Location. City Hall – 600 Elm Street, Council Chambers.
Masks are no longer required, but are still highly recommended in accordance with California Dept of Health Guidelines. To maintain public health and safety, please do not attend in person if you are experiencing symptoms associated with COVID -19.
Provide Public Comment. To address the Commission on any item on the posted agenda, fill out a Request to Speak Form located in the back of the Council Chambers and submit it to city staff; or, you may raise your hand when the Commission Chair calls for public comments.
Remote Participation Observe via:
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Zoom. https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88635467439 Or call 1-669-900-9128 and enter the Meeting ID: 886 3546 7349
Meeting Webportal. www.cityofsancarlos.org/agenda
Local TV. Comcast Channel 27 and AT&T Uverse Channel 99 Provide Public Comment. If you plan to make a public comment on any item on the posted agenda, please observe the meeting via Zoom (see above access information), and during the public comment period for the agenda item you wish to address, use the “raise hand” feature. If joining Zoom by phone, press *9 to “raise hand." Planning and Transportation Commissioners may participate in this meeting remotely as authorized by A B 361.
CHAIR:
Jim Lacoponi
COMMISSIONERS
Janet Castañeda
Kristen Clements
Ellen Garvey David
Roof
1. CALL TO ORDER
2. ASSEMBLY BILL 2449 TELECONFERENCE REQUESTS
3. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
4. ROLL CALL
5. PUBLIC COMMENT
Public Comment is limited to items not on the agenda. The Commission may briefly respond to statements made or questions posed as allowed by the Brown Act (Government Code Section 54954.2). However, the Commission's general policy is to refer items to staff for attention, or have a matter placed on a future Commission agenda for a more comprehensive action or report.
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6. APPROVAL OF MINUTES
a. Approval of the minutes of the Planning and Transportation Commission meeting of February 6, 2023.
7. PRESENTATIONS
a. New and Proposed Planning and Transportation Laws, Presentation by Amy Brown and Colin Hawley with Arc Strategies.
8. PUBLIC HEARING
Procedure for Public Hearing:
Staff will present a report on the history, physical features, etc., on the application followed with the staff's recommendations. The applicant will make a presentation. Thereafter, interested members of the community may speak on the proposal. When all interested parties have had an opportunity to be heard, the hearing will be closed, and no further discussion from the floor can be held. The Commission will then consider the evidence and make its recommendation. If you challenge a public hearing item in Court you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, the public notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the City at or prior to the public hearing. Speakers should fill out a speakers form, found by the door, and hand it to the recording secretary prior to addressing the Commission. The speaker should come up to the microphone to speak since the meeting is being recorded. This will assist staff in preparing the minutes.
a. Consideration of Design Review approval for a proposed Sign Program at 1501 1599 Industrial Road (APNs: 046240130 and 046240140).
b. Consideration of a Resolution Recommending the City Council Adopt an Ordinance Amending San Carlos Municipal Code Title 18 to Regulate Laboratories with Biosafety Levels (BSL)
9. REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE AND GENERAL INFORMATION
a. Report on recent City Council actions
b. Planning and Transportation Commission comments or reports c. Correspondence
d. Planning Staff comments, reports, and updates on current projects
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10. ADJOURNMENT
Agendas and Minutes
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Correspondence #17
March 6, 2023
City of San Carlos
Principal Planner Lisa Costa Sanders
Members of the Planning and Transportation Commission
Members of the City Council
CC: [emails redacted]
600 Elm Street
San Carlos, CA 94070
Subject: Re: Urgent Call to Action: BIOSAFETY NOW--BAN HIGH CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABS IN SAN CARLOS---Planning and Transportation Commission Agenda - March 6, 2023, 7:00 pm (zoom link)
Dear San Carlos City Council and Planning Commission -
We would like to strongly echo the Baldochhi’s in stating that there is insufficient oversight, regulation and transparency of BSL-3 labs. Therefore, we strongly oppose any private BSL-3 labs near residential areas or floods zones in San Carlos. We ask that you consider the serious safety risks that they pose and BAN these high containment biolabs in our City of Good Living.
Thanks you,
Joe and Kelly Haws
Correspondence #18
March 6, 2023
City of San Carlos
Principal Planner Lisa Costa Sanders
Members of the Planning and Transportation Commission
Members of the City Council
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CC: [emails redacted]
600 Elm Street
San Carlos, CA 94070
Subject: Re: Urgent Call to Action: BIOSAFETY NOW--BAN HIGH CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABS IN SAN CARLOS---Planning and Transportation Commission Agenda - March 6, 2023, 7:00 pm (zoom link)
Dear City Council and Planning Commission,
We also agree with the call for action against even considering BSL -3 anywhere near our city, which is very densely populated already, and will be more densely populated in the near future.
In light of the recent reports about the COVID -19 originating from a lab leak, this issue becomes ever more urgent.
Thank you.
Zinovy Fichtenholz
Sophia Kan tor
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1 SAN MATEO, SANTA CLARA & SAN BENITO COUNTIES
March 17, 2023
Mayor Rak and members of the City Council
City of San Carlos
Via email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Subject: Sierra Club recommends no BSL-3 labs in San Carlos Dear Mayor Rak and San Carlos City Council members,
The Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter’s Sustainable Land Use Committee advocates for land use issues and the Bay Alive Campaign advocates for the ecological health of San Francisco Bay. We strongly recommend that no Biosafety Level (BSL)-3 labs be built in San Carlos, and that BSL-4 labs also be excluded.
Recently, the Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter organized a webinar titled “Planning for Life Sciences Development for Bay Area Cities.” The event featured experts from the Boston/Cambridge area, a historic hub for life sciences in the US, and included biosafety experts. An important fact emerged: several cities in the greater Boston/Cambridge metropolitan area have reversed their biosafety policies to no longer allow BSL-3 or higher labs in their cities, and more are joining their ranks. Some do not even allow BSL-2 labs. Please see a list of cities and links to their ordinances HERE.
Why have they made this change? With decades of experience with the industry and the growing awareness of the increasingly lethal agents used in BSL-3 “high-containment” labs, cities are now “walking-back” from allowing the high-risk labs, described below, into their communities.
BSL-3 “high-containment” labs, as defined by the NIH, involve the higher-risk pathogens that are difficult to control, as they are often airborne and very contagious when released. They require complete dependence on mechanical systems that can fail1 through human error, mechanical failure or disasters, as well as safety oversight 1 Boston University, June 1, 2016: “A malfunctioning network switch at BU’s National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) resulted in a shutdown of parts of the lab’s ventilation monitoring system …The University has suspended BSL-3 research until the outside engineers review recommended remedial work to prevent future ventilation system malfunctions.” Correspondence #19
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2 structures.2 They work well in institutions that have scientific safety oversight committees that ensure an understanding of risks, transparency, regular reporting and inspections, and biosafety procedures for worker, public and environmental safety. San Carlos does not have such structures in place.
The San Carlos Planning Commission recently voided staff’s recommendation of no BSL-3 high-containment labs in San Carlos. Instead, the Commission voted for a hastily organized conditional use permit (CUP) process developed with industry input. We note the following.
1. San Carlos, in its Safety Element,3 does not mention biohazards, biosafety, or biosecurity. The City is completely unprepared for biohazards or a biohazard release incident. San Mateo County Environmental Health staff similarly report 4 that they have no authority or responsibility for biohazard incidents, with the exception of the Coronavirus pandemic. The State hazardous materials databases, which the fire departments and emergency responders depend upon, include chemical and radiological hazards but do not include biological hazards.
2. There has been no organized outreach process to solicit public input on a proposed new ordinance for BSL-3 labs, although this is a safety issue of critical concern to residents and for public safety and security.
3. The City’s new biotech zoning heavily impacts San Carlos’ Eastside neighborhood, and would allow high-risk BSL-3 labs in proximity to an already impacted and vulnerable residential area, endangering residents with unknown infectious agents. San Carlos has a history of regulatory failure on the east side, including reducing noise, protecting from flooding and soil contamination, as well as failures in reducing toxic air, addressing traffic, improving pedestrian safety and adding more parks.
4. High-risk labs would be adjacent to sensitive natural ecosystems that affect the Bay itself. Wildlife and Bay water quality are at risk as creeks through this zone have overflowed multiple times, flooding lab facilities, polluting the waters which empty directly onto sensitive wetlands in the Bay. Flooding and seismic events are predictable hazards in this part of the Bay Area, therefore biosafety concerns of BSL-3 labs are a critical issue.
5. At this time, the federal government and the scientific community are expressing increasing concern about the growth of new risky research in privately-funded BSL-3 labs and the lack of oversight.5 Without proper regulation or oversight by the National 2 You should be afraid of the next “lab leak”, NY Times Nov 23, 2021. “....In fact, the most concerning aspect about high-containment biolabs is that, considered as a collective, they may only be as safe as the worst lab among them. A breach or a breakdown at one could imperil us all.” 3 City of San Carlos Public Safety and Services Element 4 In a meeting with the San Mateo County Office of Environmental Health and the Sierra Club Biosafety working group
5 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) have formed an advisory committee, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). The NSABB has held meetings in 2022 and 2023 about Biosafety, with specific focus on Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (PC3O) and Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). Excerpt from transcript of NSABB Sept 2022 meeting a board member
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Correspondence #20
1 March 22, 2023
City of San Carlos
Members of the City Council
600 Elm Street
San Carlos, CA 94070
Subject: Public Comment Regarding Proposed Ordinance Amending San Carlos Municipal Code, Title 18 to Regulate Laboratories with Biosafety Levels (BSL); City Council Meeting , March 27, 2023
Requests: STOP HIGH-CONTAINMENT LAB TAKE -OVER IN SILICON VALLEY (1) BAN High-Containment BSL-3 labs in San Carlos
(2) REJECT the proposed Conditional Use Ordinance
(3) INVESTIGATE how many high -containment labs are proposed (4) MANDATE disclosure of the details of BSL-3 research proposed onsite (5) NOTIFY all San Carlos residents of proposed BSL-3 labs and conduct public hearings
Dear Mayor Rak and members of the City Council ,
On March 6th, the Planning and Transportation Commission refused to follow the February 6th City Council and staff recommendations to adopt a proposed ordinance that would prohibit privately operated, high -containment biosafety labs in San Carlos in order to protect the community from the harmful effects of hazardous materials and lethal pathoge n research. Instead, they recommended a hastily prepared, industry sponsored Conditional Use Permit that fails to protect public health and environmental safety. Please honor your earlier public commitment to ban BSL -3 labs. Do not allow San Carlos to become the high -containment biosafety lab capital of Silicon Valley.
