cm\cntr-frm\appeal
5/00
I. OWNER/APPLICANT
Applicant
Full name of Person, Firm, or Corporation
( )
Mailing Address Area Code Phone No.
Legal Owner Name:
Legal Owner Address:
Phone No.: ( ) ( ) Fax: ( ) II. PROPERTY INFORMATION
Land Use
Existing Land Use of Property and/or Building Zoning District General Plan Designation Location
Street Address Name of Nearest Intersecting Street
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR SUBMITTAL REQUIREMENTS
III. REASON FOR REQUEST
In the following provided space, please clearly specify and explain the error(s) of decision or requirement upon which you are basing this appeal. (If additional space is needed, please attach additional comments to the back of this application.)
Applicant’s Signature: Date:
APPEAL APPLICATION NO.
APPEAL APPLICATION
Planning and Building Agency
Planning Division
20 Civic Center Plaza
P.O. Box 1988 (M-20)
Santa Ana, CA 92702
(714) 647-5804
Anchor Stone Christian Church
2938 Daimler Street, Santa Ana, CA 92705
626
626
949
616-2312
Anchor Stone Christian Church, a California religious corporation 2938 Daimler Street, Santa Ana, CA 92705
616-2312
466-7077
[email protected]
corporate office
Professional (P)
Flex-3
2938 Daimler Street, Santa Ana, California
between E. Deere Avenue & E. Garry Avenue
Applicant appeals the Planning Commission's denial of Conditional Use Permit No, 2023-18.
Applicant is a religious corporation organized under California’s Nonprofit Religious Corporation law.
Applicant appeals for the reasons previously stated at Tab 1 hereto, as well as the following:
<> Denial of the CUP imposes a substantial burden on applicant's religious exercise <> City staff have never identified a compelling governmental interest for denying a CUP <> Applicant asked the Planning Commission to consider RLUIPA but it refused to do so <> The City is continuing its unlawful "pattern and practice" of violating RLUIPA - See Tab 2 Sept. 14, 2023
TAB 1
TAB 2
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #:180
KRISTEN CLARKE
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rig~ts Division
SAJ\1EENA SHINA MAJEED
Chief, Housin_g ~n_d Civil Enforcement Section
CARRIE PAGNUCCO, Acting Deputy Chief
NOAH SACKS, Trial Attorney
TERRENCE MANGAN, Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Housing and Civil Enforcement Section
1-50 M. Street NE
Washington , D.C. 20001
Telephone: (202) 531-5995
Email: [email protected]
E. MARTIN ESTRADA
United States Attorney
DAVID M. HARRIS
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
RICHARD M. PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Rights Section , Civil Division
MATTHEW NICKELL (Cal. Bar No . 304828)
Assistant United States Attorney
Federal Building, Suite 7516
300 North Los Angeles Street
Los Angeles California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-8805 , Facsimile : (213) 894-7819
Email: matthew .nickell @usdoj.gov
Attorneys for
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICAH ' S WAY,
Plaintiff,
V.
CITY OF SANTA ANA ,
Defendant.
Case No. 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES
STATEMENT OF INTEREST IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT
Date: June 5, 2023
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Courtroom: 10-A
Hon. David 0 . Carter
United States District Judge
If-- ----- - ------~
1 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
.
