Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
City of Willits Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 35
Figure 8 Historical Wildfires in the City of Willits
3.11.2 Location
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
City of Willits Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 36
Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) classify areas as having moderate, high, or very high wildfire hazard based on factors such as fuel loading, slope, fire weather, and wind conditions that influence fire behavior and spread (CAL FIRE). State Responsibility Areas (SRA) are generally rural or undeveloped lands where CAL FIRE provides wildland fire protection, while Local Responsibility Areas (LRA) are more developed areas where fire protection is provided by local fire agencies. For the purposes of this analysis, SRA and LRA were mapped together to provide full coverage of the planning area. Risk analysis focused on assets located within high to very high FHSZ, which represents the greatest wildfire hazard. FIGURE 9 shows the Fire Hazard Severity Zones in the City of Willits.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
City of Willits Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 37
Figure 9 Fire Hazard Severity Zones in the City of Willits
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
City of Willits Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 38
3.11.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
Older adults, people with disabilities, residents without reliable vehicles, renters, lower-income households, and people with respiratory conditions may face greater challenges during response and recovery.
3.11.3.1 Community Lifelines
CAL FIRE designates Fire Hazard Severity Zones within the City of Willits. Within these high- to very high-risk areas, there are four transportation-related critical facilities. Additionally, the City of Willits Steering Committee noted that many city-owned buildings are of older construction and may require retrofitting or hardening to better withstand wildfire impacts. In addition, excessive vegetation and fuel loads are present around critical facilities, including the water treatment plant and the airport, which serves as an emergency evacuation area, increasing potential wildfire risk.
3.11.3.2 Parcels
The parcel analysis for the City of Willits is summarized below in TABLE 7. Residential structures represent the largest category of buildings exposed to high to very high wildfire risk.
Table 7 Willits Parcels Exposed to Wildfire Risk Areas (High-Very High Risk) Use Type Parcel Count Land Value Improved Value
Commercial 10 $1,159,136 $63,000,236
Industrial 19 $3,481,085 $6,532,255
Institutional 3 $242,421 $597,567
Miscellaneous 4 $19,053 $0
Residential 347 $22,546,173 $57,419,169
Rural 13 $589,624 $457,884
No Data 19 $247,967 $358,604
Total 415 $28,285,459 $128,365,715
Source: The County of Mendocino Assessor’s Office and GIS Department
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
City of Willits Jurisdictional Annex
Appendix A Adoption Resolution 39
Appendix A Adoption Resolution
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
2 Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................... 2 1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 3 2 MITIGATION STRATEGY........................................................................................................... 5
2.1 MITIGATION GOALS ........................................................................................................ 5
2.2 2026 MITIGATION ACTIONS............................................................................................ 5
2.3 MITIGATION CAPABILITIES.............................................................................................. 6
2.4 PLANNING INTEGRATION................................................................................................ 7
2.5 CONTINUING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT.............................................................................. 7
2.6 CHANGES IN COMMUNITY PRIORITIES........................................................................... 7 3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................. 8
3.1 HAZARD RISK RANKING................................................................................................... 8
3.2 EARTHQUAKE .................................................................................................................. 8
3.3 EXTREME COLD OR FREEZE............................................................................................. 9
3.4 FLOOD (INLAND) ............................................................................................................. 9
3.5 WILDFIRE....................................................................................................................... 10 APPENDIX A ADOPTION RESOLUTION .......................................................................................... 14 Professional planning services for this plan update were provided by:
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Introduction 3
1 Introduction
FIGURE 1 shows the Covelo Fire Protection District (FPD) boundaries. The FPD Fire Chief participated in the HMP planning process and provided input to inform this Annex. Additional information is provided in Appendix D of the Base Plan.
The FPD involved several nonprofits and community organizations listed in Section 2 of the Base Plan through stakeholder surveys.
The West Business Development Center was one stakeholder that provided input through the stakeholder survey. The organization serves entrepreneurs and small business owners across incorporated and unincorporated areas, as well as areas outside the county. The Center noted that recent disasters, including COVID-19, wildfires, and drought, significantly disrupted small business operations. Many small businesses were identified as unprepared or underprepared for disaster impacts, resulting in operational disruptions and permanent closures.
The West Business Development Center identified key hazards of concern for the populations it serves, including coastal hazards, earthquakes, drought, extreme heat, flooding, mass earth movements, severe storms, tsunamis, and wildfires. This feedback was incorporated into the Base Plan under local vulnerabilities for applicable hazards, with additional discussion of small businesses as an under-resourced population to reflect concerns related to disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Introduction 4
Figure 1 Covelo Fire Protection District
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 5
2 Mitigation Strategy
The mitigation strategy is a central component of the hazard mitigation plan (HMP) and the primary outcome of the planning process. This strategy serves as a long-term framework for reducing vulnerabilities to hazards. While this document begins by focusing on the mitigation strategy, it is important to acknowledge the various components that informed the planning process. These inputs included decisions and information from the Planning Partners, Core Planning Team (CPT), and general public, in addition to the results of the risk and vulnerability assessment. All of this information is captured in detail across the County of Mendocino Base Plan and this Covelo Fire Protection District Annex.
2.1 Mitigation Goals
The Covelo Fire Protection District has adopted the hazard mitigation goals and objectives developed by the Core Planning Team and described in Section 1.1 of the Base Plan.
2.2 2026 Mitigation Actions
The Covelo FPD Chief identified and prioritized the following mitigation actions for the Covelo FPD based on the risk assessment and input from the public survey.
2.2.1 Coastal Hazards
No known hazard areas within the local government’s boundaries. No perceived risk, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.2.2 Dam and Levee Incidents
While there is one levee in the Town of Covelo, no Covelo Fire Protection District-owned assets are located within any dam or levee inundation areas; therefore, no assets are at risk.
2.2.3 Drought
Hazard effects from drought do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.2.4 Earthquake
• High Priority
o (CF1) New Fire Station. Replacement of the existing station with a new building constructed to updated building codes.
o (CF2) Replacement Generator for Existing Fire Station. Purchase a replacement generator for the station as the current generator has reached its useful life.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 6
2.2.5 Extreme Cold or Freeze
• High Priority
o (CF3) Engine Bay Insulation & Heating. Insulate the entire engine bay and purchase/install heaters.
o (CF4) Engine Heaters. Purchase and install block heaters for the engines.
2.2.6 Extreme Heat
Hazard effects from extreme heat do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.2.7 Flood (Inland)
• High Priority
o (CF5) Fire Station Grading. Regrade the land surrounding the station and re-route the existing irrigation system.
2.2.8 Mass Earth Movements
Hazard effects from mass earth movements do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.2.9 Severe Storms
Hazard effects from severe storms do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.2.10 Tsunami
No known hazard areas within the local government’s boundaries. No perceived risk, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.2.11 Wildfire
• High Priority
o (CF6) Fire Station Sprinklers. Purchase and installation of a sprinkler system inside of the station.
• Medium Priority
o (CF7) Wildfire Education Campaign. Develop a wildfire mitigation public education campaign. Materials will be distributed as part of the continued public engagement that will annually occur at community functions including rodeos and festivals.
2.3 Mitigation Capabilities
Planning and regulatory, administrative and technical, financial, and education and outreach capabilities are powerful tools for implementing hazard mitigation. The FPD currently does not
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 7
have any mitigation capabilities to leverage and is reliant upon county capabilities when needed.
2.3.1 Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
• The district currently has no Planning and Regulatory Capabilities in place
2.3.2 Administrative and Technical Capabilities
• The district currently has no Administrative and Technical Capabilities in place
2.3.3 Financial Capabilities
• General Obligation Bonds to Incur Debt
2.3.4 Education and Outreach Capabilities
• The district currently has no Education and Outreach Capabilities in place
2.3.5 Capability Enhancements
The district currently has limited capacity to implement mitigation and is considering expanding staffing capabilities with the hire of a new Assistant Chief. This position would support the Chief, who is the district’s only paid, full-time employee. Additional funding is needed; the district plans to pursue external grant programs to improve its capacity to implement mitigation.
2.4 Planning Integration
The Covelo FPD plans to utilize the updated 2026 HMP during grant application development.
The HMP will also inform the district’s capital improvement planning, after that process is formalized.
2.5 Continuing Public Engagement
The Covelo FPD will continue to educate the public on hazard risk and mitigation solutions through several annual events, including the Blackberry Festival in August, Indian Days in September, and at community and high school rodeos.
2.6 Changes in Community Priorities
The Covelo FPD has observed a growing public focus on wildfire risk as the top hazard of concern. The public expects more mitigation resources.
2.6.1 Development Trends
The Covelo FPD does not anticipate an expansion of services or infrastructure; therefore, vulnerability is not expected to change due to growth.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 8
3 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
3.1 Hazard Risk Ranking
TABLE 1 shows the rankings for the Covelo FPD. The Covelo FPD Chief identified the following hazards that do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority: coastal hazards, dam and levee incidents, drought, extreme heat, mass earth movements, severe storms, and tsunamis.
Table 1 Covelo FPD Hazard Risk Ranking
Hazard Risk Rank
Coastal Hazards (Flood, Sea-level rise,
Erosion)
Not Applicable
Dam & Levee Incidents Not Applicable
Drought Not Applicable
Earthquake High
Extreme Cold or Freeze Moderate
Extreme Heat Not Applicable
Flood (Inland) Moderate
Mass Earth Movements (landslides, rock falls,
debris flows)
Not Applicable
Severe Storms Not Applicable
Tsunami Not Applicable
Wildfire High
3.2 Earthquake
3.2.1 Past Events
There are no unique earthquake events that have impacted the Covelo FPD in the past. Refer to section 4.8 Earthquake in the Base Plan.
3.2.2 Location
The Covelo FPD is located near the Maacama Fault, part of the San Andreas Fault system, which lies west of the district and can produce significant earthquakes. The region’s seismic activity is influenced by the nearby Mendocino Triple Junction, and while other local faults exist, the Maacama Fault represents the primary source of large-magnitude earthquake risk for the
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 9
Covelo FPD and the surrounding area. Refer to Section 4.8 of the Base Plan for the location of fault lines in the county that could cause earthquake events in the city.
3.2.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Chief noted that the district's only station is very old and is the top asset of concern. It previously served as a bowling alley and has not been seismically retrofitted. Given the facility's age, the most cost-effective solution may be to build a new station.
Earthquakes can cause injuries, displacement, and emergency response needs within the Covelo Fire Protection District service area. Residents in older or vulnerable buildings may face greater risk. FPD staff and volunteers may also be affected personally while responding to community needs.
3.3 Extreme Cold or Freeze
3.3.1 Past Events
There are no unique extreme cold or freeze events that have impacted the Covelo FPD in the past. Refer to section 4.9 Extreme Cold or Freeze in the Base Plan.
3.3.2 Location
The entire Covelo FPD is vulnerable to the impacts of extreme cold or freeze.
3.3.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Chief noted that the district experiences regular impacts during extreme cold events that freeze water lines in the station, the engine's motors, and water pumps. Those are the top local asset concerns.
Cold or freeze events can create health risks for residents without reliable heat, shelter, transportation, or backup power. Older adults, people with disabilities, medically dependent residents, low-income households, and people experiencing homelessness may be more vulnerable. FPD staff may be called on to support emergency response, welfare checks, or access needs during cold-weather events.
3.4 Flood (Inland)
3.4.1 Past Events
The Covelo FPD has not experienced any major, widely documented flood events in recent years. Refer to section 4.10 Flood (Inland) in the Base Plan for information on regional flood events across the County of Mendocino.
3.4.2 Location
Although there are no documented historical flood events causing damage, Covelo FPD is still vulnerable to localized flooding, especially near Town Creek and other low-lying areas during
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 10
periods of heavy rainfall. Flooding has sometimes affected State Route 162, leading to road closures that may hamper emergency access.
3.4.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Chief noted that in the winter, the station's engine bay floods and water flows through the structure. This is caused by grading around the station. This is the top asset of concern.
Flooding can create life-safety risks, displacement, and access challenges for residents in affected areas. People with limited mobility, limited transportation, lower incomes, or limited access to emergency information may need additional support. Flooding may also make it harder for FPD personnel to reach residents quickly.
3.5 Wildfire
3.5.1 Past Events
The Covelo FPD has experienced several significant wildfire events since the previous HMP update. Details of these events are provided below. For information on regional wildfire trends across the county, refer to the 4.15 Wildfire section of the County Base Plan. • August 2020: Creek Fire - A wildfire burned approximately 820 acres near Covelo around Highway 162 and Short Creek Road. It destroyed three structures and prompted evacuation warnings as crews worked to contain the blaze. • August 2020: August Complex Fire DR-4558-CA - The fire significantly impacted the Covelo and Round Valley area of northern Mendocino County after a series of lightningcaused fires ignited and merged into a massive wildfire complex. Large portions of the surrounding Mendocino National Forest and nearby wilderness areas burned, and communities around Covelo experienced evacuation orders and prolonged smoke impacts as the fire spread through remote forestlands. Overall, the August Complex became California’s first “gigafire,” burning more than 1 million acres, with an estimated ~400,000 acres burned within Mendocino County, much of it in the mountains and forests surrounding the Covelo region.
• July 2024: Mina Fire - A fire burned about 98 acres northwest of Covelo around the 97500 block of Mina Road. It led to evacuation warnings and threatened timberlands and structures in the area.1
• July 2024: Pepperwood Fire - A smaller wildfire north of Covelo near Buck Mountain burned roughly 12.5 acres with no reported injuries or structure loss, but required firefighting resources and posed a local hazard.
2 • July 2025: Medicine Fire - A wildfire burned northwest of Covelo in late July 2025, first reported on the afternoon of July 27 near Rifle Range Road. The wildfire grew to about 1 MINA FIRE: INCIDENT UPDATE ON 07/10/2024 AT 8:42 AM | CAL FIRE 2 PEPPERWOOD FIRE NEAR COVELO 85% CONTAINED • THE MENDOCINO VOICE | MENDOCINO COUNTY, CA
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 11
263 acres, prompted mandatory evacuations for local residents (later lifted), and threatened more than 200 households and over 500 people. As of August 1, Cal Fire had the blaze 75 % contained, and three firefighters were injured during suppression efforts.
The cause of the fire remained under investigation.3
3.5.2 Location
Wildfire risk in the Covelo FPD is particularly pronounced in the surrounding wildlands and foothills where flammable vegetation and rugged terrain are common. For example, recent wildfires such as the 2025 Medicine Fire, which burned northwest of Covelo near Rifle Range Road, Hopper Lane, and Mina Road/Highway 162, demonstrate that areas on the outskirts of the community adjacent to grasslands and brush are vulnerable to wildfire ignition and spread.
Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) classify areas as having moderate, high, or very high wildfire hazard based on factors such as fuel loading, slope, fire weather, and wind conditions that influence fire behavior and spread (CAL FIRE). State Responsibility Areas (SRA) are generally rural or undeveloped lands where CAL FIRE provides wildland fire protection, while Local Responsibility Areas (LRA) are more developed areas where fire protection is provided by local fire agencies. SRA and LRA were mapped together to provide full coverage of the planning area.