Developers and industry representatives’ deliberate misrepresentations about biosafety oversight
We perceive that real estate developers and industry representatives have deliberately misrepresented the level of federal, state and local oversight of private high - containment labs. These labs perform research on potential pandemic pathogens and are too dangerous to be located near densely populat ed residential neighborhoods in flood and earthquake prone areas near the bay.
At the February 6th Planning Commission meeting, a local developer from MBC Biolabs outrageously claimed that BSL-3 labs are “foolproof.” They are not. See: Treason of the Science Journals a compelling article by author Ashley Rindsberg.
We agree with scientists from biosafetynow.org who attended the March 6 th Planning Commission meeting. Dr. Bryce Nickels described the representations by developers
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2 that private labs are “highly -regulated” as gaslighting in the extreme. https://twitter.com/BiosafetyNow/status/1633269996775251968 Deliberate misrepresentations about the number of high-containment labs proposed in San Carlos
Developers and staff claim that only 1% of lab tenants will lease BSL -3 lab space.
However, developers unanimously claimed that banning BSL -3 labs would have a catastrophic effect on attracting lab tenants. Although it is difficult to know how many private high -containment labs are already operating in the bay area, there appears to be few because private developers are rushing to fill the void.
For example, Gladstone, which is affiliated with UCSF , rents BSL-3 lab space and there is such high demand, there is a two -week waiting list for them to even respond to applications. See how easy it is for an individual to rent BSL -3 labs space. https://gladstone.org/form/bsl -3-lab-request
The number of proposed high -containment labs in San Carlos appears to be a heavily guarded secret. Here is a list of the current proposed developments on the city's website: www.cityofsancarlos.org
Alexandria --(the biggest development in the city) 1,625,390 sq ft MBC Biolabs--96.175
405 Industrial Road --304,070 (north east)
642 Quarry Road--410,000 (north east)
777 Industrial Road --122,462
789 Old County Road --466,198
841 Old County Road --325,448
888 Bransten Road --163,932 (Alexandria)
This totals 3,513,675. Some are in the permitting stage.
Alexandria is the largest and most well -funded developer. It has labs across the nation.
They will likely ask for BSL-3 use if you approve the Conditional Use Permit . If they obtain approval, many others will follow.
At the March 20th Planning Commission meeting, the Commis sion approved Alexandria’s request for a height exception to allow four, 23 -feet tall exhaust stacks on the roof of a new 50-feet tall development at 888 Bransten. Those types of exhaust stacks are required on BSL-3 and 4 facilities. We asked them to disclose whether BSL-3 labs were planned onsite.
Alexandria representatives refused. Their archite ct claimed that the exhaust from the stacks would contain “chemical fumes” that would be expelled from the exhaust stacks at “high -velocity”. We suspect, but cannot prove, that developers and Chamber of Commerce members are planning for San Carlos to be the regional Silicon Valley hub for BSL-3 research.
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3 We wouldn't have been concerned about or aware of BSL levels before the covid pandemic. We naively trusted the city. After all, most of you live here too. However, we don't think the industry is giving the city all the facts and are minimizing the risks.
San Carlos is at the epicenter of this issue because of the extreme amount of Life Sciences development going on here. 3.5 million sq feet of labs are being planned now.
How many more biolabs are planned for northeast San Carlos? The point is, the public doesn't know how many BSL -3s are planned or where they will be located. Approving a CUP will open the flood gates t hat will allow and attract high -containment l ab development.
The proposed CUP is rudimentary and the planners would not even agree to designate set-back requirements from homes or schools, wouldn't agree to prohibit gain of function, ePPP or select pathogen research. Commissioner Roof w orks at Genentech and emphasized that he doesn't want to limit "life -saving" research. He said that San Mateo County doesn’t have any restrictions on biosafety levels and San Carlos will be the first. We perceive that he has a conflict of interest based on his employment.
Other factors that make San Carlos unsafe for BSL -3 labs is its proximity to San Carlos' Hiller Airport which has numerous flight schools. A recent article gave the numbers:
"101,077 annual takeoffs and landings. (275 per day.) 359 Aircr aft, over 25 businesses.
It is part of the national airport system that involves 600,000 aircraft and 2,000 airports." It prohibits certain activities within its direct flight path. SFO prohibits BSL -2 and above in its flight path. San Carlos should do the same.
With the recent collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and possibly, other local banks, how many lab start-ups will have to shut down or have their businesses interrupted? Will they have money for abrupt decommissioning or closure? What will happen to all the lab animals and the very expensive pathogens and biologics, rDNA or other research materials onsite?
We implore you to ban BSL-3 labs in San Carlos. Don’t be misled by the disinformation provided by developers. Please put public safety first.
Sincerely,
Debbie and Gary Baldocchi
San Carlos residents
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From: Lisa Costa Sanders
To: Al Savay; Megan Wooley-Ousdahl; "Carol Johnson";
Subject: FW: Follow-Up--New Information (Life Sciences Mega-Developer: Alexandria) City Council Meeting, Monday, March 27th at 7:00 PST Biosafety Ordinance (Public Comment) Date: Monday, March 27, 2023 8:56:59 AM
fyi
From: Gary Baldocchi
Sent: Sunday, March 26, 2023 10:22 PM
To: Lisa Costa Sanders <[email protected]>; *City Council <[email protected]>
Cc: *Planning Commission <[email protected]> Subject: Follow-Up--New Information (Life Sciences Mega-Developer: Alexandria) City Council Meeting, Monday, March 27th at 7:00 PST Biosafety Ordinance (Public Comment) [NOTICE: This message originated outside of City of San Carlos -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] 3/26/23
Hi neighbors,
Today, we learned that Alexandria, a leading owner, operator and developer of "collaborative campuses" for Life Sciences is planning to make San Carlos part of a biolab "cluster" associated with Stanford. They are planning
8.8 million square feet of biolab development in San Francisco. We don't think that includes the 1.3 million sq ft mega-development planned in San Carlos on a 25-acre parcel. They are also building several other biolab developments on the east side of town.
Contrary to their website's assertions that they uphold the highest levels of transparency, integrity and accountability, they do not. Last year, we met with Terezia Nemeth, an Alexandria spokesperson and she refused to disclose the biosafety levels of their proposed labs, including 888 Bransten. ARE > OUR CLUSTERS > San Francisco Bay Area
ARE > OUR CLUSTERS > San Francisco Bay
Area
Correspondence #21
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There is nothing we can do about the millions of square feet of Life Sciences developments being built in San Carlos, but we hope community members can convince the city council to ban BSL-3 labs. We think Alexandria and other developers are planning to build at least three or four BSL-3 labs in San Carlos. That is alarming because there are only seven of these labs in the entire bay area. We are concerned that a lab accident could result in prolonged lockdowns, shelter-in- place,
or evacuation orders.
There are other important environmental issues:
Energy Use: BSL-3 labs Consume 5-10 times more energy per square foot than office buildings. How will the electrical grid fare after 5-6 million more square feet of biolabs are built? Many of us have already experienced power outages and rolling blackouts.
Water Use: One development at 642 Quarry Road will use 27 million gallons of water per year. Mid-Peninsula Water District (MPWD) supplies water to consumers in San Carlos, Redwood City, and parts of the unincorporated County of San Mateo.
There are ten water storage tanks with a combined total of 11,360,000 gallons.
What happens when we have another drought?
Flooding: Alexandria''s proposed 1.3 million sq ft development is on the banks of Pulgas creek which flooded the streets around that site, including El Camino Real, Old County Road and Industrial Road on December 31, 2022.
Presidio's proposed
development at 642 Quarry Road is on the banks of Belmont creek and that site flooded too. They proposed a BSL-3 lab on that site. How is it safe to build high- containment labs next to creeks and in FEMA flood zones? Evacuation routes: Life Sciences developments will bring an estimated 9,000 new employees into San Carlos by 2030. If there is an accident or loss of containment caused by a natural
disaster, such as the recent flooding and landslides, evacuation routes will be compromised.
We think the only way to minimize the most serious public health and environmental safety impacts is to ban these labs. We do not want San Carlos to become the BSL-3 capital of Silicon Valley. We hope the City Council will listen to members of our community and honor their earlier commitment to ban them.
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Please join us at tomorrow night's City Council meeting and make a public comment.
Thank you!
Debbie and Gary Baldocchi
ZOOM LINK:
City Council Meetings - March 27, 2023
Date: 03/23/2023 9:55 AM
City Council Meetings - Monday, March 27, 2023
Special Meeting- 6:30 PM & Regular Meeting- 7:00 PM
On Monday, March 27th, the City Council will hold a Special Meeting at 6:30 p.m., followed by its Regular Meeting at 7:00 p.m. The regular meeting will be conducted both in-person at City Hall and virtually via Zoom. Members of the public will have the option to observe the meetings and address the City Council as outlined below.
Special Meeting
In-Person Participation:
-Location. City Hall – 600 Elm Street, Collaboration Room.
Masks are no longer required, but are still highly recommended in accordance with California Dept of Health Guidelines. To maintain public health and safety, please do not attend in person if you are experiencing symptoms associated with COVID-19.
-Provide Public Comment. To address the City Council, fill out a Request to Speak Form and submit it to staff.
Regular Meeting
In-Person Participation:
-Location.
City Hall – 600 Elm Street, Council Chambers.
Masks are no longer required, but are still highly recommended in accordance with California Dept of Health Guidelines. To maintain public health and safety, please do not attend in person if you are experiencing symptoms associated with COVID-19.
-Provide Public Comment.
