Agenda packet — Glendale City Council, October 20, 2026 (part 24 of 29)

June 2, 2026
Planning Commission & CDD Staff Comments submitted via email 633 East Broadway, Room 105 to Case Planner, Roger Kiesel Glendale, CA 91206 & Planning Commission
RE: 3411-3437 Foothill Blvd, Glendale PLEASE INCLUDE THESE COMMENTS AT THE FORMAL PROCEEDING.

Dear Planning Commission & Staff,
The Crescenta Valley Community Association (CVCA) is a cross-jurisdictional, volunteer organization that represents the valley with one voice in matters of preserving our historical structures, monitoring and encouraging thoughtful building design, and promoting open space to maintain and enhance our suburban quality of life. Our main objectives as an association are to protect our limited resources and infrastructures through responsible growth policies; to encourage development that is compatible, preserves our historic structures and our rural community; and to ensure open space is protected and valued as a necessity for the quality of life in the Crescenta Valley area. The CVCA welcomes participation from all stakeholders in Sunland-Tujunga, Glendale, La Crescenta, Montrose and La Cañada Flintridge.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this project.

The Crescenta Valley Community Association has thoroughly reviewed the above referenced Density Bonus Case #PDBP-005269-2025. Based on the information presented during the public hearing on March 18, 2026 and written within the Decision Letter dated March 25, 2026, the CVCA supports the appeal documents submitted by the Crescenta Highlands Neighborhood Association.

It is the opinion of our membership based on available information, public testimony, and support documents submitted by the CHNA, that the City of Glendale Planning Hearing Officer:
1) Did not acknowledge that the project could present a specific adverse threat to public health or safety of the apartment residents and/or community
2) Failed to consider the limitations of narrow two-lane streets, such as New York Avenue, for emergency evacuation due to fire, flood, or earthquake
3) Dismissed the community concerns that the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone located just north of the project location could create an indirect exposure zone at the project site, dropping embers on the structures in high winds
4) Did not consider that significant excavation of the project site could trigger a breach in the underground water reservoir in New York Park, immediately adjacent to the project location, resulting in potential flood and debris-flow danger to residents in the apartments and those south and below the project
3300 of 5188

Page 2 of 2 ends

5) Assumed that provisions of AB 130 made this project exempt from CEQA when, in fact, this project will present a specific adverse threat to public health and safety which qualifies it as necessary If the Planning Commission does not grant the appeal on the grounds of the evacuation danger posed by a project of this size, it should find that the project is subject to CEQA and order an Environmental Impact Report with the costs of mitigation to be borne by the developer.

Thank you for your consideration,
Sincerely,
Lisa Morris, CVCA Steering Committee Member & Resident of Glendale, California [email protected]
3301 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:48 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd.,
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: George Garikian <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 3:15 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd.,
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Hello Roger,
My name is George Garikian, I work in Glendale, own commercial properties in the vicinity and am familiar with this project's location and area. Additionally, I have multiple friends that live in the area. I strongly advocate for this 87 unit complex.

This area has been underdeveloped and underutilized for many years and needs new development.

Located on a commercially zoned street, this project is appropriate for its size, nature and magnitude. This is corroborated by how the City of Los Angeles also plans for projects of this size on major corridors.

The project’s design is visually appealing and would greatly enhance the area’s aesthetic. Wood accents, landscaping, and a cohesive color palette are key elements of this project.

As we are all aware, there is a significant housing shortage in this area, and this project would provide much-needed housing that is also affordable. I drive regularly on this street and feel the traffic is of no concern. In addtiion, the location of the project on Foothill Blvd., eliminates concerns about emergency evacuations, as it is not a narrow, single-lane road.

For years the park behind this project has been underutilized and I think the influx of residents from this project will revitalize the park as well as many businesses in the area.

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2 This project will not block any views of the mountains. In fact, it maximizes views by incorporating balconies and patio spaces on the upper floors.

In conclusion, I believe this is a unique project in an area that has seen no significant development in years. This project's progress has been held up for a long time and it is time that it is approved so that we can meet the mandated housing goals that we all agree to and believe in.

Thank you.

George Garikian
3303 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:10 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: hovik hmkcpa.net <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 3:26 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

PROPOSED PROJECT: 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd.
87 apartment Units ( 23 x 1 bedrooms — 46 x 2 bedrooms — 18 x 3 bedrooms) My Name is Hovik Khaloian and I am a long term resident of City of Glendale and have lived in the city since 1979, I am writing this email in support of the above referenced project::

The area where the proposed project is located is in need of new developments and is currently severely underutilized and the project is a unique product for the area that has not seen any significant development in years.

There is a significant housing shortage in this area, and this project would provide much-needed housing and will also provide affordable housing.

The project’s design is visually appealing and would enhance the area’s aesthetic. Landscaping, wood accents, and a cohesive color palette are key elements.

The project will not create any concerns for traffic.

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2 The businesses in the area will benefit from increased foot traffic due to the new residents.

The project does not block any views of the mountains.

The project’s location is on Foothill Blvd which eliminates any concerns about emergency evacuations.

Respectfully yours,
Hovik Khaloian, CPA
3305 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:47 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: Robert Babayan <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:26 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

I am in support of 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD project for 87 Apartment Units ( 23 x 1 bedrooms — 46 x 2 bedrooms — 18 x 3 bedrooms)
I live in Glendale and familiar with location, we will need affordable housing in this area.

Overall, this is a unique product for the area that has not seen any significant development in years.

Best Regards,
Robert Babayan
You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3306 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:08 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: Sarkis Khajarian <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 3:29 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

To Whom It May Concern,
I am a Glendale resident and am writing to express my support for the proposed development at 3411- 3427 Foothill Boulevard.

Having spent considerable time in this area, I believe this project would be a positive addition to the community. The site is currently underutilized, and Foothill Boulevard is an appropriate location for new residential development. Glendale, like many communities throughout Southern California, continues to face a shortage of housing options, and projects such as this help address a growing need while making productive use of existing commercial corridors.

I was also impressed by the project's architectural design. The combination of landscaping, modern materials, and thoughtful design elements would improve the appearance of the area and create a more welcoming streetscape. Rather than detracting from the neighborhood, I believe it would enhance it.

In addition, new residents would bring increased activity and support to nearby businesses, helping strengthen the local economy and encourage further investment along Foothill Boulevard. The added You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3307 of 5188
2 population could also increase use of nearby public amenities and contribute to a more vibrant community.

Overall, I believe this is the type of well-planned development Glendale should encourage. It provides much-needed housing, improves an underutilized property, and contributes positively to the surrounding area. I respectfully urge you to support and approve this project.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,
Sarkis Khajarian
Glendale Resident
3308 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:53 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: Support for 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd Project Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: Shahan Kemanjian <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 1:44 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: Support for 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd Project
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Hello,
I am lifelong resident of Glendale and I am writing to you today because I want to express my full support of the project that is proposed for 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd. I can say objectively that it has never been more difficult to find affordable housing in our city, especially as all the new buildings being built are clearly for those who are in the upper-middle class groups. Thus, we are literally pricing out hard working residents and families from having better living situations. This isn’t the Glendale that I grew up in. This is why I feel so strongly in support of this project. It is the perfect time to make this sort of change in order to help better the future for our community.

I understand that some are feigning concern over traffic issues, but to be quite honest; Glendale’s traffic situation as a whole is much, much more concerning than a single area that would help benefit the entire city. So perhaps those individuals should focus on the issue as a whole than trying to use that excuse to stop close to 100 people from having affordable housing. This initiative will help the businesses in the area, it will help the nearby parks, and it will help Glendale be what Glendale should be. A community for all to have a happy, comfortable life within.

Please do the right thing and choose the people first in this situation.

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2 Thank you.
3310 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 5:07 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: Foothill Blvd. Density Bonus Project #PAPP-006680-2026 FYI
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: miller time <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 4:06 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: Foothill Blvd. Density Bonus Project #PAPP-006680-2026 CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Hello,
I'm writing today regarding the large apartment complex that is proposed for the corner of Foothill & New York, project #PAPP-006680-2026.

Let me start by saying, I use NY avenue every day. It's already gotten so much worse since Clark Magnet HS began. While I totally appreciate the use of buses at Clark, there's a lot of traffic already added to the area due to the many busses plus the school traffic that doesn't use the bus. Now it's being proposed to add a huge apartment complex?! Are you kidding me? This will only compound the traffic problems at this intersection.

After the Altadena fires, I'm also very concerned about our exit routes by potentially adding a whole lot of people and cars to that intersection.

I'm also very opposed to granting such a large and tall apartment complex to Foothill Boulevard. This is not at all consistent with the current look and feel of the area. We chose to live here because we like the quieter area. We don't want huge apartment complexes added. It will definitely decrease our quality of life and that's not right. I'm assuming if this project goes forward; it's just a matter of time before Foothill You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3311 of 5188
2 looks like downtown Glendale with so many apartments and condos. We don't want that, which is why we live here.

I hope you'll listen to those of us who live in this community and drive Foothill and New York every single day.

Thanks,
Tammy & Scott Miller
3312 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: James Lloyd <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 8:54 AM
To: Planning Commission
Cc: Abajian, Suzie; Wong, Jack; Golanian, Roubik; Garcia, Michael J.

Subject: Re: public comment re item 7a for tonight's Planning Commission meeting Attachments: Glendale - 3411-3427 Foothill Boulevard - HAA.pdf CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Please see attached a corrected version of our public comment regarding the proposed 87-unit housing development project at 3411-3427 Foothill Boulevard, which includes 9 very low income units, calendared as item 7a for tonight's Planning Commission meeting.

Please substitute this version for our previously submitted comment letter.

Dear Glendale Planning Commission,
The California Housing Defense Fund (CalHDF) submits the attached public comment re item 7a for tonight's Planning Commission meeting, the proposed 87-unit housing development project at 3411- 3427, which includes 9 very low income units.

Sincerely,
James M. Lloyd
Director of Planning and Investigations
California Housing Defense Fund
[email protected]
CalHDF is grant & donation funded
Donate today - https://calhdf.org/donate/
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Jun 3, 2026
City of Glendale
613 E. Broadway
Glendale, CA 91206
Re: Proposed Housing Development Project at 3411- 3427 Foothill Boulevard To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Dear Glendale Planning Commission,
The California Housing Defense Fund (CalHDF) submits this letter to remind the City of its obligation to abide by all relevant state laws when evaluating the proposed 87-unit housing development project at 3411-3427 Foothill Boulevard, which includes 9 very low income units. These laws include the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), the Density Bonus Law (DBL), and AB 130.

The HAA provides the project legal protections. It requires approval of zoning and general plan compliant housing development projects unless findings can be made regarding specific, objective, written health and safety hazards. (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subds. (d), (j).) The HAA also bars cities from imposing conditions on the approval of such projects that would render the project infeasible (id. at subd. (d)) or reduce the project’s density (id. at subd. (j)) unless, again, such written findings are made. As a development with at least two-thirds of its area devoted to residential uses, the project falls within the HAA’s ambit, and it complies with local zoning code and the City’s general plan. Increased density, concessions, and waivers that a project is entitled to under the DBL (Gov. Code, § 65915) do not render the project noncompliant with the zoning code or general plan, for purposes of the HAA (Gov.

Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(3)).The HAA’s protections therefore apply, and the City may not reject the project except based on health and safety standards, as outlined above.

Furthermore, if the City rejects the project or impairs its feasibility, it must conduct “a thorough analysis of the economic, social, and environmental effects of the action.” (Id. at subd. (b).)
2201 Broadway, PH1, Oakland, CA 94612
www.calhdf.org
3314 of 5188
CalHDF also writes to emphasize that the DBL offers the proposed development certain protections. The City must respect these protections. In addition to granting the increase in residential units allowed by the DBL, the City must not deny the project the proposed waivers and concessions with respect to three concessions/incentives to deviate from lot coverage, floor area ratio, height standards, residential units on the first floor, open space, and underground parking. If the City wishes to deny requested waivers, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (e)(1) requires findings that the waivers would have a specific, adverse impact upon health or safety, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific adverse impact. If the City wishes to deny requested concessions, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (d)(1) requires findings that the concessions would not result in identifiable and actual cost reductions, that the concessions would have a specific, adverse impact on public health or safety, or that the concessions are contrary to state or federal law. The City, if it makes any such findings, bears the burden of proof. (Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (d)(4).) Of note, the DBL specifically allows for a reduction in required accessory parking in addition to the allowable waivers and concessions. (Id. at subd. (p).) Additionally, the California Court of Appeal has ruled that when an applicant has requested one or more waivers and/or concessions pursuant to the DBL, the City “may not apply any development standard that would physically preclude construction of that project as designed, even if the building includes ‘amenities’ beyond the bare minimum of building components.” (Bankers Hill150 v. City of San Diego (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 755, 775.)
Furthermore, the project is eligible for a statutory exemption from environmental review pursuant to AB 130 (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.66). Caselaw from the California Court of Appeal affirms that local governments err, and may be sued, when they improperly refuse to grant a project a CEQA exemption or streamlined CEQA review to which it is entitled. (Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 890, 911.) As you are well aware, California remains in the throes of a statewide crisis-level housing shortage. New housing such as this is a public benefit: by providing affordable housing, it will mitigate the state’s homelessness crisis; it will increase the city’s tax base; it will bring new customers to local businesses; and it will reduce displacement of existing residents by reducing competition for existing housing. It will also help cut down on transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions by providing housing in denser, more urban areas, as opposed to farther-flung regions in the state (and out of state). While no one project will solve the statewide housing crisis, the proposed development is a step in the right direction. CalHDF urges the City to approve it, consistent with its obligations under state law.

CalHDF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation whose mission includes advocating for increased access to housing for Californians at all income levels, including low-income households. You may learn more about CalHDF at www.calhdf.org. 2 of 3
3315 of 5188
Sincerely,
Dylan Casey
CalHDF Executive Director
James M. Lloyd
CalHDF Director of Planning and Investigations
3 of 3
3316 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Jenny Heller <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 8:53 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger; Planning Commission
Subject: Foothill Blvd - Density Bonus / PAPP-06680-2026 CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Hello,
I was deeply distressed to hear that Project PAPP-06680-2026 has been approved. I acknowledge California's housing shortage but think that this 87-unit apartment complex (that is maximum density approved over the City's limit of 58 units and double the City's maximum height limit of 36 feet) will create more problems than it will solve. This area simply does not have the infrastructure for this large of a project.

The Crescenta Highlands are located within a Very High Fire Severity Zone. Many of us evacuated for the recent Eaton Fire, and in 2009, the Station Fire presented significant evacuation challenges in hillside neighborhoods (including mine) due to traffic congestion, which hindered first responders' ability to access the fire. Adding more housing in these already constrained areas puts residents at risk during evacuation due to increased density and narrow streets.

I understand that this decision is being appealed and urge you to reconsider with these concerns in mind.

Best,
Jenny
Jenny Heller Giagni
310.709.2006
[email protected]
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1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kristin Cantella <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 7:02 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger; Planning Commission
Subject: 5 Story 87 Unit Apartment complex at the corner of Foothill Blvd. and New York Ave.

CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

I am a resident of La Crescenta. Our home is near this proposed development. My husband and I strongly oppose this development.

I am very concerned about traffic congestion, reduction in parking spaces, the impact on our cities resources, and potential increases in crime and car accidents. Also, projects like this tend to lower the overall value of the existing properties. For these reasons, we are strongly opposed to this project. I strongly encourage you to listen to your constituents and the residents that live here. Im pretty sure that is an important part of your job, is to listen to the wants and concerns of the tax paying residents of the city.

Many of my neighbors feel the same as we do about this project. I implore you to PLEASE reserve the community charm and stop the encroaching high density building projects!! It is bad for the city and no one wants it!! Thank you,
Kristin Cantella
Some people who received this message don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3318 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 8:35 AM
To: Rafi Sarkis
Cc: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: RE: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
Good morning. Thanks for your e-mail. I will forward it to the Planning Commission for their review and consideration. -Roger
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: Rafi Sarkis <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 6:46 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

PROPOSED PROJECT: 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd.
87 apartment Units ( 23 x 1 bedrooms — 46 x 2 bedrooms — 18 x 3 bedrooms) To Whom It May Concern,
My name is Rafi Ekmekian, and I have proudly called Glendale home for more than three decades.

Having lived in the city since 1993, I am writing to express my support for the proposed development referenced above.

In my opinion, this project represents a positive investment in an area that has long been overlooked and lacks the level of development seen in other parts of the city. The site is currently underutilized, and this proposal offers an opportunity to bring new life and activity to the neighborhood.

Housing availability continues to be a challenge throughout our community, and projects such as this help address that need by introducing additional housing opportunities, including affordable housing options for residents who need them most.

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2 I am also impressed by the project's architectural design and overall presentation. The combination of landscaping, quality building materials, and thoughtful design elements will enhance the appearance of the area and create a development that complements its surroundings.

I do not anticipate the project having a significant impact on local traffic conditions. Given its location and accessibility, it appears well-positioned to accommodate future residents without creating undue congestion.

The addition of new households will also provide a boost to nearby businesses by increasing the local customer base and encouraging more economic activity in the area.

Another important consideration is that the project does not interfere with existing mountain views, preserving an important aspect of the community's character.

Finally, because the site is located along Foothill Boulevard, concerns regarding emergency access and evacuation routes are minimized due to its direct connection to a major transportation corridor.

I believe this development will be a valuable addition to the community and respectfully encourage its approval.

Sincerely,
Rafi Ekmekian
Glendale Resident Since 1993
3320 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Rita Zobayan <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 8:58 AM
To: Kiesel, Roger; Planning Commission
Subject: Foothill and New York Ave
[Some people who received this message don't oŌen get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important at hƩps://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdenƟficaƟon ]
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Hello,
I am wriƟng regarding the proposed construcƟon at the corner of Foothill Boulevard and New York Ave. I am opposed to this high rise project. This area cannot sustain that many units.

New York Ave is already extremely crowded with school buses and school traffic. Pennsylvania Avenue is very difficult to maneuver due to traffic from mulƟple schools. Traffic is backed up many Ɵmes for blocks geƫng to and from CVHS and the 210 freeway. Foothill Blvd is already crowded.

This project is not the right size for this locaƟon. It is going to send commuters into the neighborhood streets where we already experience speeders who are looking to bypass the crowded main boulevards. Many people walk, walk their dogs, ride their bikes, take strolls with their children on these community streets and the increased traffic puts everyone at risk . Just yesterday there was a major accident involving a motorist and a child on a bike at the corner of Pennsylvania and Foothill Boulevard. Adding so many units is going to increase these issues and accidents.

The project needs to be far smaller with fewer units. We are already struggling with congesƟon, let alone an inadequate infrastructure to support the addiƟonal populaƟon and vehicles.

Rita Zobayan
Please excuse any typos.

Sent from my iPhone.
3321 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 8:24 AM
To: Robert Conaty
Cc: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: RE: Foothill Blvd. Density Bo oject Case No. PAPP-006680-2026 Thank you for your e-mail. I will forward it to the Planning Commission for their review and consideration. -Roger
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Conaty <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 10:25 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Subject: Foothill Blvd. Density Bo oject Case No. PAPP-006680-2026 [You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
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This project is 2 blocks from my house. I am on the 3400 block of community Ave and this massive project will cripple traffic near my home. We already deal with the 20 busses coming and going from Clark Magnet school. This needs to be re evaluated immediately.

I do not understand how such a large structure could be approved for a small area.

Thank you, Robert Conaty

3322 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Kiesel, Roger
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 8:26 AM
To: Vaz Deravanesian
Cc: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: RE: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
Good morning. Thank you for your e-mail. I will forward it to the Planning Commission for their review and consideration. -Roger
Roger Kiesel | Senior Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8152
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: Vaz Deravanesian <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2026 9:36 PM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>
Cc: Agapeh Allahverdi <[email protected]>
Subject: 3411-3427 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD — IN SUPPORT
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Hello,
I am in full support of this development on Foothill Boulevard. I believe it will bring much needed housing opportunities while also adding diversity and vibrancy to our community.

My wife and I have lived in Montrose and owned a small business here for the past 14 years. We have seen firsthand how important it is to support thoughtful growth that benefits both residents and local businesses. This project has the potential to create new opportunities for small businesses like ours, strengthen the local economy, and help our community continue to thrive.

As both homeowners and business owners in Montrose, we strongly support this project and believe it will be a positive investment in the future of our community.

You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3323 of 5188
2 This version is more professional and community focused while keeping your personal connection to Montrose front and center.

Sincerely,
Vaz Dera
T: 818 275 2155
3730 Park Place
Montrose CA, 91020
3324 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Desiree Portillo-Rabinov <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 12:14 PM
To: Planning Commission
Subject: Approve project at 3411-3437 Foothill Blvd.

Attachments: Glendale Planning Commission 6.3.26.pdf
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Dear Commissioners and planning staff:

Please accept my attached comments regarding the above-subject project for tonight's meeting.

Thank you,
Desiree Portillo-Rabinov
Desiree Portillo Rabinov
Glendale College Board Trustee
"Si, se Puede", "Every moment is an organizing opportunity, and we must use our lives to make the world a better place". Dolores Huerta

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June 3, 2026
Planning Commission & Community Development Department Staff Attn: Case Planner, Roger Kiesel
633 East Broadway, Room 105
Glendale, CA 91206

VIA EMAIL
RE: 3411–3437 Foothill Blvd – Support with Conditions for Transportation and Environmental Review Dear Planning Commission and CDD Staff,
I am writing as a long-time La Crescenta resident to express my support for the City’s efforts to expand housing opportunities along Foothill Boulevard. This corridor, serving both Glendale and La Crescenta, has long lacked affordable and low-income housing options—despite being an area with excellent schools, access to Glendale Community College, and strong community amenities. Increasing housing here can broaden access to these opportunities, support local businesses, and strengthen the economic vitality of Foothill communities.

It is my understanding that this project is proceeding under ministerial approval pursuant to state and local housing laws. Even within that framework, I believe it is essential that the City continue to evaluate the broader impacts of increased density along this major corridor. Foothill Boulevard is a key regional connector, serving multiple jurisdictions and existing public transit routes. As density increases, it is important that transportation infrastructure, transit service, and local street and highway connectivity be reviewed to ensure they can safely and sustainably support additional population growth.

If an environmental or transportation mitigation review has already been conducted, I appreciate the due diligence your department has undertaken to move this project forward responsibly. If such analysis is still pending or incomplete, I would support the project with the expectation that the City will implement appropriate mitigation measures. These should include strategies to address traffic congestion, enhance pedestrian and bicycle safety, expand multimodal transportation options, and ensure that new development aligns with our community’s long-term sustainability goals.

Thoughtful planning today will help ensure that new housing strengthens—not strains—our neighborhoods, and that residents can move safely and efficiently throughout the subregion.

Thank you for your continued work to balance housing needs with responsible infrastructure planning. I appreciate your consideration of these comments.

Respectfully submitted,
Desiree Portillo-Rabinov
La Crescenta Resident
[email protected]
3326 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: Joe, Dennis
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 12:57 PM
To: Ezzati, Vista
Subject: FW: Appeal Case No. PAPP 006680-2026, Density Bonus Case No. PDBP-005269-2025, 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd., Glendale, CA 91214
Another comment regarding Roger’s Foothill project from this morning.

Dennis
Dennis Joe | Principal Planner
Community Development
633 E. Broadway, Room 103, Glendale, CA 91206
P: +1 (818) 937-8157
[email protected] | GlendaleCA.gov | Follow us!
120 Years of Service to Our Community
From: Lisa Morris <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 8:48 AM
To: Kiesel, Roger <[email protected]>; Joe, Dennis <[email protected]> Cc: Lisa Morris <[email protected]>
Subject: Appeal Case No. PAPP 006680-2026, Density Bonus Case No. PDBP-005269-2025, 3411-3427 Foothill Blvd., Glendale, CA 91214
CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Please include this email at the formal Appeals Hearing being conducted this evening:

In response to some of Staff Comments in the Report Approved for June 3, 2026, I have the following comments or concerns:

1. Evacuations. It is shown in the Evacuation Analysis (part of the Safety Element Update), that several streets within the neighborhood, are projected to exceed capacity in the event an evacuation were necessary in an emergency. It appears, due to the time frame they measured for the capacity tests, that they did not consider in their calculations, the number of students, staff and guests leaving Clark Magnet High School on New York Avenue. The report identifies not only New York Avenue, but also the north/south streets of Dunsmore and Boston, Avenues and the east/west streets of Markridge Drive and Santa Carlotta Street as Emergency Response Routes. One needs to remember, there are several cul-de-sacs with homes along New York Avenue, whose residents could You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3327 of 5188
2 have a difficult time exiting due to traffic jams and back-ups on New York Avenue. Foothill Boulevard is a collector road will be jammed as well. While I recognize a Roadway Management Plan is in place to improve capacity, in the event of a real life threatening emergency with panicked residents, there could very well be delays in getting the help they need to escape. And, the public’s communications may be out. No one can forget the images of residents trying to exit during the Pacific Palisades fires with one road out and people having to abandon their cars.

2. Fire Threats. Staff Report does recite the project site is roughly one-quarter mile from the VHFHSZ, and thus eligible for the AB 130 exception. Well, that’s all well and good, as long as the the wildfire behaves itself and doesn’t jump the boundaries of the designation. And we know how flying embers in high winds can travel far and ignite properties and land. I found it odd, that due to the Station Fire of 2009 and the recent devastating fires of the Eaton Fire of January 2025, the Safety Element did not analyze this area for wildfires; they only did for the Verdugo Mountains (close and south of us) and the San Rafael Hills (east Glendale). They did include a Landslide scenario for our area. We are next door to La Canada and they were under evacuation orders for the Eaton Fire; too close for comfort. According to the USDA wildfirerisk.org App, homes in La Crescenta-Montrose, have on the average, greater risk than 93% of communities in Los Angeles County, and the State. Plus, by the same source, 90% of buildings in our area are in the Indirect Exposure Zone.

Time and thoughtful consideration needs to be had for the concerns noted, along with other arguments and evidence presented at the Appeal Hearing. I urge you to deny the Density Bonus Application.

Thank you for your attention,
Lisa Morris
Resident of La Crescenta
818-326-0345
3328 of 5188
1 Ezzati, Vista
From: paul rickey <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2026 2:32 PM
To: Planning Commission
Cc: Kiesel, Roger
Subject: Resident Opposed to PDR 2105883 Project Address: 3411 – 3437 Foothill Boulevard, Glendale, CA
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PDR 2105883
Project Address: 3411 – 3437 Foothill Boulevard, Glendale, CA To: [email protected]
Opposed to 5 Story Housing
I’m a homeowner one block from this proposed project. My concern is this monstrous housing complex disturbs the character of our neighborhood because it creates more traffic, strains street parking, strains aging underground water infrastructure.

I understand the state has allowed builders to go taller, more dense and get waivers on environmental reviews because this project adds 9 low income units. They get to add 2 stories above the 3 story limit designed for Foothill.

Since there is not environmental impact required, I will provide one: Pennsylvania and Foothill is already a problem intersection. There are accidents there every week. I drive through it morning and afternoon for school runs and there are 14+ buses going in and out of Clark School. There are tons of cars up and down to the freeway. The additional 87 units will add 100+ more cars into this mix. New York Ave is gridlock in the am and after school.

On Pontiac St., drivers speed through to avoid using Foothill because of how busy it is already.

Imagine how many more speeders will use residential streets if this project is allowed.

If this project is permitted, please add more parking, decrease the number of units and do an environmental impact report that includes a traffic study (that includes peak weekday traffic patterns).

Thank You,
Paul Rickey
3242 Pontiac St
Some people who received this message don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important 3329 of 5188
Jun 3, 2026
City of Glendale
613 E. Broadway
Glendale, CA 91206
Re: Proposed Housing Development Project at 3411- 3427 Foothill Boulevard To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Dear Glendale Planning Commission,
The California Housing Defense Fund (CalHDF) submits this letter to remind the City of its obligation to abide by all relevant state laws when evaluating the proposed 87-unit housing development project at 3411-3427, which includes 9 very low income units. These laws include the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), the Density Bonus Law (DBL), and AB 130.

Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(3)).The HAA’s protections therefore apply, and the City may not reject the project except based on health and safety standards, as outlined above.

Furthermore, if the City rejects the project or impairs its feasibility, it must conduct “a thorough analysis of the economic, social, and environmental effects of the action.” (Id. at subd. (b).)
2201 Broadway, PH1, Oakland, CA 94612
www.calhdf.org
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CalHDF also writes to emphasize that the DBL offers the proposed development certain protections. The City must respect these protections. In addition to granting the increase in residential units allowed by the DBL, the City must not deny the project the proposed waivers and concessions with respect to three concessions/incentives to deviate from lot coverage, floor area ratio, height standards, residential units on the first floor, open space, and underground parking. If the City wishes to deny requested waivers, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (e)(1) requires findings that the waivers would have a specific, adverse impact upon health or safety, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific adverse impact. If the City wishes to deny requested concessions, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (d)(1) requires findings that the concessions would not result in identifiable and actual cost reductions, that the concessions would have a specific, adverse impact on public health or safety, or that the concessions are contrary to state or federal law. The City, if it makes any such findings, bears the burden of proof. (Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (d)(4).) Of note, the DBL specifically allows for a reduction in required accessory parking in addition to the allowable waivers and concessions. (Id. at subd. (p).) Additionally, the California Court of Appeal has ruled that when an applicant has requested one or more waivers and/or concessions pursuant to the DBL, the City “may not apply any development standard that would physically preclude construction of that project as designed, even if the building includes ‘amenities’ beyond the bare minimum of building components.” (Bankers Hill150 v. City of San Diego (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 755, 775.)
Furthermore, the project is eligible for a statutory exemption from environmental review pursuant to AB 130 (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.66). Caselaw from the California Court of Appeal affirms that local governments err, and may be sued, when they improperly refuse to grant a project a CEQA exemption or streamlined CEQA review to which it is entitled. (Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 890, 911.) As you are well aware, California remains in the throes of a statewide crisis-level housing shortage. New housing such as this is a public benefit: by providing affordable housing, it will mitigate the state’s homelessness crisis; it will increase the city’s tax base; it will bring new customers to local businesses; and it will reduce displacement of existing residents by reducing competition for existing housing. It will also help cut down on transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions by providing housing in denser, more urban areas, as opposed to farther-flung regions in the state (and out of state). While no one project will solve the statewide housing crisis, the proposed development is a step in the right direction. CalHDF urges the City to approve it, consistent with its obligations under state law.

Page 1 of 2 ends

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this project.

Page 2 of 2 ends

Thank you for your consideration,
Sincerely,
Lisa Morris, CVCA Steering Committee Member & Resident of Glendale, California [email protected]
3334 of 5188
,,,> EDMUND G. BROWN JR,

GOVERNOR
CALI PORN IA ~ MATTHEW RODRIQUEZ
l~~ SECRETARY FOR Water Boards
Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board
April 16, 2014
Varouj Aghajanian
1056 Trafalger Dr.,
Glendale, CA 91207

UNDERGROUND TANKS PROGRAM - CASE CLOSURE
FORMER GASOLINE STATION _{PRIORITY CASE BC-1)
3411 FOOTHILL BOULEVARD, GLENDALE, CA {CASE FILE NO. 912140052) Dear Mr. Aghajianian:
~ ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
This letter confirms the completion of a site investigation and corrective action for the underground storage tank(s) formerly located at the above-described location. Thank you for your cooperation throughout this investigation. Your willingness and promptness in responding to our inquiries concerning the former underground storage tank(s) are greatly appreciated.

Based on information in the above-referenced file and with the provision that the information provided to this agency was accurate and representative of site conditions, this agency finds that the site investigation and corrective action carried out at your underground tank(s) site is in compliance with the requirements of subdivision (a) and (b) of Section 25296.10 of the Health and Safety Code and with corrective action regulations adopted pursuant to Section 25299.3 of the Health and Safety Code and that no further action related to the petroleum release(s) at the site is required. •
This notice is issued pursuant to subdivision (g) of section 25296.10 of the Health and .Safety Code.

Claims for reimbursement of corrective action costs submitted to the Underground Storage Tank Cleanup Fund more than 365 days after the date of this letter or issuance or activation of the Fund's Letter of Commitment, whichever occurs later, will not be reimbursed unless one of the following exceptions applies: •
• D Claims are submitted pursuant to Section 25299.57, subdivision (k) (reopened UST case); or
D • Submission within the timeframe was beyond the claimant's reasonable control, ongoing work is required for closure tha.t will result in the submission of claims beyond that time period, or that under the circumstances of the case, it would be unreasonable or inequitable to impose the 365-day time period.
320 West 4th St., SUite 2001 Los t,ngeles, CA. 90013 I Www .. •.'(aterboardis.ca.gov/losangeJes Exhibit 15 - Uniform Closure Letter
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Mr. Aghajanian -2- April 16, 2014
3411 Foothill Blvd., Glendale CA
If you have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. Magdy Baiady at (213) 576-6699 or [email protected].

Sincerely,
o~u".'j~,
Samuel Unger, P.E.

Executive Officer
cc: Kathy Jundt, State Water Resources Control Board, Underground Storage Tank Cleanup Fund
Robert Trommer, State Water Resources Control Board, UST Cleanup Fund Raymond Chan, City of Los Angeles Department Building and Safety 3336 of 5188
State of California
Environmental Protection Agency
Date:
01/17/2014 \V\IP
IS File No.: 912140052
Site Name/Address:

Property located at
3411 Foothill Blvd.

Glendale,CA 91214
I. CASE INFORMATION
. i¼f12,S\~~<l!~!,G~]ttjf1&'*1tl{~
6,000
500

UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK

LOW RISK CASE REVIEW FORM
Los Angeles Regional
Water Quality Control Board
ection Chief:

Yue Ron
• Date: 2
Responsible parties:

Mike Brin
Waste Oil
AEO:

Paula Rasm
Date:
estigation and Cleanup Priority: BC-1
Address:

Van Oppen & Company Inc.

PO box793
Teton Village, WY 83025
Phone no.:
818-970-3383
•:s~Lr•.)1.'';';. ;'. ·•\': -~; • P~yr,.i'.!:~:•:",;<. •.i~'.'>;b'', • .• • Hi~"cc:>'~:'i'i·', :~1~:'"t,"h;? Removed
Removed 06/04
II. SITE CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION (GW=qroundwater)
GW Basin: San Fernando
!
Beneficial uses: Mun, Ind, Water purveyor in the area: Crescenta Valley Water District Basin Proc,' Aqr
Distance to nearest municipal supply well: 4,380 feet Water purveyor contact: David Gould 'well ID CVCWD2)
GW hiqhest depth: N/A I GW lowest depth: N/A Well screen interval: N/A I Flow direction: N/A Soil types: Maximum soil depth sampled:

Ill. SITE INSPECTION
ere sensItIve recep or next to ergarten etc. .
s, brief description: None per Google Research and site inspection 10,200 ND
TPH (Diesel) N/A N/A NE N/A 10,000 NRQ NRQ NE
Benzene ND ND 1.1 5.4 0.029 NRQ NRQ 1
Toluene ND ND 5,000 45,000 1.6 NRQ NRQ 150
Ethyl benzene ND ND 5.4 27 6.3 NRQ NRQ 300
Xylenes ND ND 630 2,700 16.9 NRQ NRQ 1,750
Methyl tertiary butyl ND ND 43 220 0.03 NRQ NRQ 13 (Primary) ether MTBE 5 Seconda
Di-isopropyl ether ND ND 2,400 10,000 NE NRQ NRQ NE
DIPE
Ethyl tertiary butyl ND ND NE NE NE NRQ NRQ NE
ether ETBE
Tertiary amyl ND ND NE NE NE NRQ NRQ NE
meth I ether AME
Tertiary butyl ND ND ,NE NE NE NRQ NRQ 12 (NL)
alcohol BA
* SLs = U EPA Risk-Based Screening Levels (November 2011) . NE = not established NL= Notii1cation Level **Seethe attached Table4-1 NA = not analyzed NRQ = Not Required

Page 1 of 4 ends

Exhibit 16 - Underground Storage Tank Low Risk Case Review Form 3337 of 5188
Site Name/Address: Property Located at
3411 Foothill Blvd., Glendale, CA
V. FREE PRODUCT
Was free product encountered? No
When was free product recovery project completed? N/A

VI SOIL REMEDIATION
ethod: N/A
Vaste manifest document: N/A
VII. GROUNDWATER REMEDIATION
Method: N/A
VIII. RECOMMENDED ACTION
I Has free product been totally recovered? N/A
Duration of remediation: N/A
Soil disposal volume: NIA
Duration of remediation: N/A
Soil Closure only: No I Case Closure: Yes I Solvent Case? No Additional action required (i.e.; additional site assessment, remediation, monitoring): None IX. COMMENTS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDED ACTION
Site Background
Staff Initial: MB
The site is a former gasoline service station and currently operated as an automotive repair shop and office (a single story commercial building) located at the northeast corner of Foothill Blvd. and New York Av~. in Glendale, CA (Figure 1). Surrounding land use is a mixture of commercial and residential properties.

Site Assessment
In 1987, four 6,000-gallon gasoline underground storage tanks (USTs) were removed from the site. According to the "Phase I & II site Assessment reports" dated November 27, 2013, TPHg and BTEX were not detected in the soil samples collected from beneath the USTs. Fuel oxygenates were not analyzed (see Lab. Report 1).

In June 2004, one 500-gallon Waste Oil UST was removed from the site, Soil samples taken from beneath the UST detected only TRPH of 10,200 mg/kg at the site. Soil samples were non-detect for BTEX and MTBE (Table 1).

In September 2009, all vent pipes associated with the former gasoline and waste oil tanks were removed and soil samples were collected at 2 feet bgs beneath the pipes. No fuel constituents were detected in any of these samples (see Closure Report - UST Vent Pipe Removal 10/29/2009, pgs 3 to 5).

In November 2013, nine soil borings (SB1 through SB9) were drilled to a maximum depth of 30 feet below ground surface (bgs) at the site (Figure 2). All soil samples were non-detect for fuel constituents, fuel oxygenates and chlorinated VOCs at the site (See Lab.

Report 2t
Based on the above information, additional soil and/or groundwater investigation is not warranted for the site Lithology:

Based on the site assessment, the site is underlain of silty sand from ground surface to approximately 30 feet (bgs), the deepest depth investigated at the site (see attached boring log).

Low Threat UST Closure Policy Criteria Evaluation
General Criteria
The site meets a through h general criteria of the low threat.closure policy as follows:
a. The unauthorized release is located within the service area of a public water· system - True (Crescenta Valley Water District).
b. The unauthorized release consist of petroleum only - True. c. The unauthorized ("primary") release from the UST system has been stopped - True, all USTs at the site were removed in • 1937 and 2004-.
d. Free product has been removed to the maximum extent practicable - Ture, No free product has been encountered. e. A site conceptual model that assesses the nature, extent and mobility of the release has been developed - True. f. The secondary source has been removed to the extent practicable- Yes (no cleanup is warranted). g. Soil and groundwater has been tested for MTBE - True. h. No known nuisances exist at the site - True.

Page 2 of 4 ends

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Site Nari'1e/Address: Property Located at
'3411 Foothill Blvd., Glendale, CA
Groundwater
Exempt- This is a soil only case.

Vapor Intrusion to Indoor Air
. Staff Initial: MB
The L TCP Policy does not have any criteria addressing the "Soil Only" cases. However, based on the facts that low concentration of only TRPH was detected in the soil beneath the site (e.g. TRPH of 10,200 mg/kg and benzene was not-detect) during the waste oil . tank removal, and that the site does not have any subsurface structures and paved with asphalt, the actual risk of vapor intrusion to indoor air is considered minimal.

Direct Contact and Outdoor Air Exposure
The site satisfied the media-specific criteria 3(a) for direct contact and outdoor air exposure.

Maximum Benzene Detected = ND mg/kg at 5 ft bgs < 8.2 mg/kg (Commercial) Maximum Ethylbenzene Detected = ND mg/kg at 5 ft bgs < 89 mg/kg (Commercial) Factors Supporting Low Risk Closure
• All USTs were removed in 1987 and 2004.
• The extent of soil contamination was adequately defined. • The residual soil contamination would not cause any huma.n health and environmental risks via major pathways, such as direct contact, drinking water ingestion, and vapor intrusion. • The nearest oroduction well is 4,380 feet awav from this site.

X. MTBE FATE & TRANSPORT PLUME LENGTH MODELING ANALYSIS Modeling was not performed since there is no groundwater wells at the site.

XI. ELECTRONIC DELIVERABLE FORMAT EDF SUBMISSION
Has electronic data reporting requirement been met? Yes XII. AB 681 REQUIREMENT Land Owner Notification
Verify property ownership http://assessor.lacounty.gov/extranet/DataMaps/Pais.aspx (date) :

Have landowner or impacted site notification requirements been met? yes Owner-Varouj Aghajanian, 1056 Trafalger Dr., Glendale, CA 91207 Responsible party- Mike Brin, Van Oppen & Company Inc., PO box 793, Teton Village, WY 83025 Pre-closure letter sent date - N/A

Page 3 of 4 ends

3339 of 5188
a
Table 4-1: Maximum Soil Screenina Levels /ma/kal for TPH BTEX and MTBE above Drinkina Water Aauifers ' T
p
H
B
T
E
X
&
M
T
B
E
\
Distance Above Carbon Range
Groundwater
C4-C12 C13-C22 C23-C32
>150 feet 1,000 10,000 50,000
...... , ... 20-150 feet 500 1,000 10,000
<20 feet 100 100 1,000
Djstance Above .\. Lithology
Groundwater: Gravel Sand Silt Clay ..
·.
:2,
:

B=0.044 B=0.077 B=0.165 B=0.8
150 feet T=2 T=4 T=9 T=43
E=8 E=17 E=34 E=170
X=23 X=48 X=93 X=465
MTBE=0.039 MTBE=0.078 MTBE = 0.156 MTBE=0.78
B=0.035 B=0.058 B=0.123 B=0.603
120 feet T=1.57 T=3.1 T=7 T=32
E:=6.3 E=12.7 E=25.9 E=128
... X=17.9 X=36 X=70.3 X=351
MTBE=0.028 MTBE =0.061 MTBE=0.117 MTBE=0.591
B=0.028 B=0.046 B=0.094 B=0.471
• 100 feet T=1.3 T=2.57 T=5.4 T=25
E=5.1 E=9.86 E=20.4 E=101
X=14.4 X=28 X=55.1 X=276
MTBE=0.020 MTBE =0.05 MTBE=0.091 MTBE=0.464
B=0.022 B=0.033 B=0.066 B=0.34
BO feet T=1 ' T=2 T=4 T=18
··'
E=4 E=7 E=15 E=73 ~ · .. X=11 X=20 X=40 X=200
MTBE=0.013 MTBE=0.039 MTBE =0.065 MTBE=0.338
B=0.018 B=0.026 B=0.048 B=0.241
60feet. , T=0.72 T=1.4 T=2.8 T=13
E=2.9 E=4.9 E=10.7 . E=52
X=7.9 X=13.9 X=28.4 X=141.5
MTBE =0.013 MTBE=0.03 MTBE=0.048 MTBE=0.247
B=0.015 B=0.018 B=0.029 B=0.143
.·.40feet• T=0.43 T=0.87 T=1.6 T=7.5
i:',
.. E=1.8 E=2.8 E=6.3 E=30
,, ./ X=4.8 X=?.8 X=16.9 X=83
. :: MTBE=0.013 MTBE=0.022 MTBE=0.03 MTBE = 0.156 .

B=0.011 B=0.011 B=0.011 B=0.044
20 feet T=0.15 T=0.3 T=0.45 T=2.3
E=0.7 E=0.7 E=2. E=9
X=1.75 X=1.75 X=5.3 X=24.5
MTBE =0.013 MTBE =0.013 MTBE =0.013 MTBE=0.065
TPH = Total petroleum hydrocarbons.

BTEX = benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes, respectively. MTBE = methyl tertiary butyl ether.

Respective MeLs (ppm): B=0.001, T=0.15, E=0.3, X=1.75, MTBE=0.013. .

BTEX screening concentrations determined per the attenuation factor method as described in RWQeB Guidance for voe Impacted Sites (March 1996), with a natural degradation factor of 11 for BTEX and of 3 for MTBE. Table values can be linearly interpolated between distance above groundwater and are proportional to fraction of each lithological thickness.

Values in Table 4-1 are for soils above drinking water aquifers. All groundwaters are considered as drinking water resources unless exempted by one of the criteria as defined under SWReB Resolution 88-63 (TDS>3000 mg/L, or deliverability <200 gal/day, or existing contamination that , cannot be reasonably treated). Regional Board staff will make a determination of potential water use at a particular site considering water quality objectives and beneficial uses. For non-drinking water aquifers, regardless of depth, TPH for ">150 feet" category in the table should be used; Distance above groundwater must be measured from the highest anticipated water level. Lithology is based on the uses scale.

In areas of naturally-occurring hydrocarbons, Regional Board staff will make determinations on TPH levels.

Page 4 of 4 ends

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CITY OF GLENDALE

SAFETY ELEMENT
April 1, 2025
Exhibit 17 - 2025 Updated Safety Element
3341 of 5188
Glendale Safety Element | Adopted 1976 | Updated 2003 & 2025 Safety Element | Adopted 1976 | Updated 2003 & 2025
2003 City Council
Frank Quintero, Mayor
Gus Gomez Rafi Manoukian
Dave Weaver Bob Yousefian
2003 Planning Commission
Aspet Davidian, Chair
Gary Gero Bob Lemke
Leonard Manoukian Richard Ramirez
2003 City Administration
James E. Starbird, City Manager
Robert McFall, Assistant City Manager
2003 Division Administration
Elaine Wilkerson, Director of Planning
Hassan Haghani, Planning Administrator
Carmen Lukassian, Office Services Supervisor
2003 Safety Element Team
Project Management: Jeff Hamilton, Senior Planner
Kathy Duarte, Planner
Consultant: Tania Gonzalez, Earth Consultants International, Inc. 2003 City Staff
Police Department: Lt. Mark Distaso; Sgt. Sam Hopper
Fire Department: Christopher Gray, Fire Chief; Battalion Chief Mike Haney; Doug Nickles, Urban Fire Forester; Ronald Gulli, Fire Captain/Emergency Services Coordinator; Jeffrey Halpert, Fire Protection Engineer; Vasken Demirjian, Environmental Management Coordinator Glendale Water and Power: Martin Nixt, Principal Civil Engineer Public Works: Lucien Le Blanc, City Engineer; Alice I. Stoner, Asst. City Engineer; Samuel Adarme, Senior Civil Engineer; Chris Chew, Civil Engineer II; William A’Hearn, GIS Analyst; Jan Bear, Deputy Building Official
3342 of 5188
Glendale Safety Element | Adopted 1976 | Updated 2003 & 2025 Safety Element | Adopted 1976 | Updated 2003 & 2025
2025 City Council
Elen Asatryan, Mayor
Ara Najarian, Ardy Kassakhian, Dan Brotman, Vartan Gharpetian 2025 Planning Commission
Stefen Chraghchian, Chair
Edith Fuentes, Chang Lee, Henrik Nazarian, Vacant
2025 City Administration
Roubik Golanian, City Manager
John Takhtalian, Assistant City Manager
2025 Division Administration
Bradley Calvert, AICP, Community Development
2025 Safety Element Team
Project Management: David Jones, Sustainability Officer; Vilia Zemaitaitis, AICP, Deputy Director of Long Range Planning; Teresa Santilena, AICP, Principal Planner; Dennis Joe, Senior Planner Consultant: Reema Shakra, AICP, Rincon Consultants, Inc. 2025 City Staff
Community Development: Ara Sargsyan, Building Official; Fred Zohrehvand, Principal Mobility Planner Police Department: Lt. Christopher Spencer, Lt. Sean Riley Fire Department: Battalion Chief Brian Julian; Tommy Nicola, Fire Captain Paramedic/Emergency Services Coordinator; Jovan Diaz, Fire Marshal
Glendale Water and Power: Leo Chan, Sr. Civil Engineer
Public Works: Sarkis Oganesyan, City Engineer; Pastor Casanova, Principal Traffic Engineer 3343 of 5188
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1

1.1 Legal Requirements ........................................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Purpose and Content ...................................................................................................................... 1

1.3 Limitations ....................................................................................................................................... 3 CHAPTER 2 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT......................................................................... 4

2.1 California Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act.................................................................... 4

2.2 California Seismic Hazards Mapping Act........................................................................................ 4

2.3 Real Estate Disclosure Requirements ............................................................................................ 4

2.4 California Environmental Quality Act .............................................................................................. 4

2.5 California Building Code.................................................................................................................. 4

2.6 Unreinforced Masonry Law ............................................................................................................. 5

2.7 National Flood Insurance Act and Flood Disaster Protection Act................................................... 5

2.8 Fire Regulations and Emergency Evacuation................................................................................. 5

2.9 Standardized Emergency Management System Law..................................................................... 6

2.10 Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) ............................................. 6

2.11 Hazardous Materials Disclosure Program ...................................................................................... 6

2.12 Climate Change .............................................................................................................................. 7 CHAPTER 3 GOALS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS ................................................................ 8

3.1 Seismic and Geologic Hazards ....................................................................................................... 8

3.1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................. 8

3.1.2 Local Conditions...................................................................................................................... 9 GOAL S-1 Seismic Hazards ...........................................................................................................10 GOAL S-2 Geologic Hazards..........................................................................................................13

3.2 Flooding Hazards ..........................................................................................................................14

3.2.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................14

3.2.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................14 GOAL S-3 Flooding Hazards ..........................................................................................................16

3.3 Fire Hazards..................................................................................................................................17

3.3.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................17

3.3.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................17 GOAL S-4 Fire Hazard....................................................................................................................20

3.4 Climate Change ............................................................................................................................23

3.4.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................23

3.4.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................23 GOAL S-5 Climate Change.............................................................................................................25 3344 of 5188
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3.5 Hazardous Materials .....................................................................................................................27

3.5.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................27

3.5.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................28 GOAL S-6 Hazardous Materials .....................................................................................................28

3.6 Terrorism, Civil Disturbance and Crime ........................................................................................30

3.6.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................30

3.6.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................30 GOAL S-7 Terrorism, Civil Disturbance, and Crime .......................................................................31

3.7 Dangerous Animals and Plants.....................................................................................................32

3.7.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................32

3.7.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................32 GOAL S-8 Dangerous Animals and Plants.....................................................................................33

3.8 Disaster Preparedness, Recovery and Emergency Response.....................................................34

3.8.1 Overview ...............................................................................................................................34

3.8.2 Local Conditions....................................................................................................................34 GOAL S-9 Disaster Preparedness, Recovery and Emergency Response.....................................37

EXHIBITS
Table-1 Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities and Schools in Glendale.......................................41 Table-2 Potential Shelters In and Near the City of Glendale .............................................................43 Table-3 Program Implementation Schedule.......................................................................................44 Plate P-1 Seismic Hazards ...................................................................................................................52 Plate P-2 Dam Inundation Zones..........................................................................................................53 Plate P-3 Wildfire Hazard Severity Zones and Critical Facilities ..........................................................54 Plate P-4 Single Access Neighborhoods ..............................................................................................55 Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route ................................................................................................56

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Technical Background Report
Appendix B: Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment
Appendix C: Evacuation Analysis
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Legal Requirements
The City of Glendale has updated the Safety Element of its General Plan in conformance with State law. As required by Section 65302(g) of the California Government Code, every local government is required to maintain a comprehensive Safety Element that addresses a variety of natural and man-made hazards and that provides goals and policies aimed at reducing exposure to these hazards and increasing preparedness.

The Safety and Seismic Safety Elements first became mandatory parts of the General Plan in 1975, when the California Legislature adopted Senate Bill 271 (Chapter 1104). This legislation required cities and counties to adopt General Plan policies relating to, at a minimum, fire safety, flooding and geologic hazards.

The City of Glendale responded to this legislation by adopting its first Safety and Seismic Safety Elements in 1976. In 1984, the Legislature adopted Assembly Bill 2038 (Chapter 1009) that expanded the list of mandatory issues that were to be evaluated in the Safety Element, with emphasis on seismic issues, and combined the previously separate Safety and Seismic Safety Elements into a single document. In 2015, the legislature adopted Senate Bill 379 requiring Safety Elements to incorporate climate adaptation and resilience strategies. New requirements to consider evacuation and emergency access were adopted pursuant to Assembly Bill 747 and Senate Bill 99 in 2019 and Assembly Bill 1409 in 2021.

The 2018 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) for the City of Glendale planning area was developed in accordance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) and followed FEMA’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan guidance. The LHMP incorporates a process where hazards are identified and profiled, the people and facilities at risk are analyzed, and mitigation actions are developed to reduce or eliminate hazard risk. The implementation of these mitigation actions, which include both short and long-term strategies, involve planning, policy changes, programs, projects, and other activities.

1.2 Purpose and Content
Originally adopted in 1976, amended in 2003, and updated in 2025, the Safety Element focuses on fire, earthquakes, flooding, and other geologic hazards, but it also addresses other safety-related issues, as required by State law. The ultimate objective of the Safety Element is to improve the safety of the City of Glendale, through the protection of areas with hazards and resource constraints; safeguarding services and existing infrastructure, and in the process make the City more resilient and prosperous.