se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 2 of 18 Page ID #:181
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................. .................... ............. .......... .......................... ........ 2 I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES .......... ................ ........... .4 II. BACKGROlJND ............................ .............. ............. ........... .... ............ ................ ........ 4 III. ARGUMENT .......... .................. .................. ........... ........... .......... .......... ........................ 7 A. MW plausibly alleged that its distribution of food and drinks to homeless individuals is "re ligious exercise" under RLUIPA ............ ................... ....... ................... 7 B. MW plausibly alleged that the City's complete refusal to allow it to provide food or drinks to homeless individuals "imposes a substantial burden " on its religious exercise under RLlJIPA ..... ................................. .................... .............................. ........ 12 IV. CONCLUSION ........................................ ................... ................................................ 15 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............ .......... ................ ....................... ...... .......... ... 17 1 se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 3 of 18 Page ID #:182
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
IO
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
Cases
A cad. ofOur Lady ofPeace v. City ofSan Diego, No. 09CV962-WQH-AJB, 2010 WL 1329014 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) ..................... .................... .................................. ...... 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................... ............... ...... ................ ....................... 4 Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................... ......................... ...... .4 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S . 709 (2005) .............. .............................. ........................... 7, 9 Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City ofNew York, 293 F.3d 570 (2d. Cir. 2002) ......... 8 First Lutheran Church v. City ofSt. Paul, 326 F.Supp.3d 745 (D. Minn. 2018) ....... 11 , 14 Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................... ....... 7, 13 Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. ofYuba City v. County ofSutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) .... 12, 13, 15
Harbor Missionary Church Corp. v. City ofSan Buenaventura , 642 F.App'x 726 (9th Cir.2016) .................................................................................................................... 8,9 Int'! Church ofFoursquare Gospel v. City ofSan Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................... ................... ..................... ............... .................. ........ ............ 10, 14 Johnson v. Baker, 23 F.4th 1209 (9th Cir. 2022) .......................... ................ ............. 10, 13 Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 424 F.Supp.2d 309 (D. Mass. 2006) ........................... l l 19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096 (9th Cir. 2023) ............................... ........................ . 14 New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City ofSalinas, 29 F.4th 596 (9th Cir. 2022) ... 12, 14 San Jose Christian College v. City ofMorgan Hill, 360 F .3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) .... 12, 14 Scottish Rite Cathedral Assn. ofLos Angeles v. City ofLos Angeles, 156 Cal.App.4th 108 (Cal. App. 2007) ............. .................................... ................ ................... .......... 11, 12 Thomas v. Review Ed. ofthe Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) .............. 12 W Presbyterian Church v. Bd. ofZoning Adjustment ofD. C., 862 F.Supp. 538 (D.D.C . 1994) ............................ ................................................................................. ...... 8, 11-12 Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................... 13 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ............................................. ............................ 13 2 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
I
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 4 of 18 Page ID #:183 World Outreach Conj Ctr. v. City ofChicago, 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009) ...... . 8, 11, 12 Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 517...................................................................................................................4 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc ........... ........................................... ....................................................... 7 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 ...... ........................................... ........... ................ ..... ......................... 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 .............................................. ............................................... ............. 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 .................................. ........... ................................................... 7, 9, 13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq . ..................................................... ........................................... 4 Legislative History
146 Cong. Rec. S6689 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) ................ ............ ....... ............................. 8 3 5
10 15
1 2
3 4
6 7
8 9
11 12
13 14
16 17
20 25
18 19
21 22
23 24
26 27
28 se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 5 of 18 Page ID #:184 I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, the United States respectfully submits this Statement of Interest to the Court relating to the Defendant City of Santa Ana's ("City") Motion to Dismiss ("Motion" or "Mot." ), ECF No. 16.1 This case raises important questions involving the application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. In addition to creating a private cause of action, RLUIP A charges the Attorney General with enforcing its provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f). Because this litigation implicates the proper interpretation and application ofRLUIPA, the United States has a strong interest in the issues raised by the City's Motion and believes that its participation will aid the Court. The scope of the United States' Statement of Interest is limited to what constitutes religious exercise and whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a substantial burden claim under RLUIPA. As Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation ofRLUIPA , the City's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs RLUIPA claim should be denied.
II. BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint ("Compl."), ECF No. 1, Micah's Way ("MW"), is a "fa ith-based organization" named after the "'Micah Mandate' set forth in Micah 6:8 in the Bible." 2 Compl. ,I5. The "Micah Mandate" requires followers "[t]o act justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God." Id. MW describ es itself as a 1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 517, " [t]he Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pendin g in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States." 2 A court must, on a motion to dismiss , assume the truth of the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Co. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). For this reason, the United States treats the Plaintiffs allegations as true in this Statement of Interest. The United States takes no position on the merits of Plaintiff's claims, including whether the City has violated RLUIPA.