FIGURE 2 shows the Fire Hazard Severity Zones in the Covelo FPD. 3 THE LATEST: 'MEDICINE FIRE' IS 75% CONTAINED • THE MENDOCINO VOICE | MENDOCINO COUNTY, CA
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 12
Figure 2 Fire Hazard Severity Zones in the Covelo Fire Protection District
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 13
3.5.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Chief noted that all the district assets, including the station, equipment, vehicles, and engines, are potentially at risk from a large wildfire. The top concerns aside from staff impacts is the station and housed vehicles.
Wildfire can affect people through direct fire exposure, smoke, evacuation, and displacement.
Risk may be greater for residents in areas with limited access, limited transportation, or limited ability to maintain defensible space. Older adults, people with disabilities, lower-income households, people with respiratory conditions, and FPD staff and volunteers may face increased risks during response and recovery.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Covelo Fire Protection District Jurisdictional Annex
Appendix A Adoption Resolution 14
Appendix A Adoption Resolution
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex 2 Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................... 2 1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 3 2 MITIGATION STRATEGY........................................................................................................... 5
2.1 MITIGATION GOALS ........................................................................................................ 5
2.2 MITIGATION SUCCESSES ................................................................................................. 5
2.3 2026 MITIGATION ACTIONS............................................................................................ 5
2.4 MITIGATION CAPABILITIES.............................................................................................. 7
2.5 PLANNING INTEGRATION................................................................................................ 8
2.6 INCORPORATION OF EXISTING PLANS AND INFORMATION........................................... 8
2.7 CONTINUING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT.............................................................................. 8
2.8 DEVELOPMENT TRENDS.................................................................................................. 8 3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................. 9
3.1 HAZARD RISK RANKING................................................................................................... 9
3.2 DROUGHT........................................................................................................................ 9
3.3 EARTHQUAKE ................................................................................................................ 10
3.4 SEVERE STORMS............................................................................................................ 10
3.5 TSUNAMI....................................................................................................................... 11
3.6 WILDFIRE....................................................................................................................... 12 APPENDIX A ADOPTION RESOLUTION .......................................................................................... 14 Professional planning services for this plan update were provided by:
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Introduction 3
1 Introduction
FIGURE 1 shows the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District (FPD) boundaries. The FPD Fire Chief participated in the HMP planning process and provided input to inform this Annex. Additional information is provided in Appendix D of the Base Plan.
The City of Point Arena City Manager and Assistant City Manager collaborated with the FPD Fire Chief during coordination meetings for the FPD and the city.
In addition to the public engagement described in the Base Plan, the FPD posted printed flyers in the City of Point Arena and the Town of Mendocino. The FPD also invited the Point Arena Fire Safe Council Coordinator to all Core Planning Team Meetings. Additionally, the FPD involved many nonprofits and community organizations listed in Section 2 of the Base Plan through stakeholder surveys.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Introduction 4
Figure 1 Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Boundaries
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Mitigation Strategy 5
2 Mitigation Strategy
The mitigation strategy is a central component of the hazard mitigation plan (HMP) and the primary outcome of the planning process. This strategy serves as a long-term framework for reducing vulnerabilities to hazards. While this document begins by focusing on the mitigation strategy, it is important to acknowledge the various components that informed the planning process. These inputs included decisions and information from the Planning Partners, Core Planning Team (CPT), and general public, in addition to the results of the risk and vulnerability assessment. All of this information is captured in detail across the County of Mendocino Base Map and this Redwood Coast FPD Annex.
2.1 Mitigation Goals
The Redwood Coast Fire Protection District (FPD) has adopted the hazard mitigation goals and objectives developed by the Core Planning Team and described in Section 1.1 of the Base Plan.
2.2 Mitigation Successes
A key mitigation success for the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District has been the enhancement of education and training programs for both staff and the public.
2.3 2026 Mitigation Actions
The Redwood Coast FPD identified and prioritized the following mitigation actions based on the risk assessment and public survey input. Refer to the HMP Base Plan Appendix C for complete details of each of the mitigation actions listed below.
2.3.1 Coastal Hazards
Hazard effects do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.2 Dam and Levee Incidents
Hazard effects do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.3 Drought
• High Priority
o (RC1) Feasibility Study for Secondary Water Source. Conduct a feasibility study to identify and develop a secondary water source for the fire protection district to ensure supply reliability.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Mitigation Strategy 6
• Medium Priority
o (RC2) Improve Water Piping Infrastructure. Collaborate with Point Arena Water Works and the City of Point Arena to upgrade and improve water piping infrastructure for enhanced reliability and efficiency for the fire district.
2.3.4 Earthquake
• High Priority
o (RC3) Study on Seismic Safety of Fire Stations. Conduct a study to assess and update fire stations to address seismic safety concerns.
2.3.5 Severe Storms
• High Priority
o (RC4) Backup Generators for Fire Stations. Install backup generators on fire stations.
o (RC5) Implement Microgrid Infrastructure and Electrical Redundancy for Critical Facilities. Design and install microgrid infrastructure and electrical redundancy systems at fire stations and critical facilities within the district boundaries to ensure operations continue during storm-related power outages. This action will strengthen local energy resilience by enabling islanding and providing dependable backup power, reducing service disruptions during severe storm events.
2.3.6 Extreme Cold or Freeze
Hazard effects do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.7 Extreme Heat
Hazard effects do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.8 Flood (Inland)
Hazard effects do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.9 Mass Earth Movements (landslides, rock falls, debris flows) Hazard effects do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Mitigation Strategy 7
2.3.10 Tsunami
• High Priority
o (RC6) Install Gate at Cove. Install a gate at the cove to be closed during tsunami events, enhancing public safety by preventing access and protecting people from potential hazards.
• Low Priority
o (RC7) Tsunami Signage. Install clear and visible signage to inform residents and tourists about tsunami risks within the district boundaries, outside of the City of Point Arena and safety procedures, enhancing awareness and preparedness during tsunami events.
2.3.11 Wildfire
• Medium Priority
o (RC8) Wildfire Mitigation Educational Campaign. Partner with the Fire Safe Council to conduct public outreach and education annually on defensible space around homes and businesses within the district boundaries. o (RC9) Fuel Reduction and Chipper Projects. Implement fuel reduction and community chipper projects in high wildfire risk areas within the fire protection district to reduce hazardous vegetation and support defensible space efforts
2.4 Mitigation Capabilities
Planning and regulatory, administrative and technical, financial, and education and outreach capabilities are powerful tools for implementing hazard mitigation. The FPD currently utilizes or has implemented many of these capabilities, as shown in the lists below.
2.4.1 Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
• Capital Improvement Program or Plan (CIP)
• Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP)
2.4.2 Administrative and Technical Capabilities
• Public Information Officer – Chief
• Emergency Manager – Chief
• Grant Writing – Not a designated position
• Warning Systems – Mendo Alerts; Tsunami Siren
• Mutual Aid
2.4.3 Financial Capabilities
• Public Funding
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Mitigation Strategy 8
2.4.4 Education and Outreach Capabilities
• Website Dedicated to Hazard Topics
• Social Media
• Public Hazard Education / Outreach Program/Hazard awareness campaigns • Fire Safe Councils
2.4.5 Capability Enhancements
Over the next five years, the Redwood Coast FPD will seek to hire a full-time grant writer to support its funding and project development efforts. The 2026 Mitigation Actions section also includes several actions that enhance these mitigation capabilities.
2.5 Planning Integration
The Redwood Coast FPD plans to integrate the 2026 HMP by using it as a guiding document and reference for future grant applications and mitigation project planning.
2.6 Incorporation of Existing Plans and Information
All HMP-relevant existing plans, studies, reports, data, and technical information were reviewed during the planning process. Refer to the Base Plan for a complete list of existing plans and information that was incorporated into this HMP.
2.7 Continuing Public Engagement
The Fire Protection District will continue public engagement efforts by sending an annual defensible space letter to homeowners and collaborating with the Point Arena Fire Safe Council to disseminate information at community events such as Block Party and Fish Fest.
2.8 Development Trends
The Redwood Coast FPD has not experienced any development changes in the past five years that have increased its vulnerability. In terms of future development, the FPD does not expect increased vulnerability to severe storms, but the communities they serve will have greater exposure to both hazards if growth occurs. In comparison, future development is not expected to increase earthquake vulnerability, as it will adhere to the latest building codes. The FPD does not foresee future development increasing exposure to drought, tsunami, or wildfire hazards.
The FPD does not intend to expand district boundaries or build new fire stations in the next five years.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 9
3 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
3.1 Hazard Risk Ranking
TABLE 1 shows the rankings for the Redwood Coast Fire Protection District. The Redwood Coast FPD identified the following hazards that do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority: coastal hazards, dam and levee incidents, extreme cold or freeze, extreme heat, flood (inland), and mass earth movements.
Table 1 Redwood Coast FPD Hazard Risk Ranking
Hazard Risk Rank
Coastal Hazards (Flood, Sea-level rise,
Erosion) Not Applicable
Dam & Levee Incidents Not Applicable
Drought High
Earthquake High
Extreme Cold or Freeze Not Applicable
Extreme Heat Not Applicable
Flood (Inland) Not Applicable
Mass Earth Movements (landslides, rock falls,
debris flows) Not Applicable
Severe Storms Moderate
Tsunami Low
Wildfire Moderate
3.2 Drought
3.2.1 Past Events
There are no unique drought events that have impacted the Redwood Coast FPD in the past.
Refer to section 4.7 Drought in the Base Plan.
3.2.2 Location
The entire Redwood Coast FPD is vulnerable to drought impacts.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 10
3.2.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Redwood Coast FPD Steering Committee noted that drought conditions elevate wildfire risk, sometimes necessitating the use of water sources, including streams and privately owned ponds.
Drought can affect people through water restrictions, increased costs, reduced water reliability, and added wildfire risk. Older adults, medically fragile residents, low-income households, renters, and residents with limited English proficiency may have fewer resources to adapt. FPD staff may also face increased response demands if drought conditions worsen fire danger or reduce available water for fire response.
3.3 Earthquake
3.3.1 Past Events
There are no unique earthquake events that have impacted the Redwood Coast FPD in the past.
Refer to section 4.8 Earthquake in the Base Plan.
3.3.2 Location
The Northern segment of the San Andreas fault is closest to the Redwood Coast FPD. Refer to section 4.8 Earthquake in the Base Plan for the location of fault lines in the county that could cause earthquake events in the city.
3.3.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Redwood Coast FPD Steering Committee noted that while fire stations are constructed in accordance with building codes, there are concerns about their resilience in the event of a significant earthquake.
Earthquakes can cause injuries, displacement, and emergency response needs across the district’s service area. Residents, visitors, and workers in older buildings, coastal areas, or areas with limited access may face greater risk. FPD staff and volunteers may also be personally affected while responding to community needs.
3.4 Severe Storms
3.4.1 Past Events
There are no unique severe storm events that have impacted the Redwood Coast FPD in the past. Refer to section 4.13 Severe Storms in the Base Plan and section 4.10 in the Point Arena Jurisdictional Annex for events that have taken place near the Redwood Coast FPD boundary.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 11
3.4.2 Location
The entire Redwood Coast FPD is vulnerable to the impacts of severe storms.
3.4.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Redwood Coast FPD Steering Committee noted that severe storms can impact staff safety and cause power outages at the station, disrupting essential operations. FPD staff may face increased response needs during storms, especially where road access is limited.
Severe storms can expose people to hazardous travel, falling trees, power outages, localized flooding, and coastal access challenges. Older adults, medically dependent residents, people with disabilities, mobile home residents, visitors, and households without backup power or reliable transportation may be more vulnerable.
3.5 Tsunami
3.5.1 Past Events
There are no unique tsunami events that have impacted the Redwood Coast FPD in the past.
Refer to section 4.14 Tsunami in the Base Plan.
3.5.2 Location
The coastal areas of the Redwood Coast FPD boundary are located within tsunami risk areas. As noted in the Base Plan, according to the California Department of Conservation, a wave run-up of 10 feet would affect the entire coastal region of Mendocino County. However, the wave runup is not projected to reach as far as the unincorporated town of Manchester, which is located within the FPD boundary. Refer to section 4.14 Tsunami of the Base Plan for the tsunami risk areas in the county.
3.5.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Redwood Coast FPD Steering Committee noted that in past tsunami events, more citizens have gone to Arena Cove in Point Arena to watch the tsunami. The FPD noted the vulnerability to staff when responding to tsunami incidents involving citizens at Arena Cove in Point Arena.
There are no direct concerns with any district assets.
Tsunami risk is a major life-safety concern for people in low-lying coastal areas, beaches, and harbor or cove areas within the district. Residents, visitors, workers, and boaters may need to evacuate immediately after a strong earthquake or warning. People with limited mobility, limited transportation, language barriers, or limited access to alerts may face greater difficulty reaching safe areas in time.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 12
3.6 Wildfire
3.6.1 Past Events
There are no unique wildfire events that have impacted the Redwood Coast FPD in the past.
Refer to section 4.15 Wildfire in the Base Plan.
3.6.2 Location
There are areas within the district’s boundaries that are in High and Very High Severity Zones.
The Elkhorn Range area experiences higher temperatures than coastal areas. This area is also denser with timber and brush, with houses scattered throughout.
Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) classify areas as having moderate, high, or very high wildfire hazard based on factors such as fuel loading, slope, fire weather, and wind conditions that influence fire behavior and spread (CAL FIRE). State Responsibility Areas (SRA) are generally rural or undeveloped lands where CAL FIRE provides wildland fire protection, while Local Responsibility Areas (LRA) are more developed areas where fire protection is provided by local fire agencies. SRA and LRA were mapped together to provide full coverage of the planning area.
FIGURE 2 shows the Fire Hazard Severity Zones in the Redwood Coast FPD.
3.6.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The district’s three firehouses are located on the coast in Point Arena, Manchester, and Irish Beach. They are less vulnerable to wildfire impacts due to the coastal environment's humidity and low temperatures. Residents living within district boundaries, especially those on Elkhorn Ridge, are vulnerable to the impacts of wildfire events.
Wildfire can affect people through direct fire exposure, smoke, evacuation, and displacement.
Older adults, people with disabilities, residents without reliable vehicles, renters, lower-income households, people with respiratory conditions, and FPD staff and volunteers may face increased risks during response and recovery.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 13
Figure 2 Fire Hazard Severity Zones in the Redwood Coast FPD
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Redwood Coast Fire Protection District Planning Partner Annex Adoption Resolution 14
Appendix A Adoption Resolution
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
2 Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................... 2 1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 3 2 MITIGATION STRATEGY........................................................................................................... 5
2.1 MITIGATION GOALS ........................................................................................................ 5
2.2 MITIGATION SUCCESSES ................................................................................................. 5
2.3 2026 MITIGATION ACTIONS............................................................................................ 5
2.4 MITIGATION CAPABILITIES.............................................................................................. 7
2.5 PLANNING INTEGRATION................................................................................................ 8
2.6 CONTINUING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT.............................................................................. 8
2.7 DEVELOPMENT TRENDS.................................................................................................. 8 3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................. 9
3.1 HAZARD RISK RANKING................................................................................................... 9
3.2 COASTAL HAZARDS: FLOODING, SEA LEVEL RISE, AND EROSION................................... 9
3.3 EARTHQUAKE ................................................................................................................ 10
3.4 TSUNAMI....................................................................................................................... 11 APPENDIX A ADOPTION RESOLUTION .......................................................................................... 13 Professional planning services for this plan update were provided by:
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Introduction 3
1 Introduction
FIGURE 1 shows the Noyo Harbor District boundaries. The Harbormaster participated in the HMP planning process and provided input to inform this Annex. Additional information is provided in Appendix D of the Base Plan.
