OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 74 • Engaging with, and supporting the formation of community groups, such as those in the Palisades, in other parts of the County.
It is also recommended that OEM, LACoFD, and LASD co-lead the development, organization, and facilitation of a cross-department training for LACoFD, LASD, and OEM leadership and staff. This, of course, will only be possible if the recommendations regarding organizational changes noted above are implemented, and department command chains emphasize the importance of participation.
Finding
Enhance LASD’s Department Training on Fire and Evacuation Operations While some parts of the LASD have completed fire response and evacuation operations training, not all have. It was noted during the review process that some surge staff brought in to support the operations did not have the full training to understand these types of events and operations.
Enhanced and consistent department-wide training is required to effectively support fire response and evacuation operations. Gaps in role clarity, chain of command integration, and field-level coordination during recent wildfire events underscore the need for a formalized training and exercise program tailored to the LASD’s operational responsibilities.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Emergency Management Council (as authorized by Los Angeles County Code Section 2.68.180(A)) should direct and support the LASD in developing a targeted wildfire and evacuation operations training initiative for all staff, modeled on best practices from highrisk jurisdictions such as Sonoma County, 54 55 CA; Boulder County, CO;56 and San Diego
County, CA.
57 The training program should be executed in close collaboration with the LACoFD and OEM and include the following key actions:
• Develop an LASD-Specific Wildfire Evacuation Training Program: Create mandatory, scenario-based training modules that define LASD roles in each phase of evacuation: warning dissemination, traffic control, perimeter enforcement, and re-entry authorization.
54 Evacuation Annex Operational Area EOP - Sonoma County Operational Area EOP, August 2021. Last referenced September 23, 2025. 55 Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan Annex – Community Alert and Warning, March 2021. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
56 2022-2027- Boulder County Hazard Mitigation Plan Last referenced September 23, 2025. 57 Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization and County of San Diego, Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan, Sept 2022. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 75 • Formalize Training in Policy and SOPs: Finalize the ongoing review and revision of the LASD’s EOPs, including evacuation-specific procedures initiated prior to this incident, and ensure station-level training is conducted upon completion to align field response with the countywide Wildfire Protection Plan.
• Establish Performance Evaluation and Accountability Measures: Integrate evacuation preparedness metrics into the LASD’s training compliance system. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office adopted a similar model post-2017,58 requiring documented participation in wildfire training and the use of structured AARs to improve performance. 59 60
• Leverage Technology for Situational Awareness Training: Incorporate GIS-based evacuation modelling tools and alert system simulations (e.g., Genasys PROTECT) into the LASD’s emergency operations training curriculum to improve spatial awareness and decision-making during evacuations.
• Specialized Wildfire Evacuation Response Team: The LASD may want to consider having a standing specialized wildfire evacuation response team, similar to the IMTs, that receives specialized training on evacuation for wildfires that can be deployed during emergencies like the January 2025 fires.
By embedding these practices into the LASD’s annual training cycle and aligning them with interagency planning efforts, the County will enhance operational effectiveness, reduce confusion during evacuations, and improve outcomes for communities at risk of wildfire threats.
Critical Focus Area #3: Resource Management
The catastrophic nature of the Palisades and Eaton Fires would have strained even fully staffed departments operating at peak capacity. However, responding agencies entered this crisis already facing staffing shortages and resource constraints. These pre-existing deficiencies, including personnel gaps in critical positions, aging equipment, and stretched operational budgets, were immediately magnified when the event’s scale and complexity demanded resources far beyond standard operational requirements. What were previously manageable departmental challenges became limiting factors in the emergency response, stressing deployment capabilities, sustained operations, and effectiveness throughout the incident timeline. 58 Sonoma County, October 2017 Complex Fires, Emergency Operations Center, After Action Report and Improvement Plan – June 2018. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
59 Boulder County Marshall Fire Operational After-Action Report (AAR), December 30,2022. Last referenced September 23, 2025. 60 Sonoma Operational Area and the County of Sonoma, Department of Emergency Management, 2019 Power Shutoffs After Action Report – March 2020. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 76 Key Challenges:
• Current staffing limitations constrain response capabilities during events. • OEM lacks a formal A-Rep program.
Staffing limitations have constrained response capabilities, resulting in insufficient personnel trained in essential functions, which has created an environment for potential single points of failure.
Priority Recommendations and Actions:
• Undertake additional planning within the LASD to identify surge resources and strategies. • Formalize staffing protocols, training, equipment needs, and the field A-Rep program within OEM.
The next section discusses the specific findings that support the priority recommendations and actions and provides more detailed recommendations for implementation.
Finding
Shortages of Law Enforcement Personnel
The emergency response revealed deficiencies in staffing levels, resource allocation, and the deployment of trained personnel, although these shortcomings must be understood within the context of extraordinary operational demands resulting from catastrophic wildfires and more than 900 LASD deputy vacancies. While the LASD had developed a staffing strategy utilizing available personnel in anticipation of the PDS, staffing challenges did occur because the LASD was involved in managing five simultaneous fires during the same timeframe while also maintaining essential public safety services countywide.
The staffing challenges were compounded by structural limitations, including a recent 50% reduction in the SIB, which left the department with insufficient public information officers (PIOs) during a crisis requiring extensive community communication. Additional LASD divisions faced similar constraints, and custody and court services operated without the personnel and patrol vehicles required to meet operational needs. These cumulative resource limitations forced the DOC team to adjust and reallocate personnel and equipment to where they were needed most.
While these staffing deficiencies significantly hampered response capabilities, they reflect broader systemic resource challenges from a shortage in staffing due to more than 900 LASD deputy vacancies. These deficiencies should be resolved by the County, and in the interim, additional strategies to increase personnel for emergency response should be considered given
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 77 the importance of having comprehensive staffing and resources that can handle multi-incident scenarios.
Several interviewees experienced communication challenges in the field, many of which were attributed to an outdated dispatch system and the absence of the internet at the command post.
The already-activated EOB and the Fleet Management Bureau were critical in providing essential services and technological support to overcome these challenges. Furthermore, the LASD had been occupied with preparations for multiple planned events, including the Rose Parade, the anniversary of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, and the Presidential Inauguration. While the department had resources in place for a potential extreme wind and fire event, the competing priorities understandably stretched their capacity.
Recommendations
To address the critical staffing and resource shortages affecting emergency response capabilities, this review recommends that the LASD implement the following strategies:
• Expansion of Personnel Capacity: Conduct a comprehensive audit of current staffing levels and develop a prioritized hiring plan to fill essential roles. Focus on divisions such as custody, court services, and patrol to ensure adequate personnel and vehicle availability during emergencies. Additionally, increase emphasis and pipeline into existing departmental CERT training and volunteer programs.
• Implement Tiered Response and Resource Typing: Continue to implement and adopt a tiered response model, where personnel are assigned to missions based on training and risk level. Use typed law enforcement resource packages, like Type 1-4, to facilitate scalable deployment. Sonoma County uses pre-defined mission sets (traffic control, security patrols, evacuation support) and assignments based on resource type and availability during wildfire evacuations.
61 • Strategically Leverage Existing Reserve and Volunteer Officer Programs: Similar to the Fire Brigade Program in the Palisades area, the LASD maintains a trained reserve deputy program and/or auxiliary law enforcement corps to support routine, nonenforcement duties during surges. These reserves can be activated during wildfires for road closures and perimeter security, freeing sworn deputies for high-priority work. While this type of program already exists within the LASD, better strategic deployment of these resources in future incidents may assist with mitigating some of the resource challenges. • Maximize Mutual Aid: Strengthen collaboration with already established mutual aid partners and implement targeted training programs for both new recruits and seasoned 61 Sonoma County Operational Area EOP Annex: Evacuation -August 2021. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 78 personnel to build resilience and enhance capabilities during future crises. Ensure mutual aid partners are aware and engaged as part of pre-event preparedness activities.