4 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 6 of 18 Page ID #:185 "Chr istian ministry" that follows the teachings of Jesus Christ, and particularly the words of Matthew 25:35-40, which state, "For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink ..." Id. 14. Consistent with this mandate , MW provides charitable services to homele ss individuals, including by providing light food and bevera ges, to persons who come to their Resource Center. Id. ,r7. In particular, MW believes it "has a religious duty to help the homeless that come to it ... including by providing a cup of coffee and a muffin if a client is hungry." Id. if27.
Since early 2016, MW's Resource Center has been located at 1517 East Fourth Street in Santa Ana, California. Compl. ,rs 1. MW describes this as an "exce llent location" because it is only half a mile from the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), facilitating its ID voucher services. 3 Id. ,rs2 . MW has paid yearly fees to the City for a business license , but does not have a Certificate of Occupancy ("COO"). Id. ,r,r1 0, 54-56.
In early 2020, MW began providing snacks and beverages outdoors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Compl. if57. Around this same time, a needle exchange program operated by the American Addiction Institute began operations two doors down from MW. The exchange was associated with increa sed neighborhood complaints of drug use, trespassing, littering , and loitering. Id. ,r,r58-60, 64-67.
In November 2021, the City's mayor received a complaint "begging" him to "do something about the homeless houses" after individuals "dump[ ed] trash and bleach" on a local resident's door. Compl. if64. In response, the mayor instructed various city departments "to devise whatever measures they could come up w ith to compel MW and the Needle Excha nge to move out of the 4th Street neighborhood or, at the very least, to severely curtail their operations." Id. ,r,r67, 68, 74. 3 MW assists homeless persons fill out ID vouchers, which allows them to obtain a free California photo ID from the DMV. MW also assist s homeless persons in obtaining birth certificates so that they can qualify for various governmen t benefits, including housing assistance. Compl. if52.
5 5
10 15
2 3
4 6
7 8
9 11
12 13
14 16
20 25
17 18
19 21
22 23
24 26
2 7
28 se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 7 of 18 Page ID #:186 On November 29, 2021, the City issued an Administrative Citation to MW for "engaging in unpermitted food distribution" and "conducting business operations without a valid COO." Comp!. ~79. The following day, the City held a community meeting regarding its "enforcement efforts" against MW. Id. ,r,r98-l 04. The mayor stated that MW and the needle exchange were "not in the right location ," and that a solution was possible only if they were "ope n-minded about finding relocation." Id. ,r,rI03-04 . His intention was "to correct what's happeni ng here, but also prevent it from happening anyplace else in the City." Id. ,r102.
MW applied for a COO in December 2021, but was denied in January 2022.
Comp!. ,r12. MW reapplied in February 2022, but was denied again "on the grounds that MW was engaged in food distribution activities that were allegedly not permitted in the Professional district." Id. In March 2022, MW informed the City that its refusal to grant a COO permitting it to provide food and beverages to poor and homeless individuals was a violation ofRLUIPA. Id. i!l07. On June 7, 2022, the City informed MW that it would "take all appropriate action," including the "issuance of administrative fines, criminal prosecution and/or civil remedies such as injunctions and penalties," if MW continued operating without a COO. Id. ,rl3.
MW administratively appealed the City's secon d COO denial in August 2022.
Comp!. i!l4. Following a hearing, the administrative hearing officer concluded that the City had failed to adequately "address the RLUIPA issues." Id. ,r16. MW subsequently met with City officials and offered to return to its pre-pandemic practice of providing food and drink indoors rather than from its garden courtyard. Id. ,r112. However, the City rejected this offer. Id. ,r113. Regardless, MW reverte d to its pre-pandemic procedures and currently only distributes food and beverages inside its Resource Center.