The City of Fort Bragg Assistant Director of Public Works, Economic Development Manager, Police Captain, and Police Chief collaborated with the District Habormaster during coordination meetings for the district and the city.
In addition to the public engagement outlined in the Base Plan, the Noyo Harbor District supported outreach through a grassroots movement. The GrassRoots Institute of Mendocino County assisted in promoting the planning process and public survey to its members. Hard-copy flyers for the public survey were also posted at locations throughout the City of Fort Bragg within the District.
The West Business Development Center was one stakeholder that provided input through the stakeholder survey. The organization serves entrepreneurs and small business owners across incorporated and unincorporated areas, as well as areas outside the county. The Center noted that recent disasters, including COVID-19, wildfires, and drought, significantly disrupted small business operations. Many small businesses were identified as unprepared or underprepared for disaster impacts, resulting in operational disruptions and permanent closures.
The West Business Development Center identified key hazards of concern for the populations it serves, including coastal hazards, earthquakes, drought, extreme heat, flooding, mass earth movements, severe storms, tsunamis, and wildfires. This feedback was incorporated into the Base Plan under local vulnerabilities for applicable hazards, with additional discussion of small businesses as an under-resourced population to reflect concerns related to disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Introduction 4
Figure 1 Noyo Harbor District Boundaries
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 5
2 Mitigation Strategy
The mitigation strategy is a central component of the hazard mitigation plan (HMP) and the primary outcome of the planning process. This strategy serves as a long-term framework for reducing vulnerabilities to hazards. While this document begins by focusing on the mitigation strategy, it is important to acknowledge the various components that informed the planning process. These inputs included decisions and information from the Planning Partners, Core Planning Team (CPT), and general public, in addition to the results of the risk and vulnerability assessment. All of this information is captured in detail across the County of Mendocino Base Plan and this Noyo Harbor District Annex.
2.1 Mitigation Goals
The Noyo Harbor District has adopted the hazard mitigation goals and objectives developed by the Core Planning Team and described in Section 1.1 of the Base Plan.
2.2 Mitigation Successes
In 2022, Noyo Harbor used the Cal OES Hazard Mitigation Plan to guide infrastructure improvements, including the replacement of cleats and rock guides. The Harbor also redeveloped a study focused on hardening infrastructure, with an estimated cost of approximately $30 million. Additionally, an icehouse with a 20-ton flake ice machine was constructed to support harbor operations.
2.3 2026 Mitigation Actions
The Harbormaster identified and prioritized the following mitigation actions for the Noyo Harbor District based on the risk assessment and input from the public survey.
2.3.1 Coastal Hazards (coastal flooding, sea-level rise, erosion, waves) • High Priority
o (NH1) Develop and Implement a Dredge Management Plan. Develop and implement a dredge management plan, including a sediment removal project and feasibility study to identify environmentally and logistically suitable disposal or reuse sites.
o (NH2) Upgrade and Harden Sediment De-Watering Cell. Upgrade and potentially harden the sediment de-watering cell to ensure its continued functionality.
2.3.2 Dam and Levee Incidents
There are no dams or levees within the district, and no dam-inundation areas from dams outside the district pose a risk.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 6
2.3.3 Drought
Hazard effects from drought do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.4 Earthquake
• High Priority
o (NH3) Coordinated Emergency Egress Route. Establish a coordinated emergency egress route from the north harbor across adjacent tribal land. Collaborate closely with tribal authorities to design, approve, and maintain this critical evacuation pathway, enhancing safe and efficient emergency access and egress for the community.
2.3.5 Extreme Cold or Freeze
Hazard effects from extreme cold or freeze do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.6 Extreme Heat
Hazard effects from extreme heat do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.7 Flood (Inland)
Hazard effects from inland flooding do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.8 Mass Earth Movements
Hazard effects from mass earth movements do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.3.9 Severe Storms
• High Priority
o (NH6) Upgrade and Replace Aging Harbor Infrastructure. Upgrade and replace aging harbor infrastructure to withstand seismic events, severe storms, and increased wave action, while also accommodating larger and heavier vessels now using the port. Improvements will include reinforcing docks, piers, and bulkheads with modern, resilient materials and designs that meet current engineering and safety standards.
2.3.10 Tsunami
• Medium Priority
o (NH4) Coordination with the Sheriff’s Office and Local PD. Increase coordination with the Sheriff’s office and local PD is critical for crowd control measures during a tsunami event.
o (NH5) Enhance Early Warning Systems for Vessel Owners in Noyo Harbor.
Improve early alert and warning systems to ensure vessel owners in the Noyo
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 7
Harbor District receive timely notifications of hazardous conditions. Early alerts provide operators with sufficient time to secure vessels or move offshore before coastal storms, tsunami warnings, or extreme wave events occur. This action includes strengthening communication systems, establishing direct notification protocols, and promoting enrollment in local and regional alert platforms to enhance maritime safety and reduce potential vessel damage.
2.3.11 Wildfire
Hazard effects from wildfire do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority.
2.4 Mitigation Capabilities
Planning and regulatory, administrative and technical, financial, and education and outreach capabilities are powerful tools for implementing hazard mitigation. The Harbor District currently utilizes or has implemented many of these capabilities, as shown below.
2.4.1 Planning and Regulatory Capabilities
• Capital Improvement Program or Plan (CIP)
o Community Sustainability Plan (2019) including Capital Improvement Program (CIP) projects
• Erosion / Sediment Control Program
o District is seeking funding for a Dredge Material Management Plan
2.4.2 Administrative and Technical Capabilities
• Engineer/Professional (Construction)
o The district retains contracted engineers with expertise in structural, marine, and civil engineering
• Floodplain Administrator
o Harbormaster
• Public Information Officer
o Harbormaster
• GIS Specialist and Capability
o Contracted GIS capability
• Emergency Manager
o Harbormaster
• Grant Writing / Management
o Harbormaster
2.4.3 Financial Capabilities
• Utilities Fees
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Mitigation Strategy 8
o Harbor District collects fee for slip usage, park and launch and various other services.
2.4.4 Education and Outreach Capabilities
• Social Media
o Harbormaster
• Community Newsletter
2.4.5 Capability Enhancements
The following lists those specific capabilities that the city will work towards expanding over the next five years. The 2026 Mitigation Actions section also includes several actions that enhance these mitigation capabilities, listed below.
• Develop a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
• Strengthen the erosion control program
2.5 Planning Integration
The Noyo Harbor District plans to incorporate this 2026 Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) update into its broader grant planning efforts.
2.5.1 Incorporation of Existing Plans and Information
All HMP-relevant existing plans, studies, reports, data, and technical information were reviewed during the planning process. The Noyo Harbor Community Sustainability Plan (2019) was incorporated into the 2026 HMP. Refer to the Base Plan for a complete list of existing plans and information that was incorporated into this HMP.
2.6 Continuing Public Engagement
Noyo Harbor will maintain active public engagement by distributing newsletters and holding monthly board meetings where the topic of recent hazard events and impacts will be discussed.
2.7 Development Trends
The district does not anticipate expanding services or infrastructure; therefore, vulnerability is not expected to change with growth.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 9
3 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
3.1 Hazard Risk Ranking
TABLE 1 shows the rankings for the Noyo Harbor District. The district identified the following hazards that do not currently present an immediate or impactful risk to the district’s assets and are, therefore, not a mitigation priority: dam and levee incidents, drought, extreme cold or freeze, extreme heat, flood (inland), mass earth movements, severe storms, and wildfire.
Table 1 Noyo Harbor District Hazard Risk Ranking
Hazard Risk Rank
Coastal Hazards (Flood, Sea-level rise,
Erosion)
High
Dam & Levee Incidents Not Applicable
Drought Not Applicable
Earthquake Moderate
Extreme Cold or Freeze Not Applicable
Extreme Heat Not Applicable
Flood (Inland) Not Applicable
Mass Earth Movements (landslides, rock falls,
debris flows)
Not Applicable
Severe Storms Low
Tsunami High
Wildfire Not Applicable
3.2 Coastal Hazards: Flooding, Sea Level Rise, and Erosion
3.2.1 Past Events
King tides at Noyo Harbor frequently produce high water levels that inundate docks, shoreline infrastructure, and low-lying harbor areas, especially when combined with large waves or storm surge. These tides and waves also contribute to coastal erosion and sediment deposition, which over time can build up in the harbor basin. The Noyo Harbor Harbormaster has noted that this sediment accumulation has created shallow areas that interfere with boat navigation.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 10
Additionally, the Noyo Harbor Harbormaster has identified high waves as one of the harbor’s greatest concerns, noting that repeated wave action can gradually damage docks, piers, and other infrastructure. Over time, these waves contribute to erosion, wear on harbor facilities, and operational challenges, making long-term maintenance and monitoring a critical component of harbor management.
Refer to the Fort Bragg Annex for additional hazard mapping.
3.2.2 Location
Within Noyo Harbor, coastal hazards are concentrated along the marina, docks, boat slips, and low-lying shoreline areas that are directly exposed to waves, storm surge, and high tides. The harbor entrance and adjacent waterfront streets are particularly vulnerable to flooding and wave overtopping, while erosion and sediment deposition can affect the harbor basin and navigation channels.
3.2.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Harbormaster noted that sediment buildup in Noyo Harbor limits navigable depth, hindering access for larger commercial and emergency vessels. Regular dredging is essential but the district lacks a feasible disposal site. Aging infrastructure struggles with stronger storms, while large waves, Noyo’s most significant coastal hazard, exacerbate erosion and undercut riverbanks and wharves. The district’s top assets of concern include the doc and any vessels.
Coastal flooding, sea-level rise, erosion, waves, and storm surge can create life-safety risks for harbor users, workers, visitors, and boaters. People working on docks, vessels, parking areas, and waterfront facilities may be exposed with limited time to respond. Harbor staff, commercial fishing crews, small business owners, and visitors may need clear warnings, evacuation information, and safe access routes.
3.3 Earthquake
3.3.1 Past Events
Noyo Harbor has historically been indirectly affected by large, distant earthquakes via tsunamis and locally by seismic shaking, with the most significant documented impact being the 2011 Japan-generated tsunami.
No earthquake events have directly impacted Noyo Harbor since the previous HMP update, but information on regional seismic activity and associated risks is available in the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment section of the Mendocino County Base Plan.
3.3.2 Location
The entire Noyo Harbor District is vulnerable to earthquake impacts. Refer to Section 4.8 of the Base Plan for the location of fault lines in the county that could cause earthquake events in the district.
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 11
3.3.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Harbormaster noted earthquakes threaten Noyo Harbor’s hard infrastructure through ground shaking and liquefaction. Top assets of concern include all district structures.
Dewatering sites for dredged sediment may also become unstable, posing additional environmental and logistical risks.
Earthquakes can cause injuries and create immediate evacuation and response needs within the harbor area. People on docks, vessels, steep access roads, or near older waterfront facilities may face greater risk. District staff and harbor workers may also be affected personally while supporting emergency response, access control, and recovery needs.
3.4 Severe Storms
3.4.1 Past Events
During the 2022–23 severe storm event (FEMA Disaster DR‑4683‑CA), the harbor sustained multiple categories of damage affecting both infrastructure and operations. Storm impacts led to significant sediment accumulation on the marina floor, necessitating dredging to restore navigability. Structural damage occurred in the back half of the marina, where piles and docks failed. In addition, the North Harbor parking lot sustained severe and significant undercutting, compromising site stability. The event also resulted in severe erosion and the loss of the front face of the dewatering dredge cell, which is used to hold dredged slurry while water drains naturally. Several of these damages, particularly the dredging, parking lot repairs, and dredge cell reconstruction, are major repair projects exceeding $1 million in cost.
Refer to section 4.13 Severe Storms in the Base Plan and section 4.10 in the Fort Bragg Jurisdictional Annex for events that have taken place near the Noyo Harbor District boundary.
3.4.2 Location
All of the City of Fort Bragg is at risk of severe storm events.
3.4.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Noyo Harbor District is vulnerable to severe storm events, including heavy rainfall that increases Noyo River flows and severe coastal winds that generate storm surge and high-energy waves. These conditions raise water levels at the harbor mouth and energize surf, allowing waves to reach farther inland and increasing wave runup, overtopping, and wave attack on harbor facilities, navigation/entrance features, and critical access routes. The compounding effects of riverine flooding, wind-driven surge, and wave action increase the probability of damage to harbor infrastructure, operational disruptions, and emergency repair needs during and after severe storms. The district’s top asset of concern are local roads.
Severe storms can create life-safety risks for district staff, harbor workers, boaters, visitors, and people working near docks, vessels, parking areas, and waterfront facilities. High winds, heavy
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 12
rainfall, hazardous surf, and power outages may make conditions dangerous with limited time to respond. Commercial fishing crews, small business owners, visitors, and people with limited access to alerts may need clear warnings and safe access or evacuation information.
3.5 Tsunami
3.5.1 Past Events
On March 11, 2011, a tsunami triggered by a powerful earthquake off Japan struck the California coast, causing significant damage at Noyo Harbor in Fort Bragg. Waves as high as six feet smashed into the marina, destroying about 26 boat slips and roughly 1,000 feet of docks, with total damage estimated at around $4 million. Heavy rain slowed cleanup efforts the following week, and the Mendocino County Board of Supervisors declared a state of emergency to help secure funding for repairs. Many larger fishing vessels had escaped damage by heading offshore before the surge, but the loss of piers threatened the upcoming fishing and tourism seasons.1
Recent tsunami warnings and advisories have affected Mendocino County, including Noyo Harbor. More information can be found in the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment section of the Base Plan.
3.5.2 Location
At Noyo Harbor, adjacent to Fort Bragg, the areas most vulnerable to tsunamis include the marina, docks, boat slips, and low-lying waterfront infrastructure along the harbor entrance and shoreline. Tsunami waves can overtop jetties and inundate adjacent streets, parking areas, and harbor facilities, threatening vessels moored at the docks. Elevated areas inland are generally less affected, but the harbor basin and surrounding low-lying harbor properties are the primary locations at risk during significant tsunami events.
3.5.3 Local Exposure and Vulnerability
The Harbormaster noted that Noyo Harbor has only one access road, creating a critical vulnerability during tsunami events. In an emergency, commercial and recreational vessel owners may rush to reach the harbor at once, causing traffic congestion and delays. The district’s top asset of concern would be the entire harbor, including all structures, vessels, and infrastructure.
Tsunami risk is a key life-safety concern for people in the harbor, on vessels, or near low-lying waterfront areas. People may need to evacuate immediately after a strong earthquake or official warning. Visitors, boaters, workers, and people with limited mobility or limited access to alerts may face greater difficulty reaching safe areas in time. 1 $4 MILLION IN TSUNAMI DAMAGES: RAIN STALLS CLEANUP AT FORT BRAGG’S NOYO HARBOR; MENDOCINO COUNTY DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY – THE PRESS DEMOCRAT
Mendocino County Hazard Mitigation Plan
Noyo Harbor District Jurisdictional Annex
Appendix A Adoption Resolution 13
Appendix A Adoption Resolution
RESOLUTION NO. 2026-
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF UKIAH ADOPTING THE 2026 MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN FOR
MENDOCINO COUNTY.