By adopting these measures, the LASD can significantly enhance its emergency response effectiveness, ensure operational continuity, and develop a resilient workforce. This proactive approach will further mitigate vulnerabilities and bolster public safety during critical events.
Finding
OEM Staffing, Protocols, Training, and Formalizing the Agency Representative Program Three interrelated challenges hindered the operational performance of OEM during the event:
• The limited staffing and funding necessary to adequately respond • The absence of formalized staffing protocols for major incidents • The informal and under-resourced A-Rep program
Current staffing limitations significantly impacted OEM’s ability to support sustained operations.
There were not enough personnel trained in essential EOC roles, particularly in alert and warning systems, planning, and situational awareness. Because of this, OEM relied on the few individuals who were sufficiently trained, which created the potential for single points of failure. While OEM staff demonstrated remarkable resourcefulness and adaptability by leveraging both the old system (CodeRED) and the new alerting platform (Genasys ALERT) to issue evacuation orders within 15 minutes (for example, the January 8, 3:25 a.m., evacuation order sent to zones in Altadena west of Lake Avenue), it is critical that the County continues to invest in regular training and system drills. This will help ensure that all team members can fully utilize the new system’s capabilities efficiently and confidently.
Due to significant staffing constraints at OEM, even essential staff attendance at critical training directly affects the department’s ability to respond to incidents. For instance, when nonleadership personnel are required to participate in necessary pre-event training during periods of elevated risk, the organization faces difficult tradeoffs that compromise operational capacity and effectiveness. Over time, these constraints introduce inefficiencies, lead to staff frustration, and ultimately undermine overall organizational readiness.
Additionally, while A-Reps were critical to field coordination and operational success, the lack of a formal program structure, such as defined roles, pre-deployment briefings, reliable transportation, safety protocols, and appropriate shift rotations, resulted in avoidable safety concerns, inconsistent field performance, and logistical complications. For example, A-Reps were required to use personal vehicles to travel between the EOC, home, and field command posts, often with minimal rest, creating potentially unsafe and difficult conditions.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 79 Recommendations
OEM has a staff of 37 for a population of 10.5 million people and does not have a dedicated operating budget. We recommend that OEM and County leadership address these challenges and build sustainable operational resilience by taking the following strategic and actionable steps:
Increase Permanent Emergency Management Staff
OEM requires adequate permanent staffing commensurate with other major metropolitan jurisdictions that face similar threat profiles and manage comparable emergency management functions, activities, and duties. The current staffing model has proven fundamentally inadequate for Los Angeles County’s complex emergency management needs. OEM has faced persistent challenges in securing stable staffing and an adequate budget, and its needs have not been prioritized in recent years. Although some staffing increases have been approved, these increases have not been sufficient to build the professional capacity necessary for effective emergency management in the nation’s most populous county.
Our recommendation is to assess the organizational structure of OEM as an office under the chief executive officer (CEO), provided that organizational authority and budget stability are obtained to address critical staffing deficiencies. Reporting directly to the CEO, and ultimately the County Executive, would be consistent with Measure G requirements in Section 11.36, where:
“Subject to State law, the County Executive shall be responsible for initiating, coordinating, and directing the County’s activities and operations relating to emergency and disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, and shall be the designated operational area coordinator and the chair of the County’s Emergency Management Council. Any ordinance adopted by the Board of Supervisors relating to the County’s emergency and disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, and the exercise of the County’s emergency powers shall be consistent with this Section.”62
However, residing at the executive level may bring challenges to add staff and direct funding for OEM. OEM must develop a strategic hiring approach focused on filling essential roles, including a dedicated preparedness team and regional coordinators who are OEM employees to replace the disaster management area coordinators and support collaboration with all 88 cities throughout the Los Angeles County region. Inadequate resources extend beyond personnel numbers to basic operational resources. OEM currently lacks funding for the proper PPE necessary for staff deployment to command posts during emergencies and lacks the vehicles needed for countywide 62 https://measureg.lacounty.gov/ Measure G Government Reform County of Los Angeles. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 80 mobility before, during, and after disasters. These gaps directly compromise response effectiveness.
While OEM and the County work to achieve appropriate permanent staffing levels, interim measures must be implemented to better position OEM for future events:
• Develop a structured cross-training and credentialing program that ensures multiple OEM staff are qualified in each core EOC function, including planning, operations, logistics, and public information.
• Establish a minimum staffing matrix for major incidents and planned events, aligned with FEMA’s National Incident Management System guidance and scalable to incident complexity.
• Implement a succession planning strategy for critical roles, particularly positions such as EOC manager, situation unit leader, and alert & warning coordinator.
Implement Formalized Staffing Protocols
• Develop written staffing activation protocols that define staffing thresholds for each incident type and phase (preparedness, response, recovery). • Create “red zone” staffing restrictions that limit non-essential leave and off-site training during elevated threat periods.
• Establish a pre-incident readiness policy that defines criteria for personnel availability, pre-staging, and standby status based on predictive hazard indicators.
Formalize and Resource the A-Rep Program
• Codify the A-Rep program with defined roles, responsibilities, position descriptions, and reporting protocols.
• Develop standardized job aids and quick-reference guides to support consistent performance in the field.
• Require all A-Reps to complete scenario-based training modules focused on field coordination, evacuation support, public warning implementation, and ICS integration. • Assign County-owned vehicles with lights and communication equipment to designated A-Reps and provide necessary and required training for using these types of vehicles to support safe, timely, and mission-ready deployment.
• Create a staffing and scheduling framework for A-Reps that ensures adequate rest periods and minimizes fatigue during extended operations.
By implementing these recommendations, OEM will be better positioned to manage extended emergency operations; eliminate operational single points of failure; and ensure safer, more effective field coordination through a properly staffed and supported A-Rep program.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 81 Critical Focus Area #4: Situational Awareness and Interoperability Situational awareness and interoperability are pivotal areas requiring immediate enhancement.
The lack of streamlined coordination tools and common systems among County agencies, coupled with gaps in existing antiquated systems, impacted the ability to monitor the unfolding events and ensure unified efforts across all operational levels to issue alerts and execute evacuations.
Key Challenges:
• Gaps in communications systems, making it challenging to maintain clear situational awareness
• Outdated and inconsistent use of technology tools
• Process gaps for new evacuation systems and processes These challenges underscore the need for robust policies, training protocols, and integrated tools to ensure that personnel across all levels can respond effectively during high-risk periods.
Priority Recommendations and Actions:
• Align situational awareness and interoperability across County departments and agencies. • Update obsolete systems and technology and enable all emergency response communications to leverage the Los Angeles Regional Interoperable Communications System’s Land Mobile Radio System.
• Ensure consistent implementation, training, and use of tools and systems.
The following specific findings support our priority recommendations and actions. We also provide more detailed recommendations for implementation.
Finding
Situational Awareness and Interoperability Across Departments Despite aligned priorities among departments, significant challenges with situational awareness and interoperability hampered effective coordination during fires. Field personnel and command staff operated with inconsistent access to real-time information due to unreliable cellular connectivity; inconsistent field reporting methods; and the use of disparate, non-integrated platforms—such as Genasys ALERT/EVAC, Tablet Command, and outdated dispatch systems (e.g., the LASD’s 38-year-old CAD platform).
LASD introduced a Teams channel to consolidate operational information within its department one hour after the Palisades fire began, with incident coordination conducted through that channel for the duration of the response. LACoFD employed several resource-tracking tools, but
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 82 these were inconsistently used and lacked full integration across field and command environments. OEM platforms from the same vendor (Genasys) did not operate in a unified manner, leading to information fragmentation. Most importantly, the three departments within the LACoFD, LASD, and OEM did not have a single technology-based interdepartmental common operating platform (COP) to coordinate their efforts beyond face-to-face collaboration at the command post and calls, emails, texts, and radio communication. As a result, personnel lacked a COP, limiting cross-agency coordination and impeding timely, informed decisionmaking at all levels.