Id. ,r29. Although MW informed the City in writing of this policy change, on January 11 , 2023, the City notified MW that it would not permit MW to "prov id[ e] any food or beverages of any kind to any clients or any other members of the public ( whether rich or poor), either inside or outside MW's Resource Center." Id. ,r,r3 1-32, 35. Accordingly, 6 5
10 15
1 2
3 4
6 7
8 9
11 12
13 14
16 20
25 17
18 19
2 1
22 23
24 26
27 28
se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC -KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 8 of 18 Page ID #:187 MW remains "su bject to potential fines, injunctions, and criminal prosecution " from the City. Id. if31; see also id. ,r13.
On January 30, 2023, MW filed this suit, alleging inter alia that the City's actions violated RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden on its religious exercise. Compl. ,r,rl 16-27. On March 22, 2023, the City moved to dismiss MW's claims. Mot. at 2.
Specifically, the City argues that MW' s "use of its property, as alleged in the Complaint, does not constitute a religious exercise under RLUIPA," and that its denial ofMW's COO application does not impose a substantial burden on MW's religious exercise because food and drink distribution is merely "inci dental " to MW's practices. Id. 111. ARGUMENT
RLUIPA provides that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substa ntial burden on the religious exercise of a person , including a religious assembly or institution" unless the gove rnment demonstrates that the imposition of that burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l). Here, MW has plausibly alleged a violation ofRLUIPA becaus e its Complaint asserts that (1) providing food and drink to hom eless individuals is a part of its "religious exercise," and (2) the City's outright ban on this practice "imposes a substantial burden on its religious exercise. " A. MW plausibly alleged that its distribution of food and drinks to homeless individuals is "religious exercise" under RLUIP A.
RLUIP A broadly defines "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- 5(7)(A). This definition is deliberately far-reaching, as evidenced by Congress ' intent to distinguish RLUIP A "from traditi onal First Amendment jurisprudence " by "expand[ing] the reach of the protection to include 'any religious exercise. "' Greene v. Solano Cnty.
Jail, 513 F.3d 982,986 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005)). Indeed, RLUTPA itself demands that it be "construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this 7 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
I
se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 9 of 18 Page ID #:188 chapter and the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
Consistent with this broad mandate, courts have routinely found that providing charity to homeless individuals - including by offering food and drink-can constitute "religious exercise " under RLUIPA. See, e.g., Harbor Missionary Church Corp. v. City ofSan Buenaventura , 642 F. App'x 726, 727-29 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that the church's homeless ministry, which included offering food , was "an integral part of its religious exercise"); World Outreach Conj Ctr. v. City ofChicago , 591 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2009) (ho lding that the City's denial of a permit impeded the church's "religious mission of providing living facilities to homeless and other needy people "); Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City ofNew York, 293 F.3d 570, 574-75 (2d. Cir. 2002) (finding that operating a homeless shelter constitutes religious exercise); see also W Presbyterian Church v. Bd. ofZoning Adjustment ofD.C., 862 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that , in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act context, the "concept of acts of charity as an essential part of religious worship is a central tenet of all major religions ," including by providing "clothing for the naked,food for the hungry, and benevolence to the needy") ( emphasis added). 4
Here , MW alleges that providing food and drink to poor and homeless individuals is an integral part of its religious exercise. MW asserts that it is a Christian "faith -based organization" named after the "Micah Mandate, " as set forth in the Bible. Compl.15 .
Feeding homeless persons is part of its "Christian ministry ." Id. ilil4, 19, 26, 42-43.
MW feeds homeless persons because it believes it "has a religious duty to help the homeless that come to it ... including by providing a cup of coffee and a muffin if a client is hungry. " Id. 127 . This belief is rooted in "heeding and implementing the 4 These rulings are consistent with RLUIPA 's legislative intent, which aimed to protect organi zations like MW that exercise their faith through charity , including by distributing food to homeless individuals . During RLUIPA's legislative process, a sponsoring senator specifically cited a "meals program for the homeless and the working poor" as a type of land use that should receive protection as religious exercise. See 146 Cong. Rec.
S6689 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 8 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 10 of 18 Page ID #:189 I following words of Jesus Christ: 'For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink' .. . . (Matthew 25:35-40)." Id. ~4.
