Late Correspondence (Uploaded 07-24-2024) — Public Safety Subcommittee, July 23, 2024

From: [email protected]
To: CityCouncilListPublic
Subject: [EXTERNAL] stop the real time crime center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 1:13:13 PM
Hello City Council Members:

I am writing as an extremely concerned citizen.

I urge you to consider how increased investment in militarization and surveillance are a threat to democracy. I urge you to reject the Real Time Crime center. The only legacy that comes from this sort of increased surveillance on a community is a bad one. Please do the right thing, invest in the people who are in the most need. Use money to create TRUE safety for all NOT just the wealthiest among us.

Give us hope and infrastructure and parks and all thinks that stop fascism.

Please do not use your time as an elected official to benefit the private prison industry, make your legacy one of change and care.

We are begging you.

As of now, you are known for being ones who would sooner see rocks embedded in concrete with the names of homeless folks who died on YOUR watch (in places where they once camped) than invest in community supported care. Change course for the good of everyone. Please invest in community care.

Sincerely,
Lee Vandeveer
From: Alyn
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Opposition to the Real Time Crime Center Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 1:19:20 PM
Hello,
I am writing for the strongest form of opposition to the proposed Real Time Crime Center as possible. I understand that it is being done in the name of public safety, but what has been proposed comes straight from the greatest minds of dystopian science fiction novels. Things like predictive policing and gunfire detection monitors like shotspotter are proven to not work, and end up unfairly targeting minority communities, who are already harassed and targeted by Law Enforcement Officers in far greater numbers than the majority population. This is being proposed with ZERO citizen oversight of either the process or implementation. It is a clear violation of every Santa Rosan's privacy.

The City of Sebastopol passed a Surveillance Use Policy years ago, which outlaws some of the most egregious practices that the Real Time Crime Center will be using, such as facial recognition and predictive policing. I highly urge that we look to our neighbors to the west and follow suit.

Earlier this year, Santa Rosa City School was forced to lay off more than 80 position. It's absolutely unconscionable that we would then spend close to a million dollars on such an unnecessary and privacy-violating project such as this. In creating this crime center, we are attacking the effects of the problem of crime, instead of the roots - lack of investment in education and basic needs of our community.

Alyn Wolves
Member - North Bay Organizing Project Police Accountability Task Force From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] NO to Real Time Crime Center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:42:44 PM
From: Ma'ayan Peer < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:08 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] NO to Real Time Crime Center

Hi SR City Council,

I'm a Sonoma County resident and frequent visitor, and buyer in Santa Rosa. I'd like to ask you all to vote against tomorrow, July 23rd,'s item 6.2 Real Time Crime Center. An increase in police surveillance is a disservice to us all, and will disproportionately affect our marginalized communities.

Folks who are black, brown, disabled, unhoused, or trans do not need the police to have more weapons to wield against them. Vote for your community and vote against the Real Time Crime Center.

Thanks

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] No surveillance via Real Time Crime Center Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:43:01 PM
From: C Sofranko < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:00 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] No surveillance via Real Time Crime Center

Hi, my name is Cecilia Sofranko and I'm a Santa Rosa resident. I'm writing to ask that you strongly oppose the "Real Time Crime Center," item 6.2, tomorrow at your July 23rd meeting. We do not need increased opportunities for police forces to pick and choose who to punish, especially when we have seen devastating police violence here in Sonoma County with the weapons they already have. I do not feel safe giving them more leverage against Black, brown, and Indigenous communities, as well as neurodivergent people who might need mental health aid, and transgender people - all of whom are known to sustain escalated brutality from LEOs.

I'm writing to ask that you truly think of the people, and who you are protecting, when making decisions on this item. Let's be realistic about who tends to be targeted, and have their lives violently disrupted, when police decide they want to.

Thank you,

Cecilia Sofranko

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Re: Meeting on 7/23/24: Item 6.2 Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:43:27 PM
From: Revelle Mast < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:39 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Meeting on 7/23/24: Item 6.2

To be clear, I urge you to oppose the proposed "real time crime center."

Thank you for the work you do,

On Mon, Jul 22, 2024, 3:32 PM Revelle Mast <[email protected]> wrote:

To all the city councilors,

I am very concerned about increasing the capabilities of surveillance infrastructure.

These tools are not inherently good and can be used malevolently.

I do not think our democracy is healthy enough for this responsibility.

Act with caution, for all our sakes, please.

Revelle Mast

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] City surveillance
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:44:00 PM
-----Original Message-----
From: >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:41 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] City surveillance
Good afternoon,
My name is Shell Baker and I am a life long resident of Sonoma County/ Santa Rosa area for 32 years. I would like to express my disapproval of the increased surveillance that is being proposed by the "real time crime center". I feel this will be weaponized against some of our most vulnerable citizens and I urge the council to turn resources towards better programs that would assist with those populations instead of increasing opportunities to criminalize them. Think with the heart and not with the shield.

Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,
Shell Baker
Sent from my iPhone

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] real time crime center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:52:06 PM

From: Madalyn Berg < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 3:48 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] real time crime center

Dear Santa Rosa City Council,
I am writing to express my fervent belief that we should not increase surveillance in our community. I think an increase in surveillance represents a threat to our safety while claiming to serve it. And it definitively impinges on our community's freedom and right to privacy.

Please consider me in your discussion tomorrow.

Warmly,
Madalyn Berg
Fountaingrove Resident

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] re: 7/23/24 Meeting, Item 6.2
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:12:54 PM
From: T Wagner < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:10 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] re: 7/23/24 Meeting, Item 6.2

Hello,

My name is T Wagner. I'm a Sonoma County resident who works and recreates in Santa Rosa. I'm writing to ask that you oppose the "Real Time Crime Center" (item 6.2) at your meeting on 7/23. We do not need increased police surveillance
when we have already seen devastating violence at the
hands of the police. I do not feel safe giving LEOs additional means of harm against already marginalized communities, such as black, brown, and indigenous people. All of these communities, and neurodivergent people in need of mental health aid, all receive escalated brutality from police with the weapons they already have.

I'm writing to ask that you oppose this item, and stop to think about who will be affected by measures like this and how they will be affected - there is a clear history already written across the States and in this county of violence allowed and perpetuated.

Thank you,
T Wagner

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] WE DO NOT WANT INCREASED SURVEILLANCE!!!! Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:13:10 PM
-----Original Message-----
From: Tanya Marsh
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:11 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] WE DO NOT WANT INCREASED SURVEILLANCE!!!! Santa Rosa Council Members,
In this time of wild division, it is crucial that city council members understand the true pulse of their community.

That there is even consideration of increasing surveillance on a population severely under resourced because our tax dollars are funding police instead of supporting community members.

Stop the surveillance!!! Stop over policing people and Increase social programs for your community members! Sincerely,
An extremely concerned parent in Sonoma County paying for a student to attend school in Santa Rosa.

Tanya Marsh

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL]
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:14:16 PM
From: Campbell Sepiida
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:11 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL]

I understand that an item on the agenda for a meeting at 9:00am 7/23/24 about the Real Time Crime Center. Reading about this technology, it seems that it requires extra surveillance. I strongly oppose increasing surveillance.

Let’s focus on “housing first” and other proven initiatives that boost the economy and build community. Increasing the power of law enforcement has proven to have the opposite effect on crime. There are entire courses taught about these things in our nation’s universities and colleges.

Please bring some reason, and consider reducing law enforcement, and increasing social services.

We should consider alternatives to police enforcement, instead of increasing their scope of power.

Please, follow the social science. Expanding law enforcement will not make out communities safer.

Thank you,
Campbell

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Increased surveillance
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:48:42 PM
From: Claire Addleman < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:34 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Increased surveillance

Writing in to say I DO NOT want increased surveillance in Santa Rosa.

Thank you,
Claire A

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Real Time Crime Center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:49:08 PM
From: Martie Fried-Lee < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:34 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real Time Crime Center

Dear City Council,

My name is Martie Fried-Lee and I'm a constituent of District 2 in Santa Rosa. I'm concerned about the potential establishment of a proposed Real Time Crime Center in the city and I'm writing to ask that you oppose moving forward with this plan. I'm worried that there won't be adequate
consideration in respecting and protecting the privacy of citizens as well as reinforcing the existing biases of law enforcement toward the Black and brown people that live here. I don't want more people to be targeted by predictive third-party algorithms that may be intended to prevent gun violence but in actuality are just going to further harm our communities that are already at risk.

Thank you for your time,

Martie Fried-Lee

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] ATTN: 7/23/24 MEETING ITEM 6.2
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:49:27 PM
From: Levon Crook < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 4:34 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] ATTN: 7/23/24 MEETING ITEM 6.2

Council Members,

I am deeply disturbed by item 6.2 on your agenda for tomorrow's meeting. Santa Rosa does not have any need for a "Real Time Crime Center", and I'm honestly not sure what you think you're doing.

The city of Santa Rosa does not need increased surveillance. It does not need a "crime center". At a time when fascism is on the rise in this country, aided by an increasingly militarized police force that brutalizes and terrorizes, your choice to build a "crime center" says you are either fascists yourselves or callous and selfish. Perhaps both.

I understand that you are politicians and therefore only care about money and power. I understand that you are sociopathic and unempathetic to the problems of the people that you claim to represent--the people who elected you. And it is clear to me that y'all are a bunch of cowards who are more interested in lining your pockets with the money from the rich people destroying this county with their greed. So to be completely honest, while I am disgusted by this, I have no faith in your humanity.

The very fact that you put this meeting, with this point on your agenda, on Tuesday morning when people will be at work, shows me how manipulative and evil you are.

We do not need a crime center. We need housing costs to be lowered, we need food prices lowered, we need compassion and empathy and community. Not an increase of spouse-beating morons with badges they shouldn't have and guns they are too eager to shoot.

Shame on you, sincerely.

Levon G. Crook

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Proposed Crime Center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 5:04:57 PM
-----Original Message-----
From:

Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 5:00 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Proposed Crime Center
Dear Santa Rosa City Council,
I’m disgusted to learn about the new “crime center” that you’re weighing wasting taxpayer’s dollars on.

Increasing surveillance on communities does not have any meaningful impact on curtailing crime. Rather, it strains the already fragile relationship between police forces and civilians.

This is an outrageous waste of taxpayer dollars, when it could be better spent benefitting and enriching our communities: providing housing, mutual aid, mental health services, etc.

Why not invest funding into measures that have demonstrably been proven to reduce crime such as these, instead of giving additional funds to an already increasingly militarized police force, solely utilizing band-aid solutions that either don’t create impactful change, or worse, make conditions for the communities they’re supposed to serve even more difficult?
If you wish to do your jobs and serve the interests of the Santa Rosa community, I strongly implore you consider reallocating these funds away from this crime center. There are demonstrably more helpful ways the taxpayer’s dollars could serve the community.

Do better.

Devon Soltani

From: Tracy Rosenberg
To: [email protected]; Public Safety Subcommittee Comment Subject: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Real Time Crime Center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 7:38:06 PM
Hello,
My name is Tracy Rosenberg and I am the advocacy director for Oakland Privacy, a regional citizens coalition that works statewide to defend the right to privacy, enhance public transparency and promote oversight regarding the use of surveillance techniques and equipment. We were instrumental in the creation of the first standing municipal citizens’ privacy advisory commission in the City of Oakland and we have engaged in privacy enhancing legislative efforts with several Northern California cities and regional entities.As experts on municipal privacy reform, we have written use policies and impact reports for a variety of surveillance technologies, conducted research and investigations, and developed frameworks for the implementation of equipment with respect for civil rights, privacy protections and community control.

I apologize for not being able to join you in person on Tuesday night, but hopefully these comments will be helpful. We have several constituent members in your city
and the surrounding county so these comments are offered both from that perspective and with a broader lens to the statewide and national surveillance conversation.

Having reviewed the Police Department's Powerpoint, there are a few comments that I'd like to provide.

1. We appreciate the written commitment to a citywide surveillance policy and a specific written policy for the RTCC. These are crucially important. However, we generally advise City Councils of two things: a) you should have the actual policies, at least working drafts of them, in front of you when you make acquisition decisions. Not just a report of a policy to come, but the actual policies. A tool is just that, a tool. The crux of the matter is how it will be used and operated which is what a policy documents. We strongly believe that policies must not be an afterthought, but must be prominent in the decision-making phase. Which is now. b) The policies involved should not just be written by the police department and filed, but should be brought to the City Council for a ratification vote and an agreement that the policies are not materially altered without a return to the City Council for a new ratification. The act of greatly enhancing the spying on and surveillance of the City's residents is a grave act and it is incumbent on the elected officials as the voice of the people to affirmatively approve it and to understand the details of what they are approving. And to do so before it is a fait accompli.

2. The Powerpoint discussed increasing the timeliness and reliability of 911 dispatch.

That is a worthwhile goal. We do feel obligated to inform you that one of the tools being proposed to do that, gunshot detection with a tool called Shotspotter, has been extensively documented to in fact, do the opposite. Recent audits from New York City and Chicago,and a Boston study reported that the tool sent officers on wild goose chases the vast majority of the time and in fact, slowed 911 response times. It is important to invest scarce public safety resources into things that actually work towards the stated goals.

3. The Powerpoint also discussed increasing the use of historical data to solve crimes. Technology obviously makes that easier, but what technology does not do is erase the historical over-representation of people of color, particularly black people, in the criminal justice system. One clear example is with cannabis prosecutions, where overwhelmingly white kids got away with cannabis possession and sale with a slap on the wrist and Black kids got criminal records. The danger of heavy reliance on historical crime data is that we perpetuate these kinds of injustices and disparate impacts into present day policing and don't even realize it because it feels "objective" and "data driven". Predictive policing, a tech based entirely on the use of historical crime data, has been largely discredited due to this reality.

4. Information-sharing. A look at your existing automated license plate reader policy shows that the City of Santa Rosa is aware of the dangers of sharing law enforcement information with ICE. Good for you. But the world is an extremely complicated place, and we are finding out that the same kinds of precautions need to be taken with sharing law enforcement data with agencies that enforce bans on reproductive care and gender-affirming care. For exactly the same reason, that the information will be mis-used and harm Santa Rosans
and their families, friends and
networks. These are the kinds of things that need to be thought about and delineated in policy before things get rolling, not afterwards when harm may become irreparable.

5. We also generally recommend that policies be explicit about 1st Amendment protected activities, as differentiated from "public gatherings" because people engaged in them have Constitutional rights that must not be violated just because surveillance tech exists. The track record on abuses, writ large, is not good and that is why policies must be explicit. We didn't see that in your existing policies.

We hope these comments are helpful and we will repeat our encouragement to do the policy work on the front end and not skip to purchase or deployment until the policy work is done and vetted publicly by the elected representatives.