To address the City Council on any item on the posted agenda, fill out a Request to Speak Form located in the back of the Council Chambers and submit it to the City Clerk; or, you may raise your hand when the Mayor calls for public comments.
Remote Participation:
Observe via:
-Zoom. https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88256140939; or call 1-669-900-9128 and enter the Meeting ID #: 882 5614 0939
-Meeting Webportal.
www.cityofsancarlos.org/agenda
-Local TV. Comcast Channel 27 and AT&T Uverse Channel 99 -Provide Public Comment. If you plan to make a public comment on any item on the posted agenda, please observe the meeting via Zoom (see above access information), and during the public comment period for the agenda item you wish to address, use the “raise hand” feature. If joining Zoom by phone, press *9 to “raise hand”.
Topics of discussion include, but are not limited to:
Recognize Community Volunteer Debbie Denton
Consider Regulating Laboratories with Biosafety Levels
Consider Greenhouse Gas In-lieu Fee Study
Prior to the meeting, should you have any questions regarding participating remotely, please contact the City Clerk's office at [email protected].
The agenda and packet are now available online – https://www.cityofsancarlos.org/residents/public- meetings.
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Correspondence #22
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the global community are prepared to rapidly detect, respond to, and recover from biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin. However, there are biosafety and biosecurity risks associated with undertaking research involving pathogens which include the possibility of laboratory accidents and the deliberate misuse of the information or products generated.
Periodic reassessment of our biosafety and biosecurity oversight frameworks helps to ensure that they effectively address existing and emerging safety and security concerns while continuing to support scientific progress and innovation.
To help inform such efforts, in February 2022 the U.S. Government (USG) charged the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) with evaluating and providing recommendations on the effectiveness of two major U.S. biosecurity policy frameworks governing:
• Research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs), including the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO)2, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Framework for Guiding Funding Decisions about Proposed Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens3; and • Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), including the USG Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences DURC4 and the USG Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences DURC5. "
.....................Recommendation 12.1. Promote and ensure that all research meeting the scope of these policy frameworks conducted within the U.S. regardless of funding source
and/or internationally by institutions supported by the USG be subject to equivalent oversight
Regards, Gita
PS I can send more information, from other sources about this as well! Gita Dev
Sustainable Land Use Committee,
Loma Prieta
On 3/23/2023 1: wyn D'Souza wrote:
Thank you Councilmember McDowell. 12:30 -1:00 PM Friday is good for us. Here is the zoom link for us to use. https://us02web.zoom.us/j/6504587436?pwd=d3NMVDRQck5lTjRyYkNzUHBIQ0hyQT09 Talk soon,
Gladwyn
On Mar 23, 2023, at 1:22 PM, Sara McDowell <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello Gladwyn,
Thank you for your email. I have read the letter and I also attended the live webinar. I am available for a 30 minute zoom tomorrow/Friday between 12:30-3pm.
Thank you,
Sara
Sara McDowell
City Councilmember
650-802-4162
[email protected]
www.cityofsancarlos.org
Unless otherwise noted, the opinions, viewpoints, and perspectives contained in this email are my own, and do not represent the official position of the City of San Carlos or its City Council. Please do not share those opinions, viewpoints, and perspectives with other members of the San Carlos City Council so as to avoid the potential development or appearance of a consensus outside a scheduled public meeting, which is prohibited under California's Brown Act.
I also respectfully
request that you refrain from sharing the opinions, viewpoints, and perspectives of other San Carlos City Council members with me.
If you are contacting me about a development application or appeal that is pending before the City Council, I am not able to read your email because it constitutes an ex parte communication.
I will, however, forward your email to city staff and it will be made part of the record. Thank you.
From: Gladwyn D'Souza
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2023 12:32 PM
Correspondence #22
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To: Sara McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: Gita Dev < ; David Crabbe
Subject: Re: Sierra Club would like to set up a meeting to discuss BSL3 labs before Monday's Council Meeting [NOTICE: This message originated outside of City of San Carlos -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] Hello Council member McDowell,
We'd like a half hour of your time via Zoom to discuss our recent letter to the city council about not allowing Level BSL3 and BSL4 labs in San Carlos, attached below.
Sorry for the late notice. We're trying to reach out to all the council members before the Monday meeting. We're available Friday any time after 9:30 AM or over the weekend if that works for you.
Please let us know if you're available and I’ll send out a zoom link.
Best regards,
Gladwyn d’Souza
Sierra Club, Loma Prieta, Conservation Committee Chair.
David Crabbe
Sierra Club, Loma Prieta, Sustainable Land Use Committee.
This email has been scanned for spam and viruses by Proofpoint Essentials. Click here to report this email as spam.
Correspondence #22
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From: Lisa Costa Sanders
To: Al Savay; Megan Wooley-Ousdahl; [email protected]; Subject: Fwd: Follow Up regarding Laboratories
Date: Monday, March 27, 2023 4:24:41 PM
Fyi
From: Terezia Nemeth
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2023 4:22 PM
To: Lisa Costa Sanders <[email protected]> Subject: Follow Up regarding Laboratories
[NOTICE: This message originated outside of City of San Carlos -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] Hello Lisa
I trust you are well.
I have listened to the hearings regarding the City of San Carlos proposed restrictions on laboratory activities.
Although I am not a scientist myself, we work with many scientists and industrial engineers who understand the impacts of laboratory activities much better than I do. I thought I would transmit to you some of the feedback from these folks in response to the points of concern raised by some in the community about the emissions from laboratory buildings.
Please note that:
1. Laboratory buildings do not have “smokestacks” – they have exhaust fans and stacks that provide proper ventilation for an overall building exhaust - similar to all commercial buildings though larger to provide for increased airflow capacity. Please note that the fume hoods and biosafety cabinets are a small fraction of the overall building exhaust. Typically, an active fume hood gives off less emissions than a gasoline powered automobile.
2. Biological hazards (toxins and agents) are under strict control in a laboratory setting and the biological molecules are generally large enough to be filtered (through the use of HEPA filters).
3. Chemical hazards are generally smaller molecules and may be more persistent in the environment. There are significant protection and containment measures/technologies for chemical hazards – these include Responsible Laboratory Management Practices (Bay Area Air Quality Management District Regulation 2 Rule 1, Section 2-1-224), the use of secondary containment (such as flammables in specialized cabinets), closed loop systems (such as HPLC’s).
Furthermore, all waste is stored in sealed containers and shipped under strict regulations to certified waste disposal sites.
4. Residents concerned about hazardous materials in their communities can take advantage of community right to know laws – these include:
0. California law requires businesses to report (publicly) hazardous materials inventories for materials stored above specific thresholds (generally, 55 gallons for liquids, 500 pounds for solids, and 200 cubic feet at STP for gases).
1. Additionally, air permits (BAAQMD) may be required for fume hoods and/or wipe Correspondence #23
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I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to or interested in the above entitled matter. I am the principal clerk of the printer and publisher of the ORANGE COUNTY REPORTER, a newspaper published in the English language in the City of Santa Ana, and adjudged a newspaper of general circulation as defined by the laws of the State of California by the Superior Court of the County of Orange, State of California, under date of June 2, 1922, Case No. 13,421. That the notice, of which the annexed is a printed copy, has been published in each regular and entire issue of said newspaper and not in any supplement thereof on the following dates, to-wit:
Executed on: 10/10/2004
At Los Angeles, California
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Signature
EXAMINER - ENQUIRER-BULLETIN
303 TWIN DOLPHIN DR #600, REDWOOD CITY, CA 94065
(650) 556-1556
SPEN 3711188
CRYSTAL MUI
CITY OF SAN CARLOS/CITY CLERK
600 ELM ST
SAN CARLOS, CA - 94070
HRG - NOTICE OF HEARING
BSL Restriction 6.26.23
I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to or interested in the above entitled matter. I am the principal clerk of the printer and publisher of the EXAMINER - ENQUIRER-BULLETIN, a newspaper published in the English language in the city of SAN CARLOS, county of SAN MATEO, and adjudged a newspaper of general circulation as defined by the laws of the State of California by the Superior Court of the County of SAN MATEO, State of California, under date 02/25/1946, Case No. 38966. That the notice, of which the annexed is a printed copy, has been published in each regular and entire issue of said newspaper and not in any supplement thereof on the following dates, to-wit:
06/15/2023
06/15/2023
SAN MATEO
!A000006337266!
Email
CITY OF SAN CARLOS
NOTICE OF PUBLIC
HEARING NOTICE IS
HEREBY GIVEN THAT the
San Carlos City Council,
pursuant to the City of San
Carlos Municipal Code
Chapter 18.35 Amendments
to Zoning Ordinance and
Map; California Government
Code Section 65854, and the
Guidelines for the California
Environmental Quality Act
Sections 15162 and 15168,
will hold a public hearing in
the Council Chambers, City
Hall – 600 Elm Street, San
Carlos, on Monday, June 26,
2023 at 7:00 p.m. , for the
purpose of hearing and
considering all comments of
all persons interested in or
concerned with: Considering
Introducing an Ordinance
Amending the City of San
Carlos Municipal Code Title
8, Health and Safety, and
Title 18, Zoning, to Regulate
Biological Research
Activities . The following
code sections are proposed
for amendment: Sections
18.06.020 (Commercial
Districts Land Use Regula-
tions), 18.07.020 (Industrial
Districts Land Use Regula-
tions), and 18.41.020
(Definitions). The following
code sections may be
added: Section 8.30
(Biological Research
Activities), and Section
18.23.310 (Standards for
Specific Uses and Activities).
The City Council will
consider the following
Ordinance(s): 1) The
Planning and Transportation
Commission's recommenda-
tion (Resolution # PTC2023-
05) that the City Council
adopt an Ordinance
amending San Carlos
Municipal Code Title 18,
Zoning, to prohibit activities
requiring Biosafety Level
(BSL) 4 containment and to
allow for activities requiring
BSL 3 containment with a
conditional use permit as
specified in the Ordinance as
amendedby the Commission;
2) introducing an Ordinance
amending San Carlos
Municipal Code Title 8,
Health and Safety, to require
an annual operating permit
for biological research
activities that require BSL 3
containment; and 3)
introducing an Ordinance
amending San Carlos
Municipal Code Title 18,
Zoning, to prohibit activities
requiring BSL 3 and BSL 4
containment.