Indeed, MW "takes great solace in the fact that providing charitable assistance to persons in need is a practice that is embraced by every major religion in the world," and MW believes it is doing "God's work" by "providing food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty , clothing to the needy, and shelter to the homeless ." Id. if42.
This type of faith-based outreach is akin to Harbor Missionary Church Corp, where the Ninth Circuit found that a city's denial of a conditional use permit, which prevented the plaintiff "from conducting its homeless ministry, an integral part of its religion," violated RLUIPA's substantial burden provision. 642 Fed. App'x at 729.
Similar to MW, the Church in Harbor Missionary used its property to provide "basic needs to the City's homeless men and women ," such as food, clothing, showers, and counseling. Id. at 727. The Church cited "the Bible at Matthew 25:34-46" as a source for its "belief that its homeless ministry is part of its religious duty to feed the hungry and clothe the naked," and that "sharing meals with homeless men and women- when done within the walls of the Church under a religious mandate-constitute[ d] sacred duties." Id. at 728-29. MW's religious beliefs are similarly rooted in religious text .
Compl. ,r,r4, 25. And like Harbor Missionary , MW's practice of distributing food and beverages to people in need is an act of religious exercise.
The City claims that MW's food and drink distribution is not religious exercise because it is "merely an incidental use of minor significance. " Mot. at 10 ( emphasis added). But MW's Complaint makes clear that food and drink distribution is an integral patt of its religious exercise and not of "minor significance." Compl. ,r,r4, 27, 42.
Moreover, the City's argument runs counter to the plain language ofRLUIPA, which protects any religious exercise , "whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) . In other words, the centrality or significance of the belief or conduct at issue does not dictate whether it is "religious exercise" under RLUIPA. See Cutter , 544 U.S. at 725 n.13 (noting that RLUIPA "bars 9 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 11 of 18 Page ID #:190 I inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is 'central ' to" an individual's religion). Indeed, in Johnson v. Baker, the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument, finding that the defendant "grossly miss[ ed] the mark" by insinuating that an incarcerated individual's particular religious practice-using scented oils before prayer - was "not really that important to his worship practice." 23 F.4th 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 2022) ( emphasis in origina l). Johnson also emphasized that a plaintiff need only demonstrate that a "particular facet" of his religious practice has been burdened under RLillPA , and that "it makes no difference" that a plaintiff may still practice his "religion as a whole" under the government's restrictions. Id. at 1214-15. As alleged in its Complaint, MW's feeding homeless individuals is an important part of its ministry and is, at the very least , a "particular facet " of its religious expression. Compl. ifif4, 7-8, 27, 31, 38-39. Accordingly , the City cannot prohibit MW's distribution of food and drink by erroneously branding it of "minor significance" to its overall religious practice.
Citing to MW's many other services, such as providing ID vouchers and hygiene products, the City argues that MW's operations "are purely administrative and are not religious in nature. " Mot. at 10. However, as the City acknowledges in its motion, it denied MW's COO because MW distributed food and drink, not because it provided ID vouchers or hygiene products. Mot. at 4. While MW's other activities are also part of its religious mission, Comp!. ,r,r 6, 52, they are not at issue in this litigation. Rather, the conduct in question is providing food and drink to the needy , and the City's Motion simp ly ignores the Complaint ' s many allegations that MW has a "religious duty" to feed homeless persons. See, e.g., id. if27; see also Int 'l Church ofFoursquar e Gospel v. City a/San Leandro , 673 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 201 1) (holding that district court may not reject the plainti ffs "characterization of its core beliefs").
Moreover, the premise of the City 's argument - that certain activities are intrinsically secular and therefore not religious exercise - has been repeatedly rejected by courts. For example, in World Outreach Conj Ctr., the Seventh Circuit found that "even the recreational and other nonreligious services provided at the community center 10 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 12 of 18 Page ID #:191 are integral to the World Outreach 's religious mission .... Souls aren 't saved just in church buildings." 591 F.3d at 535; see also First Lutheran Church v. City ofSt. Paul, 326 F.Supp.3d 745, 753, 761 (D. Minn. 2018) (finding that Church's nonprofit day- shelter and community center focused on "providing hospitality and practical assistance to the disadvantaged, homeless, or lonely" is "a form of ... religious exercise"). 5 Cases cited by the City reinforce the point that religious exercise is not limited to traditional houses of worship and can include seemingly lay or "administrative " pursuits.