Sincerely,
Tracy Rosenberg
On behalf of Oakland Privacy
Oakland CA 94609
https://oaklandprivacy.org

From: Tracy Rosenberg
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real-Time Crime Center
Date: Monday, July 22, 2024 8:02:19 PM
This public comment seems to be bouncing back to me, although the address provided for public comments on the Santa Rosa City Council web page is PSS- [email protected]. Hopefully this alternate email address will work. -----
Hello,
My name is Tracy Rosenberg and I am the advocacy director for Oakland Privacy, a regional citizens coalition that works statewide to defend the right to privacy, enhance public transparency and promote oversight regarding the use of surveillance techniques and equipment. We were instrumental in the creation of the first standing municipal citizens’ privacy advisory commission in the City of Oakland and we have engaged in privacy enhancing legislative efforts with several Northern California cities and regional entities.As experts on municipal privacy reform, we have written use policies and impact reports for a variety of surveillance technologies, conducted research and investigations, and developed frameworks for the implementation of equipment with respect for civil rights, privacy protections and community control.

I apologize for not being able to join you in person on Tuesday night, but hopefully these comments will be helpful. We have several constituent
members in your city and the surrounding county so these comments are offered both from that perspective and with a broader lens to the statewide and national surveillance conversation.

Having reviewed the Police Department's Powerpoint, there are a few comments that I'd like to provide.

2. The Powerpoint discussed increasing the timeliness and reliability of 911 dispatch. That is a worthwhile goal. We do feel obligated to inform you that one of the tools being proposed to do that, gunshot detection with a tool called Shotspotter, has been extensively documented to in fact, do the opposite. Recent audits from
New York City and Chicago,and a Boston study reported that the tool sent officers on wild goose chases the vast majority of the time and in fact, slowed 911 response times. It is important to invest scarce public safety resources into things that actually work towards the stated goals.

4. Information-sharing. A look at your existing automated license plate reader policy shows that the City of Santa Rosa is aware of the dangers of sharing law enforcement information with ICE. Good for you. But the world is an extremely complicated place, and we are finding out that the same kinds of precautions need to be taken with sharing law enforcement data with agencies that enforce bans on reproductive care and gender-affirming care. For exactly the same reason, that the information will be mis-used and harm Santa Rosans
and their families, friends and networks. These are the kinds of things that need to be thought about and delineated in policy before things get rolling, not afterwards when harm may become irreparable.

Sincerely,
Tracy Rosenberg
On behalf of Oakland Privacy
Oakland CA 94609
https://oaklandprivacy.org

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] No Surveillance via Real Time Crime Center Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:24:58 AM

From: Martina Vargas < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 5:54 PM
To: Stapp, Mark <[email protected]>; _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]> Subject: [EXTERNAL] No Surveillance via Real Time Crime Center

Dear Vice Mayor Mark Stapp & City Council Members,

My name is Martina Vargas and I am a Santa Rosa resident. I am writing to ask that you strongly oppose Item 6.2 "Real Time Crime Center" on the agenda for tomorrow's meeting on July 23rd. We do not need increased opportunities for police forces to pick and choose who to punish, especially when we have seen devastating police violence here in Sonoma County with the weapons they already have.

I do not feel safe giving them more leverage against Black, brown, and Indigenous communities, as well as neurodivergent people, who might need mental health aid, and transgender people. All of whom are known to sustain escalated violence from LEOs.

I'm writing to ask that you think of the people you represent here in Santa Rosa and contemplate who you are protecting when deciding on this agenda item. Please be realistic about who tends to be targeted and have their lives violently disrupted when police decide they want to.

Thanks for considering,

Martina Vargas

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] No surveillance via Real Time Crime Center Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:25:36 AM

From: Simone Barnard < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 7:50 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] No surveillance via Real Time Crime Center

Hi, my name is Simone Barnard and I'm a Santa Rosa resident. I'm writing to ask that you strongly oppose the "Real Time Crime Center," item 6.2, tomorrow at your July 23rd meeting. We do not need increased opportunities for police forces to pick and choose who to punish, especially when we have seen devastating police violence here in Sonoma County with the weapons they already have. I do not feel safe giving them more leverage against Black, brown, and Indigenous communities, as well as neurodivergent people who might need mental health aid, and transgender people - all of whom are known to sustain escalated brutality from LEOs.

-Simone Barnard

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Real Time Crime Center
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:25:51 AM

From: Janelle Ogg < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 8:17 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real Time Crime Center

Dear City Council Members,
This is such a great plan to help deal with crime. Just a quick note to express support for Chief Cregan's plan. Thank you for your consideration.

Janelle Ogg
--
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Real time crime ctr
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:27:51 AM

From: Jordan Byrd
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 11:57 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real time crime ctr

Dear City Council,

I am a constituent who is writing to you all to express my deep opposition to the Real Time Crime Center. Our community needs more access to positive resources that lifts people out of poverty, not more surveillance & punishment. Please stick to investing in our people in positive ways.

Thank you,
Jordan Byrd

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Real crime time center
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:28:16 AM

From: Michelle Bell < >
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 1:02 AM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real crime time center

Good day, Santa Rosa City Council,
My name is Michelle Bell and I’ve been living in Santa Rosa for four plus years. I’m writing because I saw that tomorrow you will be having a discussion about Real Crime Time Center and how to best incorporate it into everyday life in Santa Rosa. It greatly concerns me because I believe that an increase of police surveillance would be very harmful to our community. Increased surveillance would spread more fear amongst the general public and cause even more harm to vulnerable communities that are already at risk for being violently targeted by the police (Black and Indigenous Peoples, Transgender Peoples, homeless individuals, and neurodivergent people).

I implore you to
use the money/ resources not to aide the Real Crime Center. Those valuable resources would best be used for education, public programs that help neurodivergent and or disabled people, programs that provide meals for children in need, other forms of aid. These programs have proven to effectively reduce crime and provide real tangible results. I can not overstate the harm that increased police surveillance would inflict on our dear community in Santa Rosa.

Thank you,

Michelle Bell

From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Real time crime center
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:28:45 AM

From: Dan Ford < >
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 6:09 AM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real time crime center

My name is Dan Ford, and I am a Santa Rosa resident in the Southpark neighborhood. I do not want the real time crime center increasing surveillance on civilians. I do not want the real time crime center.

Thank you for your time.

From: Carol Ciavonne
To: [email protected]; CityCouncilListPublic
Cc: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real Time Crime Center
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:30:40 AM
To Whom It May Concern,
I am writing to oppose the installation of the RTCC, and the usage of the $898,000 grant to support such surveillance. Crime in Santa Rosa has been going down, not up; for reference see the Press Democrat, according to Sgt. Patricia Steffens, for statistics from 2021-2023. One of the additional problems with this idea is that it has vast potential for misuse, particularly in the area of surveillance on communities of color, which, quite frankly, the SRPD already has a tenuous relationship with.

And since the sources for these technologies are private companies, there is a possibility that people other than government entities can also access these surveillances.

I urge you to do more research on this action. The ACLU has concerns, and even the city of Sebastopol, amongst others, has come up with a set of rules that will protect its citizens from undue, there is no other way to say it, snooping. As a starting point, I include this piece by Rollie Atkinson, former owner and editor of the Healdsburg Tribune and the Sonoma West Times and News. I hope you will read and consider its many salient points. https://open.substack.com/pub/rollieatkinson/p/real-time-surveillance-is-here? r=cij9&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Thank you for your time,
Carol Ciavonne
From: Carol Ciavonne
To: CityCouncilListPublic; Public Safety Subcommittee Comment Subject: [EXTERNAL] Real Time Crime Center
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 7:37:23 AM
To Whom It May Concern,
I am writing to oppose the installation of the RTCC, and the usage of the $898,000 grant to support such surveillance. Crime in Santa Rosa has been going down, not up; for reference see the Press Democrat, according to Sgt. Patricia Steffens, for statistics from 2021-2023. One of the additional problems with this idea is that it has vast potential for misuse, particularly in the area of surveillance on communities of color, which, quite frankly, the SRPD already has a tenuous relationship with.

And since the sources for these technologies are private companies, there is a possibility that people other than government entities can also access these surveillances.

I urge you to do more research on this action. The ACLU has concerns, and even the city of Sebastopol, amongst others, has come up with a set of rules that will protect its citizens from undue, there is no other way to say it, snooping. As a starting point, I include this piece by Rollie Atkinson, former owner and editor of the Healdsburg Tribune and the Sonoma West Times and News. I hope you will read and consider its many salient points. https://open.substack.com/pub/rollieatkinson/p/real-time-surveillance-is-here? r=cij9&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Thank you for your time,
Carol Ciavonne
From: Chapters
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment; Okrepkie, Jeff; Alvarez, Eddie; Rogers, Natalie Cc: CityCouncilListPublic; Alvarez, Eddie; Stapp, Mark; MacDonald, Dianna; Fleming, Victoria; Rogers, Chris; Okrepkie, Jeff; Rogers, Natalie; Cregan, John; Lauren
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: ACLU NorCal - Sonoma County Comment re: Item 6.2, Real Time Crime Center, Public Safety Subcommittee meeting on July 23, 2024
Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 11:18:18 AM
Attachments: image001.png
SoCo ACLU-NC Letter RE Real Time Crime Center 07.22.24.pdf Chapter 8.80 SMC.pdf
Seeing Through Surveillance Report Web.pdf
Good morning,

Re-circulating this information at the request of Mayor Rogers. I’m also attaching ACLU’s report, “Seeing Through Surveillance.” Thank you.

ACLU NorCal Sonoma County Chapter
Email: [email protected]

Dear Santa Rosa Public Safety Subcommittee:

Attached, please find public comment from the Sonoma County Chapter of the ACLU of Northern California on agenda item 6.2, “Real Time Crime Center” of the Santa Rosa Public Safety Subcommittee meeting on July 23, 2024.

Respectfully,
The Sonoma County Chapter of the ACLU of Northern California

Email: [email protected]

8.80.010

8.80.015

8.80.020

8.80.030

8.80.040

8.80.050

8.80.060

8.80.065

8.80.070

8.80.075

8.80.080

8.80.090
Chapter 8.80

SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY ORDINANCE
Sections:

Title.

Purpose and findings.

Definitions.

City Council review mandatory for surveillance technology decisions.

Temporary acquisition during exigent circumstances.

Surveillance impact report and surveillance use policy submission.

Standard for approval and compliance for existing surveillance technology.

Oversight following Council approval.

Prevention of secret surveillance technology contracts and agreements.

Prohibition of certain surveillance technologies.

Whistleblower protections and enforcement.

Severability.

8.80.010 Title.

This chapter shall be known as the “Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance.” (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.015 Purpose and findings.

Biometric surveillance and predictive policing technologies have the potential to grant government entities the unprecedented power to secretly identify, monitor, and locate people simply going about their daily lives, threatening Californians’ privacy, liberty, safety and freedom as guaranteed by the California Constitution.

While surveillance technology may threaten the privacy of all of us, throughout history, surveillance efforts have been used to intimidate and oppress certain communities and groups more than others, including those that are defined by a common race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, income level, sexual orientation, or political perspective.

The use of biometric surveillance systems and predictive policing technology to watch, categorize, monitor and record the activities and movements of all Californians disproportionately impacts people of color, women, immigrants, LGBTQ people, and political activists of all backgrounds. Bias, accuracy issues, and stereotypes built into biometric surveillance systems and predictive policing technology have been shown to be flawed thus raising the potential for significant harm and injury to the groups previously mentioned.

Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 1 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

No decisions relating to surveillance technology should occur without strong consideration being given to the impact such technologies may have on civil rights and civil liberties, including those rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Sections 1, 2, and 13 of Article I of the California Constitution.

Due to the potential for abuse and misuse, it is imperative and as a matter of best practices that legally enforceable safeguards, including robust transparency, oversight, and accountability measures, must be in place to protect civil rights and civil liberties before any surveillance technology is deployed.

Whenever a surveillance technology is approved for use in the City of Sebastopol, data reporting measures must be adopted that empower the City Council and public to verify that mandated civil rights and civil liberties safeguards have been strictly adhered to.

The Sebastopol City Council finds that the public has a right to know about any funding, acquisition, or use of surveillance technologies within the City of Sebastopol. This chapter codifies and guarantees that the acquisition and use of these technologies are subject to rigorous review, public debate, oversight and annual reporting by any City department utilizing these technologies.

This chapter bans the use of certain technologies within the City of Sebastopol absent clearly defined exigent circumstances that would expose our citizens to a major risk to the public safety. Should the technologies be required to be implemented during a public safety emergency, the chapter provides for both limited use and duration with mandated public reporting requirements and significant levels of review regarding their use or any continued use. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.020
Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter, the following words, terms and phrases shall have these definitions:
“Annual surveillance report” means an annual written report concerning each of the specific surveillance technologies used by the City. The annual surveillance report will include all of the following:

1. A general description of how the surveillance technology was used;

2. A general description of whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology item was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s);

3. A summary of community complaints or concerns about each surveillance technology item;

4. The results of any internal audits required by the surveillance use policy, any information about violations of the surveillance use policy, and a general description of any actions taken in response; Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 2 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

5. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the City Council assess whether the surveillance technologies used by the City have been effective at achieving their identified purposes;

6. Statistics and information about any related Public Records Act requests;

7. Total annual costs for the surveillance technologies, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technologies in the coming year;

8. Any requested modifications to the surveillance use policy and a detailed basis for the request;

9. Where applicable, a general breakdown of what physical objects each surveillance technology hardware was installed upon, using general descriptive terms; and for each surveillance technology software, a general breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to;

10. The summary of all requests for City Council approval for the use of any surveillance technology item, including whether the City Council approved or rejected the proposal and/or required changes to a proposed surveillance use policy before approval;

11. The annual surveillance report will not contain the specific records that a surveillance technology item collects, stores, exchanges, or analyzes and/or information protected, restricted and/or sealed pursuant to State and/or Federal laws, including information not required to be released by the Public Records Act. “Biometric surveillance technology” means any computer software that uses face recognition technology or other remote biometric recognition in real time or on a recording or photograph. “City” means the City of Sebastopol, and “City Department” means any City department and its officers and employees.
“Face recognition technology” or “FRT” means an automated or semiautomated process that:

1. Assists in identifying or verifying an individual based on an individual’s face; or

2. Identifies or logs characteristics of an individual’s face, head, or body to infer emotion, associations, expressions, or the location of an individual.
“Other remote biometric recognition” means:

1. An automated or semiautomated process that assists in identifying an individual, capturing information about an individual, or otherwise generating or assisting in generating information about an individual based on physiological, biological, or behavioral characteristics ascertained from a distance;

2. Uses voice recognition technology; or

3. Identifies or logs such characteristics to infer emotion, associations, activities, or the location of an individual; and does not include identification based on fingerprints or palm prints that have been manually obtained during the course of a criminal investigation or detention.

Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 3 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023. “Personal communication device” means a cellular telephone that has not been modified beyond stock manufacturer capabilities, a personal digital assistant, a wireless-capable tablet or similar wireless two-way communications and/or portable internet-accessing devices, whether procured or subsidized by a City entity or personally owned, that is used in the regular course of conducting City business. “Predictive policing technology” means computer algorithms that use preexisting data to forecast or predict places or times that have a high risk of crime, or individuals or groups who are likely to be connected to a crime. This definition does not include computer algorithms used solely to visualize, chart, or map past criminal activity (e.g., heat maps).
“Surveillance impact report” means a written report including at a minimum the following:

1. Information describing the surveillance technology and how it works, including product descriptions from manufacturers;

2. Information on the proposed purpose(s) for the surveillance technology;

3. If applicable, the location(s) it may be deployed and crime statistics for any location(s);

4. The fiscal costs for the surveillance technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, and any current or potential sources of funding;

5. An assessment identifying with specificity any potential adverse impacts the surveillance technology, if deployed, might have on civil liberties and civil rights; and what specific, affirmative measures will be implemented to safeguard the public from those potential adverse impacts;

6. Whether use or maintenance of the technology will require data gathered by the technology to be handled or stored by a third-party vendor on an ongoing basis; and

7. A summary of the experience, if any, other governmental entities have had with the proposed technology, including information about the effectiveness, and any known adverse information about the technology such as unanticipated costs, failures, civil rights, or civil liberties abuses. “Surveillance technology” means any software, electronic device, system utilizing an electronic device, or similar, used, designed, or primarily intended to collect, retain, process, or share audio, electronic, visual, location, thermal, biometric, olfactory or similar information specifically associated with, or capable of being associated with, any individual or group. “Surveillance technology” includes but is not limited to:

1. International mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers and other cell site simulators;

2. Automatic license plate readers;

3. Electric toll readers;

4. Closed-circuit television cameras;

5. Gunshot detection hardware and services;
Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 4 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

6. Video and audio monitoring and/or recording technology, such as surveillance cameras, wide-angle cameras, and wearable body cameras;

7. Mobile DNA capture technology;

8. Biometric surveillance technology, including facial, voice, iris, and gait-recognition software and databases;

9. Software designed to monitor social media services;

10. X-ray vans;

11. Software designed to forecast criminal activity or criminality;

12. Radio-frequency ID (RFID) scanners;

13. Tools, including software and hardware, used to gain unauthorized access to a computer, computer service, or computer network.
“Surveillance technology” does not include the following devices, hardware or software:

1. Office hardware, such as televisions, computers, credit card machines, copy machines, telephones, and printers, that are in widespread use by City departments and used for routine City business and transactions;

2. City databases and enterprise systems that contain information kept in the ordinary course of City business, including, but not limited to, human resources, permits, licenses, and business records;

3. City databases and enterprise systems that do not contain any data or other information collected, captured, recorded, retained, processed, intercepted, or analyzed by surveillance technology, including payroll, accounting, or other fiscal databases;

4. Information technology security systems, including firewalls and other cybersecurity systems;

5. Physical access control systems, employee identification management systems, and other physical control systems;

6. Infrastructure and mechanical control systems, including those that control or manage street lights, traffic lights, electrical, natural gas, or water or sewer functions;

7. Manually operated technological devices used primarily for internal City and department communications and are not designed to surreptitiously collect surveillance data, such as radios, personal communication devices, and email systems;

8. Manually operated, nonwearable, handheld cameras, audio recorders and video recorders that are not designed to be used surreptitiously and whose functionality is limited to manually capturing and manually downloading video and/or audio recordings;
Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 5 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

9. Surveillance devices that cannot record or transmit audio or video or be remotely accessed, such as image stabilizing binoculars or night vision equipment;

10. Computers, software, hardware, or devices used in monitoring the work and work-related activities involving City employees, contractors and volunteers or used in conducting internal investigations involving City employees, contractors and volunteers;

11. Parking ticket devices;

12. Police department interview room and holding cell;

13. Police department computer-aided dispatch (CAD), records/case management, Live Scan, booking, Department of Motor Vehicles, California Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems (CLETS), 9-1-1, and related dispatch and operation or emergency services systems;

14. Police department early warning systems.
“Surveillance use policy” means a publicly released, legally enforceable written policy governing the City department’s use of a specific surveillance technology that, at a minimum, includes all of the following:

1. Purpose. The specific purpose(s) that the surveillance technology item is intended to advance.

2. Authorized Use. The uses that are authorized, and the rules and processes required prior to such use and uses of the surveillance technology that will be expressly prohibited.

3. Data Collection. What types of surveillance data will be collected, captured, recorded, intercepted, or retained by the surveillance technology, what types of data may be inadvertently collected during the authorized uses of the surveillance technology, and what measures will be taken to minimize and delete such data.

4. Data Access. The category of individuals who can access or use the collected information, how and under what circumstances data collected with surveillance technology can be analyzed and reviewed, and the rules and processes required prior to access or use of the information.

5. Data Protection. The general safeguards that protect information from unauthorized access, including encryption and access control mechanisms.

6. Data Retention. The limited time period, if any, that information collected by the surveillance technology will be routinely retained, the reason such retention period is appropriate to further the purpose(s) enumerated in the surveillance use policy, the process by which the information is regularly deleted after that period lapses, and the specific conditions that must be met to retain information beyond that period.

7. Public Access. How collected information can be accessed or used by members of the public, including criminal defendants.

8. Third-Party Data Sharing. Which governmental agencies, departments, bureaus, divisions, or units may receive data collected by the surveillance technology operated by the City department, including any required Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 6 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023. justification or legal standard necessary to share that data, and how it will ensure that any entity sharing or receiving such data complies with the surveillance use policy.

9. Training. The training required for any individual authorized to use the surveillance technology or to access information collected by the surveillance technology.

10. Auditing and Oversight. The mechanisms to ensure that the surveillance use policy is followed, including internal personnel assigned to ensure compliance with the policy, internal record-keeping of the use of the technology or access the information collected by the technology, technical measures to monitor for misuse, any independent person or entity with oversight authority, and the legally enforceable sanctions for violations of the policy.

11. Complaints. What procedures will be put in place by which members of the public can register complaints or concerns, or submit questions about the deployment or use of a specific surveillance technology, and how the municipal entity will ensure each question and complaint is responded to in a timely manner. (Amended as part of January 2023 update; Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.030
City Council review mandatory for surveillance technology decisions.

A City department must obtain City Council approval by ordinance of a surveillance use policy following a public hearing conducted at a regular City Council meeting, prior to engaging in any of the following:

A. Seeking funds for a surveillance technology, including, but not limited to, applying for a grant or soliciting or accepting State or Federal funds or in-kind or other donations for the purpose of acquiring surveillance technology;
B. Acquiring or borrowing a new surveillance technology, including, but not limited to, acquiring such technology without the exchange of monies or consideration;
C. Using a new or existing surveillance technology for a purpose, in a manner or in a location not previously approved by the City Council in accordance with this chapter; or D. Entering into an agreement, including a written or oral agreement, with a non-City entity to acquire, share or otherwise use surveillance technology or the information it provides, including data-sharing agreements. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.040
Temporary acquisition during exigent circumstances.

A. A department may temporarily acquire or temporarily use surveillance technology in exigent circumstances without following the provisions of this chapter. Nothing in this section or chapter shall preclude law enforcement from utilizing these technologies or utilizing mutual aid from a law enforcement partner who may opt to utilize Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 7 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023. these technologies during exigent circumstances, which for the purposes of this chapter is defined as an emergency involving imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to any person that requires the immediate use of surveillance technology or the information it provides. Any surveillance technology temporarily acquired in exigent circumstances shall be returned within seven days following the conclusion of the exigent circumstances, unless the department acquires the surveillance technology in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.

B. If a department acquires or uses surveillance technology for exigent circumstances, the department shall do all of the following:

1. Use the surveillance technology solely to respond to the exigent circumstances;

2. Cease using the surveillance technology within seven days, or when the exigent circumstances end, whichever is sooner;

3. Keep and maintain only data related to the exigent circumstances, and dispose of any data that is not relevant to an ongoing investigation, unless its retention is (a) authorized by a court based on a finding of probable cause to believe the information constitutes evidence of a crime; or (b) otherwise required by law;

4. Not disclose to any third party any information acquired during exigent circumstances unless such disclosure is (a) authorized by a court based on a finding of probable cause to believe the information constitutes evidence of a crime; or (b) otherwise required by law; and

5. Submit a written report summarizing that acquisition and/or use of surveillance technology under this section to the City Council within 60 days following the inception of the exigent circumstances. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.050
Surveillance impact report and surveillance use policy submission.

A. The City department seeking approval under SMC 8.80.030 shall submit to the City Council a surveillance impact report and a proposed surveillance use policy via an informational staff report on a regular City Council meeting consent calendar at least 45 days prior to the public hearing required under SMC 8.80.030. The informational staff report shall be posted on the City website with the relevant City Council agenda at least 30 days prior to the public hearing.

B. The City Council may request revisions to the surveillance impact report or surveillance use policy submitted by the City department. (Ord. 1145, 2022)
Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 8 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

8.80.060 Standard for approval and compliance for existing surveillance technology.

A. The City Council shall only approve a request to fund, acquire, or use a surveillance technology under SMC

8.80.030 if it determines the benefits of the proposed surveillance technology outweigh its costs, that the surveillance use policy will safeguard civil liberties and civil rights, that no alternative with lesser economic cost or impact on civil rights or liberties would be as effective, and that the uses and deployments of the surveillance technology will not be based upon discriminatory or viewpoint-based factors or have a disparate impact on any community or group.

B. A City department or departments possessing or using surveillance technology prior to the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter shall submit or jointly submit a proposed surveillance use policy no later than 120 days following the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter for review and approval by the City Council pursuant to SMC

8.80.030.

C. If a City department is unable to meet this 120-day timeline, the department may notify the Council in writing of the department’s request to extend this period and the reasons for that request. The City Council may grant City departments extensions of up to 90 days beyond the 120-day timeline to prepare and submit a proposed surveillance use policy.

D. If the City Council has not approved the continuing use of surveillance technology, including the surveillance impact report and surveillance use policy, within 180 days of their submission to the City Council, the City department shall cease its use of the surveillance technology and the sharing of surveillance data therefrom until such time as City Council approval is obtained in accordance with this chapter. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.065
Oversight following Council approval.

A. A City department that obtains approval under SMC 8.80.030 must submit to the City Council, and make available on its website, an annual surveillance report for each surveillance technology used by the City department within 12 months of Council approval, and annually thereafter on or before November 1st. The annual report shall be a single report detailing each type of technology that was utilized by the City. If the City department is unable to meet the deadline, the department head shall notify the City Council in writing of staff’s request to extend this period, and the reasons for that request. The City Council may grant reasonable extensions for good cause.

B. Based upon information in the annual surveillance report, the City Council will, at a public hearing during a regular City Council meeting, reassess whether that surveillance technology as used continues to meet the standard of approval set forth in SMC

8.80.060. If it does not, the City Council shall consider:

1. Directing that the use of the surveillance technology cease; Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 9 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

2. Requiring modifications to the surveillance use policy that are designed to address the Council’s concerns; and/or

3. Directing a report back from the department regarding steps taken to address the Council’s concerns. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.070 Prevention of secret surveillance technology contracts and agreements.

A. It shall be unlawful for the City or any City department to enter into any surveillance-related contract or other agreement that conflicts with the provisions of this chapter, and any conflicting provisions in such future contracts or agreements, including, but not limited to, nondisclosure agreements, shall be deemed void and legally unenforceable. The City and any City department shall have one year from the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter to bring any existing contracts or agreements into compliance with this chapter; after that date, any conflicting provisions in contracts or agreements signed prior to the enactment of the ordinance codified in this chapter shall be deemed void and legally unenforceable to the extent permitted by law. This section shall not apply to collective bargaining agreements and related memorandums of agreement or understanding that predate this chapter.

B. To the extent permitted by law, the City shall publicly disclose all of its surveillance-related contracts, including any and all related nondisclosure agreements, if any, regardless of any contract terms to the contrary. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.075
Prohibition of certain surveillance technologies.

A. It shall be unlawful for any City department to obtain, retain, access, or use:

1. Biometric surveillance technology; or

2. Predictive policing technology; or

3. Facial recognition technology; or

4. Any information obtained from biometric surveillance or predictive policing technologies.

B. A City department’s inadvertent or unintentional receipt, retention, access to, or use of any information obtained from subsections (A)(1) through (A)(4) of this section shall not be a violation of this subsection; provided, that:

1. The City department does not request or solicit its receipt, access to, or use of such information; and Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 10 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

2. The City department creates a log of such receipt, access to, or use and, within seven days of the event, submits that log to the City Council for inclusion in the City Council’s subsequent regular meeting agenda.

C. Any violation of this chapter constitutes an injury and any person may institute proceedings for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce this chapter. An action instituted under this subsection shall be brought against the City of Sebastopol.

D. No data collected or derived from any use of technology in violation of this chapter, and no evidence derived therefrom, may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority subject to the jurisdiction of the State of California. Data collected or derived in violation of this chapter shall be considered unlawfully obtained, and shall be deleted upon discovery.

E. A court shall award costs to the prevailing plaintiff in any action brought to enforce this chapter and any reasonable attorney’s fees as may be awarded pursuant to State law. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.080
Whistleblower protections and enforcement.

A. Neither the City nor anyone acting on behalf of the City may take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment, including but not limited to discriminating with respect to compensation, terms and conditions of employment, access to information, restrictions on due process rights, or civil or criminal liability, because:

1. The employee or applicant was perceived to, about to, or assisted in any lawful disclosure of information concerning the funding, acquisition, or use of a surveillance technology or surveillance data based upon a good faith belief that the disclosure evidenced a violation of this chapter; or

2. The employee or applicant was perceived to, about to, or assisted or participated in any proceeding or action to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

B. It shall be grounds for disciplinary action for a City employee or anyone else acting on behalf of the City to retaliate against another City employee or applicant who makes a good-faith complaint that there has been a failure to comply with any surveillance use policy or administrative instruction promulgated under this chapter.

C. Any employee or applicant who is injured by a violation of this section may institute a proceeding for monetary damages and injunctive relief against the City in any court of competent jurisdiction.

D. Enforcement.

1. Any violation of this chapter constitutes an injury and any person may institute proceedings for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce this chapter. An action instituted under this subsection shall be brought against the City of Sebastopol, and if necessary to effectuate compliance with this chapter or a surveillance use policy (including to expunge Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 11 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023. information unlawfully collected, retained, or shared thereunder), any third party, except a City employee, with possession, custody, or control of data subject to this chapter.

