RULES COMMITTEE: 3/25/2026
Item: B.1
File ID: ROGC 26-116
TO: Honorable Mayor & FROM: Toni J. Taber, MMC
City Council City Clerk
SUBJECT: The Public Record DATE: March 25, 2026
March 12, 2026 – March 19, 2026
ITEMS FILED FOR THE PUBLIC RECORD
Letters from Boards, Commissions, and Committees
Letters from the Public
1. Letter from Elva Wilson, dated March 13, 2026, regarding: Code of Conduct During City Council Meetings – Batman.
2. Letter from vivid.note1655, dated March 15, 2026, regarding: Opposition to Agenda 4.1: No to all ALPR Mass Surveillance Systems.
____________________________
Toni J. Taber, MMC
City Clerk
TJT/tt
Public Record: 1
This message is from outside the City email system. Do not open links or attachments from untrusted sources. aggressively in opposition of my view regarding use of LPR, I would feel safer if I could recognize him in an encounter in public on the streets.
Elva Wilson
mobile
3/16/26, 9:49 AM Inbox - Rules and Open Government Committee Agendas - Outlook https://outlook.office365.com/mail/[email protected]/inbox/id/AAQkADhhYzk3NTk1LTBmZDAtNDc4Yi1hN2Q0LTZjNmZjNTk5MT… 2/2 Public Record: 2
1. San José relinquished control over ALPR data to the vendor Contracts grant Flock Group, Inc. perpetual rights to use, analyze, and retain aggregated or derived data, with no City approval, audit rights, or downstream restrictions—even after contract termination.
2. City policies do not constrain vendor behavior
San José’s ALPR usage policies apply only to City personnel and do not limit vendor aggregation, secondary use, AI training, or sharing with other governments.
3. Residents have no enforceable rights to their own data Individuals have no guaranteed right to access, correct, delete, or even view ALPR records about their own movements.
4. San José claims it may withhold ALPR data even from the person tracked The City treats ALPR records as investigatory intelligence by default, denying access even when no investigation exists and the data concerns the requester’s own license plate.
5. This creates an inversion of transparency under California law A resident may access body-camera footage of a police stop but not months of automated location tracking collected without suspicion.
6. The system enables persistent, dragnet surveillance
ALPR operates continuously on everyone, justified by vague concepts like “deterrence” and “situational awareness,” rather than case-specific investigation.
7. Modern ALPR systems go far beyond license plates
Current deployments perform vehicle “fingerprinting,” capturing make, model, color, damage, accessories, and movement patterns, enabling tracking even when plates change.
8. Public representations materially downplay system capabilities City signage and documentation describing “license plate readers” obscure continuous tracking, retention, aggregation, sharing, and behavioral analysis.
9. The system is mischaracterized as “portable”
Cameras are bolted to light poles and hardwired, functioning as permanent surveillance infrastructure—likely avoiding stricter review triggered by fixed installations.
10. Data is widely shared across a multi-agency surveillance network San José ALPR data is accessible to numerous outside organizations via the vendor platform, turning a local system into a regional intelligence network.
11. Errors and misuse cause real harm
ALPR misreads have led to wrongful stops, detentions, vehicle seizures, and dangerous encounters; officers have also misused ALPR systems for stalking and harassment.
12. Security failures expose images of people, not just vehicles Independent investigations showed exposed cameras capturing and storing images of people, including faces, contradicting assurances that only plates are collected. 3/16/26, 10:13 AM Inbox - Rules and Open Government Committee Agendas - Outlook https://outlook.office365.com/mail/[email protected]/inbox/id/AAQkADhhYzk3NTk1LTBmZDAtNDc4Yi1hN2Q0LTZjNmZjNTk5MT… 2/3 This message is from outside the City email system. Do not open links or attachments from untrusted sources.
13. Surveillance is explicitly intended to change behavior Similar systems openly state that “people respond differently when under surveillance,” and police statements reflect normalization of total monitoring.
14. Privacy, civil liberties, and First Amendment impacts were never evaluated The City’s evaluation criteria excluded constitutional concerns, chilling effects, misuse risk, and cumulative location tracking impacts.
15. The program conflicts with Supreme Court privacy reasoning In Carpenter v. United States, the Court recognized that long-term, aggregated location tracking reveals the “whole of a person’s physical movements.” San José’s ALPR system enables exactly this form of tracking without individualized suspicion, public vote, or meaningful safeguards. 3/16/26, 10:13 AM Inbox - Rules and Open Government Committee Agendas - Outlook https://outlook.office365.com/mail/[email protected]/inbox/id/AAQkADhhYzk3NTk1LTBmZDAtNDc4Yi1hN2Q0LTZjNmZjNTk5MT… 3/3