For example, in Scottish Rite Cathedral Association ofLos Angeles, the court acknowledged that RLUIP A protections have "been applied to activities as divergent as religiously affiliated schools ... nonprofit hospitals ... and faith-based crisis centers." 156 Cal.App.4th at 118. And in Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop , the court found that a proposed "parish center," which would "house an office for religious education and would serve as a meeting place for the parish council," fell "well within the definition of 'religious exercise. "' 424 F.Supp.2d 309,3 19 (D. Mass. 2006). Undoubtedly, operating meeting places , schools, offices, hospitals , and crisis centers requires significant amounts of administrative work; nevertheless, these uses constitute religious exercise when operated for a religious purpose. And considering that offering food to the hungry cannot reasonably be mistaken as a rote administrative task, but rather has spiritual foundations and is a "central tenet of all major religions, " MW's practice of feeding homeless individuals is unque stionably religious exercise. See W Presbyte rian Church, 5 Some courts have found that when a religiou s organization engages in purely commercial conduct, like leasing its property to a commercial enterprise, that activity is not "religious exercise" for the purposes ofRLUIPA. See, e.g., Scot. Rite Cathedral Ass 'n ofLos Angeles v. City ofLos Angeles, 156 Cal.App.4th 108, 118-120 (Cal. App. 2007) (finding that City's actions in prohibitin g masonic temple from renting its building to for-profit commercial activities, including a boxing match, did not infringe on temple's religious exercise). However, here, the City does not contend that the challenged conduct - feeding homeless persons-is commercial or that MW somehow financially profits from it. In fact, the City concedes that "Plaintiff is not operating a commercial use." Mot. at 9.
11 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 13 of 18 Page ID #:192 862 F. Supp. at 544) (noting that one of the "five Pillars of Islam" includes giving "alms to the poor"; one of Hinduism 's "five daily obligations of worship" includes "giving food or aid to the poor"; and that religious worship in Judaism includes tendering "food for the hungry[] and benevolence to the needy").
B. MW plausibly alleged that the City's complete refusal to allow it to provide food or drinks to homeless individuals "imposes a substantial burden" on its religious exercise under RLUIP A.
Government conduct that "impose[ s] a significantly great restriction or onus upon [religious] exercise" may create a substantial burden in violation ofRLUIPA. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City ofMorgan Hill , 360 F.3d I 024, I 034 (9th Cir. 2004). A land use regulation may impose a substantial burden if it exerts "substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County ofSutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Thomas v.
Review Bd. ofthe Ind. Employment Sec. Div. , 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)).
Whether a land use regulation substantially burdens religious exercise is a highly fact-dependent question that requires examining the "totality of the circumstances." 6 New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City ofSalinas, 29 F.4th 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 567 (2023). "[D]etermining whether a burden is substantial .. . is ordinarily an issue of fact." Acad. ofOur Lady ofPeace v. City ofSan Diego , No. 09CV962-WQH-AJB , 2010 WL 1329014, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting World Outreach Conj. Ctr., 591 F.3d at 539)).
Here, MW has pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly show that the City has imposed a substantial burden on MW's religious exercise by denying its COO. Under the City's 6 Indeed, cases cited by the City underscore that a substantial burden analysis is a fact- specific inquiry that requires examination of a complete record. See New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City ofSalinas, 29 F.4th 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 567 (2023) (appeal of grant of summary judgment) ; San Jose Christian, 360 F.3d at 1027 (same) ; Scot. Rite Cathedral Ass'n ofLos Angeles, 156 Cal. App. 4th at 114 (appeal of denial of writ of administrative mandamus).