The Safety Element serves the following functions:
• Provides an assessment of the natural and man-made hazards in the City, including, but not limited to, earthquakes, landslides, fire, flood, dam inundation, hazardous materials incidents, terrorism, and vector control, and considers the impacts of climate hazards including extreme heat, extended drought, and worsening air quality. A more in-depth analysis of each of these hazards is provided in the Technical Background Report (Appendix A) and the Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (CCVA) (Appendix B). Important terms and concepts related to each of these topic areas are marked with bold text and defined throughout the Safety Element document. • Provides a framework by which safety considerations are introduced into the land use planning process and the redevelopment process.
• Strengthens the City’s existing municipal codes and provides guidelines that the City can use during the project review and permitting process to identify and mitigate hazards for new development and redevelopment. Future development and redevelopment should always consider the incorporation of measures aimed at reducing these hazards to acceptable levels. • Provides policies directed at identifying and reducing hazards in existing development; and • Strengthens earthquake, flood, fire, and hazardous materials preparedness planning and provides post-disaster reconstruction policies specific to the City of Glendale. 3346 of 5188
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• Incorporates findings from the Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment* to assess the impacts of climate change specific to the City. The Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment* evaluates how climate change may impact community members and physical assets including natural and recreational resources, buildings and facilities, and infrastructure and critical services in Glendale and informs the development of resilience goals, policies, and programs. *Rincon Consultants, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Rincon") prepares vulnerability assessments that evaluate climate change hazards, including wildfire, based on numerous sources, including third party consultants, State and Federal mapping resources, and various software modeling programs that are considered industry standard best practices. The vulnerability assessment prepared for this Safety Element evaluated wildfire hazards based on CAL FIRE’s Fire Hazard Severity Zone. Wildfire is unpredictable, and the specific conditions of wildfire could result in fire behavior that diverges from the assumptions used in this analysis. There is no guarantee that wildfire behavior and specific treatment to avoid such behavior will follow or prevent wildfire impacts. Rincon is not responsible for any damage to life or property that might occur based on the results of the vulnerability analyses herein, and any accompanying recommendations.

To that end, the Safety Element describes the natural conditions that pose a hazard, but most importantly, it presents goals, policies, and programs that if implemented can substantially reduce the impact these hazards pose to the City of Glendale and its residents. Each of these terms and components of the Element is explained further below:
• Goals are statements that describe the City’s purpose and direction in reducing its natural hazards.

They are the desired condition that the City would like to achieve. • Policies are guidelines that can be implemented to reduce the City’s exposure to hazards and maximize the community’s emergency preparedness. These are statements that address specific concerns of long-term planning importance to the community. • Programs are the specific actions that the City has committed to implement over a given number of years to reduce its hazards. They are specific implementation measures selected to maintain or improve public safety, and to satisfy the objectives of the policies and goals. Where appropriate, the agency or City department responsible for implementation and monitoring of each of these programs is identified.

Whether related to natural or man-made hazards or disaster preparedness, the Safety Element goals are guided by the City’s desire and responsibility to:
• Minimize fatalities and injuries;
• Minimize the burden on public and emergency response resources (police, fire, medical, etc.); • Minimize public and private costs for cleanup, repair and recovery; and • Minimize long-term impacts caused by displaced households, business disruption, and reduced fiscal resources (with a consequent tax burden).

Specific hazards of concern to Glendale include earthquakes, landslides and mudflows, dam or reservoir failure, wildland and structural fire, storm flooding, contamination of soil and groundwater resources by hazardous materials, terrorism, civil unrest, crime, and climate change hazards. These hazards can impact the entire City, and in particular, vulnerable populations, physical and natural assets, and critical facilities.

Critical facilities provide essential services to the public, are otherwise necessary to preserve the welfare and quality of life in the City, or fulfill important public safety, emergency response, and/or disaster recovery functions. The City’s critical facilities have been identified in the Glendale CCVA. Each of these hazards, and others of lesser impact, is described further in the following pages; for a more detailed description of each of these conditions, refer to the accompanying Technical Background Report (Appendix A) and the CCVA (Appendix B).
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1.3 Limitations
Safety Elements are by scope and definition, provisional. Although the ultimate goal of these documents does not change much over time, the information, tools and techniques available to assess the community’s exposure to various types of hazards are continuously evolving. Policies and programs are established within a framework that identifies timelines and priorities. As more critical goals are achieved, emphasis is shifted to new priorities. Most of the data, relationships and processes that affect a community are spatial in nature, and multi-variant. As a result, GIS-based mapping is utilized to describe the relationship of the hazards to the assets in Glendale. By using relevant data on the existing built environment, this report illustrates the potential impacts to the community and the infrastructure of the City.

The Safety Element provides a general evaluation of potential hazards on a City-wide basis. The identification and assessment of the hazards described in this document are based on literature and sources available at the time that this Element was prepared. Site-specific studies were not conducted specifically for this study.

For effective emergency preparedness and response, communities need to know in advance what are the potentially hazardous conditions specific to their area. A major part of this effort requires mapping of the vulnerable areas in the community. This is covered in the Technical Background Report (Appendix A) to the Safety Element. For example, the Technical Report identifies the fault zones that cross the City, areas of potential landslides and unstable slopes, areas susceptible to fire and flooding hazards, and areas where most hazardous materials in the City are being used, stored or generated. However, the hazard maps that serve as the basis for the Technical Background Report (Appendix A) are by necessity generalized; the boundaries between hazard zones should not be interpreted as precisely defined. In addition, the Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (CCVA) (Appendix B) includes maps and infographics that highlight climate hazards including extreme heat, drought, wildfire, landslides, stormwater flooding and extreme precipitation, poor air quality, and social vulnerability. This document and the accompanying illustrations are to be used for general land use planning purposes only, such as in land use decisions. This Element should not be used for site-specific studies, but rather, it should be used to identify areas where detailed siteinvestigations should be required for new developments or for redevelopments.

Computer simulations that estimate loss of life and damage to buildings and infrastructure (such as HAZUS, the software used for this study) help to design and prioritize appropriate mitigation plans. The results of these models, however, are estimates only, and this should not be forgotten. It is the magnitude, rather than the specific value, of the results that is significant (an earthquake that results in about 4,000 casualties is clearly more severe an event than one that causes about 150 casualties). Once this information is known, appropriate measures can be taken to reduce the hazard and to prepare for and respond to the estimated level of damage. These are the topics covered in this Element.

It is acknowledged that sometimes policies and programs designed to reduce specific hazards may come in conflict with individuals’ rights in their properties. Whenever possible, the mitigation measures included herein will be conducted without violating the property owners’ rights to modify or improve their investments, along with preserving the aesthetic or natural conditions of the area through minimal modifications. However, when these goals are in conflict, protection of life and property should and will take precedence. 3348 of 5188
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Chapter 2 Regulatory Environment
There are several Federal and State programs and regulations pertaining to public safety that provide the legal framework to Safety Elements of the General Plan. These programs provide the minimum guidelines and criteria that must be complied with – individual jurisdictions can choose to go beyond the Federal or State requirements and implement more stringent regulations. Some of the specific plans and programs that apply to the City of Glendale are discussed briefly below. This is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. For a more detailed description of the programs described below, refer to the Technical Background Report (Appendix A). For information regarding additional Federal, State and City regulations, refer to the Federal and State Codes of Regulations, and the City of Glendale Municipal Codes.

2.1 California Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act The Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act was signed into law in 1972 and amended in 2023 in Assembly Bill 1046. Its primary purpose is to mitigate the hazard of fault rupture by prohibiting the location of structures for human occupancy across the trace of an active fault. The Act requires the State Geologist to delineate “Earthquake Fault Zones” along faults that are “sufficiently active” and “well defined.” The Act dictates that cities and counties withhold development permits for projects within an Earthquake Fault Zone within their jurisdiction until geologic investigations demonstrate that the projects are not threatened by surface displacements from future faulting. Projects include all land divisions and most structures for human occupancy. State law exempts single-family wood-frame and steel-frame dwellings that are less than three stories and are not part of a development of four units or more. However, local agencies can be more restrictive than the State.

2.2 California Seismic Hazards Mapping Act
The goal of the Seismic Hazards Mapping Act of 1990 is to minimize loss of life and property by identifying and mitigating seismic hazards. The act addresses non-surface fault rupture earthquake hazards, including strong ground shaking, liquefaction and seismically induced landslides. The State agency charged with implementation of the Act is the California Geological Survey (CGS). The CGS prepares and provides local governments with seismic hazard zone maps that identify areas susceptible to amplified shaking, liquefaction, earthquake-induced landslides, and other ground failures. The seismic hazard zones delineated by the CGS are referred to as “zones of required investigation,” because site-specific geological hazard investigations are required for construction projects located within these areas.

2.3 Real Estate Disclosure Requirements
Pursuant to the Natural Hazards Disclosure Act, since June 1, 1998, sellers of real property and their agents are required to provide prospective buyers with a “Natural Hazard Disclosure Statement” when the property being sold lies within one or more State-mapped hazard areas, such as within an Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zone or a Seismic Hazard Zone.

2.4 California Environmental Quality Act
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was passed in 1970 to ensure that local governmental agencies consider and review the environmental impacts of development projects within their jurisdictions.

CEQA requires that an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) be prepared for projects that may have significant effects on the environment. EIRs are required to identify geologic and seismic hazards, and to recommend potential mitigation measures, giving the local agency the authority to regulate private development projects in the early stages of planning. Wildfire exposure is also considered in EIRs with an analysis of impacts on urban development.

2.5 California Building Code
Title 24 Building Standards Code, as adopted by the Division of the State Architect, includes the California Building Code (CBC), which provides “minimum standards to safeguard life or limb, health, property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design, construction, quality of materials, use and occupancy, location and maintenance of all buildings and structures and certain equipment.” These documents are historically updated every three years. The most recent version of the CBC was published in 2022, based on 3349 of 5188
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the International Building Code (IBC). The City of Glendale has adopted the 2022 CBC edition with local amendments.

2.6 Unreinforced Masonry Law
The Unreinforced Masonry Law of 1986 requires all cities and counties in Seismic Zone 4 (CBC, 1998) to identify hazardous unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings in their jurisdictions. Seismic hazard zones are regulatory zones established by the Department of Conservation and the California Geological Survey that encompasses areas that may be at higher risk during earthquakes due to weak soil or rock beneath the area or property.1 Much of the western and eastern portions of the city, near mountainous terrain, are located in seismic hazard zones and are at risk to liquefaction and landslide.2 Thus, owners of such buildings must be notified of the potential earthquake hazard, and mitigation must be performed. The mitigation method, which may include retrofitting or demolition, is left to the local jurisdiction. URMs in Glendale have been identified and catalogued in accordance with Chapter 58 of the Glendale Building Code. As of 2024, of the 703 URM buildings identified in the City, only 2 had not yet been retrofitted or demolished.

2.7 National Flood Insurance Act and Flood Disaster Protection Act The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is mandated by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 to evaluate flood hazards and provide Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM’s) for local and regional planners to promote sound land use and floodplain development.

Further, the Flood Disaster Protection Act requires owners of all structures in identified Special Flood Hazard Areas to purchase and maintain flood insurance as a condition of receiving Federal or federally related financial assistance, such as mortgage loans from federally insured lending institutions. The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 further strengthened the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) by providing a grant program for State and community flood mitigation projects. The act also established a system (Community Rating System - CRS) for crediting communities that implement measures to protect the natural and beneficial functions of their floodplains, as well as managing the erosion hazard. The City of Glendale has participated in the NFIP since 1984 (City ID No. – 065030). The latest FIRM maps for the City were created in 2008, and Glendale has been identified as an eligible and future participating community in FEMA’s list of CRS cities.3

2.8 Fire Regulations and Emergency Evacuation
Assembly Bill 337 (the Bates Bill, adopted September 29, 1992) was passed as a direct result of the great loss of lives and homes in the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire” of 1991. The Bates Bill Process is used to identify Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZs). Under Assembly Bill 3819, passed in 1994 (AB 3819 – Willie Brown), “Class A” roofing, minimum clearances of 30 feet around structures, and other fire defense improvements are required in VHFHSZs.

Assembly Bill 6 (AB6) requires that fire hazard areas be disclosed in real estate transactions. Civil Code Section 1103(c)(6) also requires real estate sellers to inform prospective buyers whether or not a property is located within a wildland area that could contain substantial fire risks and hazards.

Public Resources Code Section 4290 requires minimum statewide fire safety standards pertaining to:
• Road standards for fire equipment access;
• Standards for signs identifying streets, roads, and buildings; • Minimum private water supply reserves for emergency fire use; and • Fuel breaks and greenbelts.
1 California Department of Conservation (CDC). 2024. California Seismic Hazard Zones. https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/sh/seismic-hazard-zones#:~:text=Hazard%20Zone%E2%80%8B%3F- ,%E2%80%8B,fail%20during%20strong%20ground%20shaking. (accessed October 2024) 2 California Department of Conservation (CDC). 2024. EQ Zapp: California Earthquake Hazard Zones Application. https://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geohazards/eq-zapp (accessed October 2024) 3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2024. Community Rating System. https://www.fema.gov/floodplainmanagement/community-rating-system#participating. 3350 of 5188 Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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Wildland fire areas are also subject to Public Resources Code Sections 4291 through 4299, which require property owners in such areas to conduct maintenance in order to reduce the fire danger. The City of Glendale uses the California Fire Code with amendments and several other fire ordinances to further reduce the City’s vulnerability to structural and wildland fires.

Assembly Bill 3065 (passed in 2004) requires that the draft Safety Element be submitted to the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) and local agencies that provide fire protection at least 90 days prior to the local adoption of the Safety Element.

Senate Bill 1241 (passed in 2014) requires the Safety Element to be reviewed and updated to address the risk of fire for land classified as state responsibility areas. The review must consider the suggestions from the Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation (LCI) most recent publication of “Fire Hazard Planning, General Plan Technical Advice Series.” Policies and implementation programs in alignment with the Attorney General’s wildfire mitigation measures must be included in the Safety Element update.

Senate Bill 1035 (passed in 2018) requires the Safety Element to be reviewed at minimum once every eight years and revised as necessary to identify new information relating to flood and fire hazards and climate adaptation and resiliency strategies applicable to the city or county that was not available during the previous revision of the Safety Element.

Assembly Bill 747 (passed in 2019) and requires the Safety Element to address evacuation routes related to identified fire and geologic hazards. As of 2020, Senate Bill 99 requires that the Safety Element will be updated to identify residential developments in any hazard area that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes. To support these evacuation bills, LCI established the Evacuation Planning Technical Advisory (TA) to guide cities and counties as they update their general plan Safety Element in accordance with evacuation requirements.

2.9 Standardized Emergency Management System Law
The Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) is described by the Petris Bill (SB 1841) and is contained in Chapter 1 of Division 2 of Title 19 of the California Code of Regulations. It requires all jurisdictions within the State of California to participate in the establishment of a standardized statewide emergency management system. The California Emergency Services Act, section 8568, states that “the State Emergency Plan shall be in effect in each political subdivision of the State, and the governing body of each political subdivision shall take such action as may be necessary to carry out the provision thereof.” The act provides the basic authorities for conducting emergency operations following the proclamations of emergencies by the Governor or appropriate local authority, such as a City Manager. The City of Glendale has a comprehensive Emergency Plan in accordance with SEMS.

2.10 Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) The primary purpose of the Federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) is to inform communities and citizens of chemical hazards in their areas. Sections 311 and 312 of the EPCRA require businesses to report to state and local agencies the locations and quantities of chemicals stored onsite. Section 313 of the EPCRA requires manufacturers to report the release to the environment of any of more than 600 designated toxic chemicals. These reports help communities prepare to respond to chemical spills and similar emergencies. In the City of Glendale, businesses that use, store or generate any amount of hazardous materials are required to provide the Fire department with an inventory of the hazardous materials that they use. This helps the Fire Department identify the appropriate actions to take in the event of a significant or threatened significant release of a hazardous material.

EPCRA mandates that Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) reports be made public. The TRI is a database that contains information on toxic chemical releases and other waste management activities reported annually by certain industry groups as well as federal facilities. This inventory was established in 1986 under the EPCRA and expanded by the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990.

2.11 Hazardous Materials Disclosure Program
As indicated previously, hazardous materials are extensively legislated by the Federal, State and City governments. The City of Glendale requires all businesses that handle any amount of hazardous materials to submit an inventory of the hazardous materials that they manage to the Glendale Fire Department. This exceeds Federal and State requirements. 3351 of 5188
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In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). Title III of this legislation requires that each community establish a Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). This committee is responsible for developing an emergency plan that outlines steps to prepare for and respond to chemical emergencies in that community.

Several California statutes require the emergency notification of a hazardous chemical release. These include: Health and Safety Codes §25270.7, §25270.8 and §25507; Vehicle Code §23112.5; Public Utilities Code §7673; Government Codes §51018, §8670.25.5(a); Water Codes §13271 and §13272; and California Labor Code §6409.1(b)10. The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, better known as Proposition 65, and §9030 of the California Labor Code also has specific reporting requirements.

The Environmental Management Center (EMC) is a facility run by the Glendale Fire Department’s Hazardous Materials Section that is tasked with administering a household hazardous waste collection plan for the City of Glendale in accordance with the California Integrated Solid Waste Management Act of 1989 (AB 939).

The EMC is located at 780 Flower Street. Established in 1986, this section provides a centralized program for regulating and controlling the use and disposal of hazardous substances in the City. The program added a broad range of activities, including regulating underground storage of hazardous materials, disclosure of inventories of hazardous materials in businesses, planning for hazardous material emergencies, and enforcement of regulations to related hazardous material management.

2.12 Climate Change
Recent amendments to CA Government Code, section 65302(g)(4) require municipalities to address climate change adaptation and resilience strategies within the Safety Element, essentially requiring cities to actively plan for an address the impacts of climate change within their jurisdictions.

Government Code section 65302(g)(4)(A) requires a vulnerability assessment that identifies climate change impacts. This requirement is met by the Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) Risk Assessment, which evaluates climate impacts including wildfire, flooding, extreme heat and sea level rise. Data for these calculations is taken from Cal-Adapt tool and other local data sources, as required by Government Code section 65302(g)(4)(A)(ii). Future updates to the LHMP will continue to expand on this knowledge, bringing in additional information from the Cal-Adapt tool and California Adaptation Planning guide. In addition, there are several other documents that detail vulnerability in Glendale, including the Climate Action and Adaptation Plan (CAAP). This document serves as additional local data sources in keeping with California Government Code section 65302(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III) and (IV).

Government Code section 65302(g)(4)(B) directs cities to create a set of adaptation goals, policies and objectives to adapt to the impacts of climate change. This requirement is met by the inclusion of Chapter 3, Goals S-3, S-4, and S-5, which detail the goals and policies related to flooding hazards, fire hazards, and climate change.

Government Code section 65302(g)(4)(C) requires municipalities to create a set of feasible implementation measures designed to carry out the goals, policies and objectives that relate to climate change. This Element has been updated to include a section on implementation programs, most of which were developed through related planning efforts. The program list in Chapter 4 details the City’s approach to building on the existing mitigation measures discussed above to better address climate change. 3352 of 5188
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Chapter 3 Goals, Policies and Programs

3.1 Seismic and Geologic Hazards

3.1.1 OVERVIEW
A break or fracture between blocks of rock is called a fault. Sudden, differential movement on a fault causes an earthquake. The strain energy released during an earthquake makes the earth vibrate and shake.

Scientists typically use moment magnitude to measure the size of an earthquake, which is based on the amount of energy released and is directly proportional to the area of the fault that ruptured. Earthquake damage is typically measured relative to an intensity scale. The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale describes the observable effects that an earthquake has on structures and people.

The State of California considers a fault active, and therefore capable of generating earthquakes in the future, if it has moved at least once in the last about 11,000 years. Some faults generate an earthquake every few tens to hundreds of years, while others only break once in thousands of years. Faults with shorter recurrence intervals (time between earthquakes) have higher slip rates and are generally considered to pose a greater seismic hazard. In Southern California, the San Andreas and San Jacinto faults have the highest recurrence intervals and are therefore considered to have a higher probability of causing an earthquake in the future. The seismic risk posed by a fault is also dependent on when a fault broke last – a fault with a recurrence interval of five thousand years that has not caused an earthquake in as many years may be near the end of its strain accumulation cycle, and may therefore have a higher probability of rupturing than a fault that just caused an earthquake. If a fault breaks to the ground surface, primary ground rupture occurs. This typically results in a relatively small percentage of the total damage in an earthquake, but structures sitting directly on top of the ruptured fault can be damaged extensively.

Earthquake-induced strong ground shaking causes most of the earthquake damage. Damage to structures is usually caused by strong horizontal ground acceleration, which is measured as a percentage of g, the acceleration of gravity.

The degree of shaking depends on several factors, including earthquake size; location; depth of the focus; orientation and movement of the seismic waves (source effects); the type of sediments or rocks that the seismic waves travel through (path effects); and the interaction between the structures and the sediments or rocks at a specific site (site effects). Strong ground shaking can also trigger the destructive secondary effects of liquefaction and slope failure (landslides). Liquefaction occurs in soft, saturated sediments – when the ground shakes, the water that fills the pores increases in pressure, causing the soil to lose strength and behave as a liquid.

Most of the loss of life and injuries that occur during an earthquake are related to the collapse of buildings and structures, or people being struck by falling objects within buildings. Several types of buildings are known to perform poorly in earthquakes and are therefore considered hazardous. FEMA (1985) defines a hazardous building as “any inadequately earthquake resistant building, located in a seismically active area, that presents a potential for life loss or serious injury when a damaging earthquake occurs.” Some potentially hazardous buildings include unreinforced masonry (URM), soft-stories (tuck-under-parking), tilt-ups, pre-1960 wood frame buildings that are not tied to their foundation or with URM chimneys, and pre-cast concrete buildings.

Slope failure does not need to be triggered by an
earthquake. Some of the most significant factors that
contribute to slope failure include slope height and
steepness, shear strength and orientation of weak
layers in the underlying geologic units, and pore
water pressures. Man-made modifications to a slope
and stream erosion and down-cutting can also cause
a slope to become unstable and fail. Intense
precipitation events, or long periods of sustained
rainfall, can saturate the soils even on a gentle slope, with the potential for the soils, and the underlying
slope, to become unstable. If, in response to gravity,
the saturated soils move down slope, they can form
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extensive damage to structures in their path. Damaging debris flows also often occur on slopes that were burnt recently because there are few roots holding down the soil and the surface is covered with ash and other debris.

Although not sudden and catastrophic, there are other potential geological hazards that if not recognized and mitigated properly, can cause extensive damage to structures. These hazards are specific to the soils that act as a foundation to buildings and infrastructure and include collapsible and expansive soils. Collapsible soils undergo a rearrangement of their grains, and a loss of cementation, resulting in substantial and rapid settlement under relatively low loads. Expansive soils are fine-grained soils with variable amounts of clay minerals that can undergo significant volumetric changes as a result of changes in moisture content. The upward pressures induced by the swelling can have significant harmful effects upon structures and other surface improvements.

Radon gas is a colorless, odorless radioactive gas that forms when naturally occurring radon in the bedrock or soils breaks down. Radon gas can pose a long-term health hazard if it is allowed to collect at high concentrations in structures where people can be exposed to it for long periods of time. There are no immediate symptoms associated with radon gas exposure, but people exposed to elevated concentrations of radon gas over long periods of time can have a higher probability of developing lung cancer. It is estimated that between approximately 7,000 and 30,000 people in the United States die every year due to lung cancer as a result to exposure to radon gas.

3.1.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
The City of Glendale is located at the boundary between two of Southern California’s geomorphic provinces, in an area that is being compressed by geological forces associated with movement on the Pacific and North American tectonic plates. Growth of the San Gabriel Mountains in response to earthquakes on the Sierra Madre fault is the most obvious result of this compression. Other manifestations of this plate boundary include a broad zone of faulting that extends from offshore Southern California inland to the Mojave Desert, and the regular occurrence of earthquakes. Movement of these plates is also causing this portion of Los Angeles basin to rotate clockwise. To accommodate this rotation, several of the faults in the area move laterally, typically with one block moving to the left relative to the other (left-lateral strike-slip).

In the Glendale area, the main faults include the Sierra Madre, the Verdugo and the Raymond faults (see Plate P-1). The Sierra Madre fault is a reverse fault that extends across the northern portion of the City, at the base of the San Gabriel Mountains. A portion of the Sierra Madre fault extending through Glendale is zoned under the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act, so geological evaluations to locate the fault are mandated by State law if developments or re-developments amounting to more than 50 percent of the value of the structure are proposed within this zone.

The Verdugo fault, which extends across the central portion of the City, is thought to be a left-lateral strikeslip fault, similar to the Raymond fault, which is located immediately south of the City. The trace of the Verdugo fault has been mostly obscured by development, except at two locations, at Brand Park in Glendale and at Palm Park in Burbank. Geologic studies to locate the fault at both of these parks have been inconclusive. Therefore, it is proposed that geological studies to evaluate the potential for surface fault rupture should be required for the Verdugo fault only for certain types of development, such as critical facilities.

Similarly, geological investigations of the Sycamore Canyon, Hollywood and York Boulevard faults should also be required. For specific information about these requirements, refer to Section 3.1.3 below.

A worst-case scenario earthquake (maximum magnitude) for Glendale would involve rupture of the Verdugo fault, given that this fault lies directly below extensively developed portions of the City. Both the Sierra Madre and Raymond faults can also cause earthquakes that have the potential to severely impact the City. Several other faults farther away have the potential to generate earthquakes that would be felt in Glendale, but these are unlikely to pose a severe threat to property or human life. in the City, especially if Glendale prepares for the worst-case (Verdugo fault) event. For example, the San Andreas fault has the highest probability of causing an earthquake in Southern California in the near future, but this fault is sufficiently far from Glendale that ground shaking expected in Glendale as a result of this earthquake is not expected to be any stronger than shaking as a result of earthquakes on faults closer to the City. While building collapse may not be a large risk of the San Andreas rupture, there may be risk of damage to existing water infrastructure and roads that could make getting food, water, and medical supplies into the City more difficult.

Given that the City of Glendale is almost completely built out, the reduction of earthquake losses depends primarily on the prudent retrofitting of existing structures. Glendale has identified and catalogued 703 URM 3354 of 5188 Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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buildings in the City in accordance with Chapter 58 of the City Building and Safety Code, and as of 2024, only 2 URMs had not yet been retrofitted or demolished. This program has reduced significantly reduced the City’s seismic vulnerability; however, other potentially hazardous buildings in the City would be identified and retrofitted to reduce even further its vulnerability to strong ground shaking.

Shallow ground water levels (< 50 feet from the ground surface) occur or have occurred historically only in some portions of the City, generally along the Los Angeles River drainage in the southwestern portion of the City, and in the lower reaches of some of the canyons. Shallow ground water has also been reported in the Verdugo Wash area north of the Verdugo fault. Seasonal fluctuations in groundwater levels, and the introduction of residential irrigation requires that site-specific investigations be completed to support these generalizations in areas mapped as potentially susceptible to liquefaction (see Plate P-1). Some areas of the City may also be susceptible to seismically induced settlement. Sites near the base of the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains, at the valley margins, may be particularly vulnerable as a result of differential settlement at the bedrock-alluvial contact.

The City’s hillsides are vulnerable to slope instability due primarily to the fractured, crushed and weathered condition of the bedrock, and the steep terrain (see Plate P-1). Over steepened slopes along the large drainage channels are also locally susceptible to slope instability. The probability of large bedrock landslides occurring is relatively low; therefore, the source of potential losses due to slope instability arises primarily from the occurrence of smaller slope failures in the form of small slides, slumps, soil slips, debris flows and rockfalls. The initiation of such failures is generally tied to a preceding event, such as wildfire, heavy winter storms, seismic activity, or activities.

There have been four cases of landslides that resulted in property damage in Glendale since 1962: San Gabriel Mountains, San Rafael Hills, and Verdugo Mountains. Glendale is expected to experience an increased probability of landslides due to more frequent and severe wildfires and precipitation events.

Landslides pose a threat to communities as Glendale may experience an increase in soil erosion as well as property damage.

Some of the geologic units in the Glendale area may have fine-grained components that are moderately to highly expansive, typically along faults and fracture zones, where the bedrock has been ground to a finegrained, plastic material. Fine-grained sediments may also occur along the southern portion of the City, in the distal (farthest from the source) portions of the alluvial fans. These fine-grained units may not be present at the surface but may be exposed during grading for construction.

The Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Geological Survey have mapped Los Angeles County, California as having a moderate potential for radon gas. However, the EPA warns that structures with elevated levels of radon gas have been found in areas mapped as having a low or moderate potential for radon gas. Therefore, the EPA recommends that all homes be tested for radon gas regardless of geographic location. If a home tests with elevated levels of radon gas, there are several mitigation measures that can be taken to reduce these concentrations to more acceptable levels, although reducing radon gas levels to less than 2 picoCuries per liter (pCi/L) is difficult.

GOAL S-1 Seismic Hazards
Goal 1. Reduce the loss of life, injury, private property damage, infrastructure damage, economic losses and social dislocation and other impacts resulting from seismic hazards.

Policy 1-1 Building readiness for earthquakes. The City shall ensure that new buildings are designed to address earthquake hazards and shall promote the improvement of existing structures to enhance their safety in the event of an earthquake.

Program 1-1.1 The City shall adopt and enforce the latest version of Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations (California Building Code) with local amendments, including nearsource seismic conditions.

Program 1-1.2: The City shall maintain knowledgeable staff that can identify structural deficiencies in buildings and offer information to building owners on effective structural reinforcement options.
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Program 1-1.3: The City shall encourage owners of potentially hazardous buildings, whether identified by the State or other governmental entity, to implement seismic safety improvements on those buildings.

Program 1-1.4: The City shall cooperate with the Glendale Unified School District and the Glendale Community College District, as requested, to assist their efforts to improve the structural safety of their buildings.

Policy 1-2: Local Fault Hazard Management. The City shall enforce the provisions of the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act and the Seismic Hazards Mapping Act, with additional local provisions.

Program 1-2.1: The City shall require geological studies as part of development proposals in the Fault Hazard Management Zones shown on Plate P-1. The studies shall be conducted by State-certified engineering geologists following the guidelines published by the California Geological Survey (Note 49). The City shall require a State-certified engineering geologist or registered civil engineer, having competence in the field of seismic hazard evaluation and mitigation, to review the study at the applicant’s expense. The review shall determine the adequacy of the hazard evaluation and proposed mitigation measures and determine whether the requirements of State law are satisfied, as described in Note 49: Guidelines for Evaluating the Hazard of Surface Fault Rupture by the California Geological Survey, incorporated herein by reference.

Program 1-2.2: The City shall require geological studies as part of development proposals for critical facilities if such facilities are proposed within the Fault Hazard Management Zones of the Verdugo, Mt. Lukens, Hollywood and Sycamore Canyon faults as shown on Plate P-1. The studies shall be conducted in accordance with the California Geological Survey guidelines for surface fault rupture evaluations (Note 49). The City shall require a State-certified engineering geologist having competence in the field of seismic hazard evaluation and mitigation to review the study at the applicant’s expense. The review shall determine the adequacy of the hazard evaluation and proposed mitigation measures and determine whether the requirements of State law are satisfied in accordance with Note 49: Guidelines for Evaluating the Hazard of Surface Fault Rupture, by the California Geological Survey.

Program 1-2.3: The City shall require liquefaction assessment studies as part of development proposals in areas identified by the California Geological Survey as susceptible to liquefaction (see Plate P-1). The studies shall be conducted in accordance with the California Geological Survey’s Special Publication 117: Guidelines for Evaluating and Mitigating Seismic Hazards in California, and the Southern California Earthquake Center’s (1999) procedures to implement Special Publication 117 – Liquefaction Hazards (both documents incorporated herein by reference). On sites shown to be susceptible to liquefaction, the City shall require the implementation of mitigation measures designed to reduce this hazard to an acceptable level. The City shall require a State-certified engineering geologist or registered civil engineer, having competence in the field of seismic hazard evaluation and mitigation, to review the study at the applicant’s expense. The review shall determine the adequacy of the hazard evaluation and proposed mitigation measures and determine whether the requirements of State law are satisfied, as described in Special Publication 117 by the California Geological Survey.

Programs 1-2.4: The City shall require slope stability analyses as part of development proposals in areas identified by the California Geological Survey as susceptible to earthquakeinduced landsliding (see Plate P-1). The studies shall be conducted in accordance with the California Geological Survey’s Special Publication 117: Guidelines for Evaluating and Mitigating Seismic Hazards in California, and the Southern California Earthquake Center’s (2002) guidelines for evaluating and mitigating landslide hazards in California. On sites shown to be susceptible to earthquake-induced slope instability, the City shall require the implementation of mitigation measures designed to reduce this hazard to an acceptable level. The City shall require a State-certified 3356 of 5188 Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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engineering geologist or registered civil engineer, having competence in the field of seismic hazard evaluation and mitigation, to review the study at the applicant’s expense. The review shall determine the adequacy of the hazard evaluation and proposed mitigation measures and determine whether the requirements of State law are satisfied, as described in the California Geological Survey’s Special Publication 117.

Policy 1-3: Public Essential Structures and Critical Facilities. The City shall ensure to the fullest extent possible that, in the event of a major earthquake, essential structures and critical facilities will remain safe and operational. Critical facilities include hospitals, police stations, fire stations, emergency operation centers (as shown on Plate 1-4 of Appendix A: Technical Background Report), communication centers, generators and substations, reservoirs and “lifeline” infrastructure (as defined in Section 1.8.3 of Appendix A: Technical Background Report). The vulnerability of some of these critical facilities is summarized in Table-1 (at the end of this document).

Program 1-3.1: The City shall review the seismic vulnerability of critical facilities and “lifelines” in the Alquist-Priolo fault zones and other Fault Hazard Management Zones and make structural changes to those sections of lifelines that cross fault hazard zones that, based on the vulnerability assessment are not anticipated to perform well during an earthquake. Retrofit of these facilities shall be prioritized.

Program 1-3.2: The City shall replace the piping and fittings in those City-owned water tanks that are not currently fitted with flexible, earthquake-resistant joints.

Program 1-3.3: The City shall conduct, in cooperation with the State Office of Dam Safety, an annual review of the dams and water storage facilities in the City. The City shall follow the State’s requests in response to these annual reviews.

Policy 1-4: Application of Seismic and Geological Data to Private Development. The City shall ensure that current seismic and geologic knowledge and State-certified professional review are incorporated into the design, planning and construction stages of a project, and that sitespecific data are applied to each project.

Program 1-4.1: The City shall make available to the public the State’s list of all available registered engineering geologists and soils engineers from the State Board of Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors, and Geologists, to review, at the applicant’s expense, all geologic and geotechnical reports, including fault studies, for proposed development or redevelopment, and to review grading operations.

Program 1-4.2: The City shall partner with State Board certified geologists or soils engineers to provide the State with updated information on faults, landslide hazards, liquefaction, etc., as such data are generated by project-specific studies. The City shall work with the State to update the seismic hazards maps produced by the State that are relevant to the City.

Policy 1-5: Public information regarding seismic and geological hazards The City shall ensure public access to information regarding seismic and geologic hazards.

Program 1-5.1: The City shall regularly review the technical data on public safety and seismic safety for use in the planning process and undertake revisions or updates to the Safety Element as needed. This includes replacing maps with updated maps obtained from the State of California.

Program 1-5.2: The City shall develop a web-based system to communicate information about seismic and geologic hazards to the public, and describe strategies that people can implement at home and the workplace to reduce economic losses and improve personal safety.

Program 1-5.3: The City shall promote earthquake preparedness with publications available in various languages spoken in the community.
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Program 1-5.4: The City shall provide its residents with information about the hazards posed by radon gas, with emphasis on published sources and resources available on this subject.

GOAL S-2 Geologic Hazards
Goal 2. Reduce the loss of life, injury, private property damage, infrastructure damage, economic losses and social dislocation and other impacts resulting from geologic hazards.

Policy 2-1: Development in geologically hazardous areas. The City shall avoid development in areas of known slope instability or high landslide risk when possible and will require that developments on sloping ground use design and construction techniques appropriate for those areas.

Program 2-1.1: The City shall require geological and geotechnical investigations in areas of potential seismic or geologic hazards as part of the environmental and development review process. The City will not issue permits for development or redevelopment until assured that all potential geologic hazards have been mitigated.

Program 2-1.2: The City shall require preliminary geological investigations of tract sites by Stateregistered geotechnical engineers and certified engineering geologists (in accordance with the California Building Code and the City of Glendale’s Grading, Fills and Excavations Code – City Code 15.12).

Program 2-1.3: In those areas of Glendale susceptible to slope instability, the City shall require geotechnical investigations that include engineering analyses of slope stability, provide surface and subsurface drainage specifications, and provide detailed design for fill placement and excavation.

Program 2-1.4: The City shall discourage any grading beyond that which is necessary to create adequate and safe building areas. The City shall conduct regular inspection of grading operations to maximize site safety and compatibility with community character.

Program 2-1.5: The City shall prohibit grading that is inconsistent with the Grading Ordinance. The City shall encourage the use of varied slope ratios on manufactured slopes to reduce the visual impact of grading.

Program 2-1.6: The City shall prohibit reconstruction of structures meant for human habitation that were damaged or destroyed by failed slopes unless the applicant can prove that the remedial measures proposed will improve the unstable slope conditions such that the site is suitable for development.

Policy 2-2: Slope stability monitoring near evacuation routes. The City shall consider monitoring slope stability in areas adjacent to designated evacuation routes and critical facilities to minimize increasing risk of landslides due to climate-change related increases in wildfires and extreme precipitation events.

Program 2-2.1: The City shall consider establishing a regular inspection and maintenance cycle for existing physical landslide and debris flow defenses, including inspections prior to heavy rain events and post-wildfire events.

Program 2-2.2: The City shall consider implementing the following strategies to address increasing vulnerabilities associated with debris flow and landslides: upgrading and improving drainage capacity, reconstructing retaining walls, installing netting and vegetation, avoiding clear cutting, and stabilizing the soil after tree clearing, such as with compost and mulch.

Program 2-2.3 The City shall consider identifying locations where slopes should be actively monitored and installing landslide monitoring equipment especially in landslide susceptible areas near evacuation routes and critical assets to detect any changes in local hillside hydrologic conditions. 3358 of 5188
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3.2 Flooding Hazards

3.2.1 OVERVIEW
Rain in Southern California is generally a welcomed event – it cleans the air, makes our hills and mountains green, and provides water for drinking and recreation. Intense or prolonged rainfall, however, can cause problems in areas where people have encroached onto the floodplain, modified the landscape and built structures in areas meant to convey excess water during floods. Communities may experience overflowing river channels, flooded streets and basements, mudflows and debris flows at the mouths of canyons, and other similar conditions that can cause extensive damage to property, injuries, and, in some cases, loss of life.

In developed areas, extensive impervious surfaces
(such as pavement, buildings, and concrete walkways)
cause most precipitation to be collected as runoff.

Storm drain systems are typically designed to safely
carry the runoff through the area without ponding or
flooding. However, plugged or partially obstructed
storm drain inlets can significantly reduce the ability of the storm drain system to collect and convey the water.

Regular inspection and maintenance of the storm drain
system is required to remove any obstructing debris.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) defines the “base flood” or “100-year flood”
as a flood that has a 1-percent or greater chance of
being equaled or exceeded during any given year. A
base flood has a 26-percent chance of occurring
during a 30-year period, generally the length of most home mortgages. However, the recurrence interval represents the long-term average period between floods of a specific magnitude; rare floods could occur at short intervals or even within the same year.

Seismically induced inundation refers to flooding that results when water retention structures (such as dams) fail due to an earthquake. Dams greater than 25 feet in height or reservoirs with more than 50 acrefeet in storage capacity are required to have inundation maps that show the potential flood limits in the event that the dam is breached catastrophically. Inundation maps are prepared for emergency preparedness planning, and in no way reflect the structural integrity or safety of the dam in question.

3.2.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
While Glendale is not within the 100-year or 500-year FEMA floodplain zone, the City is at risk of flooding during extreme precipitation events. In the case of atmospheric rivers, the stormwater drainage system may be overwhelmed and increase flood vulnerability in Glendale. The Verdugo Wash is the main flood control channel in the City, separating Glendale into quadrants. The Verdugo Wash flows southeast to south, and cuts through a rising block of bedrock that we now refer to as the Verdugo Mountains on the west, and the San Rafael Hills on the east. Once it clears the Verdugo Mountains, the Verdugo Wash veers west-southwest and eventually drains into the Los Angeles River near the intersection of the Golden State (I-5) and Ventura (SR-134) Freeways. The Verdugo Wash and several of its tributaries have been confined to man-made channels since the late 1930s. In most years, this system carries little water, with peak discharges typically less than 500 cubic feet per second (cfs). Records indicate however, that the area experiences severe wet winters, and Verdugo Wash then carries peak flows exceeding 51,480 cfs.4 Due to climate change, some segments of the Verdugo Wash will experience an increase in peak flood flows as described later in this section.

Historical records show that historical peak discharges in the Glendale area have occurred most often between November and March, indicating that future flooding in the City is most likely to occur in the winter months. Storm events can generate debris flows in the upper reaches of the watershed, at and near the base of the San Gabriel Mountains, and at the base of the Verdugo Hills. This is more likely to happen in wet years in areas recently burned by wildfires. Debris flooding has occurred previously in many of the canyons near 4 Verdugo Wash. 2022. Verdugo Wash Vision Report. https://www.verdugowash.com/ (accessed October 2024). 3359 of 5188
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the Glendale area. For example, the worst storm recorded in the area occurred in 1934, following a wildfire burn in the same area that had occurred two months earlier. As a result of these two events, the storm waters carried large amounts of debris. Roads were choked, bridges were washed out, several people died, and erosion and sedimentation damaged property. The Verdugo Wash was constructed in response to this flood event.

Post-wildfire debris and associated landslides can increase the vulnerability of critical facilities such as schools, fire and police stations, and water pump stations. Debris flows can block waterways, and stormwater drains which can cause roads to flood and obstruct roadways, especially following wildfires. Therefore, with increased extreme precipitation and wildfire events, Glendale may experience increased debris flow. The Glendale Water & Power (GWP) Wildfire Mitigation Plan outlines procedures for vegetation management, wildfire power safety shutoffs, and other activities to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities. Implementing policies to manage increased debris due to climate change hazards can reduce vulnerability to critical facilities and increase overall resilience.

A study of Verdugo Wash conducted in 1978 for the Los Angeles Department of Public Works shows that the channel could accommodate the estimated peak flows everywhere, except in the area immediately north of where Verdugo Wash joins the Los Angeles River. Two recent studies were conducted to better understand the current needs and conditions of the Verdugo Wash. In 2015, the US Army Corps of Engineers developed a review plan to analyze repair needs for the Verdugo Wash. Another study, the 2022 Verdugo Wash Visioning report, models the capacity of the Verdugo Wash with considerations around future climate change projections. The impacts of climate change will increase the risk of flooding due to an increase in peak flows along the Verdugo Wash. Flow rates vary through different segments of the Verdugo Wash range from 9,665 cfs to 51,480 cfs. The modeling indicates that in the Henderson Canyon segment, which is the northern most 2.5 mile area of the Verdugo Wash, there could be an overflow. In fact, this area is known to flood regularly during winter storms dating back to the 1978 study. In the southern segment of the Verdugo Wash, peak flows will overflow at the Confluence segment. Nevertheless, in 1979, the FEMA determined that, “for all practical purposes no part of the community would be inundated by the base flood. . .”, and therefore, that the entire community would be classified as Zone C (area of minimal flood hazards where the purchase of flood insurance is not mandatory). In 1984, FEMA again informed the City that no Special Flood Hazard Areas were present within the corporate limits of the City at that time, and thus that the City was placed in Zone D, which has no mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements. In 2008, FEMA prepared Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) and the City of Glendale was placed in Zone D. Glendale is a future participant of FEMA’s Community Rating System (CRS) as part of the National Flood Program. With over 1,500 communities participating nationwide, the CRS is a voluntary incentive program encouraging community floodplain management practices beyond the minimum requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).

There are five dams in the Glendale area, Brand Park, Diedrich Reservoir, Glenoaks 968 Reservoir, Chevy Chase 1290, and East Glorietta, that are large enough that the State requires that inundation maps for these facilities be available, plus several other debris basins, such as the Oakmont Debris Basin at the northerly end of the Verdugo Wash and Brand Debris Basin Dam Number CA 01152, which are not owned nor operated by the City (owned by Los Angeles County of Public Works).. All of the larger structures are more than 50 years old and were therefore most likely not designed to withstand the strong ground shaking that the area is thought capable of experiencing given the several nearby seismic sources. Diederich Reservoir and Brand Park Dam are located within the Fault Hazard Management Zone for the Verdugo fault, and possibly just north of the fault trace. East Glorietta Dam is located in an area thought to be susceptible to liquefaction. The 10th and Western 5-004 dam, also known as the Western Reservoir, is located near, but south of the Verdugo fault. Glenoaks 968 Reservoir is located in an area where several inactive faults have been mapped; however, secondary faulting in response to movement on other faults could occur in the area.

In addition to the dams, there are 12 potable and 4 recycled water storage tanks in the City. Three of these tanks are located within the fault hazard management zone for the Sierra Madre fault. Most, but not all, of these tanks are fitted with flexible joints that can accommodate some of the lateral and vertical movements associated with an earthquake.

Climate change may cause areas throughout Glendale to experience more frequent stormwater flooding.

Stormwater systems may be overwhelmed more frequently as more extreme rain events occur, causing localized flooding which could impact properties and leave roads temporarily unusable. Areas with high amounts of impermeable surfaces and those adjacent to drainage systems are prone to stormwater flooding during periods of heavy rainfall. 3360 of 5188
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Flooding can occur because of overwhelmed stormwater systems. When an influx of stormwater exceeds a drainage system’s capacity to infiltrate water into the soil or to carry it away, localized stormwater flooding can occur. Urban landscapes tend to be built with impermeable surfaces that do not allow much water to infiltrate the ground and this increases the amount of runoff that must be channeled in storm drainage systems and carried elsewhere. Most urban drainage infrastructure was not built to manage stormwater flows from the increased precipitation events that are occurring and will occur more frequently with climate change and can be costly to retrofit. As a result, the costs and impact of urban flooding are expected to increase as precipitation patterns become more extreme due to climate change.

Flooding impacts directly create physical damage from inundation while also increasing risks to the community. Flooding can lead to cascading risks due to loss of power, wastewater management issues, pollution and hazardous materials carried by stormwater, and overwhelmed storm drainage infrastructure, exacerbating public health concerns. Road closures and power outages will cause disruptions to commuters and to residential and commercial development.

GOAL S-3 Flooding Hazards
Goal 3. Reduce the loss of life, injury, private property damage, infrastructure damage, economic losses, and social dislocation and other impacts resulting from flooding hazards.

Policy 3-1: Flood Control Measures. The City shall investigate the potential for future flooding in the area and will encourage the adoption of flood-control measures in low-lying areas of alluvial fans, along major channels, and down-gradient of large reservoirs and water tanks.

Program 3-1.1: The City shall participate in the National Flood Insurance Program.

Program 3-1.2: The City shall discourage additions to, or the reconstruction of, critical facilities if such facilities are located in dam or reservoir inundation pathways (shown on Plate P-2) unless it can be demonstrated that the proposed project and any occupants will be protected from dam or reservoir failure.

Program 3-1.3: The City shall evaluate the potential impacts to the flood control system during the environmental review process for new buildings or building additions. Hydrological studies to assess the impacts shall be required if determined necessary by the City.

Potential impacts shall be fully mitigated.

Program 3-1.4: The City shall maintain City-owned storm drain facilities, consistent with the City’s Stormwater and Urban Runoff Pollution and the Safe, Clean Water Program, to prevent the accumulation of debris or other obstructions that would hamper the effectiveness of the system during rainy days.

Program 3-1.5: The City shall upgrade stormwater systems on City-owned properties and rights-ofway to limit flooding from extreme precipitation events while also improving water filtration and quality. Deployment of such strategies such as green infrastructure (bioswales shall be prioritized in high socially vulnerable census tracts.

Program 3-1.6: The City shall contact the Los Angeles County Flood Control District to discuss implementing flood mitigation measures to mitigate any increased flood risk along the Verdugo Wash.
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3.3 Fire Hazards

3.3.1 OVERVIEW
Since the 1970s, several different methods to map
the wildfire hazard of an area have been
developed. Many of these methods rely on a point
system that considers the type and amount of
vegetation, termed fuel loading, slope gradient,
weather, dwelling density, access, level of service
provided by the local fire department, and past fire
history of an area in determining its fire hazard.

Areas with a high fire hazard at the urban-wildland
interface have to follow, at a minimum, the model
ordinance adopted by the California Fire Marshal,
but individual jurisdictions can have more stringent
requirements. These requirements include
vegetation management practices to create a
defensible space around structures (defensible
space is a zone of thinned vegetation that helps
slow the rate and intensity of a fire and provides space for fire-fighters to set up to suppress the fire and save the threatened structures), fire-resistive building materials, and minimum access road criteria.

More people than ever now live and play in or at the wildland-urban interface, an area with a high fire hazard, especially if large amounts of combustible vegetation have been allowed to accumulate over time as a result of the fuel management practices common during a large part of the 20th Century. If a wildfire spreads onto the built environment, multiple structural ignitions can develop in a short period of time due to wind transport of brands or cinders. Fires at the urban-wildland interface can be particularly dangerous and complex, posing a severe threat to public and firefighter safety, and causing devastating losses of both life and property. This has happened at several high-profile fires at the urban-wildland interface in the last 15 years (e.g., the Palisades Fire in 2025, the Eaton Fire in 2025, the 2020 August Complex in the Humboldt area, the Dixie Fire 2021 in the Butte-Pulmas County area, and the 2017 Santa
Barbara fire). A notable fire in the City’s history was the College Hills fire of June 1990, which burned 100 acres and destroyed 64 homes in the foothills of the San Rafael Hills.

More recent fires have occurred in City limits burning 1,629 acres in the 2000s (161,582 acres burned in total) and 399 acres in the 2010s (7,051 acres burned in total).

Unlike wildfires at the urban-wildland interface, which appear to be increasing in number and dollar loss, the
number of structural fires in the developed portions of cities has decreased over time, in great part due to the use of fire-resistive building materials and internal fire sprinklers, smoke detectors and fire alarms, and the faster response by better trained fire-fighters with better equipment. Nevertheless, earthquakes can generate structural fires that have the potential to severely tax the local fire suppression agencies, especially if the water supply system is impaired due to damage to the water reservoirs and/or water mains.

3.3.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
The portions of the San Rafael Hills and the Verdugo and San Gabriel Mountains within City limits are mapped as having a high fire hazard due to the steep topography of the area, the presence of flammable vegetation, and limited access (see Plate P-2). In fact, Glendale’s Fire Department places nearly two-thirds of the City in the high fire hazard area. The historical record supports this mapping: since the late 1800s, the entire northern two-thirds of the City has burned at least once. The Glendale climate often contributes to the likelihood of fires. Dried out vegetation from the hot summer months is exposed to Santa Ana wind conditions in the fall. Such winds become extremely erratic when combined with winds generated from burning vegetation and can stress fire-fighting resources and reduce fire 3362 of 5188 -fighting success. In addition, large Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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mountainous areas in Glendale contain rough topography which not only facilitates the spread of fire, but also impedes or hinders responding fire-fighting personnel and equipment. Traffic congestion in the urban areas and long travel distances and narrow, winding roads in the hillsides and mountains also can hinder fire department response to the urban-wildland interface areas. These areas have a history of fires, with some areas experiencing a wildland fire at least once a decade. Residents in all of these areas must be informed that they live in a hazardous area, and that they are responsible for maintaining their properties. This includes, but is not limited to, establishing a fire-resistant landscape consistent with Glendale’s 1993 Hillside Management Plan, and building with fire-resistant materials in accordance with Glendale’s Building and Safety Code. In addition, the Fire Zone Management Guidelines recommends using the Hillside Management Plan’s two suggested plant palettes around flammable structures with certain buffer requirements. This is especially critical in some of the older, pre-fire planning developments in the mountainous, high-fire hazard areas where access is limited by narrow roads with no secondary outlet and steep grades, which hamper the Fire Department’s response.

To reduce the wildland fire hazard, especially at the wildland-urban interface, the City of Glendale has adopted an aggressive fuel modification ordinance that requires property owners to maintain a defensible space around their properties. The Fire Department conducts annual inspections of residences and lots in the City to ensure compliance with the fuel modification ordinance, and issues notices of violation where appropriate. Glendale should continue to require property owners to conduct maintenance on their properties to reduce the fire danger in accordance with the City’s Building and Fire Safety Codes.

Fire hazards could also result in direct and indirect impacts on power delivery to Glendale community members. There are three overhead transmission lines owned and operated by GWP that pass through the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZs) in north Glendale. GWP engages in several programs to reduce the impacts associated with potential power disruption due to wildfire events. According to the GWP Wildfire Prevention Mitigation Plan, GWP has a Public Safety Shutoff Events program that involves providing 24–48-hour advanced notice, as well as more immediate shutoff notifications to limit the potential of triggering a wildfire and to avoid damaging electrical infrastructure from peak demand periods. Since wildfires are most often triggered by vegetation coming into direct contact with electric utilities, GWP also maintains a Vegetation Management Plan to reduce fuel load that can contribute to fire spread (City of Glendale 2022).

In addition, impacts anywhere along those transmission lines outside of Glendale could also cause issues within Glendale if enough capacity is not available locally to meet demand. Several major earthquakegenerating faults within the City of Glendale could trigger multiple fires (such as from downed electrical lines or broken gas mains), disrupt life-line services (water supply) and trigger other geologic hazards, such as landslides or rock–falls, which could block roads and hinder emergency response. In addition, freeways, railways, and pipelines within the City of Glendale introduce significant fire and other risks for which the City must respond. Earthquake-induced fires pose a risk in the developed, downtown areas of the City, the result of downed electric lines, broken gas mains, and tipped-over appliances. Loss estimation models conducted in 2003 indicate that earthquakes on the Sierra Madre, Verdugo, Raymond and Hollywood faults have the potential to cause significant fire-after-earthquake losses in the City of Glendale. Multiple ignitions over a broad area of the City can tax the local Fire Department, especially if the water reservoirs or water mains are also damaged during the earthquake.