Recommendations
To improve operational coordination and ensure shared situational awareness, the County should implement a multi-pronged strategy that prioritizes system integration, SOPs, and frontline accessibility.
Establish a Unified Situational Awareness Framework
• Convene a multi-agency technology integration working group, led by the chief information officer and including representatives from OEM, LACoFD, LASD, and other key departments (e.g., the Department of Public Works), to evaluate current platforms and define interoperability requirements.
• Finalize the customization and implementation of WebEOC as the COP for the County and ensure it is capable of ingesting data from existing platforms (Tablet Command, Genasys, SharePoint, CAD) and sharing it in real time with both command and field personnel. Also, develop and implement a comprehensive transition and training plan for the use of the platform.
Implement Field-Accessible Mobile Dashboards
• Ensure field personnel across all agencies have mobile-enabled access to live situational dashboards showing evacuation zones, resource assignments, incident maps, and status updates.
• Deploy offline-capable apps or data caching tools to maintain functionality in areas with limited or no connectivity.
Integrate Tools into Post-Incident Documentation and AARs • Create a standardized process for archiving digital field inputs (e.g., notes, photos, maps, voice logs) into a central repository for post-incident review and analysis. • Ensure that situational awareness tools and outputs are consistently captured and evaluated during AARs to inform future improvements.
By integrating these technologies, protocols, and redundancies, the County will establish a shared, real-time understanding of incident dynamics—empowering both field responders and
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 83 command personnel to make faster, better-informed decisions and work as a unified team during complex emergencies.
Finding
38-Year-Old CAD System
A key resource for many first responder organizations is the use of a CAD system, but it is almost 40 years old and extremely outdated. This limits situational awareness and coordination capabilities for field staff. Updating and modernizing the CAD system will streamline communication, improve resource allocation, and enhance overall operational efficiency.
Recommendations
The LASD is in the process of replacing its existing CAD system with a new and more modern system. It is recommended that, as part of that upgrade, the department conduct a full system audit of the current CAD platform and deploy a phased replacement plan that prioritizes integration with the LACoFD, OEM, and local law enforcement systems, as well as determine if it is capable of CAD-to-CAD between the LACoFD and LASD. The new system should incorporate modernized capabilities and functionality, including zone overlays, evacuation tracking, and GIS data syncing for real-time updates. Since the January fires, the LASD has taken steps to launch a comprehensive tracking tool called the Citizen Evacuation Tracker, which provides real-time visibility into who has been evacuated, who needs to be evacuated, and where resources are needed most. This is a strong initiative by the LASD and should prove useful in future incidents for evacuation coordination and planning.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 84 Finding
Knowledge and Process Gaps for New Evacuation Technology Figure 19: Interplay of Genasys EVAC, Genasys ALERT, and Genasys PROTECT There was a clear gap in the transition between the previously used alert and notification system, CodeRED, and the new system, Genasys ALERT, including the need for more training and familiarity with Genasys ALERT. While transitioning between the two systems did not appear to cause significant messaging issues, there are opportunities to enhance real-time situational awareness through improved interoperability measures and system integration, as discussed below.
Recommendations
OEM should develop a more comprehensive SOP and training program that all OEM staff and partner agencies can participate in. This would include the update and/or development of job aids
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 85 with detailed instructions and templates for various incident scenarios. It would also include inperson training sessions for the Genasys ALERT system, including quarterly drills and annual exercises, to ensure all staff are comfortable and proficient with the system.
OEM should also work with the vendor to identify any additional functionality for the system, including but not limited to:
• Integrated login capabilities—logging into Genasys EVAC to update the zones that will be notified of a warning or order, and then logging into Genasys ALERT separately, is inefficient and error-prone. This could be resolved by integrating the two systems or creating a single sign on, so that when Genasys EVAC is updated, an alert is sent to Genasys ALERT notifying the user to send out a specific message. This way, if a zone is updated in the field, the staff responsible for sending evacuation messages will be notified directly, instead of relying on someone else to make a call and update a separate system. • Archived records—requiring alert entry logs and screenshots to be archived will allow them to be reviewed during post-incident AARs.
Finding
Inconsistent Access and Use of Information Sharing Tools The LACoFD utilizes a variety of situational awareness and information-sharing tools; however, their application across the department and among mutual aid partners is inconsistent. Many of these platforms are not uniformly available to all units, particularly those in the field or from assisting agencies. This lack of access and standardization created a disconnect between field personnel and command staff. Incident Commanders were often unable to see what field units were observing in real time, limiting their ability to make informed decisions about evacuation timing, resource deployment, and incident escalation. A streamlined, two-way flow of real-time information between field and command would significantly enhance operational efficiency, safety, and decision-making. Additionally, the over-reliance on cellular connectivity and cellular data was often cited as a challenge, as coverage was limited at times due to tower outages.
Access to reliable satellite data and internet connectivity would allow for more consistent information sharing, including access to satellite-powered situational awareness tools in real time (such as FireGuard).
Recommendations
To address these information-sharing challenges and enhance situational awareness across all levels of the LACoFD and its mutual aid partners, this review recommends the following:
Technology Audit
• Audit all current tools in use (e.g., Tablet Command, Genasys, ArcGIS, FireMapper). o Evaluate their effectiveness, overlap, and gaps in coverage.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 86 o Identify opportunities for integration and alignment with external systems used by partners such as CAL FIRE, CalOES, and local law enforcement.
Standardize Access and Deployment of Information Tools
• Ensure all frontline personnel, including mutual aid units, have access to core situational awareness platforms via mobile devices or vehicle-mounted systems. • Establish minimum technology requirements and field kits for incident deployment, including pre-loaded applications, user credentials, and connectivity solutions (e.g., satellite technology).
• Evaluate and deploy satellite resources to provide information and data, and for connectivity that is not dependent on cellular connections. • Provide brief, field-friendly training or quick-reference job aids to ensure consistent use across varied personnel and agencies.
Integrate Emerging Technologies and Real-Time Data Feeds • Actively participate in and support ongoing efforts with CAL FIRE, CalOES, and Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies to pilot and implement cutting-edge fire detection and monitoring tools, including:
o FireGuard, satellite-enabled hotspot tracking
o NASA/NOAA-based thermal imaging platforms
o Unmanned aerial vehicles/drones for near-real-time mapping • Develop SOPs for how data from these systems is accessed, validated, and used during incident response and planning.
Implement Feedback Loops Between Field and Command
• Develop a process to allow field crews to push real-time observations, images, and geotagged data directly to command dashboards.
• Use tools like ArcGIS Survey123 or Tablet Command enhancements to enable structured field reporting that feeds into the COP.
By implementing these actions, the LACoFD can create a more cohesive and integrated information environment that empowers both field units and command staff with shared, timely data—ultimately improving safety, resource allocation, and operational outcomes.
Critical Focus Area #5: Community Engagement and Public Information
Effective community engagement and public information strategies are essential for fostering trust, ensuring clarity, and enhancing preparedness in emergency situations. The County must
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 87 focus on revising policies and procedures related to messaging the public while simultaneously addressing gaps in proactive communication efforts. Streamlined processes, coupled with innovative tools for situational awareness, will empower responders and residents to act decisively during critical incidents. A cohesive framework for public outreach and education that is built in collaboration with local and state partner agencies will strengthen resilience and bolster the County’s ability to respond effectively to emergencies.
Key Challenges
• Fragmented messaging due to not establishing a joint information center (JIC) ahead of the event or at the onset
• Insufficient public education on evacuation zones, personal preparedness, expectations, and preparedness resources
• Missed opportunity to use elected officials in community preparedness initiatives and activities
Addressing these key challenges is vital to enhancing the County’s emergency response capabilities. By establishing a cohesive communication framework and prioritizing coordinated community outreach, the County can transform fragmented messaging into unified, actionable information.
Priority Recommendations and Actions
• Establish a consistent and formalized JIC.