12 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 14 of 18 Page ID #:193 demands, MW would be completely prohibited at its current location from distributing food and beverages to homeless individuals who come to its doors, a service that MW believes it has a "religious duty" to perfonn. Compl. 4, 8, 27, 31-32, 38. The City has also threatened to fine and criminally prosecute MW unless it ceases this practice.
Id. ,r,r 3, 13, 31, 39. This conduct is sufficient to establish a "substantial burden" on religious exercise in violation ofRLUIPA. See Johnson , 23 F.4th at 1215-16 (noting that "government action that threatens 'punishment[] to coerce a religious adherent to forgo her or his religious beliefs"' may amount to a substantial burden) ( quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,218 (1972) (holding that a "threat of criminal sanction[] to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs " burdened religious exercise) .
The City's decision to deny MW's COO and to threaten monetary and crimina l consequences is not a "mere inconvenience ," as the City argues. Mot. at 12, 13. Rather, the City has inflicted "substantial pressure " to compel MW to modify its behavior by ceasing to perform "act[ s] of charity in providing ... food and beverage items to the poor and homeless persons. " Compl. ,rs. In banning MW's practice, the City imposes a substantial burden on MW's religious exercise. See Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988; Greene, 513 F .3d at 988 (holding that "an outright ban on a particular religious exercise is a substantial burden on that religious exercise") (emphasis added).
As discussed earlier, the City's assertion that there is no substantial burden on MW's religious exercise because food and drink distribution is "merely incidental " to MW's operations, Mot. at 12, is both legally and factually incorrect. See Sec. III.A supra. The City's argument ignores the plain langua ge ofRLUIPA, which expressly protects "any" religious exercise regardless of whether it is "compe lled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7) ( emphasis added). It is therefore irrelevant how "central" food distribution is to MW's religious beliefs in assessing whether the City's conduct has substantially burdened religious exercise in violation of 13 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 15 of 18 Page ID #:194 RLUIPA . See also First Lutheran Church, 326 F.Supp.3d at 761-62 (holding that 20- person capacity limitation and "No Trespassing" sign requirement imposed a substantial burden in violation ofRLUIPA on church's religious exercise because it interfered with efforts to assist homeless persons). In any event, the Complaint contains ample facts establishing that food distribution to homeless persons is an important part of MW 's religiou s exercise and is not " merely incidental. " Compl. ,r,r4, 27, 42. And MW's facts must be accepted as true , and all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of MW, on a motion to dismiss. Murguia v. Langdon , 61 F.4th 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023).
Further, although not required at the pleading stage, MW alleg es that it lacks readily available alternatives and that it is effectively precluded from changing locations. 7 For example, MW alleges that moving locations would be "impossible" due to the costs and unlikelihood of finding a landlord willing to rent to an organization that serves homeless individuals , and that it cannot relocate without experiencing significant uncertainty , delay , or expense , or otherwise violating its religious purpose. Compl. i!39.
These allegations further support plaintiff's substantial burden claim under RLUIPA.
See New Harvest, 29 F.4th at 602-04 (evidence that other available properties are unsuitable because of "size, configuration, safety, or current uses" can support substantial burden findin g); Int '! Church ofFoursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1067 (finding evidence of lack of other suitable sites in the city to house the church's expanded operation supported substantial burden claim).
Moreover, MW has also plausibly alleged that the City could apply the same reasonin g to deny any future COO applications , even if MW were to relocate. In 2021 , the mayor directed various staff and departments to identify a basis for removin g MW 7 While the City makes passing reference to "ready alternatives " as a factor in the substantial burden analysis, the City cites no case where a RLUIPA plaintiff was required to plead that it lacked adequate alternative location s to withstand a motion to dismi ss. Cases discussing the availability of alternative locations have done so in the context of summary judgement. See, e.g., New Harvest, 29 F.4th at 603 ; San Jose 28 Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1035.
14 C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 16 of 18 Page ID #:195 1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
13 14
15 16
17 18
19 20
21 22
23 24
25 26
27 28
from its location, Comp!. ,r74, and stated his intent to prevent homelessn ess -related issues "from happening anyplace else in the City," id. ,r102 ( emphasis added).