Most development in Glendale occurs in the flatlands, where the predominant housing type is multiple-family units (apartments and condominiums) that have special fire protection needs. To that end, City ordinances require all mid-rise and high-rise buildings to have fire and life safety systems in place, including automatic fire sprinklers and smoke detectors. The specific construction requirements are contained in the Glendale Building and Safety Code (Volume I, Section 715 which deals with construction requirements in fire hazard areas, and Volume VI, which pertains to fire and life-safety requirements).

The Glendale Fire Department (GFD) is responsible for fire suppression in the City. Nine fire stations are strategically located throughout the City to provide the level of service that has gained the GFD an Insurance Services Office (ISO) rating of 1, the highest rating possible (at this time, only 329 communities in the United States have been awarded an ISO rating of 1). The GFD responds to more than 90 percent of the emergency calls within 6 minutes of receiving the call at dispatch. The City of Glendale has adopted ordinances that exceed the minimum State requirements for fire hazard abatement. These ordinances include the requirement that all new roofs and re-roofs amounting to more than 25 percent of the original roof area to be done in Class A roofing materials. The Class A roof-covering ordinance first applied only to structures within the high fire hazard area but is now enforced Citywide. Since 1989, the City has also required internal fire 3363 of 5188
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sprinklers in all new residential one- and two-family structures. Most of the City-adopted ordinances have become effective years ahead of the rest of California, setting an example for other communities A twenty-year Glendale incident history shows that the number of incidents reports has doubled from 11,000 calls in 2003 to 22,000 calls in 2023, reflective of the population growth experienced. The number of medical emergencies compared to fire calls has increased over time and represent nearly 80 percent of all Fire Department incident calls. If the number of medical emergency responses continue to increase (which is likely, considering the aging population), and this is found to have an impact on the availability of fire-fighting personnel and equipment, it may be prudent to add another rescue ambulance and support squad vehicle and increase staffing at the fire station in the area of the City with the highest rate of medical incidents.

The GFD has several proactive programs in place to reduce the fire hazard in the City. It participates in the plan review of nearly all buildings, discretionary approvals, and other development (both public and private).

This review ensures that all new projects have Fire Department “master planning” incorporated in their design. The Fire Department has full-time fire investigators that work closely with the Police Department, and it participates in several educational programs. This includes Fire Department personnel assigned full-time to public education, contracting with a private professional acting company to perform fire safety plays. The Jr. Fire Program aims to engage with children in elementary school to teach the importance of fire safety and emergency preparedness. The program hosts an annual picnic with games and prizes for students that participate in an essay and drawing contest within the Glendale Unified School District and other youth groups.

In regards to emergency response, the
Glendale Fire Department requires EMT-D
(Emergency Medical Technician -
Defibrillator) certification of all of its
firefighters and Ambulance Operators and
requires at least one member on each
apparatus be EMT-P (Paramedic) certified.

The Glendale Fire Department has mutual
aid agreements with the larger surrounding
agencies of Los Angeles City Fire
Department and Los Angeles County Fire
Department. Additionally, the Department
has a joint powers agreement with
Pasadena and Burbank to dispatch through
the Verdugo Joint Fire Communications Center for which covers Fire Departments for 13 cities including the Hollywood Burbank Airport. The Verdugo Joint Fire Communications Center coordinates emergency calls for the cities of Glendale, Burbank, Pasadena, South Pasadena, Arcadia, Alhambra, Sierra Madre, San Gabriel, San Marino, Monterey Park, Montebello, West Covina and the Hollywood Burbank Airport. The Department has several interdepartmental agreements that ensure cooperation for emergency response (for example, Fire has an agreement with the Glendale Water and Power Department for automatic dispatch upon second alarm). It has automatic aid agreements with the adjacent cities of Burbank, Pasadena, and Los Angeles, and the County of Los Angeles. Also, it is partly to an agreement that authorizes calls for emergency response to be dispatched through the Verdugo Joint Fire Communications Center, which coordinates 49 different stations in the region, which includes stations from Glendale, Burbank, Pasadena, San Marino, South Pasadena, Monrovia, Arcadia, Sierra Madre and San Gabriel. The City of Glendale activity participates in the Standardized Statewide Emergency Management System (SEMS).

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has mapped the most up to date Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) throughout California (as may be amended by CAL FIRE in the future). The FHSZ maps are developed using a science-based and field-tested model that assigns a hazard score based on the factors that influence fire likelihood and fire behavior. Many factors are considered such as fire history, existing and potential fuel (natural vegetation), predicted flame length, blowing embers, terrain, and typical fire weather for the area. There are three levels of hazard in the State Responsibility Areas: moderate, high, and very high. FHSZs are identified for local government jurisdictions in areas known as Local Responsibility Areas (LRA). The City of Glendale is responsible for fire protection within these LRA areas.

The large amounts of open space and wildland make Glendale susceptible to brush fires year-round. The proximity of native vegetation and the climate of the region contribute to sections of the City having Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZs), as illustrated in 3364 of 5188 Plate-3, which shows the most up to date VHFHSZs.

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Critical facilities are facilities in either the public or private sector that provide essential products and services to the public, are otherwise necessary to preserve the welfare and quality of life in the City, or fulfills important public safety, emergency response, and/or disaster recovery functions. The City’s critical facilities include schools, fire stations, police stations, transportation systems, libraries, parks, City Hall, hospitals, and utility systems. According to Plate P-3, there are 2 libraries, 5 fire stations, 1 police station, 1 landfill, 1 hospital, 8 schools, 1 water treatment plant, 23 Potable/Recycled Water Pump Stations, 20 parks, and transmission lines located in the most up to date VHFHSZs.

The frequency, area, and severity of wildfires have increased significantly within Los Angeles County over the past two decades. Wildfire events are a product of temperature increases, precipitation declines, and high wind events, which compound to create wildfire prone conditions. Glendale has a history of wildfires in the past 50 years and due to climate change, projected annual wildfire probability is expected to increase by 30 percent by mid-century. Wildfires may lower water quality, cause power delivery disruption and property damage, increase habitat loss, and strain emergency services. In addition, communities may experience impacts on public health, air quality decline, fatal and non-fatal injuries, and income loss due to high exposures to wildfire smoke. Wildfires that burn within City limits can pose a significant threat to community members and can burn homes.

Policies and programs herein are consistent with the requirements of California Government Code Section 65302(g) and are based on the Attorney General’s Wildfire Guidance, CAL FIRE’s General Plan Safety Element Assessment, and recommendations from CAL FIRE and the California State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection. Rincon did not develop original policies to mitigate wildfire.

GOAL S-4 Fire Hazard
Goal 4. Reduce the loss of life, injury, private property damage, infrastructure damage, economic losses and social dislocation and other impacts resulting from fire hazards.

Policy 4-1: Fire Service and Response. The City shall ensure to the extent possible that fire services, such as fire equipment, infrastructure, and response times, are adequate for all areas of the City.

Program 4-1.1: The City shall conduct annual fire flow tests, especially in areas of high fire hazard, and shall implement water system improvements for hydrants and fire flow.

Program 4-1.2: The City shall prepare periodic Fire Station location and Resource studies.

Program 41.3: The City shall ensure that road standards meet the needs for emergency access.

Program 4-1.4: The City shall improve emergency access for areas currently below standard.

Program 4-1.5: The City shall install traffic signal preemption devices for fire response at critical intersections.

Program 4-1.6: The City shall evaluate the impact of traffic calming measures on emergency response times.

Program 4-1.7: The City shall monitor and identify current trends (including population and settlement patterns, incident trends, and changes in the economic, social and/ or cultural makeup of the community) that may impact the City’s ability to provide adequate emergency services.

Program 4-1.8: The City shall conduct studies to determine whether improvements are needed in the areas of public education and fire prevention.

Program 4-1.9: The City shall ensure that road standards meet the needs for emergency access and that access roads are not restricted by parked cars.

Program 4-1.10 The City shall coordinate with telecommunication service entities, and the Los Angeles County Cable and Telecommunications Office to fire-harden communications.
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Program 4-1.11 The City shall ensure that adequate equipment, staffing, training, and resources are provided to the Glendale Fire Department to meet current and future projected service demands and fire protection needs. Review new developments in the most up to date VHFHSZs to ensure that adequate fire protection provisions are in place, including fire flow and emergency vehicle access.

Policy 4-2 New Development. The City shall require fire protection plans for all new developments and discourage new residential development within the most up to date VHFHSZs, where feasible.

Ensure fire protection plans include risk analysis, consideration of increased wildfire hazards due to climate change, fire response capabilities, fire safety requirements, fuel management, mitigation measures and design requirements, and wildfire education maintenance and limitations. Limit new development in areas with single access points in and adjacent to steeply sloped terrain (greater than 40 percent slope) that would result in significant and unavoidable impacts relating to rapid wildfire spread.

Program 4-2.1: The City shall encourage residents to plant and maintain drought-resistant, fireresistant landscape species to reduce the risk of brush fire and soil erosion in areas adjacent to canyons, and develop stringent site design and maintenance standards for areas with high fire hazard or soil erosion potential.

Program 4-2.2: The City shall enforce the Weed Abatement Program in high fire hazard areas.

Program 4-2.3: Fuel management plans shall be required for all new development in areas subject to wildfire.

Program 4-2.4: The City shall enforce the Uniform Fire Code and Municipal Fire Code Amendments for new construction in fire hazard areas, including the use of sprinklers in residential structures.

Program 4-2.5: The City shall consider fire safety issues during revisions to the Zoning Ordinance.

Program 4-2.6: The City shall develop a program for monitoring and enforcing environmental mitigation measures or conditions of approval applied to projects.

Program 4-2.7: The City shall enforce a Class A Roofing ordinance or better for residential and commercial developments. Residents with existing wood-shingle or unrated roofing materials shall be encouraged to upgrade to fire resistive building materials, including fire resistive eaves and awnings.

Program 4-2.8 The City shall require that new subdivision tract maps for thirty or more lots provide adequate access (ingress, egress) and a minimum of two roadways with widths and lengths in compliance with the Board of Forestry and Fire Protection’s State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations Article 2, Subsection 1273, as may be amended.

Program 4-2.9: Whenever feasible, the City shall locate new essential public facilities, including health care facilities, emergency shelters, and fire stations, outside VHFHSZs.

Policy 4-3 Redevelopment. The City shall require that, after a large fire, redevelopment of a damaged property in a VHFHSZ complies with the requirements of construction and includes adequate provisions for emergency access, vegetation management, and firefighting, in compliance with current fire codes.

Policy 4-4 Existing Non-Conforming Development. The City shall minimize risks to existing development by identifying existing non-conforming development that does not meet local and state contemporary fire safety standards in terms of road standards and vegetative hazard and require all new development to meet or exceed the City of Glendale Vegetation Management Program (VMP) Defensible Space Guidelines and the California Code of Regulations, State Responsibility Areas Fire Safe Regulations.

Policy 4-5 Water Supply. The City shall evaluate the City’s fire suppression capacity and future water supply availability, as part of the next and most up to date Glendale Local Hazard Mitigation Plan, which is updated every 5 years. 3366 of 5188
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Program 4-5.1 The City shall coordinate with Glendale Water & Power and other water districts as appropriate to support the provision of adequate water throughout the City and provision of adequate water storage to meet future peak fire demands during times of peak domestic demand. Explore the feasibility of providing on-site water supply and storage to augment ordinary supplies that may be lost during a wildfire.

Program 4-5.2 The City shall require all new developments to have adequate water supply to meet fire suppression needs and comply with applicable and most up to date fire flow requirements.

Policy 4-6 Electrical Undergrounding. The City shall explore an electrical undergrounding plan, prioritizing areas with the highest wildfire risk and key evacuation routes, in alignment with the most recent VHFHSZs.

Policy 4-7 Defensible Space. The City shall require all properties in the City to implement precautionary measures to create defensible space in compliance with the most up to date regulations set forth in Senate Bill 63, Assembly Bill 3074, and Glendale Fire Department defensible space standards and guidelines. The City shall continue annual brush inspections and require public and private properties in the City to maintain a fire break around structures.

Program 4-7.1 The City shall enforce development and maintenance of buffer zones and defensible space by requiring the removal of brush and flammable vegetation surrounding public and private properties and the upkeep of an ember resistant zone around structures located in the most up to date VHFHSZs. The City shall also require public and private properties to maintain any tree adjacent to or overhanging any building free of dead or dying wood, and maintaining roofs free of leaves, needles, or other dead vegetation growth.

Program 4-7.2 The City shall encourage residents to plant and maintain drought-resistant, fire-resistant landscape species to reduce the risk of brush fire and soil erosion in areas adjacent to canyons and develop stringent site design and maintenance standards for areas with the most up to date high fire hazard or soil erosion potential.

Policy 4-8 Emergency Plan. The City Shall review and update the Emergency Operations Plan and evacuation protocols every two years as recommended by CESA and Cal OES, if feasible, to consider current community emergency evacuation needs in response to wildfires, including in the most up to date VHFHSZs.

Policy 4-9 Educational Awareness. The City shall educate residents on the most up to date fire hazard reduction strategies to employ on their properties, focusing on the most vulnerable populations such as older adults, individuals with disabilities, non-English speaking residents, and individuals with chronic health conditions.

Program 4-9.1 The City shall host educational workshops for property owners on defensible space, home hardening, and vegetation management based upon the most up-to-date science and State guidelines to reduce wildfire risk. Target education of most up-todate evacuation routes to at-risk populations including older adults and individuals with chronic health conditions.

Program 4-9.2: The City shall conduct studies to determine whether improvements are needed in the areas of public education and fire prevention.

Policy 4-10 Partnerships. The City shall regularly review and update mutual aid agreements between surrounding City Fire Departments and the Glendale Fire Department to reflect new developments, population trends in the City, station staffing/equipment, and fire behavior shifts due to climate change. Ensure protections and response for all areas are adequately covered by the appropriate updates.
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3.4 Climate Change

3.4.1 OVERVIEW
The Safety Element includes the impacts of climate change in the City of Glendale, as required by Government Code Section 65302(g). Climate change is caused by the release of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) into the atmosphere, which traps heat near the Earth’s surface raising global average temperatures in what is referred to as the “greenhouse effect.” This increase in average temperatures across the globe affects sea level rise, precipitation patterns, the severity of wildfires, the prevalence of extreme heat events, water supply, and ocean temperatures and chemistry (NASA 2022). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), GHGs are now higher than they have been in the past 400,000 years, raising carbon dioxide levels from 280 parts per million to 410 parts per million in the last 150 years (IPCC 2021). The dramatic increase in GHGs is attributed to human activities beginning with the industrial revolution in the 1800s, which represented a shift from an agrarian (e.g., cultivation of land) and handicraft-based economy to one dominated by industry and machine manufacturing (NASA 2022).

The IPCC has established various GHG emissions scenarios to communicate impacts to climate indicators including the rate of average temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise by mid and end of the century.

These climate indicators will determine future impacts to climate hazards including extreme heat, drought, wildfire, landslides, extreme precipitation and stormwater flooding, and air quality. These emissions scenarios are referred to as Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). Two of these RCPs are commonly used to compare possible futures and were selected for the City’s 2024 Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment, consistent with guidance from the California Government Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) California Adaptation Planning Guide. The two scenarios used for the climate vulnerability assessment are RCP 4.5 which represents a “medium emissions” scenario, and RCP 8.5 which represents a “high emissions” scenario.

3.4.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
The City prepared a Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (Appendix B), consistent with Government Code Section 65302(g) and as amended by SB 379, which assesses how the communities and assets in Glendale are vulnerable to climate change. Two types of vulnerabilities are identified: social and physical vulnerabilities. Climate impacts in Glendale vary geographically based on exposure, socio-economic characteristics, and physical conditions in various parts of the City. The following section provides an overview of key findings from the Glendale Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment.

Social vulnerability is the likelihood of community members to experience adverse impacts of climate change due to existing health conditions, historical marginalization, or limited access to critical resources.

Impacts include disproportionate death, injury, loss, or disruption of livelihood. Some notable vulnerable populations in Glendale that are disproportionately susceptible to climate change impacts are individuals diagnosed with high blood pressure (28%), Black, Indigenous, People of Color (BIPOC) (23%), seniors (18%), limited or non-English speakers (11%), outdoor workers (8%), and people who use active transportation (9%). Vulnerable populations are concentrated in southwest, central, and south Glendale.

These areas have the lowest tree equity score indicating there is a deficiency in the distribution of trees for a community to experience climate benefits. The most under-resourced communities such as low-income households and, BIPOC communities are disproportionately impacted by extreme heat because of factors such as the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect. UHI occurs when natural land cover is replaced with hard surfaces such as pavement, buildings, and other surfaces that absorb heat. This can increase energy costs, air pollution, and heat-related illness.5 Historical redlining, a discriminatory zoning practice that exacerbated racial segregation, has also left a legacy of unhealthy conditions in under-resourced communities making them more susceptible to climate impact such as extreme heat. According to the vulnerability assessment, the highest concern for social vulnerability is increased extreme heat and poor air quality. 5 “Reduce Urban Heat Island Effect.” United States Environmental Protection Agency. January 22, 2024. https://epa.gov/green-infrastructure/reduce-urban-heat-islandeffect#:~:text=%22Urban%20heat%20islands%22%20occur%20when,heat-related%20illness%20and%20mortality. 3368 of 5188
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Physical vulnerability is the susceptibility and limitations of physical infrastructure in the context of climate hazards and extreme events. Climate change has the capacity to harm physical infrastructure and disrupt services or restrict accessibility. Glendale can experience adverse effects from climate change with damages to natural and recreational resources, buildings and facilities, and infrastructure and critical services. Physical vulnerabilities for infrastructure and critical assets include exposure to wildfire and post-wildfire landslides while natural and recreational resources are vulnerable to extreme heat, wildfire, drought, and poor air quality.

Robust infrastructure is a crucial element in enhancing Glendale’s resilience and examining the vulnerability of critical infrastructure will offer insight on how climate change will impact them.

An increase in extreme heat events can increase the probability of heat-related illnesses such as heat stroke, heart attack, dehydration, and respiratory issues.6 Days over 97.6 degrees are expected to increase by 32 days by the end of the century and occur during a wider range of months from February to December with a 16 day increase by mid-century. This will impact grid reliability and cause possible power outages, increase water scarcity, and strain ambulance services. An increase in extreme heat days will impact vulnerable populations who will experience a higher frequency of public health risks such as dehydration, heat stroke, increased mortality rate, heart disease and increase in vector-borne diseases. Extreme heat is expected to also increase social adversities such as income loss especially outdoor workers who might be unable to access their workplace during extreme heat days.

UHI occurs in developed areas that experience hotter days and typically impact BIPOC communities and under-invested communities. Densely developed neighborhoods experience higher temperatures while greenspaces with vegetated areas more effectively absorb heat and stay cooler. Glendale will experience the most intense UHI effect in southwest neighborhoods along I-5 and the northeast neighborhoods along I210. Glendale’s most populated urban areas will likely experience the highest UHI effects. Heat inequity is the disproportionate distribution of heat-related hazards that impact socially vulnerable and BIPOC communities and will create compounding impacts on vulnerability due to existing problems around lack of access to green open spaces as a result of Glendale’s history of redlining.

Compounding housing issues can exacerbate climate impacts for vulnerable populations. The lack of affordable housing in Glendale increases overcrowding and contributes to susceptibility of heat-related illnesses for those in overcrowded housing. In addition, housing quality such as age and roof condition can impact health risks associated with extreme heat. For example, low quality housing such as poorly insulated homes can strain the electricity grid causing power outages and households may temporarily lose access to their air conditioning, fans, and refrigeration. This can lead to heat-related illnesses which can increase hospital visits and fatalities. In Glendale, 58 percent of renter households spend 30 percent or more of their income on housing costs, compared to 55 percent regionally. Additionally, 36 percent of renter households in Glendale spend 50 percent or more of their income on housing cost, compared to 29 percent regionally.7 These households are considered severely cost burdened and are therefore at a disproportionately higher risk towards climate change as they may likely not have access to air conditioning, insultation, and other infrastructural protections against climate hazards.

As a result, vulnerable communities in Glendale face higher heat-related public health risks as they may be under-resourced, have high outdoor exposure, face societal barriers, and/or have a chronic health condition.

Extreme heat risks include heat stress, heat stroke, and dehydration, which can lead to death. Increased temperatures can also worsen asthma, cardiovascular disease, certain disabilities, and other respiratory and cardiovascular conditions leading to increased emergency room visits, hospitalizations, and fatalities.

Air quality degradation is expected to increase in Glendale due to climate driven increases in dust, smog, smoke, and decreases in natural filtrations. Increased temperature leads to dry, dusty conditions also associated with drought (Hall et al. 2018). Increases in dust conditions increase exposure to particulate matter, including PM10 (particulates less than 10 microns in diameter). PM10 can cause increased respiratory disease, lung damage, cancer, premature death, and reduced visibility. These adverse health effects have been reported primarily in infants and children, and seniors with preexisting heart or lung diseases.

Increases in ambient temperature can lead to higher rates of smog also referred to as ozone (03). Groups most sensitive to O3 include children, the elderly, people with respiratory disorders, and people who exercise 6 Nature. Rapid increase in the risk of heat-related mortality. 2023. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-40599-x (accessed October 2024)
7 Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG). Local Housing Data for the City of Glendale. 2021. https://scag.ca.gov/sites/main/files/file-attachments/glendale-he-0421.pdf?1620797773 (accessed October 2024) 3369 of 5188
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strenuously outdoors. Depending on the level of exposure, ozone can inflame and damage the airways; make the lungs more susceptible to infection; and aggravate lung diseases such as asthma, emphysema, and chronic bronchitis. Ground-level ozone increases with ambient temperatures and will be experienced at higher rates due to climate change leading to raised cardiovascular and respiratory morbidity and mortality rates. Ground-level ozone has also been shown to have particularly disproportionate adverse impacts on populations experiencing homelessness and lower median income.

Precipitation variability, fewer natural filtrations, and long periods of dry spells lead to less reliable air quality for the entire region. Urban vegetation can directly affect air quality, as large healthy trees remove more pollution than younger, smaller trees. Rising temperatures could increase mortality for large healthy trees which would lower the ability for urban vegetation to reduce air pollutants, therefore increasing pollutant exposure to vulnerable populations.

Temperature, severe wildfire conditions, and the area burned by wildfires have all increased throughout the state and are expected to continue to increase. Wildfire smoke is comprised of a mixture of hazardous air pollutants that are the principal threat to public health and are estimated to contribute to approximately 18 percent of the total PM2.5 atmospheric emissions in the US. Short-term exposures to PM2.5 (up to 24-hours duration) has been associated with premature mortality, increased hospital admissions for heart or lung causes, acute and chronic bronchitis, asthma attacks, emergency room visits, respiratory symptoms, and restricted activity days. These adverse health effects have been reported primarily in infants and children, and seniors with preexisting heart or lung diseases.

The populations most vulnerable to the impacts of poor quality are those who are under-resourced, individuals with high outdoor exposure, and individuals with chronic health conditions. The CCVA identifies high social vulnerability areas in Glendale located in north Glendale along I-210, and in south and southwest Glendale. These areas are considered vulnerable due to the higher presence of lower-income and working class residents. Vulnerable populations such as people facing homelessness, outdoor workers, and people with chronic health conditions are expected to be most vulnerable to the potential impacts of extreme heat.

Populations that are under-resourced and do not have access to air filtration systems may experience respiratory issues leading to injuries or death. Individuals who face societal barriers, such as undocumented people, may not have access to medical services or evacuation centers. Outdoor workers, individuals using active transportation, and people experiencing homelessness may become injured from smoke inhalation and poor air quality. Projected annual average dry spell duration will increase to 144 days by the end of the century and 139 days by mid-century. This will result in vegetative stress, water scarcity, habitat loss, and strained water system which will consequently affect food security, air quality decline, respiratory illness, and more disease. Increased temperatures will reduce the water supply which will result in tree loss. Additionally, vulnerable populations such as those experiencing homelessness may have decreased access to water.

GOAL S-5 Climate Change
Goal 5. Reduce social and physical vulnerabilities resulting from the increasing risks of climate change
Policy 5-1: Cooling Infrastructure. The City shall, where feasible, install shade trees and cool pavement, expand the functionality and availability of cooling centers, and distribute low-cost cooling resources to reduce the impacts of extreme heat and poor air quality on climate vulnerable populations.

Program 5-1.1 The City shall explore incorporating strategies to reduce the urban heat island effect during City repaving projects.

Program 5-1.2 The City shall work to implement a tree planting program to prioritize planting trees in high social sensitivity census tracts with the lowest tree equity score, along safe routes to school and near bus stops, as detailed in the City’s Community Forest Management Plan.

Program 5-1.3 The City shall, where feasible, expand the functionality and availability of cooling centers to address a greater variety of needs as resilience centers facilitating health, food, medical, and emergency services during poor air quality events caused by climate hazards such as extreme heat events or wildfire. 3370 of 5188 Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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Program 5-1.4 The City shall consider implementing a program to purchase and deploy a lending library of air purifiers and cooling devices in partnership with local community organizations and trusted community leaders, targeting high social sensitivity census tracts.

Policy 5-2: Building Resilience. The City shall amend the building code to increase the resiliency of existing and new buildings so as to protect residents from the impacts of extreme heat and poor air quality.

Program 5-2.1 The City shall consider amending the building code to require CALGreen Tier 2 Voluntary Standards Section A5.106.11.2 for cool roofs and Section A5.106.7.2 for cool walls by the next California Building Codes (CBC) update cycle.

Program 5-2.2 The City shall amend the building code to require indoor cooling in new multi-family buildings, monitoring the California Department of Public Health guidance regarding indoor cooling which will inform the next CBC update (CBC) cycle.

Program 5-2.3 The City shall consider amending the building code to require all newly installed HVAC units for existing buildings to have two-way air condition unit capability to provide heating and cooling by the next CBC update cycle.

Policy 5-3: Access to Public Information. The City shall promote increased multi-lingual access to informational resources and emergency alert systems to raise awareness of and limit climate change impacts
Program 5-3.1 The City shall offer engaging year-round community events with educational resources at resilience centers, providing the community with free access to multilingual information, resources, and support to effectively prepare for and recover from poor air quality days, extreme weather events and other disasters, while making the resilience centers recognized fixtures in the community.

Program 5-3.2 The City shall conduct emergency alert notifications in English, Spanish, Armenian, and Korean and distribute information about Emergency Alert Program (Everbridge) sign-up in areas of highest exposure and potential impacts, including areas of high social sensitivity. The City shall remove procedural equity barriers from the sign-up program.

Program 5-3.3 The City shall, every five years, reassess which languages are spoken jointly by 5% or more of the Glendale community and expand emergency alert translations to additional languages as needed, consistent with Assembly Bill 1638.

Program 5-3.4 The City shall provide online information for preparing homes and businesses for extreme weather events, such as resources on what to have at home in an emergency kit.

Policy 5-4 Water Management. The City shall incorporate, where feasible, extended drought climate projections in water management planning and offer solutions to reduce water use and improve water quality through Glendale Water & Power while offering educational services to the community.

Program 5-4.1: The City shall, upon the next update to the Urban Water Management Plan (UWMP), review the historical record to identify the longest recorded drought and consider a similar drought length in the UWMP analysis.

Program 5-4.2 The City shall, where feasible, expand Glendale Water and Power programs to increase leakage detection systems and repairs; drought tolerant landscaping; lowflow fixtures, fitting, and appliances; greywater capture and reuse; leakage repairs; and financing and technical resources to subsidize costs to landlords and low-income households.
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Program 5-4.3 The City shall, where feasible, implement a program to conduct an energy/water nexus study to inform the City’s future public water rate structure and to directly assist low-income households with high utility burdens during water rate structure changes to avoid inequitable outcomes.

3.5 Hazardous Materials

3.5.1 OVERVIEW
The unhealthful effects of certain chemicals and substances have led to extensive regulation of hazardous materials. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines a hazardous waste as a substance that 1) may cause or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; and 2) that poses a substantial present or potential future hazard to human health or the environment when it is improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of or otherwise managed.

Hazardous waste is also ignitable, corrosive, or reactive (explosive) (U.S. EPA 40 CFR 260.10). A material may also be classified as a hazardous material if it contains defined amounts of toxic chemicals. The EPA has developed a list of specific hazardous wastes that are in the forms of solids, semi-solids, liquids, and gases.

The State of California defines hazardous materials as
substances that are toxic, ignitable or flammable, reactive, and corrosive. The State also defines an extremely hazardous material as a substance that shows high acute or chronic toxicity, carcinogenicity (causes cancer), bio accumulative properties (accumulates in the body’s tissues), persistence in the environment, or is water reactive.

Hazardous materials are extensively regulated by Federal, State and City laws, and new regulations are constantly being developed as we learn more about the impact these substances have on human health and the environment. The three main sources of information on hazardous materials management as they pertain to the City of Glendale are: 1) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2) the California Environmental Protection Agency’s (Cal EPA) Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), and 3) the City of Glendale Fire Department.

The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for pollutants considered harmful to public health and the environment. To that end, the EPA requires that the levels of five major air pollutants be measured on a daily basis. These Air Quality Indexes are reported daily in the local news media serving metropolitan areas with populations exceeding 200,000. Air Quality Indexes are reported using a numerical value between 0 and 500 that corresponds to a health descriptor like “good” or “unhealthful.” The local agency responsible for monitoring and enforcing air quality is the South Coast Air Quality Management District.

The EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Standard protects drinking water quality by limiting the levels of specific contaminants that are known to occur or have the potential to occur in water and can adversely affect public health. The EPA and the State Water Resources Control Board set the Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) for specific contaminants in ground water. These contaminants include organic and inorganic chemicals (minerals), substances that are known to cause cancer (carcinogens), radionuclides (such as uranium and radon), and microbial contaminants. Water purveyors are required to test their water for these contaminants on a fixed schedule, and report their results to the DHS.

Leaking underground storage tanks (UST’s) have been recognized since the early 1980s as the primary cause of groundwater contamination by gasoline compounds and solvents. In California, regulations aimed at protecting against UST leaks have been in place since 1983.

California’s program is more stringent than the Federal program, requiring that all tanks be double walled, and prohibiting gasoline delivery to non-compliant tanks. The State Water Resources Control Board 3372 of 5188
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(SWRCB) has been designated the lead regulatory agency in the development of UST regulations and policy.

The SWRCB maintains an inventory of leaking underground storage tanks in a statewide database.

3.5.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
There are 53 large-quantity and 348 small-quantity generators of hazardous materials in the City, as of October 2024. The distribution of these sites in the City is shown on Plate 5-1 of the Technical Background Report (Appendix A). There are also eight facilities listed in the Toxics Release Inventory that are known to have released hazardous materials of concern into the air – the EPA monitors these facilities closely to reduce the potential of future emissions at concentrations above the acceptable limits. Given these numbers, it is impressive that the actual number of unauthorized releases of hazardous materials into the environment is fairly small, as documented in the Federal and State databases reviewed. Of the 57 underground storage tank sites with a total of 141 active petroleum systems and 9 active hazardous substance systems, there have been no tank leaks since 2003.

Some of the significant hazardous sites are located within or adjacent to a liquefaction susceptible area, or in an unstable slope area, and two of the sites are located within or adjacent to a dam inundation area. None of the significant hazardous sites identified in the City are located in or adjacent to a high fire hazard area.

Given that all of Glendale is susceptible to high to very high ground motions as a result of an earthquake on the Verdugo, Sierra Madre or Raymond fault, all hazardous materials sites should provide for, at a minimum, secondary containment of hazardous substances, including segregation of reactive chemicals, in accordance with the most recent California Fire Code and City of Glendale Fire Code amendments.

Some hazardous materials sites are located within 1/2-mile of schools. Significant Hazardous Materials sites should be required to prepare Risk Management Plans (RMPs) that identify the procedures by which the surrounding critical facilities will be evacuated, should it become necessary during an accidental release of hazardous materials. Alternatively, the schools in the immediate vicinity of the significant hazardous materials sites should consider implementing, as part of their School Safety Plans mandated by Senate Bill 187 (the Safe School Act of 1997), procedures for evacuation should a chemical spill occur in the area.

The City of Glendale’s Environmental Management Center (EMC) is charged with the responsibility of conducting compliance inspections for facilities in the City that handle hazardous material, generate or treat a hazardous waste and/or operate an underground storage tank. All new installations of underground storage tanks require an inspection, along with the removal of the old tanks. The EMC coordinates hazardous material planning and appropriate response efforts with City departments, as well as local, and State agencies. The goal of these agencies is to improve public and private sector readiness, and to mitigate local impacts resulting from natural or technological emergencies. The EMC is part of the Glendale Fire Department that deals with the planning for and response to the natural and technological disasters in the City of Glendale.

The EMC is also tasked with administering a household hazardous waste collection plan for the City of Glendale in accordance with the California Integrated Solid Waste Management Act of 1989 (AB 939). The EMC is located at 780 Flower Street.

GOAL S-6 Hazardous Materials
Goal 6. Reduce threats to the public health and safety, and to the environment, from hazardous materials.

Policy 6-1: Limiting exposure of hazardous materials and waste. The City shall strive to reduce the potential for residents, workers, and visitors to Glendale to being exposed to hazardous materials and wastes.

Program 6-1.1: The City shall enforce the California Environmental Protection Agency’s seven Unified Program elements including the disclosure laws that require all users, producers, and transporters of hazardous materials and wastes to clearly identify the materials that they store, use or transport, and to notify the appropriate City, County, State and Federal agencies in the event of a violation. 3373 of 5188
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Program 6-1.2: The City shall identify City roadways along which hazardous materials are routinely transported. If critical facilities, such as schools, hospitals, child care centers or other facilities with special evacuation needs are located along these routes, the City shall notify the operators of these facilities that they are near such routes. The City shall work with the operators of these facilities to assist them with the preparation of evacuation plans.

Program 6-1.3: The City shall evaluate the potential impacts related to hazardous materials during the environmental review process for new buildings or businesses where the production, use, storage, transport or disposal of hazardous materials is proposed.

Potential impacts shall be fully mitigated.

Policy 6-1.4: Incident response. The City shall maintain the capability of responding to hazardous materials incidents in the City and along the sections of freeways that extend across the City.

This includes maintaining cooperation agreements with adjacent jurisdictions and continuing to coordinate with regional providers of emergency services.

Policy 6-1.5: Reduction or elimination of hazardous materials. The City shall encourage residents and businesses to reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials. This includes encouraging residents to buy toxic substances in only the amount needed to do the job, or better yet, to use safer non-toxic alternate products that do not pose a threat to the environment.

Program 6-1.6: The City shall support the operation of recycling centers that take hazardous substances, such as paint, paint thinner, used waste oil, etc.

Program 6-1.7: The City shall review the future direction of the City’s Certified Unified Program Agency (provided by the City’s Fire Department) to determine the best use of the agency’s resources (including but not limited to review of existing and proposed facilities, monitoring trends in the use of types and quantities of hazardous materials, enforcing cleanup and mitigation measures, and public education efforts).

Program 6-1.8: The City shall coordinate hazardous materials regulation with other agencies. The Los Angeles County Hazardous Waste Management Plan is incorporated herein by reference and shall be used by the City as a guide to hazardous waste management efforts.
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3.6 Terrorism, Civil Disturbance and Crime

3.6.1 OVERVIEW
Terrorism is defined as the “use of force or threats to demoralize, intimidate, and subjugate, especially as a political weapon or policy.” Terrorists often use or threaten to use nuclear, biological or chemical substances to cause as much damage as possible in an area or to a group of people. These are referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

Terrorism remains a serious threat to government operations, community members, and critical infrastructure. Since the early 1990s, the Federal and State governments have established programs and protocol aimed at planning for and dealing with terrorist acts. In 2004, the State of California created the California State Threat Assessment System (CAL STAS) as an integral component of the State’s Homeland Security Strategy to identify, track, assess, and analyze homeland security threats. The STAS is a collaborative effort between federal, state, local, and tribal public safety agencies to share resources, expertise, and information to detect criminal and terrorist activity. The STAS produces and disseminates timely and actionable threat information for government leaders and policymakers, private sector partners, and the broader public safety and national intelligence communities to support decisions, properly allocate resources, and mitigate threats.

Civil disturbances typically develop in response to an unpopular policy or act issued or made by the group in power, either the policy makers, or those that enforce these procedures, such as the police. Civil disturbances can also develop in response to perceived or real racial or social inequality, and deep-seated political or religious differences. Civil disturbances can include minor infractions, such as disturbing the peace or assembling illegally, to major offenses such as looting, robbery and possession of stolen property, assault, arson, brandishing of weapons, and even murder. These incidents are generally handled at the local level, with assistance from adjacent jurisdictions as needed. In the event of a large-scale mass demonstration, rioting or other violent acts, the National Guard may mobilize to aid the local law-enforcement agencies.

3.6.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
The risk of terrorist attacks occurring in Glendale is considered low but not impossible since California can be considered an attractive terrorist target, and therefore, by association, Glendale can be considered at risk.

The Police Department maintains a confidential list of assets in the City that are considered potential terrorist and/or civil disturbance targets, and is vigilant about any unusual or suspicious activities in and around these areas.

The Fire and Police Departments are responsible for
responding to terrorist attacks and civil disturbances.

The Police Department has several programs
specifically designed to deal with crowd control issues, and terrorist activities. Several other regional and State organizations and programs are responsible for
planning for and responding to civil unrest and terrorist activities. The City of Glendale is one of the few
communities in the area to receive specialized training and equipment to respond to terrorism, including
incidents involving WMDs. Glendale has incorporated
terrorism scenarios into the City’s Emergency
Response Plan and into training exercises.

The City of Glendale has one of the lowest crime rates
for cities with populations exceeding 100,000. The Police Department indicates that property crimes in Glendale far outnumber crimes against persons. The data also show that as in other commerce centers, white-collar crimes, such as fraud and identity theft, have increased in the last few years in Glendale. Like many diverse communities, Glendale experiences a presence of culturally based organized crime. Changes in the frequency, pattern, or type of crime are addressed by the Police Department. For example, the streetgang situation in Glendale is addressed on a daily basis, primarily by the Special Enforcement Detail. The Police Department utilizes a variety of programs and affirmative policing, forming partnerships with community groups, businesses, schools and other government agencies, to fight crime. The community as a whole has a zero tolerance for criminal activity. 3375 of 5188 Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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GOAL S-7 Terrorism, Civil Disturbance, and Crime
Goal 7. Increase the City’s capability to effectively respond to acts of terrorism or civil disturbance, and to reduce criminal activity.

Policy 7-1: Response to terrorist and civil disturbances. The City shall develop and implement programs intended to save lives, prevent injury and reduce property damage during and following a terrorist attack or civil unrest incident.

Program 7-1.1: The City shall regularly review and update as necessary the confidential list of potential terrorist targets in the City.

Program 7-1.2: The City shall study ways to minimize collateral damage in the areas surrounding the confidential list of potential targets.

Program7-1.3: The City shall study potential access problems along major routes such as Brand Boulevard, San Fernando Road and Verdugo Boulevard in the event of an attack or civil unrest, and shall provide recommendations to manage traffic through these areas in the event of a disaster.

Program 7-1.4: The City shall identify potential, strategically located staging sites near high-risk assets from which emergency response personnel, including mutual aid forces, can be deployed quickly and efficiently.

Program 7-1.5: The City shall continue to conduct emergency response exercises that utilize credible crime, terrorism and natural disaster scenarios.

Program 7-1.6: The City shall continue to prepare and implement measures to protect essential City facilities and infrastructure from criminal or terrorist attack, including cyber-attack.

Program 7-1.7: The City shall regularly review the Police Department’s level of training and contingency plans to ensure that the Department is responsive to any changes in the City’s profile (such as changes in demographics or types of businesses) that may increase the risk of terrorist attacks.

Program 7-1.8: The City shall annually review plans to respond to a large-scale criminal event, such as a terrorist incident. Such plans shall consider topics such as identification of potential targets, risk reduction strategies, minimization of collateral damage and coordination with other agencies.

Policy 7-2: Crime reduction programs. The City shall undertake programs aimed specifically at reducing crime.

Program 7-2.1: The City shall continue to monitor and regularly study crime statistics to look for trends or shifts in population, economics or social conditions that would engender increased crime.

Program 7-2.2: The City shall continue to educate the public about crime watch, neighborhood watch and other similar programs.
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3.7 Dangerous Animals and Plants

3.7.1 OVERVIEW
Wild animal – human interaction appears to be increasing in California, in part as a result of people’s increased encroachment onto the progressively smaller “islands” of undeveloped terrain left in the region.

This also means that animal density in these undeveloped areas has increased, with the resultant increased competition for food resources. Most often, this interaction consists of casual sightings of animals from a distance, but some animals have actually adapted to their urban surroundings and become accustomed to eating pet food, trash, and even pets. Some animals are carriers of disease.

There are several plants that can be poisonous if touched or eaten. While this is not a major health concern, sensitive individuals, especially infants, need to be protected from the potential harmful effects. There are innumerable lists of poisonous plants available in books and on the web. It is difficult to address all potential dangerous plants, but some of the more common ones are listed in the accompanying Technical Background Report (Appendix A).

3.7.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
Coyotes are common in the Glendale area. Studies of
these coyotes show that they have adapted well to the
urban environment partly because people are used to
leaving food out for them. The San Gabriel Mountains
are habitat for mountain lions and black bears. These
animals tend to avoid humans, although bears are also
opportunistic and have learned to look for food in
dumpsters and other areas frequented by people.

Actions that people can take if they encounter a
mountain lion or black bear are similar: make yourself
look as big as possible; shout; throw rocks or sticks you can reach without bending over; take aggressive action.

Deer and smaller animals like raccoons, ground
squirrels, rabbits, bats and rats can carry diseases that can be transmitted to domestic animals and people, either through direct contact, or through the bites of fleas and ticks. Some of these conditions include rabies (through direct contact, such as a bite, from the infected animal), and plague (carried by infected fleas that live on squirrels, rats, rabbits, and even domestic animals).

Mice and other rodents can also carry the virus that causes hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, a flu-like condition that can cause pulmonary distress in some individuals. Mosquitoes are also the carriers of viruses that can cause encephalitis or meningitis, such as West Nile encephalitis. People affected by all of these conditions have been reported in California, although these are generally isolated cases. The Centers for Disease Prevention and Control keep track of outbreaks or incidents of these diseases throughout the United States, and provide detailed information about each of these conditions at their web page.

Other potentially dangerous animals in the area include rattlesnakes, bees and wasps, and black widow spiders. Los Angeles County, including Glendale, is on the watch list for Africanized Honey Bee (AHB) infestation, although it is not considered a serious threat at this time. Several Salmonella incidences linked to reptiles, such as iguanas and turtles, have been reported in Los Angeles County.

The City of Glendale contracts with the Pasadena Humane Society (PHS) for animal control. The Glendale Police Department administers the contract. PHS provides to citizens, at nominal fees, humane traps that can be used to trap small animals. The PHS also deals with feral cats and stray dogs. The Arcadia District Office of the County of Los Angeles Agricultural Commissioner / Weights and Measures Department and the Greater Los Angeles County Vector Control District provide vector control services for Glendale (a vector is an organism that serves as carrier from one host to another of disease-producing bacteria, fungi, worms, or viruses).
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GOAL S-8 Dangerous Animals and Plants
Goal 8. Reduce the risks to the public related to wild animals and poisonous or dangerous plants.

Policy 8-1: Public Information. The City shall provide information to the public about the risks associated with wild animals and dangerous or poisonous plants.

Program 8-1.1: The City shall make information available to the public (for example, with pamphlets or using the City’s web site) summarizing the ways to avoid dangerous wild animals and actions that can be taken in the event of an encounter with such animals.

Program 8-1.2: The City shall make information available to the public, such as pamphlets or information on the City’s web site, summarizing the ways to avoid dangerous plants and first-aid measures that can be taken in the event of exposure to or ingestion of such plants.

Policy 8-2: Prevention of Dangerous Wildlife Interaction. The City shall assist the public in their efforts to reduce interactions with wild animals and dangerous or poisonous plants.

Program 8-2.1: The City, at the discretion of the Director of Public Works, shall provide residents with trash receptacles that are difficult for animals to knock over or open.

Program 8-2.2: The City shall work with the Park Rangers to monitor sightings of mountain lions and black bears in and adjacent to City limits, and shall post this information at the entrance to trailheads in the areas where sightings have been made in the past year.

Program 8-2.3: The City shall encourage residents who wish to compost in their properties to use enclosed composting bins as part of the City’s edible food recovery program and organics procurement program required by SB 1383.

Program 8-2.4: The City shall encourage residents to have their pets vaccinated for rabies and provide information about the benefits of flea control as a method for preventing the spread of dangerous diseases.

Program 8-2.5: The City shall monitor for unusual numbers of dead rodents or birds and notify appropriate County agencies if such an event occurs.

Program 8-2.6: The City shall monitor for coyote sightings and work with appropriate agencies to eliminate or relocate aggressive coyotes as necessary.
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3.8 Disaster Preparedness, Recovery and Emergency Response

3.8.1 OVERVIEW
Planning issues pertaining to emergency response, disaster preparedness, and disaster recovery require an assessment of the hazards, identification of functions and resources to handle short-term response, and development of recovery procedures. Earthquakes pose the greatest challenge because they occur with little or no warning, and can set into motion a number of linked events. In the immediate aftermath of a major earthquake, numerous decisions need to be made. These decisions include the orderly evacuation and sheltering of displaced individuals and families, the search for and rescue of victims, and the suspension and resumption of critical services such as utilities and transportation routes. Effective emergency response hinges on an accurate assessment of the disaster to identify those areas that need the most assistance, and reliance on pre-determined strategies that allow emergency personnel to make the best possible decisions given the circumstances.

Evacuation routes are used to guide residents and visitors from dangerous areas to safer locations or to transport emergency responders. Evacuation routes and bomb shelters are a legacy of the 1950s and 1960s when communities prepared for the evacuation of their entire population if necessary as a result of a nuclear war. In the last two decades, however, there has been a shift toward sustainability, with communities emphasizing the need to be self-sufficient after an emergency. There are, nevertheless, certain types of disasters that require the mobilization (evacuation) of a segment of the population from a hazardous or potentially hazardous area to a safer area. This would be the case, for example in the event of a wildfire threatening residences at the urban-wildland interface, the inundation of the area directly down gradient from a breached dam, or the area downwind from a facility that releases a toxic chemical into the air. All of these events require the immediate evacuation of high occupancy and dependent facilities (immobile populations) to safer areas that may or may not be near to the impacted area. Evacuated individuals may be able to come back home or to their place of business within 24 to 48 hours of the disaster. In the event of an earthquake, displaced individuals or households generally prefer to take shelter in a facility or park as close to home as possible. Evacuation need not be immediate following the earthquake, but the length of time that displaced people may need to remain in emergency shelters can be expected to last several days, until they can return home or find more permanent locations with relatives, friends or elsewhere.

Disaster response routes are roads that can best move emergency services and supplies to where they are needed the most immediately following a major disaster. Therefore, disaster routes should be kept clear of non-essential traffic and debris following an earthquake or another disaster. The public needs to stay off disaster response routes until allowed to travel on them by the local police.

In Glendale’s commitment to ensuring the safety and well-being of all residents, the City will continue to foster its collaborative approach among police, fire and city departments to effectively prevent, mitigate and recover from disasters necessitating emergency evacuations. Special attention will be given to areas with unique needs and concerns, ensuring that vulnerable populations receive tailored support and resources during such events. By enhancing communication, planning, and training, we aim to create a resilient community capable of responding swiftly and effectively to emergencies, safeguarding the lives of all citizens.

3.8.2 LOCAL CONDITIONS
The Emergency Operating Center (EOC) for
Glendale is tasked with coordinating the City’s
disaster operations. The EOC is activated
whenever there is a need to coordinate the
emergency response of City departments,
government agencies and volunteer groups in
response to emergencies, disasters or other
significant events. It is activated upon order from the City Manager's office or by certain other designated
City officials. The City’s Emergency Plan
establishes the responsibilities of the City’s
emergency response personnel and the framework
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governments and County, State and Federal agencies. The Emergency Plan is updated annually and City personnel train with it annually in exercises ranging from tabletop discussions to full-scale exercises involving dozens of personnel in the field supported by the activation of the City’s EOC. The level of EOC staffing will vary with the specific emergency situation.

It is important to remember that during large-scale disasters, such as an earthquake, several emergencies may have to be addressed simultaneously, and that emergency resources from neighboring communities and jurisdictions may not be available for some time after the disaster. In fact, other neighboring cities may fare worse than Glendale to the same disaster, and Glendale may have to respond to incidents not only within its corporate boundaries, but may be called on to assist other nearby communities. Self-sufficiency, both by City Divisions and the residents, is an important component of a community’s preparedness.

Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route shows the emergency response routes through the City of Glendale.

These emergency response routes are the main thoroughfares through the City to be used by emergency response services during an emergency. If the situation warrants the evacuation of an area, these roadways serve as evacuation routes. Plate P-5 also shows disaster response routes. There are significant differences between evacuation routes and disaster routes that need to be understood by everybody.

Evacuation routes are used to relocate residents and visitors from a hazardous or potentially hazardous area to a safer area. Given that evacuation activities are controlled by particular situations, selection of the most appropriate evacuation route for a particular disaster generally requires some improvisation. Nevertheless, identifying the routes through the City that provide for the most direct access in and out of a given area helps to speed the process during an actual emergency. Road blockage of the evacuation and disaster routes should be prevented at all times.

Disaster routes serve as thoroughfares primarily for the movement of emergency response vehicles and access to critical facilities. Disaster routes are identified in Figure 12.6 of the 2022 County of Los Angeles Safety Element.8 These are typically wide roads or major arterial routes that allow for cross-town traffic.

Notice that all fire stations in the City are located along or immediately adjacent to one of these disaster response routes. Immediate emergency clearance (for example of debris associated with an earthquake) and road/bridge repairs for short-term emergency operations are emphasized along disaster routes. When these roadways are being used for disaster response, the general public needs to stay off these roads until told otherwise by the Police Department or the EOC. Specific actions warranted along these disaster response and evacuation routes include the following:
• Mitigation measures that prevent earthquake-induced slope failures from blocking these roads should be implemented. This is especially significant for Glenoaks Boulevard, since it provides the only source of access in and out for this area of Glendale, and to a lesser degree for East Chevy Chase Drive, both in the San Rafael Hills.
• Improvement of those disaster response routes with inadequate widths to support the mobilization of fire engines and other emergency response vehicles.
• Mitigation and/or setback of structures or buildings that could potentially block the public right-of-way along these routes, where feasible. This includes cornices, parapets, or other overhangs that if collapsed, would impact traffic on these roads.
• Development of specific plans for traffic control contingencies during major disasters, considering both evacuation and disaster response options.

The disaster routes identified divide the City into sections. Potential shelter locations have been identified within each of these sections. These shelter locations are shown on Plate P-3 and on Table-2. Residents and visitors in need of shelter following a disaster are encouraged to report first to the shelter closest to them.

If that shelter is full, closed, or otherwise unavailable, then residents would be referred to the next closest open shelter. These facilities are to serve as staging and communication areas for emergency response personnel, and City officials and relief organizations managing the emergency recovery efforts. Residents should be aware of the disaster routes and emergency shelters in their neighborhood, and the actions to take in the event of a disaster, including how to be self-sufficient for at least 72 hours after a disaster. Equipment 8 County of Los Angeles. 2022. Safety Element. https://planning.lacounty.gov/long-range-planning/general-plan/general-planelements/ 3380 of 5188
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caches with supplies can be maintained at several of the shelter locations identified in Table-2 so that they are immediately available during an emergency.

LCI’s technical advisory document on Fire Hazard Planning mandates that cities and counties must identify and consider residential developments with less than two evacuation routes located in any hazard zone in the Safety Element. Single access points of entry and exit were identified for Glendale in compliance with SB 99 and LCI’s requirements (see Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route). This analysis took a conservative approach and assessed all Glendale residential developments for single access entry and exit points, as most of the City is in at least one of four hazard zones: seismic, flood, fire, and landslides.

The process to identify the residential developments that have less than two routes that can be used for emergency evacuation in Glendale included:

1. Identifying residential neighborhoods based on residential land use designations consistent with the Glendale General Plan Land Use Designations Map.

2. Road classifications (local street, major arterial, minor arterial, urban collectors, freeway, and other) were used to identify areas where 30 or more parcels/units had a single entry/exit point within high, medium high, medium, moderate, and low residential zoning as well as mixed use and additional residential zoning (residential open space and restricted residential).

3. The number of assessor parcel number boundaries adjacent to a marked road were counted. In low density residential land use areas with single family homes, the number of parcels with driveway access to the street were counted and included as a single entry/exit neighborhood if there were 30 or more units serviced by the local road. The 30 or more units threshold is consistent with the California Public Resources Code Section 4290.5 which defines subdivision as an existing residential development of more than 30 dwelling units. Medium and high-density land use areas were evaluated using the same methodology of 30 or more dwelling units.

Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route map identifies multiple residential developments in Glendale with a single access point of entry/exit. There are single access neighborhoods located throughout Glendale, including in the Chevy Chase mountains, Verdugo Mountains, and near Deukmejian Wilderness Park. The Chevy Chase and Verdugo Mountain areas are within VHFHSZs with existing evacuation plans as determined by the City. Single access points, particularly in Fire Hazard Severity Zones, can make emergency evacuations problematic during an emergency, such as a wildfire. Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route map also illustrates the major evacuation routes within Glendale.