• Develop a robust and consistent public education campaign across the County. • Engage elected officials at a more grassroots level in the preparedness initiatives. • Foster a sense of responsibility for personal preparedness.
These actions will not only elevate public understanding of risks but also strengthen partnerships between emergency management agencies, elected officials, and residents. Below are detailed findings and recommendations designed to tackle these challenges and pave the way for a more resilient approach to crisis management.
Finding
Establishment of a Joint Information Center
Early in the incident, County department communication teams, along with ICP JICs, led communications for the disaster. Due to staffing limitations, OEM staff that maintain a communications skill set were not able to establish a countywide JIC until January 9, with the support of countywide communications organization from the Chief Executive Office. The purpose of a JIC is to coordinate and disseminate accurate, consistent, and timely messages to
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 88 the public, stakeholders, and media, before, during, and after an emergency or coordinated event when the EOC is activated. A JIC also ensures the coordination of public information during incidents involving multiple agencies and/or jurisdictions.
Given the scope of this wind event and the risk it posed, there was a clear need for crossjurisdictional coordination. Los Angeles County has many emergency management jurisdictions, each with responsibility for its designated area. There does not appear to be any written policy or procedures in place to ensure that the County, local emergency management officials, the LASD, and LACoFD coordinate and communicate a unified message about the event.
Additionally, based on community input, the public did not effectively understand the potential impact of the PDS issued by the NWS. Even with extensive media coverage and public messaging prior to the event, some residents did not feel they were informed enough and/or feel the potential risk was effectively communicated.
As early as January 2, the County was sharing consistent real-time updates to the public through its social media channels and centralized emergency website. Between January 2 and January 9, before OEM established a JIC, the County shared 122 preparedness and emergency messages on its @CountyofLA social media channels, and the emergency website had more than three million views from the public. The earlier establishment of a JIC would have surged communications support to the emergency response and could have played a critical role in providing coordinated, accurate and consistent real-time updates to the public at the onset of the fires.
Recommendations
Joint Information Center Readiness
In complex events or incidents involving more than one agency, organization, or jurisdiction, it is best practice to establish a JIC, especially in advance of a known event. The establishment of a JIC in Los Angeles County in the case of a countywide event should be OEM’s responsibility.
Given the coordination responsibilities during an event, this review recommends that OEM maintain this responsibility and establish an increased level of readiness and staffing. However, the County Communications Office should serve as a backup to support opening the JIC, especially when OEM has staffing limitations. Steps the County can take to achieve this include, but are not limited to:
• Improving outreach to vulnerable, non-English-speaking, and transit-dependent populations
• Pre-identifying multilingual PIOs and back-up, trained PIOs • Establishing or using mutual aid for additional support • Developing pre-approved message libraries to reduce delays in alerts and public updates
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 89 • Establishing a standard cadence for press conferences and notifications leading up to an event
o Notifications should be pre-scheduled leading up to a known event and then pushed out as information changes or at regular intervals.
• Developing and initiating a community information campaign, in coordination with other County departments and partners, to help educate the community on expectations and sources of information during an event
• Suggesting the use of social science to evaluate the public’s understanding of evacuation messaging and recommend language and messaging prototypes that are easily understood by the public
As a best practice to expand outreach and public education, partnering with existing preparedness programs to increase awareness and training opportunities is effective. May is Wildfire Awareness Month, and many organizations and agencies plan activities throughout the month. The County could use the opportunity to:
• Increase public awareness of zone-based evacuation protocols and alert systems • Implement evacuation drills that involve real-time evacuation of residents within a predetermined area, which would involve utilizing alert and warning tools, as well as door-to-door visits, to evacuate residents to a predetermined location, then using the gathering to debrief the exercise and educate residents Recommendations
Public Information Strategy (Joint Information Center)
County departments need to collaborate in establishing a strategy for providing the public with information and establishing a JIC. This strategy should include, but not be limited to:
• Activation: Standing up the JIC as soon as the EOC is activated should be standard practice to ensure consistent, coordinated messages are transmitted to the public. It is also essential to ensure that media outlets, such as television, radio, and print, are aware of the activation and understand who they should expect to receive information from. • Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination: A directed coordination call can facilitate the exchange of critical information and help ensure that all entities communicate the same information to the public.
• Informing the Public: Over 10 million people live in Los Angeles County. Reaching them during critical events presents a significant challenge. As previously discussed, there are multiple ways to communicate information to the public, including FEMA’s IPAWS, the EAS, social media, television, radio, newspapers (apps and social media), NOAA Weather Radio, police and fire sirens, and Alert LA County, among others. The public
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 90 needs to be able to receive emergency messages through multiple channels, using two or three of the methods mentioned. However, it was noted that, given some of the variables experienced in the January fires, such as power outages and cell towers being down, less technological ways of sharing information need to be utilized. This can be accomplished by identifying information that LASD deputies and firefighters are sharing as they manage the incident and using PA systems to communicate risk and evacuation warnings and orders. Most importantly, all messaging must be concise and offer simple, straightforward, and direct courses of action.
Finding
Gaps in Public Understanding of Evacuation Zones and Alerts Interviews and field observations revealed gaps in the public’s understanding of evacuation zones, alert types (e.g., WEA vs Genasys), alert and notification access, and expected behaviors during fast-moving wildfire events. With the LASD responsible for executing evacuations, community preparedness directly affects response speed, officer safety, and public compliance.
Recommendations
Develop and implement an OEM-led Public Education and Community Preparedness Program focused on wildfire evacuation awareness, zone-based planning, and knowledge of the various alert and notification systems. This could include:
• An update of the existing “Ready! Set! Go!” program to promote awareness of Genasys and WEA alerts, and the reinforcement of “GoEarlY” behavior in high-risk events63 • Annual community evacuation drills in high-risk fire zones, which can also be used to simulate alert reception, route familiarization, and public Q&A sessions • Targeted outreach for vulnerable populations by partnering with faith groups, schools, nonprofits, and senior centers to disseminate evacuation readiness materials • Public dissemination of a “Do’s and Don’ts” list including actions that the public should or should not do during an incident. Examples of “do’s” would include checking on neighbors throughout an emergency (as many members of the public did during both the Eaton and Palisades Fires). Examples of “don’ts” include calling 911 with false reports to prompt movement of first responder resources to a given location; while individuals may do this out of fear if they can see smoke in the distance, doing so slows the response to calls about active fires that callers can see and provide detailed information about so responders can take action.
63 City of San Diego, Wildfire Ready Set Go! – Evacuation Guide. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 91 Establish a dedicated public information platform that consolidates all available alert and notification methods in one accessible location. This platform should include a comprehensive webpage and distributable materials for community meetings that explain how residents can connect to emergency alerts, while also addressing community concerns about notification tools.
For example, many residents have inquired about sirens as an alert method, but the County’s previous research demonstrated that this approach is not feasible for the region’s geography and infrastructure. By transparently communicating both available options and the rationale behind decisions about other potential tools, the program can build public trust while ensuring residents understand how to access reliable emergency information.
Finding
Leveraging Elected Officials for Community Engagement
Engagement with and by the Board of Supervisors Offices is a critical component in helping communities prepare for and stay informed during an event, making the district supervisors and their staff a valuable resource at the grassroots level. This review has highlighted how elected officials can be leveraged in relation to community engagement around preparedness and information sharing.
Recommendations
• Create a formal liaison protocol between the EOC and Board of Supervisors during major incidents.
• Assign a dedicated point of contact to brief each supervisor’s office with timely updates and coordinated messaging.
• Provide training to supervisors’ staff on emergency communications, resource activation, and constituent support roles during incidents.
• Involve Board of Supervisors staff in policy workgroups, evacuation exercises, and preevent planning meetings.