WHEREAS, the Ukiah City Council recognizes the threat that natural hazards pose to people and property within the City of Ukiah; and
WHEREAS, the Ukiah City Council has prepared a multi-hazard mitigation plan, hereby known as the 2026 Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan for Mendocino County in accordance with federal laws, including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended; the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended; and the National Dam Safety Program Act, as amended; and FEMA requirements at 44 C.F.R. 201.6; and WHEREAS, the 2026 Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan for Mendocino County identifies mitigation goals and actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property in the city of Ukiah from the impacts of future hazards and disasters; and WHEREAS, adoption by the Ukiah City Council demonstrates its commitment to hazard mitigation and achieving the goals outlined in the 2026 Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan for Mendocino County.
NOW, THEREFORE BEIT RESOLVED that the City Council of the City of Ukiah hereby adopts the 2026 Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan for Mendocino County, as approved by FEMA. Subsequent plan updates following the approval period for this plan will require separate adoption resolutions.
PASSED, ADOPTED and APPROVED this 2nd day of September 2026 by the following vote on roll call vote:
AYES:
NOES:
ABSTAIN:
ABSENT:
________________________________
Susan Sher, Mayor
ATTEST:
_______________________________
Araceli Sandoval, Deputy City Clerk
ATTACHMENT 3
CITY OF UKIAH
City Council adoption
Planning horizon: 2026–2031
Background + Policy Context
01 Federal planning
requirement
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
and 44 CFR Part 201
02 Five-year update cycle FEMA approval keeps the plan
current and actionable
03 Eligibility for mitigation
funding
Supports access to FEMA
Hazard Mitigation Assistance
programs
04 Alignment with local policy Aligns with the 2040 General Plan, the 2025 Climate Action
Plan, and infrastructureresilience priorities
2026–2031
PLAN DEVELOPMENT 03
The update combined regional analysis with local
priorities
JUNE 2025
Update launched
Mendocino County retained a
consultant and convened the
Core Planning Team.
JULY 2025–MAR. 2026
Partners developed the
plan
Workshops and coordination
with each planning partner
shaped the update. Public
engagement and input.
SEPT. 1, 2026
County adopted the plan
FEMA approved pending
adoption by local agencies. The
Board of Supervisors completed
the County’s local adoption step.
NEXT Each participating jurisdiction adopts separately; Ukiah’s approval becomes final after its resolution is submitted.
HAZARD MITIGATION 03
Mitigation reduces the loss of life and property by
lessening the impact of disasters.
The plan answers three practical questions:
01 What is mitigation? Sustained action that reduces or eliminates long-term risk from natural hazards.
02 Why mitigate? To protect lives and property, reduce disruption and recovery costs, and lessen future losses.
03 What are the goals? Build resilience, protect critical systems, guide investment, and maintain grant eligibility.
UKIAH EXAMPLES Fuels reduction • utility undergrounding • resilient infrastructure Long-term investments that reduce future risk
MITIGATION SUCCESSES 05
Utility investments reduce exposure before emergencies occur West Side undergrounding
Removing overhead facilities
improves reliability and
reduces weather and wildfire
exposure.
Also completed: drone inspections and targeted fuels
reduction
MITIGATION SUCCESSES 06
Wildfire and water projects strengthen essential systems Fuels Crew achievements Recycled-water phases 1–4 complete
RISK PROFILE 04
Five hazards drive the countywide risk picture
Highest threats identified through recent disasters and updated risk assessment WILDFIRE Life safety, structures, evacuation
EARTHQUAKE Critical facilities and lifelines
INLAND FLOODING Roads, waterways, water systems
DROUGHT Supply reliability and resilience
SEVERE STORMS Trees, utilities, access and outages
UKIAH ANNEX 05
Ten Ukiah actions are ranked high priority
Water + heat resilience
UK2 Intertie water systems
UK6 Tree canopy expansion
UK26 Climate adaptation
strategy
Critical infrastructure
UK9 Lifeline vegetation
UK16 Backup generators
UK18 Public seismic retrofits
UK19 Private seismic
assessments
Wildfire risk reduction
UK13 Home mitigation
education
UK22 Fuels reduction program
UK24 CWPP implementation
The annex contains 25 total actions spanning drought, earthquake, extreme temperatures, flooding, landslides, storms, wildfire and multiple hazards.
RECOMMENDED ACTION 06
Staff recommends adoption
Adopt the 2026 Mendocino County Multi-Jurisdictional
Hazard Mitigation Plan and the City of Ukiah Annex by
resolution.
RESULT
Final FEMA
approval for
Ukiah
Effective after
Ukiah submits its
adoption resolution
Questions?
Agenda Item No: 14.b.
MEETING DATE/TIME: 9/2/2026
ITEM NO: 2026-1363
AGENDA SUMMARY REPORT
SUBJECT: Receive Updates on City Council Committee and Ad Hoc Assignments, and, if Necessary, Consider Modifications to Assignments and/or the Creation/Elimination of Ad Hoc(s).
DEPARTMENT: City Clerk PREPARED BY: Kristine Lawler, City Clerk PRESENTER: Mayor Sher and Various Councilmembers
ATTACHMENTS:
1. 2026 City Council Special Assignments & Ad Hocs
Summary: City Council members will provide reports and updates on their committee and ad hoc assignments. If necessary, the Council may consider modifications.
Background: City Council members are assigned to a number of committees and ad hoc activities. These assignments are included as Attachment 1.
Discussion: Previously, the City Council discussed having more time allocated to reporting on committee and ad hoc activities. Often, the Council Reports section of the regular agenda is rushed due to impending business (i.e., public hearings), and not enough time is afforded for reports beyond community activities.
In an effort to foster regular updates on committee and ad hoc assignments, this item is being placed on the agenda to provide the City Council members an expanded opportunity to report on assignments and modify assignments as necessary.
Recommended Action: Receive report(s). The Council will consider modifications to committee and ad hoc assignments along with the creation/elimination ad hoc(s).
BUDGET AMENDMENT REQUIRED: N/A
CURRENT BUDGET AMOUNT: N/A
PROPOSED BUDGET AMOUNT: N/A
FINANCING SOURCE: N/A
REVENUE: No GRANT: No
PREVIOUS CONTRACT/PURCHASE ORDER NO.: N/A
COORDINATED WITH: N/A
STRATEGIC PLAN (SP): N/A
GENERAL PLAN ELEMENTS (GP): N/A
2026 CITY COUNCIL SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT LIST
LOCAL / UKIAH VALLEY MTG DATE/TIME MEETING LOCATION MAILING ADDRESS/CONTACT COMMITTEE FUNCTION ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL STAFF SUPPORT Investment Oversight Committee Varies
Civic Center
300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482
Civic Center300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482
Reviews City investments, policies, and strategies
CraneOrozco - Alternate
Alan Carter, Treasurer
Dan Buffalo, Director of Finance; 463-6220
[email protected]
Disaster Council
Shall meet a minimum of once a year at a time and place designated upon call of the chair Place designated upon call of the chair or, if she/he is unavailable or unable to call such meeting, the first vice chair and then the City Manager or her/his designee.
Office of Emergency Management
300 Seminary Ave. Ukiah, CA 95482467-5720 - Traci Boyl
Develop any necessary emergency and mutual aid plans, agreements, ordinances, resolutions, rules, and regulations.
OrozcoCriss - Alternate Traci Boyl, City Manager's Office Management Analyst; 467-5720; [email protected] Greater Ukiah Business & Tourism Alliance (GUPTA)
4th Monday of month, 10 a.m.
200 S School St.Ukiah, CA 95482
200 S School St.Ukiah, CA 95482
Promotes tourism and works to strengthen and promote the historic downtown and businesses within the greater Ukiah area Marianne Davison - Community Services Department Staff Orozco - Alternate Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager;
467-5793 [email protected]
Mendocino County Inland Water and Power Commission (IWPC) 2nd Thursday of month, 6:00 p.m.
Civic Center
300 Seminary Avenue
conference room 5
IWPC Staff P.O. Box 1247Ukiah, CA 95482391-7574 - Candace Horsley Develops coordination for water resources and current water rights: Potter Valley project - Eel River Diversion
RodinOrozco - Alternate
Jared Walker, Director of Water Resources; 467-5712, [email protected] North Coast Opportunities (NCO) 4th Wednesday of month, 2 p.m. Alternating locations - Ukiah and Lakeport Governing Board Chair
North Coast Opportunities413 North State Street
Ukiah, CA 95482
Assist low income and disadvantaged people to become self reliant Neil Davis Neil Davis, City [email protected] Sun House Guild ex officio 2nd Tuesday of month, 10:30 a.m. Sun House 431 S. Main St. Ukiah, CA 431 S. Main Street Ukiah, CA 95482 467-2836 Support and expand Grace Hudson Museum Orozco, Sher Jake Burgess - Alternate David Burton, Museum Director; 467-2836 [email protected] Ukiah Men's Golf Club Liaison 1st Tuesday of month, 4 - 5 pm Golf Course Clubhouse 599 Park Blvd. Golf Course Clubhouse 599 Park Blvd [email protected] An association of male golfers who promote and support golf in Ukiah. Jake Burgess Jake Burgess, Community Services Director; 463- 6201, [email protected] Ukiah Valley Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA) 2nd Thursday of month, 1:30 p.m.
Board of Supervisors Chambers; 501 Low
Gap RoadUkiah, CA
County Executive Office
501 Low Gap Rd., Rm. 1010Ukiah, CA 95482463-4441
GSA serves as the Groundwater Sustainability Agency in the Ukiah Valley basin CraneN/A - Alternate
Jared Walker, Director of Water Resources; 467-5712, [email protected]
MENDOCINO COUNTY MTG DATE/TIME MEETING LOCATION MAILING ADDRESS/CONTACT COMMITTEE FUNCTION ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL STAFF SUPPORT City Selection Committee Called as required by the Clerk of the Board BOS Conference Room 501 Low Gap Rd. Rm. 1090 Ukiah, CA C/O: BOS 501 Low Gap Rd., Rm 1090 Ukiah, CA 95482 463-4441 Makes appointments to LAFCO and Airport Land Use Commission (Mayor - Primary; Vice Mayor - Alternate) Mayor Sher Vice Mayor Orozco Kristine Lawler, City Clerk; 463-6217 [email protected] Economic Development & Financing Corporation (EDFC)
2nd Thursday of month, 2:00 p.m.
Primarily 631 S. Orchard Street (location varies)
Executive Director631 South Orchard AvenueUkiah, CA 95482467-5953 Multi-agency co-op for economic development and business loan program Riley (appointed 12/19/18) Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager; 467-5793 [email protected] Library Advisory Board
3rd Wednesdays of alternate months; 1:00
p.m.
Various Mendocino County Libraries Ukiah County Library 463-4491 Review library policy and activities Sher Rodin - Alternate Kristine Lawler, City Clerk; 463-6217; [email protected] Mendocino County 1st District Liaison Monthly; TBD
Civic Center Annex
conference room #5411 West Clay St.Ukiah, CA 95482
Civic Center
300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482
To coordinate activities and policy development with the City's 1st District Supervisor Crane Rodin - Alternate
Sage Sangiacomo, City Manager;
463-6221; [email protected]
Mendocino County 2nd District Liaison 1st Wednesdays of month, 8:00 a.m.
Civic Center Annex
conference room #5411 West Clay St.Ukiah, CA 95482
Civic Center
300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482
To coordinate activities and policy development with the County's 2nd District Supervisor CrissRodin - Alternate
Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager;467-5793 [email protected] Mendocino Council of Governments
(MCOG)
1st Monday of month, 1:30 p.m.
Board of Supervisors Chambers
501 Low Gap RoadUkiah, CA
Executive Director
367 N. State Street, Ste. 206
Ukiah, CA 95482
463-1859
Plan and allocate State funding, transportation, infrastructure and project County wide Criss Sher - Alternate
Tim Eriksen, Public Works Director/City Engineer;
463-6280 [email protected] Schlatter, Community Development Director; 463-6219; [email protected]
Mendocino County Airport Land Use Commission As needed
BOS Conference Room
501 Low Gap Rd., Rm. 1090,Ukiah, CA
Mendocino County Executive Office
501 Low Gap Rd. Rm. 1010 Ukiah, CA 95482
To formulate a land use compatibility plan, provide for the orderly growth of the airport and the surrounding area, and safeguard the general welfare of the inhabitants within the vicinity Liaisons: Owen/Schlatter
Greg Owen, Airport Manager; 467-2855; [email protected] Craig Schlatter, Director of Community
Development; 463-6219; [email protected]
Mendocino Local Area Formation Commission (LAFCo)
1st Monday of month, 9:00 a.m. Board of Supervisors Chambers Executive Director200 S. School Street, Ste. 2
Ukiah, CA 95482
463-4470
Required by legislation - planning spheres of influence, annexation, service areas, and special districts RodinCrane - Alternate for both city seat
members on Commission
Craig Schlatter, Director of Community Development; 463-6219; [email protected] Updated: 2/5/2026
Attachment 1
2026 CITY COUNCIL SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT LIST
MENDOCINO COUNTY
Continued MTG DATE/TIME MEETING LOCATION MAILING ADDRESS/CONTACT COMMITTEE FUNCTION ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL STAFF SUPPORT Mendocino Solid Waste Management Authority (MSWMA)
3rd Thursday of every other month (varies), 10:00 a.m.
Willits Council Chambers
Solid Waste Director3200 Taylor DriveUkiah, CA 95482468-9710 County-wide Solid Waste JPA Crane Sher - Alternate Tim Eriksen, Public Works Director/City Engineer; 463-6280 [email protected] Mendocino Transit Authority (MTA) Board of Directors
Last Wednesday of month, 1:30 p.m.
Alternating locations - Ukiah Conference Center or Fort Bragg, or Point Arena Executive Director241 Plant RoadUkiah, CA 95482462-1422 County-wide bus transportation issues and funding Sher Rodin - Alternate Tim Eriksen, Public Works Director/City Engineer; 463-6280 [email protected] Mendocino Youth Project JPA Board of Directors
3rd Wednesday of month, 7:45 a.m. 776 S. State Street Conference Room Mendocino Co. Youth Project776 S. State Street, Ste. 107Ukiah, CA 95482 707-463-4915 Targets all youth with a focus on drug and alcohol prevention, healthy alternatives and empowering youth to make healthy choices Criss Max Brazill, Admin Lieutenant - Alternate
Tom Corning, Police Chief; 463-6254;
[email protected]
Russian River Flood Control District (RRFCD) Liaison
1st Monday of month, 5:30 p.m.