2. Prior to the initiation of any legal proceeding under subsection (D)(1) of this section, the City of Sebastopol shall be given written notice of the violation(s) and an opportunity to correct such alleged violation(s) within 30 days of receipt of the notice.

3. If the alleged violation is substantiated and subsequently cured, a notice shall be posted in a conspicuous space on the City’s website that generally describes the corrective measure(s) taken to address the violation(s).

E. A court shall award costs to the prevailing plaintiff in any action brought to enforce this chapter and any reasonable attorney’s fees as may be awarded pursuant to State law.

F. Nothing in this chapter is intended to, or shall be interpreted to, conflict with the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of California, or with any State or Federal law. (Ord. 1145, 2022)

8.80.090 Severability.

A. The provisions of this chapter are declared to be separate and severable. The invalidity of any clause, phrase, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section or portion of this chapter, or the invalidity of the application thereof to any person or circumstance, shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this chapter, or the validity of its application to other persons or circumstances.

B. The City Council hereby declares that it would have passed this chapter and each and every section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, and word not declared invalid or unconstitutional without regard to whether any other portion of this chapter or application thereof would be subsequently declared invalid or unconstitutional.

C. The City Clerk shall certify to the adoption of the ordinance codified in this chapter and shall cause the same or a summary thereof to be published as required by law.

D. The ordinance codified in this chapter shall take effect and be in full force and effect 30 days from and after the date of its final passage and adoption. (Ord. 1145, 2022) Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 12 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

Disclaimer: The City Clerk’s Office has the official version of the Sebastopol Municipal Code. Users should contact the City Clerk’s Office for ordinances passed subsequent to the ordinance cited above.

City Website: www.ci.sebastopol.ca.us
Hosted by General Code.

Ch. 8.80 Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance | Sebastopol Municipal Code Page 13 of 13 The Sebastopol Municipal Code is current through Ordinance 1149, passed October 3, 2023.

2 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE

IS THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY ENGAGED IN EVALUATING PUBLIC
CONCERNS AND NEEDS?
■ Have you initiated a process to engage community members in evaluating public concerns and needs, potential interventions, and costs? Have you made sure the diversity of the community is fully represented in these discussions?
■ What specific problem does your community want to address? ■ Have you conducted an evidence-based inquiry and identified the most effective interventions to address this specific problem?
■ What interventions are supported by diverse members of the community? DO YOU KNOW ALL OF THE COSTS AND RISKS OF SURVEILLANCE? ■ What impact can surveillance have on privacy, free speech, and the rights and safety of community members?
■ Who is most likely to be harmed by surveillance? How could surveillance undermine commitments to support racial justice, immigrants’ rights, LGBTQ rights, reproductive access, and other community goals?
■ What are the financial costs of surveillance, including initial costs, long-term training, operation and maintenance, increased incarceration, and potential liability risks? ■ Have you completed a full surveillance impact assessment to identify costs and risks?

DO YOU HAVE ALL THE INFORMATION YOU NEED,INCLUDING
ALTERNATIVES TO SURVEILLANCE?
■ What surveillance systems already exist in your community? Who is operating those systems or proposing new surveillance?
■ How have you convened the entire community to discuss and critique existing or proposed surveillance? Have you made sure diverse people in the community are involved in these discussions? ■ Has the agency proposing or using surveillance provided all available information about the surveillance system before the public debate begins?
■ What evidence is there that surveillance will be effective in addressing community concerns and needs? ■ What alternatives to surveillance would be more effective, less expensive, or have less impact on the rights of community members?
■ How do you ensure agencies cannot deploy or use surveillance in the absence of community approval?

TO ASK A ND ANSWER FOR

ANY EXISTING OR PROPOSED

SURVEILLANCE

KEY QUESTIONS

4 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE A. THE PROVEN HARMS AND UNPROVEN

BENEFITS OF SURVEILLANCE

1. SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FUEL RACIAL INJUSTICE
In a nation where police interactions with the public all too frequently turn dangerous, surveillance systems can exacerbate and magnify these problems, increasing the risk of unnecessary government scrutiny, in-person encounters, and violence. Again and again, police have used surveillance systems to create inaccurate and discriminatory watchlists, engage in discriminatory stops and searches, and upend people’s lives.
“It is an affront
to our movement
for equity and
justice that the
SFPD responded by
secretly spying on
us. We have the
right to organize,
speak out, and
march without
fear of police
surveillance.”
— Hope Williams, ACLU of Northern
California client and plaintiff in
Williams v. San Francisco, speaking
about the SFPD’s surveillance
of Black Lives Matter protests in
summer 20201
Surveillance technologies amplify the over-policing of Black and Brown communities.
6 In Oakland, the police department has disproportionately used automated license plate readers (ALPR) in African American, Latino, and lower-income neighborhoods. Analyzing raw
data on how Oakland police had operated ALPR systems,
researchers concluded, “If you are driving through or parking your car in a neighborhood with a higher density of white families, you are less likely to be picked up by ALPR cameras.” Additionally, the locations where Oakland used ALPR didn’t “correlate very well with crime, ” and the ALPR was “clearly not being used to deter automobile-related crimes.”4
6 In Los Angeles, the police department used “predictive policing” surveillance software to decide where to send officers, as well as which areas and individuals to target. The results were highly discriminatory. Under the direction of the predictive policing program, the LAPD sent helicopters — which they dubbed
“ghetto birds” — to fly over some neighborhoods 80 to 90 times per week.
5 Over a six-month period, six Black and Latino men
were shot by police in areas the police had targeted under this program.6 All the while, police mocked the system’s lack of effectiveness, comparing it to a Ouija board and calling it “a civil liberties nightmare.”7 In fact, 85% of all people flagged by the LAPD’s predictive policing program were Black or Latinx, and similar patterns repeated in departments across the country.8

12 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE

7. SURVEILLANCE ENTRENCHES

ECONOMIC INJUSTICE
Surveillance systems have an outsized impact on people
living on the economic margins. Surveillance is frequently used to inflict excessive economic penalties, often with traumatizing effects that push people further into the cycle of poverty. Surveillance is also used to target the unhoused and enforce laws that make it illegal for people to sleep in vehicles or to sit, sleep, or eat in public places when they have no adequate alternatives.
49 Imposing invasive surveillance on people struggling
economically takes an emotional, psychological, physical, and economic toll that can trigger life-changing consequences long after a person is initially tracked and recorded.50 Surveilling and policing people based on economic status also feeds the creation of profiles that may be misused by other agencies to make consequential decisions, from child custody to access to benefits.51
Policymakers committed to treating everyone in their
community with respect and dignity should be very wary of how surveillance can exacerbate economic injustice and the criminalization of poverty.

CASE STUDY Speeding Cameras
Accelerate Racial Disparities in
Ticketing
When Chicago installed speeding camera networks across
the city, proponents claimed it would help increase pedestrian safety and eliminate racially biased police stops. However, in reality, the speed cameras actually accelerated racial disparities in ticketing. People in Black and Latinx neighborhoods were given tickets at twice the rate of households in white ZIP codes, and the tens of millions of dollars in penalties exacerbated economic disparities and proved disastrous for many low- income households.52 Red-light cameras produced similar disparities in the cities of Rochester, N.Y. and Miami, leading them to end their programs.53

CRIMINALIZATION

OF POVERTY AND

SURVEILLANCE
6 A number of cities have
entered into predatory deals
with private ALPR companies,
using their “free” surveillance
systems to collect outstanding
court fines while giving away
residents’ information for
“nearly unlimited commercial
use. ” Under these arrangements,
residents had to pay their
original fine and an additional
25% processing fee (which went
entirely to the private company)
or be arrested.
54 In one Texas
city, this practice resulted in
1,500 people, the vast majority
of them Black, being put in jail
in a single two-year period —
simply because they could not
afford to pay traffic fines.55
6 Residents in public housing
have been subjected to invasive
face surveillance in Detroit
and New York City. Captured
by cameras that gave police
departments “round-the-clock
video footage, ” residents and
their allies sounded the alarm
bell about how they were being
targeted solely because of their
financial circumstances.56

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 13 B. THE FULL COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance not only threatens people’s rights and safety, but also wastes resources that could be spent on evidence-based alternatives. It is costly to deploy, operate, and maintain. It fuels needless arrests and contributes to the billions spent on incarceration. And when surveillance harms people, it leads to costly lawsuits and settlements. To calculate the full financial cost of surveillance technology, policymakers must look beyond the initial sticker price.

STATISTICS: VOTERS OPPOSE

INVASIVE SURVEILLANCE,

SUPPORT RESTRICTIONS
A majority of Bay Area voters oppose invasive
surveillance and support restrictions on police
surveillance powers.
75% oppose the government’s collection and
storage of people’s biometric information.
69% oppose live access to cameras at their
homes and businesses.
66% oppose tracking of their social media posts.

Bay Area voters also strongly support community
transparency, oversight, and auditing of police
surveillance powers.
87% of Bay Area voters want mandated audits of
how police use surveillance technology.
74% percent want the community to provide
input before giving police any access to
surveillance technology.
64 % oppose giving police the authority to
decide how and when to use surveillance
without the oversight of elected officials.57

1. SURVEILLANCE IS FREQUENTLY INEFFECTIVE AND LEADS

TO LIFE-ALTERING MISTAKES
There is very little evidence that surveillance
improves public safety. Again and again,
communities have adopted surveillance systems
that can end up doing more harm than good.

CASE STUDY Oakland Spends
$2M on “Hardly Used”
Police Technology
The cash-strapped city of Oakland learned
through experience that surveillance
technology can be an ineffective and expensive
failure. An audit revealed that the city had
squandered almost $2 million on hardly used
technology between 2006 and 2011. The
auditor recommended steps to ensure that any
technology purchased was intended to fulfill
specific objectives and was regularly evaluated
for effectiveness.58 But Oakland’s wasteful
pattern continued — in 2023, the City of Oakland
approved a proposal to massively expand driver
surveillance.59
14 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE CASE STUDY San Francisco Camera Program Fails to
Meaningfully Improve Safety
In 2005, San Francisco installed government-owned video cameras in the city’s high-crime, high- traffic areas, hoping it would deter and help solve crime. However, post-installation crime statistics published by mandate under a city ordinance revealed that the cameras “had no impact on violent crime” in neighborhoods with cameras and was not significantly successful as a tool for investigations and prosecutions.60 Despite this history, in 2023 San Francisco’s mayor proposed a ballot measure that would empower the police to unilaterally expand the program while eliminating oversight by the police commission.61
In addition to its operating costs, surveillance technology may malfunction in truly tragic ways. Operators cannot be relied upon to catch errors, and, in practice, they have not. Communities considering surveillance must grapple with the real possibility that a surveillance system will wrongly identify or label a person as a suspect, with possible irrevocable consequences.

CASE STUDY Falsely Accused Due to Facial Recognition
Errors and Police Misuse
Robert Williams was arrested in front of his family for a theft he had nothing to do with.62 The arrest of Williams, a Black man from Michigan, is one of six known cases in which police in the United States have wrongly arrested Black people based on flawed facial recognition results.63 A few months later, Michael Oliver, also a resident of Michigan, was arrested for a separate theft based on a bad facial recognition match, even though he did not resemble the person photographed at the scene of the crime.
64 In yet another tragic case, police relied on a facial recognition error to arrest Porcha Woodruff, a Black woman who was eight months pregnant, holding her in jail and causing immense pain and trauma in the final stages of her pregnancy.65 In New Jersey, Nijeer Parks was wrongly accused of a hit-and-run and forced to spend ten days in jail and pay nearly $5,000 to defend himself after a facial recognition system misidentified him.66 In Georgia, police jailed Randal Reid for nearly a week because a facial recognition system falsely connected him to a theft of luxury purses in Louisiana, even though Reid had never been to Louisiana.67 In Maryland, Alonzo Sawyer was jailed for nine days for allegedly assaulting a bus driver even though he was sleeping on his couch at the time of the crime.68 In all of these cases, police misuse of facial recognition derailed people’s lives, forcing them into jail and sometimes causing them to accrue costly legal bills. While these people were eventually cleared, we don’t know how many other people have been wrongly accused by police and are currently imprisoned due to inaccurate facial surveillance.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 21 There have also been recent bipartisan efforts to pass and enforce laws at both the state and federal levels to address surveillance technology. The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) provides robust privacy protection and imposes strict limits on government surveillance related to electronic information.127 California also requires public hearings, detailed usage policies, and governing board and public involvement whenever a local agency seeks to acquire or use automated license plate readers, cell phone surveillance technology, or any military equipment, including drones.
128 California law also prohibits local agencies from sharing of information collected by automated license plate readers with out-of- state entities.129 Residents and community groups have used these laws to stop illegal surveillance practices.130
CASE STUDY ACLU Sues Marin County Sheriff For
Illegally Sharing Driver Locations Far and Wide
The ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Southern California, and Electronic Frontier Foundation sued the Sheriff and the County of Marin, alleging that the sheriff’s sharing of driver locations with hundreds of out-of-state and federal agencies violated a state law prohibiting such sharing. The sheriff collected these locations with ALPR systems and had shared them with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an agency that has used this sensitive information to locate, target, and deport community members.

After the filing of the suit, the County and sheriff quickly changed their practices to come into compliance with state law. In addition, the County was forced to pay attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs in the case.131
These state and federal protections are driven by a clear shift in public attitudes towards surveillance. Community members are concerned about surveillance and want lawmakers to rein it in. To that end, a number of local governing bodies have adopted laws requiring transparency and oversight of surveillance systems acquired or used by police and other departments.
132
Whether or not your community has adopted laws limiting or prohibiting surveillance, you will need to be able to critically assess surveillance programs that are proposed or that already exist. The next section describes a process for assessing technology as a community, underscoring why surveillance is often not the solution to the problems you and your community seek to solve.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 23 “Technology
can only serve
democracy to
the degree
that it is
democratized.”
— Malkia Devich-Cyril,
Senior Fellow and Founding
Director, MediaJustice133
A. COLLECTIVEL Y EVALUATE COMMUNITY

NEEDS, COSTS, AND ALTERNATIVES

1. DECIDE TOGETHER: INVOLVE THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY

FROM THE START
The first step is to make sure that you are involving the entire community to discuss what is happening in their neighborhoods, what specific problems they want to address, and what evidence based interventions they support. There should be thorough discussion about how resources could be allocated to address community concerns in ways that don’t increase surveillance and policing. If surveillance systems already exist, they should be reevaluated and discussed holistically by the entire community. As a policymaker, you should make sure the right questions are being asked and answered about all existing and proposed surveillance.

How are you convening the community to discuss community issues and interventions?
Community members should be in control of decisions that might involve surveillance. As you assess a surveillance proposal, create opportunities for meaningful and timely community input at multiple public hearings. These conversations about surveillance can take place at regularly scheduled, public lawmaker meetings, or you can organize a series of specific public meetings.