Consistent with AB 747, the City prepared an evacuation analysis (Appendix C) that considers two representative evacuation scenarios and provides the City with estimates of roadway capacity constraints and travel time considerations during evacuations. The analysis helps identify locations where there is a greater potential for traffic congestion and need for additional control measures in the event of an evacuation.

The evacuation analysis considers the following two representative evacuation scenarios:
• Wildfire (Scenario #1) - Wildfire ignites in the Verdugo Mountains/San Rafael Hills in east Glendale • Landslide (Scenario #2) – Landslide occurs in the San Gabriel Mountains in north Glendale The evacuation analysis uses the City of Glendale Travel Demand Model (“travel model”). The current travel model was calibrated and validated for a 2021 base year and includes a 2040 future scenario with 2040 land use forecasts and transportation improvement assumptions. The travel model represents all land uses in the City grouped into transportation analysis zones. The areas that would be affected by each evacuation scenario were identified based on the CAL FIRE’s Fire Hazard Severity Zones mapping and City of Glendale staff and emergency responders. The affected areas were overlaid with the Glendale transportation analysis zones to identify the number of people that would need to be evacuated under each evacuation scenario.

Transportation activity was modeled for one worst-case time period, based on the weekday PM peak hour (between 4PM to 6PM) when non-evacuation traffic and congestion would be at its highest levels. This analysis was developed based on conservative assumptions and modeling techniques that reflect current understanding of evacuation analysis.

A summary of the results of this analysis is provided below. 3381 of 5188
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Wildfire (Scenario #1)
• Base Year: If an evacuation were to occur due to a wildfire in the Verdugo Mountains, the analysis estimates over-capacity conditions on several roadways in the City. Specifically, the roadways where demand volumes are projected to be at or exceed road capacity with the City of Glendale can be found in Appendix C, Figure 6.
• Future Year: With peak evacuation from a wildfire in the Verdugo Mountains in the future year, the analysis predicts over-capacity conditions on several roadways in the City. In addition to the locations listed for the base year, the roadways where demand volumes are projected to be at or exceed road capacity with the City of Glendale can be found in Appendix C, Figure 7.

Landslide (Scenario #2)
• Base Year: With peak evacuation from a landslide in the San Gabriel Mountains in north Glendale in the base year, the analysis indicates over-capacity conditions on several roadways in the City.

Specifically, the roadways where demand volumes are projected to be at or exceed road capacity within the City of Glendale can be found in Appendix C, Figure 9. • Future Year: With peak evacuation from a landslide in the San Gabriel Mountains in north Glendale in the future year, the analysis predicts over-capacity conditions on several roadways in the City.

Most congestion locations would be the same as those identified for the base year. In addition to the locations listed for the base year, the roadways where demand volumes are projected to be at or exceed road capacity within the City of Glendale can be found in Appendix C, Figure 10.

Reference Appendix C for more information on the methodology and assumptions used for the evacuation analysis and more detailed results.

GOAL S-9 Disaster Preparedness, Recovery and Emergency
Response
Goal 9. Maintain a high level of emergency preparedness.

Policy 9-1: Emergency Response. The City shall prepare for emergency response and recovery from natural and urban disasters, especially wildfires and earthquake hazards.

Program 9-1.1: The City shall update disaster preparedness and recovery plans as necessary, including the Glendale Emergency Plan with every update to the Local Hazard Mitigation Plan to evaluate evacuation route capacity, safety, and viability under a range of emergency scenarios. Such plans shall be prepared in accordance with regional, State and Federal regulations and guidelines.

Program 9-1.2: The City shall maintain and update the City’s emergency response organizations consisting of representatives from all City departments, local quasi-governmental agencies, private businesses, citizens, and other community partners involved in critical and/or community-wide services.

Program 9-1.3: The City shall maintain mutual aid agreements with other agencies and develop partnerships with other emergency relief organizations.

Program 9-1.4: The City shall establish traffic control contingency plans for disaster routes.

Program 9-1.5: The City shall make information available to the public (for example, with pamphlets or using the City’s web site) about steps they can take to increase their level of disaster preparedness such as the need for storing supplies to increase self-reliance in the aftermath of a disaster.

Program 9-1.6: The City shall promote the development of evacuation plans in high-rise buildings, immobile population centers, businesses that use hazardous substances, and in other critical facilities. The evacuation procedures should be designed to be carried out without aid from the City’s emergency response resources. Ensure that new development has sufficient fire protection, police, and emergency medical services 3382 of 5188 Glendale Safety Element 2025 Update
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available by reviewing development proposals to determine impacts on emergency services and ensure developments meet appropriate safety standards.

Program 9-1.7: The City shall compile and maintain information about facilities with special risks, hazards and needs that may require specialized response.

Program 9-1.8: The City shall participate in emergency preparedness exercises.

Program 9-1.9: The City shall inventory equipment available, including battery-powered and mobile generators, cranes, bulldozers, concrete saws, large ladders, personal protective gear (including respirators, gloves, and protective clothing), medical equipment and supplies, tents and other facilities that can be used for temporary shelter and as makeshift emergency medical centers.

Program 9-1.10 The City shall assess existing City buildings, including those for first responders and critical service providers, to determine retrofits needed for long-term resilience to climate change-affected hazards including wildfires.

Program 9-1.11 The City shall provide accurate documentation required for cost recovery efforts from federal, state, and other agencies in the event of a disaster or emergency. This includes providing a plan for rapid resumption of impacted businesses and community services.

Policy 9-2: Plan Updates. The City shall review and update as necessary the Glendale Emergency Plan with every update to the Local Hazard Mitigation Plan to evaluate evacuation route capacity, safety, and viability under a range of emergency scenarios.

Policy 9-3: Evacuation Communications. The City shall strengthen and maintain evacuation communication protocols among local agencies and organizations involved in the management of emergency response, and the communication between the City and the general public during an emergency.

Program 9-3.1: The City shall implement the communications-related strategies identified in the Evacuation Analysis (Appendix C) to address how information may be shared in preparation for, during and after emergency events. Such strategies include:
• This City shall consider using systems such as public information emergency systems and emergency satellite communications to improve communications, such as those outlined in the FEMA NIMS Guidance for Public Information Officers.
• The City shall use variable message board equipment and targeted installation of permanent dynamic message signs on evacuation routes to improve communication and reduce public confusion.
• The City shall implement a traffic control center which would have up to the minute reports on traffic patterns and can communicate directly with emergency officers via broadcast media, social media, and other emergency communications channels (e.g., Everbridge, Genesis) to let drivers know about roadway congestion and conditions and direct them to alternate routes. • The City shall consider installing new traffic counters and/or CCTV cameras on freeways, which can further help assess traffic flow, volume of vehicles evacuating, and monitor incidents during emergency evacuation events. Caltrans currently has two cameras in the proximity of Glendale: SR-2 at Colorado Street and SR-134 at Glendale Avenue.
• The City shall post signs and flyers in public places, such as businesses, community centers, and parks, with instructions on where to go in an evacuation and key evacuation information. Signs and flyers should be posted in multiple languages.
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Program 9-3.2 The City shall increase redundancy in emergency evacuation communication systems in the event of an electric outage through a variety of measures, including back-up power for telecommunication towers and other critical facilities, distributing information via radio channels, promoting ownership of hand cranked radios, and other means. Regularly test alert systems for potential evacuation scenarios.

Policy 9-4: Vulnerable Populations. The City shall implement additional steps and resources for the successful evacuation of vulnerable populations, including those who are visually impaired, hearing impaired, mobility impaired, people without vehicles, non-English speaking persons, people with medical conditions, and unhoused populations.

Program 9-4.1: The City shall implement the strategies identified in the Evacuation Analysis (Appendix C) for evacuation of vulnerable populations. Such strategies include:
• The City shall ensure that evacuation information is provided for the hearing impaired that may include additional visual aids such as pictures or maps, and signage with larger fonts, as well as written updates via communication and social media channels.
• The City shall partner with neighboring cities/private/non-profit agencies to provide adequate paratransit services for those who need assistance in an evacuation, especially for those visually and mobility impaired. • The City shall emphasize the importance of carpooling with neighbors or community members and provide information on transit routes and transit stops, especially to those individuals without vehicles. The City shall also identify areas that would benefit from a carpooling program (e.g. communities with limited ingress/egress) and coordinate with neighbors, local businesses, and local transit to identify volunteers for carpooling and vehicle sharing at the community level.
• The City shall provide bilingual or multilingual materials to support communication with non-English speaking populations during evacuation.

Communications should be created in English, Armenian, Spanish, Tagalog, and Korean.
• The City shall communicate in advance the location and availability of hospitals or facilities with emergency/life-sustaining medical equipment that residents, especially those with medical conditions, can go to during an evacuation and identify the transportation mode of transfers to other facilities, based on the criticality of patients/clients and type of health needs. • The City shall arrange for food, shelter, and transportation for unhoused populations, offering age-appropriate emergency and evacuation information to homeless children.

Policy 9.5 Traffic Management. In the event of an emergency requiring evacuation, traffic management strategies to increase evacuation capacity and efficiency shall be implemented:

Program 9-5.1: The City shall implement the roadway and intersection capacity and resilience related strategies identified in the Evacuation Analysis (Appendix C) to maximize the capacity of the evacuation roadway network. Such strategies include:
• Establish temporary control points to temporarily close inbound travel lanes on select unlimited access arterials (such as parkways and boulevards) to allow outbound traffic to utilize these lanes during evacuation. • Establish temporary control points to close inbound lanes on selected roadways utilized for evacuation routes to prevent drivers on these routes from entering the City while evacuation is underway.
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• Install signal battery backups in case signal operations need to be maintained during a power outage. Consider using channeling devices, static signs, and coning strategies to manage intersection flow during power outage if the signals lack power.
• Identify and communicate with communities that have one or two access points.

Prioritize adding additional access to communities which are currently served by only one or two access points.
• Develop transportation solutions such as the use of a bus system for evacuating individuals with special needs (such as those with mobility limitations). • Establish traffic control points (i.e., locations along designated evacuation routes with emergency management personnel) to maintain a greater degree of evacuation management. These locations could enhance the efficiency of an evacuation, reduce public confusion, and allow increased operational flexibility during an evacuation.
• Maintain evacuation roadways and shoulders to clear them of trees, vegetation, and debris that would block travel lanes and shoulders for evacuating and emergency operation vehicles.

Program 9-5.2 Single Access Neighborhoods. The City shall implement strategies to improve emergency access for Glendale’s single access neighborhoods. Such strategies shall include:
• The City shall identify alternative plans for evacuation depending upon the location and dynamics of the emergency and consider conducting traffic modeling to quantify travel times under various likely scenarios. Consider the adequacy of emergency access under a range of emergency scenarios, including proximity to existing fire services and the capacity of existing services. • The City shall encourage residents to take only one or two vehicles (based on household size) to reduce the number of evacuating vehicles. The City shall offer offsite parking facilities to safely store secondary vehicles in advance of an emergency event.
• The City shall implement early evacuations for vulnerable communities with limited egress routes, including single-access neighborhoods. • The City shall conduct regular evacuation trainings to educate residents on how to prepare to be without electricity for three days or more and how to shut off domestic gas supply in cases of emergency including training for single-access community homeowner associations and residents.
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EXHIBITS
Table-1 Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities and Schools in Glendale (Based on their location relative to hazards described in Appendix A: Technical Background Report only--Site Specific Studies Recommended)
ID Critical Facilities
Strong Shaking1Surface Rupture
Liquefaction
Landsliding
Slope Instability
Wildfire Susceptibility
Flooding
Dam Inundation
Hazardous Listings
1 Emergency Operations Center
2 Glendale Police Station
3 LA County Sheriff Station
Fire Stations
4 Fire Station 21
5 Fire Station 22
6 Fire Station 23
7 Fire Station 24
8 Fire Station 25
9 Fire Station 26
10 Fire Station 27
11 Fire Station 28
12 Fire Station 29
Hospitals
13 Verdugo Hills Hospital
14 Adventist Medical Center
15 Glendale Memorial Hospital
Schools
16 Glendale Community College
17 Montrose Campus of Glendale College
18 R.D. White Elementary
19 John Marshall Elementary
20 John Muir Elementary
21 Horace Mann Elementary
22 Thomas Edison Elementary
23 Columbus Elementary
24 Mark Keppel Elementary
25 Thomas Jefferson Elementary
26 Balboa Elementary
27 Hoover High School
28 Eleanor Toll Middle School
29 Benjamin Franklin Elementary
30 Allan F. Daily High School
31 Theodore Roosevelt Middle School
32 Glendale High School H
33 Woodrow Wilson Middle School
34 Glenoaks Elementary
35 Verdugo Woodlands Elementary 3386 of 5188
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ID Critical Facilities
Strong Shaking1Surface Rupture
Liquefaction
Landsliding
Slope Instability
Wildfire Susceptibility
Flooding
Dam Inundation
Hazardous Listings
36 John Fremont Elementary
37 Lincoln Elementary
38 Dunsmore Elementary H
39 Clark Magnet High School H
40 Cerritos Elementary
41 Valley View Elementary
42 Glendale Career College
43 La Crescenta Elementary
44 Monte Vista Elementary
45 Mountain Avenue Elementary
46 Rosemont Avenue Middle School
47 Crescenta Valley High School
High Risk to Critical Facility--facility is located in, or within ½ mile, of a census tract containing 31 or more hazardous waste listings.

Moderate Risk to Critical Facility--facility is located in, or within ½ mile, of a census tract containing 11 to 30 hazardous waste listings.
1 The entire Glendale area can experience strong seismic shaking as a result of an earthquake on the Sierra Madre, Verdugo, Raymond or Hollywood faults. Based on the HAZUS analyses, Glendale High School is anticipated to experience at least moderate damage as a result of any of the four earthquake scenarios mentioned above. The schools in the northern portion of the district, near the Sierra Madre fault, are also anticipated to suffer at least moderate damage as a result of the maximum magnitude earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault. The schools that, according to the HAZUS analyses, are more likely to perform poorly during a near-source earthquake are identified with an “H”. 3387 of 5188
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Table-2 Potential Shelters In and Near the City of Glendale (For the location of the shelter closest to you, refer to Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route) Address Buildings
Building
Capacity
Phone
Number*
Number
on Map
Parks and Facilities
1 Adult Recreation Center 210 E. Colorado Street Yes 75 818-548-3775 2 Brand Park Studios 1601 W. Mountain Street Yes 40 818-548-3782 3 Civic Auditorium 1401 N. Verdugo Road Yes 600 818-548-2147 4 Crescenta Valley County Park 3901 Dunsmore Avenue L.C. Yes 40 No Phone 5 Fremont Park 600 W. Hahn Avenue No No Phone
6 Glendale Armory 220 E. Colorado Street Yes 250 No Phone 7 Glenoaks Park 2531 E. Glenoaks Blvd. Yes 40 No Phone
8 Griffith Manor Park 1551 Flower Street Yes 25 No Phone 9 Maple Park 820 E. Maple Street Yes 130 818-548-3785
10 Pacific Park 501 S. Pacific Avenue No No Phone
11 Scholl Canyon Ballfields 3200 E. Glenoaks Blvd. No No Phone 12 Scholl Canyon Park 2849 E. Glenoaks Blvd. No No Phone 13 Sparr Heights Senior Center 1613 Glencoe Way Yes 40 818-548-2187 14 Verdugo Park 1621 Cañada Blvd. No No Phone
Schools and Colleges
15 Glendale Community College 1500 N. Verdugo Road Yes 818-240-1000 16 Glendale Community College
Garfield Campus
1122 E. Garfield Avenue Yes 818-240-1000
(ext. 5678)
17 R.D. White Elementary 744 E. Doran Street Yes 818-241-2164 18 John Marshall Elementary 1201 E. Broadway Yes 818-242-6834 19 Thomas Edison Elementary 440 W. Lomita Avenue Yes 818-241-1807 20 Balboa Elementary 1844 Bel Aire Drive Yes 818-241-1801 21 Hoover High School 651 Glenwood Road Yes 818-242-6801 22 Allan F. Daily High School 220 N. Kenwood Yes 818-247-4805 23 Crescenta Valley High School 4400 Ramsdell Avenue Yes 818-249-5871 24 Glendale High School 1440 E. Broadway Yes 818-242-3161 25 Anderson W. Clark Magnet
High School
4747 New York Ave Yes 818-248-8324
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Table-3 Program Implementation Schedule
No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
Seismic and Geologic Hazards
1-1.1 Adopt Building Code
Amendments
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High Every 3
years
1-1.2 Hire and train staff
knowledgeable on the Building
Codes
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High On-going
1-1.3 Encourage seismic
improvements
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High On-going
1-1.4 Cooperate with G.U.S.D. to
improve the structural safety of
their buildings
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High On-going
1-2.1 Require geological studies for
projects in identified hazards
zones
Public Works/Engineering,
Community
Development/Building &
Safety and Planning
N/A High On-going
1-2.2 Require geological studies for
critical facilities projects in the
hazards zones of the Verdugo,
Lukens, Hollywood and
Sycamore Canyon faults
Public Works/Engineering,
Community
Development/Building &
Safety and Planning
N/A High On-going
1-2.3 Require liquefaction
assessment studies
Public Works/Engineering,
Planning
N/A High On-going
1-2.4 Require slope stability
analyses
Public Works/Engineering,
Planning
N/A High On-going
1-3.1 Review seismic vulnerability of
essential facilities
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A Moderate 3 years
1-3.2 Replace piping and fittings in
City-owned water tanks
Glendale Water & Power GWP Budget High 1 year
1-3.3 Annual review of dams and
water storage facilities
Glendale Water & Power GWP Budget High On-going
1-4.1 Develop and make available to
public a list of State certified
geologists and soils engineers
Public Works/Engineering PW Budget Moderate 1 year
1-4.2 Provide State with updated
information on seismic
hazards
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety
PW Budget High On-going
1-5.1 Update Safety Element as
needed
Community
Development/Planning
General Fund Moderate As Needed
1-5.2 Develop web-based
information for public
regarding seismic hazards and
safety strategies
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety
PW and CDD
Budget
Moderate 1 year
1-5.3 Promote earthquake
preparedness through
publications in various
languages
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety
PW and CDD
Budget
Moderate 1 year
1-5.4 Provide information about
radon gas hazards
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
CDD Budget Low 3 years
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
Seismic and Geologic Hazards
2-1.1 Require geological and
geotechnical investigations in
areas of potential hazard
Public Works/Engineering,
Community Development/
Building & Safety and
Planning
N/A High On-going
2-1.2 Require preliminary geological
investigations of tract sites
Public Works/Engineering,
Community Development/
Building & Safety and
Planning
N/A High On-going
2-1.3 Require geotechnical
investigation in areas
susceptible to slope instability
Public Works/Engineering,
Community Development/
Building & Safety and
Planning
N/A High On-going
2-1.4 Discourage unnecessary
grading. Inspect grading
operations to ensure safety.

Public Works/Engineering,
Community Development/
Building & Safety and
Planning
N/A High On-going
2-1.5 Prohibit grading that is
inconsistent with the Grading
Ordinance
Public Works/Engineering,
Community Development/
Building & Safety and
Planning
N/A High On-going
2-1.6 Prohibit reconstruction of
structures meant for human
habitation that were destroyed
by failed slopes
Community
Development/Building &
Safety and Planning
N/A High On-going
2-2.1 Consider establishing a
regular inspection and
maintenance cycle for existing
physical landslide and debris
flow defenses
Public Works,
Community Development
(Building & Safety)
PW and CDD
Budget Moderate
On-going
2-2.2 Consider implementing
strategies to address
increasing vulnerabilities
associated with debris flow
and landslides
Public Works,
Community Development
(Building & Safety)
PW and CDD
Budget
Moderate 3-years
2-2.3 Consider identifying locations
where slopes should be
actively monitored and install
landslide monitoring
equipment
Public Works,
Community Development
(Building & Safety)
PW and CDD
Budget
Moderate 2 years
Flooding Hazards
3-1.1 Participate in National Flood
Insurance Program
Public Works/Engineering N/A Moderate On-going
3-1.2 Discourage reconstruction of
critical facilities if located in
inundation pathways
Public Works/Engineering N/A High On-going
3-1.3 Fully mitigate potential impacts
to flood control system by new
development
Public Works/Engineering N/A High On-going
3-1.4 Maintain City-owned storm
drain facilities
Public Works/Engineering PW Budget High On-going
3-1.5 Upgrade stormwater systems
on City-owned properties and
rights-of-way to limit flooding
from extreme precipitation
events
Public Works/Engineering PW Budget High On-going
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
3-1.6 Implement flood mitigation
measures to mitigate
increased flood risk due to
climate change along the
Verdugo Wash
Public Works/Engineering PW Budget High On-going
Fire Hazards
4-1.1 Conduct annual fire flow tests Fire N/A Moderate On-going 4-1.2 Prepare periodic Fire Station
location and Resource studies
Fire N/A Moderate As needed
4-1.3 Road standards shall meet
needs for emergency access
Fire, Public
Works/Engineering
N/A Moderate On-going
4-1.4 Improve emergency access for
areas below standards
Fire, Public Work N/A Moderate As needed
4-1.5 Install signal preemption
devices at critical intersections
Fire, Public
Works/Transportation
Unknown Moderate Under study
4-1.6 Evaluate impact of traffic
calming devices on
emergency response times
Fire, Public
Works/Transportation
N/A Moderate On-going
4-1.7 Monitor and identify current
trends that may impact
emergency services
Fire, Police N/A Moderate On-going
4-1.8 Determine if improvements are
needed in public education
and fire prevention
Fire N/A Low On-going
4-1.9 Ensure that road standards
meet the needs for emergency
access
Public Works/Engineering N/A High On-going
4-

1.10 Coordinate with
telecommunication service
entities to fire-harden
communications
Public Works/Engineering N/A High 2 years
4-

1.11 Ensure that adequate
equipment, staffing, training,
and resources are provided to
meet current and future
projected service demands
and fire protection needs
Fire Fire Budget High On-going
4-2.1 Encourage planting and
maintenance of fire-resistant
landscaping
Fire, Community
Development/Planning
N/A Moderate On-going
4-2.2 Enforce Weed Abatement
Program in high fire hazard
areas
Fire Currently
Budgeted
High On-going
4-2.3 Require fuel management
plans for new development
Fire N/A Moderate As needed
4-2.4 Enforce the Uniform Fire Code
and Municipal Fire Code
Amendments
Fire Currently
Budgeted
High On-going
4-2.5 Consider fire safety issues
when making revisions to the
Zoning Ordinance
Community
Development/Planning,
Fire
N/A Moderate As needed
4-2.6 Develop program to monitor
and enforce mitigation
measures and conditions of
approval applied to projects
Community
Development/Planning
N/A Moderate 1 year
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
4-2.7 Enforce Class A roofing and
encourage upgrading existing
wood roofs
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High On-going
4-2.8 Require that new subdivision
tracts with 30 or more lots
provide adequate access and
a minimum of two roadways
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety and Planning
N/A High On-going
4-2.9 Locate new essential public
facilities outside Very High Fire
Hazard Severity Zones
Public Works, GWP N/A High On-going
4-5.1 Support the provision of
adequate water and water
storage to meet future peak
fire demands
GWP, Fire GWP Budget High On-going
4-5.2 Require all new developments
to have adequate water supply
to meet fire suppression needs
GWP, Fire N/A High On-going
4-7.1 Require development and
maintenance of buffer zones
and defensible space
Fire, Public Works,
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High On-going
4-7.2 Encourage residents to
maintain drought and fireresistant landscapes
Public Works, Community
Development
N/A High On-going
4-9.1 Host educational workshops
for property owners on
defensible space, home
hardening, and vegetation
management
Fire Fire Budget Moderate On-going
4-9.2 Conduct studies to determine
whether improvements are
needed in the areas of public
education and fire prevention
Fire Fire Budget Moderate On-going
Climate Change
5-1.1 Explore incorporating
strategies to reduce urban
heat island effect during City
repaving
Public Works N/A Moderate 4 to 6 years
5-1.2 Implement tree-planting
program in high priority areas
Public Works PW Budget High 2 years
5-1.3 Expand functionality and
availability of cooling centers
during poor air quality events
Public Works, Community
Services and Parks, Fire
Department
State grants High 2 years
5-1.4 Consider deploying a lending
library of air purifiers and
cooling devices targeting high
social sensitivity census tracts
Glendale Library Arts and
Culture, Community
Development/Planning
State grants Moderate 4 to 6 years
5-2.1 Consider amending the
building code to require cool
roofing and cool walls by next
CBC update cycle
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High 2 years
5-2.2 Amend building code to
require indoor cooling in new
multi-family buildings, per DPH
guidance
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High 2 years
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
5-2.3 Consider amending building
code to require all newly
installed HVAC units for
existing buildings to have twoway air conditioning unit capability
Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High 2 years
5-3.1 Offer year-round educational
resources in multiple
languages for emergency
preparedness and recovery
best practices
Fire Department,
Community Services and
Parks, Glendale Library
Arts and Culture
State grants Moderate 4 to 6 years
5-3.2 Conduct emergency alert
notifications in English,
Spanish, Armenian, and
Korean
Information Technology,
Fire Department,
Community Development,
Police
N/A High Ongoing
5-3.3 Every five years, reassess
which languages are spoken in
the Glendale community and
expand emergency alert
translations
Information Technology,
Fire Department,
Community Development,
Police
N/A High On-going
5-3.4 Provide online information for
preparing homes and
businesses for extreme
weather events
Office of Sustainability,
Community Services and
Parks, City Manager
N/A Moderate 4 to 6 years
5-4.1 Upon the next update to the
Urban Water Management
Plan (UWMP), consider the
longest recorded drought
GWP GWP budget High Ongoing
5-4.2 Expand Glendale Water and
Power programs to reduce
water use
GWP GWP budget Moderate 4 to 6 years
5-4.3 Implement a program to
conduct an energy/water
nexus study
GWP GWP budget High Ongoing
Hazardous Materials
6-1.1 Enforce the 7 Unified Program
elements related to hazardous
materials
Fire/Hazardous Materials Permit Fees High On-going
6-1.2 Identify roadways used to
transport hazardous materials
and critical facilities near such
routes
Fire/Hazardous Materials Area Plan High 2 years
6-1.3 Evaluate hazardous materials
during environmental review
process for new buildings
Community
Development/Planning,
Fire/Hazardous Materials
Plan check/
permit fees
High On-going
6-1.4 Maintain ability to respond to
hazardous materials incidents
in the City
Fire/Hazardous Materials General Fund/

EMC/EOC
High On-going
6-1.5 Encourage public to eliminate
or reduce use of hazardous
materials
Fire/Hazardous Materials Disposal fee/
State grants
High On-going
6-1.6 Continue to support recycling
centers
Fire/Hazardous Materials Disposal fee/
State grants
Moderate On-going
6-1.7 Review direction of City’s
Certified Unified Program
Agency
Fire/Hazardous Materials EMC Budget Moderate On-going
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
6-1.8 Coordinate hazardous
materials regulation with other
agencies
Fire/Hazardous Materials N/A Moderate On-going
Terrorism, Civil Disturbance and Crime
7-1.1 Review and update
confidential list of potential
targets in the City
Police N/A High On-going
7-1.2 Study ways to minimize
collateral damage to potential
targets
Police N/A High On-going
7-1.3 Study access problems of
major routes in the event of an
attack or civil unrest
Police N/A High Ongoing
7-1.4 Identify staging sites near high
risk assets
Fire, Police N/A Moderate
On-going
7-1.5 Conduct emergency response
exercises
Fire, Police N/A High On-going
7-1.6 Protect essential City facilities
from attack
Police, GWP, Fire,
Information Technology
N/A High On-going
7-1.7 Review Police training and
plans for dealing with terrorist
attacks
Police Grants High On-going
7-1.8 Annually review plans to
respond to a large-scale
incident, such as a terrorist
incident
Police/SPE Working Group N/A High On-going
7-2.1 Monitor crime statistics to look
for trends
Police N/A High On-going
7-2.2 Educate the public about
neighborhood watch and
similar programs
Police COPS Grants Moderate On-going
Dangerous Animal & Plant Hazards
8-1.1 Make information available to
the public in regards to
hazardous animals
Parks and Recreation Grants High On-going
8-1.2 Make information available to
the public in regards to
dangerous plants
Parks and Recreation Grants High On-going
8-2.1 Provide residents with animalproof trash receptacles Public Works/Maintenance
Services
Parks/PW
Grants
Low 5 years
8-2.2 Work with Forest Rangers to
monitor wild animal sightings
and publicize information
Parks and Recreation/City
PIO
N/A Low On-going
8-2.3 Encourage residents to use
enclosed composting bins
Parks and Recreation/PW
Integrated Waste Mgmt.

PW Integrated
Waste Mgmt.

Grants
Low On-going
8-2.4 Encourage residents to have
pets vaccinated and publicize
the benefits of flea control
City Clerk N/A Low On-going
8-2.5 Look for and report unusual
numbers of dead rodents or
birds
Parks and Recreation N/A High On-going
8-2.6 Monitor coyote population and
relocate aggressive coyotes
Parks and Recreation Parks Moderate On-going
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
Disaster Preparedness, Recovery and Emergency Response
9-1.1 Update preparedness and
recovery plans
All City Divisions N/A High On-going
9-1.2 Maintain and update
participants in the City’s
emergency response
organization
Fire, Police N/A High On-going
9-1.3 Maintain mutual aid
agreements with other
agencies
Fire, Police N/A High On-going
9-1.4 Establish traffic control plans
for disaster routes
Police N/A Moderate On-going
9-1.5 Publicize information about
disaster preparedness
Fire N/A
High
On-going
9-1.6 Promote development of
evacuation plans in high-rise
buildings, immobile population
centers, businesses that use
hazardous substances and in
other critical facilities.

Fire N/A Moderate On-going
9-1.7 Compile and maintain
information about facilities that
may require specialized
response.

Fire/Police/GWP/Public
Works
N/A Moderate On-going
9-1.8 Continue to participate in
emergency preparedness
exercises
All City Divisions N/A Moderate On-going
9-1.9 Inventory equipment needed
for emergency preparedness
Fire/EOC/Police/Public
Works/GWP/Finance--
Logistics
N/A High On-going
9-

1.10 Assess existing City buildings,
to determine retrofits needed
for long-term resilience to
climate change-affected
hazards
Public Works, Community
Development/Building &
Safety
N/A High On-going
9-

1.11 Provide accurate
documentation for cost
recovery efforts from federal,
state and other agencies in the
event of disaster.

All City Divisions N/A High As needed
9-2.1 Implement communicationrelated strategies in the Evacuation Analysis
(Appendix C)
Public Works, Police, Fire,
Information Technology,
City Management
N/A High On-going
9-2.2 Increase redundancy in
emergency evacuation
communication systems
Information Technology,
Fire, Public Works
N/A High On-going
9-3.1 Implement strategies for
evacuation of vulnerable
populations in Evacuation
Analysis (Appendix C)
CSP, City Management
(Public Information),
N/A High On-going
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No. Program Responsible Division
Potential
Funding Priority
Time
Frame
(years)
9-5.1 Implement roadway and
intersection capacity and
resilience-related strategies in
Evacuation Analysis
(Appendix C)
Public Works, Police N/A High On-going
9-5.2 Implement strategies to
improve emergency access for
single-access neighborhoods
Public Works, Police N/A High On-going
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Plate P-1 Seismic Hazards
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Plate P-2 Dam Inundation Zones
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Plate P-3 Wildfire Hazard Severity Zones and Critical Facilities 3399 of 5188
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Plate P-4 Single Access Neighborhoods
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Plate P-5 Emergency Response Route
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Appendix A
Technical Background Report
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Introduction to the Technical Background Report
of the Safety Element for the City of Glendale
Welcome! The Safety Element of the General Plan is the disaster mitigation plan for Glendale.

Its ultimate goal is to improve the safety of the community. However, for appropriate hazard management, including effective emergency preparedness and response, communities need to know in advance what are the potentially hazardous conditions specific to their area. A major part of this knowledge base is based on maps that identify the vulnerable areas in the community.

This is covered in the Technical Background Report of the Safety Element.

Therefore, in this report you are going to read about your City. Natural geologic processes are responsible for much of the natural beauty that makes Glendale such a special place to live and work. Unfortunately, many of these processes are not gradual, but rather, are sudden and often violent. Periodic large earthquakes are responsible for the uplift and continued growth of the San Gabriel Mountains that form the spectacular backdrop to Glendale, and the steep bedrock highlands, such as the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, right in the heart of the City.

Flooding, erosion, and sediment transport are responsible for forming the broad sloping surfaces in the Crescenta and San Fernando Valleys, as well as for carving the impressive Verdugo Canyon that connects the northern and southern portions of the City. When these geologic processes occur within an urban environment, they become hazards, and when they do occur, they can create a disaster for those impacted by them.

Most of the hazards covered in this report are “natural” hazards, such as earthquakes (Chapter 1), landslides (Chapter 2), floods (Chapter 3), and fire (Chapter 4). In reality, however, these natural conditions do not pose a hazard in the wild, and it is only when they interact with the built environment that they become an issue. For example, a landslide in an undeveloped area is just a landslide, no buildings or structures are damaged, and no one is hurt or killed. But when a landslide occurs in a developed residential area, it has the potential to cause extensive damage and monetary losses, frequently never recovered by the victims. This does not need to happen though. From past experience, we have learned how to correct slope instability, how to measure and contain flood waters, and how to design earthquake and fire resistant structures. We have also learned that avoidance is sometimes the best defense.

The last two chapters of this report cover other safety issues that are not “natural.” Chapter 5 discusses ways to reduce the harmful effects to our environment posed by many of the substances that we depend on for our every day comfort – substances such as gasoline, herbicides, fertilizers, and chemical compounds used to manufacture an amazing array of objects and products. Chapter 6 discusses crime, terrorism, and civil unrest and other safety issues of this type.

So, what is the best way to use this report? As the saying goes, “a picture is worth a thousand words.” Thus, we recommend that you first refer to the maps that accompany this report. If you are like almost everybody else, you will want to look for the area where you live or work, or where you are thinking of moving. These maps will show you at a glance whether the area you are interested in is located, for example, on or near an earthquake fault, an area susceptible to ground failure, or a highly hazardous fire area. Keep in mind, however, maps are by necessity Earth Consultants International Introduction 3404 of 5188 Page 1

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
generalized, and therefore, the boundaries shown on the map are only approximate – you do not want to be lulled into a false sense of security because your lot is across the street from where we have placed a contact between a hazardous and a non-hazardous zone. Or, alternatively, decide to move because you are currently living in an area zoned as hazardous. This is where reading the text comes in. Read about the specific hazards that you are concerned with, then apply that knowledge to your lot and house. How old is your house? Is it tied down to its foundation? Does it have a fire-resistant roof? There are specific actions that you can take to make your house specifically, or Glendale in general, a safer place.

Key paragraphs or sections in the text of special interest are identified with symbols along the right-hand margin of the pages. The three symbols used, and their significance, are as follows:

Datum of general interest -
Datum of interest to the City of Glendale -
Mitigation measures that could be implemented -
to reduce a given hazard
The primary point of this document is to educate and inform the citizens, workers, and officials of Glendale of the potential hazards in the community. By doing so, you can take action to reduce the hazards specific to your area to a level that you, your family and your community are comfortable with. Through appropriate action, the hazard does not need to become a disaster.

Glendale is a relatively mature city; many areas of the City are fully developed, and in these areas, nearly all mitigation will be through redevelopment. As a result, disaster mitigation in these sections of the City will require decades to complete. Other areas, primarily in or adjacent to the hillsides, are still in a fairly natural state, but slated for future development. In these areas, there are opportunities to develop sensibly, avoiding some hazards altogether, like active faults, and implementing mitigation measures to reduce other hazards to acceptable levels. Although hazard reduction is a moving target, it must be accomplished. Government is tasked with the responsibility for citizen health, safety, and welfare. In the end though, all mitigation is local.

Without the support of the citizens of Glendale, no governmental programs will be successful. It is hoped that this document will assist you in understanding the issues and the risks you and Glendale face. Through such an understanding you will be ready to support and implement the programs necessary to reduce your risk to community-accepted levels.

We hope that you enjoy reading this document, and that the data presented herein provides you with the impetus to demand action of yourself and others in Glendale to make it an even safer City to live and work in.

Earth Consultants International Introduction 3405 of 5188 Page 2

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page No.

CHAPTER 1: SEISMIC HAZARDS........................................................................... 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................1-1

1.2 EARTHQUAKE AND MITIGATION BASICS.......................................................................................1-1

1.2.1 Definitions.......................................................................................................................1-1

1.2.2 Evaluating Earthquake Hazard Potential.........................................................................1-4

1.2.3 Causes of Earthquake Damage........................................................................................1-6

1.2.4 Choosing Earthquakes for Planning and Design .............................................................1-8

1.3 LAWS TO MITIGATE EARTHQUAKE HAZARD.................................................................................1-9

1.3.1 Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act...................................................................1-9

1.3.2 Seismic Hazards Mapping Act......................................................................................1-10

1.3.3 Real Estate Disclosure Requirements............................................................................1-10

1.3.4 California Environmental Quality Act ..........................................................................1-11

1.3.5 Uniform Building Code and California Building Code.................................................1-11

1.3.6 Unreinforced Masonry Law ..........................................................................................1-12

1.4 NOTABLE HISTORIC EARTHQUAKES IN THE GLENDALE REGION ...............................................1-13

1.4.1 Long Beach Earthquake of 1933 ...................................................................................1-13

1.4.2 San Fernando (Sylmar) Earthquake of 1971 .................................................................1-13

1.4.3 Malibu Earthquake of 1979...........................................................................................1-16

1.4.4 Whittier Narrows Earthquake of 1987 ..........................................................................1-16

1.4.5 Pasadena Earthquake of 1988........................................................................................1-16

1.4.6 Malibu Earthquake of 1989...........................................................................................1-16

1.4.7 Sierra Madre Earthquake of 1991..................................................................................1-16

1.4.8 Landers Earthquake of 1992..........................................................................................1-17

1.4.9 Northridge Earthquake of 1994.....................................................................................1-17

1.4.10 West Hollywood Earthquake of 2001 ...........................................................................1-18

1.5 POTENTIAL SOURCES OF SEISMIC GROUND SHAKING ................................................................1-18

1.5.1 San Andreas Fault Zone ................................................................................................1-22

1.5.2 Verdugo Fault................................................................................................................1-23

1.5.3 Hollywood Fault............................................................................................................1-24

1.5.4 Raymond Fault ..............................................................................................................1-25

1.5.5 Sierra Madre Fault.........................................................................................................1-25

1.5.6 Elysian Park Fault .........................................................................................................1-26

1.6 POTENTIAL SOURCES OF FAULT RUPTURE..................................................................................1-27

1.6.1 Primary Fault Rupture...................................................................................................1-27

1.6.2 Secondary Fault Rupture and Related Ground Deformation.........................................1-33

1.7 GEOLOGIC HAZARDS RESULTING FROM SEISMIC SHAKING .......................................................1-34

1.7.1 Liquefaction and Related Ground Failure .....................................................................1-34

1.7.2 Seismically Induced Settlement ....................................................................................1-38

1.7.3 Seismically Induced Slope Failure ................................................................................1-39

1.7.4 Deformation of Sidehill Fills.........................................................................................1-40

1.7.5 Ridgetop Fissuring and Shattering ................................................................................1-40

1.7.6 Seiches...........................................................................................................................1-41

1.8 VULNERABLILITY OF STRUCTURES TO EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS ...............................................1-41

1.8.1 Potentially Hazardous Building and Structures.............................................................1-42

1.8.2 Essential Facilities.........................................................................................................1-45

1.8.3 Lifelines.........................................................................................................................1-46

1.9 HAZUS EARTHQUAKE SCENARIO LOSS ESTIMATIONS FOR THE CITY OF GLENDALE .................1-48

1.9.1 Methodology, Terminology and Input Data Used in Earthquake Loss Estimations for the City ....................................................................................................................1-49

1.9.2 HAZUS Scenario Earthquakes for Glendale Area ........................................................1-54

1.9.3 Inventory Data Used in the HAZUS Loss Estimation Models for Glendale.................1-55

1.9.4 Estimated Losses Associated with the Earthquake Scenarios .......................................1-56 Earth Consultants International Table of Contents i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Page No.

1.10 REDUCING EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS IN THE CITY OF GLENDALE ...............................................1-70

1.10.1 1997 Uniform Building Code Impacts on the City of Glendale……. ...........................1-70

1.10.2 Retrofit and Strengthening of Existing Structures.........................................................1-73

1.11 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................1-75 CHAPTER 2: GEOLOGIC HAZARDS....................................................................... 2-1

2.1 PHYSIOGRAPHIC SETTING……………………………………………………………..................2-1

2.2 GEOLOGIC SETTING ......................................................................................................................2-1

2.3 GEOLOGIC UNITS...........................................................................................................................2-3

2.3.1 Surficial Sediments.............................................................................................................2-3

2.3.2 Bedrock Units .....................................................................................................................2-7

2.4 GEOLOGIC HAZARDS IN THE GLENDALE AREA.............................................................................2-9

2.4.1 Landslides and Slope Instability .........................................................................................2-9

2.4.2 Collapsible Soils ...............................................................................................................2-19

2.4.3 Expansive Soils.................................................................................................................2-19

2.4.4 Ground Subsidence ...........................................................................................................2-20

2.4.5 Radon Gas.........................................................................................................................2-21

2.5 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................2-26 CHAPTER 3: FLOOD HAZARDS........................................................................... 3-1

3.1 STORM FLOODING .........................................................................................................................3-1

3.1.1 Hydrologic Setting..............................................................................................................3-1

3.1.2 Meteorological Setting........................................................................................................3-3

3.1.3 Historical Flows and Past Floods........................................................................................3-4

3.1.4 National Flood Insurance Program .....................................................................................3-8

3.1.5 Bridge Scour .....................................................................................................................3-11

3.1.6 Existing Flood Protection Measures .................................................................................3-11

3.1.7 Future Flood Protection ....................................................................................................3-12

3.1.8 Flood Protection Measures for Property Owners..............................................................3-13

3.2 SEISMICALLY INDUCED INUNDATION..........................................................................................3-14

3.2.1 Dam Inundation ................................................................................................................3-14

3.2.2 Inundation From Above-Ground Storage Tanks...............................................................3-16

3.3 SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND PLANNING OPPORTUNITIES...............................................................3-16 CHAPTER 4: FIRE HAZARDS............................................................................... 4-1

4.1 WILDLAND FIRES ...........................................................................................................................4-1

4.1.1 Wildland Fire Susceptibility Mapping................................................................................4-2

4.1.2 Wildland Fire Susceptibility in the Glandale Area .............................................................4-5

4.1.3 Hazard Mitigation .............................................................................................................4-10

4.1.3.1 Fire Prevention .....................................................................................................4-10

4.1.3.2 Vegetation Management .......................................................................................4-11

4.1.3.3 Legislated Construction Requirements in Fire Hazard Areas..............................4-16

4.1.3.4 Access....................................................................................................................4-18

4.1.3.5 Public Awareness..................................................................................................4-19

4.2 STRUCTURAL FIRES IN URBAN AREAS .........................................................................................4-22

4.2.1 Structural Target Fire Hazards and Standards of Coverage ..............................................4-23

4.2.2 Model Ordinances and Fire Codes....................................................................................4-24

4.3 FIRE SUPPRESSION CAPABILITIES ...............................................................................................4-24

4.3.1 Automatic and Mutual Aid Agreements...........................................................................4-29

4.3.2 Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)..................................................4-30

4.3.3 ISO Rating for the City of Glendale .................................................................................4-31 Earth Consultants International Table of Contents ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Page No.

4.4 EARTHQUAKE INDUCED FIRES ....................................................................................................4-31

4.4.1 Earthquake-Induced Fire Scenarios for the Glendale Area Using HAZUS ......................4-32

4.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................4-34 CHAPTER 5: HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT ................................................ 5-1

5.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................5-1

5.2 AIR QUALITY..................................................................................................................................5-2

5.2.1 National Ambient Air Quality Standards............................................................................5-2

5.2.2 Air Quality Index................................................................................................................5-5

5.3 DRINKING WATER QUALITY ..........................................................................................................5-6

5.4 REGULATIONS GOVERNING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND GLENDALE’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE.........................................................................................................................................5-8

5.4.1 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)..............................................5-9

5.4.2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act....................5-10

5.4.3 Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA).............................5-11

5.4.4 Resources Conservation and Recovery Act ......................................................................5-12

5.4.5 Hazardous Materials Disclosure Program.........................................................................5-13

5.4.6 Hazardous Materials Incident Response ...........................................................................5-15

5.4.7 Hazardous Material Spill/Release Notification Guidance.................................................5-15

5.5 LEAKING UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS (LUST)....................................................................5-18

5.6 GLENDALE FIRE DEPARTMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CENTER AND GLENDALE FIRE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES .....................................................................................5-18

5.7 HOUSEHOLD HAZARDOUS WASTE AND RECYCLING ...................................................................5-19

5.8 OIL FIELDS ...................................................................................................................................5-20

5.9 HAZARD ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................5-20

5.9.1 Earthquake-Induced Releases of Hazardous Materials.....................................................5-21

5.9.2 Chemical Fires ..................................................................................................................5-22

5.9.3 Hazards Overlays..............................................................................................................5-24

5.10 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................5-24 CHAPTER 6: OTHER SAFETY ISSUES..................................................................... 6-1

6.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................6-1

6.2 TERRORISM AND CIVIL UNREST ....................................................................................................6-1

6.2.1 Definitions ..........................................................................................................................6-1

6.2.2 Hazard Analysis..................................................................................................................6-2

6.2.3 Hazard Response.................................................................................................................6-2

6.3 CRIME............................................................................................................................................6-4

6.4 MAJOR ACCIDENT RESPONSE ........................................................................................................6-8

6.5 DANGEROUS ANIMALS ...................................................................................................................6-8

6.5.1 Coyotes...............................................................................................................................6-9

6.5.2 Mountain Lions.................................................................................................................6-10

6.5.3 Bears.................................................................................................................................6-12

6.5.4 Raccoons...........................................................................................................................6-13

6.5.5 Ground Squirrels...............................................................................................................6-14

6.5.6 Bees, Wasps, Hornets, and Yellow Jackets.......................................................................6-14

6.5.7 Spiders ..............................................................................................................................6-14

6.5.8 Snakes...............................................................................................................................6-15

6.6 DANGEROUS PLANTS ...................................................................................................................6-15 Earth Consultants International Table of Contents iii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Page No.

6.7 DISEASE AND VECTOR CONTROL ................................................................................................6-18

6.7.1 Lyme Disease....................................................................................................................6-18

6.7.2 Plague ...............................................................................................................................6-19

6.7.3 Arboviral Encephalitides ..................................................................................................6-21

6.7.4 Rabies ...............................................................................................................................6-22

6.7.5 Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome .....................................................................................6-23

6.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................6-23

FIGURES, TABLES AND PLATES
Figure 1-1: Regional Fault Map.........................................................................................................1-3 Figure 1-2: Regional Seismicity Map ..............................................................................................1-14 Figure 1-3: Local Active and Potentially Active Faults...................................................................1-21 Figure 1-4: Generalized Flow Chart Summarizing the HAZUS Methodology................................1-50 Figure 1-5: Building Inventory, by Occupancy Type, in the Glendale Area ...................................1-56 Figure 2-1: Radon Construction Mitigation .....................................................................................2-25 Figure 3-1: Drainage Area for Stream Gaging Station F252-R ion Glendale ...................................3-5 Figure 3-2: Historical Peak and Total Discharge Measurements for Verdugo Wash ........................3-8 Figure 4-1: September 2002 Fire in Glendale ....................................................................................4-5 Figure 4-2: Slopes Burnt During the September 9-11, 2002 Fire in Glendale ...................................4-7 Figure 4-3: Glendale’s Hillside Planting Zones...............................................................................4-13 Figure 4-4: Example of Vegetation Management at the Urban-Wildland Interface ........................4-14 Figure 4-5: Firefighters putting out the September 2002 “Mountain Incident” Fire in Glendale ....4-19 Figure 4-6: Command Post During the September 2002 “Mountain Incident” Fire in Glendale.....4-22 Figure 4-7: 20-Year History of Incidents in the City of Glendale Responded to by the Fire Department....................................................................................................................4-27 Figure 6-1: Crime Index in California for the Years 1952-2000........................................................6-4 Figure 6-2: Crime Trends in the City of Glendale for the Years 1993-2001 .....................................6-5 Figure 6-3: Crime Rate in Glendale vs. Adjacent Counties ...............................................................6-5 Figure 6-4: Crime Rate in Glendale and Neighboring Cities.............................................................6-6 Figure 6-5: Mountain Lion Range in Southern California ...............................................................6-11 Figure 6-6: Approximate Distribution of Predicted Lyme Disease Risk in the United States .........6-19 Figure 6-7: World Distribution of Plague, 1998 ..............................................................................6-20 Figure 6-8: West Nile Virus Cases in the United States as of November 2002 ...............................6-22 Table 1-1: Abridged Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale ...................................................................1-5 Table 1-2: Estimated Horizontal Peak Ground Accelerations and Seismic Intensities in the Glendale Area......................................................................................................1-20 Table 1-3: Injury Classification Scale.............................................................................................1-53 Table 1-4: HAZUS Scenario Earthquakes for the City of Pasadena...............................................1-54 Table 1-5: Number of Buildings Damaged, by Occupancy Type...................................................1-58 Table 1-6: Number of Buildings Damaged, by Construction Type ................................................1-60 Table 1-7: Estimated Casualties .....................................................................................................1-63 Table 1-8: Estimated Economic Losses..........................................................................................1-64 Table 1-9: Estimated Shelter Requirements....................................................................................1-66 Table 1-10: Expected Damage to Transportation Systems...............................................................1-68 Table 1-11: Expected Performance of Potable Water and Electricity Services................................1-69 Table 1-12 UBC Soil Profile Types.................................................................................................1-71 Table 1-13 Seismic Source Type.....................................................................................................1-73 Table 2-1: General Slope Instability Potential within the City of Glendale ...................................2-16 Table 2-2: Radon Health Risk If You Smoke or if You Have Never Smoked ...............................2-22 Table 3-1: Average Annual Rainfall by Month for the Glendale Area.............................................3-3 Table 3-2: Average Annual Rainfall by Month for the La Crescenta Area ......................................3-3 Earth Consultants International Table of Contents iv
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
FIGURES, TABLES AND PLATES (Continued)
Table 3-3: Peak Flow Records for Station F252-R at Estelle Avenue in Glendale ..........................3-6 Table 4-1: Fire Stations in the City of Glendale .............................................................................4-25 Table 4-2: Earthquake Induced Fire Losses in Glandale based on Hazus Scenario Earthquake ....4-33 Table 5-1: National Ambient Air Quality Standards ........................................................................5-3 Table 5-2: Year 2000 Peak Air Quality Statistics for Criteria Pollutants in the Los Angeles- Long Beach Metropolitan Area ................................................................................................5-4 Table 5-3: Air Quality Index (a measure of community-wide air quality) .......................................5-5 Table 5-4: Air Quality in the Glendale Area in 1999........................................................................5-6 Table 5-5: Facility with EPA Permits to Discharge to Water in the Glendale Area .........................5-8 Table 5-6: CERCLIS Sites in the Glendale Area............................................................................5-10 Table 5-7: Toxic Release Inventory of Facilities in the Glendale Area..........................................5-12 Table 5-8: EPA-Registered Large-Quantity Generator (LQG) Facilities in the Glendale Area .....5-13 Table 5-9: Sites in the Glendale Area with Leaking Underground Storage Tanks.........................5-19 Table 5-10: Significant Hazardous Materials Sites in Glendale .......................................................5-21 Table 6-1: Poisonous Plants Common in Ornamental Gardens......................................................6-17 Plate 1-1: Historical Seismicity Map (1855-2002) Glendale, California.......................................1-15 Plate 1-2: Fault Map Glendale, California.....................................................................................1-28 Plate 1-3: Seismic Hazards Map Glendale, California ..................................................................1-37 Plate 1-4: Critical Facilities Map Glendale, California..................................................................1-47 Plate 1-5: Residential Buildings with at Least Moderate Damage > 50% (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios) Glendale, California .................................................................1-59 Plate 1-6: Commercial Buildings with at Least Moderate Damage > 50% (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios) Glendale, California .................................................................1-61 Plate 1-7: Schools with at Least Moderate Damage > 50% (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios) Glendale, California ......................................................................................................1-65 Plate 1-8: Bridge Damage (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios) Glendale, California ............1-67 Plate 1-9: Engineering Soil types in Accordance with 1997 Uniform Building Code Glendale, California.......................................................................................................................1-72 Plate 2-1: Geologic Map Glendale, California ................................................................................2-4 Plate 2-1a: Explanation of Geologic Map .........................................................................................2-5 Plate 2-2: Slope Distribution Map Glendale, California................................................................2-11 Plate 2-3: Engineering Geologic Materials Map Glendale, California ..........................................2-12 Plate 2-4: Slope Instability Map Glendale, California...................................................................2-17 Plate 3-1: Geomorphic Map Glendale, California ...........................................................................3-2 Plate 3-2: Damage Caused by the January 1, 1934 Flood Glendale, California ..............................3-9 Plate 3-3: Dam Inundation Pathways.............................................................................................3-15 Plate 4-1: Historical Wildland Fire Map of the Glendale Area .......................................................4-6 Plate 4-2: High Fire Hazard Areas, City of Glendale ......................................................................4-9 Plate 4-3: Non-compliant Roads in the City of Glendale, California ............................................4-20 Plate 4-4: Fire Station Location Map, Glendale, California .........................................................4-26 Plate 5-1: Hazardous Materials Site Map Glendale, California.....................................................5-14 Plate 6-1: Crime Rate per 100,000 by Census Tract, Glendale, California .....................................6-7 APPENDIX A: REFERENCES
APPENDIX B: USEFUL WEB SITES
APPENDIX C: HAZUS EARTHQUAKE SCENARIO REPORTS
APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY
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CHAPTER 1: SEISMIC HAZARDS

1.1 Introduction
While Glendale is at risk from many natural and man-made hazards, an earthquake is the event with the greatest potential for far-reaching loss of life or property, and economic damage. This is true for most of southern California, since damaging earthquakes are frequent, affect widespread areas, trigger many secondary effects, and can overwhelm the ability of local jurisdictions to respond. Earthquaketriggered geologic effects include ground shaking, surface fault rupture, landslides, liquefaction, subsidence, and seiches, all of which are discussed below. Earthquakes can also cause human-made hazards such as urban fires, dam failures, and toxic chemical releases. These man-made hazards are also discussed in this document.