151 Laws Ave.,Suite D Ukiah, CA
151 Laws Ave., Ukiah, CA 95482; [email protected]; 462-5278 Proactively manage the water resources of the upper Russian River for the benefit of the people and environment of Mendocino County Walker/Orozco Jared Walker, Director of Water Resources; 467-5712, [email protected]
Ukiah Players Theater Board of Directors
3rd Tuesday of month, 6:00 p.m
1041 Low Gap Rd Ukiah, CA 95482 462-1210
1041 Low Gap RdUkiah, CA 95482462-1210
To oversee the activities, organization and purpose of the Ukiah Players Theater Greg Owen, Airport Manager(appointed 12/19/18)
Kristine Lawler, City Clerk; 463-6217 [email protected] Ukiah Unified School District (UUSD) Committee Quarterly 511 S. Orchard, Ste. D Ukiah, CA 95482 511 S. Orchard Ukiah, CA 95482 Information exchange with UUSD Board Chair, Mayor, Superintendent, and City Manager Orozco, Criss Sage Sangiacomo, City Manager Tom Corning, Police Chief Sage Sangiacomo, City Manager; 463-6221 [email protected]
REGIONAL MTG DATE/TIME LOCATION MAILING ADDRESS/CONTACT COMMITTEE FUNCTION ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL STAFF SUPPORT Great Redwood Trail Agency (GRTA) Bi-monthly, 3rd Thursdays, 10:30 a.m. Various Locations - announced 419 Talmage Road, Suite M Ukiah, CA 95482 463-3280 Provides a unified and revitalized rail infrastructure meeting the freight and passenger needs of the region Rodin Sher- Alternate Jake Burgess, Community Services Director 463-6201, [email protected] League of California Cities Redwood Empire Legislative Committee Prior to Division Meetings, meets 3x in person and then via conference call Various locations that are announced
Redwood Empire League President; Public Affairs Program Manager (916) 658-8243 Elected city officials and professional city staff attend division meetings throughout the year to share what they are doing and advocate for their interests in Sacramento OrozcoCriss - Alternate
Sage Sangiacomo, City Manager; 463-6221
[email protected]
Russian River Watershed Association (RRWA)
4th Thursday of month, 9:00 a.m. (only 5 times a year)
Windsor Town Hall9291 Old Redwood Hwy, #400Windsor, CA 95492707-838-1000 Russian River Watershed Association 2235 Mercury Way, Suite 105Santa Rose, CA [email protected] 707-508-3670 (message only) Consider issues related to Russian river - plans projects and funding requests RodinSher - Alternate
Tim Eriksen, Public Works Director/City Engineer;
463-6280 [email protected]
Northern California Power Agency (NCPA) - Commission
4th Thursday of month, 9:00 a.m. (see NCPA calendar)
Roseville, CA and other locations
651 Commerce Drive Roseville, CA 95678916-781-4202
Pool of State and local power utilities developing and operating power generation, providing scheduling and related energy services and providing regulatory and legislative support.
Crane - Commissioner Sher - City Council Alternate Sauers - Alternate and Commissioner in absence of Commissioner Crane
Cindy Sauers - Electric Utility Director;463-6286 [email protected] Northern California Power Agency (NCPA) – Lodi Energy Center (LEC) Appointment 2nd Monday of month, 10:00 AM Lodi, CA and other locations 651 Commerce DriveRoseville, CA 95678916-781-4299
Committee oversees the operation, maintenance and expenditures of the LEC 300 MW generating project.
Sauers – Project Participate Appointee
Cindy Sauers, Electric Utility Director,463-6286, [email protected] Transmission Agency of Northern California (TANC)
4th Wednesday of month, 10 a.m. 35 Iron Point Circle Suite 225 Folsom, CA 35 Iron Point Cir #225Folsom, CA 95630916-852-1673; [email protected] Provide electric transmission to its Member utilities through transmission line ownership or contract arrangements.
CraneSauers - Alternate
Cindy Sauers - Electric Utility Director;
463-6286 [email protected]
STANDING COMMITTEES MTG DATE/TIME LOCATION MAILING ADDRESS/CONTACT COMMITTEE FUNCTION ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL STAFF SUPPORT Diversity and Equity TBD Virtual Meeting Room (link to be created) Civic Center 300 Seminary Ave. Ukiah, CA 95482 Improve diversity and equity in the City’s workforce and municipal services Orozco/Criss Traci Boyl, City Manager's Office Management Analyst; 467-5720; [email protected] Fire Executive Committee
2nd Tue, every other month beginning in January; 5:00 p.m.
Ukiah Valley Conference Center,200 S. School Street Ukiah, CA Civic Center300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482 [email protected] Per the recently adopted agreement between the City of Ukiah and the Ukiah Valley Fire Protection District Orozco/SherAlternates: Criss
Doug Hutchison, Fire Chief; 463-6263;
[email protected]
Countywide Oversight Board to the RDA Successor Agencies 4th Thursday of January, 4:00 p.m.; meets annually
Ukiah Valley Conference Center,200 S. School Street Ukiah, CA City of UkiahATTN: City Clerk300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482 Oversee and direct the Successor Agencies of the former redevelopment agencies Crane Dan Buffalo, Director of Finance; 463-6220 [email protected] Lawler, City Clerk; 463-6217, [email protected] Water Executive Committee(Ukiah Valley Water Authority) 1st Tue of each month
at 5:00 p.m.
Ukiah Valley Conference Center,200 S. School Street Ukiah, CA City of UkiahATTN: Water Resources 300 Seminary Ave.Ukiah, CA 95482 Oversight of UVWA; set annual budget for the combined water system; Manage rates and collect levies; modify existing water rights for the provision of water service; mediation and dispute resolution; Crane/Orozco Jared Walker, Director of Water Resources; 467-5712, [email protected] Updated: 2/5/2026
COMMITTEE ASSIGNED TO PRINCIPAL STAFF SUPPORT
Electric Grid Operational Improvements Crane/Orozco Cindy Sauers, Electric Utility Director; 463-6286 [email protected]
Advance Planning & Policy for Annexation
Applications Crane/Rodin
Craig Schlatter, Community Development Director
463-6219 [email protected]
UVSD/ City Relations
Ad hoc committee to address specific issues with the Ukiah Valley Sanitation District, including discussion of overall sewer system service delivery policies, operating policy revisions, potential revisions to the current Operating Agreement, and cost sharing
Crane/Orozco
Dan Buffalo, Director of Finance;
463-6220 [email protected]
Jared Walker, Water Resources Director
467-5712, [email protected]
Complete Streets Rodin/Crane
Tim Eriksen, Public Works Director/City Engineer;
463-6280 [email protected]
Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager
467-5793 [email protected]
Jake Burgess, Community Services Director
463-6201 [email protected]
Special Districts (Water District Consolidation) Orozco/Crane Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager 467-5793 [email protected]
Corp Yard Planning Crane/Orozco Jason Benson, Senior Civil Engineer 463-6284 [email protected]
Mendocino County Courthouse Project and Reuse Sher/Orozco Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager 467-5793 [email protected]
City's 150-Year Anniversary Planning Orozco/Rodin Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager 467-5793 [email protected]
Airport Policy Criss/Crane Craig Schlatter, Community Development Director 463-6219 [email protected]
Parks & Recreation Special District Exploration Rodin/Orozco Jake Burgess, Community Services Director 463-6201 [email protected]
Downtown Zoning Code Crane/Rodin Jesse Davis, Chief Planning Manager 463-6207, [email protected]
Tourism Advisory Committee Rodin/Sher Shannon Riley, Deputy City Manager 467-5793 [email protected]
Historic Preservation Code Sher/Criss Craig Schlatter, Community Development Director 463-6219 [email protected]
Fire Severity Rodin/Orozco Craig Schlatter, Community Development Director 463-6219 [email protected]
CalPERS Crane/Orozco Dan Buffalo, Director of Finance;
463-6220 [email protected]
City Council Handbook Review and Update Sher Kristine Lawler, City Clerk 463-6217; [email protected]
Energy Resilience Sher/Orozco Cindy Sauers, Electric Utility Director; 463-6286 [email protected]
2026 AD HOC COMMITTEES
*Note: Changing the composition of an existing ad-hoc among current councilmembers after work has begun presents potential Brown Act issues. Requests for fully filled ad-hocs are represented on the draft, but staff does not recommend changes except to fill vacated assignments. The current requests on the sheet for fully composed ad-hocs are primarily intended to convey interest in topics covered by these ad-hoc committees for possible future consideration of new assignments.
Updated: 8/20/2026
Agenda Item No: 14.c.
MEETING DATE/TIME: 9/2/2026
ITEM NO: 2026-1073
AGENDA SUMMARY REPORT
SUBJECT: Adoption of Resolution Adopting the City of Ukiah Electric Utility's Facilities Physical Security Plan as Required by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision 19-01-018.
DEPARTMENT: Electric Utility PREPARED BY: Cindy Sauers, Electric Utility Director PRESENTER: Cindy Sauers, Electric Utility Director
ATTACHMENTS:
1. Ukiah Electric Utility 2021 Security Plan Report_Redacted
2. 2021 Resolution EUD's Physical Security Program_REDACTED
3. Ukiah Electric Utility Security Plan Report_2026 Update_REDACTED2
4. Resolution 2026 Utility Physical Security Plan
5. 14c Correspondence Received - Crispin Hollinshead_Redacted Summary: Council will consider adopting a Resolution adopting the City of Ukiah Electric Utility's Facilities Physical Security Plan as required by the CPUC Decision 19-01-018.
Background: The 2013 attack on PG&E’s Metcalf Transmission Substation, which damaged 17 transformers and nearby telecommunications infrastructure, highlighted the vulnerability of critical electric infrastructure and prompted increased attention regulators to strengthen physical security expectations for utilities. In response, California enacted Senate Bill (SB) 699 (2014), directing the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to consider rules addressing physical security risks to electric distribution systems. These efforts ultimately led to the development of a statewide framework requiring utilities to identify critical facilities, assess physical security risks, and develop appropriate measures to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. The CPUC implemented these statutory requirements through CPUC Decision 19-01-018. SB 699 requires electric corporations to develop, implement, and periodically update distribution grid security plans and identify critical distribution facilities, assess physical security risks, and establish appropriate mitigation measures. D.19-01-018 asserted that the Publicly Owned Utilities (POUs) should utilize the Utility Security Plan process described therein. The City of Ukiah followed the process and developed the original Utility Physical Security Plan (Attachment 1) in 2021 to reflect its commitment to safety and to protecting its ratepayers’ investment by taking reasonable and cost-effective measures in an effort to safeguard key assets of its distribution system.
On July 7, 2021, the City Council adopted Resolution 2021-30 (Attachment 2).
Discussion: As part of the ongoing utility obligations under this CPUC Decision, the City of Ukiah Electric Utility has completed an extensive review process to update and refresh the Physical Security Plan.
To comply with CPUC Decision D.19.01-018, the City of Ukiah Electric selected the Ukiah Police Department (UPD) and the Office of Emergency Management to provide a third-party assessment of the Physical Security Plan (Plan). The scope of the Physical Security Plan is to assess Ukiah’s distribution facilities, identify which facilities are considered Covered Distribution Facilities pursuant to the CPUC Decision 19-01-18 that may merit special protection and measures to lessen identified risks and threats. Once covered distribution facilities have been identified (if any), the potential physical security threats and vulnerabilities shall be identified, followed by a threat and vulnerability risk assessment to determine the baseline risk based on the likelihood of an event occurring and the level of impact if the event occurred. The third-party review by the Ukiah Police
Department and the Office of Emergency Management confirmed one “Covered Distribution Facility” for the purposes of CPUC D.19-01-018. Two additions to the Plan were recommended as a result of this review, one detailing compliance and reference to the City's Emergency Operations Plan and one identifying funding sources. The 2026 Physical Security Plan is included as Attachment 3.
Note that the proposed Plan and the 2021 Plan and Resolution include information regarding vulnerabilities in the City's electrical system that could be sabotaged, thus posing great harm to the City if this information were made public. The Plans assess the City's vulnerability to terrorist attack or other criminal acts intended to disrupt the City’s operation and are intended for consideration in closed session. Staff has opted to redact those portions of the Plans that assess the vulnerability of City infrastructure to criminal attack as this information is considered exempt under the Public Records Act. Govt. Code § 7929.200.
Staff recommends City Council adopt a resolution (Attachment 4) adopting the City of Ukiah Electric Utility's Facilities Physical Security Plan and authorize the Electric Utility Director to transmit a notice to the California Public Utility Commission regarding the update within 30 days of Council approval. Note: The Council will meet in Closed Session prior to consideration of this item to review the confidential content of the plan.
Recommended Action: Adopt a resolution adopting the City of Ukiah Electric Utility's Facilities Physical Security Plan and authorize the Electric Utility Director to transmit a notice to the California Public Utility Commission regarding the update within 30 days of Council approval.
BUDGET AMENDMENT REQUIRED: No
CURRENT BUDGET AMOUNT: N/A
PROPOSED BUDGET AMOUNT: N/A
FINANCING SOURCE: N/A
REVENUE: No GRANT: No
PREVIOUS CONTRACT/PURCHASE ORDER NO.: N/A
COORDINATED WITH: Darcy Vaughn, City Attorney; Sage Sangiacomo, City Manager; Tom Corning, Ukiah Police Chief; Traci Boyl, Sr. Management Analyst
STRATEGIC PLAN (SP): N/A
GENERAL PLAN ELEMENTS (GP): GP-A4 - Public Facilities, Services, and Infrastructure Element.
CITY OF UKIAH ELECTRIC
UTILITY SECURITY PLAN
PUBLIC REPORT ON CITY OF UKIAH’S PHYSICAL
SECURITY PROGRAM FOR DISTRIBUTION-LEVEL
FACILITIES
June 7, 2021
Attachment 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................................. 4 A. GOAL OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN.................................................................................................. 4 B. DESCRIPTION OF CITY OF UKIAH ELECTRIC.................................................................................. 4 C. RESULTS OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN ASSESSEMENT ....................................................................... 4 II. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................... 5 III. PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS .......................................................................................................... 7 A. PHYSICAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES.................................................................................................... 7 B. UTILITY SECURITY PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS........................................................................ 7 STEP 1: ASSESSMENT/PLAN DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................................ 7 STEP 1A: IDENTIFY COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES...................................................................... 8 STEP 1B: PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT.................................................................................................. 8 STEP 1C: DEVELOP MITIGATION PLAN................................................................................................ 8 STEP 2: INDEPENDENT REVIEW............................................................................................................. 8 STEP 3: VALIDATION ............................................................................................................................. 8 STEP 4: ADOPTION................................................................................................................................ 9 STEP 5: MAINTENANCE......................................................................................................................... 9 STEP 6: REPEAT PROCESS ..................................................................................................................... 9 STEP 7: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN …………………………………………………………………………….9 IV. IDENTIFICATION OF COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILIITES (STEP 1A)..................................................9 A. IDENTIFICATION FACTORS ........................................................................................................... 10 B. IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………………………………11 V. RISK ASSESSMENT (STEP 1B)…………………………………………………………………………….12 A. METHADOLOGY………………………………………………………………………………………….12
B. MITGATION MEASURES………………………………………………………………………………….12
C. RISK ASSESSMENT………………………………………………………………………………………....14 VI. COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITY MITIGATION PLANS (STEP 1C)………………………………….…14 VII. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND RESPONSE (STEP 2) .................................................................... 15 A. REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED THIRD PARTY REVIEW.............................................................. 16 B. IDENTIFICATION OF THIRD PARTY REVIEWER .............................................................................. 16 C. PUBLIC RESULTS OF THIRD PARTY EVALUATION.......................................................................... 16 D. CITY OF UKIAH RESPONSE............................................................................................................ 16 VIII. VALIDATION (STEP 3).......................................................................................................................... 16 A. SELECTION OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY ........................................................................................ 16 B. RESULTS OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY REVIEW ............................................................................... 16 C. City of Ukiah RESPONSE TO QUALIED AUTHORITY REIVEW....................................................... 16 IX. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS FOR UTILITY SECURITY PLAN ................................................................. 17 A. ASSET MANAGEMENT PROGRAM............................................................................................... 17 B. WORKFORCE TRAINING AND RETENTION PROGRAM .............................................................. 17 C. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PLAN.......................................................................................... 17 D. DISTRIBUTION GRID RESILIENCY………………………………………………………………………..17
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
4 I. OVERVIEW
A. GOAL OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN
Ensuring the safety of its facilities is a top priority for City of Ukiah, the City prioritizes safety in all aspects of its design, operation, and maintenance practices. The overarching goal of this Utility Security Plan is to describe Ukiah’s risk management approach toward distribution system physical security, with appropriate consideration of resiliency, impact, and cost.