Finding
Lack of Community Preparedness
Individuals and communities play a crucial role in emergency preparedness. It is essential for everyone to take responsibility for their own safety and well-being during emergencies. Many community members noted that they were waiting for someone to tell them to evacuate, which in many cases resulted in them leaving at a point in the fire that was much riskier than if they had left sooner. Additionally, many community members noted that they were not prepared for a fire and were not aware of the resources available to them to stay informed, specifically in the area impacted by the Eaton Fire.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 92 Recommendations
We recommend that individuals and communities be and/or remain proactive in staying informed about potential risks, creating and practicing emergency plans, and ensuring that necessary supplies are readily available. Communities can enhance their preparedness by fostering strong relationships and communication channels among residents, local organizations, and emergency services. By working together, communities can build resilience and ensure a coordinated response when disasters strike. Ultimately, being prepared for emergencies can significantly reduce the impact of such events and save lives.
While the best practices in the Palisades area provide useful guidance, for example, the dedicated relationship building and community exercising mentioned in previous sections, some additional recommendations for the whole County include:
• Individual Preparedness: Individuals and families should prepare an emergency plan that considers specific risks and vulnerabilities for where they live and regularly discuss and practice the plan. A number of resources are available for creating a personal emergency plan.
64 • Disaster Preparedness Councils: The County should develop disaster preparedness councils, similar to the Topanga Coalition for Emergency Preparedness, in vulnerable areas across the county.
• Map Your Neighborhood: In addition to some of the community group examples from the Palisades area, there is a structured program that neighborhoods, community groups, and homeowner associations can utilize to organize together. The Washington State Emergency Management Division developed the Map Your Neighborhood program, which provides instructions for how communities can come together and plan for an emergency. The program includes guided activities to identify the capabilities and vulnerabilities of each community member, assign responsibilities, and develop a community plan.65
• Buddy System: A buddy system can be implemented for people with access and functional needs. This would ensure that vulnerable individuals have neighbors or community members assigned to assist them during evacuations. 64 https://www.ready.gov/ Ready.Gov Department of Homeland Security. Last referenced September 3, 2025. 65 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMOFtk8xeV0&list=PLaYp9JZofBz3RSYyvL57jo_95G8ziwuTV Map Your Neighborhood Video for Facilitators EMD Prepare, and 5dbc4d5ff2af3 Map Your Neighborhood Overview. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 93 Action Plan and Next Steps
The final exercise in this review process was to conduct an After-Action Action Planning Meeting. This is a structured method organizations use to translate the findings, lessons learned, and recommendations from an AAR into actionable steps for improvement. While the AAR itself documents what happened, what worked well, and what gaps or challenges were identified, the action planning process ensures that these insights lead to concrete changes in policy, training, procedures, or resource allocation.
McChrystal Group worked with County stakeholders to conduct a focused review of the AAR’s strengths, gaps, and recommendations and assign prioritization to issues that pose the highest operational or organizational risk. Once prioritization was validated by County stakeholders, corrective actions were defined with more specificity to include measurable outcomes or deliverables and a timeline for implementation. Each action was assigned to an individual, department, or agency with the authority and resources to implement the change. The action planning process also included the identification of any anticipated integration challenges the County would face, including regulatory concerns, budget, and organizational hurdles.
Given the number of recommendations outlined in this report, McChrystal Group led the County through the action planning process for a handful of recommendations. The County will now follow this process to internally work through plans for the remaining recommendations.
The County anticipates establishing a reporting process for regular check-ins or progress reviews to monitor completion and adjustments. The action planning process is critical because it:
1. Closes the loop between identifying problems and implementing solutions.
2. Provides a roadmap for continuous improvement.
3. Enhances accountability by assigning owners and deadlines.
4. Builds organizational resilience by ensuring lessons learned are institutionalized.
The ultimate outcome is not just a written report but a cycle of improvement that strengthens future performance, readiness, and response capabilities.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 94 Appendix 1: Data Sources
Publicly Available Data Sources County-Provided Sources • WatchDuty
• PBS WARN
• NWS forecasts
• Genasys Protect
• CAL FIRE
• Official communications
• NWS weather data
• Social media posts and comments
• News articles
• Community-generated content (photos,
blogs, videos, etc.)
• Genasys ALERT
• Genasys EVAC
• IPAWS logs
• LACoFD call logs
• LASD call logs
• Fire incident timelines
• Dispatch logs
• FireGuard
• Situation reports
• Tablet Command
• Interviews
• DINS logs
• Policies
• Procedures
• Automatic vehicle location data for both
Fire and LASD
• SCE PSPS event notifications
• LACoFD radio traffic
• LASD radio traffic
• LASD body-worn camera footage
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 95 Appendix 2: Stakeholders Interviews
Stakeholders Interviewed
County Agency/Department Stakeholder Third-Party Stakeholders • LASD/Sheriff
• LACoFD/Fire
• Los Angeles County Chief Executive
Office’s Office of Emergency
Management/CEO
• Los Angeles County Chief Executive
Office of Communications
• Supervisorial District 3 Office
• Supervisorial District 5 Office
• SD3 community members
• SD5 community members
• City of Los Angeles Emergency
Management Division
• U.S. Forest Service, Region 5 Angeles
National Forest
• KNX News Radio
• Digital Glue
• NWS Oxnard
• Genasys, Inc.
• Wildfire Forecast and Threat Intelligence
Integration Center, CalOES
Stakeholders who Declined Interviews
• LAFD
• Los Angeles City Police Department
• FEMA
• Federal Communications Commission
• CalOES
• JPL
• Sierra Madre Fire Department
• City of Pasadena Fire Department, OEM, and Police Department
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 96 Appendix 3: Timeline Overview
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 97
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 98
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 99
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 100
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 101 Figure 20: Timeline of significant events related to alerts, warnings, notifications, and evacuations for the Eaton and Palisades Fires based on the scope of our review and analysis of information.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 102 Appendix 4: Community Listening
Session Questions
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 103 Appendix 5: Themes in Community
Feedback
The following themes are derived from information shared by Los Angeles County residents in community listening sessions held in the spring of 2025. These themes span the entirety of all six community listening sessions held by McChrystal Group between April 7 and May 7. Three sessions were held for residents impacted by the Palisades Fire, and three sessions were held for residents impacted by the Eaton Fire. Themes in community feedback are as follows:
1. Need for Preparedness Warnings from Credible Sources: Sentiment that no advance warnings were given to encourage people to prepare or pack “go bags” ahead of time.
2. No Central Source of Truth leading to Evacuation Confusion: Sentiment that there was no single, credible source providing consistent information and guidance throughout the fire incident. Additional sentiment that residents lacked a trusted channel for accessing critical resources and updates.
3. Warning Fatigue: Sentiment that residents experience fatigue from frequent high-speed wind warnings in recent months, which may reduce the perceived urgency of future alerts.
4. Need for Expert Input on Warnings: Sentiment that County should engage psychologists to help craft warning messages to reduce warning fatigue and increase effectiveness.
5. Community Preparedness: Sentiment that preparedness efforts should be better advertised or potentially made mandatory through homeowner associations (HOAs), local fire departments, or OEM initiatives.
6. Community Wildfire Prevention Plan: Sentiment that there is a clear need for a comprehensive and well-communicated wildfire prevention plan. The County must leverage the already existing County’s Countywide Community Wildfire Protection Plan, a voluntary, community-driven document designed to outline fire protection strategies tailored to the unique needs of unincorporated, at-risk communities. To ensure the plan’s effectiveness and relevance, it is essential that its goals, strategies, and resources are clearly communicated to residents. This can be achieved by increasing the frequency and
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 104 reach of community workshops, which serve as a critical platform for education, engagement, and collaborative planning.
66 7. Need for Non-Digital Notification Methods: Community members emphasized their belief in the importance of employing low-tech alert methods—such as blow horns, loudspeakers on fire and LASD vehicles, and neighborhood sirens—to ensure all residents are reached regardless of connectivity or access to technology.