The proposed amend-
ments to the San Carlos
Municipal Code are within
the scope of the activities
and impacts identified in the
Focused General Plan
Update Final Environmental
Impact Report (EIR), and no
new environmental effects
have been found and no new
mitigation is neces-
sary.Therefore, no additional
environmental review is
required pursuant to Public
Resources Code Section
21166 and California
Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) Guidelines Section
15162 and 15168. The
agenda and relevant
materials for this item will be
available for viewing online -
www.cityofsancarlos.org/age
nda; at the City Clerk's
Department in City Hall –
600 Elm Street; and at the
San Carlos Library – 610
Elm Street, beginning
Thursday, June 22, 2023.
The public will have the
option to observe •thethe
meeting•and address theand address the
Council in–person in City
Hall's Council Chambers or
remotely via Zoom. Details
and instructions•wilwill be
available on the agenda.
Questions regarding the
project may be directed to
Megan Wooley-Ousdahl,
Principal Planner, at
mwooleyous-
[email protected].
Comments may be sent via
email to the City Clerk –
City-
[email protected]
and the City Council –
CityCoun-
[email protected]; or
mailed to the City Clerk at
600 Elm Street, San Carlos,
CA 94070, or made in-
person at the public hearing.
All persons interested in the
above are hereby invited to
participate remotely in this
Public Hearing and be heard.
If you challenge this proposal
in court, you may be limited
to raising only those issues
you or someone else raised
at the public hearing
described in this notice, or in
written correspondence
delivered to the City Clerk
prior to the public hearing.
Crystal Mui, City Clerk
Publication Date:
6/15/23
SPEN-3711188#
EXAMINER - ENQUIRER-
BULLETIN
Attachment 13
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From: Gary Baldocchi
To: *City Council; Adam Rak; Sara McDowell; John Dugan; Ron Collins; Pranita Venkatesh Cc: Lisa Costa Sanders; Al Savay; Jeff Maltbie; *Planning Commission; Crystal Mui Subject: Public Comment: Proposed Biosafety Ordinance, June 26th City Council Meeting (Request City Council prohibit Biosafety level 3 labs in San Carlos
Date: Tuesday, June 20, 2023 11:56:20 PM
Attachments: Public Comment- Ban High Containment Biosafety Labs in San Carlos.docx [NOTICE: This message originated outside of City of San Carlos -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] 6/20/23
Dear Mayor Rak and members of the City Council,
We have attached a public comment letter regarding the proposed Ordinance Amending San Carlos Municipal Code to regulate Biosafety levels. Our letter provides new information that we hope you will consider.
We respectfully request that you honor the staff's two earlier recommendations to adopt the proposed ordinance that will prohibit private BSL 3 labs in San Carlos. We ask you to remain true to your earlier commitment to prohibit the labs when you directed staff to prepare an ordinance that would do so. Please don't allow pressure from developers, industry insiders and Planning Commissioners to change your minds on this critical public health and environmental safety issue.
We are optimistic that you will continue to be progressive leaders who have consistently demonstrated that you listen to members of the public, recognize the risks and will not hesitate to enact ordinances that will provide the highest level of protection to ensure public health and environmental safety in our flood prone city.
Thank you very much considering these widespread community concerns.
Respectfully submitted,
Debbie and Gary Baldocchi
Attachment 14
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1 June 20, 2023
City of San Carlos
Members of the City Council
600 Elm Street
San Carlos, CA 94070
Via email: [email protected], [email protected], Subject: Public Comment Regarding Proposed Ordinance Amending San Carlos Municipal Code, Title 18 to Regulate Laboratories with Biosafety Levels (BSL)--Please adopt the proposed ordinance that will prohibit high-containment BSL 3 labs in San Carlos.
Date of City Council meeting: Monday, June 26, 2003 at 7:00 pm, Pacific Time
Dear Mayor Rak and members of the City Council,
On March 6
th, the Planning and Transportation Commission refused to follow the February 6th City Council and staff recommendations to adopt a proposed ordinance that will prohibit privately funded, high-containment biosafety level 3 labs on environmentally sensitive sites in east San Carlos that are near residential neighborhoods and prone to flooding. Instead, the Commissioners recommended the City Council approve an industry oriented Conditional Use Permit that will allow private developers and lab operators to basically self-regulate by allowing them to hire third parties who will have a financial incentive to approve their labs.
Allowing BSL 3 labs in San Carlos fails to ensure public health and environmental safety because of the potential catastrophic risk of a loss of containment caused by a natural disaster, fire or a lab accident caused by human error that could spread potentially lethal infectious diseases into the community.
At the March 27
th City Council meeting, the staff recommended that the City Council adopt the ordinance that will prohibit privately funded BSL 3 and 4 research labs. (It does not apply to clinical labs in hospitals, universities or medical facilities.) Public comments were closed after the staff presentation and is now on calendar for your final decision.
Based on comments made in recent Planning and Transportation Commission meetings where several new Life Science developments were approved, it appears that the staff may change their prior recommendations and recommend the proposed ordinance that will allow privately funded BSL 3 labs with a Conditional Use Permit. If that happens, these labs will be subject to approval by the Planning and Transportation Commission, not the City Council. Please do not delegate your authority as elected officials to unelected commissioners. We recently learned that only three of the five commissioners must be present to establish a quorum. Two large Life Sciences developments were recently approved by only three commissioners because two were absent.
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2 What has changed during the three months since the March 27th City Council meeting? We phoned Dr. Jaishee Garhyan, Director BSL 3 Service Center, In Vitro Biosafety Level 3, (BSL3) Service Center and asked if we could meet with her to obtain information about Stanford’s BSL 3 In Vitro lab and the myriad of regulations in their detailed Biosafety Manual. She indicated that she could not meet with us because she has been retained by the City of San Carlos.
If Dr. Garhyan attends the City Council meeting, we respectfully request that she disclose whether Stanford allows research on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens, Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) or Federal Select Agents--to the extent she is legally allowed to do so. We’ve been told Stanford does not conduct this type of research, but do not know if this is accurate. If Stanford does not allow this type of high- risk research, San Carlos shouldn’t either. San Carlos residents do not want San Carlos to become the epicenter of another global pandemic.
After considerable community opposition, developers are now refusing to disclose biosafety levels planned on multiple sites claiming that future tenants are currently unknown. However, as we mentioned in our prior letters, there are at least five or six large biolab developments that appear to be designing their buildings to accommodate high-containment labs based on multiple 23 feet tall exhaust stacks on their rooftops.
Having this many private BSL 3 labs, some within 300 feet of residences, and all within a one square mile radius of each other is a recipe for disaster.
Transportation of hazardous materials and pathogens and truck loads of hazardous waste to and from the biolabs will be a frequent occurrence on major San Carlos roadways that serve as evacuation routes, including Holly street, Industrial, Old County Road and Brittan. Biolabs are staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Deliveries and pick-ups of these materials will occur at all hours of the day and night.
Over 3.5 million square feet of new biolabs are currently planned in San Carlos. There is a 3.3 million square feet development by Longfellow, Redwood Life, planned a little over a mile away in Redwood Shores. It proposes BSL 3 labs on the site, which is an unlined landfill that borders the bay and Belmont Slough.
We are optimistic that Dr. Garhyan is familiar with the differences between the oversight and regulation of privately funded BSL 3 research labs versus university or federally funded research labs. The gaps in the regulation of privately funded research were previously described during public comments at the March 27 th City Council meeting by
Dr. Richard Ebright and Dr. Bryce Nickels of Biosafetynow.org.
We will forward our letters to Dr. Garhyan in the hopes that she will address the issues if she is indeed a subject matter expert who has been retained by the city. We have also invited Stanford virologist, Dr. David Relman and scientists from Biosafety Now to attend.
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3 We anticipate that lobbyists, developers and industry insiders will turn out in force at Monday’s City Council meeting. We attended a recent presentation by Christy Shirilla, Policy Manager for the Life Sciences lobbyist group BIOCOM California.
We provide the following information to rebut her allegations that (1) there is no such thing as a private lab; (2) BSL 3 labs are common in hospitals; and (3) there are many private BSL 3 labs in the area and their locations are known. We have also included rebuttals to a number of common industry talking points. (We have repeated some of the information provided in our earlier letters for your convenience. We have added new information concerning recent meetings with industry representatives, developers, and emergency preparedness experts.)
We respectfully request that you honor the staff’s two earlier recommendations to adopt the ordinance that will prohibit private BSL 3 labs in San Carlos. We ask you to remain true to your earlier commitment to prohibit the labs when you directed staff to prepare an ordinance that would do so. Please don’t allow pressure from developers and industry insiders to change your minds on this critical public health and safety issue. We are optimistic that you will continue to be progressive leaders who demonstrate that you recognize the risks and will not hesitate to enact ordinances that provide the highest level of protection to ensure public health and environmental safety in our flood prone city.
Opposition arguments and rebuttals to community requests to ban BSL 3, 4 labs What are the four biosafety levels?
https://biosafety.utk.edu/biosafety-program/the-biosafety-program/biosafety-manual/2-principles-of-biosafety/
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4 (1) Opposition argument: Privately operated biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories should not be banned because they are heavily regulated by multiple entities and do not need additional regulation.
Rebuttal: There are significant gaps in the regulation of privately funded research on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP).
Existing US oversight of research on dangerous pathogens has four critical weaknesses:
(A) There are no US regulations with force of law for biosafety of research on pathogens other than designated Federal Select Agents. Instead, federal biosafety oversight involves only unenforced guidelines.
(B) There are no US regulations with force of law for biorisk management of research on pathogens other than smallpox virus. Instead, federal biorisk managements involves only an unused policy framework.
(C) Current US oversight of biosafety for pathogens other than select agents and biorisk management for pathogens other than smallpox virus applies only to federally funded research. Privately funded research is NOT covered.