The community must be given meaningful advance notice that these public discussions will take place. Making sure the public is engaged early on will help everyone understand community interests and identify considerations or concerns. You should contact a wide array of community groups, including those working with ethnic and religious communities, and make them aware of the proposal. This conversation should not be a one-off event. It is important to maximize public awareness early in the process and engage those who might be most impacted by surveillance.

Local agencies should not acquire or deploy new surveillance systems, or expand their surveillance programs, before this debate takes place.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 25 CASE STUDY San Jose’s Drone Grounded
Due to Backlash
San Jose residents were outraged when they learned their police department had purchased a drone without any public debate. Amid critical media coverage and protests from community groups, civil-rights advocates, and local residents, police apologized and said they would ground the drone until they could conduct adequate public outreach.136 Focusing on the problems you seek to solve can also help bring into focus the individuals or communities who are most impacted by both the issues. Throughout, you should seek to solicit and understand the thoughts and concerns of diverse community members. Once you do, you can start considering the potential interventions that would actually achieve shared community goals.

What are the best ways to address community issues? What are potential interventions?
Once you have engaged the community and identified the problems you seek to solve together, ask what the best ways are to address community issues and what non-surveillance interventions could help achieve your goals. There are likely many interventions not involving surveillance that can help your community address public safety and health issues and may be strongly supported by community members.

ALTERNATIVES TO

SURVEILLANCE

GET SIGNIFICANT

PUBLIC SUPPORT
Too often, surveillance is a
knee-jerk reaction proposed
by the police or touted by
politicians, even if there is
little evidence that it will
address crime, and even if
alternatives to surveillance
are more strongly supported
by community members.

Community members can be
suspicious when surveillance
and incarceration are used
as a catch-all, expressing
support for non-surveillance
alternatives instead. A
2022 poll of San Francisco
voters found that only 34%
supported an expanded
camera surveillance program.

A significant majority strongly
supported alternatives to
surveillance, including 89%
supporting more lighting to
deter criminal activity and
90% supporting more drug
and mental health services.
137
Are there better alternatives to surveillance?
Having a robust discussion about the scope of potential interventions may not be easy. Surveillance vendors often aggressively market their products to police and try to tout their products as the only solution.

Government agencies may be desperate for what seems like an easy fix. But the reality is much more complicated, with surveillance systems frequently causing more harm and creating more costs than they prevent. These real-life impacts, combined with the ineffectiveness of surveillance technology at delivering real public safety outcomes, are compelling reasons to ensure that fact-based conversations actually happen. Thoughtful debate will enable your community to identify and utilize interventions that have the potential to be more effective, less expensive, and less likely to be misused or otherwise negatively impact your community members. You might find it leads to decisions to dismantle and reject surveillance systems altogether.

28 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE B. CRITICALL Y ASSESS ANY EXISTING

SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OR

SURVEILLANCE PROPOSAL
In addition to considering alternatives, your
community needs to scrutinize any surveillance
proposal and reconsider existing surveillance
programs. Throughout the process of examining
a proposal or program, continue to turn to
your community and create opportunities
and space for people to weigh in. Release as
much information as possible; your community
should understand any surveillance systems in
operation and how they work. Together, center
the problem the technology is supposed to solve
and ask whether non-surveillance alternatives
exist. With community partners, ask what impact
the system has on civil rights and liberties and
the full costs of the surveillance program.

If an agency in your community already
possesses and uses surveillance technology,
these programs might have started without
any community involvement, democratic
oversight, or consideration of how they harm
civil rights and civil liberties. As a community
leader, you have a responsibility to take a
close and critical look at existing surveillance
programs. Any existing surveillance technology
should be reevaluated and publicly discussed.

Departments should never expand or blindly
continue a surveillance program — instead, take
a close look at what surveillance is in use in your
community.

As you examine things together, your community
may decide to reject a proposal or dismantle
or roll back a surveillance system. There are
many reasons you may choose to cease an
existing program: It may be too costly, ineffective,
dangerous, or harmful to civil rights and liberties.

There may also be a less costly and much less
invasive non-surveillance alternative that you
discover during the public debate. Ending a
program might involve cancelling a contract,
opting not to renew a contract, or simply directing
the agency with the technology to cease using it.

Whatever the decision, make sure it is done with
full public transparency.

Have you been fully transparent about the
surveillance proposal or program?
An informed debate can only take place if
policymakers and the public are provided with full
information about the surveillance being proposed
or used. It requires that your community have
access to a wide range of information in order
to assess the potential impacts of surveillance
and any alternatives that may address the same
problems. The agency seeking surveillance
technology must be required to prepare and
release as much information as possible about
the actual or potential uses of a surveillance
technology to help everyone understand how
a technology will work, its potential costs, and
the safeguards that will prevent its misuse if the
proposal was approved. This information should
be released far in advance of any public meeting
discussing the surveillance.

PHOTO: U.S. PATENT AND

TRADEMARK OFFICE VIA AP
SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 29 CASE STUDY Santa Clara County
Cancels Stingray Buy Due to
Transparency Concerns
In 2015, the Santa Clara County Executive rejected the Sheriff’s Office proposal to purchase a Stingray after the board of supervisors questioned the expense and secrecy of the project.

The board questioned how they could be asked to spend more than $500,000 of taxpayer money to approve a purchase that was shrouded in secrecy even from the board itself. The County Executive ultimately vetoed the purchase because the company providing the Stingray refused to “agree to even the most basic criteria we have in terms of being responsive to public records requests … We had to do what we thought was right.”
156
“I think issues
or technologies
like this and the
secrecy just breaks
all trust with our
communities and for
a democracy to work,
there needs to be
that trust with the
government.”
— Homayra Yusufi, Deputy Director,
Partnership for the Advancement of
New Americans157
CASE STUDY Oakland’s “Domain
Awareness Center” Forced To Scale
Back After Keeping Community In
The Dark
In 2013, the City of Oakland tried to expand its “Domain Awareness Center, ” which was originally focused on the Port of Oakland, into a citywide surveillance network linking together video cameras from local streets and schools, traffic cameras, and gunshot microphones. Instead of soliciting early public input about the expanded system, Oakland tried to move forward without any meaningful engagement with the community. Residents were outraged and the city council voted against expanding the system.
158

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 33 Several cities considering surveillance proposals have found it useful to actively engage community members through either working groups or specialty committees to shape policy and provide oversight. Cities like Oakland and Vallejo have created standing committees of residents, experts, and advocates who can work together to analyze proposals and make recommendations.177 The Redlands Police Department convened a Citizens’ Privacy Council, open to any city resident, to provide advice on surveillance camera policies and oversee police use of the cameras.
178 Of course, the risk
of a surveillance-focused committee risks prioritizing surveillance as a solution. Instead, you should keep the focus on real problems and non-surveillance interventions that actually work.

What are the financial and opportunity costs of this surveillance proposal or program?
Every dollar your community spends on surveillance technology is a dollar it cannot spend on some other community need. First, discuss the financial costs related to surveillance technology, which can include personnel time, training costs, maintenance, and upkeep, as well as any network and storage costs for the information your community may collect. There can also be potential lawsuit costs for violating rights, as well as costs for any data breaches of the information collected by your surveillance system.

CASE STUDY Redlands Deploys Insecure
Camera Network
The surveillance camera network in the city of Redlands made the news for the wrong reasons when computer security experts demonstrated how easily they could take control of the cameras.

Although the police department expressed concern about “people with criminal intent using the public camera feed to case homes or businesses or track the police force, ” the network was deployed with no security at all. Even after the story broke, the network was secured with an outdated encryption protocol that a researcher described as “putting a diary lock on your front door.”179

34 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE Questions about costs cannot be dismissed solely because an agency is seeking grant funding to pay for the technology. Grant money spent on surveillance may have been available to spend on other community interventions. Outside grants may also not cover the costs that follow a surveillance technology’s adoption, particularly the long-term costs of operation, repairs, and personnel.

Estimating these costs as accurately as possible — and making sure those estimates are shared with the community and made part of the debate about adopting surveillance — is key.

What are the legal risks of the surveillance proposal or program? Surveillance technology can carry a number of significant legal risks and requirements, in part because of rapid changes to privacy and surveillance law. Under current law, misuse of surveillance systems or personal information or technical glitches outside of your control could subject your community to potential legal liability. And as courts and lawmakers continue to reassess how privacy and free speech rights should apply in the digital age, there is a risk that your community’s investment in surveillance technology could leave it saddled with equipment that can no longer be legally used as intended. These factors need to be accounted for when assessing the true costs of any surveillance proposal.

What is the risk of errors, misuse, and mistakes?
Surveillance technology may be inaccurate or malfunction in truly tragic ways. Operators cannot be relied upon to catch errors, and in practice they have not. Communities considering surveillance must grapple with the real possibility that a surveillance system will wrongly identify or label a person a suspect, with possible irrevocable consequences.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 35 C. ADOPT POLICIES AND LAWS THAT

TARGET SURVEILLANCE
We hope you share a commitment to limiting the harms of surveillance and ensuring the community has power to influence and control key decisions about surveillance. So far, this document has described ways to analyze and limit harm of existing surveillance programs and proposals for new surveillance. You will encounter a number of different surveillance proposals as a policymaker, and so you should also consider policies and laws that formalize your community’s approach to surveillance. Here is a sample of the decisions that California communities have adopted via law or policy:
6 A prohibition on the acquisition and use of a particular surveillance technology;
6 Rejection of a proposed surveillance policy after a
robust public debate coupled with a resolution to scrutinize surveillance programs more broadly;
6 Amendments to an existing surveillance technology
program contract or use policy, including the imposition of new limitations on the program;
6 Closure or cancellation of a surveillance program that is at odds with community values;
6 Creation of a surveillance advisory board made up of local residents and that has the resources and authority to reject surveillance technology programs at odd with community
values; and
6 A surveillance technology ordinance that mandates
transparency, accountability and oversight whenever
surveillance technology is proposed or used. A number of governing bodies in California — including Santa Clara County, BART, Oakland, San Francisco, Berkeley, Davis, Palo Alto, and San Diego — have adopted versions of such laws.180

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 37

ENDNOTES
1 Activists Sue San Francisco for Wide-Ranging Surveillance of Black-Led Protests Against Police Violence, ACLU of
Northern California, Oct. 7, 2020, available at https:// www.aclunc.org/news/activists-sue-san-francisco-
wide-ranging-surveillance-black-led-protests-
against-police.
2 Myaisha Hayes, What Safety Really Looks Like, Medium. com#NoDigitalPrisons, Jul. 9, 2018, available at https:// medium.com/nodigitalprisons/what-safety-really-
looks-like-ced75304baeb.
3 Amnesty International, USA: Facial Recognition
Technology Reinforcing Racist Stop-And-Frisk Policing
in New York — New Research (Feb. 15, 2022), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/
usa-facial-recognition-technology-reinforcing-
racist-stop-and-frisk-policing-in-new-york-new-
research/.
4 Jeremy Gillula & Dave Maass, What You Can Learn
from Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data, EFF: Deeplinks blog,
Jan. 21, 2015, available at https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-
alpr-data.
5 Mara Hvistendahl, How the LAPD and Palantir Use Data
to Justify Racist Policing, The Intercept, Jan. 30, 2021, available at https://theintercept.com/2021/01/30/
lapd-palantir-data-driven-policing/.
6 Johana Bhuiyan, LAPD Ended Predictive Policing
Programs amid Public Outcry, A New Effort Shares Many
of Their Flaws, The Guardian, Nov. 8, 2021, available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/
nov/07/lapd-predictive-policing-surveillance-
reform.
7 Mara Hvistendahl, How the LAPD and Palantir Use Data
to Justify Racist Policing, The Intercept, Jan. 30, 2021, available at https://theintercept.com/2021/01/30/
lapd-palantir-data-driven-policing/.
8 Matt Wille, LAPD’s New Data-Driven Policing Is Just as Racist as Its Old Ways, Input, Nov. 10, 2021, available at https://www.inverse.com/input/culture/lapds-
new-data-driven-policing-is-just-as-racist-as-its-
old-ways
.
9 Amnesty International, USA: Facial Recognition
Technology Reinforcing Racist Stop-And-Frisk Policing
in New York — New Research (Feb. 15, 2022), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/
usa-facial-recognition-technology-reinforcing-
racist-stop-and-frisk-policing-in-new-york-new-
research/.
10 Alabama’s attorney general says the state can prosecute those who help women travel for abortions, AP News,
Aug. 31, 2023, available at https://apnews.com/
article/alabama-abortion-steve-marshall-
2157a7d0bfad02aad1ca41e61fe4de33.
11 Sam Biddle, U.S. Marshals Spied on Abortion Protesters Using Dataminr, The Intercept, May 15, 2023, available
at https://theintercept.com/2023/05/15/abortion-
surveillance-dataminr/.
12 Lilly Irani, Opinion: Mayor’s effort to weaken surveillance oversight threatens privacy and California values,
San Diego Union Tribune, Jan. 14, 2024, available at
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/
commentary/story/2024-01-17/opinion-mayors-
effort-to-weaken-surveillance-oversight-threatens-
privacy-and-california-values.
13 Sharona Coutts, Anti-Choice Groups Use Smartphone
Surveillance to Target ‘Abortion-Minded Women’ during
Clinic Visits, Rewire News Group, May 25, 2016, available at https://rewirenewsgroup.com/2016/05/25/anti-
choice-groups-deploy-smartphone-surveillance-
target-abortion-minded-women-clinic-visits/.
14 Joseph Cox, Data Broker Is Selling Location Data of
People Who Visit Abortion Clinics, Vice, May 3, 2022,
available at https://www.vice.com/en/article/
m7vzjb/location-data-abortion-clinics-safegraph-
planned-parenthood.
15 Hayley Tsukayama, How California can protect anyone
seeking an abortion or gender-affirming care, S.F.