The City of Ukiah recognizes the importance of securing the safety and reliability of its electric system and, therefore, City of Ukiah voluntarily participated in the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) Physical Security proceeding and has undertaken this assessment. In the spirit of continued voluntary cooperation, City of Ukiah offers the following in response to CPUC Decision 19-01-018.
B. DESCRIPTION OF CITY OF UKIAH
The City of Ukiah Electric Utility is responsible for the operation and maintenance associated with the reliable distribution of electricity to residential and commercial customers from the City of Ukiah’s interconnection with PG&E’s 60KV transmission line and the City of Ukiah’s only transmission line feeding Ukiah’s only substation. The City of Ukiah’s population is estimated at 15,683 and is 4.7 square miles. There is an estimated 73 miles of distribution lines and one transmission line.
C. RESULTS OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN ASSESSMENT
Based on the process described in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and the direction provided in D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah has determined one Covered Distribution Facility identified in Section IV, Ukiah’s existing programs and measures effectively mitigate the risks of a physical attack for this Covered Distribution Facility.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
5 II. BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2013, one or more individuals attacked equipment located within Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E) Metcalf Transmission Substation, ultimately damaging 17 transformers. These individuals also cut nearby fiber-optic telecommunication cables owned by AT&T. In response to the attack, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop new physical security requirements, resulting in the creation of CIP-014.
At the state level, Senator Jerry Hill authored SB 699 (2014), directing the CPUC to “consider adopting rules to address the physical security risks to the distribution systems of electrical corporations.” In response to SB 699, the CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division, Risk Assessment and Safety Advisory Section (RASA) prepared a white paper proposing a new requirement for investor owned utilities (IOUs) and publicly owned utilities (POUs) to develop security plans that would identify security risks to their distribution and transmission systems, and propose methods to mitigate those risks. The CPUC hosted a series of workshops to better understand the state of utility physical security protections and to seek input on refining their proposal.
In order to support a statewide improvement of how utilities address distribution level physical security risks, the California Municipal Utilities Association (CMUA), which is the statewide trade association for POUs, coordinated with the state’s IOUs to develop a comprehensive Straw Proposal1 (Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal) for a process to identify at-risk facilities and, if necessary, develop physical security mitigation plans. As a member of CMUA, City of Ukiah staff participated in the development of the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal through a CMUA working group as well as through direct meetings with the IOUs. The Joint POU/IOU Straw Proposal set out a process for the following: (1) identifying if the utility has any high priority distribution facilities; (2) evaluating the potential risks to those high priority distribution facilities; (3) for the distribution facilities where the identified risks are not effectively mitigated through existing resilience/security measures, developing a mitigation plan; (4) obtaining third party reviews of the mitigation plans; (5) adopting a document retention policy; (6) ensuring a review process established by the POU governing board; and (7) implementing information sharing protocols.
RASA filed a response2 to the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal that recommended various modifications and clarifications, including a six step process. Additionally, RASA recommended that the utility mitigation plans include: (1) an assessment of supply chain vulnerabilities; (2) training programs for law enforcement and utility staff to improve communication during physical security events; and (3) an assessment of any nearby communication utility infrastructure that supports priority distribution substations. 1 Straw Proposal available at:
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/Safety/Risk_Assessment/physicalsecurity/R1506009- Updated%20Joint%20Straw%20Proposal%20and%20Cover%20083117%20Filing.pdf. 2 RASA Response available at:
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/Safety/Risk_Assessment/physicalsecurity/Final%20Staff %20Recommendation%20for%20Commission%20Consideration%20010318.pdf.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
6 In early 2019, the CPUC approved Decision (D.) 19-01-018, which adopted the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal as modified by the RASA proposal, with additional clarifications and guidance.
D.19-01-018 clarified that where there is a conflict between the Straw Proposal and the RASA proposal, then it is the rule in the RASA proposal that controls.3 D.19-01-018 asserted that the POUs should utilize the Utility Security Plan process described therein. City of Ukiah is following the process and issuing this report at this time to reflect its existing commitment to safety and to protecting its ratepayers’ investment by taking reasonable and cost-effective measures in an effort to safeguard key assets of its distribution system. 3 D.19-01-018 at 43, footnote 58 (“Should there be any question of which shall predominate should there be any incongruity or conflict between a utility or SED RASA recommended rule, the SED RASA rule shall apply.”).
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
7 III. PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
A. PHYSICAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
The Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal seeks to support the creation of a risk management approach toward distribution system physical security, with appropriate considerations of resiliency, impact, and cost. In order to accomplish this risk-based approach, the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal identifies several principles to guide the development of each individual utility’s program. These principles are the following:
1. Distribution systems are not subject to the same physical security risks and associated consequences, including threats of physical attack by terrorists, as the transmission system.
2. Distribution utilities will not be able to eliminate the risk of a physical attack occurring, but certain actions can be taken to reduce the risk or consequences, or both, of a significant attack.
3. A one-size-fits-all standard or rule will not work. Distribution utilities should have the flexibility to address physical security risks in a manner that works best for their systems and unique situations, consistent with a risk management approach.
4. Protecting the distribution system should consider both physical security protection and operational resiliency or redundancy.
5. The focus should not be on all Distribution Facilities, but only those that risk dictates would require additional measures.
6. Planning and coordination with the appropriate federal and state regulatory and law enforcement authorities will help prepare for attacks on the electrical distribution system and thereby help reduce or mitigate the potential consequences of such attacks.
B. Utility Security Plan Development Process
City of Ukiah utilized a multi-step process to develop this Utility Security Plan that is consistent with the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and D.19-01-018. The relevant six steps of that process are the following:
STEP 1: ASSESSMENT/PLAN DEVELOPMENT
City of Ukiah staff and/or consultants prepare a Draft Utility Security Plan through the process set forth in Steps 1A, 1B, and 1C.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
8 STEP 1A: IDENTIFY COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES
City of Ukiah will evaluate all distribution-level facilities in its service territory that are subject to its control to determine if any facility meets D.19-01-018’s definition of a “Covered Distribution Facility” using the seven factors identified in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal.
STEP 1B: PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT
For every individual Covered Distribution Facility identified pursuant to Step 1A, City of Ukiah will perform an evaluation of the potential risks associated with a successful physical attack on that Covered Distribution Facility, and whether existing grid resiliency, back-up generation, and/or physical security measures appropriately mitigate identified risks.
STEP 1C: DEVELOP MITIGATION PLAN
If there are any individual Covered Distribution Facilities where the Risk Assessment performed pursuant to Step 1B finds that the existing mitigation and/or resiliency measures do not effectively mitigate the identified risks, then City of Ukiah will develop a Mitigation Plan for that Covered Distribution Facility. The Mitigation Plan will use a risk-based approach to select reasonable and cost-effective measures that can either be security focused (e.g., walls or alarms) or resiliency focused (e.g., adequate spare parts).
STEP 2: INDEPENDENT REVIEW
For every Utility Security Plan cycle, City of Ukiah will document the results of the identification process, risk assessment, and Mitigation Plan development performed pursuant to Steps 1A, 1B, and 1C. This documentation in combination with narrative description in Section IX below, constitutes City of Ukiah’s Draft Utility Security Plan. Each Draft Utility Security Plan is submitted to a Qualified Third Party for Independent Review. The Qualified Third Party Reviewer will then issue an evaluation that identifies any potential deficiencies in the Draft Utility Security Plan as well as recommendations for improvements. City of Ukiah will then modify its plan to address any identified deficiencies or recommendations, or will document the reasons why any recommendations were not adopted. The combination of the Draft Utility Security Plan, the nonconfidential conclusions of the Qualified Third-Party Reviewer, and City of Ukiah’s responses to the Qualified Third-Party Review will constitute City of Ukiah’s Utility Security Plan.
STEP 3: VALIDATION
City of Ukiah will submit its Utility Security Plan to a qualified authority for review. Such entity will provide additional feedback and evaluation of City of Ukiah’s Utility Security Plan and, to the extent that this entity is authorized, such entity deems the Utility Security Plan as adequate.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
9 STEP 4: ADOPTION
City of Ukiah’s Utility Security Plan will be presented to and adopted by City of Ukiah’s City Council at a public meeting.
STEP 5: MAINTENANCE
City of Ukiah will perform maintenance of the adopted Physical Security Plan (PSP) on a periodic basis or when warranted to refine and update the PSP to preserve plan integrity. City of Ukiah recognizes the importance to review City of Ukiah’s distribution system, to identify if there are any changes to the services that City of Ukiah provides which could result in anyone of City of Ukiah’s distribution facilities being identified as a “Covered Distribution Facility.
STEP 6: REPEAT PROCESS
In addition to the annual maintenance review, City of Ukiah will repeat the complete process as follows at least once every five (5) calendar years.
1. Assess all of City of Ukiah’s distribution facilities, identify which facilities are considered “Covered” Distribution Facilities pursuant to the CPUC Decision 19-01-18 that may merit special protection and measures to lessen identified risks and threats.
2. Once the “Covered” Distribution Facilities have been identified, identify any potential physical security threats and vulnerabilities and conduct a threat and vulnerability risk assessment. Determine the baseline risk based on the likelihood of an event occurring and the level of impact if the event occurred.
3. Based on the risk assessment, develop the recommended mitigations to reduce the identified risk and determine the residual risk based on the recommended mitigations.
4. Develop or update the PSP, establish an implementation plan, implement the identified mitigations and integrate the PSP into City of Ukiah’s resiliency plans and activities.
STEP 7: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Since there were no “Covered” Distribution Facilities identified, this section was not required.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILIITES (STEP 1A) As described in Section III, Step 1A of the Utility Security Plan process involves assessing all distribution-level facilities that are subject to the control of City of Ukiah to determine which facilities are “Covered Distribution Facilities” subject to the need for a risk assessment. This
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
10 Section describes the factors that City of Ukiah used to evaluate its distribution facilities and the results of its evaluation.
A. IDENTIFICATION FACTORS
The Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal defines seven screening factors to determine if a facility is a “Covered Distribution Facility.” Some factors require additional definitions and/or clarifications in order to be applied to City of Ukiah’s facilities. The following Table provides the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal’s Factors as modified/clarified by City of Ukiah.
Factor Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal Description Additional Clarification 1 Distribution Facility necessary for crank path,
black start or capability essential to the
restoration of regional electricity service
that are not subject to the California
Independent System Operator’s (CAISO)
operational control and/or subject to North
American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 or its
successors
2 Distribution Facility that is the primary source
of electrical service to a military installation
essential to national security and/or
emergency response services (may include
certain airfields, command centers,
weapons stations, emergency supply
depots)
3 Distribution Facility that serves installations
necessary for the provision of regional
drinking water supplies and wastewater
services (may include certain aqueducts,
well fields, groundwater pumps, and
treatment plants)
4 Distribution Facility that serves a regional
public safety establishment (may include
County Emergency Operations Centers;
county sheriff’s department and major city
police department headquarters; major
state and county fire service headquarters;
county jails and state and federal prisons;
and 911 dispatch centers)
City of Ukiah defines “reginal public
safety establishment” as any of the
following: (1) Headquarters of a major
police or fire department serving 1.5
million population with at least 1,000
sworn officers; (2) County Sheriff’s
Department Headquarters; (3) County
Emergency Operations Center; (4)
County/State Fire headquarters; (5) a
California State Prison; (6) a United
States Penitentiary; (7) a Federal
Correctional Institute; or (8) a 911
dispatch center.
5 Distribution Facility that serves a major
transportation facility (may include
International Airport, Mega Seaport, other
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
11 air traffic control center, and international
border crossing)
6 Distribution Facility that serves as a Level 1
Trauma Center as designated by the Office
of Statewide Health Planning and
Development
7 Distribution Facility that serves over 60,000
meters
B. IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS
In performing this identification analysis, [POU] is assessing all distribution level facilities that are subject to its exclusive control. The specific types of facilities include substations, and critical distribution facilities.
The following table summarizes the results of City of Ukiah’s identification analysis.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
12 V. RISK ASSESSMENT (STEP 1B)
A. METHODOLOGY
Pursuant to the process identified in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah will assess the potential risks associated with a successful physical attack on each of the Covered Distribution Facilities identified in Section IV above. For purpose of this analysis, a physical attack is limited to the following: (1) theft; (2) vandalism; and (3) discharge of a firearm.
A “successful physical attack” is limited to circumstances where a theft, vandalism, and/or the discharge of a firearm has directly led to the failure of any elements of the Covered Distribution Facility that are necessary to provide uninterrupted service to the specific load identified in Section IV.
In order to perform this risk analysis, City of Ukiah evaluates the relative risk that (1) a physical attack on a Covered Distribution Facility will be successful considering the protective measures in place; or (2) that the impacts of a successful attack will be mitigated due to resiliency and other measures in place.
B. MITIGATION MEASURES
D.19-01-018 identifies the specific mitigation measures that a utility should consider when performing this risk analysis. The following table lists these mitigation measures and provides City of Ukiah’s additional clarifications that are necessary to apply these measures to the City of Ukiah’s territory.
Measure D.19-01-018 Description Additional Clarification 1 The existing system resiliency and/or
redundancy solutions (e.g., switching the
load to another substation or circuit
capable of serving the load, temporary
circuit ties, mobile generation and/or
storage solutions).
2 The availability of spare assets to restore a
particular load.
3 The existing physical security protections to
reasonably address the risk.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
13 4
The potential for emergency responders to
identify and respond to an attack in a
timely manner.
Each facility is evaluated based on
the likelihood that a law enforcement
officer would generally be able to
arrive at the Covered Distribution
Facility within 15 minutes of a report
from the public of a break-in or
attack, or of [POU] notifying the law
enforcement agency of triggering of
an alarm at the facility.
5 Location and physical surroundings,
including proximity to gas pipelines and
geographical challenges, and impacts of
weather.
Ukiah evaluated this element based
on the proximity to gas pipe lines and
the extent to which the interior of the
facility is shielded from view and
access due to walls, vegetation, or
other physical obstructions.
6 History of criminal activity at the Distribution
Facility and in the area.
Ukiah evaluated the property crime
rates in the immediate vicinity of the
Covered Distribution Facility.
7 The availability of other sources of energy
to serve the load (e.g., customer owned
back-up generation or storage solutions).
8 The availability of alternative ways to meet
the health, safety, or security.
No additional clarification.