(D) Current US oversight of biosafety and biorisk management is undermined by systemic conflicts of interest. Responsibility for oversight is assigned to federal agencies that perform research and fund research, and almost all actual oversight is delegated to, and left to the discretion of, researchers, their institutions and privately-owned companies.
To date, the public has largely been unaware of, and excluded from, discussion of the threat posed by research in high-containment biohazard (Biosafety Level) BSL- 3 and 4 laboratories;
Private high-containment biohazard labs conducting research on designated federal select agents are not required to disclose their identities, locations or the types of pathogens or genetically modified organisms researched. Moreover, the Federal Select Agent Program is not allowed to disclose their identities or locations. As a result, the public, first responders, and state and local governments are unable to ascertain the number, identity and location of these laboratories;
Numerous scientists, researchers and non-profit groups advocate for reducing the number of high-containment biohazard laboratories and for strengthening biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk management for research on pathogens. biosafetynow.org.
In addition, Stanford researchers have also expressed concerns about the gaps in oversight of privately funded research:
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5 (A) Stanford researcher Dr. David Relman identified significant gaps in regulations and calls for stronger oversight of risky research of pathogens.
(B) Stanford law school, Ragini Gupta, LLM expected 2023: Are current laws and policies equipped to address these risks? I believe they are not. U.S. law needs reforms, and an international framework also needs to be planned since disease outbreaks will often not be restrained by national borders. But this framework (P3CO) only applies to HHS’s funding decisions. Privately funded research, or even U.S. government research with funding outside HHS, is beyond the HHS’s oversight in this respect. A framework restricted to federally funded research is inadequate in the age of DIY Biology, where it is possible to conduct experimentation relatively cheaply in garages and community labs. (One pioneer of DIY Biology wrote in 2005that a molecular biology lab could be bought on eBay for $1000; A 2017 piecesuggests basic lab equipment can be bought for $500 or less.) Unlike the HHS P3CO framework, the Federal Select Agent Program does apply to private research. Potential Pandemic Pathogens risks, regulation and reform Part 1.
(C) Stanford law school, Ragini Gupta, LLM expected 2023: The NSABB observed in its findings that a “substantial percentage” of U.S. biotechnology research is supported by non-federal funding and that the potential risks associated with both DURC (dual use research of concern and PPP (potential pandemic pathogen) research justified oversight of all relevant activities, regardless of funding source – as this would enhance “federal awareness” and promote a “national culture of responsibility.” It thus recommended that research meeting the scope of the framework conducted within the U.S. or supported by the U.S. be subject to equivalent oversight. Potential Pandemic Pathogen risks, regulation and reform, part 2.
(D) U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends improved oversight of privately funded pathogen research.
The United States has multiple, overlapping policies that guide oversight of pathogen research. These include, among others:
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) guidelines; Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP);
U.S. Government Policy for the Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC); and
Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO).
Many of these policies and guidelines are framed around biosafety and biosecurity. According to a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
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6 report, biosafety includes “the practices and equipment that ensure that lab workers, the community, and the environment are protected from infectious pathogens and biological hazards,” while biosecurity includes “practices to ensure the protection and control of biological materials in laboratories to protect them from theft, loss, or misuse.”
While some oversight mechanisms are required by law and apply to certain pathogen research conducted in the United States or by U.S. researchers, others are guidance issued by federal agencies and apply only to research and researchers they fund. Privately funded research, or research conducted outside the United States, may therefore not be covered by certain U.S. oversight mechanisms.
Two recent reports, one from GAO and a draft report from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), evaluated current U.S. polices related to research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP) and broader biosafety/biosecurity issues related to life-sciences research. While each report provided a separate set of recommendations based on its findings, when considered together, three broad focus areas emerge:
1. Clarifying language and developing standards to identify research that requires review under the P3CO policy,
2. Increasing transparency around the P3CO review and approval processes, and
3. Expanding oversight to include privately funded research. GAO: Congressional Research Service report, February 15, 2023:
(2) Opposition argument: High-containment biosafety labs are safe and pose no risks to nearby residential neighborhoods, sensitive receptors or other uses.
Rebuttal: Multiple biosafety lab accidents over the years have caused infectious disease transmission. Private labs that do not receive federal funding are not required to report accidents or loss of containment to local cities, counties and members of the public.
Lab accidents may infect workers who may then unknowingly transmit infectious diseases to members of the public. Many bioscience industry insiders, developers and lobbyist claim that lab accidents are rare and that labs do not need additional oversight or regulation. Safety regulations cut into their profits. Like oil pipeline, nuclear power proponents and other intensive resource consuming industries, they vigorously resist efforts by community members and environmental groups who challenge their safety and attack us as uninformed or alarmist.
We provide the following detailed information about lab accidents to refute that narrative.
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7 (a) Lab leaks occur at a stunning frequency. A 2019 report actually said that there were four or more lab releases of these select agents, or highly contagious viruses or toxins, in the US in 2019," added Dr. Chan. She would like to see more public oversight of labs on a national and international level. This could come from impacts to funding or publishing of findings. She believes it will lead to safer conditions and more transparency. https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/news/covid- origin-wuhan-lab-leak-alina-chan-mit-harvard/
(b) Science. France issues moratorium on prion research after fatal brain disease strikes two lab workers. Barbara Casassus, July 28, 2021.
PARIS—Five public research institutions in France have imposed a 3-month moratorium on the study of prions—a class of misfolding, infectious proteins that cause fatal brain diseases—after a retired lab worker who handled prions in the past was diagnosed with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), the most common prion disease in humans. An investigation is underway to find out whether the patient, who worked at a lab run by the National Research Institute for Agriculture, Food and Environment (INRAE), contracted the disease on the job. (c) Financial Times. Scientists fear future leaks as top-level labs proliferate.
Kiran Stacey, Helen Warrell, Yuan Yang. June 4, 2021.
(d) Wall Street Journal. How Easily Can a Virus Escape From a Lab? By Alina Chan and Matt Ridley. November 11, 2021.
(e) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Human error in high-biocontainment labs: a likely pandemic threat . Lynn Klotz. February 25, 2019. (f) ProPublica. Here are six accidents UNC researchers had with lab-created coronaviruses . Alison Young and Jessica Blake. August 17, 2020. (g) Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General. The National Institutes of Health and EcoHealth Alliance did not effectively monitor awards and subawards, resulting in missed opportunities to oversee research and other deficiencies. Christi A. Grimm, Inspector General.
January 2023.
(h) USA Today. Lab-Created bird flu virus accident shows lax oversight of risky ‘gain of function’ research. Alison Young. April 11, 2023
In addition, there are concerning examples of lab accidents from Biosafety labs that are required to publicly report "accidents" or incidents. We reviewed Boston University, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) monthly minutes. Because they receive federal funding, they are required to disclose near misses and lab accidents. Private labs that do not receive federal funding are not required to disclose these types of incidents.
Some of these occurred in BSL-2 and 3 labs. There are also BSL-4 labs onsite. See Research Occupational Health Program (ROHP) and Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) reports cited below. (Private labs do not require these types of committees or reports.)
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8 Most of the lab accidents involved BSL-2 and BSL-3s. Most were employee exposures due to needle sticks, glove lacerations and mice bites, but a couple are related to employees whose nasal swabs were positive for environmental SARS-Co-V-2, despite not working in the BSL-labs. Those were thought to be from exposure to workers who do work in the labs and share office space and break rooms with others. Here are a few excerpts from monthly minutes in Jan/Feb 2021 and Jan/Feb 2022:
(A) https://www.bu.edu/researchsupport/files/2021/05/January-2021-IBC-Meeting- Minutes-WEB.pdf
This incident involved the escape of prion infected mice:
EHS Report: On the morning of 12/24/20, an animal care staff member discovered a cage in with no mice present and reported the finding to the animal care supervisor who notified the corresponding lab and ASC vet services and operations staff. ASC set up more traps within the room to trap these three mice, which were reported to be prion- infected. On the morning of 12/26/20, one mouse was caught by an animal care staff and subsequently euthanized by a vet tech per vet instructions due to numerous limb injuries.
The three mice made an inch-wide hole and escaped out of the cage by tearing through the filtered top. The feeding bottles that had been used to administer the liquid diet were either accidentally pushed too far back giving the mice access to the filter cage top or it is also possible the mice pushed it back themselves. ASC has already made corrections and worked with the lab so this mishap can be avoided in the future. All the cages now have food hoppers, cutting off access to the filtered top.
(B) https://www.bu.edu/researchsupport/files/2021/05/February-2021-IBC-Meeting- Minutes-WEB.pdf
Just one month later, there were 6 incidents, one involved a worker who only worked in BSL-2 labs, but works in shared space with others who work with inactivated virus.
Amplicon exposures are common, but can be minimized with stringent and frequent decontamination:
Since the last IBC meeting on 1-26-21, ROHP has six incidents to report:
1-28-21: ROHP received notification of a needle stick injury from a syringe to finger after the researcher resuspended a pellet taken from intestinal luminal fluid extracellular vesicles (from patients having inflammatory bowel disease). She discarded the pair of nitrile gloves she was wearing, allowed the blood to drain from the wound (6 drops), washed her hands with water and soap for a minute and sanitized her hands with 70% ethanol. Please note this researcher did not report this incident to her supervisor or ROHP until the next day.
1-29-21: An asymptomatic researcher tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 which was later deemed to be related to environmental SARS-CoV-2 amplicon exposure. This
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9 researcher works in BSL2, does not work with SARS-CoV-2 but works in shared space with others that do work with inactivated virus.
2-3-21: ROHP received notification oflaceration to a finger with a razor used to slice mouse lung tissue. This incident was related to an IBC protocol, but the tissue did not contain any biologics.
2-8-21: An asymptomatic researcher at the NEIDL tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. This researcher denied working with SARS CoV2 but works in shared space. Her positive test was later deemed to be related to environmental amplicon exposure.
2-8-21 and 2-17-21: One asymptomatic researcher at the NEIDL tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 twice. This researcher works in BSL3 with SARS-CoV-2 and in BSL2 with a different coronavirus strain. This was later deemed to be related to amplicon exposure and not any live virus. ROHP continues to work with Healthway, Safety, PIs and BPHC regarding all researchers who test positive for SARS- CoV-2 to determine if it was community related infection or due to environmental amplicon exposure.
