTV/perimeter security solution at the RWQCP.
Section 2
CURRENT TEMPORARY CCTV INSTALLATION
Each of the three ECAMSECURE rental units deployed on site consists of a camera, battery power, lighting, and a cellular card for transmitting signal. The units are mobile (mounted on a trailer) and can be easily moved to any area of the RWQCP. The units can view an area up to 150 feet away, with a 90 -degree field of view. The current locations of the three mobile units are shown on Figure 1.
Figure 1 Locations of the Temporary CCTV Units
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 2
The units are equipped with Axis model cameras. These sy stems are not intended for low -light environments and require the presence of visible light to support proper functionality. The cameras include intelligent video that triggers an alarm to a third -party monitor, when an event (usually defined as motion) oc curs within a certain period. This third-party then notifies RWQCP personnel through a call -out list.
The existing approach is appropriate for its limited scope. The Axis cameras are excellent quality, and field testing demonstrated that the alarming and m onitoring functions are being handled properly. The primary concern associated with the installation is that the current configuration controls very little of the perimeter. The site perimeter is well over 8,000 feet. The three rental units cover only 5 percent of the perimeter. Using these same units/approach to cover the entire perimeter would require over 50 installations. This is not a viable solution from a cost or operational perspective.
In addition, the installations are easily identified by an outs ider, as they use bright lighting to assist the visible light cameras in identifying events. This issue is discussed in additional detail in Section 3.
Section 3
THERMAL IMAGING
Until a permanent CCTV protection system is implemented , the City is seeking a temporary solution to address their plant perimeter concerns .
One potential solution to the cost challenges associated with implementing the current ECAMSECURE rental units on a larger scale is to provide greater ranges for the CCTV units.
Using thermal imaging units, rather than standard visible light or infrared (IR) cameras, adds significant range to the alarmed field of view. There are thermal imagers that can “see” up to several kilometers in open space.
The primary advantage of cameras that create images using visible light, such as conventional surveillance or IR -illuminated cameras, is that the images they create are recognizable and easy to interpret. This familiarity makes them a more comfortable choice for end users. However, these cameras have in herent challenges when it comes to detection - primarily that visible light cameras are reliant on the amount of available light. In sunshine or a brightly lit areas, visible light cameras perform very well. In situations where lighting is less than ideal, objects can appear faint or not appear at all. Visible light cameras are also limited by visual contrast. Because they capture only visible light, the cameras can be deceived by visual camouflage or other factors, such as trees and shadows.
Typically, a thermal imager is more reliable than a visible light or IR camera. The thermal unit is less hindered by rain, snow, fog, or other inclement weather. These conditions can limit the range of a thermal unit, but are unlikely to block the transmission of light entirely. Thermal imaging cameras equipped with onboard video analytics are capable of classifying human or vehicular perimeter intrusions, resulting in fewer false alarms.
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 3
The primary drawback of thermal imaging is that the unit is designed to identify differences in temperature, which show up in the image as shades of black and white. Under ideal conditions, a visible light camera can identify not only an event, but can provide valuable information such as the color of clothes being worn or the identity of an intruder. This level of detail is not available with thermal imaging units.
Figure 2 includes an example of an image provided
by a thermal unit. It is difficult to determine the
make and model of the car, the license plate, the
color of jacket, or facial features of the person in
the image. However, in many cases, this level of
detail is not critical. The ultimate goal of perimeter
detection is to identify an intrusion - not
necessarily to identify the intruder. The capability
to accomplish this at long range enhances the
perimeter security of the RWQCP and reduces the
capital and operational costs .
Figure 3 and Figure 4 further demonstrate the benefits of using thermal imagery. On Figure 3, the image on the left was taken with an IR camera, while the image on the right was taken with a thermal imager. On Figure 4 the image on the left was taken with a visible light camera , and the image on the right was taken with a thermal imager. The advantages of thermal in these applications is clear - alarms would be created when the intruders are detected , and RWQCP personnel would be contacted by the third -party.
Figure 3 Infrared Versus Thermal Imager
Figure 4 Visible Light Camera Versus Thermal Imager
Figure 2 Example Thermal Unit Image
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 4
ECAMSECURE indicated that they are prepared to install Axis thermal imaging on the mobile CCTV units, rather than the currently installed short -range visible-light cameras. While there are several companies who provide thermal cameras, not all are of the same quality. Our team has had positive experience with the Axis units and believes this is an appropriate product for the application.
The proposed units would include two thermal cameras, local power, a visible light camera, and a network card. No lighting would be required. The thermal units would be placed back -to-back, each with a range of 600 feet. The visible light camera would be deployed to cover the dead area created by the back-to-back thermal configuration. Consideration was given to using single camera units in an overlapping line. This would eliminate dead spots, but would require more mobile trailers, power, and transmission.
Section 4
INTERIM TERM SOLUTION
It will likely take a year or more before a permanent perimeter camera system can be installed.