8. Need for Sirens: Resident communicated that they believed sirens to be an essential alert and warning tool, especially in areas where power or cellular service may fail. They can serve as a reliable alert system for all residents, including the most vulnerable.
Community Sentiment on Key Challenge Areas in Alerting and Warning the Community
1. Ineffective Traffic and Evacuation Management: Residents shared their perception that the Sheriff’s Department was unable to manage traffic or provide clear evacuation directions to residents.
2. Lack of Resources for Vulnerable Populations: Residents shared the sentiment that medically and socially vulnerable individuals were disproportionately affected due to limited access to timely information and support.
3. Power Outages Disrupted Communication: Residents shared that the loss of electricity prevented many residents from contacting family members and accessing accurate information during the emergency, and in some cases believed this to be the reason they did not receive an alert.
Community Sentiment on Areas to Sustain in Alerting and Warning the Community
1. Championing Expanded Use of Fire Incident Apps and KNX News Radio: Residents reported that third-party applications like WatchDuty and PulsePoint were helpful for real-time incident tracking and suggested they be more widely advertised as tools to follow to support emergency preparedness, as they aggregate information from many sources, including Genasys EVAC and other County-run resources.
2. Encouraging Formation of Community Facebook/WhatsApp Groups: Residents reported that their self-organized local Facebook and WhatsApp groups were effective in keeping residents informed and sharing real-time resources throughout the incident. 66 Countywide Community Wildfire Protection Plan—LA County Planning Last referenced September 24, 2025.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 105
3. Leveraging Reach of Community Influencers: Residents reported relying on local community influencers as a key source of information, such as a local meteorologist with a strong social media presence who played a key role in disseminating information through unofficial channels during the Eaton fire.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 106 Appendix 6: Acronym List
AAR: After-Action Review
A-Rep: Agency Representative
CAD: Computer-Aided Dispatch
CAL FIRE: California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection CEOC: County Emergency Operations Center
CERT: Community Emergency Response Team
DOC: Department Operations Center
EOB: Emergency Operations Bureau
EOC: Emergency Operations Center
FIRESCOPE: Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies HOA: Homeowner Association
IC: Incident Command
ICP: Incident Command Post
ICS: Incident Command System
IMT: Incident Management Team
JIC: Joint Information Center
LACoFD: Los Angeles County Fire Department
LASD: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
NWS: National Weather Service
OEM: Office of Emergency Management
PIO: Public Information Officer
PSPS: Public Safety Power Shutoff
SCE: Southern California Edison
SIB: Sheriff Information Bureau
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 107 SOP: Standard Operating Procedure
UC: Unified Command
WEA: Wireless Emergency Alerts
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 108 Appendix 7: Genasys Population
Estimates for Zones
Figure 21: Cumulative population under evacuation—Palisades Fire (*Includes LAFD city evacuations and warnings) Figure 22: Cumulative population under evacuation—Eaton Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 109 Appendix 8: Public Safety Power Shutoff
Events
Figure 24: PSPS events for the Palisades Fire area
Figure 23: PSPS events for the Eaton Fire area
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 110 Figure 25: PSPS de-energized circuits in Altadena
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 111 Figure 27: PSPS de-energized circuits in the Eaton Fire area, with an overlay of the Eaton Fire perimeter Figure 26: PSPS de-energized circuits in the Palisades Fire area, with an overlay of the Palisades Fire perimeter
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 112 Appendix 9: Damaged Structures
Figure 29: CAL FIRE DINS—Eaton Fire area damaged structures density Figure 28: CAL FIRE DINS—Eaton Fire area damaged structures
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 113 Figure 30: CAL FIRE DINS—Palisades Fire area damaged structures Figure 31: CAL FIRE DINS—Palisades Fire area damaged structures density
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 114 Appendix 10: Evacuation Warnings and
Orders
Figure 32: Altadena Genasys zone evacuation warning and order times
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 115 Alert Time Alert Type Genasys Zones General Location
1/7/25 6:49 PM Advisory
ALD-EASTLOMA, ALDEATONCANYON, ALD-GARFIAS, ALDMENDOCINO, ALD-MIDLOTHIAN, KINKINNELOA, PAS-E014, PAS-E015, PAS-E016, PAS-E017, PAS-E018, PASE019
Pasadena/Eaton
Canyon, North of I-210,
South of Eaton Canyon,
Altadena East of Lake
Ave
1/7/25 7:26 PM Order
PAS-E019, ALD-EASTLOMA, ALDEATONCANYON, ALD-GARFIAS, ALDMENDOCINO, ALD-MIDLOTHIAN, KINKINNELOAKinneloa Mesa, Eaton Canyon, East of Lake
Ave, North of
Washington Blvd
1/7/25 7:55 PM Warning
ALD-MENDOCINO, ALD-MOUNTLOWE,
PAS-E014, PAS-E015, PAS-E016, PASE017, PAS-E018
East of Lake Ave,
Mendocino, Pasadena
Zones North of I-210
1/7/25 9:00 PM Order ALD-MENDOCINO, ALD-MOUNTLOWE Altadena/Mendocino, East of Lake Ave
1/7/25 9:26 PM Order SMD-E007, SMD-E008 North Sierra Madre 1/7/25 9:34 PM Order LAC-E183 East of Kinneloa Mesa
1/7/25 10:27 PM Order
SMD-E004, SMD-E005, SMD-E006,
SMD-E007, SMD-E008, SMD-E009,
SMD-E010, SMD-E011, SMD-E012,
SMD-E013, SMD-E014, SMD-E017,
SMD-E019
Sierra Madre North of
W. Sierra Madre Blvd
1/7/25 10:39 PM Order PAS-E022 West Sierra Madre
1/7/25 10:43 PM Warning PAS-E018, PAS-E020 South of Kinneloa Mesa 1/7/25 11:08 PM Order SMD-E001, SMD-E002, SMD-E003,
SMD-E015, SMD-E016
Sierra Madre between
Michillinda and Lima,
North of W. Grand View
Ave
1/7/25 11:11 PM Order ARC-001, ARC-002, ARC-004 Arcadia East of Sierra Madre
1/7/25 11:17 PM Warning SMD-E018, MRV-101, ARC-003, ARC005 South Sierra Madre,
Arcadia, West Monrovia
1/8/25 12:41 AM Warning SMD-E018, MRV-101, ARC-003, ARC005 South Sierra Madre,
Arcadia, West Monrovia
1/8/25 12:51 AM Warning MRV-102, MRV-201, MRV-202, MRV203, MRV-204 North Monrovia
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 116 1/8/25 3:25 AM Order
ALD-ARROYOSECO, ALD-CANON,
ALD-CASITAS, ALD-CHANEY, ALDFARNSWORTH, ALD-GARDEN, ALDLAUREL, ALD-MEADOWS, ALDMILLARD, ALD-PALM, ALD-WAPELLO,
ALD-WHITEPARK, LCF-JPL
Altadena West of Lake
Ave extending to
include the JPL,
including all of North
Altadena, and South to
W. Woodbury Road,
excluding CALAVERAS
zones
1/8/25 3:36 AM Warning
LCF-BERKSHIRE, LCFCOMMONWEALTH, LCF-CROWN, LCFFOOTHILLEAST, LCF-INVERNESS,
LCF-STARLIGHT
East of La Cañada
Flintridge and West of
JPL
1/8/25 4:36 AM Order