Chronicle, Jun. 4, 2023, available at https://www.
sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/
ab793-abortion-body-autonomy-18166066.php;
Cyrus Farivar, Abortion Rights, Privacy Activists Push For California Ban On ‘Digital Dragnet’ Warrants, a18.asmdc. org, May 2, 2023, available at https://a18.asmdc.org/
news/20230502-abortion-rights-privacy-activists-
push-california-ban-digital-dragnet-warrants .
16 Emily Bazelon, Purvi Patel Could be Just the Beginning, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2015, available at https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/04/01/magazine/purvi-patel-
could-be-just-the-beginning.html.
17 Lauren Rankin, How an online search for abortion
pills landed this woman in jail, Fast Company, Feb.
26, 2020, available at https://www.fastcompany.
com/90468030/how-an-online-search-for-
abortion-pills-landed-this-woman-in-jail.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 39 37 Tara Evans, 21-10-12 Tara’s Statement, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Oct. 21, 2012, available at https://www.eff. org/document/21-10-12-taras-statement.
38 See Tanvir v. Holder, Case No. 13-CV-6951 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 22, 2014) (First Amended Complaint), https://ccrjustice. org/sites/default/files/assets/Tanvir%20v%20
Comey%2013-cv-6951%20First%20Amended%20
Complaint%202014_04_22%20--%20AS%20FILED.
pdf.
39 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Defends Tactics
over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New Details on
Muslim Surveillance, Huff. Post, Feb. 25, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/
nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997.html; Adam
Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, New York Drops Unit That Spied
on Muslims, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2014, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-
unit-that-spied-on-muslims-is-disbanded.html.
40 Jenna McLaughlin, The FBI vs. Apple Debate Just Got
Less White, The Intercept, Mar. 8, 2016, available at
https://theintercept.com/2016/03/08/the-fbi-vs-
apple-debate-just-got-less-white/.
41 Spies in the California Skies: New Records Expose State Police Aerial Surveillance of Racial Justice Protesters, ACLU of Northern California blog, Nov. 16, 2021, available at https://www.aclunc.org/article/spies-california-
skies-new-records-expose-state-police-aerial-
surveillance-racial-justice.
42 Richard K. De Atley & Ryan Hagen, Hundreds at
Riverside’s Fairmount Park hear speeches and march in
protest of George Floyd’s death, The Press-Enterprise,
Jun. 7, 2020, available at https://www.pressenterprise. com/2020/06/07/hundreds-at-riversides-fairmount-
park-to-hear-speeches-and-march-in-protest-of-
george-floyd-death/.
43 Matt Cagle & Jennifer Jones, Recordings Show the
California Highway Patrol’s Aerial Surveillance of Racial Justice Protests, ACLU of Northern California blog, Nov. 16, 2021, available at https://www.aclunc.org/blog/
recordings-show-california-highway-patrol-s-
aerial-surveillance-racial-justice-protests.
44 Joshua Sabatini, Little-known surveillance helps nab thieves, S.F. Examiner, Dec. 26, 2017, available at
https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/little-known-
surveillance-helps-nab-thieves/article_daa4aaf1-
b2b5-5555-b70f-3c50ad472a3a.html; Williams v. City
and County of San Francisco (Illegal Surveillance), ACLU of Northern California, Oct. 7, 2020, available at https:// www.aclunc.org/our-work/legal-docket/williams-v-
san-francisco.
45 George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson, The Intercept, Jul. 14, 2015, available at https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/
documents-show-department-homeland-security-
monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson/.
46 Nicole Ozer, Police Use of Social Media Surveillance Software is Escalating, and Activists are in the Digital Crosshairs, ACLU of Northern California blog, Sep. 20,
2016, available at https://www.aclunc.org/blog/
police-use-social-media-surveillance-software-
escalating-and-activists-are-digital-crosshairs;
Matt Cagle, This Surveillance Software is Probably Spying on #BlackLivesMatter, ACLU of Northern California
blog, Dec. 15, 2015, available at https://www.aclunc.
org/blog/surveillance-software-probably-spying-
blacklivesmatter.
47 Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU of Northern California blog, Oct. 10, 2016 available at https://www.aclunc.org/blog/
facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-
access-surveillance-product-marketed-target;
Facebook and Instagram Publicly Prohibit Surveillance of Users Following Coalition Demands, ACLU of Northern
California blog, Mar. 10, 2017, available at https://www. aclunc.org/news/facebook-and-instagram-publicly-
prohibit-surveillance-users-following-coalition-
demands.
48 Movement for Black Lives, Struggle for Power: The
Ongoing Persecution of Black Movement by the U.S.

Government (2021), https://m4bl.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/08/Struggle-For-Power-The-Ongoing-
Persecution-of-Black-Movement-by-the-U.S.-
Government.pdf.
49 Eric Tars, National Homelessness Law Center,
Criminalization of Homelessness (2021), https://nlihc.org/ sites/default/files/AG-2021/06-08_Criminalization-
of-Homelessness.pdf.
50 Virginia Eubanks, Seeta Pena Ganghadharan, Tamika
Lewis, Mariella Saba, & Tawana Pety, Our Data Bodies,
Reclaiming Our Data (Jun. 15, 2018), https://www.
odbproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ODB.

InterimReport.FINAL_.7.16.2018.pdf .
51 Virginia Eubanks, Seeta Pena Ganghadharan, Tamika
Lewis, Mariella Saba, & Tawana Pety, Our Data Bodies,
Reclaiming Our Data (Jun. 15, 2018), https://www.
odbproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ODB.

InterimReport.FINAL_.7.16.2018.pdf .

40 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE 52 Emily Hopkins & Melissa Sanchez, Chicago’s ‘Race-
Neutral’ Traffic Cameras Ticket Black and Latino Drivers the Most, ProPublica, Jan. 11, 2022, available at https:// www.propublica.org/article/chicagos-race-
neutral-traffic-cameras-ticket-black-and-latino-
drivers-the-most.
53 Id.
54 Dave Maass, “No Cost” License Plate Readers Are Turning Texas Police into Mobile Debt Collectors and Data Miners, EFF: Deeplinks blog, Jan. 26, 2016, available at https:// www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/no-cost-license-
plate-readers-are-turning-texas-police-mobile-
debt-collectors-and.
55 Alex Campbell & Kendall Taggart, A Traffic Cop’s Ticket Bonanza In A Poor Texas Town, BuzzFeed News, Jan. 26,
2016, available at https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/alexcampbell/the-ticket-machine.
56 Lola Fadulu, Facial Recognition Technology in Public Housing Prompts Backlash, N.Y. Times, Sep. 24, 2019,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/
us/politics/facial-recognition-technology-housing.
html.
57 ACLU of Northern California, Tulchin Research: BAY
AREA SURVEILLANCE (BASE) (Apr. 2022), https://
www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/ACLU-NC%20
Bay%20Area%20Surveillance%20-%20%23225-
AA%20-%20Base%20FQ%20-%20Final.pdf .
58 Oakland City Auditor, Police Technology Performance
Audit: FY 2006–07 through 2010–11 (2012), https://
www.oaklandauditor.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/20120801_Performance_
OPDTech.pdf.
59 Kiley Russell, Oakland Privacy Commission Backs Use
of New ALPR System, Piedmont Exedra, 2023, available
at https://piedmontexedra.com/2023/10/oakland-
privacy-commission-backs-use-of-new-alpr-
system; Eli Wolfe, Oakland’s license plate readers have been off for months, so why does the city want more?,
The Oaklandside, Aug. 17, 2023, https://oaklandside.
org/2023/08/17/oaklands-license-plate-readers-
have-been-off-for-months-so-why-does-the-city-
want-more/.
60 See Jennifer King, Deirdre K. Mulligan, & Steven P.

Raphael, CITRIS, CITRIS Report: The San Francisco
Camera Safety Program (Dec. 17, 2008), https://
citris-uc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/citris-
report-san-francisco-community-safety-camera-
program-2008.pdf.
61 J.D. Morris, Mayor Breed wants S.F. voters to give police more power. Here are the details, S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 17, 2023, available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/sf/
article/breed-police-2024-election-18428814.php .
62 Robert Williams, I Did Nothing Wrong. I was Arrested Anyway, ACLU, Jul. 15, 2021, available at https://
www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/i-did-
nothing-wrong-i-was-arrested-anyway; Kashmir
Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. Times,
Jun. 24, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-
arrest.html.
63 Khari Johnson, How Wrongful Arrests Based on AI
Derailed 3 Men’s Lives, WIRED, Mar. 7, 2022, available at https://www.wired.com/story/wrongful-arrests-ai-
derailed-3-mens-lives/.
64 Elisha Anderson, Controversial Detroit facial recognition got him arrested for a crime he didn’t commit, Detroit
Free Press, Jul. 10, 2020, available at https://
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
detroit/2020/07/10/facial-recognition-detroit-
michael-oliver-robert-williams/5392166002/.
65 After Third Wrongful Arrest, ACLU Slams Detroit
Police Department for Continuing to Use Faulty Facial
Recognition Technology, ACLU, available at https://
www.aclu.org/press-releases/after-third-wrongful-
arrest-aclu-slams-detroit-police-department-
for-continuing-to-use-faulty-facial-recognition-
technology.
66 Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2020,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/
technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html.
67 Associated Press, JPSO facial recognition tool led
to mistaken arrest, lawyer says, 4WWL, Jan. 2, 2023,
available at https://www.wwltv.com/article/
news/crime/jpso-facial-recognition-tool-led-to-
mistaken-arrest-lawyer-says/289-558cf26e-8652-
41df-b81d-d69a9a1a2e3e.
68 Khari Johnson, Face Recognition Software Led to His
Arrest. It Was Dead Wrong, WIRED, Feb. 28, 2023,
available at https://www.wired.com/story/face-
recognition-software-led-to-his-arrest-it-was-
dead-wrong/.
69 Matt Cagle, San Francisco — Paying the Price for
Surveillance Without Safeguards, ACLU of Northern
California blog, May 22, 2014, available at https://www. aclunc.org/blog/san-francisco-paying-price-
surveillance-without-safeguards. (Denise Green
successfully sued San Francisco for violation of her civil rights).
70 Charlie Warzel, When License-Plate Surveillance Goes Horribly Wrong, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/opinion/
when-license-plate-surveillance-goes-horribly-
wrong.html.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 41 71 Matt Novak, Cops Terrorize Black Family but Blame License Plate Reader for Misidentifying ‘Stolen’ Vehicle, Gizmodo, Aug. 4, 2020, available at https://gizmodo.com/cops-
terrorize-black-family-but-blame-license-plate-
rea-1844602731.
72 Press Release, MacArthur Just. Ctr., ShotSpotter Generated Over 40,000 Dead-End Police Deployments in Chicago in
21 Months, According to New Study, May 3, 2021, available at https://www.macarthurjustice.org/shotspotter-
generated-over-40000-dead-end-police-
deployments-in-chicago-in-21-months-according-
to-new-study/.
73 Letter from coalition of experts opposed to the Extreme Vetting Initiative to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/Technology%20Experts%20Letter%20
to%20DHS%20Opposing%20the%20Extreme%20
Vetting%20Initiative%20-%2011.15.17.pdf.
74 Matt Cagle, This Surveillance Software is Probably Spying on #BlackLivesMatter, ACLU of Northern California
blog, Dec. 15, 2015, available at https://www.aclunc.
org/blog/surveillance-software-probably-spying-
blacklivesmatter.
75 Alfred Ng, ‘Wholly Ineffective and Pretty Obviously Racist’:

Inside New Orleans’ Struggle with Facial-Recognition
Policing, Politico, 2023, available at https://www.
politico.com/news/2023/10/31/new-orleans-police-
facial-recognition-00121427.
76 Id.; Sneha Singh, New Orleans Police Face Recognition Efforts Fail to Yield Any Arrests in Nine Months, Techstory. in, Jul. 30, 2023, available at https://techstory.in/new- orleans-police-face-recognition-efforts-fail-to-
yield-any-arrests-in-nine-months/.
77 Id.
78 FTC Report Warns About Using Artificial Intelligence to Combat Online Problems, FTC, Jun. 16, 2022, available
at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-
releases/2022/06/ftc-report-warns-about-using-
artificial-intelligence-combat-online-problems.
79 Stephanie T. Nguyen, A Century of Technological Evolution at the Federal Trade Commission, FTC: Tech@FTC blog,
Feb. 17, 2023, available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/ advocacy-research/tech-at-ftc/2023/02/century-
technological-evolution-federal-trade-commission.
80 Alexandra Wigglesworth, Alan Butkovitz: Cop cameras
expose city tech ‘missteps’, Metro Philadelphia, Jun. 21, 2012, available at https://metrophiladelphia.com/alan-
butkovitz-cop-cameras-expose-city-tech-missteps/.
81 Susie Cagle, Weihua Li, & Anastasia Valeeva, Rifles, Tasers and Jails: How Cities and States Spent Billions of COVID-19 Relief, The Marshall Project, Sep. 7, 2022, available at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2022/09/07/
how-federal-covid-relief-flows-to-the-criminal-
justice-system.
82 Susie Cagle, Weihua Li, & Anastasia Valeeva, Rifles, Tasers and Jails: How Cities and States Spent Billions of COVID-19 Relief, The Marshall Project, Sep. 7, 2022, available at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2022/09/07/
how-federal-covid-relief-flows-to-the-criminal-
justice-system.
83 The White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden Issues
Call for State and Local Leaders to Dedicate More American Rescue Plan Funding to Make Our Communities Safer —
And Deploy These Dollars Quickly, Statement posted under Briefing Room (May 13, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/13/
fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-call-for-state-
and-local-leaders-to-dedicate-more-american-
rescue-plan-funding-to-make-our-communities-
safer-and-deploy-these-dollars-quickly/.
84 Susie Cagle, Weihua Li, & Anastasia Valeeva, Rifles, Tasers and Jails: How Cities and States Spent Billions of COVID-19 Relief, The Marshall Project, Sep. 7, 2022, available at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2022/09/07/
how-federal-covid-relief-flows-to-the-criminal-
justice-system.
85 Electronic Privacy Information Center, ARPA Surveillance Funding Table (2023), https://epic.org/wp-content/
uploads/2023/03/EPIC-ARPA-Surveillance-Funding-
Table.pdf.
86 Edna Ruiz, Commission approves gunshot detection system, Macon-Bibb County, Sep. 17, 2021, available at https:// www.maconbibb.us/91721shotspotter/.
87 Thomas Breen, ShotSpotter Expansion Advances, New
Haven Independent, Feb. 15, 2022, available at https:// www.newhavenindependent.org/article/shotspotter_
expansion.
88 Garance Burke, Martha Mendoza, Juliet Linderman
& Michael Tarm, How AI-powered tech landed man
in jail with scant evidence, AP News, Mar. 5, 2022,
available at https://apnews.com/article/artificial-
intelligence-algorithm-technology-police-crime-
7e3345485aa668c97606d4b54f9b6220 .

42 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE 89 Jon Schuppe, Police want a share of pandemic relief funds.