9 Requirements served by the load (e.g.,
back up command center or water
storage facility).
C. RISK ASSESSMENT
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
14 Based on the process described in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and the direction provided in D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah has determined one Covered Distribution Facility identified in Section IV, the existing programs and measures effectively mitigate the risks of a physical attack for this Covered Distribution Facility.
The follow table provides a summary of Ukiah’s assessment of each mitigation measure for each Covered Distribution Facility.
VI. COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITY MITIGATION PLANS (STEP 1C) Pursuant to the process identified in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah has determined that
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
15 VII. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND RESPONSE (STEP 2)
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED THIRD-PARTY REVIEW
D.19-01-018 specifies the following criteria for a Qualified Third Party Reviewer:
Independence: A Qualified Third-Party Reviewer cannot be a division of the City of Ukiah Electric Utility. A governmental entity can select as the third-party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision, so long as the entity has the appropriate expertise, and is not a division of the City of Ukiah that operates as a functional unit, i.e., a municipality could use its police department as its third-party reviewer if it has the appropriate expertise.
Adequate Qualifications: A Qualified Third-Party Reviewer shall be an entity other than the Operator with appropriate expertise. A governmental entity can select as the thirdparty reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision, so long as the entity has the appropriate expertise, and is not a division of the Operator that operates as a functional unit, i.e., a municipality could use its police department as its third-party review if it has the appropriate expertise.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THIRD-PARTY REVIEWER
City of Ukiah has selected as its Third-Party Reviewer Justin Wyatt, City of Ukiah Police Chief.
C. PUBLIC RESULTS OF THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION
As third-party independent reviewer, the Ukiah Police Department concurs with the conclusions of Ukiah’s Electric Utility that there is one distribution asset that is covered under the seven factors identified in Section IV. A. of the City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan.
D. CITY OF UKIAH RESPONSE
Given the conclusions of the third-party evaluator, no changes have been made to the Plan in response to the evaluation.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
16 VIII. VALIDATION (STEP 3)
A. SELECTION OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY
The City of Ukiah Electric Utility has determined that Justin Wyatt, Police Chief, City of Ukiah has sufficient familiarity with asset protection and emergency response in order to serve as the “qualified authority” for the review of City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan.
B. RESULTS OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY REVIEW
On June 22, 2021, City of Ukiah Electric Utility submitted its draft Utility Security Plan to Justin Wyatt, Police Chief, for review. The scope of Chief Wyatt’s review is to assess the overall adequacy of the plan, based on the reviewer’s [or reviewers’] expertise. In this review, Chief Wyatt makes no claims regarding the compliance of City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan with any specific requirement or standard. Further, Chief Wyatt has not assessed, and makes no claim regarding City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan’s conformance to D.19-01-018 or any other CPUC standards. Finally, Chief Wyatt’s review is limited to the information contained within City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan and Chief Wyatt has not performed any additional audits of any identified facilities or reviewed any documents outside of the information directly included within the Utility Security Plan.
C. CITY OF UKIAH RESPONSE TO QUALIED AUTHORITY REIVEW
Based on this review, Chief Wyatt deems the City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan adequate and recommends that the City Council adopt the City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
17 IX. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS FOR UTILITY SECURITY PLAN A. ASSET MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
B. WORKFORCE TRAINING AND RETENTION PROGRAM
At this time, City of Ukiah provides lineman and technician training as necessary for job duties.
The training is selected based on employee skill level and department needs with special emphasis on all work duties.
C. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PLAN
City of Ukiah has a documented preventative maintenance program. For the distribution assets, the preventative maintenance includes annual inspections and condition-based maintenance.
In addition, City of Ukiah performs weekly substation inspections and the entire distribution system is visually inspected annually and Infra-Red (IR) inspections are performed yearly and the asset condition inspection intervals are based upon manufacturer recommendations.
A. DISTRIBUTION GRID RESILIENCY
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
June 7, 2021
18 All of Ukiah’s substation system components can be taken out of service individually or as a subsystem without interrupting power to Ukiah customers. During maintenance periods to ensure that the customer load is not interrupted, the distribution system has numerous inter-ties that support maintenance clearance and redundancy in serving distributing load. In addition, to minimize the duration of outages, City of Ukiah maintains a complete inventory of materials to respond to emergencies within our distribution system.
RESOLUTION NO. 2021-30
RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF UKIAH APPROVING THE
PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN AS COMPLIANT WITH CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION DECISION D.19-01-018
WHEREAS, The City of Ukiah owns and operates an electric utility for the benefit of the Ukiah community; and
WHEREAS, in the operation of the electric utility the City is obligated to follow certain laws and regulations of the State of California; and
WHEREAS, persurant to Public Utilities CodeSection 364 enacted by Senate Bill 699, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) was tasked to develop a process and set of criteria for identifying critical electric infrastructure which it adopted in Decision D.19-01-018; and WHEREAS, in compliance with D.19-01-018, the Ukiah Police Department (UPD) served as a qualified third-party to review the City of Ukiah’s electric facilities; and WHEREAS, in conducting the review, UPD found one distribution asset [REDACTED] that is a “Covered Distribution Facility” under the seven factors identified as per D.19-01-018 and concluded that no changes are needed to the Plan in response to the evaluation.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City of Ukiah that it:
1. Finds and approves the Physical Security Plan as compliant with the obligations of CPUC D.19-01-018.
2. Directs staff to file the Physical Security Plan as required by D.19-01-018.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this 7th day of July 2021, by the following roll call vote:
AYES: Councilmembers Crane, Rodin, Duenas, Brown, and Mayor Orozco NOES: None
ABSENT: None
ABSTAIN: None
____________________________________
Juan V. Orozco, Mayor
ATTEST:
_______________________
Kristine Lawler, City Clerk
Attachment 2
CITY OF UKIAH ELECTRIC
UTILITY SECURITY PLAN
PUBLIC REPORT ON CITY OF UKIAH’S PHYSICAL
SECURITY PROGRAM FOR DISTRIBUTION-LEVEL
FACILITIES
September 2, 2026
Attachment 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................................. 4 A. GOAL OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN.................................................................................................. 4 B. DESCRIPTION OF CITY OF UKIAH ELECTRIC.................................................................................. 4 C. RESULTS OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN ASSESSEMENT ....................................................................... 4 II. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................... 5 III. PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS .......................................................................................................... 7 A. PHYSICAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES.................................................................................................... 7 B. UTILITY SECURITY PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS........................................................................ 7 STEP 1: ASSESSMENT/PLAN DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................................ 8 STEP 1A: IDENTIFY COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES...................................................................... 8 STEP 1B: PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT.................................................................................................. 8 STEP 1C: DEVELOP MITIGATION PLAN................................................................................................ 8 STEP 2: INDEPENDENT REVIEW............................................................................................................. 8 STEP 3: VALIDATION ............................................................................................................................. 9 STEP 4: ADOPTION................................................................................................................................ 9 STEP 5: MAINTENANCE......................................................................................................................... 9 STEP 6: REPEAT PROCESS ..................................................................................................................... 9 IV. IDENTIFICATION OF COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILIITES (STEP 1A)..................................................9 A. IDENTIFICATION FACTORS ........................................................................................................... 10 B. IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………………………………11 V. RISK ASSESSMENT (STEP 1B)…………………………………………………………………………….12 A. METHADOLOGY………………………………………………………………………………………….12
B. MITGATION MEASURES………………………………………………………………………………….12 C. RISK ASSESSMENT………………………………………………………………………………………....14 VI. COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITY MITIGATION PLANS (STEP 1C)………………………………….…14
VII. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND RESPONSE (STEP 2) .................................................................... 15 A. REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED THIRD PARTY REVIEW.............................................................. 16 B. IDENTIFICATION OF THIRD PARTY REVIEWER .............................................................................. 16 C. PUBLIC RESULTS OF THIRD PARTY EVALUATION.......................................................................... 16 D. CITY OF UKIAH RESPONSE............................................................................................................ 16 VIII. VALIDATION (STEP 3).......................................................................................................................... 16 A. SELECTION OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY ........................................................................................ 16 B. RESULTS OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY REVIEW ............................................................................... 16 C. City of Ukiah RESPONSE TO QUALIED AUTHORITY REIVEW....................................................... 16 IX. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS FOR UTILITY SECURITY PLAN ................................................................. 16 A. ASSET MANAGEMENT PROGRAM............................................................................................... 16 B. WORKFORCE TRAINING AND RETENTION PROGRAM .............................................................. 17 C. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PLAN.......................................................................................... 17 D. DISTRIBUTION GRID RESILIENCY………………………………………………………………………..17
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
4 I. OVERVIEW
A. GOAL OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN
Ensuring the safety of its facilities is a top priority for City of Ukiah, the City prioritizes safety in all aspects of its design, operation, and maintenance practices. The overarching goal of this Utility Security Plan is to describe Ukiah’s risk management approach toward distribution system physical security, with appropriate consideration of resiliency, impact, and cost.
The City of Ukiah recognizes the importance of securing the safety and reliability of its electric system and, therefore, City of Ukiah voluntarily participated in the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) Physical Security proceeding and has undertaken this assessment. In the spirit of continued voluntary cooperation, City of Ukiah offers the following in response to CPUC Decision 19-01-018.
B. DESCRIPTION OF CITY OF UKIAH
The City of Ukiah Electric Utility is responsible for the operation and maintenance associated with the reliable distribution of electricity to 7,800 residential and commercial customers within 4.7 square miles of service territory. The City of Ukiah’s population is estimated at 16,068. The City of Ukiah has 73 miles of distribution lines and one transmission line.
C. RESULTS OF UTILITY SECURITY PLAN ASSESSMENT
Based on the process described in D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah has determined one Covered Distribution Facility identified in Section IV. Ukiah’s existing programs and measures effectively
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
5 mitigate the risks of a physical attack for this Covered Distribution Facility, however, optional security measures have been identified for future incorporation as time and budget allow.
II. BACKGROUND
Ukiah Electric has been operating its electric system for over 100 years. The safe operation of the system has been paramount for the protection of the community.
In order to support a statewide improvement of how utilities address distribution level physical security risks, the California Municipal Utilities Association (CMUA), which is the statewide trade association for Publicly Owned Utilities (POUs), coordinated with the state’s IOUs to develop a comprehensive Straw Proposal (Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal) for a process to identify at-risk facilities and, if necessary, develop physical security mitigation plans. As a member of CMUA, City of Ukiah staff participated in the development of the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal through a CMUA working group as well as through direct meetings with the IOUs. The Joint POU/IOU Straw Proposal set out a process for the following: (1) identifying if the utility has any high priority distribution facilities; (2) evaluating the potential risks to those high priority distribution facilities; (3) for the distribution facilities where the identified risks are not effectively mitigated through existing resilience/security measures, developing a mitigation plan; (4) obtaining third party reviews of the mitigation plans; (5) adopting a document retention policy; (6) ensuring a review process established by the POU governing board; and (7) implementing information sharing protocols.
The Risk Assessment and Safety Analytics (RASA) filed a response to the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal that recommended various modifications and clarifications, including a six step process. Additionally, RASA recommended that the utility mitigation plans include: (1) an assessment of supply chain vulnerabilities; (2) training programs for law enforcement and utility staff to improve communication during physical security events; and (3) an assessment of any nearby communication utility infrastructure that supports priority distribution substations.
City of Ukiah is following the process outlined in Senate Bill (SB) 699 and issuing this report at this time to reflect its existing commitment to safety and to protecting its ratepayers’ investment by taking reasonable and cost-effective measures to safeguard key assets of its distribution system.
Article XI, Section 7 of the California Constitution provides certain Municipalities with the authority to own and operate their own utility systems and self-regulate their operations. The Electric Utility Department of the City of Ukiah is governed by the Ukiah City Council.
According to the ruling, the goal is to “establish system wide, industry standards that are aimed at addressing the potential risks and threats associated with a long term outage at a distribution facility on a statewide basis…”, “and… not designed to expand Commission (California Public Utility Commission) investigatory or penalty authority against the POUs.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
6 Ukiah’s Electric Utility Department (EUD) is a department within the City of Ukiah. For security, crime prevention, and response, the EUD is subordinate to the City of Ukiah Police Department (UPD).
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
7 III. PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
A. PHYSICAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
The Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal seeks to support the creation of a risk management approach toward distribution system physical security, with appropriate considerations of resiliency, impact, and cost. To accomplish this risk-based approach, the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal identifies several principles to guide the development of each individual utility’s program. These principles are the following:
1. Distribution systems are not subject to the same physical security risks and associated consequences, including threats of physical attack by terrorists, as the transmission system.
2. Distribution utilities will not be able to eliminate all risk of a physical attack occurring, but certain actions can be taken to reduce the risk or consequences, or both, of a significant attack.
3. A one-size fits all standard or rule will not work. Distribution utilities should have the flexibility to address physical security risks in a manner that works best for their systems and unique situations, consistent with a risk management approach.
4. Protecting the distribution system should consider both physical security protection and operational resiliency or redundancy.
5. The focus should not be on all Distribution Facilities, but only those that risk dictates would require additional measures.
6. Planning and coordination with the appropriate federal and state regulatory and law enforcement authorities will help prepare for attacks on the electrical distribution system and thereby help reduce or mitigate the potential consequences of such attacks.
B. Utility Security Plan Development Process
The major focus of this Plan is to address the risks and threats of a long-term outage to a distribution facility. Clearly, a long-term outage at any distribution facility poses numerous safety issues.
Response to and recovery from a physical security incident will be conducted in accordance with the City’s Emergency Operations Plan, applicable departmental procedures, and confidential facility-specific response protocols. Depending on the nature and consequences of the incident, the City may coordinate with affected critical facilities and operational partners, activate the Emergency Operations Center, and request mutual aid or other assistance.
The Plan describes the range of activities that the City of Ukiah Electric Utility Department is taking or considering to protect its electric distribution assets, including programs, policies, and
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
8 procedures. This Plan complies with the requirements of CPUC section 364 for POUs to prepare the first physical security plan by July 10, 2021, and every five years thereafter. The Plan will be iterative, promote continuous improvement, and represent the Utility’s best efforts to implement industry best practices in a prudent and reasonable manner.
City of Ukiah utilized a multi-step process to develop this Utility Security Plan that is consistent with the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and D.19-01-018. The relevant six steps of that process are the following:
STEP 1: ASSESSMENT/PLAN DEVELOPMENT
City of Ukiah staff and/or consultants prepare a Draft Utility Security Plan through the process set forth in Steps 1A, 1B, and 1C.
STEP 1A: IDENTIFY COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES
City of Ukiah will evaluate all distribution-level facilities in its service territory that are subject to its control to determine if any facility meets D.19-01-018’s definition of a “Covered Distribution Facility” using the seven factors identified in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal.
STEP 1B: PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT
For every individual Covered Distribution Facility identified pursuant to Step 1A, City of Ukiah will perform an evaluation of the potential risks associated with a successful physical attack on that Covered Distribution Facility, and whether existing grid resiliency, back-up generation, and/or physical security measures appropriately mitigate identified risks.