In an effort to provide an interim perimeter security solution, we recommend employing thermal imaging units through the ECAMSECURE model. Figure 5 provides a plant layout and potential locations for the units as part of this temporary solution .
Approximate distances are provided on Figure 5 in yellow at various points around the perimeter.
The blue circles indicate the seven proposed thermal unit locations, each of which would include two thermal sensors, two fixed HiRes Axis cameras, alert strobe lights, complete s olar power, one warning speaker, one mounting trailer, remote live access, and up to ten days of local storage for 24 hours per day, 7 days per week continuous recordings. The blue line emanating from each of the circles represents the estimated detection range of the Axis thermal imagers - approximately 600 feet in each direction .
This design concept provides CCTV coverage for essentially the entire perimeter. The only location that is not well covered in this design concept is the front gate area, which is presently well lit and has ample local CCTV coverage. A budgetary cost provided by ECAMSECURE for this proposed design concept is provided in Tabl e 1.
Table 1 Budgetary Estimate for the Recommended Interim Perimeter Security Solution Item Unit Cost Cost ($/month) Cost ($/year)
CCTV Unit(4) $2,920/unit/month 20,440(1) 245,280(1)
Monitoring Services $770/month 770 9,240
One-Time Setup Cost $800 N/A N/A
Total(2) $21,210 $254,520(3)
Notes:
(1) Cost assumes installation of the seven units proposed. (2) The total cost per month and total cost per year do not include the one-time setup cost of $800. (3) Leasing for a year can produce a discount of 10-11 percent. (4) There is a lease to purchase option available for the CCTV units. It is recommended that these units be used as a temporary measure only, unit a permanent CCTV/perimeter security solution is installed at the RWQCP. However, if the City should wish to lease to purchase, the CCTV units could be re-tasked for the permanent installation.
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 5
While this approach is far more cost -effective than the current visible light solution, it is still likely a relatively costly endeavor. However, there are several ways to reduce the potential costs . • The recent installation of lighting along the north perimeter would support the use of non-thermal cameras in that area. Bosch, Samsung, Axis, Avigilon, and other manufacturers provide excellent quality perimeter cameras that can operate effectively in low light. Using these cameras, in lieu of more costly thermal units for well- lit areas, would reduce capital costs, witho ut impacting the long -term solution. • The thermal units could be installed incrementally, depending on local circumstances and concerns. For example, the City could prioritize installing the camera unit shown at Location 3 to replace two of the existing mob ile units. This approach would provide perimeter coverage for the western perimeter, where lighting is the poorest.
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 6
Figure 5 Proposed Locations for Thermal Imaging CCTV Units
TM - CCTV UNIT EVALUATION | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023 | 7
Section 5
SUMMARY
The optimum long-term solution to provide appropriate perimeter security at the RWQCP will include installation of permanent technology to guard the fence line. This will be a recommendation in the forthcoming security assessment study. In the interim, employing the ECAMSECURE mobile units will meet the immediate security needs and concerns of the City.
The units should be equipped with thermal devices, which will provide a more efficient and cost-effective way to combat intrusions along the perimeter (versus visible light cameras).
Depending on available budget, the installation can be phased to address the most problematic areas of the perimeter first.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT | RWQCP SECURITY ASSESSMENT STUDY | CITY OF RIVERSIDE FINAL | JANUARY 2023
Appendix D
SECURITY PROJECTS BUDGETARY ESTIMATE
Riverside RWQCP Security Study
Security Improvement Project Conceptual Costs