LCF-BERKSHIRE, LCFCOMMONWEALTH, LCF-CROWN, LCFFOOTHILLEAST, LCF-INVERNESS,
LCF-STARLIGHT
East of La Cañada
Flintridge and West of
JPL
1/8/25 4:47 AM Order
MRV-101, MRV-102, MRV-201, MRV202, MRV-203, MRV-204, MRV-301, MRV-302, MRV-303, MRV-304, MRV305, MRV-307, MRV-401, MRV-402, MRV-403, MRV-404, MRV-405
All of North Monrovia
1/8/25 5:01 AM Warning BRA-001, BRA-002, BRA-003, BRA-004, DUA-001, DUA-002
Bradbury and Duarte
Wilderness Preserve
1/8/25 5:15 AM Order
GLN-E018, GLN-E027, GLN-E028, GLNE029, GLN-E030, GLN-E039, GLNE040, GLN-E041, LCF-ALTACANYADA,
LCF-CASTLE, LCF-CIVICCENTER,
LCF-CREST, LCF-DESCANSO, LCFFOOTHILLWEST, LCF-HAMPSTEAD, LCF-HILLARD, LCF-MEMORIAL, LCFPARADISE, PAS-E006
La Cañada Flintridge,
Northeast of Glendale
1/8/25 5:43 AM Order ALD-CALAVERAS
CALAVERAS zone,
From Altadena Dr to
Woodbury Rd, Fair Oak
s Ave to West Lake Ave
1/8/25 5:56 AM Order PAS-E008, PAS-E010, PAS-E012 North Pasadena, West of Lake Ave
1/8/25 6:00 AM Warning
GLN-E001, GLN-E002, GLN-E003, GLNE004, GLN-E006, GLN-E013, GLNE017, GLN-E026, GLN-E038, CRVALABAMA, CRV-COMMUNITY, CRVPINECONE, CRV-HENRIETTA, CRVBRIGGSTERRACE, CRV-TEASLEY,
CRV-MOUNTAIN
West of Glendale
Freeway, Montrose,
and La Crescenta
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 117 1/8/25 6:04 AM Warning PAS-E011, PAS-E013
North Pasadena from I210 to Washington
Blvd, West of Lake Ave
1/8/25 6:19 AM Order SMD-E018
Sierra Madre between
Sierra Madre Blvd and
Orange Grove Ave
1/8/25 7:07 AM Warning GLN-E043, GLN-E044 Scholl Canyon 1/8/25 7:10 AM Warning PAS-E004, PAS-E005, PAS-E007, PASE009 Rose Bowl 1/8/25 8:22 AM Order GLN-E043, GLN-E044 Scholl Canyon
1/9/25 11:47 AM Order LAC-E167 Mt. Wilson
1/9/25 11:57 AM Order LAC-E167, LAC-E165-B, LAC-E168-A Mt. Wilson Figure 33: Eaton Fire alerts—Genasys zone evacuation warnings and orders
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 118 Alert Time Alert Type Genasys Zones General Description of Location 1/7/25 10:59 AM Advisory TOP-U003 Topanga Canyon Zone 3 - Northwest of Topanga Oaks
1/7/25 11:13 AM Advisory *LAFD City Alert Topanga State Park 1/7/25 11:30 AM Warning SSM-U010-B West Sunset Mesa
1/7/25 11:50 AM Warning TOP-U007 Topanga Canyon Zone 7 - West of Topanga State Park
1/7/25 11:53 AM Order SSM-U010-A East Sunset Mesa
1/7/25 12:01 PM Warning TOP-U009 Topanga Canyon Zone 9, Southwest of Topanga State Park
1/7/25 12:07 PM Order *LAFD City Alert Topanga State Park 1/7/25 12:14 PM Warning MAL-C111-B Malibu East of Las Flores 1/7/25 12:42 PM Order MAL-C111-B Malibu East of Las Flores 1/7/25 12:55 PM Order SSM-U010-B Malibu East of Las Flores - Tuna Canyon Park
1/7/25 12:59 PM Warning MAL-C111-A Malibu West of Las Flores 1/7/25 1:00 PM Warning RMB-U030-A North Malibu West of Las Flores 1/7/25 1:18 PM Warning TOP-U008 Topanga Canyon Zone 8
1/7/25 1:39 PM Order *LAFD City Alert Pacific Palisades 1/7/25 4:42 PM Order TOP-U007 Topanga Canyon Zone 7 - West of Topanga State Park
1/7/25 4:44 PM Order TOP-U009 Topanga Canyon Zone 9, Southwest of Topanga State Park
1/7/25 4:50 PM Order TOP-U009 Topanga Canyon Zone 9, Southwest of Topanga State Park
1/7/25 4:59 PM Warning TOP-U005 Topanga Canyon Zone 5 - West of Topanga
1/7/25 5:26 PM Order TOP-U006 Topanga Canyon Zone 6 - North of Topanga
1/7/25 5:27 PM Order TOP-U004 Topanga Canyon Zone 4 - Northwest of Topanga State Park
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 119 1/7/25 5:29 PM Order TOP-U003 Topanga Canyon Zone 3 - Northwest of Topanga Oaks
1/7/25 5:30 PM Order TOP-U002 Topanga Canyon Zone 2 - Topanga Park and areas North
1/7/25 5:41 PM Order MAL-C111-A, RMBU030-A Malibu West of Las Flores 1/7/25 5:46 PM Warning
CAL-C405, CALC406, CAL-C407,
CAL-C408, CALC409, CAL-C410,
CAL-C411, CALC412, CAL-C413,
CAL-C414, CALC415, DRY-U026,
MTN-U028, RMBU030-B, RRC-U027,
SDP-U029, RMBU030-C, RMB-U030-
E, RMB-U030-F,
RMB-U030-G, RMBU030-H
North Malibu to US101, between N1 and
Las Flores Canyon, stretching Northeast
to cover Calabasas
1/7/25 5:50 PM Warning MAL-C112 Malibu
1/7/25 7:56 PM Order *LAFD City Alert Pacific Palisades 1/7/25 8:55 PM Order MAL-C112-B, RMBU030-B Carbon Canyon North of PCH 1/8/25 1:01 AM Order
DRY-U026-A, MTNU028, RMB-U030-D,
RRC-U027, SDPU029
Monte Nido
1/8/25 1:12 AM Warning MCR-U021-A, MCRU021-C Malibu Creek State Park Figure 34: Palisades Fire alerts—Genasys zone evacuation warnings and orders.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 120 Appendix 11: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch
Calls
Figure 35: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch calls for structure fires by time interval—Palisades Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 121 Figure 36: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch calls for structure fires by time interval—Eaton Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 122 Appendix 12: Fire Front Progression
Figure 38: FireGuard fire front progression—Eaton Fire
Figure 37: FireGuard fire front progression—Palisades Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 123 FireGuard Front Progression and 911 LAC Fire Dispatch—Eaton Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 124 Figure 39: FireGuard fire front progression and 911 LAC Fire dispatch calls about structure fires, as time intervals—Eaton Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 125 FireGuard Front Progression and 911 Dispatch Calls—Palisades Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 126 Figure 40: FireGuard fire front progression and 911 LAC Fire dispatch calls about structure fires, as time intervals—Palisades Fire
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 127 Appendix 13: McChrystal Group Team
Shawn Tyrie, Partner and Government President
Shawn Tyrie is a Partner at McChrystal Group. He leads engagements with clients across the federal, defense contracting, and commercial sectors.
These engagements are unified by their focus on building highperforming, resilient teams—and the leaders who lead them. He provides mission-focused technology experience with 20 years of management and leadership experience in the national security, intelligence community, and Department of Defense sectors focused on program management and implementation, strategy development, and systems engineering built on the context of intelligence community mission experience. This includes helping customers develop strategic vision, foster innovation, transform organizational workflows through the application of information technology (IT), and execute implementation plans over long-time horizons.
Erin Sutton, Partner
Erin Sutton is a Partner working with public sector clients. Before joining McChrystal Group, Erin was the Chief Deputy State Coordinator for the Virginia Department of Emergency Management. She oversaw all daily operations of the agency and provided overall support to the State Coordinator during emergencies. Erin has worked in the field of emergency management and public health for the last 20 years. She served as the Director of the City of Virginia Beach OEM and has extensive experience managing large-scale disasters in Virginia.