Activists find that ‘offensive.’, NBC News, Jun. 5, 2021, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
police-want-share-pandemic-relief-funds-activists-
find-offensive-n1269494; Ed Lazere, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, Using Federal Relief Funds to Invest in Non-Police Approaches to Public Safety (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/Fed%20
Funds%20for%20Policing%20Alternatives%20
Sept%202021.pdf.
90 Will Kane, Oakland to limit surveillance center to port, airport, S.F. Gate, Mar. 6, 2014, available at https://www.sfgate. com/bayarea/article/Oakland-to-limit-surveillance-
center-to-port-5290273.php.
91 Cyrus Farivar, In rare move, Silicon Valley county gov’t kills stingray acquisition, Ars Technica, May 7, 2015, available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/in-
rare-move-silicon-valley-county-govt-kills-stingray-
acquisition/; San Jose Police Apologizes for Secrecy
Surrounding Purchase of Drone, CBS News Bay Area,
Aug. 15, 2014, available at https://www.cbsnews.com/
sanfrancisco/news/san-jose-police-apologizes-for-
secrecy-surrounding-purchase-of-drone-crime-
privacy-surveillance-drones-unmanned-aerial-
vehicle/.
92 Grace Manthey, Law enforcement agency budgets in U.S. cities, ABC7, available at https://abcotvdata.github.io/ police-budgets/police-budgets-graphs/index.html.
93 Frank Esposito, Amanda Hernandez, & Grace Manthey,
Despite ‘defunding’ claims, police funding has increased in many U.S. cities, ABC7, Oct. 19, 2022, available at https:// abc7.com/where-police-departments-defunded-
how-does-funding-impact-crime-defund-the
budgets/12324846/#:~:text=The%20truth%20is%20
his%20agency’s,million%20%2D%20from%20
2019%20to%202022.
94 Id.
95 Kristin Lam, Sacramento City Council approves more
police funding in $1.4 billion budget, CapRadio, Jun.
15, 2022, available at https://www.capradio.org/
articles/2022/06/15/sacramento-city-council-
approves-more-police-funding-in-14-billion-budget/.
96 Thomas K. Pendergast, Board of Supes Approves $26.8
Million Boost for SFPD, Richmond Review/Sunset Beacon,
Apr. 3, 2023, available at https://sfrichmondreview.
com/2023/04/03/board-of-supes-approves-26-8-
million-boost-for-sfpd/.
97 Philip Bump, Over the past 60 years, more spending on police hasn’t necessarily meant less crime, Wash. Post, Jun. 7, 2020, available at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2020/06/07/over-past-60-years-more-
spending-police-hasnt-necessarily-meant-less-crime/.
98 See Fazaga v. FBI, 844 F.Supp.2d 1022 (C.D. Cal. 2012), https://casetext.com/case/fazaga-v-fed-bureau-of-
investigation-2.
99 NYC settles lawsuits over Muslim surveillance by police, AP News, Jan. 17, 2016, available at https://apnews.
com/article/639c450ac2144dd39b849e4282e824d1.
100 Matt Cagle, San Francisco — Paying the Price for
Surveillance Without Safeguards, ACLU of Northern
California blog, May 22, 2014, available at https://www. aclunc.org/blog/san-francisco-paying-price-
surveillance-without-safeguards; See Tim Cushing,
Another Bogus Hit from a License Plate Reader Results
in Another Citizen Surrounded by Cops with Guns Out,
TechDirt, May 23, 2014, available at https://www.
techdirt.com/articles/20140513/07404127218/
another-bogus-hit-license-plate-reader-results-
another-citizen-surrounded-cops-with-guns-out.
shtml.
101
Peter Hermann, Hack of D.C. police cameras was
part of a ransomware scheme, prosecutors say,
Wash. Post, Jul. 28, 2019, available at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/attack-
on-dc-police-security-cameras-had-broad-
implications/2018/07/24/7ff01d78-8440-11e8-9e80-
403a221946a7_story.html.
102
Jonathan Greig, California town announces data breach
involving police department, loan provider, ZDNET, Jan. 10, 2022, available at https://www.zdnet.com/article/
california-town-announces-extensive-data-breach-
involving-police-department-loan-provider/.
103
See Cal. Civil Code § 1798.29.
104 Geneva Sands, Border Agency Did “not Adequately
Safeguard” Facial Recognition Data, Watchdog
Finds, CNN, 2020, available at https://www.cnn.
com/2020/09/23/politics/customs-border-
protection-data-breach-watchdog-report/index.
html.
105
Security Intelligence, The Cost of a Data Breach
for Government Agencies (Sep. 7, 2022), https://
securityintelligence.com/articles/cost-data-
breach-government-agencies/.
106
International Business Machines Corporation, Cost of
a data breach 2022 (2022), https://www.ibm.com/
reports/data-breach?utm_content=SRCWW&
p1=Search&p4=43700072379268622&p5=p&
gclid=CjwKCAjwv8qkBhAnEiwAkY-ahgoUM_
r9ioky9UgDNIT7wtgz-H92b-0WzHUYVbNMRy62f-
ADUEMUPBoC68EQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds.
107
Symposium, The Value of Privacy, U. Cal.-Hastings School of L. Const. L. Q., Apr. 7, 2014 (oral remarks), available at http://livestre.am/4P7Lk.

SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 43 108 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), https://casetext.com/case/united-
states-v-jones-337; id. at 957 (Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment); Riley v.

California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (Roberts, C. J., Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, concurring), https://supreme.justia.
com/cases/federal/us/573/373/; id at 404 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgement);
Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018), https:// www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-
402#writing-16-402_OPINION_3 .
109
Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018), https:// www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-
402#writing-16-402_OPINION_3.
110
Press Release, Federal Appeals Court Rules Baltimore
Aerial Surveillance Program Is Unconstitutional, American Civil Liberties Union, Jun. 24, 2021, available at https:// www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-appeals-
court-rules-baltimore-aerial-surveillance-program-
unconstitutional.
111
Pole Cameras Require a Warrant in Massachusetts,
Simons Law Office blog, Sep. 19, 2020, available at
https://www.jbsimonslaw.com/pole-cameras-
require-a-warrant-in-massachusetts-state-courts/
.
112 Jennifer Lynch, First Appellate Court Finds Geofence Warrant Unconstitutional, EFF: Deeplinks blog,
Apr. 24, 2023, available at https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2023/04/first-us-appellate-court-
decide-finds-geofence-warrant-unconstitutional.
113
Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Proposed Amendments
to Cal. Const. with Arguments to Voters (Nov. 7, 1972), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/
Ballot%20Argument%20ACA%2051.pdf.
114
White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774 (1975), https://
law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-
court/3d/13/757.html.
115
White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774 (1975), https://
law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-
court/3d/13/757.html.
116
Cal. Const. Art. I, Sec. 2.
117 Palko v. Connecticut, 7302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), https:// supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/302/319/.
118 585 U.S. 296 (2018)
119 Joann Pan, FBI Turns Off 3000 GPS Devices After Ruling, Mashable, Feb. 27, 2012, available at http://mashable.
com/2012/02/27/fbi-turns-off-3000-gps-devices/.
120 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), https:// supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/389/347/.
121 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/
text/16-402#writing-16-402_OPINION_ .
122
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014), https:// supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/373/.
123 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955, 56 (2012), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-
jones-337.
124
White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757 (1975), https://law.justia. com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/757.
html.
125
People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373 (1985), https://law.justia. com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/41/373.
html.
126
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1979) (holding that, under the California Constitution, members of the public have a legal right to pass out
pamphlets and seek signatures in a privately-owned
shopping center), aff’d, .447 U.S. 74 (1980), https://
casetext.com/case/robins-v-pruneyard-shopping-
center.
127
Cal. Penal Code §§ 1546-1546.4, https://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.
xhtml?sectionNum=1546.&lawCode=PEN; www.
aclunc.org/calecpa.
128
Cal Civil Code § 1798.90.55 (ALPR), https://law.
justia.com/codes/california/2022/code-civ/
division-3/part-4/title-1-81-23/section-1798-90-
55/#:~:text=.55%20(2022)-,1798.90.,agency%20
before%20implementing%20the%20program;
Cal Govt Code §53166 (cell phone surveillance),
https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/government-code/
gov-sect-53166/; Cal Govt Code § 7070 et. seq.
(military equipment), https://casetext.com/statute/
california-codes.california-government-code.
title-1-general.division-7-miscellaneous.chapter-
128-funding-acquisition-and-use-of-military-
equipment.section-7070-definition#:~:text=(c)%20
%22Military%20equipment%22,specifically%20
excluded%20from%20this%20subdivision.
129
Cal Civil Code § 1798.90.55, https://law.justia.com/
codes/california/2022/code-civ/division-3/part-4/
title-1-81-23/section-1798-90-55/#:~:text=.55%20
(2022)-,1798.90.,agency%20before%20
implementing%20the%20program.
130
See Lagleva v. Doyle (License Plate Surveillance), ACLU of Northern California, Jun. 2, 2022, available at https:// www.aclunc.org/our-work/legal-docket/lagleva-v-
doyle-license-plate-surveillance; Matthew Guariglia,
Judge Upends Vallejo’s Use of a Stingray, Oct. 2, 2020, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/10/judge-
upends-vallejos-use-stingray.

44 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE 131 California Activists Sue Marin County Sheriff for Illegally Sharing Drivers’ License Plate Data With ICE, CBP, and
Other Out-of-State Agencies, ACLU of Northern California, Oct. 14, 2021, available at https://www.aclunc.org/
news/california-activists-sue-marin-county-sheriff-
illegally-sharing-drivers-license-plate-data-ice.
132
See, e.g., Nicole Ozer, VICTORY! Santa Clara County
Abandons Plans to Purchase a Stingray, ACLU of
Northern California, May 6, 2015, available at https:// www.aclunc.org/blog/victory-santa-clara-county-
abandons-plans-purchase-stingray; https://www.
aclunc.org/blog/californians-are-winning-fight-
against-secret-surveillance; Bonnie Eslinger, Menlo
Park Council Approves Ordinance Regulating Police Use
of Surveillance, San Jose Mercury News, May 14, 2014,
available at http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-
news/ci_25766277/menlo-park-council-approves-
ordinance-regulating-police-use; Seattle City Council
Enacts Groundbreaking Legislation Protecting Residents’ Civil Liberties, Local Progress, May 1, 2013, available at http://localprogress.org/seattle-city-council-enacts-
groundbreaking-legislation-protecting-residents-
civil-liberties/.
133
Keynote address of Malkia Cyril, Targeted Surveillance, Civil Rights, and the Fight for Democracy, Center for Media Justice, Oct. 13, 2015, available at https://mediajustice. org/news/targeted-surveillance-civil-rights-and-the-
fight-for-democracy/.
134
Aldo Toledo, Critics attack Breed’s billionaire-backed police ballot measure as dangerous to public, SF Chronicle, Feb. 22, 2024, available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/sf/
article/breed-police-ballot-measure-18682557.php.
135 Kim M. Reynolds, Rashida Richardson: Oral Histories of Surveillance, Our Data Bodies (Aug. 24, 2020), available at https://www.odbproject.org/2020/08/26/rashida-
richardson-oral-histories-of-surveillance/.
136
John Salonga, San Jose: Police Apologize for Drone
Secrecy, Promise Transparency, San Jose Mercury News,
Aug. 5, 2014, available at https://www.mercurynews.
com/2014/08/05/san-jose-police-apologize-for-
drone-secrecy-promise-transparency/.
137
Matt Cagle & Jennifer Jones, With Our Rights Under Attack, We Can’t Let SFPD Exploit Private Surveillance Cameras, ACLU of Northern California blog, Jul. 8, 2022, available at With Our Rights Under Attack, We Can’t Let SFPD
Exploit Private Surveillance Cameras | ACLU of
Northern CA (aclunc.org).
138
Justin Phillips, Oakland residents are heavily surveilled.

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SEEING THROUGH SURVEILLANCE: Why Policymakers Should Look Past the Hype • 45 147 Harvey Gee, “Bang!”: ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection
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46 • ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA • ONLINE AT ACLUNC.ORG/SEETHROUGHTHEHYPE 163 Letter from coalition of experts opposed to the Extreme Vetting Initiative to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security
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July 22, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
TO: Santa Rosa Public Safety Subcommittee
CC: Santa Rosa City Council (Mayor Natalie Rogers, Vice Mayor Mark Stapp, Council Member Eddie Alvarez, Council Member Dianna MacDonald, Council Member Victoria Fleming, Council Member Chris Rogers, Council Member Jeff Okrepkie) CC: Chief John Cregan, Santa Rosa Police Department
Re: Item 6.2, Real Time Crime Center, Public Safety Subcommittee meeting on July 23, 2024
Dear Mayor Rogers and City Councilmembers:

On behalf of the Sonoma County Chapter of the ACLU of Northern California (“ACLU NorCal Sonoma County Chapter” or “our chapter” or “ACLU”), I submit public comments on agenda item 6.2, “Real Time Crime Center” of the Santa Rosa Public Safety Subcommittee meeting on July 23, 2024.

The Previous Meeting with Police Chief John Cregan
The Sonoma County Chapter of the ACLU of Northern California is writing this letter to express our opposition to the proposed Real Time Crime Center, and to object to a misrepresentation made by the Santa Rosa Police Department (“SRPD”) regarding the ACLU.

Chief Cregan’s Staff Report suggests that SRPD met with our organization in December 2023 to discuss the matter before you today; however, that meeting was actually about the ACLU-NorCal Sonoma County Chapter’s proposal for the city to adopt a Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance which would limit the exact type of Orwellian surveillance practices that a Real Time Crime Center (whichwas not 1 mentioned once at that meeting) would facilitate. When we met with him on December 5, Chief Cregan seemed receptive to our proposal, and indicated that we may have an opportunity to present a draft of our proposed Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance at the July Public Safety Subcommittee meeting.

Instead, on the agenda before you is the polar opposite, and we staunchly oppose establishment of a vast citywide surveillance network in the Real Time Crime Center.

We object to any impression that the ACLU was consulted about the Real Time Crime Center.

Establishment of the Real Time Crime Center
We recognize your responsibility as elected leaders to maintain safety in our community.

However, we have serious concerns with plans to utilize a wide range of surveillance technologies as part of the Real Time Crime Center.

The evidence is clear that while surveillance has increased exponentially, public safety has not. On the contrary, surveillance systems often make people less safe, especially for groups that have historically been in the government’s crosshairs. Modern surveillance technology makes it possible for the government to track who we are, where we go, what we do, and who we know. It fuels hightech profiling and perpetuates systems of biased policing. It facilitates deportations, chills speech, and imperils the rights of activists, religious minorities, and people who need reproductive and gender-affirming care.1
Surveillance systems fuel racial injustice. In a nation where police interactions with the public all too frequently turn dangerous, surveillance systems can exacerbate and magnify these problems, increasing the risk of unnecessary government scrutiny, in-person encounters, and violence. Again and again, police have used surveillance systems to create inaccurate and discriminatory watchlists, engage in discriminatory stops and searches, and upend people’s lives. Surveillance technologies amplify the over-policing of Black and Brown communities.

Surveillance endangers immigrant communities, and this fact should be of particular concern for us in Santa Rosa. Across the United States, federal immigration agencies 1We encourage you to read the ACLU’s new report, “SEEINGSURVEILLANCE: THROUGH WHY POLICYMAKERS SHOULD LOOK PASTTHE HYPE,” available at
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/Seeing_Through_Surveillance__Report_Web.pdf. 2 have eagerly exploited local databases rich with information collected by private data brokers, municipal agencies, and police departments. This information is fed into a deportation machine that tears apart immigrant communities. In recent years, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has further expanded its reach into communities by exploiting local surveillance systems and databases to track, identify, and target immigrant community members for detention and deportation. No local surveillance system is safe from ICE’s demands.