In California, recent earthquakes in or near urban environments have caused relatively few casualties.

This is due more to luck than design. For example, when a portion of the Nimitz Freeway in Oakland collapsed at rush hour during the 1989, MW 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake, it was uncommonly empty because so many were watching the World Series. The 1994, MW 6.7 Northridge earthquake occurred before dawn, when most people were home safely in bed. Despite such good luck, California’s urban earthquakes have resulted in significant losses. The moderate-sized Northridge earthquake caused 54 deaths and nearly $30 billion in damage. Glendale is at risk from earthquakes that could release more than 10 times the seismic energy of the Northridge earthquake.

Although it is not possible to prevent earthquakes, their destructive effects can be minimized.

Comprehensive hazard mitigation programs that include the identification and mapping of hazards, prudent planning, public education, emergency exercises, enforcement of building codes, and expedient retrofitting and rehabilitation of weak structures can significantly reduce the scope of an earthquake’s effects and avoid disaster. Local government, emergency relief organizations, and residents must take action to develop and implement policies and programs to reduce the effects of earthquakes.

1.2 Earthquake and Mitigation Basics

1.2.1 Definitions
The outer 10 - 70 kilometers of the Earth consist of enormous blocks of moving rock, called plates. There are about a dozen major plates, which slowly collide, separate, and grind past each other. In the uppermost plates, friction locks the plate edges together, while movement continues at depth. Consequently, the near-surface rocks bend and deform near plate boundaries, storing strain energy. Eventually, the frictional forces are overcome and the locked portions of the plates move. The stored strain energy is released in waves.

By definition, the break or fracture between moving blocks of rock is called a fault, and such differential movement produces a fault rupture. The place where the fault first ruptures is called the focus (or hypocenter). The released energy waves radiate out in all directions from the rupture surface, making the earth vibrate and shake as the waves travel through.

This shaking is what we feel in an earthquake.

Although faults exist everywhere, most earthquakes occur on or near plate boundaries. Thus, southern California has many earthquakes, because it straddles the boundary between the North American and Pacific plates, and fault rupture accommodates their motion. The Pacific Plate is moving northwesterly, relative to the North American Plate, at about 50 mm/yr. This Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-1 3412 of 5188
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is about the rate at which fingernails grow, and seems unimpressive. However, it is enough to accumulate enormous amounts of strain energy over dozens to thousands of years. Despite being locked in place most of the time, in another 15 million years (a short time in the context of the Earth’s history), due to plate movements, Glendale will be hundreds of kilometers north of San Francisco.

Although the San Andreas fault marks the actual separation between the Pacific and North American plates, only about 70 percent of the plate motion occurs on the San Andreas fault itself. The rest is distributed among other faults of the San Andreas system, including the San Jacinto, Whittier-Elsinore, Newport-Inglewood, Palos Verdes, plus several offshore faults; and among faults of the Eastern Mojave Shear Zone, a series of faults east of the San Andreas, responsible for the 1992, MW 7.3 Landers and 1999 MW 7.1 Hector Mine earthquakes (Figures 1-1 and 1-2). (MW stands for moment magnitude, a measure of earthquake energy release, discussed below.) Thus, the zone of plate-boundary earthquakes and ground deformation covers an area that stretches from the Pacific Ocean to Nevada.

Because the Pacific and North American plates are sliding past each other, with relative motions to the northwest and southeast, respectively, all of the faults mentioned above are aligned northwest-southeast, and are strike-slip faults. On average, strike-slip faults are nearly vertical breaks in the rock, and when a strike-slip fault ruptures, the rocks on either side of the fault slide horizontally past each other.

However, there is a kink in the San Andreas fault, commonly referred to as the “Big Bend”.

The northwest corner of the Big Bend is located about 75 miles northeast of Glendale (Figure 1-1). Near the Big Bend, the two plates do not slide past each other. Instead, they collide, causing localized compression, resulting in folding and thrust faulting. Thrust faults meet the surface of the Earth at a low angle, dipping 25 – 35 degrees from the horizontal. Thrusts are a type of dip-slip fault, where rocks on opposite sides of the fault move up or down relative to each other. When a thrust fault ruptures, the top block of rock moves up and over the rock on the other side of the fault.

In southern California, ruptures along thrust faults have built the Transverse Ranges geologic province, a region with an east-west trend to its landforms and underlying geologic structures. This orientation is anomalous, virtually unique in the western United States, and a direct consequence of the plates colliding at the Big Bend. Many of southern California’s most recent damaging earthquakes have occurred on thrust faults that are uplifting the Transverse Ranges, including the 1971 MW 6.7 San Fernando, the 1987 MW 5.9 Whittier Narrows, the 1991 MW 5.8 Sierra Madre, and the 1994 MW 6.7 Northridge earthquakes.

Thrust faults can be particularly hazardous because many are blind thrust faults, that is, they do not extend to the surface of the Earth. These faults are extremely difficult to detect before they rupture. Some of the most recent earthquakes, like the 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake, and the 1994 Northridge earthquake, occurred on blind thrust faults.

The City of Glendale is situated in the Transverse Ranges Province, an area that is exposed to risk from multiple earthquake fault zones. The highest risks originate from the Sierra Madre (dip-slip, reverse) fault zone, the Verdugo (dip-slip, reverse) fault zone, the Hollywood (predominantly strike-slip, left lateral) fault, the Elysian Park (blind thrust) fault zone, and the Raymond (predominantly strike-slip, left lateral) fault zone. Each one of these faults will be discussed in more detail in Section 1-5.

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1.2.2 Evaluating Earthquake Hazard Potential
When comparing the sizes of earthquakes, the most meaningful feature is the amount of energy released. Thus scientists most often consider seismic moment, a measure of the energy released when a fault ruptures. We are more familiar, however, with scales of magnitude, which measure amplitude of ground motion. Magnitude scales are logarithmic.

Each one-point increase in magnitude represents a ten-fold increase in amplitude of the waves as measured at a specific location, and a 32-fold increase in energy. That is, a magnitude 7 earthquake produces 100 times (10 x 10) the ground motion amplitude of a magnitude 5 earthquake. Similarly, a magnitude 7 earthquake releases approximately 1,000 times more energy (32 x 32) than a magnitude 5 earthquake. Recently, scientists have developed the moment magnitude (Mw) scale to relate energy release to magnitude.

An early measure of earthquake size still used today is the seismic intensity scale, which is a qualitative assessment of an earthquake’s effects at a given location. Although it has limited scientific application, intensity is still widely used because it is intuitively clear and quick to determine. The most commonly used measure of seismic intensity is called the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale, which has 12 damage levels (Table 1.1).

A given earthquake will have one moment and, in principle, one magnitude, although there are several methods of calculating magnitude, which give slightly different results. However, one earthquake will produce many intensities because intensity effects vary with the location and perceptions of the observer.

Few faults are simple, planar breaks in the Earth. They more often consist of smaller strands, with a similar orientation and sense of movement. A strand is mappable as a single, fairly continuous feature at a scale of about 1:24,000. Sometimes geologists group strands into segments, which are believed capable of rupturing together during a single earthquake. The more extensive the fault, the bigger the earthquake it can produce. Therefore, multi-strand fault ruptures produce larger earthquakes.

The bigger and closer the earthquake, the greater the likelihood of damage. Thus fault dimensions and proximity are key parameters in any hazard assessment. In addition, it is important to know a fault’s style of movement (i.e. is it dip-slip or strike-slip, discussed above), the age of its most recent activity, its total displacement, and its slip rate (all discussed below). These values indicate how often a fault produces damaging earthquakes, and how big an earthquake should be expected the next time the fault ruptures.

Total displacement is the length, measured in kilometers (km), of the total movement that has occurred along the fault over as long a time as the geologic record reveals. It is usually estimated by measuring distances between geologic features that have been split apart and separated (offset) by the cumulative movement of the fault over many earthquakes. Slip rate is a speed, expressed in millimeters per year (mm/yr). Slip rate is estimated by measuring an amount of offset accrued during a known amount of time, obtained by dating the ages of geologic features. Slip rate data also are used to estimate a fault’s earthquake recurrence interval. Sometimes referred to as “repeat time” or “return interval”, the recurrence interval represents the average amount of time that elapses between major earthquakes on a fault. The most specific way to derive recurrence interval is to excavate a trench across a fault to obtain paleoseismic evidence of earthquakes that have occurred during prehistoric time.

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Table 1-1: Abridged Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
Intensity Value and Description
Average Peak
Velocity
(cm/sec)
Average Peak
Acceleration
(g = gravity )
I. Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable circumstances (I Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: None. <0.1 <0.0017 II. Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of high-rise buildings. Delicately suspended objects may swing.
(I to II Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: None.

0.1 – 1.1 0.0017 – 0.014 III. Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings, but many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing automobiles may rock slightly. Vibration like passing of truck. Duration estimated. (III Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: None.

IV. During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by few. At night some awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make creaking sound.

Sensation like a heavy truck striking building. Standing automobiles rocked noticeably. (IV to V Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: None. Perceived shaking: Light.

1.1 – 3.4 0.014 - 0.039
V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows, and so on broken; cracked plaster in a few places; unstable objects overturned.

Disturbances of trees, poles, and other tall objects sometimes noticed.

Pendulum clocks may stop. (V to VI Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential:

Very light. Perceived shaking: Moderate.

3.4 – 8.1 0.039-0.092
VI. Felt by all; many frightened and run outdoors. Some heavy furniture moved, few instances of fallen plaster and damaged chimneys. Damage slight. (VI to VII Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: Light. Perceived shaking: Strong.

8.1 - 16 0.092 -0.18
VII. Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving cars. (VIII Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: Moderate. Perceived shaking: Very strong.
16 - 31 0.18 - 0.34
VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse; great in poorly built structures.

Panel walls thrown out of frame structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, and walls. Heavy furniture overturned. Sand and mud ejected in small amounts. Changes in well water. Persons driving cars disturbed. (VIII+ to IX Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: Moderate to heavy. Perceived shaking: Severe.
31 - 60 0.34 - 0.65
IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb; great in substantial buildings with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground cracked conspicuously.

Underground pipes broken. (IX+ Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential:

Heavy. Perceived shaking: Violent.
60 - 116 0.65 – 1.24
X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed; ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Landslides considerable from river banks and steep slopes. Shifted sand and mud.

Water splashed, slopped over banks. (X Rossi-Forel scale). Damage potential: Very heavy. Perceived shaking: Extreme.
> 116 > 1.24
XI. Few, if any, (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed.

Broad fissures in ground. Underground pipelines completely out of service.

Earth slumps and land slips in soft ground. Rails bent greatly.

XII. Damage total. Waves seen on ground surface. Lines of sight and level distorted. Objects thrown into air.

Modified from Bolt (1999); Wald et al. (1999).

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Paleoseismic studies show that faults with higher slip rates often have shorter recurrence intervals between major earthquakes. This makes sense. A high slip rate indicates rocks that, at depth, are moving relatively quickly. Thus the locked, surficial rocks are storing more strain energy, so the forces of friction will be exceeded more often, releasing the strain energy in more frequent, large earthquakes.

Faults have formed over millions of years, usually in response to regional stresses. Shifts in these stress regimes do occur over millennia. As a result, some faults change in character. For example, a thrust fault in a compressional environment may become a strike-slip fault in a transpressive (oblique compressional) environment. Other faults may be abandoned altogether. Consequently, the State of California, under the guidelines of the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act of 1972 (Hart and Bryant, 1999), classifies faults according to the following criteria:

Active: faults showing proven displacement of the ground surface within about the last 11,000 years (within the Holocene Epoch), that are thought capable of producing earthquakes;
Potentially Active: faults showing evidence of movement within the last 1.6 million years, but that have not been shown conclusively whether or not they have moved in the last 11,000 years; and
Not active: faults that have conclusively NOT moved in the last 11,000 years.

These definitions are used primarily for residential subdivisions. Other definitions of activity are used by other agencies or organizations, depending on the type of facility being planned or developed. For example, longer periods of inactivity may be required for dams or nuclear power plants. An important subset of active faults are those with historical earthquakes. In California, that means faults that have ruptured since 1769, when the Spanish first arrived in the area.

The underlying assumption in this classification system is that if a fault has not ruptured in the last 11,000 years, it is not likely to be the source of a damaging earthquake in the future.

In reality, however, most potentially active faults have been insufficiently studied to determine their hazard level. Also, although simple in theory, the evidence necessary to determine whether a fault has or has not moved during the last 11,000 years can be difficult to obtain. For example, some faults leave no discernable evidence of their earthquakes, while other faults stop rupturing for millennia, and then are “reactivated” as the tectonic environment changes.

1.2.3 Causes of Earthquake Damage
Causes of earthquake damage can be categorized into three general areas: strong shaking, various types of ground failure that are a result of shaking, and ground displacement along the rupturing fault. The State definition of an active fault is designed to gauge the surface rupture potential of a fault, and is used to prevent development from being sited directly on an active fault. This helps to reduce damage from the third category. Below, the three categories are discussed in order of their likelihood to occur extensively:
1) Strong Ground Shaking causes the vast majority of earthquake damage. Horizontal ground acceleration is frequently responsible for widespread damage to structures, so it is Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-6 3417 of 5188

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commonly estimated, as a percentage of g, the acceleration of gravity. Full characterization of shaking potential, though, requires estimates of peak (maximum) ground displacement and velocity, the duration of strong shaking, and the periods (lengths) of waves that will control each of these factors at a given location. We look to the recorded effects of damaging earthquakes worldwide to understand what might happen in similar environments here in the future. In general, the degree of shaking can depend upon:
• Source effects. These include earthquake size, location, and distance, as discussed above. In addition, the exact way that rocks move along the fault can influence shaking. For example, the 1995, MW 6.9, Kobe, Japan earthquake was not much bigger than the 1994, MW 6.7 Northridge, California earthquake, but Kobe caused much worse damage. During the Kobe earthquake, the fault’s orientation and movement directed seismic waves into the city. During the Northridge earthquake, the fault’s motion directed waves away from populous areas. • Path effects. Seismic waves change direction as they travel through the Earth’s contrasting layers, just as light bounces (reflects) and bends (refracts) as it moves from air to water. Sometimes seismic energy gets focussed into one location and causes damage in unexpected areas. Focussing of 1989’s MW 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake waves caused damage in San Francisco’s Marina district, some 100 km distant from the rupturing fault.
• Site effects. Seismic waves slow down in the loose sediments and weathered rock at the Earth’s surface. As they slow, their energy converts from speed to amplitude, which heightens shaking. This is like the behavior of ocean waves - as the waves slow down near shore, their crests grow higher. In addition, seismic waves can get trapped at the surface and reverberate (resonate). Whether resonance will occur depends on the period (the length) of the incoming waves. Waves, soils and buildings all have resonant periods. When these coincide, tremendous damage can occur.

We keep talking about periods. What do we mean? Waves repeat their motions with varying frequencies. Slow-to-repeat waves are called long-period waves. Quick-to-repeat waves are called short-period waves. Long-period seismic waves, which are created by large earthquakes, are most likely to reverberate and cause damage in long-period structures, like bridges and high-rises. (“Long-period structures” are those that respond to long-period waves.) Shorter-period seismic waves, which tend to die out quickly, will most often cause damage fairly near the fault, and they will cause most damage in shorter-period structures such as one- to three-story buildings. Very short-period waves are most likely to cause nearfault, interior damage, such as to equipment. 2) Liquefaction and Slope Failure are very destructive secondary effects of strong seismic shaking.
• Liquefaction typically occurs within the upper 50 feet of the surface, when saturated, loose, fine- to medium-grained soils (sand and silt) are present. Earthquake shaking suddenly increases pressure in the water that fills the pores between soil grains, causing the soil to lose strength and behave as a liquid. This process can be observed at the beach by standing on the wet sand near the surf zone. Standing still, the sand Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-7 3418 of 5188

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will support your weight. However, when you tap the sand with your feet, water comes to the surface, the sand liquefies, and your feet sink.

When soils liquefy, the structures built on them can sink, tilt, and suffer significant structural damage. Liquefaction-related effects include loss of bearing strength, ground oscillations, lateral spreading and flow failures or slumping. The excess water pressure is relieved by the ejection of material upward through fissures and cracks. A water-soil slurry bubbles onto the ground surface, resulting in features called “sand boils”, “sand blows” or “sand volcanoes”. Site-specific geotechnical studies are the only practical, reliable way to determine the liquefaction potential of a site. • Landslides and Rockfall (Mass Wasting). Gravity inexorably pulls hillsides down and earthquake shaking enhances this on-going process. Slope stability depends on many factors and their interrelationships. Rock type and pore water pressure are arguably the most important factors, as well as slope steepness due to natural or human-made undercutting. Where slopes have failed before, they may fail again.

Thus, it is essential to map existing landslides and soil slumps. Furthermore, because there are predictable relationships between local geology and the likelihood that mass wasting will occur, field investigations can be used to identify failure-prone slopes before an earthquake occurs. This, combined with GIS-based analyses of slope gradient, land use, and bedrock or soil materials can be used to identify high-risk areas where mitigation measures would be most effective.
3) Primary Ground Rupture Due to Fault Movement typically results in a relatively small percentage of the total damage in an earthquake, yet being too close to a rupturing fault can result in extensive damage. It is difficult to safely reduce the effects of this hazard through building and foundation design. Therefore, the primary mitigation measure is to avoid active faults by setting structures back from the fault zone. Application of this measure is subject to requirements of the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act and guidelines prepared by the California Geological Survey – previously known as the California Division of Mines and Geology (CDMG Note 49). The final approval of a fault setback lies with the local reviewing agency.

Earthquake damage also depends on the characteristics of human-made structures. The interaction of ground motion with the built environment is complex. Governing factors include a structure’s height, construction, and stiffness, which determine the structure’s resonant period; the underlying soil’s strength and resonant period; and the periods of the incoming seismic waves. Other factors include architectural design, condition, and age of the structure.

1.2.4 Choosing Earthquakes for Planning and Design
It is often useful to create a deterministic or design earthquake scenario to study the effects of a particular earthquake on a building or a community. Often, such scenarios consider the largest earthquake that is believed possible to occur on a fault or fault segment, referred to as the maximum magnitude earthquake (Mmax). Other scenarios consider the maximum probable earthquake (MPE) or design basis earthquake (DBE) (1997 Uniform Building Code - UBC), the earthquake with a statistical return period of 475 years (with ground motion that has a 10 percent probability of being exceeded in 50 years). For public schools, hospitals, and other critical facilities, the California Building Code (1998) defines the Upper Bound Earthquake (UBE), which has a statistical return period of 949 years and Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-8 3419 of 5188

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a ground motion with a 10 percent probability of being exceeded in 100 years. As the descriptions above suggest, which earthquake scenario is most appropriate depends on the application, such as the planned use, lifetime or importance of a facility. The more critical the structure, the longer the time period used between earthquakes and the larger the design earthquake should be.

Geologists, seismologists, engineers, emergency response personnel and urban planners typically use maximum magnitude and maximum probable earthquakes to evaluate seismic hazard. The assumption is that if we plan for the worst-case scenario, we establish safety margins. Then smaller earthquakes, that are more likely to occur, can be dealt with effectively.

Seismic design parameters define what kinds of earthquake effects a structure must be able to withstand. These include peak ground acceleration, duration of strong shaking, and the periods of incoming strong motion waves.

As is true for most earthquake-prone regions, many potential earthquake sources pose a threat to Glendale. Thus it is also important to consider the overall likelihood of damage from a plausible suite of earthquakes. This approach is called probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA), and typically considers the likelihood of exceeding a certain level of damaging ground motion that could be produced by any or all faults within a 100-km radius of the project site, or in this case, the City. PSHA is utilized by the U.S. Geological Survey to produce national seismic hazard maps that are used by the Uniform Building Code (ICBO, 1997).

Regardless of which fault causes a damaging earthquake, there will always be aftershocks.

By definition, these are smaller earthquakes that happen close to the mainshock (the biggest earthquake of the sequence) in time and space. These smaller earthquakes occur as the Earth adjusts to the regional stress changes created by the mainshock. The bigger the mainshock, the greater the number of aftershocks, the larger the aftershocks will be, and the wider the area in which they might occur.

On average, the largest aftershock will be 1.2 magnitude units less than the mainshock. Thus, a MW 6.9 earthquake will tend to produce aftershocks up to Mw 5.7 in size. This is an average, and there are many cases where the biggest aftershock is larger than the average predicts. The key point is this: any major earthquake will produce aftershocks large enough to cause additional damage, especially to already-weakened structures. Consequently, postdisaster response planning must take damaging aftershocks into account.

1.3 Laws To Mitigate Earthquake Hazard

1.3.1 Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act
The Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zones Act was signed into law in 1972 (in 1994 it was renamed the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act). The primary purpose of the Act is to mitigate the hazard of fault rupture by prohibiting the location of structures for human occupancy across the trace of an active fault (Hart and Bryant, 1999). This State law was passed in direct response to the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, which was associated with extensive surface fault ruptures that damaged numerous homes, commercial buildings and other structures. Surface rupture is the most easily avoided seismic hazard.

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The Act requires the State Geologist (Chief of the California Geological Survey) to delineate “Earthquake Fault Zones” along faults that are “sufficiently active” and “well defined.” These faults show evidence of Holocene surface displacement along one or more or their segments (sufficiently active) and are clearly detectable by a trained geologist as a physical feature at or just below the ground surface (well defined). The boundary of an “Earthquake Fault Zone” is generally about 500 feet from major active faults, and 200 to 300 feet from well-defined minor faults. The Act dictates that cities and counties withhold development permits for sites within an Earthquake Fault Zone within their jurisdiction until geologic investigations demonstrate that the sites are not threatened by surface displacements from future faulting (Hart and Bryant, 1999).

The Alquist-Priolo maps are distributed to all affected cities and counties for their use in planning and controlling new or renewed construction. Local agencies must regulate most development projects within the zones. Projects include all land divisions and most structures for human occupancy. State law exempts single-family wood-frame and steel-frame dwellings which are less than three stories and are not part of a development of four units or more. However, local agencies can be more restrictive than State law requires. Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zone mapping has been completed by the State Geologist for the northwestern Glendale area, in the Sunland and Burbank Quadrangles (CDMG, 1979a; 1979b).

1.3.2 Seismic Hazards Mapping Act
The Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act only addresses the hazard of surface fault rupture and is not directed toward other earthquake hazards. Recognizing this, in 1990, the State passed the Seismic Hazards Mapping Act (SHMA), which addresses non-surface fault rupture earthquake hazards, including strong ground shaking, liquefaction and seismically induced landslides. The California Geological Survey (CGS) is the principal State agency charged with implementing the Act. Pursuant to the SHMA, the CGS is directed to provide local governments with seismic hazard zone maps that identify areas susceptible to amplified shaking, liquefaction, earthquake-induced landslides, and other ground failures. The goal is to minimize loss of life and property by identifying and mitigating seismic hazards. The seismic hazard zones delineated by the CGS are referred to as “zones of required investigation.” Site-specific geological hazard investigations are required by the SHMA when construction projects fall within these areas.

The CGS, pursuant to the 1990 SHMA, has been releasing seismic hazards maps since 1997.

In the Glendale area, the CGS has mapped the Sunland, Burbank, Pasadena, Hollywood and Los Angeles quadrangles. These maps indicate that liquefaction and earthquake-induced landslides are hazards present locally in the Glendale area.

1.3.3 Real Estate Disclosure Requirements
Since June 1, 1998, the Natural Hazards Disclosure Act has required that sellers of real property and their agents provide prospective buyers with a “Natural Hazard Disclosure Statement” when the property being sold lies within one or more State-mapped hazard areas.

If a property is located in a Seismic Hazard Zone as shown on a map issued by the State Geologist, the seller or the seller's agent must disclose this fact to potential buyers. The law specifies two ways in which this disclosure can be made. One is to use the new Natural Hazards Disclosure Statement as provided in Section 1102.6c of the California Civil Code.

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Statement can be substituted for the Natural Hazards Disclosure Statement only if the Local Option Statement contains substantially the same information and substantially the same warning as the Natural Hazards Disclosure Statement.

California State law also requires that when houses built before 1960 are sold, the seller must give the buyer a completed earthquake hazards disclosure report, and a copy of the booklet entitled “The Homeowner’s Guide to Earthquake Safety.” This publication was written and adopted by the California Seismic Safety Commission. The most recent edition of this booklet is available from the web at www.seismic.ca.gov/. The booklet contains a sample of a residential earthquake hazards report that buyers are required to fill in, and it provides specific information on common structural weaknesses that can fail, damaging homes during earthquakes. The booklet further describes specific actions that can be taken by homeowners to strengthen their home.

The Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act and the Seismic Hazards Mapping Act also require that real estate agents, or sellers of real estate acting without an agent, disclose to prospective buyers that the property is located in an Earthquake Fault or Seismic Hazard Zone.

1.3.4 California Environmental Quality Act
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was passed in 1970 to insure that local governmental agencies consider and review the environmental impacts of development projects within their jurisdictions. CEQA requires that an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) be prepared for projects that may have significant effects on the environment. EIRs are required to identify geologic and seismic hazards, and to recommend potential mitigation measures, thus giving the local agency the authority to regulate private development projects in the early stages of planning.

1.3.5 Uniform Building Code and California Building Code The City of Glendale has been enforcing building code provisions since 1920, when it passed Ordinance 411 regulating garages, filling stations, gasoline pumps and buggies. In 1922, it expanded its regulations to address the State Tenement House Act and other matters dealing with buildings. Ordinance 522 established the term “Superintendent of Buildings”, the forerunner of the Building Official, as the overseer of enforcement of the regulations governing the construction of buildings on private property in the City of Glendale. Since then, Glendale has regularly updated its building code regulations to protect the safety of the community.

The International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO) was formed in 1922 to develop a uniform set of building regulations; this led to the publication of the first Uniform Building Code (UBC) in 1927. In keeping with the intent of providing a safe building environment for our community, the technical provisions of the City’s building codes have been updated on a regular basis as new editions of the UBC have been published. In addition to updating the regulations concerning fire and life, this has also kept Glendale current with the latest provisions for the seismic design of buildings.

Recognizing that many building code provisions are not affected by local conditions, like exiting from a building, and to facilitate the concept that industries working in California should have some uniformity in building code provisions throughout the State, in 1980 the legislature amended the State’s Health and Safety Code to require local jurisdictions to adopt Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-11 3422 of 5188
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the latest edition of the Uniform Building Code (UBC). The law states that every local agency, City and County, enforcing building regulations must adopt the provisions of the California Building Code (CBC) within 180 days of its publication. The publication date of the CBC is established by the California Building Standards Commission and the code is known as Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations. Based upon the publication cycle of the UBC, the CBC has been updated and republished every three years since the initial action by the legislature.

To further the concept of uniformity in building design, in 1994 ICBO joined with the two other national building code publishers, the Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc. (BOCA) and the Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. (SBCCI), to form a single organization, the International Code Council, (ICC). In 2000, the group published the first International Building Code (IBC) as well as an entire family of codes, (i.e. building, mechanical, plumbing and fire) that were coordinated with each other.

As a result, the last (and final) version of the UBC was issued in 1997.

Since the formation of the ICC and the publication of the IBC, the California legislature has not addressed the matter of updating the CBC with a building code other than the UBC.

Therefore, even though the seismic design provisions have not been brought up to the current standards of the IBC, the Building Standards Commission has chosen to continue to adopt the old 1997 UBC for the CBC through the 2004 cycle.

In addition to adopting the provisions of the CBC, local jurisdiction may adopt more restrictive amendments provided that they are based upon local geographic, topographic or climatic conditions. The City of Glendale, along with 55 other local jurisdictions, have worked together to make our local amendments consistent with the rest of southern California. Currently, Glendale’s Building and Safety staff are very active in the code development process and all regional activities to improve the technical provisions of the building code and the understanding of the purpose of the building codes by the public. They participate in the Los Angeles Regional Uniform Code Program, (LARUCP), and promote the adoption of uniform amendments to the CBC by other local jurisdictions.

1.3.6 Unreinforced Masonry Law
Enacted in 1986, the Unreinforced Masonry Law (Section 8875 et seq of the California Government Code) required all cities and counties in Seismic Zone 4 (zones near historically active faults) to identify hazardous unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings in their jurisdictions, establish a URM loss reduction program, and report their progress to the State by 1990. The owners of such buildings were to be notified of the potential earthquake hazard these buildings pose. The loss reduction program to be implemented, however, was left to each local jurisdiction, although the law recommends that local governments adopt mandatory strengthening programs by ordinance and that they establish seismic retrofit standards. Some jurisdictions did implement mandatory retrofit programs, while others established voluntary programs. A few cities only notified the building owners, but did not adopt any type of strengthening program.

The Glendale area lies entirely within Seismic Zone 4. Therefore, and in compliance with the Unreinforced Masonry Law, Glendale issued Chapter 58 of the City Code – Earthquake Hazard Reduction in Existing Buildings. The provisions of Chapter 58 apply to all URM buildings constructed before June 7, 1938, or buildings for which a building permit was issued prior to June 7, 1938. The Code requires all URMs, except for detached one- or twoEarth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-12 3423 of 5188
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family dwellings and apartment houses with less than 5 dwelling units, to be identified and catalogued. Owners of applicable URMs are then to retain a civil or structural engineer or architect licensed in California to conduct a structural analysis of the building to determine whether the structure meets the minimum earthquake standards specified in the City Code. If the building does not meet the minimum requirements, the owner is to either retrofit or demolish the building. The Code establishes time limits to comply with these requirements depending on the use of the building; essential and high-risk structures are to be surveyed and retrofitted more quickly than other types of buildings.

1.4 Notable Historic Earthquakes in the Glendale Region Figure 1-2 shows the approximate epicenters of earthquakes that have resulted in significant ground shaking in the Los Angeles basin, including Glendale. The most significant of these events are summarized below. Plate 1-1 shows the historical seismicity in the immediate vicinity of Glendale.

The map shows that small earthquakes, of magnitude between 1 and 3, have occurred historically in the area, but that no moderate to large earthquakes have occurred beneath Glendale in historical times.

1.4.1 Long Beach Earthquake of 1933
This Mw 6.4 earthquake occurred on March 10, 1933, at 5:54 in the afternoon. The location of the earthquake’s epicenter has been re-evaluated, and determined to have occurred approximately 3 miles south of present-day Huntington Beach. However, it caused extensive damage in Long Beach, hence its name. The earthquake occurred on the Newport-Inglewood fault, a right-lateral strike slip fault that extends across the western portion of the Los Angeles basin (see Figure 1-1). The Newport-Inglewood fault did not rupture the surface during this earthquake, but substantial liquefaction-induced damage was reported. The earthquake caused 120 deaths, and over $50 million in property damage (Wood, 1933).

Most of the damaged buildings were of unreinforced masonry, and many school buildings were destroyed. Fortunately, children were not present in the classrooms at that time, otherwise, the death toll would have been much higher. This earthquake led to the passage of the Field Act, which gave the Division of the State Architect authority and responsibility for approving design and supervising construction of public schools. Building codes were also improved.

1.4.2 San Fernando (Sylmar) Earthquake of 1971
This Mw 6.6 earthquake occurred on the San Fernando fault zone, the western-most segment of the Sierra Madre fault, on February 9, 1971, at 6:00 in the morning. The surface rupture caused by this earthquake was nearly 12 miles long, and occurred in the Sylmar-San Fernando area, just a few miles northwest of Glendale. The maximum slip measured at the surface was nearly 6 feet.

The earthquake caused over $500 million in property damage and 65 deaths. Most of the deaths occurred when the Veteran's Administration Hospital collapsed. Several other hospitals, including the Olive View Community Hospital in Sylmar suffered severe damage.

Newly constructed freeway overpasses also collapsed, in damage scenes similar to those which occurred 23 years later in the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Loss of life could have been much greater had the earthquake struck at a busier time of day. Thirty-one buildings in Glendale were so severely damaged that they had to be demolished, and approximately 3,250 masonry chimneys in the City collapsed. The total building loss in Glendale as a result of this earthquake was estimated at more than $2 million (Oakeshott, 1975).

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As with the Long Beach earthquake, legislation was passed in response to the damage caused by the 1971 earthquake. In this case, the building codes were strengthened and the Alquist Priolo Special Studies (now Earthquake Fault) Zone) Act was passed in 1972.

1.4.3 Malibu Earthquake of 1979
This earthquake occurred on January 1, 1979 at 3:15 in the afternoon. The epicenter of the ML5.2 earthquake was approximately 8 miles south of Malibu, and 23 miles west of Los Angeles. Although it caused only minor damage in the areas closest to its epicenter, the earthquake was felt as far away as Kings, Kern and San Diego counties.

1.4.4 Whittier Narrows Earthquake of 1987
The Whittier Narrows earthquake occurred on October 1, 1987, at 7:42 in the morning, with its epicenter located approximately 12 miles southwest of Glendale (Hauksson and Jones, 1989). The ML 5.9 earthquake occurred on a previously unknown, north-dipping concealed thrust fault (blind thrust) now called the Puente Hills fault (Shaw, and Shearer, 1999). The earthquake caused eight fatalities, over 900 injured, and $358 million in property damage.

Severe damage was confined mainly to communities east of Los Angeles and near the epicenter. Areas with high concentrations of URMs, such as the “Uptown” district of Whittier, the old downtown section of Alhambra, and the “Old Town” section of Pasadena, were severely impacted. Several tilt-up buildings partially collapsed, including tilt-up buildings built after 1971, that were built to improved building standards but were of irregular configuration, revealing seismic vulnerabilities not previously recognized.

Residences that sustained damage usually were constructed of masonry, were not fully anchored to foundations, or were houses built over garages with large door openings. Many chimneys collapsed and in some cases, fell through roofs. Wood-frame residences, in contrast, sustained relatively little damage, and no severe structural damage to high-rise structures in downtown Los Angeles was reported.

1.4.5 Pasadena Earthquake of 1988
The Pasadena earthquake occurred at 3:38 in the morning on December 3, 1988, directly underneath the city of Pasadena. The ML5.0 earthquake occurred on the Raymond fault (Hauksson and Jones, 1991), and helped determine that the Raymond fault is a left-lateral strike-slip fault (prior to this earthquake, the geological community was divided on this issue – the fault forms a well-defined scarp that many attributed to reverse faulting). This earthquake was also notable because it was followed by an unusually small number of aftershocks, and these were of small size (the largest was only a magnitude 2.4).

1.4.6 Malibu Earthquake of 1989
This ML5.0 earthquake occurred on January 18, 1989 at 10:53 in the evening. The earthquake’s epicenter was about 10 miles south of Malibu. As a result of this earthquake, several people were injured, shelved items fell in local stores, and some windows were broken. Hardest hit was the coastal region encompassing Malibu, Santa Monica, and Redondo Beach, though damage was low even in that area. Slight damage was also reported in Los Angeles, Hollywood, Monterey Park, and Lancaster.

1.4.7 Sierra Madre Earthquake of 1991
The Sierra Madre earthquake occurred on June 28, 1991 at 7:43 in the morning approximately 18 miles northeast of Glendale. The Mw 5.8 earthquake probably occurred on the Clamshell-Sawpit Canyon fault, an offshoot of the Sierra Madre fault zone in the San Gabriel Mountains (Haukson, 1994). Because of its depth and moderate size, it caused no Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-16 3427 of 5188

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surface rupture, but it did trigger rockslides that blocked some of the local mountain roads.

Roughly $40 million in property damage occurred in the San Gabriel Valley; URM buildings were hardest hit, and many brick chimneys collapsed. Two deaths resulted from this earthquake -- one person was killed in Arcadia, and one person in Pasadena died from a heart attack. In all, at least 100 others were injured, though the injuries were mostly minor.

1.4.8 Landers and Big Bear Earthquakes of 1992
On the morning of June 28, 1992, most people in southern California were awakened at 4:57 by the largest earthquake to strike California in 40 years. Named “Landers” after a small desert community near its epicenter, the earthquake had a magnitude of 7.3. More than 50 miles of surface rupture associated with five or more faults occurred as a result of this earthquake. The average right-lateral strike-slip displacement was about 10 to 15 feet, but a maximum of 18 feet of slip was observed. Centered in the Mojave Desert, approximately 120 miles from Los Angeles, the earthquake caused relatively little damage for its size (Brewer, 1992). It released about four times as much energy as the very destructive Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, but fortunately, it did not claim as many lives (one child died when a chimney collapsed). The power of the earthquake was illustrated by the length of the ground rupture it left behind. The earthquake ruptured 5 separate faults: Johnson Valley, Landers, Homestead Valley, Emerson, and Camp Rock faults (Sieh et al., 1993). Nearby faults also experienced triggered slip and minor surface rupture. There are no Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) reports for this earthquake in the Glendale area, but in Pasadena three individuals reported MMIs of IV, and in Burbank, MMIs of IV to V were reported (see Table 1-1) (http://pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/shake/ca/).

The magnitude 6.4 Big Bear earthquake struck little more than 3 hours after the Landers earthquake on June 28, 1992 at 8:05:30 A.M. PDT. This earthquake is technically considered an aftershock of the Landers earthquake (indeed, the largest aftershock), although the Big Bear earthquake occurred over 20 miles west of the Landers rupture, on a fault with a different orientation and sense of slip than those involved in the main shock. From its aftershock, the causative fault was determined to be a northeast-trending left-lateral fault.

This orientation and slip are considered “conjugate” to the faults that slipped in the Landers rupture. The Big Bear earthquake did not break the ground surface, and, in fact, no surface trace of a fault with the proper orientation has been found in the area. The Big Bear earthquake caused a substantial amount of damage in the Big Bear area, but fortunately, it claimed no lives. However, landslides triggered by the quake blocked roads in the mountainous areas, aggravating the clean-up and rebuilding process (SCEC-DC, 2001).

1.4.9 Northridge Earthquake of 1994
The Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994 woke up most of southern California at 4:30 in the morning. The earthquake’s epicenter was located 20 miles to the west-northwest of downtown Los Angeles, on a previously unknown blind thrust fault now called the Northridge (or Pico) Thrust. Although moderate in size, this earthquake produced the strongest ground motions ever instrumentally recorded in North America. The Mw 6.7 earthquake is one of the most expensive natural disasters to have impacted the United States.

Damage was widespread, sections of major freeways collapsed, parking structures and office buildings collapsed, and numerous apartment buildings suffered irreparable damage. Damage to wood-frame apartment houses was very widespread in the San Fernando Valley and Santa Monica areas, especially to structures with “soft” first floor or lower-level parking garages.

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and/or shifted walls laterally. The death toll was 57, and more than 1,500 people were seriously injured.

In the Glendale area, this earthquake caused predominantly Modified Mercalli intensities of VII (44 individuals reported MMIs of VII and one individual reported MMIs of VIII) (http://pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/shake/ca/). High-profile damage in Glendale includes the following cases: A section of the third level above grade in the Glendale City Center parking structure collapsed, sections of the Glendale Galleria parking structure settled 4 to 8 inches due to damage to pedestals, and the Glendale Fashion Center had damage to exterior columns.

Despite the losses, gains made through earthquake hazard mitigation efforts of the last two decades were obvious. Retrofits of masonry building helped reduce the loss of life, hospitals suffered less structural damage than in 1971 San Fernando earthquake, and emergency response was exemplary. Extensive documentation regarding this earthquake and its effects on the built environment is available on the world wide web. Additional information can be found at the following web sites as well as others:
http://geohazards.cr.usgs.gov/northridge/
www.eqe.com/publications/northridge/northridge.html.

1.4.10 West Hollywood Earthquake of 2001
A M4.2 earthquake occurred in West Hollywood at 4:59 in the afternoon on September 9, 2001. This earthquake was widely felt throughout the Los Angeles Basin and in parts of San Fernando Valley. No significant damage was reported. This is the largest earthquake to occur in the Los Angeles basin since the 1994 Northridge earthquake and its aftershocks. The earthquake’s epicenter was located near the intersection of the Newport-Inglewood and Hollywood faults. The focal mechanism showed horizontal strike-slip motion on a northnorthwest striking plane, suggesting that this event may be associated with the north end of the Newport-Inglewood fault (Hauksson, Hutton and Jones, 2001; at http://Pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/eqinthenews/ci09703873/index.html). This earthquake caused MMIs in Glendale of between III and IV (http://pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/shake/ca/).

1.5 Potential Sources of Seismic Ground Shaking
Seismic shaking is the geologic hazard that has the greatest potential to severely impact Glendale given the City’s proximity to several active seismic sources (faults). As discussed in Section 1.4 above, some of these faults caused moderate-sized earthquakes in the last century; but, given their length, are thought capable of generating even larger earthquakes in the future that would cause strong ground shaking in Glendale and nearby communities.

To give the City a better understanding of the hazard posed by these faults, we performed a deterministic seismic hazard analysis using software that is an industry standard [EQFAULT, by Blake (2000a)], to estimate the Peak Horizontal Ground Accelerations (PHGA) that can be expected at Glendale’s City Center due to earthquakes occurring on any of the known active or potentially active faults within 100 km (62 miles) from the City. We also conducted probabilistic seismic hazard analyses using FRISKSP (Blake, 2000b) to estimate the median PHGA at twelve different sites throughout the City. The difference between these two approaches is that, while a deterministic hazard assessment addresses individual sources or scenario events, probabilistic assessments combine all seismic sources and consider the likelihood (or probability) of each source to generate an earthquake.

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known faults within 100 km, and for each fault, a suite of possible damaging earthquakes is considered, each weighed according to its likelihood of occurring in any particular year.

To conduct these seismic shaking analyses, we used the same fault database (including fault locations and earthquake magnitudes of the maximum magnitude and maximum probable earthquakes for each fault) used by the CGS and USGS for the National Seismic Hazard Maps (Peterson and others, 1996).

The PHGA estimates obtained from these analyses provide a general indication of relative earthquake risk in Glendale. However, studies that better constrain the distance from a given site to the various faults in the region, and that consider the near-surface soil types should be conducted for site-specific projects.

Those faults that, based on the ground shaking analyses described above, can cause peak horizontal ground accelerations of about 0.1g or greater (Modified Mercalli Intensities greater than VII) in the Glendale area are listed in Table 1-2. For a map showing most of these faults, refer to Figure 1-3.

Those faults included in Table 1-2 that have the greatest impact on the Glendale area, or that are thought to have a higher probability of causing an earthquake, are described in more detail in the following pages.

Table 1-2 shows:
• The closest approximate distance, in miles and in kilometers, between Glendale’s City Hall and each of the main faults considered in the deterministic and probabilistic analyses; • the maximum magnitude earthquake (Mmax) each fault is estimated capable of generating; • the intensity of ground motion, expressed as a fraction of the acceleration of gravity (g), that could be experienced in the Glendale area if the Mmax occurs on one of these faults; and • the Modified Mercalli seismic Intensity (MMI) values estimated to be felt in the City as a result of the Mmax on each one of these faults.

In general, peak ground accelerations and seismic intensity values decrease with increasing distance away from the causative fault. However, local site conditions, such as the top of ridges, can amplify the seismic waves generated by an earthquake, resulting in localized higher accelerations than those listed here. The strong ground motion values presented here should therefore be considered as average values; higher values may occur locally in response to site-specific conditions.

The probabilistic seismic analyses performed for this study indicate that the Glendale area has a 10 percent chance of experiencing ground accelerations greater than 55 to 70 percent the force of gravity (0.55g to 0.70g) in 50 years. These probabilistic ground motion values for the City of Glendale are in the high to very high range for southern California, and are the result of the City’s proximity to major fault systems with high earthquake recurrence rates.

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Table 1-2
Estimated Horizontal Peak Ground Accelerations and
Seismic Intensities in the Glendale Area
Fault Name Distance to
Glendale (mi)
Distance to
Glendale (km)
Magnitude of
Mmax *
PGA (g)
from Mmax
MMI from
Mmax
Verdugo <1 <1 6.7 0.61 X
Hollywood <2 ~1 6.4 0.55 X
Raymond <2 ~1 6.5 0.55 X
Sierra Madre 5 9 7.0 0.46+ X
Elysian Park Thrust 6 10 6.7 0.38 IX
Sierra Madre (San Fernando) 9 15 6.7 0.28 IX
Santa Monica 10 16 6.6 0.25 IX
Newport-Inglewood 11 17 6.9 0.24 IX
Compton Thrust 12 19 6.8 0.25 IX
San Gabriel 12 19 7.0 0.23 IX
East Oak Ridge (Northridge) 12 20 6.9 0.26 IX
Clamshell-Sawpit 13 21 6.5 0.20 VIII
Malibu Coast 17 28 6.7 0.18 VIII
Whittier 17 28 6.8 0.16 VIII
Santa Susana 19 30 6.5 0.16 VIII
San Jose 21 33 6.5 0.14 VIII
Palos Verdes 21 34 7.1 0.16 VIII
Holser 24 39 6.5 0.13 VIII
Cucamonga 27 43 7.0 0.15 VIII
Chino-Central Avenue 27 44 6.7 0.13 VIII
Anacapa Dume 28 45 7.3 0.17 VIII
San Andreas (1857 Rupture) 29 46 7.8 0.18 VIII
San Andreas - Mojave 29 46 7.1 0.12 VII
Oakridge (Onshore) 31 49 6.9 0.13 VIII
Simi-Santa Rosa 33 53 6.7 0.11 VII
San Cayetano 36 57 6.8 0.11 VII
* The Mmax reported herein are based on the fault parameters published by the CGS (CDMG, 1996).

However, as described further below, in the text, recent paleoseismic studies suggest that some of these faults, like the Sierra Madre fault, can generate even larger earthquakes than those listed above. These PGAs were calculated using Blake’s (2000a) deterministic analysis software. In general, areas closer to a given fault will generally experience higher accelerations than areas farther away, therefore the northern portion of the City, next to the Sierra Madre fault, would experience higher accelerations than those reported herein.

Abbreviations used in Table 1-2:
mi – miles; km – kilometers; Mmax – maximum magnitude earthquake; PGA – peak ground acceleration as a percentage of g, the acceleration of gravity; MMI – Modified Mercalli Intensity.

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1.5.1 San Andreas Fault Zone
As discussed previously, the San Andreas fault is the principal boundary between the Pacific and North American plates, and as such, it is considered the “Master Fault” because it has frequent (geologically speaking), large, earthquakes, and it controls the seismic hazard in southern California. The fault extends over 750 miles (1,200 kilometers), from near Cape Mendocino in northern California to the Salton Sea region in southern California. At its closest approach, the San Andreas fault is approximately 24 miles (38 km) north of Glendale.

Large faults, such as the San Andreas fault, are generally divided into segments in order to evaluate their future earthquake potential. The segments are generally defined at discontinuities along the fault that may affect the rupture length. In central and southern California, the San Andreas fault zone is divided into five segments named, from north to south, the Cholame, Carrizo, Mojave, San Bernardino Mountains, and Coachella Valley segments (Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities - WGCEP, 1995). Each segment is assumed to have a characteristic slip rate (rate of movement averaged over time), recurrence interval (time between moderate to large earthquakes), and displacement (amount of offset during an earthquake). While this methodology has some value in predicting earthquakes, historical records and studies of prehistoric earthquakes show that it is possible for more than one segment to rupture during a large quake or for ruptures to overlap into adjacent segments.

The last major earthquake on the southern portion of the San Andreas fault was the 1857 Fort Tejon (Mw 7.8) event. This is the largest earthquake reported in California. The 1857 surface rupture broke the Cholame, Carrizo, and Mojave segments, resulting in displacements of as much as 27 feet (9 meters) along the rupture zone. Peak ground accelerations in the Glendale area as a result of the 1857 earthquake are estimated to have been as high as 0.18g. Rupture of these fault segments as a group, during a single earthquake, is thought to occur with a recurrence interval of between 104 and 296 years.

The closest segment of the San Andreas fault to Glendale is the Mojave segment, located approximately 29 miles to the northeast of the City Center area. This segment is 83 miles (133 km) long, extending from approximately Three Points southward to just northwest of Cajon Creek, at the southern limit of the 1857 rupture (WGCEP, 1995). Using a slip rate of 30±8 millimeters per year (mm/yr) and a characteristic displacement of 4.5±1.5 meters (m), the Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities (WGCEP, 1995) derived a recurrence interval of 150 years for this segment. The Mojave segment is estimated to be capable of producing a magnitude 7.1 earthquake, which could result in peak ground accelerations in the Glendale area of about 0.13g. The WGCEP (1995) calculated that this segment has a 26 percent probability of rupturing sometime between 1994 and 2024.

The next closest segment of the San Andreas fault to the City of Glendale is the Carrizo segment, located approximately 41 miles from downtown. This fault segment, which is about 75 miles (121 km) long, also ruptured during the 1857 earthquake. Slip on this segment of the San Andreas fault was greater than on either of the two other segments, averaging 6 to 7 m, and locally displaying offsets of as much as 8 to 10 m. Several paleoseismological studies have been conducted on this segment of the San Andreas fault. This would suggest that this segment is well understood, but the data are often conflicting or inconclusive. Past earthquakes have been resolved in some trench exposures but not in others only a few miles away, and the slip estimates for past earthquakes as determined from these exposures also vary. To account for and resolve these discrepancies, the 1995 WGCEP used a slip rate of Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-22 3433 of 5188

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34±3 mm/yr, and a slip per event of 7±4 m. The error bars on the slip-per-event data reflect the varying measurements that have been made along the fault length for the 1857 event.

These values resolve into a recurrence interval of 206 (+149, -125 years). This segment is thought capable of producing a magnitude 7.2 earthquake, which could result in peak ground accelerations in the Glendale area of about 0.10g. The WGCEP (1995) also calculated an 18 percent probability that this fault segment will generate an earthquake sometime between 1994 and 2024.

The San Bernardino Mountains segment, located about 43 miles from downtown Glendale, is approximately 49 miles (78 km) long, and extends from Cajon Creek to the San Gorgonio Pass. This segment is a structurally complex zone that is poorly understood, and for which there are scant data on fault behavior. Using a slip rate of 24±5 mm/yr and a characteristic displacement of 3.5±1.0 m, the WGCEP (1995) derived a recurrence interval on this fault of 146 years. This fault segment is estimated capable of producing a magnitude 7.3 earthquake, which could result in peak ground accelerations in Glendale of about 0.1g. If this fault segment ruptures together with the Mojave and Coachella Valley segments, higher ground motions would be expected. In 1994, the WGCEP (1995) calculated that this fault segment had a 28 percent probability of rupturing sometime in the next 30 years. Since the fault has not ruptured yet, the probability that it will before the year 2024 has increased.

1.5.2 Verdugo Fault
The Verdugo fault is a 13 to 19-mile (21 to 30 km) long, southeast-striking fault that that extends along the northeastern edge of the San Fernando Valley, and at or near the southern flank of the Verdugo Mountains, through the cities of Glendale and Burbank. Weber et al. (1980) first reported southwest-facing scarps 2 to 3 meters high in the alluvial fan deposits in the Burbank and west Glendale areas, and other subsurface features indicative of faulting.

Weber et al. (1980) relied on these scarps, on offset alluvial deposits at two localities, and on a subsurface groundwater cascade beneath Verdugo Wash to suggest that movement on this fault is youthful, but no age estimates were provided. Weber et al. (1980) further suggested that this fault is a shallow, north-dipping reverse fault responsible for uplift of the Verdugo Mountains, and proposed that the fault zone is approximately 1 km wide. For nearly 20 years since Weber et al.’s (1980) report, the Verdugo fault was not studied, but in the last few years, recognizing the potential threat that this fault poses to the Los Angeles metropolitan region, several researchers have started to investigate this fault.

Some researchers have relied on deep subsurface data, primarily oil well records and geophysical data to review the subsurface geology of the San Fernando Valley area, including the characteristics of the Verdugo fault (Tsutsumi and Yeats, 1999; Langenheim et al., 2000; Pujol et al., 2001). Results of these studies suggest that the Verdugo fault changes in character from a reverse fault adjacent to the Pacoima Hills, near its northwestern terminus, to a normal fault at the southwest edge of the Verdugo Mountains. To the north, the Verdugo fault appears to merge with both the Mission Hills and Northridge Hills faults. To the south, the fault is on trend with the Eagle Rock fault, but it is still unclear whether these faults are connected. Vertical separation on the Verdugo fault is at least 1,000 meters (3,300 feet), based on the structural relief between the valley floor and the crest of the Verdugo Mountains and other indicators (Tsutsumi and Yeats, 1999). Even though some of the data suggest that the Verdugo fault is a reverse fault, there are several researchers who now propose that the Verdugo fault is a left-lateral strike-slip fault (Walls et al., 1998; Dolan, personal communication, 2002).