One member asked when researchers are continuously wearing masks in the lab, how it is possible for them to contract amplicon contamination in their nasal swabs. The Research Safety Director and ROHP Medical Director indicated that this is still unknown but they discussed some possibilities such as touching door knobs or lab work surfaces before changing into workplace clean masks or placing personal clothing on chairs in the lab before donning a lab coat or such. (C) https://www.bu.edu/researchsupport/files/2022/03/February-2022-IBC-Meeting- Minutes WEB.pdf
Research Occupational Health Program (ROHP) & Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) Report ROHP reported three (3) incidents to the committee:
A visiting researcher cut left thumb with razor blade while cutting unfixed human kidney tissue;
A graduate student sustained a puncture to left 2nd digit with a needle that had been used to inject lentivirus vector on transgenic mice;
A PhD student sustained percutaneous injury to left 5th finger from unknown glass shard. EHS reported on a near-miss incident to the committee: • Needles found in biohazard trash. EHS provided follow-up on the root cause of these incidents and corrective actions. It was noted that the needle stick injury with lentiviral vector inside is a NIH reportable incident and the report will be sent to NIH and BPHC. (3) Opposition argument: High-containment biosafety (BSL) labs should not be banned because they already exist in hospital and diagnostic laboratories.
Rebuttal: This is incorrect. Hospital and diagnostic labs are not the same as biosafety research labs. They are designated as clinical laboratories and have
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10 been found to have a number of significant gaps in their regulation and oversight.
They primarily handle BSL 1 or 2 specimens.
Going forward in this document, “clinical laboratories” refers to laboratories whose primary mission is supporting direct patient care while “public health laboratories” refers to national, state, and local government laboratories tasked primarily with disease surveillance. We also distinguish between diagnostic laboratories, which may be either clinical or public health laboratories, and which perform testing for direct patient care, and research laboratories, which primarily develop new knowledge not used for direct patient decision making. Public health laboratories typically perform both research and diagnostic testing; in practice, all these distinctions necessarily blur.
A well-established laboratory biosafety guidance in the United States is the CDC/National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), currently in its 6th edition (14). The BMBL focuses on biological research settings where the agent is almost always known before the work begins. This perspective differs substantially for clinical laboratory professionals, who generally do not know whether their specimens contain emerging disease or infectious agents. In addition, in contrast to diagnostic laboratories (15), research laboratories often work with agents in high concentrations and large volumes.
Recognizing these differences, a CDC-convened Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel published the “Guidelines for Safe Work Practices in Human and Animal Medical Diagnostic Laboratories” in 2012 (15). While describing common hazards and providing guidance for safe work practices in diagnostic laboratories, it reinforced the paradigm that associates biological agents to biosafety levels. Both the BMBL and this publication indicate that work with Ebola should only occur in a biosafety level four (BSL-4) or maximum containment laboratory. Since most U.S. clinical laboratories operate at biosafety level two (BSL-2) (15), concerns about biosafety risks and possible exposure contributed, at least in part, to the reported reluctance and delays in providing laboratory testing to suspect Ebola specimens during the 2014 outbreak (4, 11, 12).
However, testing a single specimen from a suspect patient, particularly a patient with an unknown—and possibly very low—likelihood of actually having Ebola virus disease (EVD), presents much different risks than working with Ebola in a research setting, perhaps in large volumes and high concentrations (13). Many clinical laboratories in 2014, both in the United States and abroad, demonstrated they could appropriately mitigate those risks without relying on a maximum containment laboratory (16, 17). For an example of how one hospital accomplished this, see section “Real-life example of biosafety risk management—experience of a community hospital laboratory during an outbreak situation.”
In summary, while clinical laboratory testing is highly regulated in the United States, national regulations specific for clinical laboratory safety are limited. The majority of laboratories, those operating under a Certificate of Waiver or a Certificate of Provider-
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11 Performed Microscopy, are not routinely inspected and therefore lack an external mechanism to monitor the quality and safety of their testing practices. Overall, there is a lack of uniformly implemented and routinely monitored systems in place for laboratory safety and biosafety nationwide. Clinical Laboratory Biosafety Gaps: Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks Reveal a Path to Safer Future, Clinical Microbiology Review, July, 2021.
(4) Opposition argument: High-containment biosafety labs are no less sustainable than other commercial offices and uses.
Rebuttal: High containment biosafety labs use 5-10 times more energy, 4-5 times more water and generate millions more tons of solid and hazardous waste than other commercial office uses.
Energy Use
Unfortunately, a laboratory is a prodigious consumer of natural resources. For example, laboratories typically consume 5 to 10 times more energy per square foot than do office buildings. And some specialty laboratories, such as clean rooms and labs with large process loads, can consume as much as 100 times the energy of a similarly sized institutional or commercial structure. EPA, Laboratories for the 21st Century: An Introduction to Low-Energy Design.
This article titled, How Much Does Lab Space Cost is instructive. It reads, in part:
Electricity is one of the largest energy infrastructure costs laboratories accrue. Lab facilities constantly rely on equipment like freezers, incubators, centrifuges, biosafety cabinets, and computers to operate, resulting in high electricity usage ranging from 30 to 100 kilowatt-hours per square foot each year, according to E Source. The additional output means that a facility’s electrical systems need to keep up with demand, or risk failing.
The building’s lights can also use a lot of electricity, depending on the type of bulb being used and the amount of time they’re on. Scientists tend to work longer hours than the average office employee, adding to the power demands and costs.
Laboratories also require more heating, ventilation, or air conditioning than the typical office building, and rely on powerful HVAC systems and fume hoods to provide ventilation and air flow as needed in different areas of the lab. These systems allow them to stay prepared for contaminants spilling or being released into the air, but often results in ventilation systems running around the clock.
Office buildings generally run their cooling and heating systems during normal business hours, and only supply a small percentage of fresh air, recirculating the majority of its air instead. A laboratory may not only need more fresh air, it may also require maintained, stable temperatures 24 hours a day to protect valuable samples and experiments. https://www.excedr.com/blog/how-much-does-lab-space-cost/
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12 In addition, biosafety labs also require the use of natural gas, tanked gas or other highly flammable and toxic gases. Many are unable to use solar panels because they require 23 feet tall rooftop exhaust stacks. In other words, high-containment biolabs are often unable to fully comply with local REACH codes, prohibitions on natural gas use and state and local Climate Mitigation Adaptation plans.
Biolabs have redundant power systems, including backup generators, but the generators are not designed to last for more than 24-48 hours. The back-up generators are intended to provide emergency power long enough to allow lab operators to shut down the labs. However, the generators are not always reliable. During power outages in the summer of 2022, Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (SCVMC) and O' Connor hospital lost power for hours. See the doctors' descriptions of moving ICU patients in the dark using light from their cell phones.
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/providers/backup-
generators-fail-northern-california-hospital-during-record-breaking-heatwave Unfortunately, most of the backup generators are powered by diesel which is in increasingly short supply in California. Ordinances should require developers to maintain at least a weeks’ supply of diesel fuel on-site.
Prolonged power outages may cause severe hardships on residents and members of the public. Some Menlo Park residents were without power for multiple days during the week of February 20, 2023. Their City Council held an emergency meeting on February 23rd. Residents called for the city to improve its communication amid a week of high winds and storms that have left households without power for multiple days across the city. They see weather as prep for a potential major natural disaster. However, according to city officials, some small pockets of Menlo Park still remain without power. "If we struggle the first 48 hours for something relatively small like we did this time, how will we communicate when something more serious happens? How can we just learn from this so that we do better in the future." The city will reimburse residents $400 per night if they are still without power." Menlo Park residents see weather as prep for potential major natural disaster.
Stanford recently posted an article titled: Preparing for a Power Outage in a Research Facility. It reads in part: Normal occupancy and research operations are always prohibited in affected buildings during power outages, regardless of emergency generator status.
How can northern California’s overtaxed energy grid support millions more square feet of high energy consuming Life Sciences developments being built throughout the bay area? Who will have priority for electrical power—commercial developments or members of the public and hospitals? The biosafety ordinance should include a plan which anticipates and addresses this critical and foreseeable public safety issue.
Water use
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13 Biosafety labs use approximately 4-5 times more water than other users, even when they employ green technology. Clinical laboratories use 10 times more energy than offices, more than four times more water, and generate billions of pounds of waste every year, nearly all of it considered hazardous.
https://www.aacc.org/cln/articles/2019/march/clinical-labs-making-the-switch-to-green One 410,000 square feet Life Sciences development at 642 Quarry Road, San Carlos will use 27 million gallons of water per year. Water storage capacity for that area of San Carlos is 11 million gallons. Another 339,000 square feet Life Sciences development at 841 Old County Road, San Carlos will use 15 million gallons per year.
Solid and hazardous waste generation
Many millions of square feet of new Life Sciences developments are planned in a concentrated “cluster” in the bay area. Cumulatively, they will generate millions more tons of hazardous waste and single use plastics, primarily in the form of personal protective equipment (PPE) and biosafety lab supplies. This increase in solid waste will severely strain existing landfills and require that new landfills and hazardous waste disposal sites be built. Moreover, truckloads of this waste must be transported on major San Carlos roadways that are our primarily evacuation routes to reach to Hwy 101.
A recent article in Environmental Science and Pollution Research addressed the issues.
It reads in part:
The COVID-19 pandemic not only has caused a global health crisis but also has significant environmental consequences. . . However, according to this review, the pandemic put enormous strain on the present waste collection and treatment system, resulting in ineffective waste management practices, damaging the environment. The extensive usage of face masks increased the release of microplastics/nanoplastics (183 to 1247 particles piece 1) and organic pollutants in land and water bodies. Furthermore, the significant usages of anti-bacterial hand sanitizers, disinfectants, and pharmaceuticals have increased the accumulation of various toxic emerging contaminants (e.g., triclocarban, triclosan, bisphenol-A, hydroxychloroquine) in the treated sludge/biosolids and discharged wastewater effluent, posing great threats to the ecosystems. This review also suggests strategies to create long-term environmental advantages. Thermochemical conversions of solid wastes including medical wastes and for treated wastewater sludge/biosolids offer several advantages through recovering the resources and energy and stabilizing/destructing the toxins/contaminants and microplastics in the precursors. Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the environment, waste management and energy sectors: a deeper look into the long-term impacts, May 2022
According to another recent study that included California waste management practices, researchers expressed concerns that failure to provide essential infrastructure may lead to a sanitary and environmental crisis.