Surveillance is frequently ineffective and can lead to life-altering mistakes. Surveillance technology may malfunction in truly tragic ways. Operators cannot be relied upon to catch errors, and, in practice, they have not. In San Francisco, the police relied on a license plate reader scan that erroneously flagged a 47-year-old Black woman’s red car as a stolen grey truck. She was improperly stopped, forced to exit her vehicle, handcuffed, and held at gunpoint by four officers.2
We are living in a time where abortion and gender-affirming care is being criminalized in some states, and there is a real threat that surveillance information collected in communities will be exploited to identify, track, and criminalize people who travel for care and the Californians who are helping those people obtain care.3Deploying surveillance systems in our community may fill databases with information that place people at risk. Even if there are limits to sharing information, once this information is collected, there is no foolproof way to immunize it from legal demands brought by out-of-state governments.

The community, not the police, must be the leader in any decision about the acquisition or use of surveillance technology. Those who may be most impacted need to know when and why surveillance is being considered, what it is intended to do, and what it will cost them — both in dollars, and in their rights. And they need to be empowered to limit or reject surveillance if the costs outweigh the benefits. 3Alabama’s attorney general says the state can prosecute those who help women travel for abortions, AP News, Aug. 31, 2023, available at https://apnews.com/
article/alabama-abortion-steve-marshall2157a7d0bfad02aad1ca41e61fe4de33. 2Matt Cagle, San Francisco —Paying the Price for Surveillance Without Safeguards, ACLU of Northern California blog, May 22, 2014, available at https://www. aclunc.org/blog/san-francisco-paying-pricesurveillance-without-safeguards. (Denise Green successfully sued San Francisco for violation of her civil rights).
3 Utilization of Surveillance Technologies
Chief Cregan’s presentation to the Public Safety Subcommittee names these programs and tools as part of the Real Time Crime Center: automated license plate readers, surveillance cameras, computer aided dispatch system, records management system, drones, fleet and body worn cameras, and gunshot detection software. We oppose deployment of many of these types of technologies and together, it creates a vast surveillance network able to monitor the everyday movements of law-abiding community members. We call attention to specific tools named in Chief Cregan’s presentation.

First, automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) are a powerful surveillance system that can be used to invade the privacy of individuals and violate the rights of entire communities. ALPR systems collect and store location information about drivers whose cars pass through ALPR cameras’ fields of view, which, along with the date and time of capture, can be built into a database that reveals sensitive details about where individuals work, live, associate, worship, seek medical care, and travel.4 ALPR systems are easily misused to harm marginalized communities.5As with other surveillance technologies, police often deploy license plate readers in poor and historically overpoliced areas, regardless of crime rates.6When placed in fixed locations, ALPRs essentially create checkpoints throughout a city that log and monitor 6Dave Maass and Jeremy Gillula,What You Can Learn from Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIERFOUND., Jan. 21, 2015,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data; Barton Gellman and Sam Adler-Bell, The Disparate Impact of Surveillance, THECENTURYFOUND., Dec. 21, 2017, https://tcf.org/content/report/disparate-impact-surveillance/; see also, e.g., Kaveh Waddell,How License-Plate Readers Have Helped Police and Lenders Target the Poor, T HEATLANTIC, Apr. 22, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-have-helped-police-an d-lenders-target-the-poor/479436/(summarizing data indicating that Oakland Police Department deployed ALPRs “disproportionately often in low-income areas and in neighborhoods with high concentrations of African-American and Latino residents”).
5 See, e.g., Angel Diaz & Rachel Levinson-Waldman,Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use, BRENNAN CRT. FORJUST., Sept. 10, 2020, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-an d-policy-recommendations;Matt Cagle,San Francisco – Paying the Price for Surveillance Without Safeguards, ACLU OF. NORTHERNCAL., May 22, 2014,
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/san-francisco-paying-price-surveillance-without-safeguards. 4 See, e.g., Automatic License Plate Readers, ELECTRONICFRONTIERFOUND., March 29, 2023, https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/automated-license-plate-readers; You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements, AM. CIV. LIBERTIESUNION, July 2013, https://www.aclu.org/documents/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record- americans-movements
4 where residents go and when, threatening their freedom of movement and potentially reinforcing historical patterns of neighborhood segregation.7When mounted to police cars, ALPRs turn those vehicles into mobile surveillance machines that indiscriminately capture the driving information of passersby. Such surveillance can amplify racial and economic disparities in our policing and incarceration systems, and also has serious psychological consequences.8
Research from California and around the world on video surveillance has repeatedly shown that it has limited efficacy on crime.9A 2019 systemic review of 40 years of video surveillance showed that it has had “no significant effects” in combating violent crime.10 Surveillance camera programs have a significant impact on privacy. Twenty-four-hour video monitoring of public spaces gives the government a vast quantity of information on private citizens that would otherwise be unavailable, allowing it to monitor people engaging in wholly innocent and constitutionally protected behavior.

We are also concerned that unmanned aerial devices (drones) increase the government’s surveillance power in newly invasive ways. This is in part because drones eliminate traditional practical barriers that have prevented continuous and routine aerial surveillance: for example, unlike a traditional manned helicopter or aircraft, drones are smaller, cheaper to acquire and operate, and easier for humans to fly without advanced skill. Drones can fly lower, more quietly, and navigate private spaces in ways unlike traditional aircraft. The technological advances of drones lower the cost of surveillance, removing a natural existing deterrent to continued and abusive surveillance.

Drones also give police an unprecedented ability to monitor people going about their lives. Small, hovering platforms, drones can explore hidden spaces or peer into windows. They can be equipped with high powered, night-vision cameras. Vendors may 10Eric L. Piza, Brandon C. Welsh, David P. Farrington, & Amanda L. Thomas, “CCTV surveillance for crime prevention. A 40-year systematic with meta-analysis,” Criminology & Public Policy 18, no. 1 (2019). https:// academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1275&context=jj_pubs. 9Nicole Ozer, Studies and Articles on Video Surveillance, ACLU of Northern California blog, Jul. 31, 2007, available at https://www.aclunc.org/blog/studies-and-articlesvideo-surveillance. 8Chris Chambers,NSA and GCHQ: The Flawed Psychology of Government Mass Surveillance, T HE GUARDIAN, August 26, 2013,
https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2013/aug/26/nsa-gchq-psychology-government-mas s-surveillance
7Laura Schenker, David Sylvan, Jean-Louis Arcand, and Ravi Bhavnani,Segregation and ‘Out-of-Placeness’: The Direct Effect of Neighborhood Racial Composition on Police Stops, POLITICAL RESEARCHQUARTERLY, April 2023,https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231171516. 5 also offer video analytics or biometric surveillance software intended to recognize and track specific people, events, and objects. With a drone, police agencies can more easily watch people without their knowledge and record detailed information about people at home, at protests, and at religious gatherings. An agency may also seek to coordinate multiple drones into swarms that scoop up information and create a system of comprehensive neighborhood surveillance.

Gunshot detection systems, such as ShotSpotter, are flawed in methodology and effectiveness.11The surveillance technology frequently fails to work, confusing gunshots with other noises, and its errors have put innocent people in jail.12Studies of the systems in both San Diego and Chicago both found errors and that they often led to “dead-end” police deployments — in San Diego, 60% of officer dispatches to the scene of the gunshot microphone failed to uncover anything, and in Chicago, the system generated over 40,000 dead-end police deployments.13Not only do the dead-end deployments waste resources that could be used more effectively, but gunshot detection microphones also create a “false technological justification” for overpolicing and contribute to wrongful stop-and-frisks.14Rather than supporting public safety, they “increase the frequency of police interactions, which also increases the risk of Black Americans becoming the victims of police brutality or harassment.”15Instead of throwing money at gunshot detection microphones, some experts point to properly designed violence reduction strategies as a much more effective public safety intervention. 15Harvey Gee, “Bang!”: ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Technology, Predictive Policing, and Measuring Terry’s Reach, 55 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 767 (2022), https:// repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol55/iss4/3. 14Press Release, MacArthur Just. Ctr., ShotSpotter Generated Over 40,000 Dead-End Police Deployments in Chicago in 21 Months, According to New Study, May 3, 2021, https://www.macarthurjustice.org/
shotspotter-generated-over-40000-dead-endpolice-deployments-in-chicago-in-21-monthsaccording-to-ne w-study/.
13Kara Grant, ShotSpotter Sensors Send SDPD Officers to False Alarms More Often Than Advertised, Voice of San Diego, Sep. 22, 2020, available at http:// voiceofsandiego.org/2020/09/22/shotspottersensors-send-sdpd-officers-to-false-alarms-moreoften-than-a dvertised/.
12Garance Burke, Martha Mendoza, Juliet Linderman, & Michael Tarm, How AI-powered tech landed man in jail with scant evidence, AP News, Mar. 5, 2022, available at https://apnews.com/article/artificial-intelligencealgorithm-technology-police-crime-7e3345485aa6 68c97606d4b54f9b6220.
11Russell Contreras, Critics say gunshot-detection technology often doesn’t work, Axios, Apr. 9, 2022, available at https://www.axios.com/2022/04/07/ campaign-zero-against-shotspotter-crime. 6 Surveillance Requires Oversight
Any government use of surveillance must include proper oversight and accountability to protect individuals’ rights and liberties and to maintain the critical trust that should exist between law enforcement and the community. For this reason, we drafted a Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance, which has already been adopted by the City of Sebastopol and which we urge the City of Santa Rosa to adopt as well.

Such an ordinance – which was the actual purpose of the ACLU’s previous meeting with Chief Cregan – creates transparent processes which allow law enforcement to obtain and renew approval for the use of certain surveillance devices including in exigent circumstances, while restricting unnecessary and problematic uses and practices.

A copy of Sebastopol’s Surveillance Technology & Community Safety Ordinance, now codified atChapter 8.80 of the Sebastopol Municipal Code, is attached here as an exhibit for reference.

Alternatives to Surveillance That Produce Public Safety Results As policy-makers, we encourage you to look into and invest in alternatives to surveillance that are proven to increase public safety. Investing in the physical lighting of a neighborhood, rather than installing more cameras, can reap community-wide benefits. Community activists in California have highlighted Oakland’s lighting ordinance as an example that streetlights not only prevent crime but also make neighborhoods feel safer.16
Speed bumps and other traffic calming techniques have been shown to be effective for traffic safety,17can be utilized for a fraction of the cost of cameras (less than $10,000 for a speed bump, while speeding and red-light cameras can cost $80,000 per 17Iowa State University, Temporary Speed Hump Impact Evaluation, Final Report (Jul. 2022), https://nacto.org/ docs/usdg/temporary_speed_humps_impact_ evaluation_hallmark.pdf. 16Pacific Institute, Streetlights and Community Safety (2009), https://pacinst.org/wp-content/ uploads/2013/02/streetlights3.pdf.
7 intersection),18and do not infringe on privacy by collecting and retaining information about community members.

Above, we detailed our concerns with gunshot detection systems. We understand the need to implement policies to reduce gun violence in our community. Gun buyback programs focus on a core problem — the prevalence of guns — and have been extremely effective in taking guns off the street and in mobilizing communities to examine their stances on gun control.19
A growing body of research also suggests that greenery like grass and trees, not tracking devices and surveillance, may make cities safer. Research in Philadelphia in 2018 found that vacant lots that were “cleaned and greened” — for a cost of just $5 per square meter — had statistically significant reductions in overall crime and burglaries over a 38-month period, including a 29% percent drop in gun violence in neighborhoods below the poverty line.20The researchers extrapolated that if the intervention was scaled across the entire city, it could translate to more than 350 fewer shootings each year.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we oppose the creation of the proposed Real Time Crime Center at this juncture. Instead, we encourage the City of Santa Rosa to adopt an ordinance that would impose reasonable checks and balances on law enforcement’s use of surveillance in order to protect civil rights and liberties. We also strongly object to any 20Jackie Flynn Mogensen, The Surprising Science of Fighting Crime With…Trees, Mother Jones, 2019, available at https://www.motherjones.com/
environment/2019/04/trees-crime-cincinnatiphiladelphia-ida-b-wells-chicago/. 19J.B. Wogan, Cities Rethink Gun Buyback Programs, Governing, Feb. 27, 2023, available at https://www. governing.com/archive/gov-cities-rethink-gunbuyback-programs.html; Helen Webley-Brown, Anna Sipek, Katie Buoymaster, Juilee Shivalkar, Will Owen, & Eleni Manis, Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, ShotSpotter and the Misfires of Gunshot Technology (Jul. 14, 2022), https://static1.squarespace.com/ static/5c1bfc7eee175995a4ceb638/t/62cc83c 0118f7a1e018bf162/1657570241282/2022.7.7_ ShotSpotter+Report_FINAL.pdf; Harvey Gee, “Bang!”:

ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Technology, Predictive Policing, and Measuring Terry’s Reach, 55 U.

Mich. J. L. Reform 767 (2022), https://repository.law. umich.edu/mjlr/vol55/iss4/3. 18Implementation costs for automated red light camera systems range from $67,000 to $80,000 per intersection, Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office, Sep. 30, 2003, available at https:// www.itskrs.its.dot.gov/its/benecost.nsf/ ID/2b209ad2c5ad2ab985256db10045892b; Mark Lazzaretto, City Manager, City of San Gabriel, Staff Report: City-Wide Speed Hump Policy Consideration (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.sangabrielcity.com/ DocumentCenter/View/11543/Item-6A--City-WideSpeed-Hump-Policy. 8 implication that the ACLU was consulted with, or approved of, a Real Time Crime Center.

Respectfully,
The Sonoma County Chapter of the ACLU of Northern California 9 From: Bolla, Rhonda
To: Public Safety Subcommittee Comment
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] 7/23/24 meeting item 6.2 public comment Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2024 3:22:10 PM

From: Petal Conlon < >
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2024 5:14 PM
To: _CityCouncilListPublic <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] 7/23/24 meeting item 6.2 public comment

Hello Santa Rosa city council,

I am a resident of Sonoma County and frequent visitor of Santa Rosa. Many services and social events that don’t exist in my town I venture into Santa Rosa for. I am reaching out to you to please not go along with the creation of a “Real time crime center”. Our community does not need or want this level of surveillance. This does not increase safety and it threatens our rights to privacy! Please put money into services that prevent crime- affordable housing, free public transit, education, food programs, low cost healthcare…. To name a few.

Thank you for your consideration,
Petal

Public Safety SubcommitteeJuly 23, 2024

Public Safety Subcommittee
July 23, 2024