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Other investigators have taken a more direct, hands-on approach to study this fault, but finding locations suitable for trenching has been difficult in the extensively developed San Fernando Valley. Dolan and Tucker (1999) tried to better define the location and recency of activity of the Verdugo fault by conducting geological and geophysical studies across the inferred trace of the fault in Brand Park. They used closely spaced boreholes drilled in a line perpendicular to the trend of the fault, and ground penetrating radar to look for stratigraphic anomalies that could be suggestive of faulting. They identified one possible anomaly that could be the Verdugo fault and excavated a trench across the suspect area. However, the sediments exposed in the trench were too friable to maintain the trench open long enough to conduct their study. Dolan and Tucker believe that they did locate a fault, but they are uncertain about whether or not the fault is a recent strand of the Verdugo fault. Realizing that the Brand Park site may not yield any additional, useful information, Dolan and Tucker (1999) shifted their attention to another potential trenching site, at Palm Park in Burbank.

Unfortunately, their studies at Palm Park were equally unsuccessful at locating and characterizing this fault (Dolan, personal communication, 2002).

Slip rate on the Verdugo fault is poorly constrained, and currently estimated at about 0.5 mm/yr (CDMG, 1996). The fault’s recurrence interval is unknown; however, the fault’s southern segment is thought to have ruptured during the Holocene, and the fault is therefore considered active (Jennings, 1994). Based on its length, the Verdugo fault is thought capable of generating magnitude 6.0 to 6.8 earthquakes. A magnitude 6.7 earthquake on this fault would generate peak ground accelerations in the Glendale area of about 0.6g to 0.7g. Higher accelerations can be expected locally. Given the high accelerations that this fault is estimated capable of generating in Glendale, an earthquake scenario on this fault was modeled for loss estimation using HAZUS (see Section 1.9, below).

1.5.3 Hollywood Fault
The Hollywood fault is the eastern 9-mile (14 km) long segment of the Santa Monica – Hollywood fault system that forms the southern margin of the Santa Monica Mountains (locally known as the Hollywood Hills). It has also been considered the westward extension of the Raymond fault (see Section 1.5.4 below). From east to west, the fault traverses the Hollywood section of Los Angeles, and the cities of West Hollywood and Beverly Hills. Its eastern end is mapped immediately south of Glendale’s southern boundary (see Plate 1-2).

Movement on the Hollywood fault over geologic time is thought responsible for the growth of the Hollywood Hills, which is why earlier researchers characterized this fault as a northward-dipping reverse fault. However, recent studies by Dolan et al. (1997, 2000a) and Tsutsumi et al. (2001) show that the Hollywood fault is primarily a left-lateral strike-slip fault. A lateral component of movement on this fault is consistent with its linear trace and steep, 80- to 90-degree dips (reverse faults typically have irregular, arcuate traces and shallow dips).

The Santa Monica – Hollywood fault system has not produced any damaging historical earthquakes, and it has had only relatively minor microseismic activity. Subsurface studies by Dolan et al. (2000a) suggest that the Hollywood fault moves infrequently. The most recent surface-rupturing earthquake on this fault appears to have occurred 7,000 to 9,500 years ago, and another earthquake appears to have occurred in the last 10,000 to 22,000 years (Dolan et al., 2000a). These data suggest that the fault either has a slow rate of slip (of between 0.33 and 0.75 mm/yr), or that it breaks in large-magnitude events. Interestingly, the recent past history of earthquakes on the Hollywood fault is remarkably similar to that of the Sierra Madre fault. Paleoseismologists are currently researching the possibility that earthquakes on Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-24 3435 of 5188

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the Sierra Madre fault trigger rupture of the Santa Monica – Hollywood fault system. If this is the case, then large earthquakes in the Los Angeles region may cluster in time, releasing a significant amount of strain over a geologically short time period, followed by lengthy periods of seismic quiescence.

Based on its length, the Hollywood fault is thought capable of generating a Mw ~6.4 to 6.6 earthquake. A conservative magnitude 6.4 earthquake on the Hollywood fault is thought capable of generating peak ground accelerations of about 0.55g in Glendale, near City Hall.

Even higher accelerations, of as much as 0.7g can be expected along the southernmost portion of the City, near the eastern end of the fault.

1.5.4 Raymond Fault
The Raymond (or Raymond Hills) fault is a left-lateral, strike-slip fault about 13 miles (20 km) long that extends across the San Gabriel Valley, along the eastern and southern margins of Pasadena, and through the northern reaches of Arcadia, San Marino and South Pasadena.

The westernmost portion of the Raymond fault is mapped just south of the City of Glendale (see Plate 1-2). The fault produces a very obvious south-facing scarp along much of its length, which led many geologists to favor reverse-slip as the predominant sense of fault motion. However, left-deflected channels, shutter-ridges, sag ponds, and pressure ridges indicate that the Raymond fault is predominantly a left-lateral strike-slip fault. This sense of motion is confirmed by the seismological record, especially by the mainshock and aftershock sequence to the 1988 Pasadena earthquake of local magnitude (ML) 5.0 that probably occurred on this fault (Jones et al., 1990; Hauksson and Jones, 1991). Investigators have suggested that the Raymond fault transfers slip southward from the Sierra Madre fault zone to other fault systems (Walls et al., 1998).

The Raymond fault was recently trenched in San Marino, at the Los Angeles Arboretum in Arcadia (Weaver and Dolan, 2000), and in eastern Pasadena (Dolan et al., 2000b) where significant data on the recent history of this fault were collected. These studies indicate that the most recent surface-rupturing earthquake on this fault occurred 1,000 to 2,000 years ago, and that between three and five earthquakes occurred on this fault between 41,500 and 31,500 years ago. This suggests that the fault either breaks in cluster earthquakes, or that several more surface-rupturing earthquakes have occurred on this fault that were not detected in the trenches. Proposed slip rates on the fault vary from a minimum of 1.5 mm/yr (Weaver and Dolan, 2000) to 4 (+1, -0.5) mm/yr (Marin et al., 2000; Dolan et al., in review). Weaver and Dolan (2000) also suggest an average recurrence interval for this fault of about 3,000 years.

A conservative magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the Raymond fault would generate peak ground accelerations in the Glendale area of about 0.55g. However, the paleoseismic data suggest that this fault is capable of generating larger earthquakes, in the 7.0 magnitude range (Dolan et al., 2000b). If this is the case, stronger ground shaking as a result of an earthquake on this fault could be experienced in Glendale.

1.5.5 Sierra Madre Fault
The Sierra Madre fault zone is a north-dipping reverse fault zone approximately 47 miles (75 km) long that extends along the southern flank of the San Gabriel Mountains from San Fernando to San Antonio Canyon, where it continues southeastward as the Cucamonga fault.

The Sierra Madre fault has been divided into five segments, and each segment seems to have a different rate of activity.

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The northwestern-most segment of the Sierra Madre fault (the San Fernando segment) ruptured in 1971, causing the Mw 6.7 San Fernando (or Sylmar) earthquake. As a result of this earthquake, the Sierra Madre fault has been known to be active. In the 1980s, Crook and others (1987) studied the Transverse Ranges using general geologic and geomorphic mapping, coupled with a few trenching locations, and suggested that the segments of the Sierra Madre fault east of the San Fernando segment have not generated major earthquakes in several thousands of years, and possibly as long as 11,000 years. By California’s definitions of active faulting, most of the Sierra Madre fault would therefore be classified as not active.

Then, in the mid 1990s, Rubin et al. (1998) trenched a section of the Sierra Madre fault in Altadena, at the Loma Alta Park, and determined that this segment has ruptured at least twice in the last 15,000 years, causing magnitude 7.2 to 7.6 earthquakes. This suggests that the Los Angeles area is susceptible to infrequent, but large near-field earthquakes on the Sierra Madre fault. Rubin et al.’s (1998) trenching data show that during the last earthquake, this fault trace shifted as much as 13 feet (4 meters) at the surface, and that total displacement in the last two events adds to more than 34 feet (10.5 meters)! Although the fault seems to slip at a rate of only between 0.5 and 1 mm/yr (Walls et al., 1998), over time, it can accumulate a significant amount of strain. The paleoseismic data obtained at the Loma Alta Park site were insufficient to estimate the recurrence interval and the age of the last surface-rupturing event on this segment of the fault. However, Tucker and Dolan (2001) trenched the east Sierra Madre fault at Horsethief Canyon and obtained data consistent with Rubin et al.’s (1998) findings. At Horsethief Canyon, the Sierra Madre fault last ruptured about 8,000 to 9,000 years ago. Using a slip rate of 0.6 mm/yr and a slip per event of 5 meters, resolves into a recurrence interval of about 8,000 years. If the last event occurred more than 8,000 years ago, it is possible that these segments of the Sierra Madre fault are near the end of their cycle, and therefore likely to generate an earthquake in the not too distant future.

Given the data presented above, and since the Sierra Madre fault extends across the northern reaches of the Glendale area, this fault poses a significant hazard to the City. The deterministic analysis for the Glendale City Center area estimates peak ground accelerations of about 0.46g, based on a magnitude 7.0 earthquake on the segment of the Sierra Madre fault that extends through the City of Glendale. A larger earthquake on this fault, of magnitude between 7.2 and 7.6, could generate significantly stronger peak ground accelerations, especially in the northern portion of the City. Specific losses in Glendale as a result of an earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault are discussed in detail in Section 1.9, below.

If the San Fernando segment of the Sierra Madre fault ruptured, causing a magnitude 6.7 earthquake, peak ground accelerations of about 0.28g are anticipated in the southern portion of Glendale, near City Hall. As before, stronger ground accelerations would be expected in the northern reaches of the City, closer to the fault.

1.5.6 Elysian Park Fault
The Whittier Narrows earthquake of October 1, 1987 occurred on a previously unknown blind thrust fault underneath the eastern part of the Los Angeles basin. Davis et al. (1989) used oil field data to construct cross-sections showing the subsurface geology of the basin, and concluded that the Whittier Narrows earthquake occurred on a thrust ramp they called the Elysian Park thrust fault. They modeled the Elysian Park as a shallow-angle, reverse-motion fault 6 to 10 miles below the ground surface generally located between the Whittier fault to the southeast, and the Hollywood fault to the west-northwest. Although blind thrusts do not Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-26 3437 of 5188
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extend to the Earth’s surface, they are typically expressed at the surface by a series of hills or mountains. Davis et al. (1989) indicated that the Elysian Park thrust ramp is expressed at the surface by the Santa Monica Mountains, and the Elysian, Repetto, Montebello and Puente Hills.

Davis et al. (1989) estimated a long-term slip rate on the Elysian Park of between 2.5 and 5.2 mm/yr. Dolan et al. (1995) used a different approach to estimate a slip rate on the Elysian Park fault of about 1.7 mm/yr with a recurrence interval of about 1,475 years. Then, in 1996, Shaw and Suppe re-interpreted the subsurface geology of the Los Angeles basin, proposed a new model for what they call the Elysian Park trend, and estimated a slip rate on the thrust ramp beneath the Elysian Park trend of 1.7±0.4 mm/yr. More recently, Shaw and Shearer (1999) relocated the main shock and aftershocks of the 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake, and showed that the earthquake sequence occurred on an east-west trending buried thrust they called the Puente Hills thrust (rather than the northwest-trending Elysian Park thrust).

Given the enormous amount of research currently underway to better characterize the blind thrust faults that underlie the Los Angeles basin, the Elysian Park thrust fault will most likely undergo additional significant re-interpretations. In fact, Shaw and Shearer (1999) suggest that the Elysian Park thrust fault is no longer active. However, since this statement is under consideration, and the Elysian Park thrust is still part of the active fault database for southern California (CGS, previously CDMG, 1996), we have considered this fault as a potential seismic source in Glendale. If this fault caused a magnitude 6.7 earthquake, it is estimated that Glendale would experience peak ground accelerations of about 0.38g.

1.6 Potential Sources of Fault Rupture

1.6.1 Primary Fault Rupture
Primary fault rupture refers to fissuring and offset of the ground surface along a rupturing fault during an earthquake. Primary ground rupture typically results in a relatively small percentage of the total damage in an earthquake, but being too close to a rupturing fault can cause severe damage to structures. As discussed previously, development constraints within active fault zones were implemented in 1972 with passage of the California Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act. The Alquist-Priolo Act prohibits the construction of new habitable structures astride an active fault and requires special geologic studies to locate, and evaluate whether a fault has ruptured the ground surface in the last about 11,000 years. If an active fault is encountered, structural setbacks from the fault are defined.

In the Glendale vicinity, the CGS has identified the Rowley fault (a section of the Sierra Madre fault) and the Raymond fault as sufficiently active and well defined to require zoning under the guidelines of the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act. The Alquist-Priolo zones designated by the CGS for these faults are shown on Plate 1-2. Only the Rowley fault zone extends into the City of Glendale proper, so the Raymond fault is not discussed further below. Other faults that have been mapped in Glendale but have not been zoned by the California Geological Survey are discussed in more detail below.

The Rowley fault is the first segment of the Sierra Madre fault to the east of the fault traces that ruptured the ground surface during the 1971 Sylmar earthquake (see Plate 1-2; the Lakeview fault is the easternmost fault that ruptured the surface in 1971. The Sunland fault to the north did not break, but extensive landsliding occurred in the Sunland fault area in response to movement on the Lakeview fault). Where the Rowley fault has been mapped in Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-27 3438 of 5188
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the town of Tujunga, it consists of at least three fault planes in a zone of brecciated granodiorite that is thrust over very coarse conglomerate and basalt flows. In Glendale, the Rowley fault has been mapped as a single strand that bifurcates at its eastern end, near Ward Canyon (see Plate 1-2). The fault has been well located as evidenced by a single solid line on the map. Farther to the east, the fault is not as well defined and is therefore not currently zoned under the Alquist-Priolo Act criteria.

Geologic studies conducted soon after the 1971 earthquake suggested that the last rupture on the San Fernando segment of the Sierra Madre fault prior to 1971 had occurred less than 200 years before (Bonilla, 1973). However, a more recent trenching study in the immediate vicinity of Bonilla’s trench suggests that this fault has only broken twice in the last 3,500 to 4,000 years, including the 1971 rupture (Fumal et al., 1995), which suggests this fault has a recurrence interval of about 2,000 years rather than 200 years. Nevertheless, the San Fernando segment appears to be more active than other segments of the Sierra Madre fault, as first suggested by Crook et al. (1987), who proposed that the rest of the fault zone has not moved in many thousands of years, possibly since before the Holocene. Relatively recent trenching studies by Rubin et al. (1998) in Altadena, approximately 6 miles to the southeast of Glendale, have shown that the segment of the Sierra Madre fault through Altadena, and possibly through Glendale, has a long recurrence interval, but that it has moved in the Holocene and is therefore active. The segment of fault that Rubin et al. (1998) trenched has ruptured the ground surface twice in the last about 15,000 years, with the most recent earthquake having occurred probably 8,000 to 9,000 years ago. Other studies farther to the southeast, at Horsethief Canyon in the San Dimas area, also showed that this section of the Sierra Madre fault has not broken in the last 8,000 years, but that the fault has slipped as much as 46 feet (14 m) between 8,000 and 24,000 years ago (Tucker and Dolan, 2001).

These two studies suggest that the central segments of the Sierra Madre fault, between the San Fernando segment on the north and the Cucamonga fault on the south, ruptures at the same time in infrequent but large magnitude (M>7) events.

Based on the data presented above, the section of the Rowley fault not currently zoned by the State should nevertheless be considered active. A fault hazard management zone that includes and extends beyond the inferred traces of the fault is proposed, as shown on Plate 1-

2. Geologic studies similar in scope to those required by the CGS in Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zones should be conducted if new development or redevelopment is proposed in the fault hazard management zone. As detailed geological investigations are conducted, the location and activity status (some of the splays may be proven to have not moved within the last 11,000 years) of the faults shown on Plate 1-2 may be refined or modified. The map should be amended as new data become available and are validated.

The Mt. Lukens fault is a west- to northwest-trending thrust fault that extends across the south flank of the San Gabriel Mountains, between Haynes Canyon on the northwest, and the Los Angeles Crest Highway on the southeast. In the Glendale area, the fault is mapped about 1,500 feet to the north of the Sierra Madre fault. Because of its closeness to the Sierra Madre fault, Smith (1978) previously mapped this fault as part of the Sierra Madre fault system. The fault was mapped more recently by Crook et al. (1987), and Dibblee (1991a, 1991b, 2002).

Although the Mt. Lukens thrust fault appears to be a separate fault system, in the Glendale area this fault is so close to the Sierra Madre fault that if the Sierra Madre fault ruptured, it could trigger co-seismic movement on the Mt. Lukens thrust fault. Therefore, a fault hazard management zone for critical facilities is herein proposed for the Mt. Lukens fault.

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The Verdugo Canyon – La Tuna Canyon fault is oriented in a northwesterly direction through Glendale, where it inferred at the base of the northeast flank of the Verdugo Mountains, but changes to a more westerly orientation in the La Tuna Canyon, where the fault reportedly controls the location of the drainage. This fault was proposed by geologists from the Metropolitan Water District (as mentioned in Envicom, 1975), who indicated that the fault is north-dipping in the La Tuna Canyon, and south-dipping farther east. The fault was also inferred under the Verdugo Wash, where a deep, northwest-trending depression in the basement rocks has been reported (California State Water Rights Board, 1962 as discussed in Envicom, 1975). The sections of the fault described above are not recognized by Dibblee (1991a, 1991b) in his geologic maps of the area, but farther to the east, in the San Rafael Hills, Dibblee maps a fault that is consistent with Byer’s (1968) mapping. Farther to the east, the fault appears to swing to the east, where it may join the Sycamore Canyon fault (see Plate 1-2). There are no data available to suggest that this fault is active; Envicom (1975) indicate that the fault is not a barrier to groundwater flow in the Verdugo Wash area, and should therefore be considered inactive.

The Sycamore Canyon fault zone consists of a series of discontinuous faults that trend northeasterly in the vicinity of Sycamore Canyon, in the western part of the San Rafael Hills.

Byer (1968) extended this fault zone westward across and along the north side of Sycamore Canyon, but more recent geologic maps of the area (Dibblee, 1989b) do not show this trace (see Plate 1-2). Although the presence of sheared clays along a portion of the fault, in the eastern San Rafael Hills, has contributed to some slope instability problems, Weber (1980) reported that no evidence that the fault zone is active has been found. Weber (1980) also suggested that topographic lineaments observed in the northeastern San Rafael Hills (within Pasadena) might be an extension of the Sycamore Canyon fault. This connection has not been proven out by field evidence. However, Weber’s (1980) lineaments coincide with lineaments in the younger alluvial fan deposits in the Pasadena area mapped by Rubin (1992) that may be the surface expression of the most recently active traces of the Sierra Madre fault.

Therefore, in the Pasadena area, the Sycamore Canyon fault has been zoned, with geological studies required in this zone if the proposed development is a critical facility. A similar approach is recommended for the southwest-trending section of the Sycamore Canyon fault that extends through the San Rafael Hills in the Glendale area. Even if the fault is not active, the sheared clays that have been reported along the fault zone may be highly expansive. If a structure is built across the surface trace of these clays, and these clays swell when wetted, the structure could experience some structural damage (see Section 2.4.3). Engineered mitigation measures such as deep removals along the clay zone and replacement with nonexpansive materials may be warranted.

The Verdugo fault strikes southeasterly across the southern edge of the Verdugo Mountains, through the central portion of Glendale, and across the foot of the San Rafael Hills, where it seems to merge with the Eagle Rock fault. The Verdugo fault separates the plutonic and metamorphic rocks that crop out in the Verdugo Mountains from the alluvial fan deposits to the southwest. The fault is probably coincident with the sharp break in slope along the southwestern edge of the Verdudo Mountains, where many of the alluvial fans that emanate from the mountains merge together to form the gently southwest-facing alluvial surface between the mountains and the Los Angeles River. In older aerial photographs of the area, Dolan and Tucker (1999) interpreted several small scarps that could represent the last surface rupturing event on this fault, but these scarps have all been obliterated by development. In fact, the inferred trace of the Verdugo fault is covered with buildings and roads along almost Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-30 3441 of 5188

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its entire length, which makes it difficult to find suitable field study areas where the fault can be exposed and studied.

To date, there has been only one study in Glendale that attempted to locate and date the most recent surface rupturing events on this fault. This study, conducted in Brand Park (Dolan and Tucker, 1999) may have constrained the location of the fault zone in the area, but the actual fault trace could not be identified due to the discontinuous nature of the alluvial fan deposits that they encountered, and because the trench excavated was too unstable to be entered safely. Dolan and Tucker (1999) proposed that the trace of the Verdugo fault in this area is approximately 300 feet (90 m) farther to the north of where it is inferred by Dibblee (1991), extending in a southeasterly direction through the area between the Tea House and the Dr.’s House at Brand Park. Unfortunately, Dolan and Tucker (1999) could not confirm the fault location elsewhere due to landscaping and previous ground surface modifications at the park (for parking lots and playing fields) that precluded the possibility of excavating another trench.

Previous investigators (Byer, 1968) also identified a wide zone of faulting farther to the north that consists of laterally discontinuous fault planes that generally dip to the northeast.

Locally, they observed minor shearing of the terrace deposits, which suggested to them relatively youthful movement on the fault. This zone of faulting is identified in Plate 1-2 with cross-hatchures. This zone of faulting may not be the most recent fault trace, but there are insufficient data to determine whether or not these faults are active. Therefore, this fault zone should be investigated in the future if development is proposed in the area..

Although the most recently active traces of the Verdugo fault are not well located, most investigators agree that the Verdugo fault is active and therefore has the potential to generate future surface-rupturing earthquakes. Earlier investigators suggested that this fault is primarily a thrust fault, responsible for uplift of the Verdugo Mountains (R.T. Frankian & Associates, 1968; Weber et al., 1980; Weber, 1980), but more recently, it is thought that the fault displays primarily left-lateral strike-slip movement (Walls et al., 1998; Dolan, personal communication, 2002). A fault hazard management zone that includes the inferred trace of the fault as mapped by Dibblee (1991), but is wider to the north, to include the break in slope and the zone of faulting mapped by Byer (1968) is proposed. As with the fault hazard management zone for the Rowley fault, geological studies should be conducted for sites within the Verdugo fault hazard management zone if new development or significant redevelopment is proposed.

The Eagle Rock fault crosses the southwestern part of Pasadena and the northernmost portion of Los Angeles, including along a 2-mile stretch of the Ventura (134) Freeway, where it separates crystalline bedrock on the north from sedimentary rock on the south (see Plates 1- 2 and 2-1). The portion of the Eagle Rock fault east of the San Rafael Hills was originally termed the “San Rafael fault” by Weber (1980), who suggested the fault was active in late Quaternary time. This conclusion was based on the presence of linear topographic features across the Pleistocene alluvial fan surface east of the San Rafael Hills. Farther to the southeast, the fault appears to join the Raymond fault, however the exact location of the eastern terminus of the Eagle Rock fault is not well defined, and its geomorphology in this area is much more subdued than that of the Raymond fault. Consequently, Weaver and Dolan (2000) concluded that a connection with the Raymond fault could not be established with certainty. To the west, the Eagle Rock fault lies on trend with the Verdugo fault, although in the subsurface, based on gravity data, Weber (1980) suggests that there may be a step or bend between the two fault zones. Although very little is known about the Eagle Rock fault, given Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-31 3442 of 5188

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that it appears to be related to active faults in the area, such as the Verdugo fault, it should be considered potentially active, subject to further study. For example, although the Eagle Rock fault may not be capable of generating an earthquake, it may break co-seismically with movement on the Verdugo fault. A fault hazard management zone for this fault has been recommended in the Pasadena area, similar to that for the Sierra Madre and Verdugo faults (Plate 1-2). Extension of this zone between Pasadena and Glendale is recommended, but the limits of this zone are predominantly outside the City of Glendale.

The Scholl Canyon faults were mapped by Byer (1968), and Envicom (1975) suggested that this fault zone connects the Verdugo fault in the west to the Eagle Rock fault in the east.

However, more recent mapping by Dibblee (1989b) does not even show these faults, and there are no data data available to indicate that these fault traces, if even present, are active.

The York Boulevard fault is a short, northeast trending fault first mapped by Lamar (1970), and more recently by Dibblee (1989a, 1989b) in the Adams Hill area of southern Glendale.

According to Lamar (1970) the fault does not offset older, Pleistocene-age deposits, and is therefore not active. However, the York Boulevard fault does appear to separate the Raymond fault from the Hollywood fault, in an area where according to Weber (1980) there is step or bend in the fault zones at depth. Alternatively, the York Boulevard fault may be the eastern extension of the Hollywood fault. Based on these relationships, and given that both the Raymond and Hollywood faults are active, Envicom (1975) suggested that the York Boulevard fault may be active also. Given its length, the York Boulevard fault is not likely to generate an earthquake, but it may move co-seismically with an earthquake on the Hollywood fault. Therefore, a hazard management zone for this fault is proposed, where geological studies to locate and characterize the fault would be required prior to development of a critical facility.

The eastern terminus of the Hollywood fault has been mapped along the southwesternmost corner of the City of Glendale (see Plate 1-2). This fault has been shown to be active in the Los Angeles and West Hollywood areas, where recently obtained data indicate that this fault breaks in infrequent, but large magnitude earthquakes. In the West Hollywood area, the inferred location of the fault along Sunset Boulevard has been proven to be incorrect; the fault is farther south, in the valley. However, in the Los Angeles area, the fault does appear to be at the mountain front. The fault has been well located in the Hollywood Hills, just to the west of Glendale, by Yerkes (1967) and Dibblee (1991b), but as it extends across the Los Angeles River and into the Glendale area, its location is less well defined. Given that this fault is considered active, the inferred location of the fault in Glendale is herein included in a fault hazard management zone. Because of its location in the floodplain of the Los Angeles River, where shallow ground water and deep Holocene sediments are anticipated, geologic studies to locate this fault may prove to be difficult and expensive, requiring the use of deep boreholes rather than trenching.

A few other minor, unnamed faults have been mapped both in the San Rafael Hills and in the Verdugo Mountains (see Plate 1-2). These faults appear to be confined to the older bedrock units, with no impact on the younger terrace and alluvial deposits, and are therefore not considered active. Fault hazard management zones for these faults are not considered warranted, however, geologists studying these areas should continue to look for evidence of Holocene movement on these faults. As new data are developed and verified by third-party reviewers, Plate 1-2 should be amended to reflect any changes in the location, recency of activity and need for future studies on these faults.

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MITIGATION OF PRIMARY FAULT RUPTURE
Paleoseismic studies on the Sierra Madre fault suggest that slip per event on this fault exceeds 13 feet (4 m). Other faults in the area may experience similar amounts of displacement if they break during an earthquake. Most engineered structures are not designed to withstand this amount of movement, so buildings that straddle a fault will most certainly be damaged beyond repair if and when the fault breaks. Since it is impractical to reduce the damage potential to acceptable levels by engineering design, the most appropriate mitigation measure is to simply avoid placing structures on or near active fault traces. However, because of the complexity of most active fault zones, particularly at the surface where they may become braided, splayed or segmented, locating and evaluating the active traces is often not an easy task. A geologic investigation, which may include fault trenching, must be performed if structures designed for human occupancy are proposed within an Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zone. The study must evaluate whether or not an active segment of the fault extends across the area of proposed development. Based on the results of these studies, appropriate structural setbacks can be recommended. Specific guidelines for evaluating the hazard of fault rupture are presented in Note 49, published by the CGS, which is available on the world wide web at: www.consrv.ca.gov/DMG/pubs/notes/49/index.htm. Similar studies are proposed herein for the fault hazard management zones defined around faults not yet zoned as active by the State, but which have either been shown to be active, or are thought to be active by association with other nearby, active faults.

A common misperception regarding setbacks is that they are always 50 feet from the active fault trace. In actuality, geologic investigations are required to characterize the ground deformation associated with an active fault. Based on these studies, specific setbacks are delineated. If a fault trace is narrow, with little or no associated ground deformation, a setback distance less than 50 feet may be recommended. Conversely, if the fault zone is wide, with multiple splays, or is poorly defined, a setback distance greater than 50 feet may be warranted. Structural setbacks from reverse faults, such as the Sierra Madre, may also be asymmetrical across the trace of the fault, with a wider setback zone defined for the upper plate, where past earthquakes have shown that most damage occurs. State law allows local jurisdictions to establish minimum setback distances from a hazardous fault, and some communities have taken a prescriptive approach to this issue, establishing specific setbacks from a fault, rather than allowing for different widths depending on the circumstances. For example, the City of West Hollywood requires a 50-foot setback from the Hollywood fault for conventional structures, and 100-foot setback for critical and high-occupancy facilities.

1.6.2 Secondary Fault Rupture and Related Ground Deformation Primary fault rupture is rarely confined to a simple line along the fault trace. As the rupture reaches the brittle surface of the ground, it commonly spreads out into complex fault patterns of secondary faulting and ground deformation. In the 1992 Landers earthquake, the zone of deformation around the main trace ranged up to hundreds of feet wide (Lazarte et al., 1994).

Surface displacement and distortion associated with secondary faulting and deformation can be relatively minor or can be large enough to cause significant damage to structures.

Secondary fault rupture refers to ground surface displacements along faults other than the main traces of active regional faults. Unlike the regional faults, these subsidiary faults are not deeply rooted in the Earth’s crust and are not capable of producing damaging earthquakes on their own. Movement along these faults generally occurs in response to movement on a nearby regional fault. The zone of secondary faulting can be quite large, even in a moderateEarth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-33 3444 of 5188
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sized earthquake. For instance, in the 1971 San Fernando quake, movement along subsidiary faults occurred as much as 2 km from the main trace (Ziony and Yerkes, 1985).

Secondary faulting in thrust fault terrain is very complex, and numerous types of faulting have been reported. These include splays, branches, tear faults, shallow thrust faults, and back-thrusts, as well as faults that form in the shallow subsurface as a result of folding in sedimentary layers. Identified by Yeats (1982), fold-related types include flexural slip faults (slippage along bedding planes), and bending-moment faults (tensional or compressional tears in the axis of folding). A striking example of flexural slip along bedding planes occurred during the Northridge earthquake, when numerous bedding plane faults ruptured across the surface of newly graded roads and pads in a subdivision near Santa Clarita. The ruptures were accompanied by uplift and warping of the nearby ground (Treiman, 1995).

Secondary ground deformation includes fracturing, shattering, warping, tilting, uplift and/or subsidence. Such deformation may be relatively confined along the rupturing fault, or spread over a large region (such as the regional uplift of the Santa Susana Mountains after the Northridge earthquake). Deformation and secondary faulting can also occur without primary ground rupture, as in the case of ground deformation above a blind (buried) thrust fault.

MITIGATION OF SECONDARY FAULT RUPTURE AND GROUND

DEFORMATION
Geotechnical investigations for future developments, especially in the hillside areas of the City, should consider this hazard. The methodology for evaluating these features is similar to that used for evaluating primary fault rupture (CGS, previously CDMG Note 49).

Lazarte (1994) outlined three approaches to mitigation of fault rupture hazard, which could be applied to secondary deformation as well. The first is avoidance, by the use of structural setback zones. The second is referred to as “geotechnical engineering.” This method consists of placing a compacted fill blanket, or a compacted fill blanket reinforced with horizontal layers of geogrid, over the top of the fault trace. This is based on observations that the displacement across a distinct bedrock fault is spread out and dissipated in the overlying fill, thus reducing the severity of the displacement at the surface. The third method is “structural engineering.” This refers to strengthening foundation elements to withstand a limited amount of ground deformation. This is based on studies of foundation performance in the Landers earthquake showing that structures overlying major fault ruptures suffered considerable damage but did not collapse. Application of the second and third methods requires a thorough understanding of the geologic environment and thoughtful engineering judgment. This is because quantifying the extent of future displacement is difficult, and there are no proven engineering standards in place to quantify the amount of mitigation needed (for instance how thick a fill blanket is needed).

1.7 Geologic Hazards Resulting from Seismic Shaking

1.7.1 Liquefaction and Related Ground Failure
Liquefaction is a geologic process that causes various types of ground failure. Liquefaction typically occurs in loose, saturated sediments primarily of sandy composition, in the presence of ground accelerations over 0.2g (Borchardt and Kennedy, 1979; Tinsley and Fumal, 1985).

When liquefaction occurs, the sediments involved have a total or substantial loss of shear strength, and behave like a liquid or semi-viscous substance. Liquefaction can cause Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-34 3445 of 5188
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structural distress or failure due to ground settlement, a loss of bearing capacity in the foundation soils, and the buoyant rise of buried structures. The excess hydrostatic pressure generated by ground shaking can result in the formation of sand boils or mud spouts, and/or seepage of water through ground cracks.

As indicated above, there are three general conditions that need to be met for liquefaction to occur. The first of these – strong ground shaking of relatively long duration - can be expected to occur in the Glendale area as a result of an earthquake on any of several active faults in the region (see Section 1.5 above). The second condition - loose, or unconsolidated, recently deposited sediments consisting primarily of silty sand and sand - occurs along the Verdugo Wash and the lower reaches of its tributaries, and in the alluvial plain south of the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills. Young alluvial sediments have also been mapped in the area between the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains, in the northern portion of the City, but close to the San Gabriel Mountains these sediments are coarser grained and may therefore not be susceptible to liquefaction. Alluvial sediments have also been mapped in the canyons emanating from the San Rafael Hills, such as Scholl and Sycamore canyons (see Plate 2-1, in Chapter 2). The third condition – water-saturated sediments within about 50 feet of the surface – has been known to occur historically only in the Verdugo Wash north of surface projection of the Verdugo fault, and in the floodplain of the Los Angeles River. Therefore, these are the areas with the potential to experience future liquefaction-induced ground displacements. The areas are shown on Plate 1-3, and are discussed further below.

The Verdugo fault appears to cause a step or series of steps in the ground water surface, with groundwater levels consistently lower on the south side of the fault zone. Brown (1975) indicated that these steps in the groundwater surface are due to offsets in the bedrock surface at depth along the fault zone, but that no surface evidence of a fault forming groundwater barrier has been found in the area. Nevertheless, a barrier to groundwater must be present in this area to cause the water on the north side of the fault zone to rise to within 50 feet of the ground surface. Although not mapped, shallow groundwater conditions may occur locally in those sections of the south-flowing canyons emanating from the Verdugo Mountains that are located north of the Verdugo fault zone. Ground water may be perched on top of the bedrock surface, and ponded behind the fault zone. Since the bedrock that forms these mountains weathers to sand-sized particles, some of the canyons may contain sediments susceptible to liquefaction. The potential for these areas to liquefy should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

The San Fernando Valley narrows to essentially a point in the area of Glendale between the Verdugo Mountains to the north, and the Hollywood Hills to the south, in the area where the Los Angeles River veers to the south. Due to this constriction, or reduction in the crosssectional area of the water-bearing section of the valley, the ground water rises. Historically the ground water in this area has risen to within less than 50 feet of the ground surface. As a result, this portion of the basin, which is underlain by unconsolidated, young sediments, is susceptible to liquefaction. Plate 1-3 shows those areas of Glendale that the California Geological Survey (CDMG, 1999) has identified as susceptible to liquefaction based on an extensive database of boreholes and groundwater levels measured in wells. Areas near existing stream channels, such as Verdugo Wash and the Los Angeles River, are thought to be especially vulnerable to liquefaction. Much of the liquefaction-related ground failure in the city of Simi Valley during the Northridge earthquake was concentrated near the Arroyo Simi. A study by the CGS found that most of the property damage occurred in poorly engineered fills placed over the natural, pre-development channels of the Arroyo Simi, where ground water is very shallow (Barrows et al., 1994).

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The types of ground failure typically associated with liquefaction are explained below.

Lateral Spreading - Lateral displacement of surficial blocks of soil as the result of liquefaction in a subsurface layer is called lateral spreading. Even a very thin liquefied layer can act as a hazardous slip plane if it is continuous over a large enough area. Once liquefaction transforms the subsurface layer into a fluid-like mass, gravity plus inertial forces caused by the earthquake may move the mass downslope towards a cut slope or free face (such as a river channel or a canal). Lateral spreading most commonly occurs on gentle slopes that range between 0.3° and 3°, and can displace the ground surface by several meters to tens of meters. Such movement damages pipelines, utilities, bridges, roads, and other structures. During the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, lateral spreads with displacements of only a few feet damaged every major pipeline. Thus, liquefaction compromised San Francisco’s ability to fight the fires that caused about 85 percent of the damage (Tinsley et al., 1985).

Flow Failure - The most catastrophic mode of ground failure caused by liquefaction is flow failure. Flow failure usually occurs on slopes greater than 3°. Flows are principally liquefied soil or blocks of intact material riding on a liquefied subsurface. Displacements are often in the tens of meters, but in favorable circumstances, soils can be displaced for tens of miles, at velocities of tens of miles per hour. For example, the extensive damage to Seward and Valdez, Alaska, during the 1964 Great Alaskan earthquake was caused by submarine flow failures (Tinsley et al., 1985).

Ground Oscillation - When liquefaction occurs at depth but the slope is too gentle to permit lateral displacement, the soil blocks that are not liquefied may separate from one another and oscillate on the liquefied zone. The resulting ground oscillation may be accompanied by the opening and closing of fissures (cracks) and sand boils, potentially damaging structures and underground utilities (Tinsley et al., 1985).

Loss of Bearing Strength - When a soil liquefies, loss of bearing strength may occur beneath a structure, possibly causing the building to settle and tip. If the structure is buoyant, it may float upward. During the 1964 Niigata, Japan earthquake, buried septic tanks rose as much as 3 feet, and structures in the Kwangishicho apartment complex tilted as much as 60° (Tinsley et al., 1985).

Ground Lurching - Soft, saturated soils have been observed to move in a wave-like manner in response to intense seismic ground shaking, forming ridges or cracks on the ground surface. At present, the potential for ground lurching to occur at a given site can be predicted only generally. Areas underlain by thick accumulation of colluvium and alluvium appear to be the most susceptible to ground lurching. Under strong ground motion conditions, lurching can be expected in loose, cohesionless soils, or in clay-rich soils with high moisture content.

In some cases, the deformation remains after the shaking stops (Barrows et al., 1994).

LIQUEFACTION MITIGATION MEASURES
In accordance with the SHMA, all projects within a State-delineated Seismic Hazard Zone for liquefaction must be evaluated by a Certified Engineering Geologist and/or Registered Civil Engineer (this is typically a civil engineer with training and experience in soil engineering). Most often however, it is appropriate for both the engineer and geologist to be Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-36 3447 of 5188
NOTES:

This map is intended for general land use planning only. Information on this map is not sufficient to serve as a substitute for detailed geologic investigations ofindividual sites, nor does it satisfy the evaluation requirements set forth in geologic hazard regulations.

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Areas where previous occurrence of
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Glendale, California
Plate
1-3
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involved in the evaluation, and in the implementation of the mitigation measures. In order to assist in the implementation of the SHMA, the State has published specific guidelines for evaluating and mitigating liquefaction (California Division of Mines and Geology, 1997).

Furthermore, in 1999, a group sponsored by the Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC, 1999) published recommended procedures for carrying out the CGS guidelines. In general, a liquefaction study is designed to identify the depth, thickness, and lateral extent of any liquefiable layers that would affect the project site. An analysis is then performed to estimate the type and amount of ground deformation that might occur, given the seismic potential of the area.

Mitigation measures generally fall in one of two categories: ground improvement or foundation design. Ground improvement includes such measures as removal and recompaction of low density soils, removal of excess ground water, in-situ ground densification, and other types of ground improvement (such as grouting or surcharging).

Special foundations that may be recommended range from deep piles to reinforcement of shallow foundations (such as post-tensioned slabs). Mitigation for lateral spreading may also include modification of the site geometry or inclusion of retaining structures. The type (or combinations of types) of mitigation depend on the site conditions and on the nature of the proposed project (CGS, previously CDMG, 1997).

It should be remembered that Seismic Hazard Zone Maps may not show all areas that have the potential for liquefaction, nor is information shown on the maps sufficient to serve as a substitute for detailed site investigations.

1.7.2 Seismically Induced Settlement
Under certain conditions, strong ground shaking can cause the densification of soils, resulting in local or regional settlement of the ground surface. During strong shaking, soil grains become more tightly packed due to the collapse of voids and pore spaces, resulting in a reduction of the thickness of the soil column. This type of ground failure typically occurs in loose granular, cohesionless soils, and can occur in either wet or dry conditions.

Unconsolidated young alluvial deposits are especially susceptible to this hazard. Artificial fills may also experience seismically induced settlement. Damage to structures typically occurs as a result of local differential settlements. Regional settlement can damage pipelines by changing the flow gradient on water and sewer lines, for example.

Fracturing and offset of the ground can also occur. During the Northridge earthquake, extensive ground fracturing developed along the margins of Potrero Canyon at the alluvium/bedrock contact. Investigations after the earthquake showed that the fractures, which were both tensional and compressional in nature, formed as a result of ground lurching and differential settlement in the alluvium (Rymer et al., 1995).

Those portions of the Glendale area that may be susceptible to seismically induced settlement are the alluvial surfaces and larger drainages that are underlain by late Quaternary alluvial sediments (similar to the liquefaction-susceptible areas shown on Plate 1-3). Sites near the base of the Verdugo and San Gabriel Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, and along the margins of the larger drainage channels may be particularly vulnerable.

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MITIGATION OF SEISMICALLY INDUCED SETTLEMENT
Mitigation measures for seismically induced settlement are similar to those used for liquefaction. Recommendations are provided by the project’s geologist and soil engineer, following a detailed geotechnical investigation of the site. Overexcavation and recompaction is the most commonly used method to densify soft soils susceptible to settlement. Deeper overexcavation below final grades, especially at cut/fill, fill/natural or alluvium/bedrock contacts may be recommended to provide a more uniform subgrade. Overexcavation should also be performed so that large differences in fill thickness are not present across individual lots. In some cases, strengthened foundations and/or fill compaction to a minimum standard that is higher than that required by the UBC may be recommended.

1.7.3 Seismically Induced Slope Failure
Strong ground motions can worsen existing unstable slope conditions, particularly if coupled with saturated ground conditions. Seismically induced landslides can overrun structures, people or property, sever utility lines, and block roads, thereby hindering rescue operations after an earthquake. Over 11,000 landslides were mapped shortly after the Northridge earthquake, all within a 45-mile radius of the epicenter (Harp and Jibson, 1996). Although numerous types of earthquake-induced landslides have been identified, the most widespread type generally consists of shallow failures involving surficial soils and the uppermost weathered bedrock in moderate to steep hillside terrain (these are also called disrupted soil slides). Rock falls and rock slides on very steep slopes are also common. The 1989 Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes showed that reactivation of existing deep-seated landslides also occurs (Spittler et al., 1990; Barrows et al., 1995).

A combination of geologic conditions leads to landslide vulnerability. These include high seismic potential; rapid uplift and erosion resulting in steep slopes and deeply incised canyons; highly fractured and folded rock; and rock with inherently weak components, such as silt or clay layers. The orientation of the slope with respect to the direction of the seismic waves (which can affect the shaking intensity) can also control the occurrence of landslides.

Several areas in Glendale have been identified as vulnerable to seismically induced slope failure (see Plate 1-3). The mountainous region along the northern reaches of the City (the San Gabriel Mountains) is susceptible to slope failure due to the steep terrain. The crystalline bedrock that crops out in the northern and central portions of the San Rafael Hills is locally highly fractured and weathered. In steep areas, strong ground shaking can cause slides or rockfalls in this material. Slope failures can also occur in the western and central portions of the City, in the Verdugo Mountains, where locally steep terrain is combined with fractured igneous and metamorphic rock units. Numerous small landslides can be expected to occur in these areas in response to an earthquake on the Sierra Madre, the Verdugo or other nearby faults. For a more detailed assessment of potential slope instability in the Glendale area, refer to Section 2.4.1 of this report.

MITIGATION OF SEISMICALLY INDUCED SLOPE FAILURE
Existing slopes that are to remain adjacent to or within developments should be evaluated for the geologic conditions mentioned above. In general, slopes steeper than about 15 degrees are most susceptible, however failures can occur on flatter slopes if unsupported weak rock units are exposed in the slope face. For suspect slopes, appropriate geotechnical investigation and slope stability analyses should be performed for both static and dynamic (earthquake) Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-39 3450 of 5188
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conditions. For deeper slides, mitigation typically includes such measures as buttressing slopes or regrading the slope to a different configuration. Protection from rockfalls or surficial slides can often be achieved by protective devices such as barriers, rock fences, retaining structures, catchment areas, or a combination of the above. The runout area of the slide at the base of the slope, and the potential bouncing of rocks must also be considered. If it is not feasible to mitigate the unstable slope conditions, building setbacks should be imposed.

In accordance with the SHMA, all development projects within a State-delineated Seismic Hazard Zone for seismically induced landsliding must be evaluated by a State-licensed engineering geologist and/or civil engineer (for landslide investigation and analysis, this typically requires both). In order to assist in the implementation of the SHMA, the State has published specific guidelines for evaluating and mitigating seismically induced landslides (CGS, previously CDMG, 1997). More recently, the Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC, 2002) sponsored the publication of the “Recommended Procedures for Implementation of DMG Special Publication 117.” These procedures are expected to be adopted by the Los Angeles County and other cities and counties in California in the next year or so, pending some slight revisions and further discussions among the geotechnical community.

1.7.4 Deformation of Sidehill Fills
Sidehill fills are artificial fill wedges typically constructed on natural slopes to create roadways or level building pads. Deformation of sidehill fills was noted in earlier earthquakes, but this phenomenon was particularly widespread during the Northridge earthquake. Older, poorly engineered road fills were most commonly affected, but in localized areas, building pads of all ages experienced deformation. The deformation was usually manifested as ground cracks at the cut/fill contacts, differential settlement in the fill wedge, and bulging of the slope face. The amount of displacement on the pads was generally 8 cm or less, but this resulted in minor to severe property damage (Stewart et al., 1995). This phenomenon was most common in relatively thin fills (9 m or less) placed near the tops or noses of narrow ridges (Barrows et al., 1995).

MITIGATION OF SIDEHILL FILL DEFORMATION
Hillside grading designs should be evaluated during site-specific geotechnical investigations to determine if there is a potential for this hazard. There are currently no proven engineering standards for mitigating sidehill fill deformation, consequently current published research on this topic should be reviewed by project consultants at the time of their investigation. It is thought that the effects of this hazard on structures may be reduced by the use of posttensioned foundations, deeper overexcavation below finish grades, deeper overexcavation on cut/fill transitions, and/or higher fill compaction criteria.

1.7.5 Ridgetop Fissuring and Shattering
Linear, fault-like fissures occurred on ridge crests in a relatively concentrated area of rugged terrain in the Santa Cruz Mountains during the Loma Prieta earthquake. Shattering of the surface soils on the crests of steep, narrow ridgelines occurred locally in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, but was widespread in the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Ridgetop shattering (which leaves the surface looking as if it was plowed) by the Northridge earthquake was observed as far as 22 miles away from the epicenter. In the Sherman Oaks area, severe damage occurred locally to structures located at the tops of relatively high Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-40 3451 of 5188
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(greater than 100 feet), narrow (typically less than 300 feet wide) ridges flanked by slopes steeper than about 2.5:1 (horizontal:vertical). It is generally accepted that ridgetop fissuring and shattering is a result of intense amplification or focusing of seismic energy due to local topographic effects (Barrows et al., 1995).

Ridgetop shattering can be expected to occur in the topographically steep portions of the San Gabriel Mountains north of Glendale, in the Verdugo Mountains, and locally in the San Rafael Hills. These areas are for the most part undeveloped, so the hazard associated with ridgetop shattering is relatively low. However, above ground storage tanks, reservoirs and utility towers are often located on top of ridges, and during strong ground shaking, these can fail or topple over, with the potential to cause widespread damage to development downslope (storage tanks and reservoirs), or disruptions to the lifeline systems (utility towers).

MITIGATION OF RIDGETOP FISSURING AND SHATTERING
Projects located in steep hillside areas should be evaluated for this hazard by an Engineering Geologist. Although it is difficult to predict exactly where this hazard may occur, avoidance of development along the tops of steep, narrow ridgelines is probably the best mitigation measure. For large developments, recontouring of the topography to reduce the conditions conducive to ridgetop amplification, along with overexcavation below finish grades to remove and recompact weak, fractured bedrock might reduce this hazard to an acceptable level.

1.7.6 Seiches
Reservoirs, lakes, ponds, swimming pools and other enclosed bodies of water are subject to potentially damaging oscillations (sloshing), or seiches. This hazard is dependent upon specific earthquake parameters (e.g. frequency of the seismic waves, distance and direction from the epicenter), as well as site-specific design of the enclosed bodies of water, and is thus difficult to predict.

MITIGATION OF SEICHES
The degree of damage to small bodies of water, such as to swimming pools, would likely be minor. However, property owners downslope from pools that could seiche during an earthquake should be aware of the potential hazard to their property should a pool lose substantial amounts of water during an earthquake. Site-specific design elements, such as baffles, to reduce the potential for seiches is warranted in tanks and in open reservoirs or ponds where overflow or failure of the structure may cause damage to nearby properties.

Damage to water tanks in recent earthquakes, such as the 1992 Landers-Big Bear sequence and the 1994 Northridge, resulted from seiching. As a result, the American Water Works Association (AWWA) Standards for Design of Steel Water Tanks (D-100) provide new criteria for seismic design (Lund, 1994).

1.8 Vulnerability of Structures to Earthquake Hazards
This section assesses the earthquake vulnerability of structures and facilities common in the Glendale area. This analysis is based on past earthquake performance of similar types of buildings in the U.S.

The effects of design earthquakes on particular structures within the city are beyond the scope of this study. However, utilizing a recent standardized methodology developed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), general estimates of losses are provided in Section 1.9 of this report.

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Although it is not possible to prevent earthquakes from occurring, their destructive effects can be minimized. Comprehensive hazard mitigation programs that include the identification and mapping of hazards, prudent planning and enforcement of building codes, and expedient retrofitting and rehabilitation of weak structures can significantly reduce the scope of an earthquake disaster.

With these goals in mind, the State Legislature passed Senate Bill 547, addressing the identification and seismic upgrade of Unreinforced Masonry (URM) buildings. In addition, the law encourages identification and mitigation of seismic hazards associated with other types of potentially hazardous buildings, including pre-1971 concrete tilt-ups, soft-stories, mobile homes, and pre-1940 homes.

1.8.1 Potentially Hazardous Buildings and Structures
Most of the loss of life and injuries due to an earthquake are related to the collapse of hazardous buildings and structures. FEMA (1985) defines a hazardous building as “any inadequately earthquake resistant building, located in a seismically active area, that presents a potential for life loss or serious injury when a damaging earthquake occurs.” Building codes have generally been made more stringent following damaging earthquakes.

Building damage is commonly classified as either structural or non-structural. Structural damage impairs the building's support. This includes any vertical and lateral force-resisting systems, such as frames, walls, and columns. Non-structural damage does not affect the integrity of the structural support system, but includes such things as broken windows, collapsed or rotated chimneys, unbraced parapets that fall into the street, and fallen ceilings.

During an earthquake, buildings get thrown from side to side and up and down. Given the same acceleration, heavier buildings are subjected to higher forces than lightweight buildings. Damage occurs when structural members are overloaded, or when differential movements between different parts of the structure strain the structural components. Larger earthquakes and longer shaking duration tend to damage structures more. The level of damage can be predicted only in general terms, since no two buildings undergo the exact same motions, even in the same earthquake. Past earthquakes have shown us, however, that some types of buildings are far more likely to fail than others.

Unreinforced Masonry Buildings - Unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs) are prone to failure due to inadequate anchorage of the masonry walls to the roof and floor diaphragms, lack of steel reinforcing, the limited strength and ductility of the building materials, and sometimes, poor construction workmanship. Furthermore, as these buildings age, the bricks and mortar tend to deteriorate, making the buildings even weaker.

In response to the 1986 URM Law, Glendale issued Chapter 58 of the City Code requiring all URMs in the City to be identified (see Section 1.3.6). In the year 2000, the City of Glendale reported to the Seismic Safety Commission that 703 URMs had been identified in the City.

Of these, only 1 building (the Casa de Adobe de San Rafael) was considered of historical significance. By 2000, all 703 building owners had been notified about the hazards of URM construction, and 491 of the URMs had been retrofitted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 58. Two more buildings had retrofit permits issued, but the work had not yet begun.

Finally, another 206 URMs had been demolished or were slated for demolition, leaving only four buildings for which mitigation plans were not yet available (Seismic Safety Commission, 2000). In 2002, City records show that retrofitting had not yet begun at only two buildings, and that one other building was being retrofitted.

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Soft-Story Buildings - Of particular concern are soft-story buildings (buildings with a story, generally the first floor, lacking adequate strength or toughness due to too few shear walls).

Apartments above glass-fronted stores, and buildings perched atop parking garages are common examples of soft-story buildings. Collapse of a soft story and “pancaking” of the remaining stories killed 16 people at the Northridge Meadows apartments during the 1994 Northridge earthquake (EERI, 1994). There are many other cases of soft-story collapses in past earthquakes. The City of Glendale Engineering Section has identified approximately 520 buildings in the City that are of soft-story construction.

Wood-Frame Structures - Structural damage to wood-frame structures often results from an inadequate connection between the superstructure and the foundation. These buildings may slide off their foundations, with consequent damage to plumbing and electrical connections.

Unreinforced masonry chimneys may also collapse. These types of damage are generally not life threatening, although they may be costly to repair. Wood frame buildings with stud walls generally perform well in an earthquake, unless they have no foundation or have a weak foundation constructed of unreinforced masonry or poorly reinforced concrete. In these cases, damage is generally limited to cracking of the stucco, which dissipates much of the earthquake's induced energy. The collapse of wood frame structures, if it happens, generally does not generate heavy debris, but rather, the wood and plaster debris can be cut or broken into smaller pieces by hand-held equipment and removed by hand in order to reach victims (FEMA, 1985).