Accordingly, MW has plausibly alleged that "the City would [not] agree to provide a COO" to MW in any location . Id. if40; see Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 989 (reasoning that prior application denials "to a significantly great extent lessened the possibility that future [] applications would be successful").
The City has informed MW that it "will not entertain" any conditions short of MW shuttering its food and beverage service. Comp!. iI32. MW ceased distributing food and beverag es outside of the office and moved this activity indoors in order to address the City's concerns , but these actions have not appeased the City. Id. ,r,r27-29 , 112. The City's complete prohibition on allowing MW to feed homeless individuals at its Resource Center under any circumstances further supports MW's claim that the City has violated RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burd en on its religiou s exercise. See Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 991 (upholding substantial burden finding in part becaus e defendant refused to accept mitigation conditions offered by plaintiff or suggest what conditions it would accept to permit religious temple).
IV. CONCLUSION
MW' s Complaint alleges sufficient facts plausibly showing (1) that its food and beverage distribution to homeless individuals is religious exercise protected by RLUIP A, and (2) that the City's denial of its COO application substantially burdens its religious exercise in violation of RLUIP A. Therefore, the City's motion to dismiss MW's RLUIP A claim should be denied.
Dated: May 9, 2023
E. MARTIN ESTRADA
United States Attorney
Respectfully submitted,
FOR THE UNITED STATES:
KRISTEN CLARKE
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Divi sion
15 5
10 1
2 3
4 6
7 8
9 11
12 13
14 15
20 25
16 17
18 19
21 22
23 24
26 27
28 C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC-KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 17 of 18 Page ID #:196 DAVID M. HARRIS
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
RICHARD M. PARK
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Rights Section, Civil Division
Isl Matthew Nickell
MATTHEW NICKELL
Assistant United States Attorney
Civil Rights Section, Civil Division
SAMEENA SHINA MAJEED
Chief, Housing and Civil Enforcement
Section
Civil Rights Division
CARRIEPAGNUCCO
Acting Deputy Chief, Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section
Civil Rights Division
Isl Noah Sacks
NOAH SACKS
Trial Attorne)'., Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section
Civil Rights Division
Isl Terrence Mangan
TERRENCE MANGAN
Trial Attorney, Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section
Civil Rights Division
Attorneys.for the United States ofAmerica
16 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11
12 13
14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23
24 25
26 27
28 C se 8:23-cv-00183-DOC -KES Document 25 Filed 05/09/23 Page 18 of 18 Page ID #:197
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned, counsel of record for the United States, certifies that this brief contains 5,120 words, which complies with the word limit ofL.R. 11-6.1.
Dated : May 9, 2023 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Matthew Nickell
MATTHEW NICKELL
Assistant United States Attorney
Civil Rights Section, Civil Division
17 MEMORANDUM
MCT # 67459
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Finance & Management Services Agency
Planning and Building Agency
Miscellaneous Cash Transaction
PROJECT NAME: MASTER ID #
PROJECT ADDRESS:
Application # Permit #
AP #
Anchor Stone Christian Church
2938 S Daimler St, Santa Ana, CA 92705-5811
2023-179697
ISSUED TO:
ADDRESS:
Steven Lee
1030 N Mountain Ave #198
Ontario, CA 91762
APPL-2023-7-APC
430-173-16
All fees are subject to change at any time and may also be affected by scheduled adjustments on July 1 of each year. The Payee must pay the prevailing rate at the time payment is made.
Thursday, September 14, 2023
PAID
1 Appeal (Applicant) $4,944.00 $4,944.00 01116002 53606 1.0000 FUND NO.AMOUNTRATEUNITQTYDESCRIPTIONITEM
Issued By:
Comments:
TOTAL MCT AMOUNT:
Created via Planning Invoice process
web_plpay (Planning and Building Agency)
NOTES:
$4,944.00
TotalGL Account #
01116002 53606 $4,944.00
For payment to be considered complete, a
Miscellaneous Cash Transaction (MCT) must be paid
in full.