STEP 1C: DEVELOP MITIGATION PLAN
If there are any individual Covered Distribution Facilities where the Risk Assessment performed pursuant to Step 1B finds that the existing mitigation and/or resiliency measures do not effectively mitigate the identified risks, then City of Ukiah will develop a Mitigation Plan for that Covered Distribution Facility. The Mitigation Plan will use a risk-based approach to select reasonable and cost-effective measures that can either be security focused (e.g., walls or alarms) or resiliency focused (e.g., adequate spare parts).
STEP 2: INDEPENDENT REVIEW
For every Utility Security Plan cycle, City of Ukiah will document the results of the identification process, risk assessment, and Mitigation Plan development performed pursuant to Steps 1A, 1B, and 1C. This documentation in combination with narrative description in Section IX below, constitutes City of Ukiah’s Draft Utility Security Plan. Each Draft Utility Security Plan is submitted to a Qualified Third Party for Independent Review. The Qualified Third Party Reviewer will then issue an evaluation that identifies any potential deficiencies in the Draft Utility Security Plan as well as
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
9 recommendations for improvements. City of Ukiah will then modify its plan to address any identified deficiencies or recommendations, or will document the reasons why any recommendations were not adopted. The combination of the Draft Utility Security Plan, the nonconfidential conclusions of the Qualified Third-Party Reviewer, and City of Ukiah’s responses to the Qualified Third-Party Review will constitute City of Ukiah’s Utility Security Plan.
STEP 3: VALIDATION
City of Ukiah will submit its Utility Security Plan to a qualified authority for review. Such entity will provide additional feedback and evaluation of City of Ukiah’s Utility Security Plan and, to the extent that this entity is authorized, such entity deems the Utility Security Plan as adequate.
STEP 4: ADOPTION
City of Ukiah’s Utility Security Plan will be presented to and adopted by City of Ukiah’s City Council at a public meeting.
STEP 5: MAINTENANCE
City of Ukiah will refine and update the Utility Security Plan as appropriate and as necessary to preserve plan integrity.
STEP 6: REPEAT PROCESS
1. The City of Ukiah will repeat this six-step process at least once every five years.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILIITES (STEP 1A) As described in Section III, Step 1A of the Utility Security Plan process involves assessing all distribution-level facilities that are subject to the control of City of Ukiah Electric Utility to determine which facilities are “Covered Distribution Facilities” subject to the need for a risk assessment. This Section describes the factors that City of Ukiah used to evaluate its distribution facilities and the results of its evaluation.
A. IDENTIFICATION FACTORS
The Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal defines seven screening factors to determine if a facility is a “Covered Distribution Facility.” Some factors require additional definitions and/or clarifications in order to be applied to City of Ukiah’s facilities. The following Table provides the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal’s Factors as modified/clarified by City of Ukiah.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
10 Factor Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal Description Additional Clarification 1 Distribution Facility necessary for crank path,
black start or capability essential to the
restoration of regional electricity service
that are not subject to the California
Independent System Operator’s (CAISO)
operational control and/or subject to North
American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) Reliability Standard CIP-014-2 or its
successors
No additional clarification.
2 Distribution Facility that is the primary source
of electrical service to a military installation
essential to national security and/or
emergency response services (may include
certain airfields, command centers,
weapons stations, emergency supply
depots)
Only sites essential to national security
or emergency responses (for example,
would exclude recruiting offices)
3 Distribution Facility that serves installations
necessary for the provision of regional
drinking water supplies and wastewater
services (may include certain aqueducts,
well fields, groundwater pumps, and
treatment plants)
No additional clarification.
4 Distribution Facility that serves a regional
public safety establishment (may include
County Emergency Operations Centers;
county sheriff’s department and major city
police department headquarters; major
state and county fire service headquarters;
county jails and state and federal prisons;
and 911 dispatch centers)
City of Ukiah defines “regional public
safety establishment” as any of the
following: (1) Headquarters of a major
police or fire department serving 1.5
million population with at least 1,000
sworn officers; (2) County Sheriff’s
Department Headquarters; (3) County
Emergency Operations Center; (4)
County/State Fire headquarters; (5) a
California State Prison; (6) a United
States Penitentiary; (7) a Federal
Correctional Institute; or (8) a 911
dispatch center.
5 Distribution Facility that serves a major
transportation facility (may include
International Airport, Mega Seaport, other
air traffic control center, and international
border crossing)
No additional clarification.
6 Distribution Facility that serves as a Level 1
Trauma Center as designated by the Office
of Statewide Health Planning and
Development
No additional clarification.
7 Distribution Facility that serves over 60,000
meters
No additional clarification.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
11 B. IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS
In performing this identification analysis, Ukiah is assessing all distribution level facilities that are subject to its exclusive control. The specific types of facilities include substations, and critical distribution facilities.
The following table summarizes the results of City of Ukiah’s identification analysis.
V. RISK ASSESSMENT (STEP 1B)
A. METHODOLOGY
Pursuant to the process identified in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah will assess the potential risks associated with a successful physical attack on each of the Covered Distribution Facilities identified in Section IV above. For purpose of this analysis, a physical attack is limited to the following: (1) theft; (2) vandalism; and (3) discharge of a firearm.
A “successful physical attack” is limited to circumstances where a theft, vandalism, and/or the discharge of a firearm has directly led to the failure of any elements of the Covered Distribution Facility that are necessary to provide uninterrupted service to the specific load identified in Section IV.
In order to perform this risk analysis, City of Ukiah evaluates the relative risk that (1) a physical attack on a Covered Distribution Facility will be successful considering the protective measures in place; or (2) that the impacts of a successful attack will be mitigated due to resiliency and other measures in place.
B. MITIGATION MEASURES
D.19-01-018 identifies the specific mitigation measures that a utility should consider when performing this risk analysis. The following table lists these mitigation measures and provides City
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
12 of Ukiah’s additional clarifications that are necessary to apply these measures to the City of Ukiah’s territory.
Measure D.19-01-018 Description Additional Clarification 1 The existing system resiliency and/or
redundancy solutions (e.g., switching the
load to another substation or circuit
capable of serving the load, temporary
circuit ties, mobile generation and/or
storage solutions).
No additional clarification.
2 The availability of spare assets to restore a
particular load.
No additional clarification.
3 The existing physical security protections to
reasonably address the risk.
No additional clarification.
4 The potential for emergency responders to
identify and respond to an attack in a
timely manner.
Each facility is evaluated based on
the likelihood that a law enforcement
officer would generally be able to
arrive at the Covered Distribution
Facility within 15 minutes of a report
from the public of a break-in or
attack, or of Ukiah notifying the law
enforcement agency of triggering of
an alarm at the facility.
5 Location and physical surroundings,
including proximity to gas pipelines and
geographical challenges, and impacts of
weather.
Ukiah evaluated this element based
on the proximity to gas pipe lines and
the extent to which the interior of the
facility is shielded from view and
access due to walls, vegetation, or
other physical obstructions.
6 History of criminal activity at the Distribution
Facility and in the area.
No additional clarification.
7 The availability of other sources of energy
to serve the load (e.g., customer owned
back-up generation or storage solutions).
No additional clarification.
8 The availability of alternative ways to meet
the health, safety, or security.
No additional clarification.
9 Requirements served by the load (e.g.,
back up command center or water
storage facility).
No additional clarification.
While Ukiah’s covered facility has adequate physical security and resilience, there are additional technologies that could be used to increase situational awareness by both the utility and law enforcement. These enhancements have been identified and are included in the utility’s operational budget.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
13 The CPUC Ruling 19-01-018 identified four strategies where this plan, in conjunction with other City plans, the 5-Year Capital Improvement Plan, and operational budget will enhance the City’s physical security measures:
1. Response Time – Measures to improve the potential for emergency responders to identify and respond to an attack in a timely manner;
2. Deterrent – Measures to discourage unauthorized breach of the facility;
3. Access – Fences, gates, barriers, or other security devices; and
4. Coordination – Measures to collaborate with law enforcement.
These strategies and technologies, combined with enhanced situational awareness, improved planning, and coordination with Ukiah Police Department provide a high level of security for Ukiah’s distribution assets.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
14 C. RISK ASSESSMENT
Based on the process described in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and the direction provided in D.19-01-018, the City of Ukiah has determined that the risks of a physical attack for the Covered Distribution Facility identified in Section IV are effectively mitigated , however, additional technologies could provide additional layers of security.
Approved security or resiliency improvements will be incorporated into the Utility’s capital improvement plan or operating budget, as appropriate. The Utility will maintain an internal implementation. Facility-specific details will be maintained confidentially as appropriate.
The following table provides a summary of Ukiah’s assessment of each mitigation measure for each Covered Distribution Facility.
As identified above, the Covered Distribution Facility has existing measures sufficient to effectively mitigate the identified risks of a physical attack.
In addition to physical security measures, the distribution system has flexibility and redundancy built into it through field devices. The Utility is able to feed critical loads from different feeders and different transformers.
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
15 VI. COVERED DISTRIBUTION FACILITY MITIGATION PLANS (STEP 1C) Pursuant to the process identified in the Joint IOU/POU Straw Proposal and D.19-01-018, City of Ukiah has determined that for the Covered Distribution Facilities subject to Ukiah’s control, the existing mitigation measures sufficiently reduce the risk of a physical security attack. • Existing resiliency
• Spare assets
• Existing physical security
• Prompt emergency response
• Location
• Criminal history
• Backup generation
• Alternate solutions
VII. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND RESPONSE (STEP 2)
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED THIRD-PARTY REVIEW
D.19-01-018 specifies the following criteria for a Qualified Third Party Reviewer:
Independence: A Qualified Third-Party Reviewer cannot be a division of the City of Ukiah Electric Utility. A governmental entity can select as the third-party reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision, so long as the entity has the appropriate expertise, and is not a division of the City of Ukiah that operates as a functional unit, i.e., a municipality could use its police department as its third-party reviewer if it has the appropriate expertise.
Adequate Qualifications: A Qualified Third-Party Reviewer shall be an entity other than the Operator with appropriate expertise. A governmental entity can select as the thirdparty reviewer another governmental entity within the same political subdivision, so long as the entity has the appropriate expertise, and is not a division of the Operator that operates as a functional unit, i.e., a municipality could use its police department as its third-party review if it has the appropriate expertise.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THIRD-PARTY REVIEWER
City of Ukiah has selected as its Third-Party Reviewer Tom Corning, City of Ukiah Police Chief as well as Operations or Emergency Management (OEM) Senior Analyst, Traci Boyl.
C. PUBLIC RESULTS OF THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
16 As third-party independent reviewer, the Ukiah Police Department and OEM concur with the conclusions of Ukiah’s Electric Utility that there is one distribution asset that is covered under the seven factors identified in Section IV. A. of the City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan.
D. CITY OF UKIAH RESPONSE
Given the conclusions of the third-party evaluator, two additions were recommended and added as a result of this review, one detailing compliance and reference to the City's Emergency Operations Plan and one identifying funding sources.
VIII. VALIDATION (STEP 3)
A. SELECTION OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY
The City of Ukiah Electric Utility has determined that Tom Corning, Police Chief, City of Ukiah and Traci Boyl, Senior Management Analyst have sufficient familiarity with asset protection and emergency response in order to serve as the “qualified authorities” for the review of City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan.
B. RESULTS OF QUALIFIED AUTHORITY REVIEW
On August 20, 2026, City of Ukiah Electric Utility submitted its draft Utility Security Plan to Tom Corning, Police Chief and Traci Boyl, Senior Management Analyst for review. The scope their review is to assess the overall adequacy of the plan, based on the reviewer’s expertise. In this review, neither Chief Corning nor Traci Boyl make any claims regarding the compliance of City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan with any specific requirement or standard. Further, neither reviewer makes any claim regarding City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan’s conformance to D.19-01-018 or any other CPUC standards. Finally, their review is limited to the information contained within City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan and Chief Corning and Traci Boyl have not performed any additional audits of any identified facilities or reviewed any documents outside of the information directly included within the Utility Security Plan.
C. CITY OF UKIAH RESPONSE TO QUALIED AUTHORITY REIVEW
Based on this review, Chief Corning and Traci Boyl deem the City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan adequate and recommends that the City Council adopt the City of Ukiah Electric’s Utility Security Plan.
IX. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS FOR UTILITY SECURITY PLAN
A. ASSET MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Security Plan
September 2, 2026
17 The City of Ukiah’s Covered Facility is designed with “in-service” redundancy, therefore, every system having backup that can quickly accept the lost load, with a few limitations. In addition, critical spare parts are maintained for repairs.
Based on history, this has proven to be an effective strategy for City of Ukiah.
For some of the other distribution system components, City of Ukiah does maintain spare parts and equipment to allow for repairs and replacement of failed equipment that is critical to meeting customer electricity demands. Currently, City of Ukiah’s asset management strategy is being developed.
B. WORKFORCE TRAINING AND RETENTION PROGRAM
The City of Ukiah provides lineman and technician training as necessary for job duties. The training is selected based on employee skill level and department needs with special emphasis on all work duties.
C. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PLAN
The City of Ukiah has a documented preventative maintenance program. For the distribution assets, preventative maintenance includes annual inspections and condition-based maintenance.
In addition, the City of Ukiah Electric Utility performs weekly substation inspections and the entire distribution system is visually inspected annually and Infra-Red (IR) inspections are performed periodically. Asset condition inspection intervals are based upon manufacturer recommendations.
A. DISTRIBUTION GRID RESILIENCY
All of Ukiah’s Covered Facility system components can be taken out of service individually or as a subsystem without interrupting power to Ukiah customers. During maintenance periods to ensure that the customer load is not interrupted, the distribution system has numerous inter-ties that support maintenance clearance and redundancy in serving distribution load. In addition, to minimize the duration of outages, City of Ukiah maintains a complete inventory of materials to respond to emergencies within our distribution system.
Attachment 4
RESOLUTION NO. 2026-
RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF UKIAH, ADOPTING THE CITY OF UKIAH ELECTRIC UTILITY’S PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN
WHEREAS: California Senate Bill (SB) 699 requires the State’s electric utilities to develop and submit physical security plans to safeguard their electrical distribution systems from intentional threats; and
WHEREAS: the City of Ukiah’s Electric Utility has completed its required five-year program review and update of the Electric Utility Physical Security Plan, pursuant to SB 699 and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision 19-01-018; and WHEREAS: the program review and associated update of Ukiah’s Electric Utility Physical Security Plan confirms that the Utility’s approach to physical security remains effective, aligned with statewide requirements, and focused on the continued security and resilience of utility infrastructure.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council of the City of Ukiah approves the Utility’s 2026 updated Physical Security Plan in accordance with CPUC Decision 19-01-018.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the City Council of the City of Ukiah finds that the Ukiah Utility Electric Physical Security Plan contains sensitive information regarding the security of critical electric infrastructure, including vulnerabilities, physical security measures, and other security sensitive information. Public disclosure of the Ukiah Electric Physical Security Plan could compromise the security of the City’s electric utility facilities and infrastructure.
Accordingly, the Ukiah Electric Physical Security Plan is exempt from public disclosure to the extent permitted by the California Pubic Records Act, including, Government Code § 7929.200.
PASSED AND ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the City Council of the City of Ukiah on the 2nd day of September 2026, by the following roll call vote:
AYES:
NOES:
ABSENT:
ABSTAIN:
______________________________
Susan Sher, Mayor
ATTEST:
_____________________________
Araceli Sandoval, Deputy City Clerk