Pre-Cast Concrete Structures - Partial or total collapse of buildings where the floors, walls and roofs fail as large intact units, such as large pre-cast concrete panels, cause the greatest loss of life and difficulty in victim rescue and extrication (FEMA, 1985). These types of buildings are common not only in southern California, but abroad. Casualties as a result of collapse of these structures in past earthquakes, including Mexico (1985), Armenia (1988), Nicaragua (1972), El Salvador (1986 and 2001), the Philippines (1990) and Turkey (1999) add to hundreds of thousands. In southern California, many of the parking structures that failed during the Northridge earthquake, such as the Cal-State Northridge and City of Glendale Civic Center parking structures, consisted of pre-cast concrete components (EERI, 1994).

Collapse of this type of structure generates heavy debris, and removal of this debris requires the use of heavy mechanical equipment. Consequently, the location and extrication of victims trapped under the rubble is generally a slow and dangerous process. Extrication of trapped victims within the first 24 hours after the earthquake becomes critical for survival. In most instances, however, post-earthquake planning fails to quickly procure equipment needed to move heavy debris. The establishment of Heavy Urban Search and Rescue teams, as recommended by FEMA (1985), has improved victim extrication and survivability. Buildings that are more likely to fail and generate heavy debris need to be identified, so that appropriate mitigation and planning procedures are defined prior to an earthquake.

Tilt-up Buildings - Tilt-up buildings have concrete wall panels, often cast on the ground, or fabricated off-site and trucked in, that are tilted upward into their final position. Connections and anchors have pulled out of walls during earthquakes, causing the floors or roofs to collapse. A high rate of failure was observed for this type of construction in the 1971 San Fernando and 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquakes. Tilt-up buildings can also generate heavy debris.

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Reinforced Concrete Frame Buildings - Reinforced concrete frame buildings, with or without reinforced infill walls, display low ductility. Earthquakes may cause shear failure (if there are large tie spacings in columns, or insufficient shear strength), column failure (due to inadequate rebar splices, inadequate reinforcing of beam-column joints, or insufficient tie anchorage), hinge deformation (due to lack of continuous beam reinforcement), and nonstructural damage (due to the relatively low stiffness of the frame). A common type of failure observed following the Northridge earthquake was confined column collapse (EERI, 1994), where infilling between columns confined the length of the columns that could move laterally in the earthquake.

Multi-Story Steel Frame Buildings - Multi-story steel frame buildings generally have concrete floor slabs. However, these buildings are less likely to collapse than concrete structures. Common damage to these types of buildings is generally non-structural, including collapsed exterior curtain wall (cladding), and damage to interior partitions and equipment.

Overall, modern steel frame buildings have been expected to perform well in earthquakes, but the 1994 Northridge earthquake broke many welds in these buildings, a previously unanticipated problem.

Older, pre-1945 steel frame structures may have unreinforced masonry such as bricks, clay tiles and terra cotta tiles as cladding or infilling. Cladding in newer buildings may be glass, infill panels or pre-cast panels that may fail and generate a band of debris around the building exterior (with considerable threat to pedestrians in the streets below). Structural damage may occur if the structural members are subject to plastic deformation which can cause permanent displacements. If some walls fail while others remain intact, torsion or soft-story problems may result.

Mobile Homes - Mobile homes are prefabricated housing units that are placed on isolated piers, jackstands, or masonry block foundations (usually without any positive anchorage).

Floors and roofs of mobile homes are usually plywood, and outside surfaces are covered with sheet metal. Mobile homes typically do not perform well in earthquakes. Severe damage occurs when they fall off their supports, severing utility lines and piercing the floor with jackstands.

Combination Types - Buildings are often a combination of steel, concrete, reinforced masonry and wood, with different structural systems on different floors or different sections of the building. Combination types that are potentially hazardous include: concrete frame buildings without special reinforcing, precast concrete and precast-composite buildings, steel frame or concrete frame buildings with unreinforced masonry walls, reinforced concrete wall buildings with no special detailing or reinforcement, large capacity buildings with long-span roof structures (such as theaters and auditoriums), large unengineered wood-frame buildings, buildings with inadequately anchored exterior cladding and glazing, and buildings with poorly anchored parapets and appendages (FEMA, 1985). Additional types of potentially hazardous buildings may be recognized after future earthquakes.

In addition to building types, there are other factors associated with the design and construction of the buildings that also have an impact on the structures’ vulnerability to strong ground shaking. Some of these conditions are discussed below:

Building Shape - A building’s vertical and/or horizontal shape can also be important.

Simple, symmetric buildings generally perform better than non-symmetric buildings. During an earthquake, non-symmetric buildings tend to twist as well as shake. Wings on a building Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-44 3455 of 5188
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tend to act independently during an earthquake, resulting in differential movements and cracking. The geometry of the lateral load-resisting systems also matters. For example, buildings with one or two walls made mostly of glass, while the remaining walls are made of concrete or brick, are at risk. Asymmetry in the placement of bracing systems that provide a building with earthquake resistance, can result in twisting or differential motions.

Pounding - Site-related seismic hazards may include the potential for neighboring buildings to “pound”, or for one building to collapse onto a neighbor. Pounding occurs when there is little clearance between adjacent buildings, and the buildings “pound” against each other as they deflect during an earthquake. The effects of pounding can be especially damaging if the floors of the buildings are at different elevations, so that, for example, the floor of one building hits a supporting column of the other. Damage to a supporting column can result in partial or total building collapse.

1.8.2 Essential Facilities
Critical facilities are those parts of a community's infrastructure that must remain operational after an earthquake. Critical facilities include schools, hospitals, fire and police stations, emergency operation centers, and communication centers. Plate 1-4 shows the locations of the City’s fire stations, police stations, schools, and other critical facilities. A vulnerability assessment for these facilities involves comparing the locations of these facilities to the hazardous areas identified in the City, including active and potentially active faults (Plate 1- 2), liquefaction-susceptible areas (Plate 1-3), unstable slope areas (Plates 1-3 and 2-4), potential dam failure inundation areas (Plate 3-3), fire hazard zones (Plate 4-2), and sites that generate hazardous materials (Plate 5-1).

High-risk facilities, if severely damaged, may result in a disaster far beyond the facilities themselves. Examples include power plants, dams and flood control structures, freeway interchanges, bridges, and industrial plants that use or store explosives, toxic materials or petroleum products.

High-occupancy facilities have the potential of resulting in a large number of casualties or crowd-control problems. This category includes high-rise buildings, large assembly facilities, and large multifamily residential complexes.

Dependent-care facilities, such as preschools and schools, rehabilitation centers, prisons, group care homes, and nursing homes, house populations with special evacuation considerations.

Economic facilities, such as banks, archiving and vital record-keeping facilities, airports, and large industrial or commercial centers, are those facilities that should remain operational to avoid severe economic impacts.

It is crucial that critical facilities have no structural weaknesses that can lead to collapse. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 1985) has suggested the following seismic performance goals for health care facilities:
• The damage to the facilities should be limited to what might be reasonably expected after a destructive earthquake and should be repairable and not be life-threatening. • Patients, visitors, and medical, nursing, technical and support staff within and immediately outside the facility should be protected during an earthquake.

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• Emergency utility systems in the facility should remain operational after an earthquake.
• Occupants should be able to evacuate the facility safely after an earthquake. • Rescue and emergency workers should be able to enter the facility immediately after an earthquake and should encounter only minimum interference and danger. • The facility should be available for its planned disaster response role after an earthquake.

1.8.3 Lifelines
Lifelines are those services that are critical to the health, safety and functioning of the community. They are particularly essential for emergency response and recovery after an earthquake. Furthermore, certain critical facilities designed to remain functional during and immediately after an earthquake may be able to provide only limited services if the lifelines they depend on are disrupted. Lifeline systems include water, sewage, electrical power, communication, transportation (highways, bridges, railroads, and airports), natural gas, and liquid fuel systems. The improved performance of lifelines in the 1994 Northridge earthquake, relative to the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, shows that the seismic codes upgraded and implemented after 1971 have been effective. Nevertheless, the impact of the Northridge quake on lifeline systems was widespread and illustrates the continued need to study earthquake impacts, to upgrade substandard elements in the systems, to provide redundancy in systems, to improve emergency response plans, and to provide adequate planning, budgeting and financing for seismic safety.

Some of the observations and lessons learned from the Northridge earthquake are summarized below (from Savage, 1995; Lund, 1996).
• Several electrical transmission towers were damaged or totally collapsed. Collapse was generally due to foundation distress in towers that were located near ridge tops where amplification of ground motion may have occurred. One collapse was the result of a seismically induced slope failure at the base of the tower. • Damage to above ground water tanks typically occurred where piping and joints were rigidly connected to the tank, due to differential movement between the tank and the piping. Older steel tanks not seismically designed under current standards buckled at the bottom (called “elephant’s foot”), in the shell, and on the roof. Modern steel and concrete tanks generally performed well.
• Significant damage occurred in water treatment plants due to sloshing in large water basins.
• A number of facilities did not have an emergency power supply or did not have enough power supply capacity to provide their essential services. • Lifelines within critical structures, such as hospitals and fire stations, may be vulnerable. For instance, rooftop mechanical and electrical equipment is not generally designed for seismic forces. During the Northridge quake, rooftop equipment failed causing malfunctions in other systems.
• A 70-year old crude oil pipeline leaked from a cracked weld, spreading oil for 12 miles down the Santa Clara River.
• A freight train carrying sulfuric acid was derailed causing an 8,000-gallon acid spill and a 2,000-gallon diesel spill from the locomotive.

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The above list is by no means a complete summary of the earthquake damage, but it does highlight some of the issues pertinent to the Glendale area. All lifeline providers should make an evaluation of the seismic vulnerability within their systems a priority. The evaluation should include a plan to fund and schedule the needed seismic mitigation.

1.9 HAZUS Earthquake Scenario Loss Estimations for the City of Glendale HAZUS-99TM is a standardized methodology for earthquake loss estimation based on a geographic information system (GIS). A project of the National Institute of Building Sciences, funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is a powerful advance in mitigation strategies.

The HAZUS project developed guidelines and procedures to make standardized earthquake loss estimates at a regional scale. With standardization, estimates can be compared from region to region.

HAZUS is designed for use by state, regional and local governments in planning for earthquake loss mitigation, emergency preparedness, response and recovery. HAZUS addresses nearly all aspects of the built environment, and many different types of losses. The methodology has been tested against the experience of several past earthquakes, and against the judgment of experts. Subject to several limitations noted below, HAZUS can produce results that are valid for the intended purposes.

Loss estimation is an invaluable tool, but must be used with discretion. Loss estimation analyzes casualties, damage and economic loss in great detail. It produces seemingly precise numbers that can be easily misinterpreted. Loss estimation's results, for example, may cite 4,054 left homeless by a scenario earthquake. This is best interpreted by its magnitude. That is, an event that leaves 4,000 people homeless is clearly more manageable than an event causing 40,000 homeless people; and an event that leaves 400,000 homeless would overwhelm a community's resources. However, another loss estimation that predicts 7,000 people homeless should probably be considered equivalent to the 4,054 result. Because HAZUS results make use of a great number of parameters and data of varying accuracy and completeness, it is not possible to assign quantitative error bars. Although the numbers should not be taken at face value, they are not rounded or edited because detailed evaluation of individual components of the disaster can help mitigation agencies ensure that they have considered all the important options.

The more community-specific the data that are input to HAZUS, the more reliable the loss estimation.

HAZUS provides defaults for all required information. These are based on best-available scientific, engineering, census and economic knowledge. The loss estimations in this report have been tailored to Glendale by using a map of soil types for the City. HAZUS relies on 1990 Census data, but for the purposes of this study, we replaced the population by census tract data that came with the software with the 2000 Census data. Other modifications made to the data set before running the analyses include:
• updated the database of critical facilities, including the number and location of the fire and police stations in the City,
• revised the number of beds available in the three major hospitals in Glendale to better represent their current patient capacity, and
• upgraded the construction level for most unreinforced masonry buildings in the City to better represent the City’s retrofitting efforts of the last decade. • As useful as HAZUS seems to be, the loss estimation methodology has some inherent uncertainties. These arise in part from incomplete scientific knowledge concerning earthquakes and their effect upon buildings and facilities, and in part from the approximations and simplifications necessary for comprehensive analyses.

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Users should be aware of the following specific limitations:
• HAZUS is driven by statistics, and thus is most accurate when applied to a region, or a class of buildings or facilities. It is least accurate when considering a particular site, building or facility.
• Losses estimated for lifelines may be less than losses estimated for the general building stock.
• Losses from smaller (less than M 6.0) damaging earthquakes may be overestimated. • Pilot and calibration studies have not yet provided an adequate test concerning the possible extent and effects of landsliding.
• The indirect economic loss module is new and experimental. While output from pilot studies has generally been credible, this module requires further testing. • The databases that HAZUS draws from to make its estimates are often incomplete or outdated (as discussed above, efforts were made to improve some of the datasets used for the analysis, but for some estimates, the software still relies on 1990 census tracts data and 1994 DNB economic reports). This is another reason the loss estimates should not be taken at face value.

1.9.1 Methodology, Terminology and Input Data Used in the Earthquake Loss Estimations for the City
The flow chart in Figure 1-4 illustrates the modules (or components) of a HAZUS analysis.

The HAZUS software uses population data by census tract and general building stock data from Dunn & Bradstreet (DNB).

Essential facilities and lifeline inventory are located by latitude and longitude. However, the HAZUS inventory data for lifelines and utilities were developed at a national level and where specific data are lacking, statistical estimations are utilized. Specifics about the site-specific inventory data used in the models are discussed further in the paragraphs below. Other sitespecific data used include soil types and liquefaction susceptible zones. The user then defines the earthquake scenario to be modeled, including the magnitude of the earthquake, and the location of the epicenter. Once all these data are input, the software calculates the loss estimates for each scenario.

The loss estimates include physical damage to buildings of different construction and occupancy types, damage to essential facilities and lifelines, number of after-earthquake fires and damage due to fire, and the amount of debris that is expected. The model also estimates the direct economic and social losses, including casualties and fatalities for three different times of the day, the number of people left homeless and number of people that will require shelter, number of hospital beds available, and the economic losses due to damage to the places of businesses, loss of inventory, and (to some degree) loss of jobs. The indirect economic losses component is still experimental; the calculations in the software are checked against actual past earthquakes, such as the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquake, but indirect losses are hard to measure, and it typically takes years before these monetary losses can be quantified with any degree of accuracy. Therefore, this component of HAZUS is still considered experimental.

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Data In ,........-----, Hazard
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Figure 1-4
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Critical Facilities: HAZUS breaks critical facilities into two groups: essential facilities and high potential loss (HPL) facilities. Essential facilities provide services to the community and should be functional after an earthquake. Essential facilities include hospitals, medical clinics, schools, fire stations, police stations and emergency operations facilities. The essential facility module in HAZUS determines the expected loss of functionality for these facilities. The damage probabilities for essential facilities are determined on a site-specific basis (i.e., at each facility). Economic losses associated with these facilities are computed as part of the analysis of the general building stock. Data required for the analysis include occupancy classes (current building use) and building structural type, or a combination of essential facilities building type, design level and construction quality factor. High potential loss facilities include dams, levees, military installations, nuclear power plants and hazardous material sites.

Transportation and Utility Lifelines: HAZUS divides the lifeline inventory into two systems: transportation and utility lifelines. The transportation system includes seven components: highways, railways, light rail, bus, ports, ferry and airports. The utility lifelines include potable water, wastewater, natural gas, crude and refined oil, electric power and communications. If site-specific lifeline utility data are not provided for these analyses, HAZUS performs a statistical calculation based on the population served.

General Building Stock Type and Classification: HAZUS provides damage data for buildings based on these structural types:
• Concrete • Steel
• Mobile Home • Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls
• Precast Concrete • Wood Frame
• Reinforced Masonry Bearing
Walls
and based on these occupancy (usage) classifications:
• Residential • Religion
• Commercial • Government and
• Industrial • Education
• Agriculture
Building Damage Classification - Loss estimation for the general building stock is averaged for each census tract. Building damage classifications range from slight to complete. As an example, the building damage classification for wood frame buildings is provided below.

Wood-frame structures comprise the City’s most numerous building type.

Wood, Light Frame:
• Slight Structural Damage: Small plaster or gypsum-board cracks at corners of door and window openings and wall-ceiling intersections; small cracks in masonry chimneys and masonry veneer.
• Moderate Structural Damage: Large plaster or gypsum-board cracks at corners of door and window openings; small diagonal cracks across shear wall panels exhibited by Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-51 3462 of 5188

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small cracks in stucco and gypsum wall panels; large cracks in brick chimneys; toppling of tall masonry chimneys.
• Extensive Structural Damage: Large diagonal cracks across shear wall panels or large cracks at plywood joints; permanent lateral movement of floors and roof; toppling of most brick chimneys; cracks in foundations; splitting of wood sill plates and/or slippage of structure over foundations; partial collapse of “room-over-garage” or other “soft-story” configurations; small foundations cracks.
• Complete Structural Damage: Structure may have large permanent lateral displacement, may collapse, or be in imminent danger of collapse due to cripple wall failure or failure of the lateral load resisting system; some structures may slip and fall off the foundations; large foundation cracks.

Incorporation of Historic Building Code Design Functions - Estimates of building damage are provided for “High”, “Moderate” and “Low” seismic design criteria. Buildings of newer construction (e.g., post-1973) are best designated by “High.” Buildings built after 1940, but before 1973, are best represented by “Moderate.” If built before about 1940 (i.e., before significant seismic codes were implemented), “Low” is most appropriate. A large percentage of buildings in the City of Glendale fall in the “Moderate” and “High” seismic design criteria.

Fires Following Earthquakes - Fires following earthquakes can cause severe losses. In some instances, these losses can outweigh the losses from direct damage, such as collapse of buildings and disruption of lifelines. Many factors affect the severity of the fires following an earthquake, including but not limited to: ignition sources, types and density of fuel, weather conditions, functionality of water systems, and the ability of fire fighters to suppress the fires.

A complete fire-following-earthquake model requires extensive input about the readiness of local fire departments and the types and availability (functionality) of water systems. The fire following earthquake model presented here is simplified. With better understanding of fires that will be garnered after future earthquakes, forecasting capability will undoubtedly improve. For additional information regarding this topic, refer to Section 4.6.

Debris Generation - HAZUS estimates two types of debris. The first is debris that falls in large pieces, such as steel members or reinforced concrete elements. These require special treatment to break into smaller pieces before they are hauled away. The second type of debris is smaller and more easily moved with bulldozers and other machinery and tools. This type includes brick, wood, glass, building contents and other materials.

Estimating Casualties - Casualties are estimated based on the assumption that there is a strong correlation between building damage (both structural and non-structural) and the number and severity of casualties. In smaller earthquakes, non-structural damage will most likely control the casualty estimates. In severe earthquakes where there will be a large number of collapses and partial collapses, there will be a proportionately larger number of fatalities. Data regarding earthquake-related injuries are not of the best quality, nor are they available for all building types. Available data often have insufficient information about the type of structure in which the casualties occurred and the casualty-generating mechanism.

HAZUS casualty estimates are based on the injury classification scale described in Table 1-3.

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Table 1-3: Injury Classification Scale
Injury Severity
Level Injury Description
Severity 1 Injuries requiring basic medical aid without requiring hospitalization.

Severity 2 Injuries requiring a greater degree of medical care and hospitalization, but not expected to progress to a life-threatening status.

Severity 3 Injuries which pose an immediate life-threatening condition if not treated adequately and expeditiously. The majority of these injuries are the result of structural collapse and subsequent entrapment or impairment of the occupants.

Severity 4 Instantaneously killed or mortally injured.

In addition, HAZUS produces casualty estimates for three times of day:
• Earthquake striking at 2:00 a.m. (population at home) • Earthquake striking at 2:00 p.m. (population at work/school) • Earthquake striking at 5:00 p.m. (commute time).

Displaced Households/Shelter Requirements - Earthquakes can cause loss of function or habitability of buildings that contain housing. Displaced households may need alternative short-term shelter, provided by family, friends, temporary rentals, or public shelters established by the City, County or by relief organizations such as the Red Cross or Salvation Army. Long-term alternative housing may require import of mobile homes, occupancy of vacant units, net emigration from the impacted area, or, eventually, the repair or reconstruction of new public and private housing. The number of people seeking short-term public shelter is of most concern to emergency response organizations. The longer-term impacts on the housing stock are of great concern to local governments, such as cities and counties.

Economic Losses - HAZUS estimates structural and nonstructural repair costs caused by building damage and the associated loss of building contents and business inventory.

Building damage can cause additional losses by restricting the building's ability to function properly. Thus, business interruption and rental income losses are estimated. HAZUS divides building losses into two categories: (1) direct building losses and (2) business interruption losses. Direct building losses are the estimated costs to repair or replace the damage caused to the building and its contents. Business interruption losses are associated with inability to operate a business because of the damage sustained during the earthquake. Business interruption losses also include the temporary living expenses for those people displaced from their homes because of the earthquake.

Earthquakes may produce indirect economic losses in sectors that do not sustain direct damage. All businesses are forward-linked (if they rely on regional customers to purchase their output) or backward-linked (if they rely on regional suppliers to provide their inputs) and are thus potentially vulnerable to interruptions in their operation. Note that indirect losses are not confined to immediate customers or suppliers of damaged enterprises. All of the successive rounds of customers of customers and suppliers of suppliers are affected. In this Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-53 3464 of 5188

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way, even limited physical earthquake damage causes a chain reaction, or ripple effect, that is transmitted throughout the regional economy.

1.9.2 HAZUS Scenario Earthquakes for the Glendale Area
Five specific scenario earthquakes were modeled using the HAZUS loss estimation software available from FEMA: earthquakes on the San Andreas, Sierra Madre, Verdugo, Raymond and Hollywood faults (see Table 1-4).

Table 1-4: HAZUS Scenario Earthquakes for the City of Glendale Fault Source Magnitude Description
San Andreas -
Mojave Segment 7.1
A large earthquake that ruptures the Mojave segment of the San Andreas fault is modeled because of its high probability of occurrence, even though the epicenter would not be too close to the City.

Likely worst-case scenario for the Glendale area. The 7.2 magnitude Sierra Madre 7.2 earthquake modeled is at the lower range of the size of earthquakes that researchers now believe this fault is capable of generating.

Possible worst-case scenario for Glendale. Although this earthquake is not as large as the one estimated on the Sierra Madre fault, this Verdugo 6.7 fault extends through an extensively developed area, and therefore has the potential to cause significant damage to buildings and infrastructure.

Maximum magnitude earthquake on the Raymond fault. This fault Raymond 6.5 near the southern portion of the City could cause significant damage in the southern and eastern portions of Glendale, and in the San Rafael Hills.

Maximum magnitude earthquake on the Hollywood fault would cause extensive damage in Hollywood, West Hollywood, and in the Hollywood 6.4 southwestern portion of Glendale. This fault could break together with the Santa Monica faults, generating a stronger, more damaging earthquake than the one presented herein.

Four of the five earthquake scenarios modeled for this study are discussed in the following sections. An earthquake on the San Andreas fault is discussed because it has the highest probability of occurring in the not too distant future, even though the loses expected from this earthquake are not the worst possible for Glendale. An earthquake on the San Andreas fault has traditionally been considered the “Big One,” the implication being that an earthquake on this fault would be devastating to southern California. However, there are several other seismic sources that, given their location closer to the Los Angeles metropolitan area, have the potential to be more devastating to the region, even if the causative earthquake is smaller in magnitude than an earthquake on the San Andreas fault. The 7.1 magnitude San Andreas earthquake modeled for this study would result from the rupture of the Mojave segment of the fault. This segment is thought to have more than a 40 percent probability of rupturing in the next 30 years. A larger-magnitude earthquake on the San Andreas fault would occur if more than one segment of the fault ruptures at the same time. If all three southern segments of the San Andreas fault break together, an earthquake of at least magnitude 7.8 would result.

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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
The Sierra Madre and Verdugo scenarios are also presented here because both of these faults have the potential to cause significant damage in the City. As discussed in Section 1.5.5, the Sierra Madre fault appears to have last ruptured more than 8,000 years ago, and may be near the end of its strain accumulation cycle. Given that recent studies suggest that the Sierra Madre fault can generate earthquakes of magnitude 7.2 to 7.5 (instead of the 7.0 used by the California Geological Survey), a lower-bound 7.2 magnitude earthquake was chosen for the scenario and loss estimation analysis. The earthquake history and recurrence interval of the Verdugo fault are unknown, and as a result, the probability of future earthquakes on this fault cannot be quantified with any degree of certainty. What it is certain is that if, and when this fault breaks, the City of Glendale will be impacted. HAZUS helps to quantify the damage expected.

The Raymond and Hollywood faults would both cause about the same amount of damage in Glendale. The Raymond fault appears to break more often than the Hollywood fault, and as a result, one could argue that it has a higher probability of rupturing again in the future.

However, since the Hollywood fault appears to have last ruptured several thousand years ago, it may actually be closer to rupture. Since both faults are located immediately south of Glendale, the damage patterns can be expected to be very similar (directivity of fault breakage can have a substantial impact on the damage potential, but the damage analyses conducted for this study are not designed to be sensitive to this issue).

1.9.3 Inventory Data Used in the HAZUS Loss Estimation Models for Glendale As mentioned previously, the population data used for the Glendale analyses were modified using the recently available 2000 Census data. The general building stock and population inventory data conform to census tract boundaries, and the census tract boundaries generally conform to the City limits, with minor exceptions. The region studied is 30 square miles in area and contains 28 census tracts. There are over 68,000 households (1990 Census Bureau data – the 2000 Census lists 74,000 households) in the region, with a total population of 194,000 (based on 2000 Census Bureau data). There are an estimated 33,000 buildings in the region with a total building replacement value (excluding contents) of $9.85 billion (1994 dollars). Approximately 96 percent of the buildings (and 76 percent of the building value) are associated with residential housing (see Figure 1-5). In terms of building construction types found in the region, wood-frame construction makes up 94 percent of the building inventory.

The remaining percentage is distributed between the other general building types. The replacement value of the transportation and utility lifeline systems in the City of Glendale is estimated to be nearly $3.26 billion and $245 million (1994 dollars), respectively.

The HAZUS inventory of unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings includes more URMs than those now present in the City, since many URMs have been demolished since 1994.

Therefore, the URM numbers in the HAZUS output are somewhat overstated. However, far more URMs in Glendale have been retrofitted than demolished, and the database used for the HAZUS analyses accounts for this: the seismic design criteria for most URMs in the City were upgraded from low to moderate to reflect the retrofitting efforts that have been accomplished in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is important to note, however, that retrofitting is typically designed to keep buildings from collapsing, but that structural damage to the building is still possible and expected.

Changes were made to the HAZUS hospital inventory for Glendale, specifically, to the number of beds available. In all cases, the number of beds at all hospitals has increased since Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-55 3466 of 5188

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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
1990, based on recent bed counts published by each of the three main hospitals in the City:

Glendale Adventist Medical Center has 450 beds, Glendale Memorial Hospital and Health Center has 334 beds, and Verdugo Hills Hospital has 158 beds, for a total hospital capacity of 942 beds. At least one of these hospitals (Glendale Memorial) is currently enlarging its facilities to serve an even larger number of patients. The new hospital wing is being built to the seismic standards of the Office of the State Architect in accordance with State law.

Figure 1-5
Building Inventory, by Occupancy Type, in the Glendale Area (values shown are in millions of dollars)
Residential
7,478,968
Others
183,915
Industrial
357,454
Commercial
1,827,638
Residential 75.9%
Commercial 18.6%
Industrial 3.6%
Others 1.9%
Regarding critical facilities, the HAZUS database for Glendale includes 70 schools or school facilities, including school district offices, private schools, and community colleges. The City’s emergency operations center in the basement of City Hall is also included. The database was modified to include the two police stations and nine fire stations that serve the City. The locations of these facilities are shown on Plate 1-4.

1.9.4 Estimated Losses Associated with the Earthquake Scenarios HAZUS loss estimations for the City of Glendale based on four of the earthquake scenarios modeled are presented concurrently below. For the complete master reports for these scenarios, refer to Appendix C. These scenarios include earthquakes on the San Andreas, Sierra Madre, Verdugo and Raymond faults. Of the five earthquake scenarios modeled for the City, the results indicate that the San Andreas fault earthquake will pose the least damage to the Glendale, although this fault may have the highest probability of rupturing in the nearfuture.

The Sierra Madre and Verdugo earthquake scenarios are the worst-case scenarios for the City. The losses are similar, but the damaged areas will be different, as the faults transect different sections of the City. Since the Sierra Madre fault is a reverse fault, it has the potential to generate stronger ground accelerations than the predominantly left-lateral strike Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-56 3467 of 5188
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
slip Verdugo fault (reverse faults typically generate stronger ground accelerations, distributed over a broader geographic area than strike-slip faults). However, the stronger seismic shaking will be experienced north of the fault, in the sparsely populated San Gabriel Mountains.

Landsliding and rock collapse can be expected to result in road closures in the mountains, and some damage to the dams north of the area can be anticipated. The areas adjacent to and immediately south of the Sierra Madre fault will also experience damage.

The losses anticipated as a result of either the Raymond or Hollywood fault causing an earthquake are also similar. These events would pose the next worst-case scenario for Glendale. Directivity of the seismic waves, as discussed earlier in this chapter, will determine, at least to some extent, where and how much damage will be experienced in the area as a result of earthquakes on either the Hollywood or Raymond faults. However, seismologists still do not have the tools to predict where, when, and how a fault will break, and HAZUS does not consider these issues in the loss estimation analysis.

Building Damage - HAZUS estimates that between approximately 350 and 5,000 buildings will be at least moderately damaged in response to the earthquake scenarios presented herein, with the lower number representative of damage as a result of an earthquake on the San Andreas fault, and the higher number representing damage as a result of an earthquake on either the Verdugo or Sierra Madre fault. These figures represent about 1 to 15 percent of the total number of buildings in the study area. An estimated 0 to 55 buildings will be completely destroyed. Table 1-5 summarizes the expected damage to buildings by general occupancy type, while Table 1-6 summarizes the expected damage to buildings in Glendale, classified by construction type.

The data presented in Tables 1-5 and 1-6 show that most of the buildings damaged will be residential, with wood-frame structures experiencing mostly slight to moderate damage. The Verdugo and Sierra Madre fault earthquake scenarios both have the potential to cause at least slight damage to more than 50 percent of the residential structures in Glendale, and moderate to complete damage to as much as 16 percent of the residential stock. The distribution and severity of the damage caused by these earthquakes to the residential buildings in the City is illustrated in Plate 1-5. As mentioned before, an earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault would cause more damage in the northern section of the City than an earthquake on either the Verdugo or Raymond faults. The Raymond (and Hollywood) faults have the potential to cause significant damage to the residential stock of Glendale, but the damage would not be as severe as that caused by either the Sierra Madre or Verdugo faults. The San Andreas fault scenario is anticipated to cause slight to moderate damage to about 10 percent of the residential buildings in the City.

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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Table 1-5: Number of Buildings Damaged, by Occupancy Type Scenario Occupancy Type Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total San Andreas Residential 2,859 308 0 0 3,167
Commercial 86 25 0 0 111
Industrial 23 10 1 0 34
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0
Religion 3 0 0 0 3
Government 0 0 0 0 0
Education 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2,971 343 1 0 3,315
Sierra Madre
Residential 11,362 4,166 387 51 15,966
Commercial 276 257 68 2 603
Industrial 65 71 24 2 162
Agriculture 2 2 0 0 4
Religion 18 14 2 0 34
Government 1 0 0 0 1
Education 5 2 0 0 7
Total 11,729 4,512 481 55 16,777
Verdugo
Residential 11,656 4,153 330 20 16,159
Commercial 285 272 82 5 644
Industrial 66 73 24 2 165
Agriculture 2 1 0 0 3
Religion 18 15 2 0 35
Government 1 0 0 0 1
Education 5 1 0 0 6
Total 12,033 4,515 438 27 17,013
Raymond
Residential 10,026 2,949 186 4 13,165
Commercial 271 224 50 0 545
Industrial 62 60 16 2 140
Agriculture 2 0 0 0 2
Religion 17 11 1 0 29
Government 1 0 0 0 1
Education 4 1 0 0 5
Total 10,383 3,245 253 6 13,887
Although the numbers presented in Table 1-5 only hint at it, the commercial and industrial structures will also be impacted. The Sierra Madre and Verdugo earthquakes have the potential to damage about 10 percent and 14 percent of the commercial and industrial buildings, respectively, in the City. The distribution and severity of damage to the commercial structures in the City as a result of earthquakes on the Verdugo, Sierra Madre and Raymond faults is illustrated in Plate 1-6. All three earthquakes shown on Plate 1-6 are anticipated to cause damage in the commercial district of the City, but an earthquake on the Verdugo fault would be the most severe, given the fault’s location through the heart of Glendale.

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10.2 Magnitude 6.7 Earthquake on Verdugo Fault Magnitude 7.2 Earthquake on Sierra Madre Fault Magnitude 6.5 Earthquake on Raymond (Hill) Fault EXPLANATION Sources: Federal Emergency Management Agency, HAZUS 99-SR2 Number of Buildings Damaged by Census Tract
(labeled with percentage of damaged buildings in census tract) □ 201-300 - 0-100 - 401 and greater
□ *more than 50% of the residential structure has undergone moderate, - 101-200 301-400 extensive and/or complete damage - - Earth
nsultants
lemational
Project Number: 2103
Date: July, 2003
Residential Buildings With At Least Moderate Damage> SO%* (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios)
Glendale, California
Plate
1-5
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Table 1-6: Number of Buildings Damaged, by Construction Type Scenario Structure Type Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total San Andreas Concrete 26 2 0 0 28
Mobile Homes 10 5 0 0 15
Precast Concrete 18 7 0 0 25
Reinforced Masonry 40 19 0 0 59
Steel 23 8 0 0 31
URM 23 5 0 0 28
Wood 2,831 290 0 0 3,121
Total 2,971 336 0 0 3,307
Sierra Madre
Concrete 103 103 25 0 231
Mobile Homes 8 25 12 2 47
Precast Concrete 59 83 22 2 166
Reinforced Masonry 149 167 57 0 373
Steel 73 106 34 0 213
URM 39 50 11 1 101
Wood 11,298 3,978 315 44 15,635
Total 11,729 4,512 476 49 16,766
Verdugo
Concrete 106 111 31 1 249
Mobile Homes 11 23 11 0 45
Precast Concrete 60 91 29 2 182
Reinforced Masonry 157 185 67 0 409
Steel 74 106 38 0 218
URM 39 55 12 1 107
Wood 11,586 3,944 250 10 15,790
Total 12,033 4,515 438 14 17,000
Raymond
Concrete 103 94 21 0 218
Mobile Homes 12 20 4 0 36
Precast Concrete 60 72 20 0 152
Reinforced Masonry 142 142 45 0 329
Steel 74 89 24 0 187
URM 43 43 7 0 93
Wood 9,949 2,785 126 0 12,860
Total 10,383 3,245 247 0 13,875
The HAZUS output shows that URMs in Glendale will suffer slight to extensive damage, but that very few are likely to be completely destroyed. This is anticipated to reduce the number of casualties significantly. The numbers show that by retrofitting its URMs, Glendale has already reduced significantly its vulnerability to seismic shaking.

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Magnitude 6.7 Earthquake on Verdugo Fault Magnitude 7.2 Earthquake on Sierra Madre Fault Magnitude 6.5 Earthquake on Raymond (Hill) Fault

EXPLANATION
Number of Buildings Damaged by Census Tract
(labeled with percentage of damaged buildings in census tract) - 0-1 0 D 21-30 - 41 and greater
- 11-20 D 31-40
Base Map: USGS Topographic Map from Sure!MAPS RASTER
Sources: Federal Emergency Management Agency, HAZUS 99-SR2 *more than 50% of the residential structure has undergone moderate, extensive and/or complete damage
Project Number: 2103
Date: July, 2003
Earth Commercial Buildings With At Least Moderate Damage > SO% onsultants Plate (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios) temalional Glendale, California
1-6
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Significantly, reinforced masonry, concrete and steel structures are not expected to perform well, with hundreds of these buildings in Glendale experiencing at least moderate damage during an earthquake on the Sierra Madre or Verdugo faults. These types of structures are commonly used for commercial and industrial purposes, and failure of some of these structures explains the casualties anticipated during the middle of the day in the nonresidential sector (see Table 1-7). These types of buildings also generate heavy debris that is difficult to cut through to extricate victims.

Casualties - Table 1-7 provides a summary of the casualties estimated for these scenarios.

The analysis indicates that the worst time for an earthquake to occur in the City of Glendale is during maximum non-residential occupancy (at 2 o’clock in the afternoon, when most people are in their place of business and schools are in session). The Verdugo fault earthquake scenario is anticipated to cause the largest number of casualties, followed closely by an event on the Sierra Madre fault.

Essential Facility Damage - The loss estimation model calculates the total number of hospital beds in Glendale that will be available after each earthquake scenario.

A maximum magnitude earthquake on the Verdugo fault is expected to impact the local hospitals such that only 38 percent of the hospital beds (358 beds) would be available for use by existing patients and injured persons on the day of the earthquake. One week after the earthquake, about 57 percent of the beds are expected to be back in service. After one month, 82 percent of the beds are expected to be operational.

Similarly, on the day of the Sierra Madre earthquake, the model estimates that only 378 hospital beds (40 percent) will be available for use by patients already in the hospital and those injured by the earthquake. After one week, 59 percent of the beds will be back in service. After thirty days, 83 percent of the beds will be available for use.

An earthquake on the Raymond fault is only expected to be slightly better regarding the availability of hospital beds. The model estimates that only 391 hospital beds (42 percent) will be available on the day of the earthquake. After one week, 60 percent of the hospital beds are expected to be available for use, and after one month, 84 percent of the beds are expected to be operational.

An earthquake on the San Andreas fault is not expected to cause significant damage to the hospitals in Glendale: On the day of the earthquake, the model estimates that 86 percent of the beds will be available for use; after one week, 93 percent of the beds will be available for use; and after 30 days, 98 percent of the beds will be operational.

Given that the models estimate a maximum of about 100 people in the Glendale area will require hospitalization after an earthquake on either the Verdugo or Sierra Madre faults (see Table 1-7), the hospitals in the City, even with the reduced number of beds that the model projects will be available, are anticipated to handle the local demand. However, nearby cities, such as Pasadena, which have limited medical care resources available, are anticipated to have a higher number of casualties. Glendale’s hospitals will most likely provide a regional service to other nearby communities, taking in patients that other hospitals outside the City cannot handle because of damage to their own facilities, or due to excess demand for medical care.

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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Table 1-7: Estimated Casualties
Type and Time of Scenario
Level 1:

Medical
treatment
without
hospitalization
Level 2:

Hospitalization
but not life
threatening
Level 3:

Hospitalization
and life
threatening
Level 4:

Fatalities due to
scenario event
San Andreas
2AM Residential
(maximum Non-Residential
residential Commute
occupancy) Total
15 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
16 1 0 0
2PM Residential
(max educational, Non-Residential
industrial, and Commute
commercial) Total
4 1 0 0
24 2 0 0
0 0 0 0
28 3 0 0
5PM (peak Residential
Non-Residential commute time) Commute
Total
4 0 0 0
9 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
13 1 0 0
Sierra Madre (M7.2)
2AM Residential
(maximum Non-Residential
residential Commute
occupancy) Total
165 24 2 4
9 2 0 1
0 0 0 0
175 26 2 4
2PM Residential
(max educational, Non-Residential
industrial, and Commute
commercial) Total
43 6 1 1
337 71 9 19
0 0 0 0
380 78 10 20
Residential
5PM (peak Non-Residential
commute time) Commute
Total
51 7 1 1
122 26 3 7
0 1 1 0
173 34 5 8
Verdugo
2AM Residential
(maximum Non-Residential
residential Commute
occupancy) Total
179 27 2 5
11 2 1 1
0 0 0 0
189 29 3 6
2PM Residential
(max educational, Non-Residential
industrial, and Commute
commercial) Total
47 7 1 1
378 82 11 22
0 0 0 0
425 89 12 23
Residential
5PM (peak Non-Residential
commute time) Commute
Total
56 8 1 2
140 31 4 8
1 1 1 0
197 40 6 10
Raymond
2AM Residential
(maximum Non-Residential
residential Commute
occupancy) Total
131 17 2 3
7 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
138 18 2 3
2PM Residential
(max educational, Non-Residential
industrial, and Commute
commercial) Total
35 5 0 1
244 47 6 11
0 0 0 0
279 52 6 12
Residential
5PM (peak Non-Residential
commute time) Commute
Total
42 5 0 1
90 17 2 4
0 0 1 0
132 23 3 5
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
HAZUS also estimates the damage to other critical facilities in the City, including schools, fire and police stations, and the emergency operations center. According to the model, an earthquake on the Mojave segment of the San Andreas fault is not going to damage any of the schools, fire or police stations, or the City’s emergency operations center. All of these facilities would be fully functional the day after the earthquake.

An earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault is anticipated to cause at least moderate damage to seven schools in the City, and none of the schools and school district offices in Glendale are expected to be more than 50 percent operational the day after the earthquake. Most of the schools with more than 50 percent moderate damage are located in the northern portion of the City, as illustrated in Plate 1-7. The model also indicates that although none of the other critical facilities will experience more than slight damage, none of them would be more than fully operational the day after the earthquake.

An earthquake on the Verdugo fault is anticipated to cause at least moderate damage to one school in the City – Glendale High (see Plate 1-7), which according to the HAZUS inventory, also houses the Glendale Cosmetology School. The model indicates that none of the other critical facilities in the City will experience more than slight damage, but with the exception of one hospital, none of the critical facilities (including fire stations and the emergency operations center) will be more than 50 percent functional the day after the earthquake.

An earthquake on the Raymond fault is expected to also damage Glendale High. Damage to the other critical facilities in the City is expected to be less severe than that caused by earthquakes on either the Sierra Madre or Verdugo faults, but few facilities are expected to be more than 50 percent operational the day after the earthquake.

Economic Losses - The model estimates that total building-related losses in the City of Glendale will range from $83 million for an earthquake on the San Andreas fault, to $853 million for an earthquake on the Verdugo fault. Approximately 20 percent of these estimated losses would be related to business interruption in the city. By far, the largest loss would be sustained by the residential occupancies that make up as much as 60 percent of the total loss.

Table 1-8 below provides a summary of the estimated economic losses anticipated as a result of each of the earthquake scenarios considered herein.

Table 1-8: Estimated Economic Losses
Scenario Property Damage
Business
Interruption Total
San Andreas $69.8 Million $13.5 Million $83.3 Million
Sierra Madre $639.7 Million $158.2 Million $797.8 Million Verdugo $680.4 Million $72.7 Million $853.0 Million
Raymond $560.1 Million $127.6 Million $687.7 Million
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Magnitude 6.7 Earthquake on Verdugo Fault Magnitude 7.2 Earthquake on Sierra Madre Fault Magnitude 6.5 Earthquake on Raymond (Hill) Fault Sources: Federal Emergency Management Agency, HAZUS 99-SR2

EXPLANATION
Location of school with at least • moderate damage *more than 50% of the school structures have undergone moderate, extensive and/or complete damage
- Earth
onsultants
ternational
Project Number: 2103
Date: July, 2003
Schools With At Least Moderate Damage > 50%*
(Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios)
Glendale, California
Plate
1-7
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Shelter Requirement - HAZUS estimates that approximately 1,300 households in Glendale may be displaced due to the Verdugo earthquake modeled for this study (a household contains four people, on average). About 980 people will seek temporary shelter in public shelters. The rest of the displaced individuals are anticipated to seek shelter with family or friends. An earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault is anticipated to displace nearly 1,200 households, with approximately 900 people seeking temporary shelter. An earthquake on the San Andreas fault is not expected to displace any households.

Table 1-9: Estimated Shelter Requirements
Scenario
Displaced
Households
People Needing
Short-Term Shelter
San Andreas - Mojave Segment 0 0
Sierra Madre 1,179 886
Verdugo 1,303 980
Raymond 945 738
Transportation Damage – Damage to transportation systems in the City of Glendale is based on a generalized inventory of the region as described in Table 1-10. Road segments are assumed to be damaged by ground failure only; therefore, the numbers presented herein may be low given that, based on damage observed from the Northridge and San Fernando earthquakes, strong ground shaking can cause considerable damage to bridges. Economic losses due to bridge damage are estimated at between $0.8 million (for an earthquake on the San Andreas fault) to $24.4 million for an earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault.

The San Andreas fault earthquake scenario estimates that only 1 of the 143 bridges in the study area will experience at least moderate damage, but this bridge is expected to be more than 50 percent functional by the next day. The San Andreas earthquake scenario indicates that the Burbank airport will experience some economic losses, but that its functionality will not be impaired.

Alternatively, an earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault is expected to damage about 27 bridges in the Glendale area, with 5 of them considered to be completely damaged.

Temporary repairs are expected to make all but 2 of the bridge locations more than 50 percent functional one day after the earthquake. Seven days after the earthquake, all bridge locations would be more than 50 percent functional. The Burbank airport is expected to incur losses of about $1.8 million, but the airport will be functional. The Sierra Madre fault earthquake scenario is the worst-case for the transportation system in the City. The damage to bridges as a result of earthquakes on the Sierra Madre, Verdugo and Raymond faults is illustrated in Plate 1-8.

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Magnitude 6.7 Earthquake on Verdugo Fault Magnitude 7.2 Earthquake on Sierra Madre Fault Magnitude 6.5 Earthquake on Raymond (Hill) Fault

EXPLANATION
Sources: Federal Emergency Management Agency, HAZUS 99-SR2 •
•
Bridge Damage
At least Moderate Damage
Complete Damage
Project Number: 2103
Date: July, 2003
Earth Bridge Damage Plate onsultants (Based on Three Earthquake Scenarios) temational Glendale, California
1-8
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
A maximum magnitude earthquake on the Verdugo fault is modeled to damage about 25 bridges in the City, with 4 of them considered completely damaged. However, as before, all but 2 of the bridge locations are expected to be functional by the next day. The Raymond and Hollywood fault earthquake scenarios model some damage to the Glendale transportation system, but less than that caused by either the Sierra Madre or Verdugo earthquakes discussed above.

Table 1-10: Expected Damage to Transportation Systems
Scenario System Segments in
Inventory
Replacement
Value for All
Segments in
Inventory
With At
Least
Moderate
Damage
With
Complete
Damage
Economic
Loss ($M)
>50 percent
Functional
after 1 Day
San Andreas
Highway
Major
Roads 5 $2.8 Billion 0 0 0 5
Bridges 143 $419 Million 1 0 0.8 143
Railways Tracks 2 $19 Million 0 0 0 2
Airport Facilities 4 $8 Million 0 0 0.3 4
Sierra Madre
Highway
Major
Roads 5 $2.8 Billion 0 0 0 5
Bridges 143 $419 Million 27 5 24.4 143
Railways Tracks 2 $19 Million 0 0 0 2
Airport Facilities 4 $8 Million 2 0 1.8 4
Verdugo
Highway
Major
Roads 5 $2.8 Billion 0 0 0 5
Bridges 143 $419 Million 25 4 23.3 141
Railways Tracks 2 $19 Million 0 0 0 2
Airport Facilities 4 $8 Million 1 0 1.7 4
Raymond
Highway
Major
Roads 5 $2.8 Billion 0 0 0 5
Bridges 143 $419 Million 13 2 12.1 143
Railways Tracks 2 $19 Million 0 0 0 2
Airport Facilities 4 $8 Million 1 0 1.6 4
Utility Systems Damage - The HAZUS inventory for the Glendale area does not include specifics regarding the various lifeline systems in the City, therefore, the model estimated damage to the potable water and electric power using empirical relationships based on the number of households served in the area. The results of the analyses regarding the functionality of the potable water and electric power systems in the City for the four main earthquakes discussed herein are presented in Table 1-11. According to the models, all of the earthquake scenarios will impact the electric power systems; thousands of households in the City are expected to not have electric power even three days after an earthquake on any of the faults discussed in this report. An earthquake on either the Sierra Madre or Verdugo fault is anticipated to leave as many as 9,000 households without electricity for more than one week.

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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
The potable water system is anticipated to do better, but nearly 8,000 households are expected to be without water for at least 3 days after the earthquake. These results suggest that the City will have to truck in water into some of the residential neighborhoods in the northern portion of the City until the damages to the system are repaired. Residents are advised to have drinking water stored in their earthquake emergency kits, enough to last all members of the household (including pets) for at least 3 days.

Table 1-11: Expected Performance of Potable Water and Electricity Services Scenario Utility
Number of Households without Service*
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
San Andreas Potable Water 0 0 0 0 0
Electricity 10,215 1,440 69 0 0
Sierra Madre Potable Water 16,145 7,933 0 0 0
Electricity 45,389 26,431 9,695 376 0
Verdugo Potable Water 11,060 4,189 0 0 0
Electricity 45,250 26,154 9,449 332 0
Raymond Potable Water 4,334 52 0 0 0
Electricity 43,850 24,845 8,868 322 0
*Based on Total Number of Households = 68,186.

Fire Following Earthquake - HAZUS uses a Monte Carlo simulation model to estimate the number of ignitions and the amount of burnt area as a result of an earthquake. For the earthquake scenarios ran for Glendale, HAZUS estimates between 3 and 11 ignitions immediately following an earthquake, with the San Andreas fault earthquake scenario triggering 3 ignitions, and the Verdugo and Sierra Madre faults triggering 11 ignitions each.

The Raymond and Hollywood faults are both expected to trigger 10 ignitions in the City. The burnt area resulting from these ignitions will vary depending on wind conditions. Normal wind conditions of about 10 miles per hour (mph) are expected to result in burn areas of between 1.9 and 6.7 percent of the region’s total area. If Santa Ana wind conditions are present at the time of the earthquake, the burnt areas can be expected to be significantly larger.

The fires triggered by an earthquake on the San Andreas fault are anticipated to displace as few as 30 people (if the winds are low), and as many as 308 people (if 30 mph winds are blowing through the area at the time). The fires triggered by the other earthquake scenarios are expected to impact between 116 and 354 people (if winds are low), and as many as 2,047 to 2,919 people (if 30 mph winds are present). Additional information regarding fires after earthquakes and the resultant losses estimated for the City of Glendale are provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.6.

Debris Generation - The model estimates that a total of 620 – 1,710 thousand tons of debris will be generated. Of the total amount, brick and wood comprise 28 percent of the total, with the remainder consisting of reinforced concrete and steel. If the debris tonnage is converted to an estimated number of truckloads, it will require 25,000 – 69,000 truckloads (@25 tons/truck) to remove the debris generated by the earthquakes modeled.

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1.10 Reducing Earthquake Hazards in the City of Glendale This section identifies and discusses the opportunities available for seismic upgrading of existing development and capital facilities, including potentially hazardous buildings and other critical facilities. Many of the issues and opportunities available to the City apply to both new development and redevelopment and infilling. Issues involving rehabilitation and strengthening of existing development are decidedly more complex given the economic and societal impacts inherent to these issues.

Prioritizing rehabilitation and strengthening projects requires that the City consider where its resources would be better spent to reduce earthquake hazards in the existing development, and how the proposed mitigation programs can be implemented so as not to cause undue hardship on the community.

Rehabilitation programs should target, on a priority basis, potentially hazardous buildings, critical facilities, and high-risk lifeline utilities.

Recent earthquakes, with their relatively low loss of life, have demonstrated that the best mitigation technique in earthquake hazard reduction is the constant improvement of building codes with the incorporation of the lessons learned from past earthquakes. The most recent building codes (UBC 1997; CBC 1998, 2001) are a prime example in incorporation of lessons and further reduction of the earthquake hazard. However, while new building codes reduce the hazard, increases in population leading to building in vulnerable areas and the aging of the existing building stock work toward increasing the earthquake hazard of a given region.

1.10.1 1997 Uniform Building Code Impacts on the City of Glendale Two significant changes were incorporated into the 1997 Uniform Building Code (UBC – which is the basis for the 1998 and 2001 California Building Code) that impact the City of Glendale. The first change is a revision to soil types and amplification factors, and the second change is the incorporation of the proximity of earthquake sources in UBC seismic zone 4, which includes the City of Glendale. These changes represent the most significant increases in ground shaking criteria in the last 30 years. The new soil effects are based on observations made as a result of the Mexico City, Loma Prieta and other earthquakes, and impact all buildings in the City of Glendale. In addition, in the current code, soil effects impact buildings of short predominant period of ground shaking (low-rises), whereas in the past, only long-period structures (high-rises) were influenced by UBC requirements. The new ground-shaking basis for code design is now more complicated, however, because of the wide range of soil types and the close proximity of seismic sources. For the City of Glendale, these code changes are warranted. Due to the proximity of the Sierra Madre, Verdugo, Raymond and Hollywood fault systems, the entire area is impacted by the near-source design factors. The 1997 UBC contains detailed descriptions of the incorporation of these new parameters; only a summary is provided below.

Soil Types and Soil Amplification Factors: The seismic design response spectra are defined in terms of two site seismic coefficients Ca and Cv. These coefficients are determined as a function of the following parameters:
• Seismic Zone
• Soil Type, and
• Near Source Factors (UBC Zone 4 only)
The UBC outlines six soil types based on the average soil properties for the top 100 feet of the soil profile. Site-specific evaluation by the project’s geotechnical engineer is required to Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-70 3481 of 5188

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classify the soil profile underlying proposed projects. The soil type parameters are intended to be used by project engineers with Tables 16-S and 16-T of the 1997 UBC. A general description of the 1997 UBC soil types are outlined in Table 1-12, and the soil types in the City of Glendale are illustrated in Plate 1-9.