Type Units Qty Install Factor Cost/Unit Subtotals Fee type PercentageCost R1 Add wrought iron fencing in designated area Plant perimeter NE. lf 750 1.2 $ 100 $ 90,000 Combined Subtotal $102,400 R2 Add concrete barrier under fence in designated areas Plant perimeter each 2 1.2 $ 1,000 $ 2,400 Contingency 30% $30,720.0 R3 Add gate and fence separation from Septic drop off area lump sum 1 1.0 $ 5,000 $ 5,000 Tax 9.5% $12,646.40 R4, R5, R9 Vegetation clearance lump sum 1 1.0 $ 5,000 $ 5,000 Engineering/Admin 30% $43,729.9 Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $26,237.95Subtotal $ 102,400 TOTAL $220,000 R7 Thermal Cameras each 14 1.2 $ 8,500 $ 142,800 Combined Subtotal $1,110,460 R8 PTZ Cameras each 8 1.2 $ 5,500 $ 52,800 Contingency 30% $333,138.0 R20 Video Servers, Licenses, & Storage lump sum 1 1.0 $ 15,000 $ 15,000 Tax 9.5% $137,141.81 R24 Poles each 9 1.2 $ 4,000 $ 43,200 Engineering/Admin 30% $474,221.9 Ductbank lf 9000 1.3 $ 50 $ 585,000 Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $284,533.17 Programming R24 lump sum 1 1.0 $ 5,000 $ 5,000 Security Network Switches each 4 1.3 $ 2,000 $ 10,400 Misc. Electrical, Instruemntation, and Controls % 0.3 1.0 $ 854,200 $ 256,260 Subtotal $ 1,110,460 TOTAL $2,340,000
R12, R13 Add internal PTZ integrated to ACS / IDS each 10 1.3 $ 5,500 $ 71,500 Combined Subtotal $92,950 - building mounted Contingency 30% $27,885.0
- servers / storage as part of Project 2 Tax 9.5% $11,479.33 - Integration Engineering/Admin 30% $39,694.3
Misc. Electrical, Instruemntation, and Controls % 0.3 1.0 $ 71,500 $ 21,450 Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $23,816.58 Subtotal $ 92,950 TOTAL $200,000
R17 Control Panels each 6 1.3 $ 2,800 $ 21,840 Combined Subtotal $371,852 R18 Servers, Software, Licenses lump sum 1 1.0 $ 15,000 $ 15,000 Contingency 30% $111,555.6 R22 Card Reader Doors each 30 1.3 $ 4,500 $ 175,500 Tax 9.5% $45,923.72 R26 I/O Boards each 6 1.3 $ 2,000 $ 15,600 Engineering/Admin 30% $158,799.4 R15, R19 IDS component - devices each 50 1.3 $ 500 $ 32,500 Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $95,279.64 R25 Security Network Switches each 6 1.3 $ 2,000 $ 15,600 Programming Integration lump sum 1 1.0 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 Misc. Electrical, Instruemntation, and Controls % 0.3 1.0 $ 286,040 $ 85,812 Subtotal $ 371,852 TOTAL $790,000
R21, R29, R30 Develop and Deliver policy / procedure documents. lump sum 1 1.0 $ 20,000 $ 20,000 Combined Subtotal $20,000 R31 Ensure golf cart keys are properly secured (no additional cost) - - - - - Contingency 30% $6,000.0 Tax 9.5% $2,470.00
Engineering/Admin 30% $8,541.0
Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $5,124.60Subtotal $ 20,000 TOTAL $50,000 R11 Bollards each 20 1.2 $ 1,500 $ 36,000 Combined Subtotal $53,500 R14 Replace Hinges each 100 1.2 $ 100 $ 12,000 Contingency 30% $16,050.0 R16 Repair Access Ladders lump sum 1 1.0 $ 2,500 $ 2,500 Tax 9.5% $6,607.25 R27 Lock External Panels lump sum 1 1.0 $ 500 $ 500 Engineering/Admin 30% $22,847.2 R6, R10 Site Signage lump sum 1 1.0 $ 2,500 $ 2,500 Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $13,708.31 Subtotal $ 53,500 TOTAL $120,000
R23 Activate Reader Out for Gates (lanor) lump sum 1 1.0 $ 500 $ 500 Combined Subtotal $5,720 R28 Tamper Switches each 15 1.3 $ 200 $ 3,900 Contingency 30% $1,716.0 Misc. Electrical, Instruemntation, and Controls % 0.3 1.0 $ 4,400 $ 1,320 Tax 9.5% $706.42 Engineering/Admin 30% $2,442.7
Contractor Overhead/Profit/Fees 18% $1,465.64Subtotal $ 5,720 TOTAL $20,000 TOTALS SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS SUBTOTAL $1,756,882 OVERALL TOTAL $3,740,000 Asset /Project
Project 3 - Internal Surveillance / IDS With
Video
Project 2 - CCTV Perimeter Protection
Riverside RWQCP
Security Recommendation Implementation
Conceptual Project Cost Breakdown Table
Project Cost by AssetApplicable
Recommendations
Security Costs
Project 1 - Plant Fencing and CPTED
Improvements
The cost estimate herein is based on our perception of current conditions at the project location. This estimate reflects our professional opinion of accurate costs at this time and is subject to change as the project design matures. Carollo Engineers have no control over variances in the cost of labor, materials, equipment; nor services provided by others, contractor's means and methods of executing the work or of determining prices, competitive bidding or market conditions, practices or bidding strategies. Carollo Engineers cannot and does not warrant or guarantee that proposals, bids or actual construction costs will not vary from the costs presented as shown.
This estimate represents a Class 5 budgetary estimate as defined by the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering (AACE) International. Typical accuracy for Class 5 Estimates is expected to be in the range of -30 to +50 percent. Consumers of construction cost estimate data should be advised that pricing accuracy is time sensitive and will degrade over relatively brief periods of time. Pricing updates should be made regularly to increase overall reliability.
Project 7 - Miscellaneous Electrical
Security Upgrades
Project 4 - Access Control & Intrusion
Detection
Project 5 - Security Policy and Procedures
Project 6 - Miscellaneous Physical Security
Upgrades