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14 Some of the challenges that were found to be impacting MSWMSs throughout the study timeline across different states are (i) the increase in residential volume, (ii) decrease in waste collection revenues, (iii) shortage of waste collection personnel due to illness and quarantining, (iv) concern on workers’ exposure to the virus, and (v) the increase in recycling contamination. The severity of these challenges, along with their adaptive measures, however, were found to vary depending on the system characteristics of the MSWMSs and their regional contexts. Challenges and Adaptive Measures for U.S.
Municipal Solid Waste Management Systems during the COVID-19 Pandemic, April 2022.
(5) Opposition argument: High containment privately funded biosafety labs should not be prohibited, but allowed by jurisdictions that establish guidelines and oversight codified in Conditional Use Permit ordinances.
Rebuttal: Local cities and jurisdictions’ staff do not have the requisite expertise, experience and funding to provide sufficient oversight and monitoring through a Conditional Use Permit. In addition, the catastrophic risks from siting these labs in the densely populated, environmentally sensitive bay area far outweigh the potential monetary rewards.
(a) Lack of expertise
Historically, there have been few BSL 3 labs in the bay area and they were located on University and medical center campuses, in South San Francisco and areas that are not near densely populated residential neighborhoods.
Allowing private, BSL 3 labs with a Conditional Use Permit does not adequately protect the community and environment from the potential harmful effects of hazardous materials and pathogens. San Carlos city staff recently admitted they have no biosafety or biosecurity experience or expertise and that regulations and oversight will be complex, time-consuming and expensive. Planner Costa Sanders pointed out that cities on the east coast that allow high-containment labs have biosafety/biosecurity committees that provide oversight. She said: we don’t have that expertise. See video of the meeting: Link to 2/6/23 Planning Commission (Minute: 29.) Although there are numerous agencies that provide guidelines and oversight of biosafety labs, each lab is responsible for developing a detailed biosafety manual that addresses the inherent risks of research. Universities like Stanford have comprehensive Biosafety manuals and committees. That is not true for private labs which may include underfunded start-ups or labs that lease BSL 3 lab space to multiple and rotating tenants.
San Mateo County Department of Environmental Health and Safety does not have biosafety committees, guidelines or ordinances that specify where biosafety labs should be sited and how privately-owned, speculative developments with multiple unknown BSL tenants should be operated and monitored. Most San Mateo county regulations
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15 address hazardous materials (chemicals), not hazardous biological cellular materials or pathogens (except with regard to medical waste).
(b) Cites are prohibiting BSL 3 and 4 labs
San Carlos staff previously recommended a ban vs a proposed Conditional Use Permit.
Staff conceded that only 1% of biosafety lab tenants will request BSL-3 use. EDAC Director Al Savay said that the city does not think the economic impacts on market dynamics will be significant and that he feels good about moving forward with the proposed ordinance (to ban BSL 3 labs) based on public safety and community concerns. Link to 2/6/23 Planning Commission (Minute: 26.) Staff specifically stated that banning BSL-3 labs will have NO significant economic impacts. They repeated this at the City Council meeting on March 27
th.
Redwood City council has indicated that it will require Conditional Use Permits for BSL 1 and 2 labs downtown. No BSL 3 labs will be allowed. (A recent San Mateo Daily Journal article incorrectly stated that that BSL 3 labs would be considered downtown.) This is scheduled for Redwood City Council review on June 26 th. See the following
article which accurately describes the discussion:
https://www.rwcpulse.com/redwood-city-news/redwood-city-considers-adding-labs-to-downtown-area-as- council-members-discuss-development-challenges-6988531
At the 5/8 City Council study session, Council Member Martinez-Saballos expressed concerns about hazardous materials transport downtown within proximity to housing.
Other concerns were about the need to address sensitive receptors in mixed use buildings with R&D labs because staff found no other cities in the region that permit biolabs downtown. (Source: Nina Goodale, Redwood City, Sierra Club Bay Area Biosafety Working Group member, community and environmental activist, attended the meeting.)
Extensive biosafety ordinances have been enacted in east coast cities, but perhaps that is because they have many more labs and a much longer history of regulating them.
See this detailed spreadsheet that lists cities near Cambridge, MA that ban BSL- 3 and 4s. The cities that allow them have extensive guidelines and ordinances. (Spreadsheet is cited with permission from its’ authors, Nina and Steven Goodale, Redwood Shores community and environmental activists.)
(c) Unacceptable risks from fires, floods, earthquakes and natural disasters There are catastrophic public safety and environmental risks associated with siting high- containment biosafety labs in the bay area which is particularly susceptible to sea level rise, flooding, earthquakes, liquification and rolling power outages due to an outdated and overtaxed energy grid. A June 1, 2023 webinar, Safety First, Planning Ahead for a Lab Crisis, illustrated the risks. It was hosted by Lab Manager Webinars.
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16 The speaker was Tracy Wieder, (now Tracy Durnan) MBA, Senior Manager, Facilities Operations and Lab Support, University of Miami Sylvester Comprehensive Cancer Center. (She has recently relocated.) Her presentation was outstanding. She is an expert in emergency management of biosafety labs. She showed photos and presented case studies of labs that had experienced natural disasters, chemical fires and flooding from broken sprinklers. She provided valuable information related to preventing lab accidents and responding to them. Although her target audience is primarily biosafety lab researchers, we learned a lot from her. We highly recommend that local cities, community and environmental groups engage her as a speaker or consultant.
She began the webinar: “Labs are a dangerous place to work.”
Case studies:
(1) In 2001, Tropical Storm Allison hit the Houston metropolitan area and caused tremendous damage from deadly flooding to research facilities at the University of Houston Medical School. There was a massive loss of research animals, valuable research materials and cell lines. All back-up generators failed. Laboratory Disaster Planning: Lessons Learned from 2001 Tropical Storm Allison, Tracy Wieder, 2018
https://www.labmanager.com/laboratory-disaster-planning-lessons- learned-from-2001-tropical-storm-allison-1924
(2) A 2012 chemical fire from a reaction between chemicals in a chemistry lab caused a fire on a New York university campus. The entire campus had to be evacuated for over a week. Fire at SUNY Canton | NCPR News (northcountrypublicradio.org) See the following for the after-action slide presentation by their fire department. SUNYCantonFire.pdf (nysema.org) We note that Stanford university lost power for days after the Edgewood Fire in June, 2022. Fires are not a rare or theoretical possibility near San Carlos. In fact, there was a grass fire less than a mile away near the Whipple exit, today, June 20, 2023. Smoke billowed across Hwy 101 for hours. Crews investigate suspicious fire in Redwood City, KTVU.
(3) A construction crew at a major research building broke off a fire sprinkler head during HVAC work over a weekend. It flooded biosafety labs on the floor below. Lab personnel removed some of the most expensive equipment, but they were unable to occupy the lab until after flood mitigation work was complete. The water damaged HEPA filters in the biosafety cabinets and they could not be replaced because they were no longer manufactured.
In the event of a major earthquake, flooding, or prolonged power outages, damage to high containment labs could be extreme and require evacuation of thousands of people
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17 living hear the labs and closure of highways, roadways and airports located in the evacuation zone. It could take days or months for personnel to access and safely decommission the labs. If these labs are located in close proximity to Hwy 101, El Camino, SFO and Hiller airports, mandatory evacuations could severely impact transportation and evacuation routes for the entire bay area. Toxic smoke from a high- containment lab fire could also disrupt air travel, sicken thousands of people, animals and wildlife and cause widespread environmental damage. (d) Supply chain disruptions have resulted in 30-50 week delays in obtaining critical lab safety equipment.
A May 16, 2023 Northern California Life Sciences webinar was hosted by Hacienda, Longellow and Mai Construction. Tito Shafique, Zagar Consulting, an industry panel representative, indicated that there are ongoing supply chain interruptions for laboratory air handlers, transformers and equipment from China (provides heavy mechanical equipment) and Europe (provides key processing equipment) that are resulting in delays of 30-50 weeks for critical biosafety lab equipment. These issues will increase exponentially in the event of a major disaster.
(e) Danger to first responders: fire departments and first responders may choose NOT to enter BSL-3 labs in the event of a fire or emergency.
Emergency responders may choose not to enter high-containment biolabs. Tracey Wieder confirmed this in the recent Lab Crisis webinar.
(f) Lack of transparency and secrecy. The public does not know where high- containment labs are located and have inadequate information to protect themselves if they are in the vicinity of a lab accident or loss of containment.
According to city staff, they were unable to determine how many private BSL 3 labs are in the bay area or where they are located. They estimated there are about seven, including university biosafety labs. We have been unable to confirm this.
Private high-containment biohazard labs conducting research on designated federal select agents are not required to disclose their identities, locations or the types of pathogens or genetically modified organisms researched. Moreover, the Federal Select Agent Program is not allowed to disclose their identities or locations. As a result, the public, first responders, and state and local governments are unable to ascertain the number, identity and location of these laboratories.
Private, high-containment biolabs located near residential areas and sensitive receptors should not be allowed to justify their secrecy and lack of transparency by claiming proprietary or security issues. The public has a right to know what pathogens are being researched in labs next door. Prohibiting high-containment labs is the most effective way to minimize the risk of catastrophic events spreading infectious diseases into the community.
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18 We attended a meeting on June 15th where this issue was discussed. Mary Pardon, President of the Belmont Chamber of Commerce claimed that the locations of BSL 3 labs are known and said that she had a map showing the location of the BSL 3 labs in the bay area. She said she obtained it from OSHA. However, she refused to provide a copy of the map claiming that it was “confidential” and that “the County knows where these labs are.”