Table 1-12: UBC Soil Profile Types
Soil
Profile Type
Soil Profile
Name/
Generic
Description
Average Soil Properties for the Upper 100 Feet
Shear Wave
Velocity
(feet/second)
Standard
Penetration Test
(blows/foot)
Undrained Shear
Strength (psf)
SA Hard Rock >5,000
SB Rock 2,500 to 5,000
SC Very dense soil
and soft rock
1,200 to 2,500 >50 >2,000
SD Stiff soil profile 600 to 1,200 15 to 50 1,000 to 2,000 SE Soft soil profile <600 <15 <1,000
SF Soil requiring site-specific evaluation.

Near- Source Factors: The Glendale area is subject to near-source design factors given the proximity of several active fault systems. These parameters, new to the 1997 Uniform Building Code (UBC), address the proximity of potential earthquake sources (faults) to the site. These factors were present in earlier versions of the UBC for implementation into the design of seismically isolated structures, but are now included for all structures. The adoption into the 1997 code of all buildings in UBC zone 4 was a result of the observation of more intense ground shaking than expected near the fault ruptures at Northridge in 1994, and again one year later at Kobe, Japan. The 1997 UBC also includes a near-source factor that accounts for directivity of fault rupture. The direction of fault rupture was observed to play a significant role in distribution of ground shaking at Northridge and Kobe. For Northridge, much of the earthquake energy was released into the sparsely populated mountains north of the San Fernando Valley, while at Kobe, the rupture direction was aimed at the city and was a contributing factor in the extensive damage. However, the rupture direction of a given source cannot be predicted, and as a result, the UBC requires a general increase in estimating ground shaking of about 20 percent to account for directivity.

Seismic Source Type: Near source factors also include a classification of seismic sources based on slip rate and maximum magnitude potential. These parameters are used in the classification of three seismic source types (A, B and C) summarized on Table 1-13.

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Table 1-13: Seismic Source Type
Seismic
Source
Type
Seismic Source Description
Seismic Source Definition
Maximum Moment
Magnitude, M
Slip Rate,
SR
(mm/yr.)
A Faults that are capable of producing
large magnitude events and which
have a high rate of seismicity.

M > 7.0 and SR > 5
B All faults other than Types A and C.

C Faults which are not capable of
producing large magnitude
earthquakes and which have a
relatively low rate of seismic
activity.

M < 6.5 SR < 2
Type A faults are highly active and capable of producing large magnitude events. Most segments of the San Andreas fault are classified as Type A. The Type A slip rate (>5 mm/yr) is common only to tectonic plate boundary faults. Type C seismic sources are considered to be sufficiently inactive and not capable of producing large magnitude events such that potential ground shaking effects can be ignored. Type B sources include most of the active faults in California and include all faults that are neither Type A nor C. The 1997 UBC requires that the locations and characteristics of these faults be established based on reputable sources such as the California Geological Survey (CGS – previously known as the California Division of Mines and Geology - CDMG) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). The CGS classifies the Sierra Madre, Verdugo, Raymond, and Hollywood faults as Type B faults.

To establish near-source factors for any proposed project in the City of Glendale, the first step is to identify and locate the known active faults in the region. The International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO) has provided an Atlas of the location of known faults for California to accompany the 1997 UBC. The rules for measuring distance from a fault are provided by the 1997 UBC. The criteria for determining distance to vertical faults, such as the San Andreas, are relatively straightforward. However, the distance to thrust faults and blind thrust faults is assumed as 0 for anywhere above the dipping fault plane to a depth of 10 kilometers. This greatly increases the areal extent of high ground shaking parameters, but is warranted based on observations of ground shaking at Northridge.

Summary: Seismic codes have been undergoing their most significant changes in history.

These improvements are a result of experience in recent earthquakes, as well as extensive research under the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP). Inclusion of soil and near-field effects in the 1997 UBC represents a meaningful and impactive change put forth by the geoscience community. Seismic codes will continue to improve with new versions of the building code, and as new data are obtained from both past and future earthquakes.

1.10.2 Retrofit and Strengthening of Existing Structures The UBC is not retroactive, and past earthquakes have shown that many types of structures are potentially hazardous. Structures built before the lessons learned from the 1971 Sylmar earthquake are particularly susceptible to damage during an earthquake, including Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-73 3484 of 5188

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unreinforced masonry (URM) structures, pre-cast tilt-up concrete buildings, soft-story structures, unreinforced concrete buildings, as well as pre-1952 single-family structures.

Other potentially hazardous buildings include irregular-shaped structures and mobile homes.

Therefore, while the earthquake hazard mitigation improvements associated with the current building codes address new construction, the retrofit and strengthening of existing structures requires the adoption of ordinances. The City of Glendale has adopted an ordinance aimed at retrofitting unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs).

Other potentially hazardous buildings, such as pre-1971 concrete tilt-up structures, can be inventoried next. Potentially hazardous buildings can be identified and inventoried following the recommendations set forth in publications such as “Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards: Handbook and Supporting Documentation” and “A Handbook for Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings and Supporting Documentation”, both prepared by the Applied Technology Council in Redwood City, California, and supplied by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA publications 154 and 155, and 175 and 178, respectively). The Glendale Building Department has already inventoried the softstory buildings in the City, but this inventory needs to be kept current and in a digital file that can be improved and modified as necessary.

The building inventory phase of a seismic hazard mitigation program should accurately record the potentially hazardous buildings in an area. To do so, a GIS system is invaluable.

The data base should include information such as the location of the buildings, the date and type of construction, construction materials and type of structural framing system, structural conditions, number of floors, floor area, occupancy and relevant characteristics of the occupants (such as whether the building houses predominantly senior citizens, dependent care or handicapped residents, etc.), and information on structural elements or other characteristics of the building that may pose a threat to life.

Once buildings are identified as potentially hazardous, a second, more thorough analysis may be conducted. This step may be carried out by local officials, such as the City's building department, or building owners may be required to submit a review by a certified structural engineer that has conducted an assessment of the structural and non-structural elements and general condition of the building, and has reviewed the building's construction documents (if available). The nonstructural elements should include the architectural, electrical and mechanical systems of the structure. Cornices, parapets, chimneys and other overhanging projections should be addressed too, as these may pose a significant threat to passersby, and to individuals who, in fear, may step out of the building during an earthquake. State of repair of buildings should also be noted, including cracks, rot, corrosion, and lack of maintenance, as these conditions may decrease the seismic strength of a structure. Occupancy should be noted as this factor is very useful in prioritizing the buildings to be abated for seismic hazards.

For multi-story buildings, large occupancy structures, and critical facilities, the seismic analysis of the structure should include an evaluation of the site-specific seismic environment (e.g., response spectra, estimates of strong ground motion duration, etc.), and an assessment of the building's loads and anticipated deformation levels. The resulting data should be weighted against acceptable levels of damage and risk chosen by the City for that particular structure. Once these guidelines are established, mitigation techniques available (including demolition, strengthening and retrofitting, etc.) should be evaluated, weighted, and implemented.

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With the inventory and analysis phases complete, a retrofit program can be implemented.

Although retrofit buildings may still incur severe damage during an earthquake, the mitigation results in a substantial reduction of casualties by preventing collapse. The societal and economic implications of rehabilitating existing buildings are discussed in many publications, including “Establishing Programs and Priorities for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings - A Handbook and Supporting Report”, “Typical Costs for Seismic Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings: Summary and Supporting Documentation,” (FEMA Publications 174 and 173, and 156 and 157, respectively). Another appropriate source is the publication prepared by Building Technology, Inc. entitled “Financial Incentives for Seismic Rehabilitation of Hazardous Buildings - An Agenda for Action (Report and Appendices).” The City of Glendale should set a list of priorities by which strengthening of the buildings identified as hazardous will be established and conducted. Currently, there are no Federal or State mandated criteria established to determine the required structural seismic resistance capacity of structures. Retrofitting to meet the most current UBC standards may be cost-prohibitive, and therefore, not feasible. The City may develop its own set of criteria, however, this task should be carried out following a comprehensive development and review process that involves experienced structural engineers, building officials, insurance representatives, and legal authorities. Selection of the criteria by which the structural seismic resistance capacity of structures will be measured may follow a review of the performance during an earthquake of similar types of buildings that had been retrofit prior to the seismic event. Upgrading potentially hazardous buildings to, for example, 1973 standards may prove inefficient if past examples show that similar buildings retrofit to 1973 construction codes performed poorly during a particular earthquake, and had to be demolished anyway. Issues to be addressed include justification for strengthening a building to a performance level less than the current code requirements, the potential liabilities and limitations on liability, and the acceptable damage to the structure after strengthening (FEMA, 1985).

The mitigation program established by the City could be voluntary or mandatory. Voluntary programs to encourage mitigation of potentially hazardous buildings have been implemented with various degrees of success in California. Incentives that have been used to engender support among building owners include tax waivers, tax credits, and waivers from certain zoning restrictions. Other cities have required a review by a structural engineer when the building is undergoing substantial improvements.

1.11 Summary
Since it is not possible to prevent an earthquake from occurring, local governments, emergency relief organizations, and residents are advised to take action and develop and implement policies and programs aimed at reducing the effects of earthquakes. Individuals should also exercise prudent planning to provide for themselves and their families in the aftermath of an earthquake.

Earthquake Sources:
• The City of Glendale is located in an area where several active faults have been mapped. At least two active faults extend through portions of the City: the Sierra Madre fault along its northern limits, and the Verdugo fault through its central portion. The Raymond and Hollywood faults are generally mapped just south of the City’s boundaries, except for the easternmost portion of the Hollywood fault, which actually extends into the southern portion of the City. Given the location of these faults in and near the City, the 1997 Uniform Building Earth Consultants International Seismic Hazards Page 1-75 3486 of 5188

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Code requires that Glendale incorporate near-source factors into the design of new buildings.

In addition to the faults above, the Elysian Park, Santa Monica, Newport-Inglewood, San Gabriel, Oakridge and several other fault zones have the potential to generate earthquakes that would cause strong ground shaking in Glendale.
• Geologists, seismologists, engineers and urban planners typically use maximum magnitude and maximum probable earthquakes to evaluate the seismic hazard of a region, the assumption being that if we plan for the worst-case scenario, smaller earthquakes that are more likely to occur can be dealt with more effectively.
• A number of historic earthquakes have caused significant ground shaking in Glendale. The 1971 Sylmar and 1994 Northridge earthquakes caused significant damage in the City.

Design Earthquake Scenarios:
• Both the Sierra Madre and Verdugo faults have the potential to generate earthquakes that would be described as worst-case for the City of Glendale. The segment of the Sierra Madre fault that extends through the northern reaches of the City is thought capable of generating an earthquake of magnitude between 7.0 and 7.5. In this report, a magnitude 7.2 earthquake was modeled to obtain loss estimates for the City. A magnitude 7.5 earthquake would cause even higher losses than those presented here. Based on its known length, the Verdugo fault is thought capable of generating an earthquake as large as magnitude 6.7. This estimate of the size of the earthquake that the Verdugo fault is thought capable of generating has not been confirmed through field studies of the fault’s previous surface-rupturing events (paleoseismic studies).
• A maximum magnitude earthquake on the Mojave segment of the San Andreas was also considered as a likely earthquake scenario given that this fault is thought to have a relatively high probability of rupturing in the not too distant future. The loss estimation model indicates that the damage caused by an earthquake on the San Andreas fault to the City of Glendale is small compared to the other earthquakes modeled, but not insignificant. Damages of about $83 million were estimated for Glendale if the segment of the San Andreas fault closest to the City breaks in a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. If more than one segment of the fault breaks in the same earthquake, the size of it will be larger, and the damage in Glendale can be anticipated to be more severe.

Fault Rupture and Secondary Earthquake Effects:
• Several active and potentially active faults are known to extend into or across the City, including traces of the Sierra Madre fault, the Verdugo fault, the eastern extension of the Hollywood fault, and the western extension of the Eagle Rock and Sycamore Canyon faults. A fault hazard management zone has been defined around some of these faults – it is proposed that geological studies to evaluate the potential for surface fault rupture should be required in these zones prior to development or redevelopment. A portion of the Sierra Madre fault (the Rowley fault) is zoned under the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act, so geological evaluations to locate the fault are mandated by State law if developments or re-developments amounting to more than 50 percent of the original value of the structure are proposed within this zone. In early aerial photographs of the area, the Verdugo fault appears to have strong geomorphic expression along most of its trace, but unfortunately most of the fault zone is now covered with buildings and roads. This makes it difficult to locate and study the fault.

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cause extensive damage to the buildings and infrastructure built across the traces of the fault, the City should consider implementing a program designed to locate and characterize the fault.

Once this is done, structures located across the fault can be moved, strengthened, or demolished. Lots impacted by the fault can be purchased by the City and converted into open space or other suitable land use.
• Currently, shallow ground water levels (< 50 feet from the ground surface) are known to occur along that portion of the Verdugo Wash and its tributaries located north of the Verdugo fault, and in areas near the Los Angeles River. Shallow ground water perched on bedrock may be present seasonally in the canyons draining the south flank of the Verdugo Mountains, especially in the portions of the canyons north of the trace of the Verdugo fault. Seasonal fluctuations in groundwater levels, and the introduction of residential irrigation requires that site-specific investigations be completed to support these generalizations in areas mapped as potentially susceptible to liquefaction.
• Those portions of Glendale that may be susceptible to seismically induced settlement are generally the floodplains and larger drainages that are underlain by late Quaternary alluvial sediments (similar to the liquefaction-susceptible areas). Sites near the base of the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, at the valley margins, may be particularly vulnerable as a result of differential settlement at the bedrock-alluvial contact. • The northern and western portions of the Glendale area are most vulnerable to seismically induced slope failure, due to the steep terrain. Some areas in the San Rafael Hills are also susceptible to earthquake-induced slope instability.
• The California Geological Survey (CGS) has completed mapping in the Glendale area under the Seismic Hazards Mapping Act. Geological studies in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the CGS should be followed in those areas identified as having a liquefaction or slope-instability hazard.

Earthquake Vulnerability:
• Most of the loss of life and injuries that occur during an earthquake are related to the collapse of hazardous buildings and structures, or from non-structural components (contents) of those buildings.
• Inventory of potentially hazardous structures, such as concrete tilt-ups, pre 1971- reinforced masonry, and pre-1952 wood-frame buildings, is recommended. • Most damage in the City is expected to be to wood-frame residential structures, which amount to more than 95 percent of the building stock in the City. Two of the earthquake scenarios modeled for this study suggest that as much as 50 percent of the residential buildings in the City will experience at least some damage. However, the damage to residential structures, although costly, is not expected to cause a large number of casualties. • The loss estimation models indicate that some of the school buildings in the City are likely to be damaged during an earthquake. Glendale High School consistently received poor marks in the HAZUS analyses. Several schools in the northern portion of the City are expected to experience at least moderate damage as a result of an earthquake on the Sierra Madre fault.

Given that the Glendale Unified School District, rather than the City, is responsible for the safety of the school buildings discussed in this report, it is recommended that the City provide the School District with the results of these analyses for the District to use as appropriate.

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Given the HAZUS results, it would be prudent for the District to conduct a structural assessment of these schools, and prioritize their structural strengthening.

Earthquake Hazard Reduction:
• The best mitigation technique in earthquake hazard reduction is the constant improvement of building codes with the incorporation of the lessons learned from each past earthquake. This is especially true in areas not yet completely developed, but it is not the most practical option for cities like Glendale, where most of the land is already developed. Nevertheless, for new development, or re-development, where this involves more than 50 percent of the original cost of the structure, the adoption and implementation of the most current building code adopted by the City is warranted. The recent building codes incorporate two significant changes that impact the City of Glendale. The first change is a revision to soil types and amplification factors, and the second change is the incorporation of the proximity of earthquake sources in UBC seismic zone 4. However, since the City of Glendale is mostly developed, and building codes are generally not retroactive, the adoption of the most recent building code is not going to improve the existing building stock, unless actions are taken to retrofit the existing structures. Retrofitting existing structures to the most current building code is in most cases not practicable and cost-prohibitive. However, specific retrofitting actions, even if not to the latest code, that are known to improve the seismic performance of structures should be attempted.
• All of the Glendale area is subject to near-source design factors because the City is traversed by two active fault systems, and located near at least two other potentially significant seismic sources. These parameters, new to the 1997 Uniform Building Code (UBC) and the 1998 and 2001 California Building Codes (CBC), address the proximity and the potential of earthquake sources (faults) to the site.
• While the earthquake hazard mitigation improvements associated with the 1997 UBC address new construction, the retrofit and strengthening of existing structures requires the adoption of ordinances. The City of Glendale has adopted an ordinance aimed at retrofitting unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs). Similar ordinances can be adopted for the voluntary or mandatory strengthening of wood-frame residential buildings, pre-cast concrete buildings, and soft-story structures, among others. Although retrofitted buildings may still incur severe damage during an earthquake, their mitigation results in a substantial reduction of casualties by preventing collapse.
• Adoption of new building codes does not mitigate local secondary earthquake hazards such as liquefaction and ground failure. Therefore, these issues are best mitigated at the local level.

Avoiding areas susceptible to earthquake-induced liquefaction, settlement or slope instability is generally not feasible. The best alternative for the City is to require “special studies” within these zones for new construction, as well as for significant redevelopment, and require implementation of the subsequent engineering recommendations for mitigation.

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CHAPTER 2: GEOLOGIC HAZARDS

2.1 Physiographic Setting
The City of Glendale is located at the southeasternmost edge of the San Fernando Valley, in an area characterized by sharp contrasts in terrain. Distinct topographic features separate the City into four specific areas. From north to south these include 1) the steeply rising range front of the San Gabriel Mountains, 2) the gently south-dipping but elevated alluvial fan surface known as the La Cañada Valley at the base of the San Gabriel Mountains, 3) the lower but not less impressive bedrock highlands of the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, and 4) the even more gently southdipping alluvial surface (piedmont) at the base of the Verdugo Mountains. Farther south, just outside the City limits, is the northeastern end of the Santa Monica Mountains, which are locally referred to as the Hollywood Hills. The Los Angeles River hugs the north side of the Hollywood Hills as it flows easterly through the area; when it reaches the eastern end of the hills, the river veers south to flow through the “Narrows” and the City of Los Angeles on its way to the Pacific Ocean. The two heavily populated alluvial surfaces at the base of the Verdugo and San Gabriel Mountains are linked by the south-trending canyon carved by the Verdugo Wash that separates the Verdugo Mountains on the west from the San Rafael Hills on the east.

Elevations in the southern part of the City range from about 420 feet above mean sea level at the southernmost point to about 800 feet at the base of the Verdugo Mountains. Mount Verdugo reaches an elevation of 3,126 feet, while the top of Flint Peak in the San Rafael Hills sits at an elevation of 1,889 feet. In the San Gabriel Mountains, the highest point within the City is at an elevation of about 4,800 feet.

The steep southern flank of the San Gabriel Mountains is deeply incised by gorges and canyons that drain south into the La Cañada Valley, where they have been channelized, conveying their flows south to Verdugo Wash. The three canyons that are located mostly within City limits include Ward, Dunsmore, and Cooks. Several other streams draining the San Gabriel Mountains that are also channelized through the La Crescenta area and into the northern portion of Glendale; these include the Eagle Canyon, Pickens, Hills and Winery Canyon channels. Refer to Chapter 3 and Plate 3-1 for additional information and the location of these landforms. Nearly all the tributaries flowing northerly and easterly out of the Verdugo Mountains and westerly out of the San Rafael Hills also empty into Verdugo Wash. South of the mountains, Verdugo Wash turns to the west-southwest and joins the Los Angeles River near the junction of Highway 134 with the 5 Freeway (Interstate 5). Drainage from the southwestern slope of the Verdugo Mountains flows directly across the alluvial fan and into the Los Angeles River. As discussed further in Chapter 3, Verdugo Wash has been confined to a man-made channel through most of Glendale to reduce the potential for it to flood the City.

2.2 Geologic Setting
The physical features described above reflect geologic and climatic processes that have effected this region in the last few million years. The most striking geologic features of the Glendale area are the Verdugo and San Gabriel Mountains, which form a dramatic backdrop to the southern and northern portions, respectively, of the City. These rugged, geologically young mountains are part of the Transverse Ranges Province of southern California. The characteristic features that define this province are a series of predominantly east-west trending mountain ranges and their intervening valleys. The ranges encompass the northern part of Los Angeles County as well as parts of Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, and Santa Barbara counties, and extend offshore, forming submarine canyons and ridges, in addition to the Channel Islands.

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The San Gabriel Mountains are located in the central part of the Transverse Ranges, where they rise abruptly to heights of more than 7,000 feet above the valley floor (several peaks are more than 9,000 feet high and Mount Baldy is the highest at 10,064 feet). Bounded by the San Andreas fault system on the north and the Sierra Madre fault zone on the south, the mountains are essentially a large block of the Earth’s crust that has been squeezed up and thrust over the valley floor by north-south compression along the Big Bend portion of the San Andreas tectonic plate boundary. Tectonic forces that initiated the rise of the mountains are thought to have started about 3.5 million years ago, at a time when scientists now believe there was a change in the relative motion of the Pacific and North American tectonic plates from strike-slip (slipping horizontally past one another) to transpressive (oblique movement that is a combination of strike-slip and compression). Uplift of the mountains accelerated in mid-Pleistocene time, about 500,000 years ago, and continues today (Wright, 1991). The current rate of uplift, in the context of geologic time, is one of the fastest in the world.

Displacements on faults at the northern edge of the Los Angeles Basin, in the San Fernando and San Gabriel Valleys, are mainly of the thrust or thrust-oblique type, causing older geologic units to be pushed up along a series of faults that dip northward beneath the mountains they have formed (see Plate 1-2). The most dramatic example of this in the Glendale area is the Sierra Madre fault zone, which has thrust ancient crystalline rocks onto and over younger sediments filling the valley. The Verdugo Mountains are also a prominent feature on the Glendale skyline. These mountains are separated from the San Gabriel mountain front by the La Cañada Valley (“cañada” is the Spanish word for valley, gorge, or ravine), but are composed of crystalline rocks similar to those exposed in the San Gabriel Mountains (Jennings et al., 1977; Dibblee, 1989a, 1991a, 1991b). During the mid Miocene (approximately 15 million years ago), the Glendale area was a region of low relief, but the same tectonic forces that gave rise to the San Gabriel Mountains also thrust the basement rocks up to form the present Verdugo Mountains (R.T. Frankian & Associates, 1968). This uplift is thought to have occurred along the Verdugo fault, which is identified by the juxtaposition of Cretaceous quartz diorite bedrock against Quaternary alluvial fan deposits along the southwestern front of the Verdugo range.

Some researchers have suggested that vertical separation on this fault may be at least 3,300 feet (1,000 m) (Tsutsumi and Yeats, 1999). Not only was the bedrock uplifted, but it seems that the entire bedrock block was tilted to the north, as evidenced by the consistently north- to northeast-dipping fabric of the rock exposed in the Verdugo Mountains. More recently, the Verdugo fault is thought to be primarily a strike-slip fault (Walls et al., 1998; Dolan, personal communication, 2002).

Also in recent years, researchers have discovered that the Los Angeles metropolitan area is underlain by a series of deep-seated, low-angle thrust faults. When these faults do not reach the surface, they are called “blind thrusts”. Faults of this type are thought to be responsible for the uplift of many of the low hills in the Los Angeles Basin, such as the Elysian Park, Repetto, and Montebello Hills (Dolan et al., 2001). Previously undetected blind thrust faults were responsible for the M5.9 Whittier Narrows earthquake in 1987, and the destructive M6.7 Northridge earthquake in 1994.

Strike-slip faults are also present in the northern Los Angeles basin, and where they have been most recently active, they have deformed the landscape and altered drainage patterns. An example of such faulting near the Glendale area is the Raymond fault, a predominantly left-lateral fault that is responsible for the string of low hills and knolls that disrupt the gently sloping valley floor near the southeastern edge of the City (Weaver and Dolan, 2000). The Raymond fault is an active structure that is thought to have been the source of the 1988 Pasadena earthquake (Jones et al., 1990). The relationship between the two styles of fault movement (thrust and strike-slip) is complex and not well understood. Consequently, it is currently one of the focus points in the ongoing research for a greater understanding of earthquake hazards in the Los Angeles basin (Dolan et al., 2001).

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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
The San Rafael Hills are the southeastern extension of the Verdugo Mountains and are similarly separated from the San Gabriel Mountains by the La Cañada Valley. In their central and northern parts, the San Rafael Hills are composed of crystalline rocks similar to those exposed in the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains. However, the Eagle Rock fault, which traverses the southern part of the hills, forms the geologic boundary between crystalline rocks to the north and Miocene-age sedimentary rocks forming the low hills to the south.

The La Cañada Valley and the valley south of the Verdugo Mountains are infilled with alluvial fan sediments shed off the rising mountains. As a result, the composition of these alluvial deposits reflects that of the rocks eroded by the various streams emanating from the mountains. Multiple generations of overlapping alluvial fans are present, with older sediments occurring at depth, and younger deposits occurring near the top of the section. Deposition is still ongoing, and as a result, the alluvial sediments exposed at the ground surface are very young. As discussed in Section 1.7, and covered further in this chapter, the age of these alluvial sediments controls to some extent the engineering properties of the materials, and also determines their susceptibility to liquefaction, settlement, and other seismic and geotechnical hazards. Remnants of older surfaces are present locally near the base of the mountains, north of the Sierra Madre fault, where movement on the fault has elevated the alluvial deposits above the area of active deposition. Older alluvial sediments also occur locally in the Verdugo Mountains and San Rafael Hills, on the sides of canyons.

2.3 Geologic Units
The general distribution of geologic units that are exposed at the surface in the Glendale area is shown on the Geologic Map (Plate 2-1). In the numerous geologic maps that have been published over the years for this area, there are inconsistencies in the nomenclature used for faults and geologic formations. In the section that follows, the characteristics of each unit are discussed using the names published by Dibblee (1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 2002). Descriptions of the units, as well as some of their engineering characteristics, are compiled from R.T. Frankian & Associates (1968), Lamar (1970), Morton (1973), Crook et al. (1987), Dibblee (1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 2002), and the California Geological Survey (CDMG, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). The units are described, from the youngest to the oldest, in the following sections. Fault names are those published primarily by Weber (1980), Dibblee (1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b), Yerkes (1997), Yerkes and Graham (1997), and Envicom (1975).

2.3.1 Surficial Sediments
Researchers use the degree of soil development on surfaces, stratigraphic position, degree of stream incision, relative uplift, and mineral composition to estimate the age of alluvial deposits. If organic materials, such as charcoal, are found in the deposits, then the age of these sediments can be determined with more certainty using radiocarbon dating techniques. Other absolute age dating techniques for sediments, such as optical thermoluminescence, are slowly becoming more commonplace. The age estimates given below for the alluvial units in Glendale are based on a combination of techniques that different researchers have used to interpret the geologic history of the area.

Earth Consultants International Geologic Hazards 3492 of 5188 Page 2-3 -----
NOTES: i
"
This map is intended for general land use planning only. Information on this map is not sufficient to serve as a substitute for detailed geologic investigations ofindividual sites, nor does it satisfy the evaluation requirements set forth in geologic hazard regulations.

Fault lines on the map are used solely to approximate the fault location. The width and location of the faults should not be used in lieu ofsite-specific investigalions, evaluation, and design. (ITT F
Detailed geologic investigations, including trenching studies, may make it possible to refine the location and activity status of a fault. All faulls may not be shown. This map should be amended as new data become available and are validated.

Earth Consultants International (ECI) makes no representations or warranties regarding the accuracy ofthe data from which these maps were derived. ECI shall not be liable under any circumstances for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, or consequential damages with respect lo any claim by any user or third party on account of, or arising from, the use ofthis map.
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Scale: 1 :60,000
1000 0 1000 2000 3000 Base Map: USGS Topographic Map from Sure!MAPS RASTER Sources: Weber, 1980; Dibblee, 1989a, 1989b, 1991 a, 1991 b, 2002; Rubin, Meters 1992; Yerkes, 1997; Yerkes and Graham, 1997; Byer, 1968. 5000 0 5000 10000 15000
Feet
- - Earth
nsultants
temational
Project Number: 2103
Date: July, 2003
Geologic Map
Glendale, California
Plate
2-1
3493 of 5188
Fault; solid where location known, dashed
where approximate, dotted where concealed,
hatchured where defined as zone,
(for more information refer to Plate 1-2).
...............
---
Glendale City Boundary
Geologic Contact

GEOLOGIC UNIT DESCRIPTIONS
Surficial Sediments
.,
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E
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.,
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.,
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.,
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.,
a:
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-r
~ Artificial fill
Stream channel deposits of gravel, sand and silt.

Alluvium; unconsolidated floodplain deposits of silt, sand and gravel.

Alluvial Fan
Mapped Landslide
Older Dissected Surficial Sediments
GJ
-
Remnants of older weakly consolidated alluvial deposits of gravel, sand and silt.

Alluvial fan gravel and sand derived from San Gabriel Mountains; includes some Qg and Qa in northern areas.

Elevated remnants of alluvial gravel and fanglomerate deposits, weakly indurated; in San Gabriel Mountain foothills partly weathered reddish; in that area may locally include Pacoima and Saugus Formation of Smith (1986).

Monterey Formation
White-weathering, thin bedded, platy siliceous and semi siliceous rocks.

Topanga(?) Formation I Ttqdbj Gray to brown breccia, massive to vaguely bedded, composed of angular detritus and a few rounded cobbles and boulders, all of biotite horblende quartz diorite. -
Dike Rocks
-
Light gray to brown, semi-friable sandstone, and interbedded brown sandy to silty shale, semisiliceous shale, and pebble-cobble conglomerate of quartz diorite detritus; Luisian(?) stage,
Thin dikes of black to brown, fine-grained basaltic to andesitic intrusive rocks.

Thin dikes of light gray latite porphyry.

Granitic Rocks
Gray-white, medium- to fine-grained massive granitic rock mostly of quartz monzonite and granodiorite composition; composed essentially of quartz, plagioclase feldspar (oligoclase), K-feldspar (mostly microline) and minor biotite.

Quartz Diorite
-
Gray, medium-grained quartz diorite to diorite, massive, non-gneissoid quartz diorite composed essentially of plagioclase feldspar (oligoclase-andesine, hornblende, biotite, and minor quartz); incoherent where weathered.

Gray, medium-grained quartz diorite to diorite, massive to gneissoid quartz diorite, composed essentially of plagioclase feldspar (oligoclase-andesine, hornblende, biotite, and minor quartz); incoherent where weathered.

Homblende-Diorite
Dark gray, massive to locally gneissoid, medium-grained diorite-gabbro composed rr of hornblende and plagioclase feldspar (andesine); locally includes lenses of hornbh biotite-rich layered gneiss.

Siliceous Metamorphic Rocks
- Gray, banded fine-grained siliceous rock; probably metaquartzite or metachert.

Gneissic Rocks
-
Gray banded biotite-rich quartz plagioclase gneiss; in part contorted, migmatized witi quartz diorite (qd) and complexly intruded or injected by leucogranitic rocks (gr) .

Small lenses of white layered marble and associated clac-silicate rocks.

Explanation of Geologic Map
Project Number. 2103
Date: July, 2003
Plate
2-1a
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TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
CITY of GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
The youngest and most widely exposed alluvial units in the Glendale area consist of Holocene (about 10,000 years old and younger) channel and floodplain deposits derived from the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, and from the Hollywood Hills south and west of the Glendale area. The sediments have been transported from the base of the slopes to the piedmont surfaces by the streams that drain these highlands, that is, the tributaries to Verdugo Wash and Verdugo Wash itself. A large portion of the City is situated on these young deposits.

Older fan deposits form as an elevated, moderately to highly dissected surface near the San Gabriel Mountains range front, in the La Cañada Valley area. Limited exposures of this unit are also present as isolated terraces above active stream channels within the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains, and within deeply incised drainage channels where they are visible in the sidewalls below the younger units. Even older alluvial deposits occur locally on the uplifted side (north) of the active Sierra Madre thrust fault. The estimated age for these older sediments in the San Gabriel Mountains is about 200,000+ years (Crook et al., 1987).

Artificial Fill (map symbol Qaf) – Artificial fill occurs in small patches at the base of the San Gabriel Mountains and within canyons of the Verdugo Mountains and San Rafael Hills. The deposits in the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains consist primarily of engineered fill that has been compacted and is suitable for development. This type of fill lines the bottom of canyons and is used for residential developments, road beds, and flood control structures.

Interstate Highway 210 is also built on engineered fill where it passes through the northern portion of Verdugo Canyon. In the San Rafael Hills, artificial fill that has been compacted to lower densities (not suitable for building foundations) is used for the Scholl Canyon Golf Course and Scholl Canyon Park. Many other areas of artificial fill, too small to show on the geologic map, are present in the City.

Holocene Alluvium (map symbols Qg and Qa) – This group includes modern stream channel and fan deposits (Qg), as well as slightly older floodplain deposits (Qa). Within the City of Glendale, the youngest alluvial unit (Qg) has been mapped in and immediately adjacent to the channel of the Los Angeles River, and in the lower-most reaches of the Verdugo Wash, just before it empties into the Los Angeles River. These sediments are not present in the central and upper reaches of the Verdugo Wash because sediment deposition in this area is now largely contained by the debris basins and man-made channels that have been built in the last about 50 to 70 years. The Qg deposits consist of unconsolidated, poorly sorted, white to gray, silt, sand and gravel. These deposits lack development of a soil profile at or near the ground surface, indicating their youthfulness. Their density has been described as very loose to loose.

The older (Qa) unit is the most extensive deposit in the study area, underlying most of southern Glendale, the Verdugo Wash canyon, and the central and lower reaches of several of the tributaries to Verdugo Wash. Qa deposits also underlie the small uplifted valley that dissects the southern part of the San Rafael Hills. In most areas, this unit consists of fluvial and alluvial fan deposits of unconsolidated, gray to olive brown, silt, fine to coarse sand, and gravel. Mid to late Holocene in age (approximately 5,000 years old and younger), these deposits have been slightly elevated above the modern drainage courses. The gravels are typically subangular to rounded, and are generally unweathered. Soil development in this unit is limited to a poorly developed A horizon. In the southern portion of the San Rafael Hills, this deposit consists primarily of silty and clayey sand with interbedded clay. The density of these deposits has been described as loose to medium dense.

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The oldest Holocene unit (Qf) consists of alluvial fan deposits shed off the Verdugo Mountains and deposited at the base of the range front. This unit consists primarily of pale yellowish brown sandy layers with lesser amounts of matrix-supported pebble- to cobble-sized gravel. The compositions of the clasts include granite, quartz diorite, schist, crystalline limestone, and quartzite. These sediments are generally unconsolidated and show minimal soil development, as evidenced by a few buried A horizons and some possible buried B horizons (Dolan and Tucker, 1999).

Pleistocene Dissected Alluvium (map symbols: Qoa, Qof and Qog) – The youngest Pleistocene unit that crops out in the study area (Qoa) consists of uplifted remnant alluvial fan deposits. Small patches of Qoa, approximately 1/2 acre in area, are located on both sides of Verdugo Wash, on the north side of the Verdugo fault, and at the San Gabriel range front, on the uplifted (north) side of the Sierra Madre fault zone. These alluvial fan deposits are characterized by weakly consolidated deposits of gravel, sand, and silt.

The next oldest unit (Qof) underlies most of the developed area of north Glendale and consists of mid-Pleistocene alluvial fan deposits shed from the San Gabriel Mountains and dissected by modern drainages. These deposits consist primarily of yellowish brown to pale brown silt, sand, and silty sand with little to no clay. The alluvium has been described as dense and weakly to moderately well consolidated. Near the mountain front, these deposits consist of crudely bedded sand and gravel with large boulders. Where undisturbed, this unit has a poorly to moderately developed soil profile which includes an A horizon and textural B horizon.

Most of the oldest alluvial deposits (Qog) have been removed by erosion or concealed by deposition of younger sediments. Exposures are limited to a few remnants uplifted above the bottom of Verdugo Canyon at the eastern end of the Verdugo Mountains. This unit consists of red to yellow, poorly consolidated to well-consolidated fine to coarse sand, silty sand, and gravel. Clay content varies from low to high. This unit has been extensively dissected by both large and small drainages, and typically has a well developed soil profile. Gravels within the unit are highly weathered.

Landslide Debris (map symbol Qls) - Three small landslides (Qls) of probable Holocene age have been mapped on the slopes of the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills (see Plates 2-1 and 2-4). Because the bedrock in these areas is highly fractured and weathered, the slides consist of small blocks and rock fragments rather than large cohesive masses. The Qls deposits are discussed in more detail in the landslide hazards section below (Section 2.4.1).

2.3.2 Bedrock Units
Within Glendale, areas of high relief are underlain primarily by a complex assemblage of crystalline rocks created from multiple episodes of igneous intrusion and metamorphism deep within the Earth’s crust. This association represents a long history of such events, and includes some of the oldest rocks (dating back to the Precambrian age) in southern California.

The contacts between rock types are approximate and somewhat variable in geologic maps published over the years, reflecting the difficulty of mapping in rugged, brush-covered terrain, as well as identifying rock types that are highly shattered, sheared, and crushed. Many map units include more than one rock type, and the predominant rock type has typically been used to characterize the unit. One unit, the leucocratic granodiorite, occurs as dikes and irregularshaped lenses intruding into the various different units southwest of the South Branch of the San Gabriel fault. The youngest bedrock unit consists of sedimentary rock formed from deep marine deposits that encroached onto the area where Glendale is now located prior to uplift of the present Verdugo and San Gabriel Mountains.

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Topanga Formation (map symbol: Ttqdb and Ttsc) - The Miocene age Topanga Formation underlies the low hills at the southern edge of the City. This sedimentary rock unit is separated from the crystalline rocks of the San Rafael Hills by the Raymond fault. In the Glendale area, the Topanga Formation consists of two primary components: a light gray to brown sandstone interbedded with a lesser amount of shale and conglomerate (Ttsc), and a massive to vaguely bedded breccia with lenses of silty shale and sandstone (Ttqdb). Bedding character is typically crudely developed to massive in the conglomerate beds, whereas it is well developed in the finer grained sequences. Sedimentary structures within the deposits have led scientists to believe these sediments were deposited in a deep marine environment with a not too distant source (Lamar, 1970). This unit is folded, and bedding dips generally in the range of 20 to 30 degrees to the west and north, although both flatter and steeper dips have been measured locally (Dibblee, 1989a, 1989b).

Dike Rocks (map symbol: Tb and Tl) – These units occur as widely scattered, tabular bodies of igneous rock within older rocks of the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills. The dikes typically formed by intrusion of magma into fractures and joints of the existing rocks.

In the Glendale area, the dikes are fine-grained and consist of brown to black rocks of basaltic and andesitic composition (Tb), as well as pale gray rocks composed of light-colored minerals (Tl). The dikes are thought to be late Miocene in age, or older.

Leucocratic Granitic Rocks (map symbol: gr) – This unit includes light colored, fine- to medium-grained rocks composed primarily of quartz, plagioclase and potassium feldspars, with minor biotite. It occurs as bands and patches across the base of the San Gabriel Mountains, and as intrusive dikes into the older quartz diorite rock within the Verdugo Mountains and San Rafael Hills. This unit is exposed at a few sites along Verdugo and Sycamore Canyons. This unit is thought to be Cretaceous or Jurassic in age, but may be older.

Quartz Diorite (map symbol: qd and gqd) - Sometimes referred to as the Wilson Diorite, this unit is the most widespread bedrock type in the Glendale area. The bulk of the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills are comprised of quartz diorite. The color of the rock is typically a light gray to light brown, and the minerals that form the rock include plagioclase feldspar, hornblende, biotite and quartz. The texture is generally medium grained and the structure is massive (qd). In the central part of the San Rafael Hills, just north of Highway 134, at the southeastern margin of Glendale, the mineral grains are aligned, giving the rock a distinct banding or “foliation” (qqd). This is called a “gneissoid” texture due to its similarity to gneiss, a relatively common metamorphic rock. The foliation gives the rock a somewhat layered structure, and in this area, that structure dips 60 to 70 degrees to the east and northeast.

A similar structure is observed in the Verdugo Mountains, except that the foliation dips steeply to the east, and the orientation changes from northwesterly in the southern part of the mountains, to northerly in the northern part of the range (R.T. Frankian & Associates, 1968).

The contact between the massive and foliated units is gradational. This rock is highly fractured and generally deeply weathered, making it friable (grains disaggregate easily) near the surface. This unit is approximately 122 million years old, based on actual dating of bedrock samples, and is therefore early Cretaceous in age (Larsen, 1958).

Hornblende Diorite-Gabbro (map symbol: hd) – Within City limits, this rock type crops out in a few small isolated areas in the northern part of Hahamongna Watershed Park. The rock is medium-grained and massive, but locally has a gneissoid structure. The rock is dark gray in color because it is rich in dark minerals such as hornblende and biotite.

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Siliceous Metamorphic Rocks (map symbol: mq) – These rocks are rare within the City, occurring only locally in a few small isolated areas in the San Rafael Hills. As described by Smith (1986), this unit consists of medium gray, fine-grained to microcrystalline, banded, siliceous rock, probably metachert. It is estimated to be Paleozoic in age, but may be as old as Precambrian.

Gneissic Rocks (map symbol: gn and ml) – These are the oldest and most lithologically complex rocks that crop out in the Glendale area. The rocks are exposed as irregular patches in the San Rafael Hills and the Verdugo Mountains, and consist primarily of quartzofeldspathic gneiss (gn). Small lenses of white, layered marble and calc-silicate (ml) occur within these rocks in the central portion of the Verdugo Mountains. These rocks are complexly intruded by younger granitic rocks. The gneissic rocks are generally well-banded, and moderately to well-foliated. The foliation dips primarily to the northeast at 30 to 80 degrees (Dibblee, 1991a, 1991b).

2.4 Geologic Hazards in the Glendale Area

2.4.1 Landslides and Slope Instability
Nearly half of the land in Glendale consists of steep hillslopes and rugged mountains. These areas have for the most part been preserved in their near natural state, while most of the development in the City occurs in the flat to gently sloping alluvial surfaces at the base of the mountains. However, some development (primarily residential) is present in and adjacent to steep hillsides. These areas include the canyons within the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, and the alluvial fans situated at the front of the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains (see Plate 2-2). Such areas are locally vulnerable to slope instability, particularly in winters of heavy rainfall and in winters following wildfires.

Careful land management in hillside areas can reduce the economic and social losses caused by slope failures. This generally includes land use zoning to restrict development in unstable areas, grading codes for earthwork construction, geologic and soil engineering investigations and reviews, construction of drainage structures, and where warranted, placement of warning systems. Other important factors are risk assessments (including susceptibility maps), a concerned local government, and an educated public.

TYPES OF SLOPE FAILURES
Slope failures occur in a variety of forms and there is usually a distinction made between gross failures (sometimes also referred to as “global” failures) and surficial failures. Gross failures include deep-seated or relatively thick slide masses, such as landslides, whereas surficial failures can range from minor soil slips to destructive debris flows. Slope failures can occur on natural or man-made slopes. Most failures of man-made slopes occur on older slopes, many of which were built at slope gradients steeper than those allowed by today’s grading codes. Although infrequent, failures can also occur on newer graded slopes, generally due to poor engineering or poor construction. Slope failures often occur as elements of interrelated natural hazards in which one event triggers a secondary event, such earthquake-induced landsliding, fire-flood sequences, or storm-induced mudflows.

Gross Instability
Landslides - Landslides are movements of relatively large land masses, either as nearly intact bedrock blocks, or as jumbled mixes of bedrock blocks, fragments, debris, and soil. The type Earth Consultants International Geologic Hazards 3498 of 5188 Page 2-9 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
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of movement is generally described as translational (slippage on a relatively planar, dipping layer), rotational (circular-shaped failure plane) or wedge (movement of a wedge-shaped block from between intersecting planes of weakness, such as fractures, faults and bedding).

The potential for slope failure is dependent on many factors and their interrelationships. Some of the most important factors include slope height, slope steepness (Plate 2-2), shear strength and orientation of weak layers in the underlying geologic unit (see Plate 2-3), as well as pore water pressures. Joints and shears, which weaken the rock fabric, allow water to enter the bedrock mass leading to deeper weathering of the rock, along with increased pore pressures and increased weight of the landmass. Water also increases the plasticity of weak clays lining the joints or shears, forming planes of weakness along which the landmass can fail.

Ultimately, all of these conditions can cause the slope to fail.

For engineering of earth materials, these factors are combined in calculations to determine if a slope meets a minimum safety standard. The generally accepted standard is a factor of safety of 1.5 or greater (where 1.0 is equilibrium, and less than 1.0 is failure). Although existing landslides are not widespread in the Glendale area, it is probable that many of the steeper hillsides do not meet the minimum factor of safety, and slope stabilization may be needed if development reaches these areas. Natural slopes, graded slopes, or graded/natural slope combinations must meet these minimum engineering standards where they impact planned homes, subdivisions, or other types of developments. Slopes adjacent to areas where the risk of economic losses from landsliding is small, such as parks and mountain roadways, are often allowed a lesser factor of safety. From an engineering perspective, landslides are generally unstable (may be subject to reactivation), and may be compressible, especially around the margins, which are typically highly disturbed and broken. The headscarp area above the landslide mass is also unstable, since it is typically oversteepened, cracked, and subject to additional failures.

Surficial Instability
Slope Creep - Slope creep in general involves deformation and movement of the outer soil or rock materials in the face of the slope, due to the forces of gravity overcoming the shear strength of the material. Soil creep is the imperceptibly slow and relatively continuous downslope movement of the soil layer on moderate to steep slopes. Creep is most common in soils that develop on fine-grained bedrock units. Rock creep is a similar process, and involves permanent deformation of the outer few feet of the rock surface, resulting in folding and fracturing. Rock creep is most common in highly fractured, fine-grained rock units, such as siltstone and claystone, but also occurs in highly fractured crystalline rock. In fact, studies of prehistoric landslides in the San Gabriel Mountains suggest that creep can weaken steep rock slopes to the point where toppling failure (essentially a large slide consisting of angular blocks of rock) can occur (Rodgers et al., 1992).

Creep also occurs in graded fill slopes. This process is thought to be related to the alternate wetting and drying of slopes constructed with fine-grained, expansive soils. The repeated expansion and contraction of the soils at the slope face leads to loosening and fracturing of the soils, thereby leaving the soils susceptible to creep. While soil creep is not catastrophic, it can cause damage to structures and improvements located at the top of the slope.

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Soil Slip - This type of failure is generated by strong winter storms, and is widespread in the steeper slope areas, particularly after winters with prolonged and/or heavy rainfall. Failure occurs on canyon sideslopes, and in soils that have accumulated in swales, gullies and ravines.

Slope steepness has a strong influence on the development of soil slips, with most generated on slopes with gradients of between 27 and 56 degrees (Campbell, 1975).

Earth flow - This type of slope failure is a persistent, slow-moving, lobe-shaped slump that typically comes to rest on the slope not far below the failure point. Earth flows commonly form in fine-grained soils (clay, silt and fine sand), and are mobilized by an increase in pore water pressure caused by infiltration of water during and after winter rains. Earth flows occur on moderate to steep slopes with gradients of between 15 and 35 degrees (Keefer and Johnson, 1983).

Rockfall – Rockfalls are free-falling to tumbling masses of bedrock that have broken off steep canyon walls or cliffs. The debris from repeated rockfalls typically collects at the base of extremely steep slopes in cone-shaped accumulations of angular rock fragments called talus.

Rockfalls can happen wherever fractured rock slopes are oversteepened by stream erosion or man’s activities.

Debris Flow - This type of failure is the most dangerous and destructive of all types of slope failure. A debris flow (also called mudflow, mudslide, and debris avalanche) is a rapidly moving slurry of water, mud, rock, vegetation and debris. Larger debris flows are capable of moving trees, large boulders, and even cars. This type of failure is especially dangerous as it can move at speeds as fast as 40 feet per second, is capable of crushing buildings, and can strike with very little warning. As with soil slips, the development of debris flows is strongly tied to exceptional storm periods of prolonged rainfall. Failure occurs during an intense rainfall event, following saturation of the soil by previous rains.

A debris flow most commonly originates as soil slip in the rounded, soil-filled “hollow” at the head of a drainage swale or ravine. The rigid soil mass is deformed into a viscous fluid that moves down the drainage, incorporating into the flow additional soil and vegetation scoured from the channel. Debris flows also occur on canyon walls, often in soil-filled swales that do not have topographic expression. The velocity of the flow depends on the viscosity, slope gradient, height of the slope, roughness and gradient of the channel, and the baffling effects of vegetation. Even relatively small amounts of debris can cause damage from inundation and/or impact (Ellen and Fleming, 1987; Reneau and Dietrich, 1987). Recognition of this hazard led FEMA to modify its National Flood Insurance Program to include inundation by “mudslides” (FEMA, 2001).

Watersheds that have been recently burned typically yield greater amounts of soil and debris than those that have not burned. Erosion rates during the first year after a fire are estimated to be 15 to 35 times greater than normal, and peak discharge rates range from 2 to 35 times higher. These rates drop abruptly in the second year, and return to normal after about 5 years (Tan, 1998). In addition, debris flows in burned areas are unusual in that they can occur in response to small storms and do not require a long period of antecedent rainfall. These kinds of flows are common in small gullies and ravines during the first rains after a burn, and can become catastrophic when a severe burn is followed by an intense storm season (Wells, 1987).

The United States Geological Survey (USGS), as part of its National Landslide Hazards Program, is currently developing tools and methodologies to identify and quantify slope stability hazards posed by burned watersheds. Such tools will help communities with emergency planning and in dealing with post-fire rehabilitation (USGS, 2001).

Earth Consultants International Geologic Hazards 3502 of 5188 Page 2-13 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
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OCCURRENCE OF SLOPE FAILURES IN THE GLENDALE AREA
Evidence of past slope failures are found throughout the mountain and foothill regions of the City of Glendale. The crystalline rock of the San Gabriel Mountains, weakened by fracturing, shearing, and crushing along numerous fault zones, particularly near the range front, combined with the moderate to extremely steep slopes that have resulted from rapid uplift of the mountains, are important elements that create the setting for the development of slope failures.

Similar conditions are present in the Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills, where rocks are highly weathered and slope gradients of 30 degrees or steeper are common.

Significantly, however, areas of gross instability such as large deep-seated landslides have not been mapped in the Glendale area, primarily because the highly fractured crystalline rocks that underlie the San Gabriel and Verdugo Mountains and the San Rafael Hills rarely fail as large cohesive units. All of the landslides mapped within City limits are relatively small in area, and limited to the Verdugo Mountains and San Rafael Hills. The larger of these landslides are shown on Plates 2-2 and 2-4. Numerous other smaller landslides have also occurred in the area, but their size is too small to show on the maps that accompany this report. Large prehistoric landslides have been mapped in the San Gabriel Mountains just to the east of the City, but not in the Glendale area. The distribution of existing landslides in the Glendale area and vicinity was compiled from various publications, including Morton and Streitz, (1969), Crook et al. (1987), and Dibblee, (1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 2002).

Areas of surficial instability are common along the steep slopes and canyons the San Gabriel Mountains, Verdugo Mountains and San Rafael Hills. Unfortunately detailed maps showing previous sites of surficial slope failures, such as small landslides, slumps, soil slips, and rockfalls have not been compiled or published for the Glendale area. However, an unpublished engineering geology report records several talus rockfalls on steep slopes and roadcuts in the Verdugo Mountains (R. T. Frankian & Associates, 1968). The common occurrence of rockfalls can also be inferred by the abundant talus at the base of steep slopes and in canyons of the San Gabriel Mountains.

The Southern California Area Mapping Project (SCAMP), a cooperative effort between the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the California Geological Survey (CGS), has produced a series of Debris-Flow Occurrence Maps, at a scale of 1:100,000, that predict in a general way areas that will be prone to debris flows in normally vegetated hillsides (SCAMP, 2001). The maps are based on their studies of recent El Nino events, specifically relating the relationships between rainfall thresholds, terrain, and past debris flow events. Their studies indicate that in upland areas underlain by sedimentary rock and fractured crystalline rock (such as that found in the mountains of Glendale), essentially all past debris flows have occurred on slopes with gradients of 26 degrees or steeper. The mapped debris flow susceptibility areas in the San Gabriel Mountains include most slopes steeper than 26 degrees, but do not include the heads of the large alluvial fans at the base of the mountains because the flood control dams and debris basins that have been built in these areas are thought to be adequate to contain flows from unburned areas.

However, flows can overwhelm flood control structures during periods of extreme rainfall on a recently burned hillside. For instance, during winters of exceptional rainfall (such as 1934, 1969, 1978, and 1980), debris flows caused widespread property damage and loss of life in communities in and near the base of the San Gabriel Mountains, with areas below burned watersheds receiving the bulk of the damage. For example, in November 1933, there was a Earth Consultants International Geologic Hazards 3503 of 5188 Page 2-14 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REPORT to the 2003 SAFETY ELEMENT
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large fire in the Montrose-La Crescenta area that burned more than 5,000 acres. Then, on January 1, 1934, intense rainfall fell on the same area that had burned. La Crescenta and Glendale received the brunt of the damage. Several people died, swept away by debris-laden flows that overtopped the canyons in the area. Streets were clogged with debris, and several bridges were washed out (see Plate 3-2). In 1978, several canyons within burned watersheds near the Glendale area overtopped their debris basins (Davis, 1980). These canyons include Zachau Canyon located north of Sunland, Shields Canyon north of La Crescenta, and Rubio Canyon north of Altadena. In 1980, the Rubio basin again overflowed, partially inundating one home and threatening several others (Davis, 1980). Therefore, if the right conditions are met, such as high rainfall within burned watersheds, the possibility that debris flows will overtop basins in the Glendale area cannot be precluded.

Glendale City CouncilOctober 20, 2026

Glendale City Council
October 20, 2026