She received her BS degree in biology from Radford University and her MS in microbiology and immunology from Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. She is a certified Emergency Manager, Master Exercise Practitioner, and has her Project Management Professional certification.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 128 Shandi Treloar, Principal (Project Lead)
Shandi Treloar is a Principal with McChrystal Group, supporting the emergency management business within the Government Practice group.
Prior to McChrystal Group, she was the Vice President and Preparedness Lead for Emergency Management (EM) Partners. In this role, Shandi built the preparedness practice area from scratch, increasing the firm’s revenue by over $6 million. Shandi was also responsible for the firm’s first nonFEMA federal contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, supporting their emergency management program.
Prior to EM Partners, Shandi had her own emergency management consulting firm, EM Strategies, LLC. As the Principal, her goal was to empower clients and partners to build stronger emergency management programs, from recovery processes and debris management planning to strategic comprehensive program development.
Chloe Hite, Senior Associate (Project Manager)
Chloe Hite is an Associate at McChrystal Group, with experience on a range of products for a diverse set of clients across the healthcare, pharmaceutical, technology, and energy sectors. She has led and contributed on a variety of engagements, including leadership development at scale across a workforce of 80,000, strategy alignment at a Fortune 500, and aligning narrative development following a rapid business transformation at a Fortune 5 company.
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Chloe worked as a Project and Program Manager in international development consulting, managing projects in a range of impact areas including disaster relief and risk preparedness, food security and nutrition, global health, emerging market supply chain logistics, local economic development, blended finance, and leadership and governance, with a focus on gender equity and inclusion.
She holds a BA in Anthropology and Economics from Boston University and an MA in International Economics and Development from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 129 Shruti Holey, Analyst (Project Administrator)
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Shruti completed her master’s in public health at Yale, with a concentration in healthcare management.
During her time there, she held various internship positions at Yale New Haven Health; the Hospital for Special Surgery, New York; and 500 Women Scientists, and was a consultant with the Connecticut Hospice, where she worked on creating workplace cohesion and implementing leadership training. She was a fellow at the Yale Institute of Global Health and at Yale Law School’s Solomon Centre for Health Law and Policy, where she worked on research on health equity, women’s health, and global health.
She completed her bachelor’s in dental surgery from Dr D.Y. Patil Dental College and Hospital, Pune, India. She practiced as a general dentist and founded a nonprofit that worked toward creating health equity through healthcare awareness programs in underprivileged communities.
Ryan Aminzadeh, Partner (Analytics Lead)
Ryan Aminzadeh is a Partner and the Chief Data and Analytics Officer at McChrystal Group. In this role, Ryan is responsible for researching, developing, and deploying McChrystal Group’s broad portfolio of analytic and diagnostic capabilities. These include diagnostic surveys, network analysis, and AI and natural language processing (NLP)-based analytics technologies oriented around people, teams, and organizations.
Ryan is also responsible for technical operations, including data engineering; data model development and maintenance; and other bespoke data scraping, synthesis, storage, processing, and visualization applications.
Before joining McChrystal Group, Ryan co-founded and served as the Chief Technology Officer of HelioScout, developing recruiting and talent analytics and insights software. This included bespoke data acquisition, augmentation, and search and retrieval software, customized NLP algorithms, predictive statistical modeling software, user interface design/development, and IT infrastructure/architecture.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 130 Stephanie Beltz, Senior Learning Designer
Stephanie Beltz is a Senior Learning Designer within McChrystal Group Academy, where she leverages the latest insights from organizational, social, and behavioral research to design, develop, and implement leadership solutions for our clients.
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Stephanie was most recently a Senior Talent Management Consultant at Jackson National Life, where she designed and facilitated leadership training across the organization, coached managers and executives around leadership competencies, and developed organizational initiatives related to diversity, equity, inclusion, and employee well-being. In the preceding ten years, she was a psychology professor at three institutions of higher education and a psychotherapist at two behavioral health organizations.
Stephanie received her BA in Psychology from Ohio University and her MA in Psychology in Education from Columbia University. She also has a PhD in Organizational Leadership from the Chicago School of Professional Psychology.
Victor Bilgen, Partner
Victor Bilgen is a Partner at McChrystal Group, where he is the Head of Team Science, leading a group of statisticians and data scientists specializing in custom and tailored research analyzing numerous leadership behaviors, networked communication pathways, and organizational processes.
An expert in research design, Victor led the development of McChrystal Group’s analytical methodology used to baseline organizations on our Team of Teams model. As a thought leader in network analysis and data analytics, Victor regularly presents at industry conferences, including the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Conference and Connected Commons.
Since joining McChrystal Group in 2012, Victor and his team have analyzed hundreds of organizations and hundreds of thousands of individual respondents.
Victor received a BSc in Communication and Sociology and an MSc in Marketing Communication from the University of Connecticut. In his spare time, Victor is an accomplished musician and loves cooking and trying new foods.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 131 Edessa Bautista, Associate
Edessa Bautista is a Program Manager at McChrystal Group, where she manages and coordinates the logistics of multiple learning and development projects to ensure all team members are adequately prepared and aligned to execute the program. Additionally, she supports learning designers in shaping and customizing learning content and materials. She is currently supporting several learning programs with clients from the biopharmaceutical industry, state and federal government organizations, and a Fortune 100 multinational accounting and professional services firm.
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Edessa was a math educator, then transitioned to be an education and program consultant working with districts, charter schools, and school leaders in the state of California as their partner in strategic talent acquisition, management, and development. In addition, she implemented a high touch advising framework for aspiring California educators to ensure completion of the credentialing program, employment, and tenure in their respective fellowships.
Taryn Brymn, Senior Advisor
Taryn Brymn has spent the last decade building peer networking communities for leading global C-suite executives and board directors, helping them reimagine solutions to perennial business challenges. Most recently, she led executive programs at Future Forum, a research consortium led by Slack in partnership with Boston Consulting Group, Management Leadership for Tomorrow, and MillerKnoll. Using Future Forum’s quarterly desk worker research, Taryn turned data into dialogue centered on new ways of working and managing teams.
Prior to Slack, Taryn was Director of Programs at G100 Network (part of the World 50 Group), where she shaped membership programs for leaders of Fortune 500 companies. Earlier in her career, Taryn held roles in nonprofit grant execution and management. Most recently, her work supported the revitalization of cultural institutions in New York City at the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone.
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 132 Ken Pimlott, Fire Subject Matter Expert
Ken Pimlott is the former Director of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (also known as CAL FIRE). He led the agency from 2010 to 2018, overseeing wildfire response, prevention programs, and forest management across California. With over 30 years of firefighting experience, Ken played a crucial role in managing some of the state’s most devastating wildfires.
John Sokich, Meteorological Subject Matter Expert
John Sokich formerly served as the Director of National Weather Service Congressional Affairs at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association National Weather Service. He has extensive experience in meteorology, bringing years of expertise in weather forecasting, policy, and communication, and now operates as an independent contractor advising on these issues.
Rob Giordano, Law Enforcement Subject Matter
Expert
Rob Giordano joins McChrystal Group from CAS Safety Consulting. Rob previously served as the Sonoma County Sheriff. During his tenure, he led the evacuation strategy for the 2017 Sonoma Complex fires (Tubbs, Nuns, and Pocket Fires). His leadership and contributions during the 2017 fires were recognized by Congress, California’s State Legislature, and several local groups. Rob retired as the Sonoma County Sheriff after serving 29 years in law enforcement and started a law enforcement consulting practice.
Clint Shubel, Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert
Clint Shubel also joins the McChrystal Group from CAS Safety Consulting. During his tenure as Assistant Sonoma County Sheriff, Clint served as the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office DOC IC during the 2017 Sonoma Complex fires. His additional expertise is in fire prevention, emergency action plans, and general health and safety responsibilities related to the construction industry.
Item: 14.D.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Receive and file a verbal report on the Rolling Hills Community Association's request to host a Salvation Army donation drive in the City Hall parking lot Background:
None.
Discussion:
None.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
Receive and file. Provide direction to staff.
Attachments:
None