We respectfully request that city staff confirm whether OSHA provides maps of where BSL 3 labs are located and whether this information is available to the public.
We implore you to approve the biosafety ordinance that will prohibit high-containment BSL 3 labs in San Carlos. Thank you very much for considering our comments and concerns.
Respectfully,
Debbie and Gary Baldocchi
San Carlos residents
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From: Barbara Kelsey
To: Adam Rak; *City Clerk"s Office
Cc: Gita Dev; Gladwyn d"Souza; dcarch; James Eggers
Subject: Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter comment letter re: June 26th Council Meeting Agenda item: Proposed Biotech Ordinance
Date: Wednesday, June 21, 2023 10:54:07 AM
Attachments: San Carlos Sierra Club recommends no BSL-3 Labs in San Carlos 3.17.23.pdf Sierra Club letter-BSL3 Ban-San Carlos 6.21.23.pdf
[NOTICE: This message originated outside of City of San Carlos -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.] June 21, 2023
Mayor Rak and members of the City Council
City of San Carlos
Via email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Dear Mayor Rak and Members of the Council,
The Sierra Club, Loma Prieta Chapter, Sustainable Land Use Committee (SLU) advocates on land use issues in San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties. We would like to reiterate our position that the city should adopt the version of the proposed Biotech ordinance that prohibits any BSL-3 or BSL-4 lab in San Carlos.
Please find attached our full comment letter and our earlier letter to the City Council, dated March 17, 2023.
Respectfully yours,
Gita Dev, FAIA, Co-Chair
Sustainable Land Use Committee
Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter
Cc: James Eggers, Executive Director, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter Gladwyn d’Souza, Conservation Chair, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter Sent by:
Barbara Kelsey
she/her/hers
Chapter Coordinator
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1 SAN MATEO, SANTA CLARA & SAN BENITO COUNTIES
March 17, 2023
Mayor Rak and members of the City Council
City of San Carlos
Via email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Subject: Sierra Club recommends no BSL-3 labs in San Carlos Dear Mayor Rak and San Carlos City Council members,
use issues and the Bay Alive Campaign advocates for the ecological health of San Francisco Bay. We strongly recommend that no Biosafety Level (BSL)-3 labs be built in San Carlos, and that BSL-4 labs also be excluded.
Recently, the Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter Planning for Life Sciences Development for Bay Area Cities.
Boston/Cambridge area, a historic hub for life sciences in the US, and included biosafety experts. An important fact emerged: several cities in the greater Boston/Cambridge metropolitan area have reversed their biosafety policies to no longer allow BSL-3 or higher labs in their cities, and more are joining their ranks. Some do not even allow BSL-2 labs. Please see a list of cities and links to their ordinances HERE.
Why have they made this change? With decades of experience with the industry and the growing awareness of the increasingly lethal agents used in BSL- -
- -risk labs, described below, into their
communities.
BSL- - the NIH, involve the higher-risk pathogens
that are difficult to control, as they are often airborne and very contagious when released. They require complete dependence on mechanical systems that can fail1 through human error, mechanical failure or disasters, as well as safety oversight 1 Boston University, June 1, 2016: National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories
-3 research until the outside engineers review recommended remedial work to prevent future ventilation system malfunctions
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2 structures.2 They work well in institutions that have scientific safety oversight committees that ensure an understanding of risks, transparency, regular reporting and inspections, and biosafety procedures for worker, public and environmental safety. San Carlos does not have such structures in place.
-3
high-containment labs in San Carlos. Instead, the Commission voted for a hastily organized conditional use permit (CUP) process developed with industry input. We note the following.
San Carlos, in its Safety Element,3 does not mention biohazards, biosafety, or biosecurity. The City is completely unprepared for biohazards or a biohazard release incident. San Mateo County Environmental Health staff similarly report 4 that they have no authority or responsibility for biohazard incidents, with the exception of the Coronavirus pandemic. The State hazardous materials databases, which the fire departments and emergency responders depend upon, include chemical and radiological hazards but do not include biological hazards.
There has been no organized outreach process to solicit public input on a proposed new ordinance for BSL-3 labs, although this is a safety issue of critical concern to residents and for public safety and security.
would allow high-risk BSL-3 labs in proximity to an already impacted and vulnerable residential area, endangering residents with unknown infectious agents. San Carlos has a history of regulatory failure on the east side, including reducing noise, protecting from flooding and soil contamination, as well as failures in reducing toxic air, addressing traffic, improving pedestrian safety and adding more parks.
High-risk labs would be adjacent to sensitive natural ecosystems that affect the Bay itself. Wildlife and Bay water quality are at risk as creeks through this zone have overflowed multiple times, flooding lab facilities, polluting the waters which empty directly onto sensitive wetlands in the Bay. Flooding and seismic events are predictable hazards in this part of the Bay Area, therefore biosafety concerns of BSL-3 labs are a critical issue.
At this time, the federal government and the scientific community are expressing increasing concern about the growth of new risky research in privately-funded BSL-3 labs and the lack of oversight.
5 Without proper regulation or oversight by the National
2 In fact, the most concerning
aspect about high-containment biolabs is that, considered as a collective, they may only be as safe as the worst lab among them. A breach or a breakdown at one could imperil us all
3 City of San Carlos Public Safety and Services Element 4 In a meeting with the San Mateo County Office of Environmental Health and the Sierra Club Biosafety working group
5 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) have formed an advisory committee, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). The NSABB has held meetings in 2022 and 2023 about Biosafety, with specific focus on Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (PC3O) and Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). Excerpt from transcript of NSABB Sept 2022 meeting a board member
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3 Institutes of Health (NIH) or other public health agencies, allowing the proliferation of these facilities presents a significant risk to public safety.
Lastly, we would like to note that the draft Conditional Use Permit ordinance for BSL-3 labs appears to have been designed by an industry consultant, for industry interests. It fails to address important elements of a successful biosafety policy that experts with decades of experience with BSL labs in their communities have raised, 6 including public accountability,
transparency, and reporting of accidents. Additionally, it does not adequately address critical sustainability issues, neighborhood concerns, and environmental safety.
Therefore, we strongly urge you to reject the establishment of any BSL-3 labs in San Carlos.
We also recommend the creation and adoption of transparent Biosafety Standards for all BSL labs, as in cities in the Boston/Cambridge biotech hub area, based on scientific principles and developed with an open process involving public health and safety agencies, the community, and other stakeholders, including environmental groups. County-wide standards would be preferable to City-by-City standards as the County Environmental Health Services Agency is the agency responsible for overseeing public health and safety in San Mateo County.
Respectfully submitted,
Gita Dev, Co-Chair, Sustainable Land Use Committee
Chair, Conservative Committee
Jennifer Chang Hetterly, Campaign Lead, Bay Alive
Cc: James Eggers, Executive Director, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter Dave Pine, Chair, Board Of Supervisors, San Mateo County < > Ray Mueller, Board of Supervisors District 3, San Mateo County < Len Materman, OneShoreline, San Mateo County <
Matt Fabry, Manager, San Mateo County Water Pollution Prevention Program < > Xavier Fernandez, Regional Water Quality Control Board
Steve Goldbeck, Chief Deputy Director, Bay Conservation and Development Commission < >
Ashley Tomerlin, Bay Conservation and Development Commission >
notes:
especially out here in the west with Silicon Valley.
6 Planning for Life Sciences Development for Bay Area Cities 2, 2023
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sierraclub.org/loma-prieta ~ 3921 East Bayshore Road, Suite 204, Palo Alto, CA 94303 Page 1 of 2
SAN MATEO, SANTA CLARA & SAN BENITO COUNTIES
June 21, 2023
Mayor Rak and members of the City Council
City of San Carlos
Via email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Subject: June 26th Council Meeting re: Proposed Biotech Ordinance Dear Mayor Rak and Members of the Council,
The Sierra Club, Loma Prieta Chapter, Sustainable Land Use Committee (SLU) advocates on land use issues in San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties.
We would like to reiterate our position that the city should adopt the version of the proposed Biotech ordinance that prohibits any BSL-3 or BSL-4 lab in San Carlos.
The nature of the biological infectious agents being studied, and animal research undertaken in a BSL3 or 4 lab could create a health and safety hazard in the event of human error, accidents or in disasters such as a serious seismic event.
Siting of such facilities near creeks, waterways, in shoreline areas, in flood zones, and earthquake liquefaction zones, can create potential vulnerabilities for the regional Bay ecology and human health should public infrastructure be compromised and emergency protocols fail.
Most of the labs that will be leased in the proposed new speculative Life Sciences Developments will be privately funded.
There are significant gaps in the regulation of privately funded research labs, and the majority of the larger speculative developers, such as Alexandria, have little idea who they may rent space to in the future.
Chances are high that that space will be leased to private companies that may be small (and possibly startups). These do not have the size or technical expertise that a Genetech or Gilead have to self-regulate the safety of a BSL-3 lab.
There will be little to no negative impact on the economic vitality of the city or on the city's desirability as a location for Biotech development since 98 to 99% of all new biotech labs will be BSL-1 or 2 level labs. There is not a huge demand for BSL-3 labs.
Many cities that have previously considered BSL-3 labs usually have a designated scientific review committee made up of experts in the field and local community members to advise the city on the implications of approving such a facility.
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sierraclub.org/loma-prieta ~ 3921 East Bayshore Road, Suite 204, Palo Alto, CA 94303 Page 2 of 2 The City of San Carlos does not currently have the expertise and personnel to perform this level of biotech oversight and third party oversight is not recommended if City staff cannot evaluate and endorse the results. Neither do the CDC and NIH have the resources to oversee the research in every lab.
To summarize: Any BSL-3 laboratory located in San Carlos could be the source of an accidential release of potentially life-threatening pathogens that could affect the local community and the environment, so the prudent approach from a health and safety perspective and from a city liability perspective is to prohibit such facilities outright. Please prohibit all BSL-3 laboratories in San Carlos.
We also attach our earlier letter to City Council, dated March 17, 2023.
Respectfully yours,
Gita Dev, FAIA, Co-Chair
Sustainable Land Use Committee
Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter
Cc: James Eggers, Executive Director, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter
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